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                       HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR
                           AND ITS ORIGIN.




                       HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR

                           AND ITS ORIGIN.


                                  BY
                         FRANCES E. COLENSO.


       ASSISTED IN THOSE PORTIONS OF THE WORK WHICH TOUCH UPON
                           MILITARY MATTERS

                                  BY
                   LIEUT.-COLONEL EDWARD DURNFORD.


                               London:
             CHAPMAN AND HALL, LIMITED, 193, PICCADILLY.
                                1880.

                        _All Rights reserved._




                      CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS,
                        CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS.




PREFACE.


It is probable that the Bishop of Natal may be held responsible
for the contents of a volume written partly by his daughter, and
having for its subject the Zulu War; more especially if a general
coincidence can be traced between what are known to be his views
and those which are expressed in this history. My father’s opinions
have, naturally, considerable influence over those held or expressed
by his family, and I do not imagine that much will be found in these
pages from which he will dissent. Nevertheless, it is desirable that
my readers should understand from the first that he is in no sense
responsible for their contents.

When I left Natal, in September last, the idea of writing upon the
subject of the Zulu War had hardly occurred to me; it has developed
since to an extent quite beyond my original intentions, and I find
that its fulfilment has rather taken my father by surprise. I had no
opportunity of consulting him upon the subject, nor has he yet seen a
word of what I have written, for on reaching England I found that, to
be of any use at all, the book should appear almost at once.

I made, indeed, ample use of the pamphlets which the Bishop of Natal
has written on behalf of Langalibalele and Cetshwayo, which have
saved me many hours of weary search. Consequently, while the Bishop
is in no way responsible for such errors or omissions as may occur in
this volume, any merit or usefulness which my portion of the book
may contain is due chiefly to his labours.

The general plan of my history was laid out, and the first
few chapters were written, during the voyage from Natal, and
upon reaching England I obtained the assistance of my friend
Lieut.-Colonel Edward Durnford in that portion of the work which
deals with the military conduct of the war. While it was desirable
that a record of military events should be made by one whose
professional knowledge qualified him for the duty, there was an
additional reason which made his help appropriate. It may easily
be understood from his name that the interest taken by him in his
task would be of no ordinary kind. Colonel Durnford has written
the military portions of the book, but is not responsible for any
expressions of opinion upon matters strictly political.

I am far from feeling that I am the best person to undertake such a
work as this, which my father himself would look upon as a serious
one, and which he, or even my sister, who has worked with him
throughout, would do so much better than I; but they were not at
hand, and I have thought it my duty to do what I could, while I could
have had no better aid than that given me by Colonel Durnford.

However insufficient the result may prove, we shall at least hope
that our work may give some slight assistance to that cause of
justice, truth, and mercy, the maintenance of which alone can ensure
the true honour of the British name.

                                                FRANCES ELLEN COLENSO.

  _January 22nd, 1880._




CONTENTS.


  CHAPTER I.
                                                           PAGE
  FIRST CAUSES                                                1


  CHAPTER II.

  LANGALIBALELE                                              20


  CHAPTER III.

  TRIAL OF LANGALIBALELE                                     38


  CHAPTER IV.

  THE BISHOP’S DEFENCE                                       51


  CHAPTER V.

  THE PUTINI TRIBE                                           63


  CHAPTER VI.

  SIR GARNET WOLSELEY: WHAT HE CAME FOR, WHAT HE DID,
      AND WHAT HE DID NOT DO                                 78


  CHAPTER VII.

  THE MATSHANA INQUIRY AND COLONEL COLLEY                    89


  CHAPTER VIII.

  THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL                           112


  CHAPTER IX.

  THE DISPUTED TERRITORY                                    138


  CHAPTER X.

  THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION                                   163


  CHAPTER XI.

  SIHAYO, UMBILINI, AND THE MISSIONARIES IN ZULULAND        192


  CHAPTER XII.

  THE ULTIMATUM, DECLARATION OF WAR, AND COMMENCEMENT OF
      CAMPAIGN                                              235


  CHAPTER XIII.

  ISANDHLWANA                                               273


  CHAPTER XIV.

  RORKE’S DRIFT—HELPMAKAAR—COURT OF INQUIRY, ETC.           302


  CHAPTER XV.

  THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SIKUKUNI                             325


  CHAPTER XVI.

  NO. 4 COLUMN—INTOMBI—INDHLOBANE—KAMBULA—KING’S
      MESSENGERS                                            344


  CHAPTER XVII.

  THE LOWER TUGELA—INYEZANE—ETSHOWE                         368


  CHAPTER XVIII.

  NGINGINDHLOVU—RELIEF OF ETSHOWE—BORDER RAIDING            380


  CHAPTER XIX.

  REINFORCEMENTS—ISANDHLWANA REVISITED                      394


  CHAPTER XX.

  THE PRINCE IMPERIAL                                       418


  CHAPTER XXI.

  ULUNDI                                                    433


  CHAPTER XXII.

  SIR GARNET WOLSELEY—CAPTURE OF CETSHWAYO                  453


  CONCLUSION                                                475




THE ZULU WAR.




CHAPTER I.

FIRST CAUSES.


England’s collisions with the savage races bordering upon her
colonies have in all probability usually been brought about by the
exigencies of the moment, by border-troubles, and acts of violence
and insolence on the part of the savages, and from the absolute
necessity of protecting a small and trembling white population from
their assaults.

No such causes as these have led up to the war of 1879. For more
than twenty years the Zulus and the colonists of Natal have lived
side by side in perfect peace and quietness. The tranquillity of
our border had been a matter of pride as compared to the disturbed
and uncertain boundaries between Zululand and the Transvaal. The
mere fact of the utterly unprotected condition of the frontier
farmers on _our_ border, and the entire absence of anything like
precaution, evinced by the common practice of building houses of the
most combustible description, is a proof that the colonists felt
no real alarm concerning the Zulus until the idea was suggested to
them by those in authority over them.[1] The only interruption to
this tranquil condition of the public mind about the Zulus was in the
year 1861, when a scare took place in the colony, for which, as it
afterwards proved, there were no grounds whatsoever. A general but
unfounded belief was rife that Cetshwayo,[2] king, or rather at that
time prince, ruling Zululand, was about to invade Natal, in order to
obtain possession of his young brother Umkungo, a claimant of the
Zulu crown, and who had escaped over the border at the time of the
great civil war of which we shall presently treat. This young prince
had been placed—by the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone—at
Bishopstowe,[3] for his education in the Native Boys’ School there;
and it was not until he had been there for years that the fancy
arose, suggested and fostered by the border farmers and traders in
Zululand, that Cetshwayo intended to take him by force from amongst
us, or at all events to make the attempt.

Under the influence of this belief the troops then stationed in
Natal were ordered to the frontier, the colonial volunteers were
called out, the defence of the principal towns became a matter for
consideration; while outlying farmers, and residents in the country,
hastened to remove their families to places of comparative safety.

Bishopstowe was supposed to be the special object of the expected
attack; but the Bishop himself, having occasional opportunities of
learning the state of things in Zululand, through his missionary
there, could never be brought thoroughly to believe in the gravity
of the danger. It is true that, as a matter of precaution, and in
deference to the strongly-expressed opinion of the Lieut.-Governor
of the Colony and of Mr. Shepstone, he sent away the threatened boy
to some of his own people, in a more remote and safer part of the
colony. But he was extremely reluctant to take the further step,
strongly urged upon him, of removing his family and people to the
adjacent city of Pietermaritzburg, and only consented to do so
under protest. During the night following his consent, but before
the project had been carried out, he had reason for a few hours to
suppose that he had been mistaken in his own judgment. The family
at Bishopstowe was knocked up at one o’clock in the morning by a
messenger from a passing Dutch farmer, who, on his way into town with
his own family, had sent word to the Bishop that Cetshwayo’s army had
entered the colony, was already between him and Table Mountain—that
is to say within a distance of nine miles—and was burning, killing,
and destroying all upon the way to Bishopstowe. There seemed to be no
doubt of the fact; so, hastily collecting their native villagers,[4]
the Colensos left their homes and started for the town, which they
reached, most of them on foot, about daybreak. The consequence of
their being accompanied and followed by a considerable party of
natives (of both sexes and all ages!) was that the townspeople
immediately supposed that the “Zulus had come;” and some of them
actually left their houses, and took refuge in the various places of
safety—such as the fort, the principal churches, and so on—previously
decided upon by the authorities in case of necessity. In common South
African terms they “went into laager.”

As the day passed, and still no further tidings arrived of the
approach of the Zulus or the destruction of Bishopstowe, the Bishop
began to have strong suspicions that, after all, he had been right in
his original opinion, and that “the killing, burning, and destroying”
had been conjured up by some excited imagination. This opinion was
confirmed, if not completely established, in the course of the day,
by the reception of a letter from the missionary in Zululand before
mentioned, in which he inquired, on the Zulu king’s behalf, what
fault the latter had committed towards the English, that they should
be preparing to invade his country. The missionary added that all
was perfectly quiet in Zululand, until the border tribes, seeing
the British troops approaching, fled inland in alarm, killing their
cattle to prevent their falling into the hands of the invaders, and
burying their other possessions where they could not carry them
away. In point of fact the “scare” had no foundation whatsoever, and
the Zulus were quite as much alarmed by the actual approach of the
British troops as the Natalians had been by the imaginary Zulu army.
The worst immediate consequence of the mistake was the want, almost
amounting to famine, produced amongst the border Zulus by the loss of
their cattle. A later and more serious result has been that general
impression, which has long obtained credence at home in England,
that the colonists of Natal have not only been in fear of their
lives on account of the Zulus for many years, but have also had good
and sufficient reason for their alarm. But for this fixed, though
groundless idea, England would hardly have been in such a hurry to
send out additional troops for the protection of the colony as she
was in the summer of 1878; to her own great loss and to the very
considerable injury of the colony itself, not to speak of its unhappy
neighbours and heretofore friends the Zulus.

It is certainly true that during the year 1878 the inhabitants of
Natal did honestly feel great fear of the Zulus, and of a possible
invasion of the colony by them, the alarm in many cases amounting
to absolute panic. But this feeling was produced by no warlike
menaces from our neighbours, no sinister appearances on our borders.
The panic—or “scare,” as it would popularly be called in Natal—was
forced upon the people by the conduct and language of their rulers,
by the preparations made for war, troops being sent for from England
“for defensive purposes” (as was so repeatedly asserted by both Sir
Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford, then Lieut.-General the Hon. F.
A. Thesiger), and by the perpetual agitation of the local newspaper
editors.

It is true indeed that a certain section of the colonists eagerly
desired war. To some the presence of the troops was a source of
actual fortune, to others the freedom and independence of so large
a body of black people, whom they could neither tax nor force to
work for them, was, and had long been, odious; the revenue to be
derived from a hut-tax levied upon the Zulus, and the cheap labour
to be obtained when their power and independence should be broken,
formed one of the chief subjects for speculation when the war was
first suggested. To others, again, the prospect of war was simply a
source of pleasurable excitement, a hunt on a large scale, martial
glory to be won, with just spice enough of danger to give zest to the
affair; as had been the case in the war just concluded in Kaffraria.
Naturally this feeling was commonest amongst the volunteers and
their friends. Some of them looked upon the matter in a light which
would meet with utter condemnation in any civilised society; but
many others, especially the young lads who filled up the ranks of
the volunteer corps, were simply dazzled by visions of military
distinction, excited by the popular phrases in perpetual use about
“fighting for their country, and doing their duty as soldiers,” to
the extent of losing sight altogether of the question as to whether
or no their country really required any defence at all.

Natal cannot honestly claim to be guiltless in bringing about the
war with the Zulus, and will hardly deny that in 1878 the prospect
was a most popular one amongst her sons. Perhaps Sir Bartle Frere
could not so easily have produced a war out of the materials which
he had at hand but for the assistance given him by the popular cry
in the colony, and the general fear of the Zulus, which called forth
England’s ready sympathy and assistance. But it must be remembered
that the panic was not a genuine one, nor even one like that of 1861,
produced by the folly of the people themselves. It was distinctly
imposed upon them by those in authority, whose policy was to bring
about a collision with the Zulus, and who then made use of the very
fears which they had themselves aroused for the furtherance of their
own purpose.

The subjugation of the Zulus and the annexation of their country,
formed part of a policy which has occupied the minds of certain
British statesmen for many years. The ambition of creating a South
African Empire, to be another jewel in Victoria’s crown, which, if
no rival, should at least be a worthy pendant to the great Indian
Empire, was a dazzling one, and towards that object all Government
action in South Africa has apparently tended since the year 1873.
When the idea was first conceived those only know who formed it, but
it took practical and visible form in 1873. In that year by crowning
the Zulu king we assumed a right to interfere in the internal
management of the country, thereby establishing a possible future
cause of offence, which, as the Zulus obstinately refused to put
themselves in the wrong by any sort of interference with us, was
necessary in order to bring about a state of things which should
eventually give us a sufficient excuse for taking possession of the
country altogether.

The origin of this performance was as follows. In the year 1856 a
great revolution took place in Zululand, and a civil war broke out
between two claimants to the heirship of the throne (then filled
by Umpande), namely, the present king, Cetshwayo, and his brother
Umbulazi. Cetshwayo was quite young at the time, and appears to have
been put forward by some ambitious warriors, who intended to rule in
his name, and did not expect the remarkable power and talent which he
afterwards developed.

Umbulazi’s party was beaten, he himself being killed in battle, great
carnage ensuing, and many fugitives escaping into Natal.

Amidst all the bloodshed and horror which naturally attends such
a warfare as this between savages, there stands out the singular,
perhaps unprecedented, fact that Cetshwayo, although victorious to
the extent of carrying the nation with him, not only never made any
attempt upon the old king, his father’s, life, but did not even
depose him or seize his throne. The old man lived and—nominally,
at all events—reigned for many years, though, owing to his age and
obesity, which was so great as to prevent his walking, he seems to
have been willing enough to leave the real authority in the hands of
his son, while retaining the semblance of it himself. He was treated
with all due respect by Cetshwayo and his followers until he died a
natural death in the year 1872, when Cetshwayo ascended the throne
which had long been virtually his own, and was proclaimed king of
Zululand. This was looked upon as a fitting time for a little display
of authority by ourselves, hence the friendly expedition to Zululand
of 1873, when we gave Cetshwayo to understand that, however it might
appear to him, he held his power from us, and was no true king till
we made him such. It was also rightly thought to be an opportunity
for suggesting to the Zulu king such reforms in the government of
his country as would naturally commend themselves to English ideas.
We considered, and with some reason, that capital punishment was an
over-frequent occurrence in Zululand, and that, on the other hand,
judicial trials before sentence should be the universal rule. It was
also desirable, if possible, to decrease the belief in witchcraft,
by which so much power was left in the hands of the witch-doctors
or priests;[5] and finally it was thought necessary to provide for
the safety of the missionaries resident in the land.[6] How far this
was a desirable step depends entirely on whether the men themselves
were earnest, self-sacrificing, peace-loving teachers of the gospel
of Christ, or mere traders for their own benefit, under the cloak
of a divine mission, ready to hail a bloody war. “Only the utter
destruction of the Zulus can secure future peace in South Africa ...
we have the approbation of God, our Queen, and our own conscience.”
(See letter from a missionary clergyman to Sir Bartle Frere,[7] dated
December 17th, 1878. (P. P. [C. 2316] p. 3.))

It was frequently asserted at the time in Natal that this coronation
ceremony (1st September, 1873) was nothing better than a farce,
and the way in which it was carried out seems hardly to have been
understood by the king himself. The Natalians were puzzled as to what
could be the meaning or intention of what seemed to them a hollow
show, and were on the whole rather inclined to put it down to Mr.
Shepstone’s supposed habit of “petting the natives,” and to “Exeter
Hall influences,” resulting in a ridiculous fuss on their behalf.

From Mr. Shepstone’s despatch on the subject of the coronation of
Cetshwayo (P. P. [C. 1137]), and from messages brought from the
latter to the Government of Natal after his father’s death, there
appears to have been a strong desire on the part, not only of the
people, but of the king himself, that his formal succession to the
throne should be unattended by bloodshed and disorder, such as had
ushered in the rule of his predecessors for several generations.
How greatly the character of the Zulu rule had improved in a
comparatively short period may be judged by a comparison of the fact
[p. 5, _ibid._] (mentioned by Mr. Shepstone), that during the reigns
of Chaka and Dingana (grandfather and great-uncle to Cetshwayo), all
the royal wives were put to death either before the birth of their
children, or with their infants afterwards, with the behaviour of
Cetshwayo, both to his father and to his father’s wives.[8] And Mr.
Shepstone himself speaks of Cetshwayo on the occasion of this visit
in the following manner:—“Cetywayo is a man of considerable ability,
much force of character, and has a dignified manner; in all my
conversations with him,” the Secretary for Native Affairs continues,
“he was remarkably frank and straightforward, and he ranks in every
respect far above any native chief I have ever had to do with.”
Throughout the despatch, indeed, Mr. Shepstone repeatedly speaks of
the king’s “frankness” and “sagacity,” in direct opposition to the
charges of craft and duplicity so recklessly brought against the
latter of late.

King Umpande died in October, 1872, having reigned nearly
thirty-three years, and on the 26th February, 1873, messengers from
Cetshwayo brought the news of his father’s death to the Governor
of Natal, requesting at the same time that Mr. Shepstone might be
sent to instal Cetshwayo as his successor,[9] in order that the
Zulu nation should be “more one with the government of Natal,”
and be “covered by the same mantle.” The message ended with the
request which Cetshwayo never lost an opportunity of making, that we
would protect his country from Boer aggressions.[10] “We are also
commissioned,” say the messengers, “to urge, _what has already been
urged so frequently_, that the government of Natal be extended so as
to intervene between the Zulus and the territory of the Transvaal
Republic.”

The mere fact that this proposition was frequently and earnestly
pressed upon the Natal Government by the Zulus, is in itself a proof
positive that the aggressions were not on their side. They desired
to place what they looked upon as an impassable barrier between the
two countries, and could therefore have had no wish themselves to
encroach.

Further messages passed between Cetshwayo and the Natal Government
upon the subject, until it was finally arranged that the coronation
should be performed by Mr. Shepstone, in Zululand, and, with a party
of volunteers as escort, he crossed the Tugela on the 8th August,
1873, accompanied by Major Durnford, R.E., Captain Boyes, 75th
Regiment, and several other officers and gentlemen.

Mr. Shepstone’s long despatch, already quoted from, and in which
he describes, with true native minuteness, the most trivial
circumstances of the journey, and subsequent proceedings, gives the
impression that he looked upon his mission as a service of danger to
all concerned. It was, however, carried out without any break in the
friendly relations between the Zulus and his party, who returned to
Pietermaritzburg “without unpleasant incident” on the 19th September.

The coronation mission was carried out—how far _successfully_
entirely depends upon the results expected or desired by those
in command. The king himself, while looking upon the fact of his
recognition as sovereign of Zululand by the English as important,
is quite keen enough to have detected certain elements of absurdity
in the proceedings by which they invested him with his dignity.
There was perhaps a little good-humoured scorn in his reception of
the somewhat oddly-chosen presents and marks of honour offered him.
Without losing that respect for and faith in the English which has
always characterised his dealings with them, he felt impatiently
that they were rather making a fool of him; especially when they
put upon his shoulders a little scarlet mantle—formerly a lady’s
opera-cloak—the curtailed dimensions of which made him ridiculous
in his own eyes; and upon his head a pasteboard, cloth, and tinsel
crown, whose worthlessness he was perfectly capable of comprehending.
Mr. Shepstone’s despatch represents him as greatly impressed by the
ceremony, etc.; but the impression on the minds of many observers
was that he put up with much which both seemed and was trifling and
ridiculous, for the sake of the solid benefits which he hoped he and
his people would derive from a closer connection with the English.

The portion of Mr. Shepstone’s despatch, however, which it is
important that we should study with attention is that which refers to
the “coronation promises” (so called) of Cetshwayo, and treats of the
political subjects discussed between king and kingmaker.

Sir Bartle Frere repeatedly speaks of the transaction as “a solemn
act by the king, undertaken as the price of British support and
recognition;” of Cetshwayo as having “openly violated his coronation
promises;” of his “undoubted promises;” while Sir Garnet Wolseley,
in his speech to the assembled chiefs and people of the Zulu nation,
speaks of the coronation promises as though the want of attention
to them had been the chief, if not the only, cause of the king’s
misfortunes; and the same tone is taken in all late despatches on the
subject.

And now let us turn to Mr. Shepstone’s own report, prepared at the
time, and see whether we gather from it the impression that the
conditions of his treaty with Cetshwayo were thought of, or intended
by him, to stand as solemn and binding promises, of which the
infraction, or delay in carrying out, would render the king and his
people liable to punishment at our hands. After giving his reasons
for objecting to “formal or written” treaties with savages,[11] Mr.
Shepstone himself remarks, “Ours is an elastic arrangement.” This
is a singularly candid confession, of the truth of which there can
be little doubt. Whether such a term _should_ be applicable to the
treaties made by an English Government is quite another question, to
which we will leave the English public to find an answer. We have,
however, but to quote from Mr. Shepstone’s own despatch to prove the
convenient “elasticity” of his propositions, and how greatly they
have been magnified of late in seeking a quarrel against the Zulu
king. At p. 16 of the report, after enumerating the “arrangements
and laws” proposed by him, and heartily approved by the Zulus, Mr.
Shepstone remarks: “Although all this was fully, and even vehemently,
assented to, it cannot be expected that the amelioration described
will immediately take effect. To have got such principles admitted
and declared to be what a Zulu may plead when oppressed, was but
sowing the seed, which will still take many years to grow and
mature.” And at p. 17 he says: “I told the king that I well knew the
difficulties of his position, and that he could overcome them only
by moderation and prudence and justice, but without these they would
certainly overcome him.” And again (p. 18, par. 82) he explains that
when he left Natal he had looked upon the “charge” which he knew that
he would be expected to deliver to Cetshwayo on his installation, as
something in the nature of an ordination sermon, or bishop’s charge
to candidates for confirmation, likely to influence only in so far
as the consciences of those addressed might respond, etc.; but that,
on entering Zululand, he found that the people thought so much of
this part of the duty he had undertaken that he felt himself to have
“become clothed with the power of fundamental legislation,” and
thought it right to take advantage of the opportunity for introducing
improvements in the government of the people. “I have already
described my success,” he continues, “and I attribute it to the
sagacity of Cetywayo.”

But in all this there is no mention of “solemn promises,” to break
which would be an insult to the majesty of England, and an excuse
for war; nor is there, from beginning to end of the despatch, any
token that Mr. Shepstone looked upon them in that light, or had any
immediate expectation of proving the usefulness of his “elastic”
arrangement.

In describing his interviews and political discussions with the Zulu
king, Mr. Shepstone speaks repeatedly in high praise of the ability
and behaviour of the former. He says in one place: “Cetywayo received
us cordially as before.... Major Durnford and my son, with the Natal
Native Indunas, sat down with me to an interview with Cetywayo and
the councillors, that lasted for five hours without intermission. It
was of the most interesting and earnest kind, and was conducted with
great ability and frankness by Cetywayo. Theoretically, my business
was with the councillors who represented the nation; but, had it not
been for the straightforward manner in which Cetywayo insisted upon
their going direct to the point, it would have been impossible to
have got through the serious subjects we were bound to decide in the
time we did.”

Of the points discussed in this way the most important was that
which, a little later, led directly up to the Zulu War—namely, the
aggressions of the Transvaal Boers and the disputed boundary between
them and the Zulus. “The whole of the afternoon,” says Mr. Shepstone,
“was occupied with this subject, about which he occasionally grew
very earnest, and declared that he and every Zulu would die rather
than submit to them—viz. the Boer encroachments. He reproached the
Government of Natal for not having taken up the Zulu cause, and
for not even having troubled themselves to examine whether their
statements were true or not, while they treated them as if without
foundation.”

In fact, on this, as on every other occasion, the Zulu king lost no
opportunity of protesting against the encroachments of the Boers,
lest his peaceable conduct towards these latter, maintained in
deference to the wishes of the Natal Government, should be brought
up against him later as a proof of their rights. Whatever may have
been the intentions and opinions of Mr. Shepstone on the subject of
the “coronation promises,” he left Cetshwayo unfettered in his own
opinion, having merely received certain advice as to the government
of his people from his respected friends the English, to whose wishes
he should certainly give full attention, and whose counsel he would
carry out as far as was, in his opinion, wise or feasible. As already
stated, the principal item of the English advice related to capital
punishment, which we, with some justice, considered a too frequent
occurrence in Zululand, especially in cases of supposed witchcraft,
this superstition being undoubtedly the bane of the country.

But in judging of the king’s acts in this respect, it should be
remembered that, to rule a nation without any assistance in the form
of gaols or fetters, capital punishment must needs be resorted to
rather more frequently than in our own country, where, indeed, it is
not so long since we hung a man for stealing a sheep, and for other
acts far short of murder. And as to the superstition concerning
witches, it can hardly have led to more cruelty and injustice in
Zululand than in civilised European countries, where at Trèves 7000
victims were burned alive for witchcraft; 500 at Geneva in three
months; 1000 in the province of Como; 400, at _once_, at Toulouse;
with many other like cases on official record.[12] The practice of
smelling out a witch, as it is called, is one to be put a stop to as
soon as possible by gradual and gentle means, and Cetshwayo himself
had arrived at that conclusion without our assistance, as shown in
his conversation with the native printer Magema, whose account of a
visit paid to the Zulu king appeared in “Macmillan’s Magazine” for
March, 1878.

But the custom of a people—the law of a land—is not to be done away
with or altered in an hour; nor could we English reasonably expect
such radical changes in the administration of a country to follow
our orders as immediately and naturally as we should expect a new
ordinance to be received by the natives of Natal living under our
own rule. Neither could we justly consider the non-fulfilment of
our wishes and commands a sufficient cause for attacking Zululand,
although such supposed non-fulfilment was the first, and for a long
time the only _casus belli_ which could be found against the Zulu
king.

The first occasion on which the solemnity of these “coronation
promises” was made of importance was in 1875, when Bishop Schreuder
undertook to pay Cetshwayo a visit for the purpose of presenting
him with a printed and bound copy of Mr. Shepstone’s Report upon
the coronation in 1873, and impressing him fully with the wishes of
the English Government. Even then, judging from Bishop Schreuder’s
account of his interview, neither king nor councillors were
thoroughly satisfied with the result.[13] Cetshwayo, while admiring
the exact report given of what took place during Mr. Shepstone’s
visit, objected that he had reserved his own royal prerogatives and
the right of putting criminals to death for certain serious crimes,
and pointed out that Mr. Shepstone had neglected to inform the Queen
of this fact.

Bishop Schreuder, from his own account, appears to have overruled all
objections with a very high hand, and almost forced the “book,” with
his own interpretation of it, upon the seemingly reluctant king, who,
he says, “evidently felt himself out of his depth.”




CHAPTER II.

LANGALIBALELE.


Meanwhile in Natal mischief was brewing. A certain chief in the north
of the colony was supposed to be in a very rebellious frame of mind,
and it was rumoured that force of arms would prove necessary in order
to bring him to his senses.

This chief was one Langalibalele, who, with his tribe, the
Ama-Hlubi, had been driven out of Zululand by Umpande in the year
1848, and had taken refuge in Natal. He was located by the English
Government in the country below the Draakensberg Mountains, with
the duty imposed upon him of defending Natal against the attacks
of the predatory hordes of Bushmen who, in the early days of the
colony, made perpetual and destructive raids over the mountains.
From this point of view it would seem reasonable that the Hlubi
tribe should be permitted the use of firearms, prohibited, except
under certain restrictions, to the natives of Natal; inattention to
which prohibition was the ground upon which the original suspicions
concerning Langalibalele’s loyalty were based. The law, however,
by which this prohibition and these restrictions were made was one
of those enactments which, even when theoretically wise, are often
practically impossible, and to which new communities are so prone.

Theoretically no native can possess a gun in Natal which has not
been registered before a magistrate. Practically, in every kraal, in
every part of the colony, there were, and doubtless still are, many
unregistered guns, bought by natives, or given to them in lieu of
wages by their masters (a common practice at the Diamond Fields),
with very vague comprehension or total ignorance on the part of
the native that any unlawful act had been committed. This would be
more especially natural when the masters who thus furnished their
men with the forbidden weapon were themselves in some way connected
with the government of the country (Natal), whose sanction would
therefore be looked upon by the natives as an equivalent to the
permission of Government itself. But in point of fact the law had
always been enforced in such an extremely lax way, the evasions of
it were so easy and numerous, and so many white men of position and
respectability in the colony were party to the infraction of it,
that it is no wonder that its reality and importance was but lightly
engraved upon the native mind.

The special accusation, however, brought against Langalibalele to
prove his rebellious tendencies was that young men of his tribe were
in possession of unregistered guns, which, in addition, had not
been brought in to the magistrate, when demanded, for registration.
The reason for this unwillingness (on the part of the young men) to
comply with the above demands, appeared afterwards in the fact that
other guns which had been properly produced for registration, had,
after considerable delay, been returned to their owners in an injured
condition, rendering them unfit for use.

As these guns were the well-earned reward of hard labour, and
greatly valued by their possessors, it is little to be wondered at
that there should be considerable reluctance on the part of others
to risk the same loss. A little forbearance and consideration on
the part of those in authority might, however, easily have overcome
the difficulty. But in this case, as in others, the mistake was
committed of requiring prompt and unquestioning obedience, without
sufficient care being taken to protect the rights of those who
rendered it. As usual we would not stop to reason or deal justly
with the savage. Carelessness of the property of the natives, the
overbearing impatience of a magistrate, the want of tact and good
feeling on the part of a commonplace subordinate—all these led to an
indefinitely uneasy state of things, which soon produced considerable
anxiety in the colonial mind. This feeling prevailed during Mr.
Shepstone’s absence in Zululand, and it was generally understood that
the Secretary for Native Affairs’ next piece of work after crowning
Cetshwayo would be that of “settling Langalibalele.”

But beyond the reluctance to produce their guns for registration,
there was nothing in the behaviour of the Hlubi tribe to give the
colonists cause for apprehension. No lawless acts were committed, no
cattle stolen, no farmhouse fired, and the vague fears which existed
amongst the white inhabitants as to what might happen were rather
the result of the way in which “Government” shook its head over the
matter as a serious one, than justified by any real cause for alarm.
It was in fact one of those “Government scares” which occasionally
were produced from causes or for reasons not apparent on the surface.

On Mr. Shepstone’s return from the coronation of Cetshwayo,
Government native messengers were sent to Langalibalele, requiring
the latter to come down in person to Pietermaritzburg, the capital
of Natal, to answer for the conduct of his tribe concerning their
guns. The message produced a great—and to those who were ignorant of
the cause of it—a most unreasonable panic in the tribe, in which the
chief himself shared considerably. The Ama-Hlubi appeared exceedingly
suspicious, even of the designs of the Government messengers,
who were made to take off their great-coats, and were searched
for concealed weapons before being admitted into the presence of
Langalibalele. Such distrust of British good faith was held in itself
to be a crime, the insolence of which could not be overlooked.
Furthermore it was soon evident that the tribe would not trust their
chief, nor he his person, in the hands of the Government, now that
he was in disfavour. Without actually refusing to obey the orders
he had received and proceed to Pietermaritzburg, Langalibalele sent
excuses and apologies, chiefly turning upon his own ill-health,
which made travelling difficult to him. This answer was the signal
for the military expedition of 1873, which was entered upon without
any further attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the
affair, or to find out the real grounds for the evident fear and
distrust of the Hlubi tribe. In October, 1873, the force, partly
of regulars, partly colonial, a few Basuto horse, with an entirely
unorganised and useless addition of untrained Natal natives, started
from Pietermaritzburg, with all the pomp and circumstance of war;
and much to the delight of the young colonial blood on the look-out
for martial distinction. The tribe, however, far from having the
least wish to fight, or intention of opposing the British force,
deserted their location as soon as the news reached them that the
army had started, and fled with their chief over the Draakensberg
Mountains. Our force, commanded by Colonel Milles of the 75th
Regiment, and accompanied by the Lieut.-Governor Sir B. C. C. Pine
and Mr. Shepstone, reached a place called Meshlyn, situated on the
confines of the district to be subdued, on October 31st; but the
“enemy” had vanished, and were reported to be making the best of
their way out of the colony, without, however, committing ravages of
any description on their way, even to the extent of carrying off any
of their neighbours’ cattle. In fact they were frightened, and simply
ran away. Our object now was to arrest the tribe in its flight; and a
plan was formed for enclosing it in a network of troops, seizing all
the passes over the mountains, and thus reducing it to submission.

Positions were assigned to the different officers in command, and
the scheme looked extremely well on paper, and to men who were
not acquainted with the district and the exceeding difficulty of
travelling through it. Unfortunately, with the same lamentable
failure in the Intelligence Department which has characterised
the more important proceedings of 1879, very little was known, by
those in command, of the country, or of what was going on in it. Mr.
Shepstone himself, whose supposed knowledge of the people, their
land, and all concerning them was so greatly and naturally relied
upon, proved totally ignorant of the distances which lay between one
point and another, or of the difficulties to be overcome in reaching
them.

In consequence of this singular ignorance a little force was sent
out on the evening of November 2nd, under command of Major Durnford,
R.E., chief of the staff, with orders to seize and hold a certain
pass known as the Bushman’s River Pass, over which Langalibalele was
expected to escape; the distance having been miscalculated by about
two-thirds, and the difficulties of the way immensely underrated.

Major Durnford was himself a new-comer in the colony at that time,
and had therefore no personal knowledge of the country; but he
was supplied with full, though, as it soon appeared, unreliable
information by those under whose command he served, and who were in
possession of a plan or diagram of the district which turned out to
be altogether incorrect. He did, indeed, reach his assigned post,
though four-and-twenty hours after the time by which he expected
to be there; while those sent out to take up other positions never
reached them at all, owing to the same incorrect information
concerning locality.

Major Durnford was in command of a party composed of 2 officers,
6 non-commissioned officers, and 47 rank and file of the Natal
and Karkloof Carbineers, 24 mounted Basutos,[14] and a native
interpreter. His orders were[15] to seize and hold the Bushman’s
River Pass, “with a view to preventing the entrance in or out of the
colony of any natives until the expedition is ready to cross over.”
Special orders were also given to him that he was on no account to
fire the first shot.

There was one excellent reason, not generally taken into
consideration, for this order, in the fact that the three days given
by Government to the tribe in which to surrender would not be over
until midday on the 3rd of November.

Starting at 8.30 P.M. on the 2nd November, Major Durnford’s force
only reached its destination at 6.30 A.M. on the 4th, having
traversed a most difficult country, broken, pathless, and well-nigh
inaccessible. On the line of march many men fell out, utterly unable
to keep up; pack-horses with provisions and spare ammunition were
lost; and Major Durnford had his left shoulder dislocated, and other
severe injuries, by his horse falling with him over a precipice on
the 3rd. He pressed on for some hours, but became quite exhausted at
the foot of the Giant’s Castle Pass, where he lay some time; he was
then dragged up with the aid of a blanket, reaching the top of the
pass at 2 A.M. At 4 A.M. Major Durnford was lifted on his horse, and
with his force—reduced to 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 33
troopers, and the Basutos—pushed on to the Bushman’s River Pass, and
occupied it at 6.30 A.M., finding Langalibalele’s men already in the
pass.

Major Durnford posted his men, and went forward with the interpreter
to parley with the chiefs, and induce them to return to their
allegiance. This was a service of danger, for the young warriors
were very excited. Seeing that the enemy were getting behind rocks,
etc., commanding the mouth of the pass, he made every preparation
for hostilities, though restricted by the order not to fire the
first shot. Finding that, although the natives drew back when he
bade them, they pressed on again when his back was turned, and that
the volunteers were wavering, he at last reluctantly directed an
orderly retreat to higher ground, from whence he could still command
the pass. Upon a shot being fired by the natives, the retreat became
a stampede, and a heavy fire being opened, three of the Carbineers
and one Basuto fell. The horse of the interpreter was killed, and,
while Major Durnford was endeavouring to reach the man and lift him
on his own horse, the interpreter was killed by his side, and Major
Durnford was surrounded and left alone. Dropping the reins, he drew
his revolver, and shot his immediate assailants, who had seized his
horse’s bridle, and, after running the gauntlet of a numerous enemy
at close quarters, escaped with one serious wound, an assegai-stab in
the left arm, whereby it was permanently disabled. He received one
or two trifling cuts besides, and his patrol-jacket was pierced in
many places. Getting clear of the enemy, Major Durnford rallied a few
Carbineers and the Basutos, and covered the retreat.

The head-quarters camp was reached about 1 A.M. on the 5th. At 11
P.M. on that day, Major Durnford led out a volunteer party—artillery
with rockets, 50 men of the 75th Regiment, 7 Carbineers, and 30
Basutos—to the rescue of Captain Boyes, 75th Regiment, who had been
sent out with a support on the 3rd, and was believed to be in great
danger. Major Durnford had received such serious injuries that the
doctor endeavoured to dissuade him from further exertion, but as
those sent to his support were in danger and he knew the country,
he determined to go. He was lifted on his horse, and left amid the
cheers of the troops in camp. Having marched all night—resting only
from 3 to 5 A.M.—they met Captain Boyes’ party about midday; they had
lost their way, and thus did not find the Giant’s Castle Pass.

After this, Major Durnford, with a considerable force, occupied
Bushman’s River Pass, recovered and buried the bodies of his
comrades, and held the pass. He afterwards patrolled the disturbed
districts. The Lieut.-Governor, Sir B. C. C. Pine, in a despatch
dated 13th November, 1873, accepted the responsibility of the orders
not to fire the first shot, and said of Major Durnford: “He behaved,
by testimony of all present, in the most gallant manner, using his
utmost exertions to rally his little force, till, left _absolutely_
alone, he was reluctantly compelled to follow them—wounded.”

Colonel Milles, commanding the field force, published the following
order:

                                  “CAMP MESHLYN, 7th November, 1873.

  “The Commandant, with deep regret, announces to the field
  force under his command the loss of three Carbineers, viz.:
  Mr. Erskine, Mr. Potterill, and Mr. Bond, and of one native
  interpreter, Elijah, who formed part of the small force sent up
  with Major Durnford, R.E., to secure the passes, and who were
  killed during the retreat of that party from the passes, which,
  although they had gallantly seized, they were unable to hold, the
  orders being for ‘the forces not to fire the first shot,’ and so
  having to wait till they were placed at a great disadvantage.
  The brave conduct of those killed is testified to by all their
  comrades, and there is consolation alone in the thought that
  they died nobly fighting for their country. The Commandant must,
  however, publicly render his thanks to Major Durnford for the way
  in which he commanded the party, for his courage and coolness,
  and especially for the noble way in which, after his return from
  the passes, being almost exhausted, he mustered a volunteer party
  and marched to the relief of Captain Boyes, who was considered in
  great danger.
                                  “By command,
                                        “A. E. ARENGO CROSS
                                         “(For Chief of the Staff).”

Although the main body of the fighting-men of the tribe had left
Natal, most of the women and children, the sick and infirm, with
a few able-bodied men to watch over them, had taken refuge in
holes and caves, of which there are a considerable number in that
mountainous part of the colony. The men of the tribe, indeed, were
in disgrace with the Government, and thought it best to be out of
the way when the British force paid their homes a visit, but it was
not for a moment imagined that the soldiers would make war upon
women and children. The latter, in any case, could not have taken
that tremendous and hurried journey across the great mountains; and,
with what soon proved a very mistaken confidence on the part of the
people, all who could neither fight nor travel were left in these
hiding-places, from which they expected to emerge in safety as soon
as the troops, finding no one to oppose them, should have left the
district. “The English soldiers will not touch the children,”[16]
was the expression used. So far, however, was this idea from being
realised, that the remainder of the expedition consisted of a series
of attempts, more or less successful, to hunt the unfortunate
“children” out of their hiding-places and take them prisoners.

During these proceedings many acts were committed under Government
sanction which can only be characterised by the word “atrocities,”
and which were as useless and unnecessary as they were cruel.[17]

Poor frightened creatures were smoked to death or killed by rockets
in caves which they dared not leave for fear of a worse fate at
the hands of their captors; women and children were killed, men
were tortured, and prisoners put to death. On one occasion a white
commander of native forces is said to have given the significant
information to his men that he _did not wish to see the faces of any
prisoners_; and it is reported that a prisoner was made over to the
native force to be put to death as the latter chose. The colonial
newspapers apologised at the time for some of these acts, on the
score that they were the result of the youthful enthusiasm of “Young
Natal” fleshing his maiden sword.

These acts were chiefly committed by the irregular (white) troops
and native levies, and are a signal proof of how great a crime it
is to turn undisciplined or savage troops, over whom no responsible
person has any real control, loose upon a defenceless people. The
excuse made by those in authority in such cases is always “We did not
intend these things to take place, but horrors are always attendant
on savage warfare.” But such excuses are of small value when, in
campaign after campaign, it has been proved that the use of colonial
troops under their own officers, and of disorganised masses of armed
“friendly natives,” is invariably productive of scenes disgraceful to
the name of England, without any attempt being made to introduce a
better system. Certainly if “horrors” beyond the fair fortune of war
_are_ necessarily attendant upon savage warfare, they should not be
those inflicted by British troops and their allies upon unarmed or
solitary men, women, and children.

So many women were injured in dislodging them from the caves that
Major Durnford, on his second return from the mountains, instituted a
hospital-tent where they might be attended to; but such humanity was
by no means the general rule.

If acts of barbarity were for the most part committed by the
irregular troops, there is one instance to the contrary which can
never be forgotten in connection with this affair—so flagrant a case
that the friends of the officer in command, when the story first
appeared in the colonial papers, refused to believe in it until it
was authenticated beyond a doubt.

A body of troops—infantry, irregular cavalry, and undisciplined
natives—upon one occasion during this expedition were engaged for
some hours in trying to dislodge a solitary native from a cave in
which he had taken refuge. The force had discovered the hiding-place
by the assistance of a little boy, whom they captured and induced to
betray his friends.

The “rebel” (in this case there was but one) refused to surrender,
and for a long while defended himself gallantly against the attacks
of the whole force. Shots were fired through the apertures of the
cave, rockets (a new and horrible experience to the poor creature)
were discharged upon him. At last, after holding out for some hours,
the man gave up the struggle, and coming out from his insufficient
shelter, begged for mercy at the hands of his numerous foe. He had a
good many wounds upon him, but none sufficiently severe to prevent
his walking out amongst his captors, and asking them to spare his
life. After a short consultation amongst the officers, a decision was
arrived at as to the proper treatment of this man, who had proved
himself a brave soldier and was now a helpless captive.

By order of the officer commanding, a trooper named Moodie put
his pistol to the prisoner’s head and blew out his brains. A
court-martial sat upon this officer in the course of the following
year, and he was acquitted of all blame. The defence was that the man
was so seriously injured that it was an act of humanity to put an
end to him, and that the officer dared not trust him in the hands of
the natives belonging to the English force, who were exasperated by
the long defence he had made. But the prisoner was not mortally nor
even dangerously wounded. He was able to walk and to speak, and had
no wound upon him which need necessarily have caused his death. And
as to the savage temper of the native force, there was no reason why
the prisoner should be left in their charge at all, as there was a
considerable white force present at the time.[18]

The result of the expedition against the Hlubi tribe was so little
satisfactory that those in authority felt themselves obliged to look
about for something else to do before taking the troops back to
Pietermaritzburg. They found what they wanted ready to their hand.
Next to Langalibalele’s location lay that of the well-to-do and quiet
little tribe of Putini. “Government” had as yet found no fault with
these people, and, secure in their own innocence, they had made no
attempt to get out of the way of the force which had come to destroy
their neighbours, but remained at home, herded their cattle, and
planted their crops as usual. Unfortunately, however, some marriages
had taken place between members of the two tribes, and when that
of Langalibalele fled, the wives of several of his men took refuge
in their fathers’ kraals in the next location. No further proof
was required of the complicity of Putini with Langalibalele, or of
the rebellious condition of the smaller tribe. Consequently it was
at once, as the natives term it, “eaten up,” falling an easy prey
owing to its unsuspecting state. The whole tribe—men, women, and
children—were taken prisoners and carried down to Pietermaritzburg,
their cattle and goods were confiscated, and their homes destroyed.
Several of the Putini men were killed, but there was very little
resistance, as they were wholly taken by surprise. The colony was
charmed with this success, and the spoils of the Putini people were
generally looked to to pay some of the expenses of the campaign.
Whatever may have been the gain to the Government, by orders of
which the cattle (the chief wealth of the tribe) were sold, it
was not long shared by the individual colonists who purchased the
animals. The pasture in that part of the country from which they had
come is of a very different description from any to be found in the
environs of Pietermaritzburg, and, in consequence of the change,
the captured cattle died off rapidly almost as soon as they changed
hands. But this was not all, for they had time, before they died, to
spread amongst the original cattle of their new owners two terrible
scourges, in the shape of “lung-sickness” and “red-water,” from which
the midland districts had long been free. One practical result of the
expedition of 1873 seems to be that neither meat, milk, nor butter
have ever again been so cheap in the colony as they were before that
date, the two latter articles being often unobtainable to this day.

The unhappy prisoners of both tribes were driven down like beasts to
Pietermaritzburg, many of the weaker dying from want and exposure
on the way. Although summer-time, it happened to be very wet, and
therefore cold; our native force had been allowed to strip the
unfortunates of all their possessions, even to their blankets and
the leather petticoats of the women. The sufferings of these poor
creatures—many of them with infants a few days old, or born on the
march down—were very great. A scheme was at first laid, by those in
authority, for “giving the women and children out” as servants for a
term of years—that is to say, for making temporary slaves of them to
the white colonists. This additional enormity was vetoed by the home
Government, but the fact remains that its perpetration was actually
contemplated by those entrusted with the government of the colony,
and especially of the natives, and was hailed by the colonists as
one of the advantages to accrue to them from the expedition of
1873. Several children were actually given out in the way referred
to before the order to the contrary arrived from England, and a
considerable time elapsed before they were all recovered by their
relatives.

The unhappy women and children of the Langalibalele tribe were mere
emaciated skeletons when they reached the various places where they
were to live under surveillance. They seemed crushed with misery,
utterly ignorant of the cause of their misfortunes, but silent and
uncomplaining. Many of the women had lost children—few knew whether
their male relatives were yet alive. On being questioned, they
knew nothing of Mr. Shepstone, not even his name, which was always
supposed to command the love and fear of natives throughout the
length and breadth of the land. They did not know what the tribe had
done to get into such trouble; they only knew that the soldiers had
come, and that they had run away and hidden themselves; that some of
them were dead, and the rest were ready to die too and have it all
over. A considerable number of these poor creatures were permitted
by Government to remain upon the Bishop’s land, where most of them
gradually regained health and spirits, but retained always the
longing for their own homes and people and their lost chief which
characterises them still.[19]




CHAPTER III.

TRIAL OF LANGALIBALELE.


Meanwhile the fugitive chief had at last been captured by the
treachery of a Basuto chief named Molappo, who enticed him into
his hands, and then delivered him up to Mr. Griffiths, resident
magistrate in that part of British Basutoland. When he and his party
were first captured they had with them a horse laden with all the
coin which the tribe had been able to get together during the last
few days before the expedition started from Pietermaritzburg, and
which they had collected to send down as a ransom for their chief.
Their purpose was arrested by the news that the soldiers had actually
started to attack them; when, feeling that all was lost, they fled,
carrying the chief and his ransom with them. What became of the
money, whether it became Molappo’s perquisite, or whether it formed
part of the English spoil, has never been publicly known. But it can
hardly be denied that the readiness of the people to pay away in
ransom for their chief the whole wealth of the tribe earned by years
of labour on the part of the working members, is in itself a proof
that their tendencies were by no means rebellious.

Langalibalele, with seven of his sons and many indunas (captains) and
headmen, was brought down to Pietermaritzburg for trial, reaching the
town on the 21st December.

So strong was the unreasoning hatred of the colonists against him
on account of the death of the three Carbineers which had resulted
from the expedition, that the unhappy man, a helpless captive, was
insulted and pelted by the populace as he was conveyed in irons to
the capital; and again, after sentence had been passed upon him, upon
his way to Durban.

It was at this stage of affairs that the Bishop of Natal first
came upon the scene, and interfered on behalf of the oppressed.
Until 1873, while earnestly endeavouring to do his best as teacher
and pastor amongst the natives as well as amongst their white
fellow-colonists, he had not found it to be his duty to go deeply
into political matters concerning them. He had great confidence at
that time in the justice and humanity of their government as carried
on by Mr. Shepstone, for whom he had a warm personal regard, based
on the apparent uprightness of his conduct; and he had therefore
contented himself with accepting Mr. Shepstone’s word in all that
concerned them.

That so many years should have passed without the Bishop’s having
discovered how greatly his views and those of his friend differed in
first principles as to the government of the people, is due partly to
the fact that the two met but seldom, and then at regular expected
intervals, and partly because no great crisis had previously taken
place to prove the principles of either in that respect. Their
regular interviews were upon Sundays, when the Bishop, going into
Pietermaritzburg for the cathedral service, invariably spent a
couple of hours with his friend. During these comparatively short
meetings doubtless Mr. Shepstone’s real personal regard for the
Bishop caused him temporarily to feel somewhat as he did, and,
where he could not do so, to refrain from entering upon political
discussion. The sympathy with Mr. Shepstone which existed in the
Bishop’s mind prevented the latter from looking more closely for
himself into matters which he believed to be in good hands, and which
did not naturally fall within the sphere of his duties; while the
comparatively trivial character of the cases with which the native
department had hitherto dealt, was not such as to force their details
before a mind otherwise and fully employed.

The Langalibalele expedition, however, opened the Bishop’s eyes.
While it lasted, although deeply deploring the loss of life on either
side, and feeling great indignation at the atrocities perpetrated
on ours, he did not doubt that Mr. Shepstone had done all he could
to avert the necessity of bloodshed, and expected to find him, upon
his return to Pietermaritzburg, much grieved and indignant at the
needless amount of suffering inflicted upon his people, the greater
portion of whom must be entirely innocent, even although the charges
against their chief should be proved.

The discovery that Mr. Shepstone entirely ratified what had been
done[20] was the first blow to his friend’s reliance on him. The
mockery of justice termed a trial, granted to Langalibalele, was the
next; and the discovery of how completely he had misconceived Mr.
Shepstone’s policy closed the intimacy of their friendship.

It soon became apparent that the trial of the chief was indeed to
be a farce—a pretence, meant to satisfy inquiring minds at home
that justice had been done, but which could have but one result,
the condemnation of the prisoner, already prejudged by a Government
which, having declared him to be a rebel and having treated him as
such, was hardly likely to stultify itself by allowing him to be
proved innocent of the charges brought against him.

That there might be no doubt at all upon the subject, the prisoner
was denied the help of counsel, white or black, in the hearing
of his case, even to watch the proceedings on his behalf, or to
cross-examine the witnesses; consequently the official record of the
trial can only be looked upon as an _ex parte_ statement of the case,
derived from witnesses selected by the Supreme Chief,[21] examined by
the Crown Prosecutor, and not cross-examined at all on the prisoner’s
behalf, although the assistance of counsel was recognised by the
Crown Prosecutor himself as being in accordance with Kafir law.[22]

But the formation of the court and its whole proceedings were
palpably absurd, except for the purpose of securing a conviction;
and that this was the case was generally understood in Natal, Even
those colonists who were most violent against the so-called “rebel,”
and would have had him hanged without mercy, asserting that he had
been “taken red-handed,” saw that the authorities had put themselves
in the wrong by granting the prisoner a trial against the justice of
which so much could be alleged.

In point of fact, the Lieut.-Governor had no power to form a court
such as that by which Langalibalele was tried, consisting of his
excellency himself as Supreme Chief, the Secretary for Native
Affairs, certain administrators of native law, and certain native
chiefs and indunas. Besides which the Lieut.-Governor was not only
debarred by an ordinance of the colony[23] from sitting as judge in
such a court, from which he would be the sole judge in a court of
appeal, but had already committed himself to a decision adverse to
the prisoner by having issued the proclamation of November 11th,
1873, declaring that the chief and his tribe had “set themselves
in open revolt and rebellion against Her Majesty’s Government in
this colony,” and “proclaiming and making known that they were in
rebellion, and were hereby declared to be outlaws,” and that “the
said tribe was broken up, and from that day forth had ceased to
exist,” and by further seizing and confiscating all the cattle and
property of the said tribe within reach, deposing Langalibalele from
his chieftainship, and otherwise treating him and his tribe as rebels.

His Excellency, therefore, could not possibly be looked upon as an
unprejudiced judge of the first instance in the prisoner’s case;
nor could the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone, by whose
advice and with whose approval the expedition had been undertaken.
As to the minor members of the court, they could hardly be expected
to have an independent opinion in the matter, especially the “native
chiefs and indunas,” who knew very well that they would be liable to
the accusation of disaffection themselves if they ventured to show
any bearing towards the prisoner, or to do otherwise than blindly
follow the lead of their white “brother-judges” (!) and masters.

The native names gave a satisfactory air of justice to the
proceedings of the court in English eyes, but in point of fact they
were but dummy judges after all.

Not only, however, was the court wrongly constituted, but its
proceedings were irregular and illegal. It was called, and considered
to be, a _native_ court, but in point of fact it was a nondescript
assembly, such usages of either native or supreme court as could
possibly tell on the prisoner’s side (notably the use of counsel)
being omitted, and only those which would insure his conviction
admitted.

It was not the practice of the colony for serious crimes to be tried
before a native court. But in this case they were obliged to run
counter to custom for the reason given in a previous note, that most
of the separate charges against the chief could not be recognised
as crimes at all in an English court of law. At the same time the
sentence finally given was one quite beyond the power of the court
to pronounce. Clause 4 of the ordinance limits the power of the
Supreme Chief to “appointing or removing the subordinate chiefs or
other authorities” among the natives, but gives him no power to
sentence to death, or to “banishment or transportation for life to
such place as the Supreme Chief or Lieut.-Governor may appoint.”
When Langalibalele had been “removed” from his chieftainship, and
himself and the bulk of his tribe “driven over the mountain out of
the colony” by the Government force, as announced in the bulletin of
November 13th, 1873, the cattle within the colony seized, and many of
the tribe killed in resisting the attempt to seize them, the Supreme
Chief, under native law, had expended his power; while banishment is
a punishment wholly unknown to Kafir law, as is plainly stated in
“Kafir Laws and Customs,” p. 39.

Again, throughout the trial, the prisoner was assumed to have pleaded
guilty, although in point of fact he had merely admitted that he had
done certain acts, but desired witnesses to be called whose “evidence
would justify or extenuate what he had done,” a plea which in any
ordinary court would be recorded as a plea of “Not guilty.”

The native members of the court, also, were made to sign a judgment,
the contents of which had been “interpreted” to them, and their
signatures “witnessed,” by which the prisoner is declared to have
been “convicted, on clear evidence, of several acts, for some of
which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every
civilised country in the world.” The absurdity of this is palpable,
since it was impossible that these men should know anything of the
law of any civilised land; it is plain, therefore, that in pretending
to agree with assertions, of the meaning of which they were totally
ignorant, they were under some strong influence, such as prejudice
against the prisoner, undue fear of the Supreme Chief, or desire to
please him—one of them being “Head Induna of the Natal Government,”
and another the “Induna to the Secretary for Native Affairs.”

To turn to these crimes, “for some of which he would be liable to
forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the
world”—to which statement His Excellency the Supreme Chief, the
Secretary for Native Affairs, and the Administrators of Native Law
have also signed their names—we find that the charges run as follows:

1. “Setting at naught the authority of the magistrate in a manner[24]
_not indeed sufficiently palpable to warrant the use of forcible
coercion to our_ (civilised) laws and customs.” Which charge we may
at once dismiss as absurd.

2. “Permitting, or _probably_ encouraging, his tribe to possess
fire-arms, and retain them contrary to law.”

3. “With reference to these fire-arms, defying the authority of the
magistrate, and once insulting the messenger.”

4. “Refusing to appear before” the Supreme Chief when summoned,
“excusing his refusal by evasion and falsehood,” and “insulting his
messenger.”

5. “Directing his cattle and other effects to be taken out of the
colony under an armed escort.”

6. Causing the death of Her Majesty’s subjects at the Bushman’s River
Pass.

It is plain to the most casual observation that none of the first
five accusations, even if fully proved, refer to crimes punishable by
death in any civilised land; and it is difficult to see how the Chief
could reasonably be considered responsible for the sixth and last,
seeing that the action took place in his absence, against his express
commands, and to his great regret.

Returning to the five first-named offences, we find that the
statements contained in the second and third charges are the only
proofs alleged of the truth of the first—to which therefore we need
give no further attention—the magistrate himself stating that “this
was the first time the prisoner ever refused to appear before him
when ordered to do so;” and this was the first time for more than
twenty years that he had been reported for any fault whatever.

Proceeding to charge No. 2, we find that the prisoner entirely denied
having encouraged his young men to possess themselves of guns; nor
could he justly be said to have even “permitted” them to do so merely
because he did not actively exert himself to prevent it. The men went
away from home, worked, were paid for their services in guns, or
purchased them with their earnings, without consulting him. He had
never considered it to be part of his duty to search the huts of his
people for unregistered guns, but had simply left them to suffer the
consequences of breaking the laws of the colony, if discovered. It
is also to be observed that amongst the seven sons captured with him
only one had a gun at a time when certainly, if ever, they would have
carried them; which does not look as though he had greatly encouraged
them to possess themselves of firearms.

But if the second charge, in a very modified form, might be
considered a true one, yet Langalibalele had done no worse in that
respect than most of the other chiefs in the colony. In proof of
this assertion may be brought “Perrin’s Register” for the years
1871-2-3—the years during which a large number of natives received
payment for their services at the diamond-fields in guns. From this
register it appears that the total number of guns registered in eight
of the principal northern tribes of the colony—the two first-named
chiefs being _indunas_ to the very magistrate who complained of
Langalibalele—was as follows:

  +---------------------+--------------------+
  |                     | GUNS REGISTERED IN |
  |      HUTS.          +--------------------+
  |                     | 1871.| 1872.| 1873.|
  +---------------------+------+------+------+
  | Ndomba         1190 |   —  |   —  |   —  |
  | Faku           2071 |   —  |   2  |   —  |
  | Mganu          1277 |   —  |   —  |   —  |
  | Pakade         2222 |   1  |   —  |   1  |
  | Zikali         1651 |   —  |   1  |   —  |
  | Nodada         3000 |   —  |   1  |   2  |
  | Putini         1239 |   —  |   1  |   —  |
  | Langalibalele  2244 |   —  |   9  |   4  |
  +---------------------+------+------+------+

Furthermore, any fault with respect to the guns was not an offence
under Kafir Law, and could only have been tried in the Colonial
Court under the ordinary law of the colony.

The third and fourth charges were those which, when first reported in
Natal, produced considerable alarm and indignation in the minds of
the colonists. A defiance of the authority, both of magistrate and
Supreme Chief, and insult offered to their messengers, looked indeed
like actual rebellion. The charges, however, dwindled down to very
little when properly examined. The “defiance” in question consisted
only in an answer made to the magistrate to the effect that he could
not send in as desired five young men—in possession of unregistered
guns—because they had run away, he knew not whither, being frightened
by the course pursued by the magistrate’s messenger; and that he
could not find eight others, said to have come into the colony with
guns, and to belong to his tribe, upon such insufficient data,
and unless their names were given to him. The sincerity of which
reasoning was shortly proved by the fact that, as soon as their names
were notified to him, he did send in three of those very lads, with
their guns, and two more belonging to other members of their party,
besides sending in with their guns those who had worked for Mr. W. E.
Shepstone, and who probably thought that the name of their master was
a sufficient guarantee for their right to possess firearms.

The charge of insulting the native messengers from Government, of
which a great deal was made at first, proved to be of very little
consequence when investigated, but it is one to which special
attention should be given because, indirectly, it is connected with
the Zulu War.

The facts are as follows: One of the chief witnesses for the
prosecution, Mawiza, a messenger of the Government, stated in his
evidence-in-chief on the second day of the trial, that on the
occasion of his carrying a message from Government, the prisoner’s
people had “taken all his things from him,” and had “stripped, and
taken him naked” into the Chiefs presence. But on the fourth day,
in answer to a question from His Excellency, he said “that they had
_intended_ to strip him but had allowed him to retain his trousers
and boots,” thereby contradicting himself flatly. Nevertheless the
court being asked by His Excellency whether it required further
evidence on this point, replied in the negative. They did not even
ask a question, on the subject, of Mawiza’s two companion messengers,
Mnyembe and Gayede, though both these were examined; Mnyembe’s
evidence-in-chief being cut short _before_ he came to that part of
the story, and Gayede’s taken up just _after_ it.

The chief was kept in solitary confinement from the day when he was
brought down to Pietermaritzburg, December 31st, till the day when
his sons were sentenced, February 27th; not being allowed to converse
with any of his sons, or with any members of his tribe, or with any
friend or adviser, white or black. It was therefore quite out of his
power to find witnesses who would have shown, as Mnyembe and Gayede
would have done, that Mawiza’s statements about the “stripping” were
false; that he still wore his waistcoat, shirt, trousers, boots, and
gaiters, when he was taken to the chief; and that the “stripping”
in question only amounted to this, that he himself put off his two
coats, by the chiefs orders, “as a matter of precaution caused by
fear” and not for the purpose of insulting the messenger, or defying
the Supreme Chief. They would have satisfied the court also that
other acts charged against the prisoner arose from fear, and dread of
the Supreme Chief, and not from a spirit of defiance.

This affair of the messenger, explained by fear and suspicion on the
part of Langalibalele, by which, also, he accounted for his refusal
to “appear before” the Supreme Chief (which is to say that, being
desired to give himself up into the hands of the Government, he was
afraid to do so, and ran away), was the turning-point of the whole
trial. What special reason he had for that fear and distrust will
be inquired into shortly. Meanwhile the court considered that such
expressed distrust of the good faith of the authorities was an added
offence on the part of the prisoner, who was formally condemned to
death, but his sentence commuted to banishment for life to Robben
Island, the abode of lunatics and lepers, in which other captive
native chiefs had languished and died before him.[25]




CHAPTER IV.

THE BISHOP’S DEFENCE.


The daily accounts of the trial which appeared in the local papers
were read with great interest and attention by the Bishop, who
quickly discerned the injustice of the proceedings. Mawiza’s manifest
contradiction of his own evidence first attracted his attention, and
led to his hearing from some of his own natives what was not allowed
to appear at the trial, that Mawiza’s story was entirely false.
Seeing how seriously this fact bore upon the prisoner’s case, he went
to Mr. Shepstone and told him what he had heard.

The Secretary for Native Affairs was at first very indignant with
the Bishop’s informant, doubting the truth of his statement, and
declaring that the man must be severely punished if it were proved
that he had lied. The Bishop, confident in the integrity of his
native,[26] assented, saying, however, that the same argument should
apply to Mawiza. The matter was at once privately investigated by Mr.
Shepstone—the Bishop, Mawiza, Magema, and others being present—with
the result that Mr. Shepstone himself was obliged to acknowledge the
untrustworthiness of Mawiza, who was reproved in the severest terms
for his prevarications by the other native indunas.[27]

Singularly enough, however, _this discovery made no difference
whatever in the condemnation and sentence of the prisoner_, although
the charge thus, to a great extent, disposed of, was the most serious
of those brought against him.

But this was not all. Another point struck the Bishop very forcibly,
namely, the perpetual recurrence of one phrase from various
witnesses. “He (Langalibalele) was afraid, remembering what was
done to Matshana,” and “he was afraid that he should be treated as
Matshana was, when he was summoned to appear by Government.” Such
expressions, used in excuse of the Chiefs conduct, would, of course,
have been inquired into had the prisoner been allowed counsel, or
had any one watched the case on his behalf. But although the court
judged the excuse of “fear” to be an added fault on the Chiefs part,
and although perpetual allusions were made by witnesses to a specific
cause for this fear, no question was asked, and no notice taken
by those present of the perpetually recurring phrase. The Bishop,
however, in the interests of justice and truth, made inquiries
amongst his own natives as to the meaning of these allusions. He
knew, of course, in common with the rest of the inhabitants of Natal,
that, in the year 1858, a native chief named Matshana had got into
some trouble with the Government of Natal. A commando had gone out
against him, and, after a skirmish with some native troops under Mr.
John Shepstone, in which Mr. Shepstone was wounded, and some men on
the other side killed, he had escaped with his people into Zululand,
where he had lived ever since. The Bishop had never heard the details
of the affair, and knew of nothing in connection with this incident
which could account for the “fear because of what was done to
Matshana.”

“Can you tell me anything of the story of Matshana’s escape from
Natal?” was the question put by him at different times to different
natives; and everyone thus questioned gave substantially the
same account, of what was plainly among them a well-known, and
well-remembered incident in the history of the colony.

Matshana, they said, was accused of some offence, and being summoned
before the authorities to answer for it, had refused to appear. Mr.
John Shepstone, with a native force, of whom this very Langalibalele,
then a young chief, with his followers formed a portion, was sent
out to endeavour to reduce him to obedience. Mr. Shepstone invited
him to a friendly interview, in which they might talk over matters,
but to which Matshana’s men were to bring no weapons. In consequence
of the reluctance of Matshana to fulfil this condition, the proposed
interview fell through several times before it was finally arranged.
Matshana’s people, even then, however, brought their weapons with
them, but they were induced to leave them at a certain spot a short
distance off. The meeting took place; Mr. Shepstone being seated in
a chair with his people behind him, Matshana and his men crouched
native fashion upon the ground, suspicious and alert, in a semicircle
before him. Suddenly Mr. Shepstone drew a gun from beneath the rug
at his feet, and fired it (he says, as a signal), whereupon his men,
some of whom had already ridden between Matshana’s party and their
arms, fell on, and the struggle became general, resulting in the
death of many of Matshana’s people. The chief himself, who seems to
have been on the look-out for a surprise, escaped unhurt. He was
resting upon one knee only when the first shot was fired, and sprang
over the man crouching behind him. Another man, named Deke, who was
sitting close to him, was wounded in the knee, but is alive to this
day.

This story, which in varied form, but substantially as given above,
was generally known and believed by the natives, furnished a very
complete explanation of why Langalibalele ventured to distrust the
good faith and honour of the Government, having himself taken part
in, and been witness of, such a disgraceful transaction; which, when
it came to the knowledge of the Secretary of State, was emphatically
condemned by him. Remembering this circumstance, it is not wonderful
that Langalibalele should have taken the precaution of searching the
Government messengers for concealed weapons.

It seemed strange that Mr. Shepstone, sitting as judge upon the
bench to try a man for his life, should silently allow so great a
justification of his chief offence to remain concealed. But it
seemed stranger still to suppose him ignorant of any part of an
affair carried out under his authority, and by his own brother.

However, the Bishop took the matter privately to him in the first
instance, telling him what he had heard, and pointing out what an
important bearing it had upon the unfortunate prisoner’s case. He was
met by a total denial on Mr. Shepstone’s part that any such act of
treachery had ever taken place, or that there were any grounds for
the accusation.

Nevertheless, after careful consideration, and on thoroughly sifting
the obtainable evidence, the Bishop could not avoid coming to the
painful conclusion that the story was substantially true, and was a
valid excuse for Langalibalele’s fear. Finding that further appeal
on behalf of the prisoner to those on the spot was in vain, he now
wrote and printed a pamphlet (giving the usual native version that
the first shot fired was _at_ Matshana) on the subject for private
circulation, and especially for Lord Carnarvon’s information.[28]

One of the first results of the appearance of this pamphlet was
a demand on the part of Mr. J. Shepstone’s solicitor for “an
immediate, full, and unqualified retraction of the libel falsely and
maliciously published in the pamphlet, with a claim for £1000 damages
for the injury done to Mr. J. Shepstone by the same.”

Such an action would have had but a small chance of a decision upon
the Bishop’s side at that time in Natal, so, to defend himself—and
not, as generally supposed, out of enmity to the Shepstones—he
appealed to Lord Carnarvon in the matter, on the grounds that his
action had been taken for the public good, and in the interests of
justice.

Meanwhile the unfortunate chief and his eldest son Malambule
were sent to Robben Island, the former as a prisoner for life,
the latter for five years. They were secretly conveyed away from
Pietermaritzburg to the port, and every effort made to prevent the
Bishop from seeing them, or interfering on their behalf. Other sons,
two of them mere lads, who had as yet held no more important position
in the tribe than that of herdboys to their father’s cattle, and many
of the headmen and indunas, were condemned to imprisonment in the
gaol at Pietermaritzburg for terms varying in length from six months
to seven years. The two young sons, lads named Mazwi and Siyepu, were
kept prisoners for the shortest period named, six months; but it was
some little time after they left the gaol before they were really
set at liberty. The family at Bishopstowe, where their mothers and
many of their other relatives were located, were naturally anxious to
have the two boys also, and, as soon as their term of imprisonment
was up, applied for the charge of them. Somewhat to their surprise
all sorts of difficulties were raised on the point—one would have
thought a very simple one—and they were at last curtly informed
that the boys did not wish to go to Bishopstowe, and would remain
where they were, under surveillance in another district. The Bishop
himself was away at the time, but his eldest daughter, acting for
him, soon discovered through native sources that in point of fact the
boys were extremely anxious to go to Bishopstowe, but were in too
terrified a condition to express a wish. The question had been put to
them in this form: “So! you have been complaining! you say you want
to leave the place you have been sent to, and go to Bishopstowe?”
Whereupon the frightened lads, their spirits crushed by all that
had befallen them, naturally answered: “We never complained, nor
asked to go anywhere”—which, was perfectly true. By dint of a little
determination on the part of Miss Colenso, however, the desired
permission was at last obtained, and Mazwi and Siyepu entered the
Bishopstowe school, which had already been established for the boys
of the scattered tribe. Under the treatment which they there received
they soon began to recover from their distress, and to lose the
terrified expression in the eyes which characterised them painfully
at first. But the health of Mazwi, the elder, was broken by hardship
and confinement, and he died of consumption a few years after.[29]

It soon became apparent that there must be something specially
injurious to the prisoners in their life in gaol beyond the mere
fact of confinement. Nearly all the men of the Hlubi tribe left it
labouring under a dreadful complaint of a complicated form (said to
be some species of elephantiasis), of which a considerable number
died; others, as in Mazwi’s case, falling victims to consumption. On
inquiry it appeared that the fault lay in the _excessive washing_
to which every part of the building was habitually subjected—floors
and bed-boards being perpetually scrubbed, and therefore seldom
thoroughly dry. This state of things was naturally a trial to the
constitutions of people accustomed to life in the warm smoke-laden
atmosphere of a native hut. However beneficial it might be to the
natives to instruct them in habits of cleanliness,[30] this was
hardly the way to do it, and the results were disastrous. The
peculiar complaint resulting from confinement in the city gaol was
commonly known amongst the natives as the “gaol-disease,” but it
had not attracted the same attention while the victims to it were
occasional convicts, as it did when it attacked a large number of
innocent prisoners of war!

After the chief had been sent to Robben Island, it was represented,
by those interested in his welfare, that to leave him there for the
rest of his life without any of his family or people near him—except
his son Malambule, who was to be released in five years’ time—would
be a great and unnecessary addition to the hardship of his position;
and it was finally decided that one of his wives and a servant of
his own should be sent to join him in captivity. A few days after
this decision a story was circulated in the colony, causing some
amusement, and a little triumph on the part of the special opponents
of the chief and his cause: it was to the effect that “out of all
Langalibalele’s wives not one was willing to go to him,” and many
were the sarcastic comments made upon the want of family affection
thus evinced by the natives. On due inquiry it turned out that the
manner in which the question had been put to them was one highly
calculated to produce a negative answer. Native policemen, who were
sent to the kraals where they were living, to inquire which of them
would be willing to go, accosted them with “Come along! come along
and be killed with your chief!” which proposition was not unnaturally
looked upon with considerable disfavour. When, however, the matter
was properly explained to them, they all expressed their willingness
to go, although a journey across the (to them) great unknown
element was by no means a trifling matter in their eyes. The woman
selected in the first instance was one Nokwetuka, then resident at
Bishopstowe, where she was fitted out for her journey, and provided
with suitable clothes.[31] She joined her husband upon the island
as proposed, as also did a lad of the tribe Fife, who happened to
be residing (free) at the Cape, and obtained permission to attend
upon his chief. It was not until some time after, when Langalibalele
had been removed to an adjoining portion of the mainland, bleak and
barren indeed, but an improvement upon Robben Island, that two other
women and a little son were added to the party.[32]

For the son, Malambule, however, there was no possibility of making
any such arrangements during the five years of his captivity, as
he was a bachelor; although when he was captured he had a bride in
prospect, the separation from and probable loss of whom weighed
greatly upon his mind. He could not even learn whether she was yet
alive, as so many women had been killed, and others had died since
from the effects of the hardships they had undergone; while it was
more than probable, supposing her to be yet living, that she might be
given in marriage to some other more fortunate individual, either by
the authority of her relatives, or, as happened in another case, by
that of the Government of Natal.[33]

Towards the end of his imprisonment, Malambule grew very restless and
morose; and, when he found himself detained some time after the term
of years had elapsed, he became extremely indignant and difficult
to manage, being in fact in a far more “rebellious” frame of mind
than he ever was before. On one occasion he showed so much temper
that it was thought necessary to put him under temporary restraint
in the gaol. Apparently he was very wise in giving so much trouble,
for it was shortly found expedient to let him go, though it remains
unexplained why he should not have been set free immediately upon
the expiration of his sentence. He was sent back to Natal, but still
treated as a prisoner until he reached Pietermaritzburg, where he was
finally set at liberty; putting in a sudden and unexpected appearance
at Bishopstowe, where he was joyfully welcomed by his own people.
He did not, however, spend much time amongst them, but hurried off
as soon as possible up-country to find his bride. It is pleasant
to be able to record that he found her just in time to prevent
another marriage being arranged for her, and that his return was as
satisfactory an event to her as to himself.




CHAPTER V.

THE PUTINI TRIBE.


To assist in paying the expenses of the expedition, “Government”
had “eaten up” the small tribe commonly known as the “Putini,” but
properly called the “Amangwe” tribe, “Putini” being, in reality, the
name of their late chief, who died shortly before the disturbances,
leaving the sole custody of their infant son and heir to his young
widow, who accordingly held the position and dignity of chieftainess
in the tribe.

To say that the “eating up” of these people was an utter mistake is
to say no more than can honestly be said concerning Langalibalele’s
tribe, the Ama-Hlubi; but, in the case of the Putini people, the
mistake was a more flagrant one, and, when all was said and done,
there was no possibility of making out a charge against them at all.
Finally the fact stared the Government (both at home and in Natal) in
the face that a tribe had been attacked, members of it killed, the
people taken prisoners and stripped of all their possessions, without
even the shadow of a reason for such treatment being forthcoming.

Major (by this time Lieutenant-Colonel) Durnford specially took up
the cause of this injured and innocent people. It was plain enough
that the Government at home would never ratify the action taken
against the Amangwe tribe by the Government in Natal; and that sooner
or later the latter would be forced, in this instance, to undo their
work as far as possible—to restore the people to their location, and
to disgorge at least part of their plunder:—and it was evident to
Colonel Durnford that the sooner this was done the better for all
parties. The Natal Government would put itself in a more dignified
position by voluntarily and speedily making full amends for the wrong
done, and doing of its own accord what eventually it would be obliged
to do at the command of the home Government. It was also of special
importance to the people themselves that they should be allowed to
return to their homes in time to plant their crops for the following
year.

About May, 1874, it had been decided by the Government that
Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, in his capacity of Colonial Engineer,
should take a working-party to the Draakensberg Mountains, and blow
up, or otherwise destroy, all the passes by which ingress or egress
could be obtained. The chief object of this demolition was that of
giving confidence to the up-country districts, the inhabitants of
which were in perpetual fear of inroads from the scattered members
of the outlawed tribe. They had indeed certain grounds for such
apprehensions, as one or two attacks had been made upon farmhouses
since the expedition. Even these demonstrations were not evidence of
organised resistance, but mere individual acts of vengeance committed
by single men or small parties, in return for brutalities inflicted
upon the women and children belonging to them. They were, however,
sufficient to keep the country in perpetual alarm, which it was
highly advisable should be checked.

The demolition of the passes being decided upon, Colonel Durnford
applied for the services of the male Putini prisoners, some eighty in
number, and induced the Government to promise the men their liberty,
with that of the rest of the tribe, if, on their return, when the
work should be finished, the Colonel could give them a good character.

He left Pietermaritzburg with his party of pioneers and a company of
the 75th Regiment, under Captain Boyes and Lieutenant Trower, in May,
and spent some months in the complete destruction of the Draakensberg
passes, returning to the capital in September. The movement at first
raised violent though unavailing opposition amongst the colonists,
who persisted in looking upon the Putini men as bloodthirsty rebels,
who might at any moment break loose upon them and ravage the country.
But when the whole party returned from the mountains, without a
single case of misconduct or desertion amongst them—although they
had had hard work and undergone great hardships (shared to the full
by Colonel Durnford, who suffered to the end of his life from the
effects of intense cold upon his wounded arm)—the colonists ceased to
look upon them as desperate ruffians, and soon forgot their fears.
Meanwhile the Colonel found considerable difficulty in obtaining the
actual freedom of the tribe, for which he and his eighty pioneers had
worked so hard and suffered so much. Any less resolute spirit would
have been beaten in the contest, for “Government” was determined not
to give way an inch more than could possibly be helped.

However, the matter was carried through at last, and the whole tribe
returned to their devastated homes—including the eighty pioneers,
to whom the Colonel had paid the full wages of free labourers for
the time during which they had worked—in good time to plant their
crops for the coming year. Eventually they also received some small
compensation for the property of which they had been robbed, though
nothing even approaching to an equivalent for all that had been taken
from them or destroyed by the Government force in 1873.

The same party of mounted Basutos who were with Colonel Durnford at
the Bushman’s River Pass affair, accompanied him throughout this
second more peaceful expedition, and remained his devoted followers
for the rest of his life.

The colony was tranquil again, and gradually the immediate
consequences of the expedition vanished below the surface of everyday
life, except in the minds of those who had suffered by it. But one
important result was obtained. England was once more convinced that
the time for withdrawing her troops from the colony and leaving it
to protect itself had not yet arrived. Some such project had been
entertained during the previous year, and its speedy accomplishment
was frequently foretold; but such a proceeding would have been fatal
to the plans of the empire-making politicians. The impossibility
of withdrawing the troops was clearly established by turning a
mole-hill into a mountain—by proving how critical the condition of
the native mind within the colony was considered to be by those who
should be the best judges—so that it was thought necessary to turn
out the whole available European force, regular and irregular, upon
the slightest sign of disturbance; and most of all by creating such a
panic in the colonial mind as had not existed since the early days of
Natal.

It is doubtful how soon the Secretary of State for the Colonies
himself knew the extent to which the operations of 1873-4 could be
made subservient to his great confederation scheme; or rather, to
speak more correctly, how seriously the latter must be injured by
any attempt to set right the injustice done to the Hlubi tribe. When
the Bishop went to England[34] and pleaded in person the cause of
the injured people, there can be no doubt that Lord Carnarvon was
fully impressed by the facts then made known to him. None of the
despatches sent home could in the least justify the proceedings of
his subordinates in Natal. Lord Carnarvon’s own words, expressing
his disapproval of the action taken against the two tribes, and
requiring that all possible restitution should be made to them, show
plainly enough that at the period of the Bishop’s visit to him, with
all the facts of the case before him, his judgment in the matter
coincided with that of the Bishop himself. The latter returned to
Natal, satisfied that substantial justice would now be done, or at
all events that the suffering already inflicted upon the innocent
Hlubi and Amangwe tribes, by the rash and mistaken action of the
Government, would be alleviated to the utmost extent considered
possible without lowering that Government in the eyes of the people.

Certain steps, indeed, were immediately taken. Orders were sent out
for the release of the Putini people, which order Colonel Durnford
had already induced the Natal Government to anticipate; and a further
order was notified that the tribe should be compensated for the
losses sustained by them during the late expedition. In the case of
Langalibalele and his tribe, although it was not thought advisable
to reinstate them in their old position, every effort was to be
made to mitigate the severity with which they had been treated. A
few extracts from the Earl of Carnarvon’s despatch on the subject
will best show the tone in which he wrote, and that the Bishop might
reasonably feel satisfied that mercy and consideration would be shown
to the oppressed people.

The Earl of Carnarvon, after reviewing the whole proceeding, comments
somewhat severely upon the manner in which the trial had been
conducted. On this point he says: “I feel bound to express my opinion
that there are several points open to grave observation and regret.”
He speaks of the “peculiar and anomalous” constitution of the court,
the equally “peculiar” law by which the prisoner was tried, and of
“the confusion and unsatisfactory result to which such an anomalous
blending of civilised and savage terms and procedure must lead.” He
remarks that it was in his judgment “a grave mistake to treat the
plea of the prisoner as one of guilty;” and he says, “still more
serious, because it involved practical consequences of a very grave
nature to the prisoner, was the absence of counsel on his behalf.”
Entering into the various charges brought against the prisoner, and
the evidence produced to support them, he dismisses the magistrate’s
accusation of “general indications, of which, however, it is
difficult to give special instance, of impatience of control”; and
the Governor and Secretary for Native Affairs comments on the same
as unimportant, with the words, “I am bound to say that the evidence
does not appear to me fully to support these statements.”[35]

Reviewing the circumstances and evidence concerning the unregistered
guns, he says: “I am brought to the conclusion that, though there
was probably negligence—it may be more or less culpable—in complying
with the law, there was no sufficient justification for the charge
in the indictment that Langalibalele did encourage and conspire
with the people under him to procure firearms and retain them,
as he and they well knew contrary to law, for the purpose and
with the intention of, by means of such firearms, resisting the
authority of the Supreme Chief.” Of the extent to which the chief’s
disobedience, in not appearing when summoned by Government, was due
to a “deliberately-planned scheme of resistance in concert with
others, or the mere effect of an unfounded panic,” the Earl remarks:
“Unfortunately this was not made clear.” And, finally, referring to
the charge of insulting the Government messengers, he says: “I am
obliged, with great regret, to conclude that this very important
portion of the evidence given against the prisoner at the trial was
so far untrustworthy as to leave it an open question whether the
indignities of which the witness complained may not have amounted to
no more than being obliged to take off his coat, which might be a
precaution dictated by fear, and nothing else.”

Having thus censured the proceedings of his subordinates on every
point, he says:

“That the Amahlubi tribe should be removed from its location may
have been a political necessity which, after all that had occurred,
was forced upon you, and I fear[36] it is out of the question
to reinstate them in the position, whether of land or property,
which they occupied previously. The relations of the colony with
the natives, both within and without its boundaries, render this
impossible. But every care should be taken to obviate the hardships
and to mitigate the severities which, assuming the offence of the
chief and his tribe to be _even greater than I have estimated it,
have far exceeded the limits of justice_.[37] Not only should the
terms of the amnesty of the 2nd May last be scrupulously observed,
but as far as possible means should be provided by which the members
of the tribe may be enabled to re-establish themselves in settled
occupations.”[38] Lord Carnarvon further says: “With respect to
the Putili tribe, I have in their case also expressed my opinion
that no sufficient cause has been shown for removing them from
their location. I can discover no indication of their conspiracy
or combination with Langalibalele, beyond the vague and wholly
uncorroborated apprehension of some movement on their part in
connection with the supposed tendencies of his tribe; and therefore I
can see no good reason for any punishment on this ground.”

The proclamation to the native population enclosed in this despatch
contained the following sentences:

“Langalibalele we release from imprisonment on the island in the sea,
but he shall not return to Natal. The Amahlubi may, if they choose,
when that is prepared which is to be prepared, go to him, but he will
not be allowed to go to the Amahlubi.”

In all that Lord Carnarvon thought fit to say on this occasion he
does not express the slightest approval of any person concerned,
or action taken, except of the “conduct of Colonel Durnford, whose
forbearance and humanity towards the natives” (he says) “has
attracted my attention.” A despatch of the same date (3rd December,
1874) recalls Sir Benjamin Pine from the government of Natal.

Anything more thoroughly condemnatory could hardly be imagined,
although it may be reasonably questioned how far justice was done to
Sir Benjamin Pine[39] by the whole weight of mismanagement being
placed upon his shoulders, while his coadjutor and adviser, Mr.
Shepstone, on whose opinion he had acted throughout, and whose word,
by his supposed knowledge of native ways and character, was law
throughout the affair, was promoted and rewarded.

After perusing Lord Carnarvon’s remarks and directions, my readers
may imagine that some very good result would be produced on the
fortunes of both tribes, but in this supposition they would be
greatly mistaken. Nor, unless they had been in the habit of perusing
South African despatches with attention, would it occur to them how
easily the proclamation quoted from, drawn up by Mr. Shepstone, could
be evaded. The proclamation itself is almost childish in its foolish
way of informing the people that they had behaved very badly, and
deserved all they had got, but would be relieved of their punishment
by the mercy of the Queen, and must behave very well and gratefully
in future. Such exhortations to people who were perfectly aware that
they had been treated with the utmost injustice were rather likely
to raise secret contempt than respect in the minds of an intelligent
people, who would have far better understood an honest declaration
that “we have punished you, under the impression that you had done
what we find you did not do, and will therefore make it up to you as
much as possible.”

The two important sentences of the proclamation (already quoted at
p. 71), however, were capable of being adapted to an extent of which
Lord Carnarvon probably did not dream. His lordship can hardly have
intended the first sentence by which Langalibalele was released
“from imprisonment on the island in the sea,” simply to mean that
he was to be conveyed to the nearest (most dreary) mainland, and
imprisoned there, within the limits of a small and barren farm, where
every irritating restriction and annoying regulation were still
imposed five years after. The words “he shall not return to Natal,”
certainly do not imply rigid confinement to a small extent of land,
where friends, white or black, are not allowed to visit him, or
send the most innocent presents without tedious delay and official
permission. The second sentence is an admirable specimen of South
African art. The people might go to their chief if they chose, “_when
that is prepared which is to be prepared_”—but which never has been
yet.

We give Lord Carnarvon full credit for not having the slightest
notion that this clause would have no result whatever, as nothing
ever would be “prepared.” Year after year has dragged on—one or two
women[40] and a couple of boys being allowed, as a great favour, to
join the old chief during that time. But every difficulty has always
been raised about it, and not the slightest attempt has been made to
enable or permit the tribe or any part of it to follow.

When the chief and his son were first removed from Robben Island to
Uitvlugt, a desolate and unfruitful piece of ground on the adjoining
mainland, at a considerable distance from the nearest dwelling-place
of any description, it was understood that the family would live in
comparative liberty, being merely “under surveillance;” that is to
say, that some suitable person or persons would be appointed by the
Cape Government to live within reach of them, and to be answerable
for their general good behaviour, for their gratification in every
reasonable wish or request, and for their making no attempt to escape
from the Cape Colony and return to their homes in Natal.

Strict justice would have required that the chief and his
people—those that were left of them—should be restored to their
location, as was done in the case of the other tribe, and that
both should be repaid the full ascertainable value of the property
taken from them or destroyed; but politicians in these our days
place “expediency” so far above justice and truth, that men who are
fighting for the latter out-of-date objects may well be thankful for
the smallest concession to their side.

The Bishop accordingly was satisfied that the new arrangement
proposed for the captive chief’s comfort was as good a one as he
could expect from Lord Carnarvon, although not what he might have
done himself had the power lain with him. But when he signified his
satisfaction in the matter, it was certainly on the assumption that
Langalibalele was to be made to feel his captivity as little as
possible upon the mainland—in fact that it was to consist _merely_ in
his inability to leave the colony, or, without permission, the land
assigned to him in it. But that such reasonable permission should be
easily obtainable—that as many of his family and tribe as desired to
do so should be allowed to join him there—that no galling restraints
(such as still exist) should be imposed upon him, were certainly
conditions proposed by Lord Carnarvon and accepted by the Bishop.

When the Bishop returned to Natal, however, he left behind him in
England one who, closely following upon his steps, undid much of the
work which the other had done. Mr. Shepstone could have brought no
new light to bear upon the subject—he could have given Lord Carnarvon
no fresh facts which had not appeared already in the despatches,
through which the Natal Government had been in constant communication
with him. It was not likely that Mr. Shepstone should possess
information hitherto unknown to the rest of the world, including Lord
Carnarvon himself, which should have the power of entirely altering
the latter’s deliberately-formed judgment upon the subject under
consideration. But had this been so, Lord Carnarvon would assuredly
have communicated the fact to the Bishop, with whom he had parted in
complete unanimity of opinion, and to whom, and through whom to the
unhappy chief, promises had been made and hopes held out, destined,
apparently, never to be fulfilled.

It is needless to conjecture what may have passed between Lord
Carnarvon and the man who reached England somewhat under a cloud,
with certain errors to answer for to a chief who was well up in facts
beforehand, but who, in 1876, appears as Sir Theophilus Shepstone,
K.C.M.G., with a commission as administrator of the Transvaal hidden
in the depths of his pocket. The facts speak for themselves. The
desire of the Secretary of State to achieve confederation in South
Africa (the South African Empire!), the peculiar capabilities of Mr.
Shepstone for dealing with the native and Dutch races of the country,
and the considerable check which “strict justice” to the injured
tribes would be to the great confederation scheme, are sufficient
grounds for believing that absolution for the past, and immunity
from the consequences of his acts were purchased by the engagement,
on Mr. Shepstone’s part, to carry out in quiet and successful manner
the first decided step towards the great project of confederation and
empire, namely, the annexation of the Transvaal. In the light cast by
succeeding events, it is plain that nothing would have been much more
inconvenient in the scheme of South African politics than any measure
which would be a censure upon Mr. Shepstone, or prevent his promotion
to a higher office in the State.

That no such alteration in the opinion of the Secretary of State ever
took place may be gathered from his very decided though courteous
replies to the appeals made to him from the colony, to the addresses
from the Legislative Council and other colonists, containing
protests against Lord Carnarvon’s decisions, and professing to give
additional evidence against the tribes in question which would
completely justify the proceedings of the colonial Government, and
the severities of their punishment.

To all that could be thus alleged Lord Carnarvon replies: “I did
not form my opinion until I had received and considered the fullest
explanation which the Government whose acts are questioned desired
to place before me, and in considering the case I had the advantage
of personal communication with an officer who was specially deputed
to represent the Government of Natal before me, and who, from his
knowledge, ability, and experience, was perhaps better qualified than
any other to discharge the duty which was confided to him. I fail to
find in the present documents the explanations which are promised in
the address to Her Majesty, or indeed any evidence so specific or
conclusive as to affect the opinion which, after the most anxious
consideration, Her Majesty’s Government formed upon this case.”—(P.
P. [C. 1342-1] p. 45.)

In another despatch of the same date (July 27, 1875, [C. 1342-1] p.
46), addressed to the officer administering the Government, Natal,
he concludes: “As there is apparently no prospect of arriving at
an agreement of opinion on several points, there is, perhaps, no
advantage in continuing the discussion of them.” Nevertheless,
although holding so clear and decided a judgment, Lord Carnarvon
permitted his just and humane directions for the treatment of the
injured tribes to be practically set aside by those in authority
under him.[41]




CHAPTER VI.

SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

WHAT HE CAME FOR, WHAT HE DID, AND WHAT HE DID NOT DO.


England, however, was beginning to feel that her South African
possessions were in an unsettled condition, although in point of fact
they were quiet enough until she meddled with them in the blundering
well-meaning fashion in which she has handled them ever since. It was
patent, indeed, that some interference was required, when innocent
tribes were liable to such cruel injustice as that inflicted upon
the Ama-Hlubi and Amangwe in 1873, and, if her interference was
honestly intended on their behalf, she has at least the credit of the
“well-meaning” attributed to her above. Whatever her intentions may
have been, however, the result has been a progress from bad to worse,
culminating at last in the late unhappy Zulu War.

It is believed by many that England possesses but one man upon whom
she can place any reliance in times of difficulty and danger, and
accordingly Natal shortly received notice that Sir Garnet Wolseley
was coming to “settle her affairs;” and the Natalians, with feelings
varying from humble and delighted respect to bitter and suspicious
contempt, prepared themselves to be set straight—or not—according to
their different sentiments.

The great man and his “brilliant staff,” as it was soon popularly
called by the colonists—not without a touch of humour—arrived in
Natal upon the last day of March, 1875, and on the 1st of April he
took the oaths as Administrator of the Government at Pietermaritzburg.

He immediately commenced a series of entertainments, calculated by
their unusual number and brilliancy to dazzle the eyes of young
Natalian damsels. These latter, accustomed as they were to very
occasional and comparatively quiet festivities, and balls at which
a few of the subalterns of the small garrison at Fort Napier were
their most valued partners, found themselves in a new world of a most
fascinating description, all ablaze with gold and scarlet, V.C.’s,
C.B.’s, titles, and clever authors. And, what was more, all these
striking personages paid them the most gracious attentions—attentions
which varied according to the importance of the young ladies’
male relatives to the political scheme afoot. Meanwhile dinner
after dinner was given to the said relatives; Sir Garnet Wolseley
entertained the whole world, great and small, and the different
members of his staff had each his separate duty to perform—his list
of people to be “fascinated” in one way or another. For a short
time, perhaps, the popularity desired was achieved in consequence of
their united and persevering efforts, although from the very first
there were voices to be heard casting suspicion upon those who were
“drowning the conscience of the colony in sherry and champagne;” and
there were others, more far-sighted still, who grimly pointed out to
the gratified and flattered recipients of this “princely hospitality”
the very reasonable consideration: “You will have to pay for the
sherry and champagne yourselves in the end.”

Undoubtedly the conviction that the colony would pay dear for its
unwonted gaiety—that it was being “humbugged” and befooled—soon stole
upon the people. While the daughters enjoyed their balls, their
fathers had to buy their ball-dresses; and while the legislative
councillors and all their families were perpetually and graciously
entertained at Government House, the question began to arise: “What
is the object of it all?”

All unusual treatment calls forth special scrutiny, and it is to
be doubted whether Sir Garnet’s lavish hospitality and (almost)
universally dropped honey, with all the painful labours of his
brilliant staff combined, did more than awaken the suspicions which
a course of proceedings involving less effort would have failed to
evoke. Even the most ignorant of Dutch councillors would be wise
enough to know that when a magnate of the land treated him and his
family as bosom friends and equals of his own, the said magnate
must want to “get something out of him”—even the most untaught and
ingenuous of colonial maidens would soon rate at their true value the
pretty speeches of the “men of note,” who would have had them believe
that, after frequenting all the gayest and most fashionable scenes of
the great world, they had come to Natal and found their true ideal
upon its distant shores.

A vast amount of trouble and of energy was thrown away by all
concerned, while the few whose eyes were open from the first stood
by and watched to see what would come of it. The question remains
unanswered to this day. That the annexation of the Transvaal by Sir
Garnet Wolseley did _not_ come of it, is to that discreet general’s
great credit. And had his decision—that the work which he was
specially sent out to do[42] was one for which the country was not
ripe, and would not be for many years—been accepted and acted upon by
England, the expense of his six months’ progress through Natal would
have been well worth incurring indeed, for in that case there would
have been no Zulu War. But this, unfortunately for all parties, was
not the case.

The popular answer in Natal to the question, “What did Sir Garnet
Wolseley do for you?” is, “He got us up an hour earlier in the
morning;” an excellent thing truly, but a costly hour, the history
of which is as follows: For many years the city of Pietermaritzburg,
known as “Sleepy Hollow” to its rivals of another and, in its own
opinion, a busier town, had set all its clocks and watches, and
regulated all its business hours by the sound of a gun, fired daily
from Fort Napier at nine o’clock A.M., the signal for which came
from the town itself. The gun was frequently credited with being
too fast or slow by a few seconds or even minutes, and on one
occasion was known to have been wrong by half-an-hour; a mistake
which was remedied in the most original fashion, by setting the gun
back a minute and a half daily till it should have returned to the
proper time; to the utter confusion of all the chronometers in the
neighbourhood. But, right or wrong, the nine-o’clock gun was the
regulator of city time, including that of all country places within
reach of its report. The natives understood it, and “gun-fire” was
their universal hour of call; the shops were opened at its sound, and
but little business done before it. But during Sir Garnet Wolseley’s
reign in Natal it occurred, not without reason, to the member of
his staff whom he placed in temporary authority over the postal and
other arrangements of the colony, that nine o’clock was too late for
a struggling community to begin its day, and he therefore altered
the original hour of gun-fire to that of eight A.M. How far the
alteration really changed the habits of the people it is hard to
say, or how many of them may now let the eight-o’clock gun wake them
instead of sending them to work, but the change remains an actual
public proof of the fact that in 1875 Sir Garnet Wolseley visited
Natal.

A more important measure was the bill which he carried through the
Legislative Assembly for the introduction of eight nominee members to
be chosen by the Government, thereby throwing the balance of power
into the hands of the executive, unless, indeed, nominee members
should be chosen independent enough to take their own course. Whether
this measure was looked upon as very important by those who proposed
it, or whether the energy displayed was for the purpose of convincing
the public mind that such really was Sir Garnet’s great object in
Natal, it is not so easy to decide. But looking back through the
events of the last few years one is strongly tempted to suspect that
the whole visit to Natal, and all the display made there, was nothing
but a pretence, a blind to hide our designs upon the Transvaal, for
which Sir Garnet wisely considered that the country was not ripe.

But if in this instance we are bound to admire Sir Garnet Wolseley’s
good sense, we must, on the other hand, greatly deprecate his
behaviour towards the two unfortunate tribes whose sorrows have been
recorded, and towards those who took an interest in their welfare and
just treatment—more especially towards the Bishop of Natal.[43]

From the very first Sir Garnet’s tone upon native matters, and
towards the Bishop, were entirely opposed to that used by Lord
Carnarvon. Every attempt made by the Bishop to place matters upon
a friendly footing, which would enable the new Governor to take
advantage of his thorough acquaintance with the natives, was
checked; nor through the whole of his governorship did he ever invite
the Bishop’s confidence or meet him in the spirit in which he was
himself prepared to act; a course of proceeding most unfortunately
imitated by some of his successors, especially Sir Bartle Frere, who
only “invited criticism of his policy”—and received it—when too late
to be of any avail except to expose its fallacies.

It is impossible to rise from a perusal of the despatches written by
Sir Garnet after his arrival in Natal, in answer or with reference
to matters in which the Bishop was concerned, without coming to the
conclusion that from the very beginning his mind was prejudiced
against the Bishop’s course, and that he had no sympathy with him or
the people in whom he was interested. Far from attempting to carry
out Lord Carnarvon’s instructions in the spirit in which they were
undoubtedly given, he set aside some, and gave an interpretation of
his own to others, which considerably altered their effect; while his
two despatches, dated May 12th and 17th, show plainly enough the bias
of his mind.

The first is on the subject of the return of Langalibalele, which the
Bishop had recommended, offering to receive him upon his own land
at Bishopstowe, and to make himself responsible, within reasonable
limits, for the chief’s good behaviour. Sir Garnet “would deprecate
in the strongest terms” such return. “Langalibalele,” he says, “as
I am informed by all classes here, official and non-official (a
very small knot of men of extreme views excepted), is regarded by
the native population at large as a chief who, having defied the
authorities, and in doing so occasioned the murder of some white
men, is now suffering for that conduct.” While thus avoiding the
direct responsibility of sitting “in judgment upon past events,” by
_quoting_ from “all classes here,” he practically confirms their
opinion by speaking of those who differ from them as “a very small
knot of men of extreme views;” and he further commits himself to the
very unsoldierlike expression of “murder” as applied to the death of
the five men at the Bushman’s River Pass, by speaking in the same
paragraph of the punishment of the chief as “a serious warning to
all other Kafir chiefs ... to avoid imitating his example.” Without
mentioning the Bishop by name, he makes repeated allusions to him in
a tone calculated to give an utterly false impression of his action
and character. “To secure these objects” (the future safety of the
colony and the true interests of white and black) “it is essential
that a good feeling should exist between the two races; and I am
bound to say that in my opinion those who, by the line of conduct
they adopt, keep alive the recollection of past events,”[44] etc.
etc. “I have no wish to attribute to those who adopt this policy any
interested motives. I am sure that they are actuated by feelings
of high philanthropy,” (? simple justice and honesty), “and nothing
is farther from my mind than a wish to cast any slur upon them. Yet
I must say that from the manner in which they refuse to believe all
evidence that does not coincide with their own peculiar views, and
from the fact of their regarding the condition of affairs in Natal
from one standpoint alone, I am forced to consider them impractical
(_sic_), and not to be relied on as advisers by those who are
responsible for the good government of all classes.” In the following
paragraphs he speaks of “sensational narratives oftentimes based
upon unsifted evidence,” “highly-coloured accounts,” and “one-sided,
highly-coloured, and, in some instances, incorrect statements that
have been made public in a sensational manner,” all which could
refer to the Bishop alone. If by regarding the condition of affairs
in Natal from one standpoint alone, Sir Garnet Wolseley means the
standpoint of British honour and justice, and looks upon those who
hold it as “impractical,” there is little more to say. But Sir
Garnet can never have given his attention to the Bishop’s printed
pamphlets, and could therefore have no right to an opinion as to his
reception or treatment of evidence, or he would not venture to use
the expressions just quoted of one who had never made an assertion
without the most careful and patient sifting of the grounds for it,
whose only object was to establish the truth, _whatever that might
be_, and who was only too glad whenever his investigations threw
discredit upon a tale of wrong or oppression. That principles of
strict honour and justice should in these our days be characterised
as “peculiar views,” is neither to the credit of the English nation
nor of its “only man.”

In the second despatch mentioned Sir Garnet makes the following
singular remark: “In the meantime I take the liberty of informing
your lordship that the words ‘the Amahlubi may, if they choose,
when that is prepared which is to be prepared, go to him,’ are
interpreted, by those who have taken an active part in favour of
the tribe, as binding the Government to convey all members of the
Amahlubi tribe who may wish to join Langalibalele, to whatever place
may be finally selected for his location. I do not conceive that
any such meaning is intended, and should not recommend that such
an interpretation should be recognised. I think, however, it may
fairly be matter for consideration whether Langalibalele’s wives and
children, who have lost all their property,[45] might not be assisted
with passages by sea to join Langalibalele.”[46]

It is difficult to imagine what other interpretation can be placed
on the words of the proclamation, or how, after it had once been
delivered, any narrower measures could be fairly considered, or
require further “instructions.”

In subsequent letters Sir Garnet scouts altogether representations
made by the Bishop of the destitute condition of members of the
Hlubi tribe, replying to Lord Carnarvon on the subject by enclosing
letters from various magistrates in different parts of the country
denying that destitution existed; saying that the people were “in
sufficiently good circumstances;” and most of them suggesting that,
should anything like starvation ensue, the people have only to hire
themselves out as labourers to the white people. The Bishop would
certainly never have made representations unsupported by facts; but
in any case it is a question whether we had not some further duties
towards a large number of innocent people whom we had stripped of all
their possessions, and whose homes and crops we had destroyed, than
that of allowing them to labour for us at a low rate of wages; or
whether the mere fact of its being thus possible for all to keep body
and soul together relieved us of the responsibility of having robbed
and stripped them.

These facts in themselves prove how different from Lord Carnarvon’s
feelings and intentions were those of his subordinate, and how real
Sir Garnet’s antagonism. It is not therefore surprising that the
commands of the former were not, and have never been, carried out.




CHAPTER VII.

THE MATSHANA INQUIRY AND COLONEL COLLEY.


In consequence of the threatened action for libel against the
Bishop of Natal on account of statements made in his defence of
Langalibalele, which Mr. John Shepstone considered to be “of a most
libellous and malicious nature,” the Bishop had laid the matter
before the Lieut.-Governor, Sir B. Pine, requesting him to direct an
inquiry to be made into the truth of the said statements. This was
refused by His Excellency through the acting Colonial Secretary in
the following terms: “Your lordship has thought it right to make the
most serious charges against an important and long-tried officer of
this Government—charges, too, relating to a matter which occurred
sixteen years ago.[47] That officer has, in His Excellency’s opinion,
very properly called upon your lordship to retract those charges.
Instead of doing this, you have appealed to the Lieut.-Governor to
institute an inquiry as to the truth of the charges you have made.
This the Lieut.-Governor has no hesitation in declining to do.”
Thereby prejudging the case without inquiry.

The Bishop’s next action was an appeal to the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, which he requested the Lieut.-Governor to forward with
a copy of the correspondence which had already taken place on the
subject, in order that His Excellency might be fully aware of what
steps he was taking.

This appeal contained a short account of the facts which had led to
his making the statements complained of—the trial of Langalibalele,
and the “fear of treachery” perpetually pleaded by many witnesses
in excuse of the chiefs conduct, but treated with contempt both by
the court below and the council, each including the Secretary for
Native Affairs, and presided over by His Excellency. The statements
made by the Bishop—not mere “charges” unsupported by evidence, but
the deposition of four eye-witnesses who might be cross-examined
at will—would, if proved to be true, greatly tend to palliate the
offences imputed to the chief, and should therefore not have been
suppressed by the officer concerned, who had kept silence when a
word from his mouth would have cleared a prisoner on trial for his
life from a very serious part of the charge against him. The Bishop
therefore submitted that the fact of the events in question having
taken place sixteen years before was no reason why they should not be
brought to light when required for the prisoner’s defence.

The correspondence which ensued—including a very curious circumstance
relating to a missing despatch, recorded in the despatch-book
at Pietermaritzburg, but apparently never received in Downing
Street—will be found by those interested in the subject in the
Bishop’s pamphlet, “The History of the Matshana Inquiry.” For our
present purpose it is sufficient to remark that on the 22nd of April,
1875, Lord Carnarvon directed Sir Garnet Wolseley to institute a
careful inquiry into the matter, and suggested that under all the
circumstances this inquiry might be best conducted by one or more
of the senior officers of Sir Garnet’s staff, who had accompanied
him on special service to Natal. The correspondence which followed
between the parties concerned, with arrangements for the summoning
of witnesses and for the management of the trial, are also all to be
found in the above-mentioned pamphlet. The inquiry was to be of a
private nature, no reporters to be admitted, nor counsel on either
side permitted.[48] The Bishop and Mr. Shepstone were each to be
allowed the presence of one friend during the inquiry, who, however,
was not to speak to the witnesses, or to address the officer holding
the inquiry. In addition the Bishop asked, and received, permission
to bring with him the native interpreter, through whom he was in the
habit of conducting important conversations with natives, as his
own Zulu, although sufficient for ordinary purposes, was not, in
his opinion, equal to the requirements of the case, while Mr. J.
Shepstone was familiar from childhood with colloquial Kafir.

In the Bishop’s pamphlet he points out that the course which Lord
Carnarvon had thought proper to adopt in this case was wholly his
own, and proceeds as follows:—a passage which we will quote entire:—

“And I apprehend that this inquiry, though of necessity directed
mainly to the question whether Mr. John Shepstone fired at Matshana
or not, is not chiefly concerned with the character of the act
imputed to him, described by the Secretary for Native Affairs as of
a treacherous murderous nature, but involves the far more serious
question whether that act, if really committed, was suppressed by
Mr. John Shepstone at the time in his official report, was further
suppressed by him when he appeared last year as Government prosecutor
against a prisoner on trial for his life—who pleaded it as a very
important part of his defence, but found his plea treated by the
court, through Mr. John Shepstone’s silence, as a mere impudent
‘pretext’—and has been finally denied by him to the Secretary of
State himself, and is still denied down to the present moment. Such
an act as that ascribed to him, if duly reported at the time, might,
I am well aware, have been justified by some, or at least excused, on
grounds of public policy under the circumstances; though I, for my
part, should utterly dissent from such a view. In that case, however,
it would have been unfair and unwarrantable to have reproached Mr.
Shepstone at the present time for an act which had been brought
properly under the cognizance of his superiors. But the present
inquiry, as I conceive, has chiefly in view the question whether
the facts really occurred as Mr. John Shepstone reported at first
officially, and has since reaffirmed officially, or not.”

Colonel Colley, C.B., was the officer appointed to conduct the
inquiry, the commencement of which was fixed for August 2nd, 1875.

The intervening period granted for the purpose was employed by the
Bishop in summoning witnesses from all parts of the land; from
Zululand, from the Free State, and distant parts of the colony.
Matshana himself was summoned as a witness under an offer of safe
conduct from the Government. He, however, did not find it convenient,
or was afraid, to trust himself in person; but Cetshwayo sent some
of his men in his place. The Bishop’s object was to summon as many
“indunas,” or messengers, or otherwise prominent persons in the
affair of 1858; men who were thoroughly trustworthy, and “had a
backbone,” and would not be afraid to speak the truth; his desire
being to get at that truth, whatever it might be. Thirty-one men
responded to his call, of whom, however, only twenty were examined
in court, the Bishop giving way to Colonel Colley’s wish in the
matter, and to save the court’s time. Four other witnesses summoned
by _both_ the Bishop and Mr. Shepstone were examined, and nine more
on Mr. Shepstone’s behalf, called by him. The Bishop had considerable
difficulty in procuring the attendance of the witnesses he required.
The simple order of Mr. John Shepstone would suffice, by the mere
lifting up of his finger, to bring down to Pietermaritzburg at
once any natives whom he desired as witnesses, invested as he was
in the native mind with all the weight and all the terrors of the
magisterial office; and with the additional influence derived from
the fact of his having only recently filled, during his brother’s
absence in England, the office of Secretary for Native Affairs,
with such great—almost despotic—authority over all the natives in
the colony. The Bishop, on the contrary, had no such influence. He
had no power at all to insist upon the attendance of witnesses. He
could only _ask_ them to come, and if they came at his request, they
would know that they were coming, as it were, with a rope around
their necks; and if they were proved to have borne false witness,
calumniating foully so high an official, they had every reason to
fear that their punishment would be severe, from which the Bishop
would have had no power—even if, in such a case, he had the will—to
save them.

When, upon the 2nd August, the inquiry began, out of the many
witnesses called by the Bishop, upon whom lay the _onus probandi_,
only three were at hand; and two of these, as will be seen, were
present merely through the wise forethought of _the_ intelligent
Zulu, William Ngidi. But for this last, the inquiry would have
begun, and—as the Commissioner was pressed for time, having other
important duties on his hands in consequence of Sir Garnet Wolseley
and staff being about immediately to leave the colony—might even
(as it seemed) have ended, with only a single witness being heard
in support of the Bishop’s story. No others were seen or even heard
of for some days, and then by accident only. The Secretary for
Native Affairs, it is true, by direction of Sir Garnet Wolseley,
had desired Cetshwayo to send down Matshana, and the Bishop fully
expected that this intervention of the Government with a promise
of safe conduct for him, would have sufficed to bring him. But Mr.
John Dunn, “Immigration Agent” of the Government in Zululand, and
Cetshwayo’s confidential adviser, whom the Bishop met in Durban on
July 8th, told him at once that he did not think there was the least
chance of Matshana’s coming, as the Secretary for Native Affairs’
words in 1873, when he went up to crown Cetshwayo (who asked very
earnestly that Matshana might be forgiven and allowed to return
to Natal) were so severe—“He had injured the Secretary for Native
Affairs’ own body;” that is, one of his men had wounded his brother
(Mr. John Shepstone) fifteen years previously, when thirty or forty
of Matshana’s men had been killed—that he would be afraid to come at
a mere summons like this, notwithstanding the promise of safety, the
value of which he would naturally appreciate by his own experience
in former days. Mr. Dunn promised to do his best to persuade him to
go down, but did not expect to succeed. And, in point of fact, he
never came, alleging the usual “pain in the leg;” and the discussion
in Zululand about his coming had only the result of delaying for
some days the starting of the other witnesses whom the Bishop had
asked Cetshwayo to send. On August 4th, however, Zulu messengers
arrived, reporting to the Secretary for Native Affairs the sickness
of Matshana, and to the Bishop the fact that six witnesses from
Zululand were on the way, and they themselves had pushed on ahead
to announce their coming, as they knew they were wanted for August
2nd. Accordingly five of them arrived on August 8th, and the sixth,
Maboyi, on August 5th, under somewhat singular circumstances, as
will presently appear. Meanwhile most important witnesses in support
of the Bishop’s story were expected by him from Matshana’s old
location—Kwa’ Jobe (at the place of “Jobe”)—partly in consequence of
a letter written by Magema to William Ngidi, partly in compliance
with the Bishop’s request sent through Cetshwayo to Matshana himself
in Zululand. William Ngidi replied to Magema, as follows: “Your
letter reached me all right, and just in the very nick of time, for
it came on Saturday, and the day before Mr. John arrived here (Kwa’
Jobe), and called the men to come to him on Monday, that they might
talk together about Matshana’s affair. On Sunday my friend Mlingane
came, and we took counsel together; for by this time it was well
known that Mr. John had come to speak with the people about that
matter of Matshana. So we put our heads together, and I got up very
early on Monday morning and hurried off to Deke, and told him that
he was called by Sobantu (the Bishop) to go before the Governor. He
readily agreed to go, and went down at once, on the very day when
Matshana’s people came together to Mr. John, so that he never went to
him; but, when I arrived, there had just come already the messenger
to call him to go to Mr. John, and another came just as he was about
to set off for ’Maritzburg. I told him to call for Mpupama on his
way, and take him on with him. I see that you have done well and
wisely in sending that letter without delay to me.”

Accordingly these two men, Deke and Mpupuma, reached Bishopstowe
safely in good time. Also Ntambama, Langalibalele’s brother, of whom
the Bishop had heard as having been present on the occasion, readily
came at his summons, though he was not asked to give his evidence,
nor did the Bishop know what it would be before he made his statement
in court. But for the prudent action of William Ngidi, Ntambama would
have been the only witness whose testimony would have sustained
the Bishop’s statements during the first days of the inquiry; and
his evidence, unsupported, might have been suspected, as that of
Langalibalele’s brother, of not being disinterested, and would have
been contradicted at once (see below) by Ncamane’s.

On Saturday, July 31st, the inquiry being about to begin on the
Monday, Magema received a doleful letter from William Ngidi to the
effect that the ’Inkos Sobantu must take care what he was about,
for that all the people were afraid, and would not venture to come
forward and give evidence against a high government official. He
spoke, however, of one man “whom I trust most of all the people
here,” and who had the scar upon his neck of a wound received upon
the day of Matshana’s arrest.

Discouraging, indeed, as it was to find on the very eve of the
inquiry that all his efforts through William Ngidi had failed to
procure witnesses, except the two sent down by him at the first,
the Bishop was utterly at a loss to understand how his message to
Cetshwayo had, to all appearance, also entirely failed with respect
to those men of Matshana still living Kwa’ Jobe, as well as (it
seemed) those living in Zululand.

On August 5th the mystery with respect to the witnesses Kwa’ Jobe
was explained. Deke, Mpupuma, Ntambama, and Njuba, who had come
from Zululand, had all been examined, as well as Ncamane, who,
when called by the Bishop, had replied that he would only come if
called by the Government; and when summoned through the Secretary
for Native Affairs, at the Bishop’s request, withdrew or modified
important parts of his printed statement. The Bishop had actually
no other witness to call, and all his efforts to obtain a number
of well-informed and trustworthy eye-witnesses from Zululand, Kwa’
Jobe, and Basutoland, seemed likely to end in a complete fiasco. But
on the evening of Thursday, August 5th, a native came to him in the
street and said that his name was Maboyi, son of Tole (Matshana’s
chief induna, who was killed on the occasion in question), and that
he had been sent by Matshana to Mr. Fynn, the superintendent, and
Lutshungu, son of Ngoza, the present chief, of the remnant of his
former tribe living Kwa’ Jobe, to ask to be allowed to take down to
’Maritzburg as witnesses those men of his who were present on the
day of the attempt to seize Matshana. Mr. Fynn said that “He did not
refuse the men, but wished to hear a word by a letter coming from the
Secretary for Native Affairs—it was not proper that he should hear
it from a man of Matshana coming from Zululand,” and sent him off
under charge of a policeman to ’Maritzburg, where he was taken to the
Secretary for Native Affairs, who said to him: “If Matshana himself
had come, this matter might have been properly settled; it won’t be
without him!” But the Secretary for Native Affairs said nothing to
Maboyi about his going to call the witnesses Kwa’ Jobe; he only asked
by whom he had been sent, and when informed, he told him to go home
to Zululand, as he had not been summoned and had nothing to do with
this affair. Maboyi had reached ’Maritzburg on Monday, August 2nd,
the day on which the inquiry began. He saw the Secretary for Native
Affairs on Tuesday, and on that day was dismissed as above. Not a
word was said to the Bishop about his being brought down in this way
under arrest, which fully explained the non-arrival of his witnesses
from the location; since, first, their fear of giving witness against
a government official, and now the arrest of Maboyi, had spread a
kind of panic among them all, and deterred them from coming to give
evidence against Mr. John Shepstone—himself a resident magistrate,
only lately acting as Secretary for Native Affairs, and the brother
of the Secretary for Native Affairs himself—merely in answer to the
Bishop’s unofficial summons. Hearing, however, on Thursday from
natives that the case was then going on at Government House, Maboyi
went up to speak with the Bishop, but arrived when the court had
adjourned. He found him out in town, however, just as he was on the
point of leaving for Bishopstowe, and was, of course, told to wait
and give his evidence. Accordingly, he went to Bishopstowe, and
Magema was charged to bring him in for examination on Saturday, the
next day of the inquiry. On the way into town for that purpose, Mr.
Fynn’s policeman most positively refused to let him stay, and went
off ultimately in great wrath, as Maboyi and Magema insisted that he
must give his evidence before leaving town to return to Zululand.

On that day, Saturday, August 7th, the Bishop explained the whole
affair to the Commissioner, and, having obtained a list of names
from Maboyi, requested that a Government messenger might be sent for
the men at once, and the Secretary for Native Affairs was instructed
to summon them. On Monday, August 9th, the Secretary for Native
Affairs replied that he had summoned all these men, except seven,
who were already in town, having been called by Mr. John Shepstone,
and having been, in fact, under his hands—in charge of his induna
Nozitshina—from the very first day of the inquiry. It seemed as if
William Ngidi’s statement was really to be verified, and that these
men had all succumbed to their fears. On the other hand, among these
seven was Matendeyeka, whom William Ngidi “trusted most of all;” and
there might be amongst them some who would have the courage to speak
out and to describe the facts connected with the arrest of Matshana
to the best of their ability. At all events the Bishop resolved to
call them, and do his best to bring the truth out of them; and Magema
afterwards whispered that he had heard from one of Mr. John’s men,
who was present when he spoke with the people (Kwa’ Jobe), that the
men there had said: “It was of no use to discuss it beforehand;
they would say nothing about what they remembered now; but before
the Governor they would speak the plain truth as they knew it.”
Accordingly the Bishop called four of these men—Matendeyeka, Faku
(son of Tole), Magwaza, Gwazizulu—and they all confirmed the story as
told by his other witnesses. He left the other three to be called by
Mr. John Shepstone, but he never called them. That these witnesses
should have been called by Mr. John Shepstone, as well as by the
Bishop, was satisfactory, showing that they were witnesses to whom
no objection could be made on the score of character or position in
the tribe, or as having been in any way, directly or indirectly,
influenced by the Bishop.

But the result was that, as these men were in the hands of the other
side from the time they reached until they left ’Maritzburg, the
Bishop had never even seen them, or had any communication with them,
until they appeared to give their evidence. He was wholly ignorant
beforehand of what they _would_ say or what they _could_ say; he knew
not whether they would confirm or contradict the story told by his
other witnesses; and he knew not on what particular points, if any,
they could give special evidence, and was therefore unable to ask the
questions which might have elicited such evidence.

By this time (August 8th) the witnesses from Zululand had arrived,
from whom the Bishop learned the names of other important witnesses
living Kwa’ Jobe, and at his request these also were sent for by
Government messengers. Unfortunately, through Maboyi’s arrest, some
of the Bishop’s witnesses summoned by the Secretary for Native
Affairs arrived too late on the very day (August 21st) on which the
evidence was closed, and others a day or two afterwards—twelve
altogether—of whom only one could be heard, whom the Bishop had
expressly named as a man whose testimony he especially desired to
take. Upon the whole, Sir Garnet Wolseley, who began by “leaving
entirely in the Bishop’s hands” the difficult and not inexpensive
business of “obtaining his witnesses,” summoned ultimately twenty-two
of them, of whom, however, four only could be heard by the
Commissioner; two (Matshana and Ngijimi) did not come at all; and
three, including a most important witness, were called too late to be
able to arrive till all was over; while four more out of the seven
who had been called by Mr. John Shepstone gave their evidence in
support of the Bishop, as doubtless the three others would have done,
if Mr. John Shepstone had called them.

In the despatch to the Earl of Carnarvon, already quoted from (note
to p. 91), Sir B. Pine remarks: “I think it further my duty to
point out to your lordship that much of the evidence adduced by the
Bishop in this case has been taken in this way (_ex parte_, without
the safety of publicity, and the opportunity of cross-examination);
evidence so taken is peculiarly untrustworthy, for everyone
moderately acquainted with the native character is aware that when a
question is put to a native, he will intuitively perceive what answer
is required, and answer accordingly.” The above is a common but
insufficiently supported accusation against the natives, denied by
many who are more than “moderately acquainted” with their character;
although of course it is the natural tendency of a subservient race
in its dealings with its masters, and possible tyrants. But granting
for the nonce its truth, it would, in the case of the Matshana
inquiry, tell heavily on the Bishop’s side. Sir B. Pine was not
present at the private investigation made by the Bishop, to which he
alludes in the above sentence, and therefore can be no judge of the
“cross-examination,” which the four original witnesses underwent; and
they, if they did “intuitively perceive” what answer was required,
and “answer accordingly,” must merely have spoken the truth; a truth
which, at that early period of his investigations, the Bishop was
_most reluctantly_ receiving, and would gladly have had disproved.

The evidence before the court, however, was given under circumstances
which, if Sir B. Pine’s account of native witnesses be correct, adds
enormously to the value of the fact that out of these twenty-four
witnesses, summoned from various quarters, many of them without
opportunity of communicating either with the Bishop or with each
other, but one[49] failed when it came to the point; and he, a feeble
old man, just released from prison (one of the captured tribe), was
manifestly in a state of abject alarm at finding himself brought
up to witness against the Government whose tender mercies he had
so lately experienced, and contradicted before Colonel Colley the
greater part of the story which he had originally told the Bishop.
This poor creature had been intimidated and threatened by a certain
man named Adam, under whose surveillance he lived after being
released from gaol, and who actually turned him and his family
out at night as a punishment for his having obeyed a summons to
Bishopstowe. He was manifestly ready to say anything which would
relieve him from the fear of the gaol, which he pleaded to Mr.
Shepstone a day or two later; on which occasion he unsaid all he had
previously said, having, as he afterwards confessed, been warned by
Mr. Shepstone’s policeman Ratsha, who asked him for what purpose he
had been summoned by the Bishop, _not to speak a word about_ “Mr.
John’s” treatment of Matshana. But, with the best intentions, the man
did not succeed in making his story tally entirely with that of Mr.
Shepstone’s other witnesses, nor with Mr. Shepstone’s own.

With this one exception the Bishop’s witnesses told the same story in
all essential respects. They were men arriving from many different
and distant parts of the colony, from Zululand, and from the Free
State, who could not possibly have combined to tell the same story
in all its details, which, if false, would have been torn to pieces
when so many men of different ages and characters were cross-examined
by one so thoroughly acquainted with all the real facts of the case
as Mr. Shepstone—men who had nothing to expect from the Bishop, but
had everything to dread from the Government if proved to have brought
a false and foul charge against an officer so highly placed and so
powerfully protected; _yet not the least impression was made upon the
strength of their united evidence_.

The case, however, is very different when we turn to Mr. Shepstone’s
witnesses. Of these, nine in number (besides the four natives called
by both the Bishop and Mr. Shepstone), seven were natives; the other
two being the Secretary for Native Affairs and Mr. John Taylor—a
son of Mr. John Shepstone’s first wife by her former husband. Mr.
Taylor was a lad of nine at the time, but, having been present with
his mother and little sister on the occasion of the attack upon
Matshana, was summoned as a witness by Mr. Shepstone. His evidence
was chiefly important as helping to prove that Matshana’s party had
not the concealed weapons which Mr. Shepstone’s chief native witness
Nozitshina said were left by them in immense numbers upon the ground;
as he stated that he and his sister went over the ground, after the
affair was over, and picked up the assegais, “about eight or nine” in
number.

But it is important to remark that the very fact of the presence
at this meeting of Mrs. Shepstone with her two children, goes
far to disprove the account given by Mr. Shepstone in his second
“statement,” prepared by him on the occasion of this trial, but
which is greatly at variance on some vital points with the narrative
written by him on the day after the event, dated March 17th, 1858,
for the information of His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor. It
seems almost incredible that Mr. John. Shepstone should have, as
he says in his second statement, “made up his mind to face almost
certain” death, not only for himself and all his men, but for _his
wife and her two young children_, on the grounds that it was “too
late to withdraw at this stage” (same report), when at any time
since the “day or two previous” (_ibid._), when the information in
question[50] reached him; according to his account he might have
put off the meeting, or at all events have sent his wife and her
children to a place of safety. The Secretary for Native Affairs’
evidence could of course be of a merely official character, as he
was not present on the occasion. He stated that Mr. John Shepstone’s
letters of February 16th and 24th, 1858, asked for by the Bishop, on
the subject of the approaching interview with Matshana, could not be
found, although they “must have been recently mislaid,” as he himself
(the Secretary for Native Affairs) had quoted from one of them in his
minute for the Secretary of State in June, 1874. Of Mr. Shepstone’s
native witnesses it can only be said that, amongst the seven called
by him only, six contradicted themselves and each other to so great
an extent as to make their evidence of no value, while the evidence
of the seventh was unimportant, and the four witnesses called by both
Mr. Shepstone and the Bishop told the same story as did the witnesses
of the latter, most unexpectedly to him.

Nevertheless Colonel Colley’s judgment, although convicting Mr. John
Shepstone of having enticed the chief Matshana to an interview with
the intention of seizing him, was received and acted upon in Natal
as an acquittal of that officer. So far was this the case, that,
although Lord Carnarvon directed that the Bishop’s costs should be
placed upon the colonial estimates, the Legislative Council of the
colony refused to pay them on the grounds that they were the costs of
the losing party. In his report Colonel Colley gives his opinions as
follows:

“That Matyana was enticed to an interview, as stated by the Bishop,
and was induced to come unarmed, under the belief that it was a
friendly meeting, such as he had already had with Mr. Shepstone,
for the purpose of discussing the accusations against him and the
question of his return to his location.

“That Matyana, though very suspicious and unwilling, came there in
good faith; and that the accusations against him—of meditating the
assassination of Mr. Shepstone and his party, of a prearranged plan
and signal for the purpose, and of carrying concealed arms to the
meeting—which are made in Mr. J. Shepstone’s statements, are entirely
without foundation.

“That Mr. Shepstone at that time held no magisterial position, but
was simply the commander of a small armed force charged with the
execution of a warrant; and that the manner in which he proposed to
effect the seizure, viz. at a supposed friendly meeting, was known
to and sanctioned by, if not the Government, at least the immediate
representative of the Government and Mr. Shepstone’s superior, Dr.
Kelly, the resident magistrate of the district.

“That Mr. Shepstone did not attempt to shoot Matyana, as described
by the Bishop, but fired into the air after the attempt to seize
Matyana had failed, and in consequence of the attempt made almost
simultaneously by some of Matyana’s men to reach the huts and seize
the arms of Mr. Shepstone’s men.

“The concealment of the gun,” he continues, “and the fact that a
number of Matyana’s men were killed in the pursuit, is not disputed
by Mr. Shepstone.

“I confess that I have had the greatest difficulty in forming my
opinion on this latter point, and especially as to whether Mr.
Shepstone fired into the air as he states. _The weight of direct
evidence adduced at the inquiry lay altogether on the other
side._”[51]

Colonel Colley then proceeds to give the considerations by which he
has been influenced in coming to a conclusion directly opposed to the
side on which, as he himself says, lay the weight of direct evidence.
These considerations were threefold. The first is an opinion of
his own, considerably at variance with most people’s experience,
namely, that a story handed down by oral tradition “crystallises
into an accepted form,” by which he explains away the fact that so
many witnesses told the same story, and one which stood the test of
cross-examination, without any important variations.

The second consideration was even more singular, namely, that
allowance must be made on Mr. John Shepstone’s side for the greater
ability with which the Bishop conducted his case; and the third lay
in the statement that “Mr. J. W. Shepstone is a man of known courage,
and a noted sportsman and shot,” and “was not likely to have missed”
Matyana if he had fired at him; “and, if driven to fire into the
crowd in self-defence, it is more probable that he would have shot
one of the men on the right.” The Bishop’s opponents from the very
first persistently put forward the notion that he had “brought a
charge against Mr. J. W. Shepstone,” and this was countenanced by the
Government when they threw upon him the serious task of prosecuting
before a Court of Enquiry, whereas in point of fact the real question
at issue was not whether or no a certain shot was actually fired, but
whether, on a certain occasion, a Government official had acted in
a treacherous manner towards a native chief, thereby giving reason
for the excuse of fear on the part of Langalibalele, treated as a
false pretence by the court, some members of which were fully aware
of the facts, and the prosecutor himself the official concerned. And,
further, whether the said facts had been concealed by high Government
officers, and denied by them repeatedly to their superiors in England.

On the former questions Colonel Colley’s report leaves no doubt,
and Lord Carnarvon’s comments upon it are of a very decided nature.
After signifying his acceptance of the decision as a “sound and
just conclusion,” and complimenting Colonel Colley on the “able
and conscientious manner in which” he “has acquitted himself of an
arduous and delicate task,” he continues: “On the other hand, I must,
even after the lapse of so many years, record my disapprobation of
the artifices by which it is admitted Matyana was entrapped into the
meeting with a view to his forcible arrest. Such underhand manœuvres
are opposed to the morality of a civilised administration; they lower
English rule in the eyes of the natives; and they even defeat their
own object, as is abundantly illustrated by the present case.”

Mr. J. W. Shepstone, however, was a subordinate officer, and if
his mode of executing the warrant was approved by the superior
authorities in the colony, the blame which may attach to the
transaction must be borne by them at least in equal proportion.

The gist of Colonel Colley’s decision is altogether condemnatory of
Mr. J. Shepstone, some of whose statements, he says, “are entirely
without foundation,” and, by implication, also of his brother, the
Secretary for Native Affairs; yet virtually, and in the eyes of
the world, the decision was in their favour. To quote from _The
Natal Mercury_ of November 2nd, 1875: “It is still understood that
Mr. Shepstone, in the minds of impartial judges, stands more than
exonerated from the Bishop’s charges.” Mr. John Shepstone was
retained in his responsible position, and received further promotion;
and his brother was immediately appointed to the high office of
Administrator of Government, and sent out with power to annex the
Transvaal if he thought proper.

We have dwelt at some length upon the inquiry into the Matshana
case; for, since the annexation of the Transvaal was one of the
direct and immediate causes of the Zulu War, and since it seems
improbable that any other man than Sir Theophilus Shepstone could at
the moment have been found equally able to undertake the task, it
becomes a serious question to what extent an inquiry which had no
practical effect whatsoever upon the position of men whose conduct
had been stigmatised by the Secretary of State himself as “underhand
manœuvres, opposed to the morality of a civilised administration,”
may not be considered chargeable with the disastrous results. And,
further, we must protest against the spirit of the last sentence of
Lord Carnarvon’s despatch on the subject, in which he expresses his
“earnest hope that his (Colonel Colley’s) report will be received
by all parties to this controversy in the spirit which is to be
desired, and be accepted as a final settlement of a dispute which
cannot be prolonged without serious prejudice to public interests,
and without a renewal of those resentments which, for the good of the
community—English as well as native—had best be put to rest.”

A dislocated joint must be replaced, or the limb cannot otherwise be
pressed down into shape and “put to rest;” a thorn must be extracted,
not skinned over and left in the flesh; and as, with the dislocation
unreduced or the thorn unextracted, the human frame can never recover
its healthful condition, so it is with the state with an unrighted
wrong, an unexposed injustice.

The act of treason towards Matshana, hidden for many years, looked
upon by its perpetrators as a matter past and gone, has tainted all
our native policy since—unknown to most English people in Natal or
at home—and has finally borne bitter fruit in the present unhappy
condition of native affairs.




CHAPTER VIII.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL.


On the 5th of October, 1876, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G., was
appointed “to be a Special Commissioner to inquire respecting certain
disturbances which have taken place in the territories adjoining the
colony of Natal, and empowering him, in certain events, to exercise
the power and jurisdiction of Her Majesty over such territories, or
some of them.” (P. P. [C. 1776] p. 1.)

The commission stated: “Whereas grievous disturbances have broken
out in the territories adjacent to our colonies in South Africa,
with war between the white inhabitants and the native races, to
the great peril of the peace and safety of our said colonies ...
and, if the emergency should seem to you to be such as to render
it necessary, in order to secure the peace and safety of our said
colonies and of our subjects elsewhere, that the said territories,
or any portion or portions of the same, should provisionally, and
pending the announcement of our pleasure, be administered in our
name and on our behalf; then, and in such case only, we do further
authorise you, the said Sir Theophilus Shepstone, by proclamation
under your hand, to declare that, from and after a day to be therein
named, so much of any such territories as aforesaid, as to you after
due consideration, shall seem fit, shall be annexed to and form part
of our dominions.... Provided, first, that no such proclamation
shall be issued by you with respect to any district, territory, or
state unless you shall be satisfied that the inhabitants thereof, or
a sufficient number of them, or the Legislature thereof, desire to
become our subjects, nor if any conditions unduly limiting our power
and authority therein are sought to be imposed.”

Such was the tenor of the commission which, unknown to the world at
large, Sir Theophilus Shepstone brought with him when he returned to
Natal in November, 1876. The sudden annexation which followed was
a stroke which took all by surprise except the few already in the
secret; many declaring to the last that such an action on the part of
the English Government was impossible—because, they thought, unjust.
It is true that the Republic had for long been going from bad to
worse in the management of its own affairs; its Government had no
longer the power to enforce laws or to collect taxes; and the country
was generally believed to be fast approaching a condition of absolute
anarchy. Nevertheless it was thought by some that, except by the
request of those concerned, we had no right to intrude our authority
for the better control of Transvaal affairs so long as their bad
management did not affect us.

On one point, however, we undoubtedly had a right to interfere, as
the stronger, the juster, and more merciful nation—namely, the
attitude of the Transvaal Boers towards, and their treatment of, the
native tribes who were their neighbours, or who came under their
control. On behalf of the latter unfortunates (Transvaal subjects),
we did not even profess to interfere; but one of the chief causes
alleged by us for our taking possession of the country was a long and
desultory war which was taking place between the Boers and Sikukuni,
the chief of the Bapedi tribe living upon their northern borders, and
in the course of which the Boers were behaving towards the unhappy
natives with a treachery, and, when they fell into their power, with
a brutality unsurpassed by any historical records. The sickening
accounts of cruelties inflicted upon helpless men, women, and
children by the Boers, which are to be found on official record in
the pages of the Blue-book (C. 1776), should be ample justification
in the eyes of a civilised world for English interference, and
forcible protection of the sufferers; and it is rather with the
manner in which the annexation was carried out, and the policy which
followed it, than with the intervention of English power in itself,
that an objection can be raised.

The war between the Boers and the Bapedi arose out of similar
encroachments on the part of the former, which led, as we shall
presently show, to their border disputes with the Zulus. Boer farmers
had gradually deprived of their land the native possessors of the
soil by a simple process peculiarly their own. They first rented
land from the chiefs for grazing purposes, then built upon it,
still paying a tax or tribute to the chief; finally, having well
established themselves, they professed to have purchased the land
for the sum already paid as rent, announced themselves the owners of
it, and were shortly themselves levying taxes on the very men whom
they had dispossessed. In this manner Sikukuni was declared by the
Boers to have ceded to them the whole of his territory—that is to
say, hundreds of square miles, for the paltry price of a hundred head
of cattle.

An officer of the English Government, indeed (His Excellency’s
Commissioner at Lydenburg, Captain Clarke, R.A.), was of opinion
[C. 2316, p. 29] that, “had only the Boer element in the Lydenburg
district been consulted, it is doubtful if there would have been war
with Sikukuni,” as the Boers, he said, might have continued to pay
taxes to the native chiefs. And the officer in question appears to
censure the people who were “willing to submit to such humiliating
conditions, and ambitious of the position of prime adviser to a
native chief.” It is difficult to understand why there should be
anything humiliating in paying rent for land, whether to white or
black owners, and the position of prime adviser to a powerful native
chief might be made a very honourable and useful one in the hands of
a wise and Christian man.

Captain Clarke continues thus: “It was the foreign element under the
late President which forced matters to a crisis. Since the annexation
the farmers have, with few exceptions, ceased to pay tribute to the
Chiefs; their relations with the natives are otherwise unchanged.
Culture and contact with civilisation will doubtless have the effect
of re-establishing the self-respect of these people, and teaching
them the obligation and benefits imposed and conferred on them by
their new position.” That is to say, apparently, teaching them that
it is beneath their dignity to pay taxes to native landowners, but
an “obligation imposed” upon them to rob the latter altogether of
their land, the future possession of which is one of the “benefits
conferred on them by their new position” (_i.e._ as subjects of the
British Crown).

“The Bapedi branch of the Basuto family,” says Captain Clarke, in the
same despatch, “essentially agricultural and peaceful in its habits
and tastes, even now irrigate the land, and would, if possible,
cultivate in excess of their food requirements. The friendly natives
assure me that their great wish is to live peacefully on their lands,
and provide themselves with ploughs, waggons, etc. The experience of
the Berlin missionaries confirms this view. Relieved of their present
anomalous position, into which they have been forced by the ambition
of their rulers,[52] and distrust of the Boers, encouraged to follow
their natural bent, the Basutos would become a peaceful agricultural
people, capable of a certain civilisation.” How well founded was this
“distrust of the Boers,” may be gathered from the accounts given in
the Blue-book already mentioned.

The objects of the Boers in their attacks upon their native
neighbours appear to have been twofold—the acquisition of territory,
and that of children to be brought up as slaves.

_The Cape Argus_ of December 12th, 1876, remarks: “Through the whole
course of this Republic’s existence, it has acted in contravention
of the Sand River Treaty;[53] and slavery has occurred not only
here and there in isolated cases, but as an unbroken practice has
been one of the peculiar institutions of the country, mixed up with
all its social and political life. It has been at the root of most
of its wars.... The Boers have not only fallen upon unsuspecting
kraals simply for the purpose of obtaining the women and children
and cattle, but they have carried on a traffic through natives, who
have kidnapped the children of their weaker neighbours, and sold them
to the white man. Again, the Boers have sold and exchanged their
victims amongst themselves. Waggon-loads of slaves have been conveyed
from one end of the country to the other for sale, and that with the
cognizance and for the direct advantage of the highest officials
of the land. The writer has himself seen in a town situated in the
south of the Republic the children who had been brought down from a
remote northern district.... The circumstances connected with some
of these kidnapping excursions are appalling, and the barbarities
practised by cruel masters upon some of these defenceless creatures
during the course of their servitude are scarcely less horrible than
those reported from Turkey, although they are spread over a course of
years instead of being compressed within a few weeks.” This passage
is taken from a letter to _The Argus_ (enclosed in a despatch from
Sir Henry Barkly to the Earl of Carnarvon, December 13th, 1876),
which, with other accompanying letters from the same source, gives an
account of Boer atrocities too horrible for repetition. [C. 1776].
A single instance may be mentioned which, however shocking, is less
appalling than others, but perhaps shows more plainly than anything
else could do what the natives knew the life of a slave in the
Transvaal would be. The information is given by a Boer. “In 1864,” he
says, “the Swazies accompanied the Boers against Males.[54] The Boers
did nothing but stand by and witness the fearful massacre. The men
and women were also murdered. One poor woman sat clutching her baby
of eight days old. The Swazies stabbed her through the body; and when
she found that she could not live, she wrung her baby’s neck with
her own hands, to save it from future misery. On the return of that
commando the children who became too weary to continue the journey
were killed on the road. The survivors were sold as slaves to the
farmers.”

Out of this state of things eventually proceeded the war between
the Boers and Sikukuni, the result of which was a very ambiguous
one indeed; for although Sikukuni was driven out of the low-lying
districts of the country, he took refuge in his stronghold, which
affords such an impregnable position in a thickly-populated range of
mountains as hitherto to have defied all attempts, whether made by
Boers or by English, to reduce it.[55]

Another important reason alleged at the time for taking possession of
the Transvaal was that the border troubles between it and Zululand
were becoming more serious every day; that, sooner or later, unless
we interposed our authority, a war would break out between the Boers
and the Zulus, into which we should inevitably be drawn. The Zulus,
having continually entreated our protection, while at our desire they
refrained from defending themselves by force of arms, were naturally
rejoiced at an action on our part which looked like an answer to
their oft-repeated prayer, and eagerly expected the reward of their
long and patient waiting.

But, however strongly we may feel that it was the duty of the more
powerful nation to put a stop to the doings of the Transvaal Boers,
even at considerable expense to ourselves, the manner in which we
have acted, and the consequences which followed, have been such as to
cause many sensible people to feel that we should have done better
to withdraw our prohibition from Cetshwayo, and allow him and the
Boers “to fight it out between them.”[56]

We might have honestly and openly interfered and insisted upon
putting a stop to the atrocities of the Boers, annexing their country
if necessary to that end, but then we ourselves should have done
justice to the natives on whose behalf we professed to interfere,
instead of taking over with the country and carrying on those very
quarrels and aggressions which we alleged as a sufficient reason for
the annexation.

When Sir Theophilus Shepstone went up to Pretoria it was, ostensibly,
merely to advise the President and Volksraad of the Transvaal
Republic as to the best means of extricating themselves and the
country from the difficulties into which they were plunged, and
with the expressed intention of endeavouring to produce a peaceful
settlement with Sikukuni, which should protect him and his people
for the future from the tyranny of the Boers. Up to the last the
notion that there was any intention of forcibly annexing the country
was indignantly repudiated by the members of the expedition,
although their chief meanwhile was in possession of his commission
as Administrator of the British Government in the Transvaal. There
were some who suspected that there was more in the movement than
was confessed to by those concerned. It was argued that, were Sir
Theophilus Shepstone’s visit of a purely friendly nature, no armed
force would have been sent to escort him, as he was going, not into
a savage country, but into one which, at all events, professed to
have a civilised government and an educated class. The unsettled
state of feeling amongst the Boers was pleaded in answer to this
argument, but was commonly met by the suggestion that if, under the
circumstances, the armed force of mounted police which accompanied
the important visitor might be looked upon as a justifiable
precaution, yet the possible danger to strangers from the violence
of a few lawless men in a country in which the government was not
strong enough to keep them in check, was not great enough to account
for the fact that a regiment of British infantry was hastily moved
up to Newcastle, from whence they could speedily be summoned into
the Transvaal. The presence of a Zulu army upon the other border,
where it lay quiet and inoffensive for weeks during Sir Theophilus
Shepstone’s proceedings in the Transvaal, was naturally looked upon
as a suspicious circumstance. There can be little doubt that—whether
or no Cetshwayo obeyed a hint from his old friend the Secretary for
Native Affairs, and sent his army to support him, and to overawe the
Boers by a warlike demonstration—the Zulus were present in a spirit,
however inimical to the Boers, entirely friendly to the English. The
mere fact that the army lay there so long in harmless repose, and
dispersed promptly and quietly _immediately_ upon receiving orders to
do so from Sir Theophilus Shepstone, proves that, at all events, they
and their king thought that they were carrying out his wishes. The
feeling expressed at the time by a British officer,[57] in speaking
of this Zulu army, and recommending that it should be dispersed, that
“it were better the little band of Englishmen (including, of course,
himself) should fall by the hand of the Boers than that aught should
be done by the former to bring about a war of races,” can hardly have
been shared by Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself, or the message to
the Zulu king to withdraw his army would have been despatched some
weeks earlier.

In face of these facts it strikes one as strange that the temporary
presence of this Zulu army on the Transvaal borders, manifestly in
our support (whether by request or not), and which retired without
giving the least offence, or even committing such acts of theft or
violence as might be expected as necessary evils in the neighbourhood
of a large European garrison, should have been regarded, later, as a
sign of Cetshwayo’s inimical feeling towards _the English_.[58]

Mr. Pretorius, member of the Dutch executive council, and other
influential Transvaalers, assert that Sir T. Shepstone threatened to
let loose the Zulus upon them, in order to reduce them to submission;
but the accusation is denied on behalf of the Administrator of the
Transvaal. And Mr. Fynney (in the report of his mission to Cetshwayo
from Sir T. Shepstone, upon the annexation of the Transvaal, dated
July 4, 1877) gives the king’s words to him, as follows: “I am
pleased that Somtseu (Sir Theophilus Shepstone) has sent you to let
me know that the land of the Transvaal Boers has now become part of
the lands of the Queen of England. I began to wonder why he did not
tell me something of what he was doing. I received one message from
him, sent by Unkabano, from Newcastle, and I heard the Boers were
not treating him properly, and that they intended to put him into a
corner. If they had done so, I should not have wanted for anything
more. Had one shot been fired, I should have said, ‘What more do I
wait for? they have touched my father.’”

But all doubt upon the subject of Sir T. Shepstone’s intention
was quickly and suddenly set at rest—the silken glove of friendly
counsel and disinterested advice was thrown aside, and the mailed
hand beneath it seized the reins of government from the slackened
fingers of the President of the Transvaal. On the 22nd January,
1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone entered Pretoria, the capital of
the country, where he was received with all kindness and attention
by the president, Mr. Burgers, and other important men, to whom he
spoke of his mission in general terms, as one the object of which
was “to confer with the Government and people of the Transvaal, with
the object of initiating a new state of things which would guarantee
security for the future.”[59]

On April 9th, 1879, Sir T. Shepstone informed President Burgers that
“the extension over the Transvaal of Her Majesty’s authority and
rule” was imminent.

The following protest was officially read and handed in to Sir T.
Shepstone on the 11th April:

  “Whereas I, Thomas François Burgers, State President of the
  South African Republic, have received a despatch, dated the
  9th instant, from Her British Majesty’s Special Commissioner,
  Sir Theophilus Shepstone, informing me that his Excellency has
  resolved, in the name of Her Majesty’s Government, to bring the
  South African Republic, by annexation, under the authority of the
  British Crown:

  “And whereas I have not the power to draw the sword with good
  success for the defence of the independence of the State against
  a superior power like that of England, and in consideration of
  the welfare of the whole of South Africa, moreover, feel totally
  disinclined to involve its white inhabitants in a disastrous war,
  without having employed beforehand all means to secure the rights
  of the people in a peaceable way:

  “So, I, in the name and by the authority of the Government and
  the people of the South African Republic, do hereby solemnly
  protest against the intended annexation.

  “Given under my hand and under the Seal of the State at the
  Government Office at Pretoria, on this the 11th day of April, in
  the year 1877.
                              (Signed)     “THOMAS BURGERS,
                                                  “State President.”

A strong protest was handed in on the same date by the Executive
Council, in which it was stated “the people, by memorials or
otherwise, have, by a large majority, plainly stated that they are
averse to it” (annexation).

On April 17th, 1877, Sir T. Shepstone writes to Lord Carnarvon:
“On Thursday last, the 12th instant, I found myself in a position
to issue the proclamations necessary for annexing[60] the South
African Republic, commonly known as the Transvaal, to Her Majesty’s
dominions, and for assuming the administration thereof.” P. P. [C.
1776] pp. 152-56.

His intentions had been so carefully concealed, the proclamation took
the people so completely by surprise; that it was received in what
might be called a dead silence, which silence was taken to be of that
nature which “gives consent.”

It has been amply shown since that the real feeling of the country
was exceedingly averse to English interference with its liberties,
and that the congratulatory addresses presented, and demonstrations
made in favour of what had been done, were but expressions of feeling
from the foreign element in the Transvaal, and got up by a few
people personally interested on the side of English authority. But
at the time they were made to appear as genuine expressions of Boer
opinions favourable to the annexation, which was looked upon as a
master-stroke of policy and a singular success.

It was some time before the Transvaalers recovered from the stunning
effects of the blow by which they had been deprived of their
liberties, and meanwhile the new Government made rapid advances, and
vigorous attempts at winning popularity amongst the people. Sir T.
Shepstone hastened to fill up every office under him with his own
men, although there were great flourishes of trumpets concerning
preserving the rights of the people to the greatest extent possible,
and keeping the original men in office wherever practicable. The
first stroke by which popularity was aimed at was that of remitting
the war taxes levied upon the white population (though unpaid)
to meet the expenses of the war with Sikukuni. It became apparent
at this point what an empty sham was our proposed protection of
Sikukuni, and how little the oppression under which he and his people
suffered had really called forth our interference. Sir T. Shepstone,
while remitting, as stated, the tax upon the Boers, insisted upon the
payment in full of the fine in cattle levied by them upon Sikukuni’s
people. So sternly did he carry out the very oppressions which he
came to put an end to, that a portion of the cattle paid towards
the fine (two thousand head, a large number, in the reduced and
impoverished state of the people) were sent back, by his orders, on
the grounds that they were too small and in poor condition, with the
accompanying message that better ones must be sent in their place. A
commission (composed of Captain Clarke, R.A., and Mr. Osborne) was
sent, before the annexation, by Sir T. Shepstone, to inquire into a
treaty pressed by the Boers upon Sikukuni, and rejected by him, as
it contained a condition by which he was to pay taxes, and thereby
come under the Transvaal Government.[61] To these gentlemen “Sikukuni
stated that the English were great and he was little [C. 1776, p.
147], that he wanted them to save him from the Boers, who hunted him
to and fro, and shot his people down like wild game. He had lost
two thousand men” (this included those who submitted to the Boers)
“by the war, ten brothers, and four sons.... He could not trust
the Boers as they were always deceiving him.” After saying that “he
wished to be like Moshesh” (a British subject), and be “happy and at
peace,” he “asked whether he ought to pay the two thousand head of
cattle, seeing that the war was not of his making.”

“To this we replied,” say the Commissioners, “that it was the custom
of us English, when we made an engagement, to fulfil it, cost what it
might; that our word was our word.”

Small wonder if the oppressed and persecuted people and their chief
at last resented such treatment, or that some of them should have
shown that resentment in a manner decided enough to call for military
proceedings on the part of the new Government of the Transvaal.
In point of fact, however, it was not Sikukuni, but his sister—a
chieftainess herself—whose people, by a quarrel with and raid upon
natives living under our protection, brought on the second or English
“Sikukuni war.”

Turning to the other chief pretext for the annexation of the
Transvaal, the disturbed condition of the Zulu border, we find
precisely the same policy carried out. When it was first announced
that the English had taken possession of the country of their
enemies, the Zulus, figuratively speaking, threw up their caps, and
rejoiced greatly. They thought that now at last, after years of
patient waiting, and painful repression of angry feelings at the
desire of the Natal Government, they were to receive their reward in
a just acknowledgment of the claims which Sir T. Shepstone had so
long supported, and which he was now in a position to confirm.

But the quiet submission of the Boers would not have lasted, even
upon the surface, had their new Governor shown the slightest sign
of leaning to the Zulu side on the bitter boundary question; and as
Sir T. Shepstone fancied that the power of his word was great enough
with the Zulus to make them submit, however unwillingly, there was
small chance of their receiving a rood of land at his hands. He had
lost sight of, or never comprehended the fact, that that power was
built upon the strong belief which existed in the minds of the Zulu
king and people with regard to the justice and honesty of the English
Government. This feeling is amply illustrated by the messages from
the Zulu king, quoted in our chapter upon the Disputed Territory, and
elsewhere in this volume, and need therefore only be alluded to here.

But this belief, so far as Sir T. Shepstone is concerned, was
destroyed when the Zulus found that, far from acting according to his
often-repeated words, their quondam friend had turned against them,
and espoused the cause of their enemies, whom, at his desire, they
had refrained these many years from attacking, when they could have
done so without coming into collision with the English.

The Zulus, indeed, still believed in the English, and in the Natal
Government; but they considered that Sir T. Shepstone, in undertaking
the government of the Boers, had become a Boer himself, or, as
Cetshwayo himself said, his old friend and father’s back, which
had carried him so long, had become too rough for him—if he could
carry him no longer he would get down, and go to a man his equal
in Pietermaritzburg (meaning Sir Henry Bulwer, Lieut.-Governor of
Natal), who would be willing and able to take him up.

It is a curious fact, and one worthy of note, that Sir T. Shepstone,
who for so many years had held and expressed an opinion favourable
to the Zulus on this most important boundary question, should yet
have studied it so little that, when he had been for six months
Administrator of the Transvaal, with all evidence, written or oral,
official or otherwise, at his command, he could say, speaking of a
conversation which he held with some Dutch farmers at Utrecht—Parl.
p. (2079, p. 51-4): “I then learned for the first time, what
has since been proved by evidence the most incontrovertible,
overwhelming, and clear, that this boundary line[62] had been
formally and mutually agreed upon, and had been formally ratified by
the giving and receiving of tokens of thanks, and that the beacons
had been built up in the presence of the President and members of the
Executive Council of the Republic, in presence of Commissioners from
both Panda and Cetshwayo, and that the spot on which every beacon was
to stand was indicated by the Zulu Commissioners themselves placing
the first stones on it.

“I shall shortly transmit to your Lordship” (the Secretary of State
for the Colonies) “the further evidence on the subject that has been
furnished to me.” This “further evidence,” if forwarded, does not
appear in the Blue-books. It is plain that the Border Commissioners
of 1878 found both the “evidence the most incontrovertible,
overwhelming, and clear,” and the “further evidence” promised,
utterly worthless for the purpose of proving the case of the Boers;
but, even had it been otherwise, Sir T. Shepstone’s confession
of ignorance up to so late a date on this most vital question is
singularly self-condemnatory.

“When I approached the question,”[63] he says, “I did so supposing
that the rights of the Transvaal to land on the Zulu border had very
slender foundation. I believed, from the representations which had
been systematically made by the Zulus to the Natal Government on
the subject, of which I was fully aware from the position I held in
Natal, that the beacons along the boundary line had been erected by
the Republican Government, in opposition to the wishes, and in spite
of the protests, of the Zulu authorities.[64]

“I, therefore, made no claims or demand whatever for land. I invited
Cetshwayo to give me his views regarding a boundary, when I informed
him from Pretoria that I should visit Utrecht on the tour I then
contemplated making. When I met the Zulu prime minister and the
indunas on the 18th October last” (six weeks before he discovered,
in conversation with some Boers, the “evidence incontrovertible,
overwhelming, and clear”), “on the Blood River, I was fully prepared,
if it should be insisted on by the Zulus, as I then thought it might
justly be, to give up a tract of country which had from thirteen
to sixteen years been occupied by Transvaal farmers, and to whose
farms title-deeds had been issued by the late Government; and I
contemplated making compensation to those farmers in some way or
another for their loss. I intended, however, first to offer to
purchase at a fair price from the Zulu king all his claims to land
which had for so many years been occupied and built upon by the
subjects of the Transvaal, to whom the Government of the country was
distinctly liable.”[65]

Sir T. Shepstone, when he met the Zulu indunas at the Blood River,
was prepared to abandon the line of 1861 (claimed by the Boers), for
that of the Blood River and the Old Hunting Road (“if it should be
insisted on by the Zulus,” as he “then thought it might justly be”),
which, in point of fact, would have satisfied neither party; but
he does not say by what right he proposed to stop short of the old
line of 1856-7—viz. the Blood River—and insist upon the “Old Hunting
Road.” If the half-concession were just, so was the whole—or neither.

To these half-measures, however, the Zulus would not submit, and the
conference failed of its object.

“Fortunately, therefore, for the interests of the Transvaal,”
says Sir T. Shepstone, “I was prevented by the conduct of the
Zulus themselves from surrendering to them at that meeting what my
information on the subject then had led me to think was after all
due to them, and this I was prepared to do at any sacrifice to the
Transvaal, seeing, as it then appeared to me, that justice to the
Zulus demanded it.”

In spite, however, of the concession to the Boers, made in Sir T.
Shepstone’s altered opinion on the border question, they were by
no means reconciled to the loss of their independence, although
Captain Clarke says (C. 2316, p. 28), in speaking of the Boers in
Lydenburg district, “they, in the majority of cases, would forget
fancied wrongs if they thought they had security for their lives
and property, education for their children, and good roads for the
transport of their produce.”[66]

The following “agreement signed by a large number of farmers at
the meeting held at Wonderfontein,” and translated from a Dutch
newspaper, the _Zuid Afrikaan_, published at Capetown on the 15th
February (C. 2316, p. 1), gives a different impression of the state
of feeling amongst the Boers:

“In the presence of Almighty God, the Searcher of all hearts, and
prayerfully waiting on His gracious help and pity, we, burghers of
the South African Republic, have solemnly agreed, and we do hereby
agree, to make a holy covenant for us, and for our children, which we
confirm with a solemn oath.

“Fully forty years ago our fathers fled from the Cape Colony in order
to become a free and independent people. Those forty years were forty
years of pain and suffering.

“We established Natal, the Orange Free State, and the South African
Republic, and three times the English Government has trampled our
liberty and dragged to the ground our flag, which our fathers had
baptised with their blood and tears.

“As by a thief in the night has our Republic been stolen from us. We
may nor can endure this. It is God’s will, and is required of us by
the unity of our fathers, and by love to our children, that we should
hand over intact to our children the legacy of the fathers. For that
purpose it is that we here come together and give each other the
right hand as men and brethren, solemnly promising to remain faithful
to our country and our people, and with our eye fixed on God, to
co-operate until death for the restoration of the freedom of our
Republic.

“So help us Almighty God.”

These pious words, side by side with the horrible accounts of the
use made by the Boers of their liberty while they had it, strike one
as incredibly profane; yet they are hardly more so than part of the
speech made by Sir T. Shepstone to the burghers of the Transvaal on
the occasion of the annexation.

“Do you know,” he asks them, “what has recently happened in Turkey?
Because no civilised government was carried on there, the Great
Powers interfered and said, ‘Thus far and no farther.’ And if
this is done to an Empire, will a little Republic be excused when
it misbehaves? Complain to other powers and seek justice there?
Yes, thank God! justice is still to be found even for the most
insignificant, but it is precisely this justice which will convict
us. If we want justice we must be in a position to ask it with
unsullied hands.”[67]

Our first quotation was from the words of ignorant Boers, our second
from those of a man South African born and bred, South African in
character and education. But perhaps both are surpassed by words
lately written by an English statesman of rank. Let us turn to a
“minute” of Sir Bartle Frere’s, forwarded on November 16th, 1878
(2222, p. 45), and see what he says in defence of Boer conquests and
encroachments. “The Boers had force of their own, and every right of
conquest; but they _had also what they seriously believed to be a
higher title, in the old commands they found in parts of their Bible
to exterminate the Gentiles, and take their land in possession_.[68]
We may freely admit that they misinterpreted the text, and were
utterly mistaken in its application. But _they had at least a sincere
belief in the Divine authority for what they did, and therefore a far
higher title than the Zulus could claim for all they acquired_.”[68]
(P. P. [C. 2222] p. 45).

If the worship of the Boers for their sanguinary deity is to be
pleaded in their behalf, where shall we pause in finding excuses for
any action committed by insane humanity in the name of their many
gods? But the passage hardly needs our comments, and we leave it to
the consideration of the Christian world.

A paragraph from _The Daily News_ of this day, November 8th, 1879,
will suitably close our chapter on the Transvaal. It is headed
“Serious Disturbance in the Transvaal,” and gives a picture of the
disposition of the Boers, and of the control we have obtained over
them.

                                            “PRETORIA, October 13th.

  “A somewhat serious disturbance has occurred at Middleberg. A
  case came in due course before the local court, relating to a
  matter which took place last July. A Boer, by name Jacobs, had
  tied up one of his Kaffir servants by his wrists to a beam, so
  that his feet could not touch the ground. The man was too ill
  after it to move for some days. The case against the Boer came on
  on October 8th. A large number of Boers attended _from sympathy
  with the defendant_,[69] and anxious to _resist any interference
  between themselves and their Kaffirs_. The Landrost took the
  opportunity to read out Sir Garnet’s proclamation, declaring the
  permanency of the annexation of the Transvaal. The attitude of
  the Boers appeared to be so threatening that after a time the
  Landrost _thought it better to adjourn the hearing for a couple
  of hours_.

  “On the court’s reassembling, he was informed that
  five-and-twenty Boers had visited two of the stores in the town,
  and had seized gunpowder there, gunpowder being a forbidden
  article of sale. The following day a much larger attendance of
  Boers made their appearance at the court. Seventy of them held
  a meeting, at which they bound themselves to protect those who
  had seized the gunpowder, and their attitude was so threatening
  that the Landrost, on the application of the public prosecutor,
  _adjourned the case sine die_. A fresh case of powder seizing
  was reported on the same day. Colonel Lanyon has already gone to
  the scene of disturbance, which will be dealt with purely, _at
  all events at present_, as a civil case of violence exercised
  against the owners of the stores. At the same time a troop of
  dragoons will be there about the day after to-morrow, and a
  company of infantry in a few days more, while a considerable
  number of the 90th Regiment will in a short time be, in regular
  course, passing that way. The spark will therefore no doubt be
  stamped out quickly where it has been lighted. The only danger is
  in the tendency to explosion which it perhaps indicates in other
  directions.”




CHAPTER IX.

THE DISPUTED TERRITORY.


We must now look back and gather up the threads—hitherto interwoven
with accounts of other matters—connected with what has been rightly
called the “burning question” of the disputed territory, which led
eventually to the Zulu War.

The disputes between the Boers and Zulus concerning the boundary line
of their respective countries had existed for many years, its origin
and growth being entirely attributable to the well-known and usually
successful process by which the Dutch Boers, as we have already said,
have gradually possessed themselves of the land belonging to their
unlettered neighbours. This process is described by Mr. Osborn,
formerly resident magistrate of Newcastle, now Colonial Secretary of
the Transvaal Government, September 22nd, 1876 (1748, p. 196).

“I would point out here that this war (with Sikukuni) arose solely
out of dispute about land. The Boers—as they have done in other
cases, and are still doing—encroached by degrees upon native
territory; commencing by obtaining permission to graze stock upon
portions of it at certain seasons of the year, followed by individual
graziers obtaining from native headmen a sort of license to squat
upon certain defined portions, ostensibly in order to keep other
Boer squatters away from the same land. These licenses, temporarily
extended, as friendly or neighbourly acts, by unauthorised, headmen,
after a few seasons of occupation by the Boer, are construed by him
as title, and his permanent occupation ensues. Damage for trespass is
levied by him upon the very men from whom he obtained right to squat,
to which the natives submit out of fear of the matter reaching the
ears of the paramount Chief, who would in all probability severely
punish them for opening the door of encroachment to the Boer. After
awhile, however, the matter comes to a crisis, in consequence of the
incessant disputes between the Boers and the natives; one or other
of the disputants lays the case before the paramount Chief, who,
upon hearing both parties, is literally frightened with violence
and threats by the Boer into granting him the land. Upon this,
the usual plan followed by the Boer is at once to collect a few
neighbouring Boers, including an Acting Field Cornet, or even an
Acting Provisional Field Cornet, appointed by the Field Cornet or
Provisional Cornet, the latter to represent the Government, although
without instructions authorising him to act in the matter. A few
cattle are collected among themselves, which the party takes to
the Chief, and his signature is obtained to a written instrument,
alienating to the Republican Boers a large slice of, or all, his
territory. The contents of this document are, so far as I can make
out, never clearly or intelligibly explained to the Chief, who signs
it and accepts of the cattle, under the impression that it is all in
settlement of hire for the grazing licenses granted by his headmen.”

“This, I have no hesitation in saying, is the usual method by which
the Boers obtain what they call cessions of territories to them by
native Chiefs. In Sikukuni’s case, they say that his father, Sikwata,
ceded to them the whole of his territory (hundreds of square miles)
for one hundred head of cattle.”

Also Sir H. Barkly, late Governor of the Cape, writes as follows,
October 2nd, 1876 (1748, p. 140):

“The following graphic description of this process (of Boer
encroachment) is extracted from a letter in the Transvaal _Advocate_
of a few weeks ago: ‘Frontiers are laid down, the claim to which
is very doubtful. These frontiers are not occupied, but farms are
inspected (“guessed at” would be nearer the mark), title-deeds for
the same are issued, and, when the unlucky purchaser wishes to take
possession, he finds his farm (if he can find it) occupied by tribes
of Kafirs, over whom the Government has never attempted to exercise
any jurisdiction.’ ‘Their Chief,’ it adds, ‘is rather bewildered
at first to find out that he has for years been a subject of the
Transvaal.’ ‘The Chief in question is one Lechune, living on the
north-west of the Republic. But the account is equally applicable
to the case of Sikukuni, or Umswazi, or half-a-dozen others, the
entire circuit of the Republic, from the Barolongs and Batlapins on
the west, to the Zulus on the east, being bordered by a _series of
encroachments disputed by the natives_.’”

A memorandum from Captain Clarke, R.A., Special Commissioner at
Lydenburg, dated April 23rd, 1879 (C. 2367, p. 152), also gives
an account of the way in which the Boers took possession of the
Transvaal itself, highly illustrative of their usual practice, and
of which the greater part may be quoted here, with a key to the real
meaning of phrases which require some study to interpret.

“On the entrance of the Fou Trekkers into the Transvaal, they
were compelled against their hereditary instincts to combine for
self-defence against a common foe.” (That is to say, that, having
forced themselves into a strange country, they necessarily combined
to oust those they found there.) “External pressure was removed by
success, and the diffusive instinct asserted itself”—which being
translated into ordinary English simply signifies that, having
conquered certain native tribes, they settled themselves upon their
lands, and returned to their natural disunited condition. “Isolated
families, whose ambition was to be out of sight of their neighbours’
smoke, pushed forward into Kafir-land” (as yet unconquered).

“Boundaries were laid down either arbitrarily or by unsatisfactorily
recorded treaty with savage neighbours. The natives, forced back,
acquired the powers of coalition lost by the Boers, and in their turn
brought pressure to bear on their invaders and whilom conquerors;
farm after farm had to be abandoned, and many of the Boers who
remained acknowledged by paying tribute that they retained their
lands by the permission of neighbouring chiefs. The full importance
of this retrograde movement was not at once felt, as a natural
safety-valve was found.”

“A considerable portion of the east of the Transvaal is called
the High Veldt, and consists of tableland at a considerable
elevation, overlying coal-measures; this district appears bleak and
inhospitable, overrun by large herds of game and watered by a series
of apparently stagnant ponds which take the place of watercourses....
From various sources, within the last six years, it has been
discovered that the High Veldt is most valuable for the grazing of
sheep, horses, and cattle; and farms which possess the advantage of
water are worth from £1,000 to £1,200, where formerly they could have
been bought for as many pence.”

“This discovery has opened a door of escape for many of the
_native-pressed borderers_. _The pressure_ on those that remain
increases, and on the north-east and west of the Transvaal is a
fringe of farmers who live by the sufferance or in fear of the
interlacing natives.”

The phrases which I have italicised seem to indicate that the
writer has lost sight of the fact that, if the border farmers are
“native-pressed,” it is because they have intruded themselves amongst
the natives, from which position a just and wise government would
seek to withdraw them, instead of endeavouring to establish and
maintain them in it by force. This latter course, however, is the
one which Captain Clarke recommends. The remainder of his memorandum
is a series of suggestions for this purpose, one of which runs as
follows: “To take away the immediate strain on the border farmer, and
the risk of collision which the present state of affairs involves,
I would suggest the establishment of Government Agents, who should
reside _on or beyond the border now occupied by the farmers_.[70] ...
Each Residency should be a fortress, built of stones and prepared for
defence against any native force.”

Sir Bartle Frere’s version of Captain Clarke’s account, given to
the Secretary of State in a despatch enclosing the above, runs as
follows: “Most of the native chiefs now there have gradually crept
in, under pressure from the northward, and finding no representatives
of the Transvaal Government able to exercise authority on the spot,
have gradually set up some sort of government for themselves, before
which many of the Boers have retired, leaving only those who were
willing to pay a sort of tribute for protection, or to avoid being
robbed of their cattle.”

With whatever oblique vision Sir Bartle Frere may have perused the
enclosure from which he gathers his facts, no unbiassed mind can
fail to detect the singular discrepancy between the account given by
Captain Clarke and that drawn from it by the High Commissioner in his
enclosing letter.

He makes no mention of the _driving out_ of the natives which
preceded their _creeping in_, and which figures so largely in Captain
Clarke’s memorandum, of which he professes to give a sketch. And he
introduces, entirely on his own account, the accusation against the
natives implied in the phrase “or to avoid being robbed of their
cattle,” of which not a single word appears in the memorandum itself.

Properly speaking, there were two disputed boundary lines up to
1879, the one being that between Zululand and the Transvaal, to
the south of the Pongolo River; the other that between the Zulus
and the Swazis, to the north of, and parallel to, that stream.[71]
The Swazis are the hereditary enemies of the Zulus, and there has
always been a bitter feeling between the two races, nevertheless the
acquisitiveness of the Transvaal Boers was at the bottom of both
disputes. They profess to have obtained, by cession from the Swazi
king in 1855, a strip of land to the north-east of the Pongolo River
and down to the Lebomba Mountains, in order that they might form a
barrier between them and the Zulus; but the Swazis deny having ever
made such cession.

In addition to the doubt thrown upon the transaction by this denial,
and the well-known Boer encroachments already described, it remains
considerably open to question whether the Swazis had the power to
dispose of the land, which is claimed by the Zulus as their own.
The commission which sat upon the southern border question was not
permitted to enter upon that to the north of the Pongolo, which
therefore remains uncertain. The one fact generally known, however,
is undoubtedly favourable to the Zulu claim. The territory in
question was occupied until 1848 by two Zulu chiefs, Putini of the
Ama-Ngwe, and Langalibalele of the Ama-Hlubi tribe, under the rule
of the Zulu king Umpande. These chiefs, having fallen into disgrace
with the king, were attacked by him, and fled into Natal. They were
ultimately settled in their late locations under the Draakensberg,
leaving their former places in Zululand, north and south of the
Pongolo, the inNgcaka (Mountain), and inNgcuba (River) vacant.

Sir Henry Bulwer remarks on this point—(P. P. 2220, pp. 400-2):

“Sir T. Shepstone says indeed, that there is no dispute between the
Transvaal and the Ama-Swazi; but, as he adds that, should questions
arise between them, they may be settled on their own merits, it is
not impossible that questions may arise; and I am certainly informed
that the Ama-Swazi used formerly to deny that they had ever ceded
land to the _extent_ claimed by the Republic.” But that the western
portion, at all events, of the land in dispute was at that time under
Zulu rule, is apparent from an account given by members of the house
of Masobuza, principal wife of Langalibalele, and sister to the Swazi
king, who was sheltered at Bishopstowe after the destruction of the
Hlubi tribe, and died there in 1877.

“In Chaka’s time, Mate, father of Madhlangampisi, who had lived from
of old on his land north of the Pongolo, as an _independent_ chief,
not under Swazi rule, gave, without fighting, his allegiance to
Chaka; and from that time to this the district in question has been
under Zulu rule, the Swazi king having never at any time exercised
any authority over it.” The same statement applies to several other
tribes living north, and on either side of the Pongolo, amongst them
those of Langalibalele and Putini.

“Madhlangampisi’s land was transferred by the Boer Government as
late as January 17th, 1877, to the executors of the late Mr.
M’Corkindale, and now goes by the name of ‘Londina,’ in which is
the hamlet of ‘Derby.’... We are perfectly aware that the southern
portion of the block is held by command of the Zulu chief, and
the executor’s surveyors have been obstructed in prosecuting the
survey.”—_Natal Mercury_, July 23rd, 1878.

In 1856 a number of Boers claimed _Natal_ territory _west_ of the
Buffalo, as far as the Biggarsberg range, now the south-west boundary
of the Newcastle County, and some of them were in occupation of
it; and, a commission being sent to trace the northern border of
the colony along the line of the Buffalo, these latter opposed
and protested against the mission of the Commissioners; but their
opposition spent itself in threats, and ended in the withdrawal from
Natal of the leaders of the party.

Other Boers had settled _east_ of the Buffalo, in the location
vacated by the tribe of Langalibalele, as to whom the aforesaid
Commissioners write:

“During our stay among the farmers it was brought to our notice by
them that they had obtained from Panda the cession of the tract of
country beyond the Buffalo (inNcome), towards the north-west; they
had subscribed among themselves one hundred head of cattle for this
land, which had been accepted by Panda.”

And Sir T. Shepstone says:

“Panda never denied this grant (N.B.—in respect of what lay _west_
of the Draakensberg), but repudiated the idea that he had sold the
land. His account was that, when the farmers were defeated by Her
Majesty’s troops in Natal, some of them asked him for land to live
upon outside the jurisdiction of the British Government, and that he
gave them this tract ‘only to live in, as part of Zululand under Zulu
law’” (P. p. 1961, p. 28). “The cattle they say they paid for it,
Panda looked upon as a thank-offering, made in accordance with Zulu
custom” (1961, pp. 1-5).

In reply to messages sent by the Zulu king to the Natal Government,
complaining of the encroachments of the Boers on the _north_, as
well as the west of Zululand, and begging the friendly intervention
and arbitration of the English, the advice of the Natal authorities
was always to “sit still,” and use no force, for England would see
justice done in the end.[72]

From all this it would appear that the claim of Cetshwayo to land
north of the Pongolo was not an “aggressive act,” without any real
foundation in right, and merely a defiant challenge intended to
provoke war; but was a just claim, according to the tests applied
by Sir Bartle Frere—(P. p. 2222, p. 29)—viz. “actual occupation and
exercise of sovereign rights.”

The subject is fully gone into, and further evidence produced, in the
Bishop of Natal’s pamphlet, “Extracts from the Blue-Books;” but the
main facts are as here stated.

On turning to the subject of the better known border dispute, between
the Zulus and the Transvaal Boers on the east, we are confronted at
once by the fact that the decision of the Commissioners, chosen by
Sir H. Bulwer to investigate the matter, was decidedly favourable
to the Zulu claim; which, after careful consideration of all the
evidence on either side, they found to be a just and good one. This
decision should, in itself, have been sufficient to relieve the Zulu
king from the accusation of making insolent demands for territory
with aggressive and warlike intentions. But as, up to July, 1878, the
above charge was the sole one brought against him, and on account
of which troops were sent for and preparations made for war; and
as, also, Sir Bartle Frere has thought fit to cast a doubt upon
the judgment of the Commissioners by the various expressions of
dissatisfaction which appear in his correspondence with the Bishop of
Natal; it will be necessary for us to enter fully into the matter, in
order to understand the extent to which the question bore fruit in
the Zulu War.

In 1861 Cetshwayo demanded from the Transvaal Government the persons
of four fugitives, who had escaped at the time of the Civil War of
1856, and had taken refuge amongst the Boers. One of these fugitives
was a younger son of Umpande, by name Umtonga, who took refuge
at first in Natal; from whence, however, he carried on political
intrigues in Zululand, with the assistance of his mother, which
resulted in the death of the latter and in a message from Cetshwayo
to the Natal Government, complaining of Umtonga’s conduct, and
requesting that he should be placed in his hands. This was refused,
but the Government undertook to place the young man under the
supervision of an old and trusted colonial chief, Zatshuke, living
in the centre of the colony. Umtonga professed to accept and to be
grateful for this arrangement; but, upon the first step being taken
to carry it out, he fired twice at the policeman who was sent to
conduct him to Zatshuke, but missed him, and then escaped to the
Transvaal territory.

From thence he, with another brother, and two indunas (captains)
were given up to Cetshwayo by the Boers, who required, in return for
their surrender, the cession of land _east_ of the Blood River, and
a pledge that the young princes should not be killed. Cetshwayo is
said by the Boers to have agreed to both conditions, and he certainly
acted up to the latter, three of the four being still alive, and the
fourth having died a natural death.[73] It is this alleged bargain
with Cetshwayo (in 1861) on which the Boers found their claim to the
main portion of the disputed territory—a “bargain in itself base and
immoral; the selling of the persons of men for a grant of land, and
which no Christian government, like that of England, could recognise
for a moment as valid and binding,” even if it were ever made. _But
it is persistently denied by the Zulus_ that such a bargain was ever
consented to by them or _by their prince_. On this point Cetshwayo
himself says: “I have never given or sold any land to the Boers of
the Transvaal. They wished me to do so when I was as yet an umtwana
(child, prince). They tried to get me to sign a paper, but I threw
the pen down, and never would do so, telling them that it was out of
my power to either grant or sell land, as it belonged to the king,
my father, and the nation. I know the Boers say I signed a paper,
and that my brothers Hamu and Ziwedu did also. I never did, and if
they say I held the pen or made a mark, giving or selling land, it is
a lie!” The Prince Dabulamanzi, and chiefs sitting round, bore out
the king in this statement. (From Report of Mr. Fynney on July 4th,
1877—P. p. 1961, p. 45.)

And so says Sir T. Shepstone (1961, p. 5): “Panda, who is still
living, repudiated the bargain, and Cetshwayo denied it. The
Emigrant Farmers, however, insisted on its validity, and proceeded
to occupy. The Zulus have never ceased to threaten and protest. And
the Government of Natal, to whom these protests and threats have been
continually made, has frequently, during a course of fifteen years,
found it very difficult to impress the Zulus with the hope and belief
that an amicable solution of the difficulty would some day be found,
provided that they refrained from reprisals or the use of force.”

The first message from the Zulus on the subject of the disputed
territory was received on September 5th, 1861, in the very year
in which (according to the Boers) the cession in question was
made (1961, p. 7). The Bishop of Natal, in his “Extracts” already
mentioned, records eighteen messages on the same subject, commencing
with the above and concluding with one brought on April 20th, 1876
(1748, p. 49), showing that for a period of fifteen years the Zulu
king (whether represented by Umpande or by Cetshwayo) had never
ceased to entreat “the friendly intervention and arbitration of this
Government between them and the Boer Government” (1961, p. 9). These
eighteen messages acknowledge the virtual supremacy of the English,
and the confidence which the Zulus feel in English justice and
honour, and they request their protection, or, failing that, their
permission to protect themselves by force of arms; they suggest that
a Commission sent from Natal should settle the boundary, and that a
Resident or Agent of the British Government should be stationed on
the border between them and the Boers, to see that justice was done
on both sides. They report the various aggressions and encroachments
by which the Zulus were suffering at the hands of their neighbours,
but to which they submitted because the question was in the hands of
the Government of Natal; and they repeatedly beg that the English
will themselves take possession of the disputed country, or some part
of it, rather than allow the unsettled state of things to continue.
“They (the Zulus) beg that the Governor will take a strip of country,
the length and breadth of which is to be agreed upon between the
Zulus and the Commissioners (for whom they are asking) sent from
Natal, the strip to abut on the Colony of Natal, and to run to the
northward and eastward in such a manner, in a line parallel to the
sea-coast, as to interpose in all its length between the Boers and
the Zulus, and to be governed by the Colony of Natal, and form a
portion of it if thought desirable.

“The Zulu people earnestly pray that this arrangement may be carried
out immediately, because they have been neighbours of Natal for so
many years, separated only by a stream of water, and no question has
arisen between them and the Government of Natal; they know that where
the boundary is fixed by agreement with the English there it will
remain.

“Panda, Cetshwayo, and all the heads of the Zulu people assembled,
directed us to urge in the most earnest manner upon the
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the prayer we have stated.”

This is the concluding portion of the fourth message, received
on June 5th, 1869 (1961, p. 9). The fifth, reporting fresh Boer
aggressions, was received on December 6th, 1869.

In the course of the same year Lieutenant-Governor Keate addressed
the President of the South African Republic on the subject, and
suggested arbitration, which suggestion was accepted by the
President, provided that the expenses should be paid by the losing
party; and during the following two years repeated messages were
sent by Mr. Keate reminding the President that being “already in
possession of what the Zulu authorities put forward as justifying
their claims,” he only awaits the like information from the other
side before “visiting the locality and hearing the respective
parties.”—(P. p. 1961, p. 24).

On August 16th, 1871, the Government Secretary of the South African
Republic replies that he has “been instructed to forward to the
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the necessary documents bearing on the
Zulu question, together with a statement of the case, and hopes to do
so by next post; but that, as the session, of the Volksraad had been
postponed from May to September, it would be extremely difficult to
settle the matter in 1871,” he therefore proposed January, 1872, as a
convenient time for the purpose.

Nearly eight weeks later (October 9th) Lieutenant-Governor Keate
informs the President that the documents promised, upon the Zulu
border question, have not yet reached him; but sees nothing, at
present, likely to prevent his “proceeding, in January next, to the
Zulu border for the purpose of settling the matter at issue.”

But the promised papers appear never to have been sent. The
arbitration never took place. Lieutenant-Governor Keate was relieved
from the government of Natal in 1872; and the next stage of the
question is marked by the issue on May 25th, 1875, of a proclamation
by Acting-President Joubert, annexing to the dominion of the South
African Republic the territory, the right to which was to have been
decided by this arbitration.

In this proclamation no reference is made to the (alleged) Treaty
of 1861 (see p. 176), by which “what is now and was then disputed
territory had been ceded to the South African Republic,” though
it certainly annexes to the Republic all the country included in
the Treaty, and seems to annex more. But no ground of claim is set
forth or alluded to upon which the right to annex is founded, “with
reservation of all further claims and rights of the said Republic,”
nor any reason assigned for the act, except to “prevent disagreement”
between the Boers and the Zulus. And Sir T. Shepstone goes on to say
(1961, p. 5):

“The officers of the South African Republic proceeded to exercise
in this annexed territory the ordinary functions of government, and
among these, the levying taxes on natives. The Zulus, who had been
persistent in repudiating the cession, and who have continued to
occupy the territory as theirs, resisted the demand by Cetshwayo’s
directions, and a collision appeared imminent, when the difficulty
was avoided by the officers withdrawing the order they had issued.”

Nevertheless, in spite of the repeated disappointments with which
they met, the Zulus continued to send complaints and entreaties
to the Government of Natal; which messages, although they never
varied in their respectful and friendly tone towards the English,
show plainly how deeply they felt the neglect with which they were
treated. The English “promises” are spoken of again and again, and
the thirteenth message contains a sentence worth recording, in its
simple dignity. “Cetshwayo desired us,” say the messengers, “to urge
upon the Governor of Natal to interfere, to save the destruction of
perhaps both countries—Zululand and the Transvaal. He requests us to
state that he cannot and will not submit to be turned out of his own
houses. It may be that he will be vanquished; but, as he is not the
aggressor, death will not be so hard to meet” (1748, p. 14).

Sir Henry Bulwer’s answers to these messages contain passages which
sufficiently prove that up to this time the Government of Natal
had no complaints to make against the Zulu king. “This is the
first opportunity the Lieutenant-Governor has had,” he says, “of
communicating with Cetshwayo since his (Sir H. Bulwer’s) arrival
in the Colony. He therefore takes the opportunity of sending him a
friendly greeting, and of expressing the pleasure with which he had
heard of the satisfactory relations that have existed between this
Colony and the Zulus,” November 25th, 1875 (1748, p. 15).

“This Government trusts that Cetshwayo will maintain that moderation
and forbearance which he has hitherto shown, and which the Government
has great pleasure in bringing to the notice of the councillors of
the great Queen, and that nothing will be done which will hinder the
peaceful solution of the Disputed Territory question,” July 25th,
1876 (1748, p. 97).

Meanwhile repeated acts of violence and brutality on the part of
the Boers are reported, and in the Blue-books before us the Zulu
complaints are confirmed from various official sources, by Mr. Fynn,
Resident Magistrate of the Umsinga Division (1748, p. 10), by Sir
Henry Bulwer (1748, pp. 8, 11, 12, 25), by Sir T. Shepstone himself
(1748, pp. 10, 24, 29, 52, 56), by Mr. Osborn (1748, p. 82), and by
Sir Henry Barkly (1748, p. 25). No attempt at settlement, however,
had been made in answer to these appeals up to the time of the
annexation of the Transvaal, in 1877, by Sir T. Shepstone; after
which so great a change took place in the tone of the latter upon the
subject of the disputed territory.

Upon this question we may quote again from Mr. Fynney’s report of
the king’s answer to him upon the announcement of the annexation of
the Transvaal. “I hear what you have said about past disputes with
the Boers, and about the settlement of them,” said the king; “the
land question is one of them, and a great one. I was in hopes, when I
heard it was you who visited me, that you had brought me some final
word about the land, as Somtseu had sent from Newcastle by Umgabana
to say that his son would come with the word respecting the land so
long in dispute, and I felt sure it had come to-day, for you are his
son. Now the Transvaal is English ground, I want Somtseu to send
the Boers away from the lower parts of the Transvaal, that near my
country. The Boers are a nation of liars; they are a bad people, bad
altogether; I do not want them near my people; they lie, and claim
what is not theirs, and ill-use my people. Where is Thomas (Mr.
Burgers)?”

“I informed him,” says Mr. Fynney, “that Mr. Burgers had left the
Transvaal.”

“Then let them pack up and follow Thomas,” said he, “let them go. The
Queen does not want such people as those about her land. What can
the Queen make of them or do with them? Their evil ways puzzled both
Thomas and Rudolph (Landdrost of Utrecht); they will not be quiet.
They have laid claim to my land, and even down to _N’Zabankulu_ (you
saw the line), burned it with fire, and my people have no rest.”

“Umnyamana (Prime Minister) here remarked,” continues Mr. Fynney, “we
want to know what is going to be done about this land; it has stood
over as an open question for so many years. Somtseu took all the
papers to England with him to show the great men there, and we have
not heard since.” To which Mr. Fynney, of course, had no reply to
make.

Within a fortnight of the annexation the Boers on the Zulu border
presented Sir T. Shepstone with an address, stating that during the
last ten or twelve years (_i.e._ from 1861, when this encroachment
was begun by the Boers) they had “suffered greatly in consequence of
the hostile behaviour of the Zulu nation, but more so for the last
two years” (_i.e._ from 1875, when the Boer Government proclaimed the
disputed territory to belong to the Transvaal, and proceeded to levy
taxes upon its Zulu inhabitants), so that, they said, their lives and
goods were in danger (1814, p. 14).

Accordingly Sir T. Shepstone writes to Lord Carnarvon as follows:
“I shall be forced to take some action with regard to the Disputed
Territory, of which your lordship has heard so much, but I shall be
careful to avoid any direct issue.”[74]

“It is of the utmost importance,” he continues, “that all questions
involving disturbance outside of this territory should be, if
possible, postponed until the Government of the Transvaal is
consolidated, and the numerous tribes within its boundaries have
begun to feel and recognise the hand of the new administration.”

These remarks already show the change in sentiment, on Sir T.
Shepstone’s part, which was more markedly displayed at the Blood
River meeting between him and the Zulu indunas. The conference
proved an utter failure, as also did several other attempts on Sir
T. Shepstone’s part to persuade the Zulus to relinquish to him, on
behalf of the Transvaal, the claims upon which they had so long
insisted.

On December 5th, 1877, two indunas came from Cetshwayo to the
Bishop of Natal with a request that he would put the Zulu claim in
writing, to be sent to Sir H. Bulwer and the Queen. The same indunas,
a few days later, with Umfunzi and ’Nkisimane—messengers from
Cetshwayo—appointed, before a notary public, Dr. Walter Smith and Mr.
F. E. Colenso to be “diplomatic agents” for Cetshwayo, “who should
communicate on his behalf in the English language, and, when needful,
in writing,” and especially to “treat with the British Government on
the boundary question” (2000, p. 58);[75] which appointment, however,
Sir H. Bulwer and Sir T. Shepstone refused to recognise; and the
former, having proposed the Border Commission before receiving notice
of this appointment—though the Commissioners had not yet started from
’Maritzburg—did not feel it advisable, as “no such appointment had
been made by the Zulu king,”[76] to communicate to Messrs. Smith and
Colenso Lord Carnarvon’s despatch (January 21st, 1878), which said:

“I request that you will inform Mr. Smith and Mr. Colenso that
the desire of Her Majesty’s Government in this matter is that the
boundary question shall be fully and fairly discussed, and a just
arrangement arrived at, and that you will refer them to Sir T.
Shepstone, to whom has been committed the duty of negotiating on the
subject.”[77]

Meanwhile, however, Sir T. Shepstone’s “negotiations” had proved
unsuccessful, and Sir Henry Bulwer writes to Sir Bartle Frere (2000,
p. 68): “It seems but too clear, from all that has now happened, that
the prospect of a settlement of the question by direct negotiations
between the Government of the Transvaal and the Zulu king is at an
end. The feeling against the Boers on the part of the Zulu king
and people is too bitter, and they are now scarcely less angry
against the new Government of the Transvaal than they were against
the old Government.” He then suggests arbitration as a way by which
the Zulu king “can escape the alternative of war, by which he can
obtain justice, and by which, at the same time, he can avoid direct
negotiations with the Government of a people whom he dislikes and
distrusts.”

The diplomatic agents were never recognised by the colonial
authorities, or allowed to exercise their functions; but a visit
which Mr. Colenso paid to the Zulu king in connection with the
appointment is worth recording for the sake of the glimpse it gives
of Cetshwayo’s habits and daily life, as told by a disinterested
eye-witness.

The king, it appears, whom so many have delighted to represent as
a corpulent unwieldy savage, to whom movement must be a painful
exertion, was in the habit of taking a daily constitutional of about
six miles out and back. Mr. Colenso observed that this was his
regular habit, and during his stay at the royal kraal he daily saw
Cetshwayo start, and could trace his course over the hills by the
great white shield carried before him as the emblem of kingship.

On his return the king regularly underwent a process of ablution at
the hands of his attendants, who poured vessels of water over him,
and rubbed the royal person down with a species of soft stone. This
performance over, Cetshwayo ascended his throne or chair of state,
upon which he remained, hearing causes, and trying cases amongst his
people, until the shades of evening fell, before which time he did
not break his fast.

This description, of the accuracy of which there can be no question,
gives a picture of a simple, moderate, and useful kingly existence,
very different from the idea commonly received of a savage monarch,
wallowing in sloth and coarse luxury, and using the power which he
holds over his fellow-creatures only for the gratification of every
evil or selfish human passion. Cetshwayo ruled his people well
according to his lights: let us hope that, now we have wrested his
kingdom from him, our government may prove a _more_ beneficent one.




CHAPTER X.

THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION.


Sir Henry Bulwer’s message proposing arbitration was sent to
Cetshwayo on December 8th, 1877 (2000, p. 67).

In this message he makes it plain to the king that “the Governments
of Natal and the Transvaal are now brothers, and what touches one
touches the other.” “Therefore,” he continues, “the Lieut.-Governor
of Natal sends these words to Cetshwayo that he may know what is in
his mind, and that Cetshwayo may do nothing that will interrupt the
peaceful and friendly relations that have existed for so many years
between the English and the Zulus.” He then proposes that he should
write to “the Ministers of the great Queen in England, and also to
the Queen’s High Commissioner who resides at Capetown, in order that
they may send fit and proper persons, who will come to the country
with fresh minds, and who will hear all that the Zulus have to say on
the question, and all that the Transvaal Government has to say, and
examine and consider all the rights of the question, and then give
their decision in such manner that all concerned may receive and
abide by that decision, and the question be finally set at rest.

“Meanwhile,” he says, “no action should be taken to interfere with
the existing state of things or to disturb the peace. But the
disputed territory should be considered and treated as _neutral_
between the two countries for the time being.”

Before this communication reached him, Cetshwayo had already sent
messengers to the Bishop of Natal, asking advice how to act in his
present difficulties. And they had carried back “a word,” which would
reach the king about November 19th, to the effect that he must on
no account think of fighting the Transvaal Government, and that he
had better send down some great indunas to propose arbitration to
Sir Henry Bulwer, in whose hands he might leave himself with perfect
confidence, that the right and just thing would be done by him. The
Bishop knew nothing of Sir Henry’s intentions when he sent this
reply; and, in point of fact, the two had separately come to the same
conclusion as to what would be the wisest course to follow.

Cetshwayo therefore was prepared to receive Sir Henry’s proposition,
which he did, not only with respect, but with delight and relief
(2000, p. 138). His answer to the message contained the following
passages: “Cetshwayo hears what the Governor of Natal says ... and
thanks him for these words, for they are all good words that have
been sent to Cetshwayo by the Governor of Natal; they show that the
Natal Government still wishes Cetshwayo to drink water and live.”
He suggests, however, that before sending for people from across the
sea to settle the boundary, he should be glad if the Governor would
send his own representatives to hear both sides of the dispute, and
if they cannot come to a decision, “a letter can be sent beyond the
sea” for others to come. The message continues: “Cetshwayo thanks the
Governor for the words which say the ground in dispute should not be
occupied while the matter is talked over.”

“Cetshwayo says he hears it said that he intends to make war upon
the Transvaal. He wishes the Natal Government to watch well and see
when he will do such a thing. For, if he attended to the wish of the
English Government in Natal when it said he must not make war on the
Transvaal _Boers_, why should he wish to do so upon those who are now
of the same Great House as Natal, to whose voice he has listened?”

“Cetshwayo is informed that he is to be attacked by the Transvaal
people. If so, and if he is not taken by surprise, he will, as soon
as he hears of the approach of such a force, send men who will report
it to the Natal Government before he takes any action.”

“Cetshwayo says he cannot trust the Transvaal Boers any longer; they
have killed his people, they have robbed them of their cattle on the
slightest grounds. He had hoped Somtseu would have settled all these
matters. But he has not done so; he wishes to cast Cetshwayo off;
he is no more a father, but a firebrand. If he is tired of carrying
Cetshwayo now, as he did while he was with the Natal Government, then
why does he not put him down, and allow the Natal Government to look
after him, as it has always done?”

Sir Henry Bulwer expressed his satisfaction at this reply, speaking
of it as a far more satisfactory one than they had been led to expect
(2000, p. 138), and he writes of it to Sir T. Shepstone thus: “You
will see by the king’s reply that he has met my representations in a
very proper spirit.... I have no reason to think that what the king
says is said otherwise than in good faith; and, if this be so, there
seems to me to be no reason why this dispute should not be settled in
a peaceable manner” (2097, p. 26), and he says to Cetshwayo himself,
“The Lieutenant-Governor has heard the words of Cetshwayo. He is glad
that the words which he lately sent to Cetshwayo were welcome. They
were words sent in a friendly spirit, and Cetshwayo received them in
a friendly spirit. This is as it should be,” and he agrees to the
king’s proposal concerning commissioners from Natal, provided that
the Transvaal Government agree also.

The following is the account given by the Government messengers, who
carried Sir H. Bulwer’s message to Cetshwayo of the manner in which
it was received by the king and his indunas (2079, p. 25):

“While we spoke to Cetshwayo, we saw that what we were saying lifted
a great weight from his heart, that they were words which he was glad
to hear; and what he said to us as we finished showed us we were
right in this belief....

“We could see, when we arrived at the great kraal, that the indunas,
and even the king, were not easy in their hearts, and from all we
could see and gather, the chief men under the king did not wish for
war. After the message was delivered, all of them appeared like men
who had been carrying a very heavy burden, and who had only then been
told that they could put it down and rest.”

It is best known to himself how, in the face of these words, and with
nothing to support his statement, Sir Bartle Frere could venture to
assert in his fourth letter to the Bishop, “The offers to arbitrate
originated with the Natal Government, and were by no means willingly
accepted by Cetshwayo;” Cetshwayo having, in point of fact, earnestly
asked for arbitration again and again, as we have already shown, and
rejoicing greatly when at last it was offered him. Mr. J. Shepstone’s
observation also (2144, p. 184), that “To this suggestion Cetshwayo
replied ‘that he had no objection,’” hardly gives a fair view of the
state of the case.

But, before this satisfactory agreement had been arrived at, Sir T.
Shepstone had managed still further to exasperate the feelings of the
Zulus against the new Government of the Transvaal, while the fact
that Natal and the Transvaal were one, and that to touch one was to
touch the other, and to touch England also, had not been brought home
to the king’s mind until he received Sir H. Bulwer’s message.

Before the receipt of that message, Cetshwayo had every reason to
believe that the negotiations concerning the disputed territory were
broken off. Sir T. Shepstone’s tone on the subject had altered; he
had parted with the king’s indunas at the Blood River in anger,
and the messenger whom he had promised to send to the king himself
had never appeared. Meanwhile, the Boers had gone into laager, by
direction, they say, of Sir T. Shepstone himself, and with the full
expectation that he was about to make war upon the Zulus. No offer
of arbitration had yet been made. Cetshwayo had been played with
and baffled by the English Government for sixteen years, and to all
appearance nothing whatever was done, or would be done, to settle
in a friendly manner this troubled question, unless he took steps
himself to _assert_ his rights, and he seems to have taken the
mildest possible way of so doing under the circumstances. According
to the official reports at the time, he sent a large force of armed
men to build a military kraal near Luneburg, north of the Pongolo,
in land which was also disputed with the Transvaal Government, but
formed no part of the (so called) disputed territory to the south
of that river, or as Lord Carnarvon said to a deputation of South
African merchants (_Guardian_, January 9th, 1878): “He (the Zulu
king) had proceeded to construct, in opposition to Sir T. Shepstone’s
warnings, a fortified kraal in a disputed territory abutting upon
English soil.”

But this was a very exaggerated way of describing a comparative
trifling circumstance. The erection of a kraal—not, as so frequently
asserted, a military one, but merely an ordinary Zulu kraal for the
residence of a headman, to keep order among the 15,000 Zulus who
lived in that district—had long been contemplated, and had once,
during Umpanda’s lifetime, been attempted, though the Boers had
driven away the Zulu officer sent for the purpose, and destroyed the
work he had commenced.

Cetshwayo himself explains his reason for sending so large a force
for the purpose, on the grounds that he wished the kraal to be built
in one day, and his men not to be obliged to remain over a night,
while, as Colonel Durnford, R.E., says (2144, p. 237), “the fact that
the men at work are armed is of no significance, because every Zulu
is an armed man, and never moves without his weapon.”

Sir T. Shepstone, however, was greatly alarmed when he first heard of
the building of this kraal, and writes concerning it—November 16th,
1877 (1961, p. 224): “I feel, therefore (because of the irritating
effect of it upon the Transvaal), that the building of this kraal
must be prevented at all hazards.” The “hazards” do not appear to
have proved very serious, as a simple representation on the part of
Captain Clarke, R.A., and Mr. Rudolph, sent to the spot by Sir T.
Shepstone, resulted in the Zulu force retiring, _having made only
a small cattle kraal and chopped and collected some poles_, which
they left on the ground, to be used for the building of the huts
hereafter, but which were very soon carried off and used as firewood
by the Luneburg farmers.

But this did not satisfy Sir T. Shepstone, who sent messengers to
Cetshwayo, complaining of what had been done, and of “finding,” as
he says, “a Zulu force in the rear of where he was staying;”[78]
and saying that, in consequence, and in order to restore confidence
amongst those Boers living on the Blood River border, he (Sir
T. Shepstone) had decided to send a military force down to the
waggon-drift on the Blood River, to encamp there on our side of the
river. Cetshwayo replies that he did not send to have the kraal built
that trouble might arise, but because his people were already living
on the ground in dispute. He admits that of course the administrator
could do as he pleased about sending an armed force to encamp on his
own borders; but he urges him to think better of it, saying that
the Zulus would be frightened and run away, and, if he in his turn
should send an armed force to encamp just opposite Sir T. Shepstone’s
encampment, to put confidence into _his_ people’s hearts, he asks,
somewhat quaintly, “would it be possible for the two forces to be
looking at one another for two days without a row?”

Many expressions are scattered through the Blue-books at this period
concerning “Zulu aggressions;” and Sir T. Shepstone makes frequent,
though vague and unproven, accusations concerning Cetshwayo’s
“mischievous humour,” and the terror of the Boer frontier farmers.

But, so far as these remarks allude to the border squabbles
inseparable from the state of affairs, the score is so heavily
against the Boers that the counter-charges are hardly worth
considering. The only acts chargeable upon the king himself are,
first, the building of this kraal, which really amounted to no more
than a practical assertion of the Zulu claim to land north of the
Pongolo; and, secondly, the execution of a (supposed) Zulu criminal
there, which was an exercise of Cetshwayo’s authority over his own
people living in the district.

For the acts of violence committed by the robber chief Umbilini, the
Zulu king could not justly be considered responsible; but of this
matter, and of the raid committed by the sons of Sihayo, we will
treat in a later chapter.

Sir T. Shepstone himself allows that Cetshwayo’s frame of mind was a
better one after the reception of Sir Henry Bulwer’s message offering
arbitration (2079, pp. 51-54); and says that his (Sir T. Shepstone’s)
messengers “describe Cetshwayo as being in a very different temper to
that which he had on former occasions exhibited;” to use their own
expression, “it was Cetshwayo, but it was Cetshwayo born again.”...
“They gleaned from the Zulus ... that a message from the Governor of
Natal had been delivered, and they concluded that the change which
they had noticed as so marked in the king’s tone must have been
produced by that message.”

The fact that Cetshwayo joyfully and thankfully accepted Sir Henry
Bulwer’s promise—not to give him the land he claimed, but to have the
matter investigated and justice done—is sufficiently established; but
from the Boers the proposal met with a very different reception.

Sir T. Shepstone acknowledged the receipt of Sir H. Bulwer’s despatch
of December 11th, “transmitting copy of a message” which he “had
thought fit to send to the Zulu king,” and then summoned a few
leading men in the district, and laid the proposition before them.
He reports that after some pretty speeches about the “Christian,
humane, and admirable proposal,” which they should have “no excuse
for hesitating to accept, if Cetshwayo were a civilised king and the
Zulu Government a civilised government,” etc. etc., they proceeded to
state their objections. They had, they said, no misgiving regarding
the justice of the claim of the State; and they believed that the
more it was investigated, the more impartial the minds of the
investigators, the clearer and more rightful would that claim prove
itself to be. Nevertheless, they professed to fear the delay that
must necessarily be caused by such an investigation[79] (the dispute
having already lasted fifteen years!) and to doubt Cetshwayo’s
abiding by any promise he might make to observe a temporary boundary
line.

To place the two parties to the dispute on equal terms, they said,
the land in question should be evacuated by both, or occupied by
both under the control of Sir Henry Bulwer, who, they proposed, as
an indispensable condition of the proposed arbitration, should take
possession of the land in dispute or of some part of it. And Sir T.
Shepstone remarks:

“My view is that the considerations above set forth are both weighty
and serious.

“I do not anticipate that, under the circumstances, Cetshwayo would
venture to make or to authorise any overt attack. I do fear, however,
the consequences of the lawless condition into which the population
all along the border is rapidly falling. Cetshwayo, I fear, rather
encourages than attempts to repress this tendency; and, although he
will not go to war, he may allow that to go on which he knows will
produce war.”

The condition of the border seems, as we have already shown, to have
been “lawless” for many years, though the fault lay rather, with the
Boers—whose many acts of violence are recorded in the Blue-books—than
with the Zulus, and Sir T. Shepstone has apparently overlooked the
fact that he himself had just summarily put a stop to an attempt, on
Cetshwayo’s part to “repress” any lawless “tendency” amongst his own
people (of which the Administrator complains) by placing a headman,
or responsible person, amongst them to keep order.

Under the above-mentioned conditions Sir T. Shepstone accepts
Sir Henry Bulwer’s proposal, and informs him that, under the
circumstances, he shall not carry out his expressed intention of
placing a military post in the neighbourhood of the Blood River.

And again he writes—January 17th, 1878 (2079, p. 58):

“It was, however, necessary to point out to Sir H. Bulwer the
difficulties and dangers, as well as the loss of property, which
the white people (Boers?) feel that they will be subjected to by the
acceptance of His Excellency’s proposal, unless he can devise some
means by which their safety and interests can be protected during the
pending of the investigation, _which under existing circumstances it
is Cetshwayo’s interest to prolong indefinitely_.”

The words which I have italicised show that Sir T. Shepstone took for
granted beforehand that the decision of the Commissioners would be
unfavourable to the Zulus.

Sir Henry Bulwer, however, did not see his way to falling in with the
conditions of the Boers, and replies as follows (2079, p. 128):

“I do not see that I am in a position, or that, as the
Lieutenant-Governor of this colony, I should have the power to take
actual possession of the country in dispute. And if to take over the
country, and hold possession of it, is considered by your Government
an indispensable condition for the acceptance of the mediating
course I have proposed, I feel that my proposal falls short of the
requirements of the case.”

On January 29th, Sir T. Shepstone writes to Sir Henry again, saying
that “It was felt that, in consequence of the step which you have
thought it right to take in your communication to the Zulu king of
the 8th December last, the Government of the Transvaal is placed at
a disadvantage, and that the longer action on your part is delayed,
the greater that disadvantage grows. It follows, therefore, that any
action in the direction of your proposition is better than no action
at all; and I was urged to beg your Excellency to take some step in
the matter without delay.”

Accordingly Sir Henry at once sends a message to Cetshwayo,
suggesting the observance of a “neutral belt,” pending the settlement
of the boundary question (2079, p. 132), and mentioning the two
lines, from point to point, which he proposed for the purpose.

The same suggestion was made, of course, to Sir T. Shepstone, who
replies as follows: “You have rightly assumed the concurrence of
this Government, and I trust that Cetshwayo will see in your message
the necessity that is laid upon him to prove that he was sincere in
asking you to undertake the inquiry.”

This ready acquiescence is fully accounted for by the fact, shortly
apparent, that _both_ the lines mentioned by Sir Henry, between which
neutrality should be observed, were within what was claimed by the
Zulus as their own country, and Sir T. Shepstone says: “At present
the belt of country indicated is occupied solely by Zulus. The whole
of it has been apportioned in farms to Transvaal subjects, but has
not been occupied by them.”

Small wonder that the Zulu king, in reply to this proposal,
“informs the Governor of Natal that the two roads mentioned in His
Excellency’s message are both in Zululand, and therefore the king
cannot see how the ground between the roads can belong to both
parties.”

Nevertheless Sir Henry Bulwer hardly seems to fall in with Sir T.
Shepstone’s suggestion, that Cetshwayo’s consent on this point should
be looked upon as a test of his sincerity: “Either,” he says (2100,
p. 73), “he has misunderstood the real nature of the proposal, or he
is disinclined to accept anything which may in his opinion be taken
to signify a withdrawal of one iota of his claim.” And, in point of
fact, though no “neutral ground” was marked off, the Commission went
on just as well without it; all the apprehensions of disturbance and
disorder having been falsified by the event.

Sir T. Shepstone repeatedly speaks of the border Boers having been
forced by Zulu acts and threats of aggression to abandon their farms
and go into laager, etc. etc.; but, on investigation, it is apparent
that this abandonment of farms, and trekking into laager, took place
in consequence of an intimation from the Landrost of Utrecht, under
instructions from Sir T. Shepstone himself; as appears from the
following passages of an address from seventy-nine Boers, protesting
against arbitration as “an absurdity and an impossibility,” which was
presented to Sir T. Shepstone on February 2nd, 1878 (2079, p. 140):

“The undersigned burghers, etc. ... take the liberty to bring to your
Excellency’s notice that they, in consequence of intimation from the
Landrost of Utrecht, dated 14th December last, on your Excellency’s
instructions, partly trekked into laager, and partly deserted their
farms, in the firm expectation that now a beginning of a war would
soon be made.... That they have heard with anxiety and understand
that arbitration is spoken of, which would have to determine our
property and possessions; which we fear will decide in favour of
a crowned robber, murderer, and breaker of his word, who knows as
well as we that he is claiming a thing which does not belong to
him ... for which reason we are sure that such arbitration is an
absurdity and an impossibility. We therefore hereby protest against
all proposed or to be undertaken arbitration; and we will, with all
legal means at our disposal, etc., resist a decision, etc., over our
property which we know would be unlawful and unjust.”

They give as a reason for presenting the address from which these
phrases are taken, “_because it is impossible for us to remain any
longer in laager without any object_,” which hardly looks as though
they thought themselves in daily danger from the Zulus, unless the
“beginning of a war” should “soon be made” by Sir T. Shepstone.
They request His Excellency “to commence without any further delay
defending” their “rights and property and lives;” and should His
Excellency “not be inclined or be without power” to do so, they
further signify their intention of requesting him to assist them
with ammunition, and not to hinder them seeking assistance, of
fellow-countrymen and friends, to maintain their “rights,” and to
check their “rapacious enemies and to punish them.”

And they conclude: “We, the undersigned, bind ourselves on peril
of our honour to assist in subduing the Zulu nation, and making it
harmless.”

Sir T. Shepstone encloses this in a sympathising despatch, but Sir
Henry Bulwer remarks upon it and upon a subsequent memorial[80] of
the same description—February 23rd (2100, p. 67):

“Of course, if the object of the memorialists is war, if what they
desire is a war with the Zulu nation, it is not to be wondered at
that they should find fault with any steps that have been taken to
prevent the necessity for war. Nor, if they desire war, is it to be
expected that they should be favourable to arbitration, though I find
it difficult to reconcile the expression of the apprehensions of the
memorialists that arbitration would decide against them, with the
unanimous expression of opinion, previously given to your Excellency
by some of the leading men of the district, that the proposal made
by me was a Christian, humane, and admirable one; that they had no
misgivings regarding the justice of the claim of the State, and
that they believed the more it was investigated ... the clearer and
more rightful would that claim prove itself to be. Your Excellency
observes that the deep feeling of distrust shown by the memorialists
is scarcely to be wondered at, when it is remembered that they are
compelled to occupy with their families fortified camps, while their
farms in the neighbourhood are being occupied by Zulus, their crops
reaped, and their cultivated lands tilled by Zulus, and the timber of
their houses used as Zulu firewood.

“I do not quite understand what farms and cultivated lands are
referred to; because in a previous despatch—your despatch, No. 7, of
February 5th—your Excellency, in referring to the disputed territory,
states, so I understand, that it ‘_is at present occupied solely by
Zulus_,’ and that, although the whole of it has been apportioned in
farms to Transvaal subjects, _it has not been occupied by them_.’”

The matter was referred to the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere,
and the appointment of a commission was approved by him. He plainly
took it for granted that, as Sir T. Shepstone had said, the Transvaal
claim was based on “evidence the most incontrovertible, overwhelming,
and clear,” and looked to the commission for the double advantage of
enabling Sir T. Shepstone “to clear up or put on record, in a form
calculated to satisfy Her Majesty’s Government, an answer to all
doubts as to the facts and equity of the question,” and of gaining
time for preparing a military force to silence and subjugate the
Zulus should they object (as he expected) to such an award. That
nothing short of military coercion of the Zulus would settle the
matter, was evidently Sir Bartle Frere’s fixed idea; in fact that was
the foregone conclusion with him from beginning to end.

On February 12th, Sir Henry Bulwer sent a message to Cetshwayo (2079,
p. 140), to this effect:

“The Lieut.-Governor now sends to let Cetshwayo know that he has
selected, for the purpose of holding this inquiry, the Queen’s
Attorney-General in Natal (Hon. M. H. Gallway, Esq.), the Secretary
for Native Affairs (Hon. J. W. Shepstone, Esq.), and Colonel
Durnford, an officer in the Queen’s army.

“These gentlemen will proceed by-and-by to the place known as Rorke’s
Drift, which is on the Buffalo River, and in Natal territory, and
they will there open the inquiry on Thursday, March 7th.

“The Lieut.-Governor proposes, as the most convenient course to be
taken, that the Zulu king should appoint two or three indunas to
represent the Zulu king and the Zulu case at the inquiry, and that
these should be at Rorke’s Drift on March 7th, and meet the Natal
Commissioners there. The same thing also the Governor proposes shall
be done by the Transvaal Government.” And the king’s reply to the
messengers was expressive: “I am very glad to hear what you say—I
shall now be able to sleep.”

On March 7th the Commission met at Rorke’s Drift, and sat for
about five weeks, taking evidence day by day in presence of the
representatives deputed, three by the Transvaal Government, and three
by the Zulus.

Of the three gentlemen who formed the Commission, one was Sir T.
Shepstone’s brother, already mentioned in this history, whose natural
bias would therefore certainly not be upon the Zulu side of the
question; another was a Government official and an acute lawyer; and
the third, Colonel Durnford, to the writer’s personal knowledge,
entered upon the subject with an entirely unbiassed mind, and with
but one intention or desire, that of discovering the actual truth,
whatever it might be. The only thing by which his expectations—rather
than his opinions—were in the least influenced beforehand, was the
natural supposition, shared by all, that Sir T. Shepstone, who had
the reputation of being in his public capacity one of the most
cautious of men, must have some strong grounds for his very positive
statement of the Transvaal claim.

There was, plainly, some slight confusion in the minds of the
three Transvaal delegates, as to their position relative to the
Commissioners, with whom they apparently expected to be on equal
terms, and in a different position altogether from the Zulu
delegates on the other side. This, however, was a manifest mistake.
It was particularly desirable that the Zulus should be made to feel
that it was no case of white against black; but a matter in which
impartial judges treated either side with equal fairness, and without
respect of persons. One of the Commissioners was the brother of their
chief opponent, one of the Transvaal delegates his son; it would
naturally have seemed to the Zulus that the six white men (five out
of whom were either Englishmen, or claimed to be such) were combining
together to outwit them, had they seen them, evidently on terms
of friendship, seated together at the inquiry or talking amongst
themselves in their own language.

The Commissioners, however, were careful to avoid this mistake.
Finding, on their arrival at Rorke’s Drift, that the spot intended
for their encampment was already occupied by the Transvaal delegates,
who had arrived before them, they caused their own tents to be
pitched at some little distance, in order to keep the two apart.
The same system was carried out during the sitting of the Court, at
which the Commissioners occupied a central position at a table by
themselves, the Transvaal delegates being placed at a smaller table
on one hand, mats being spread for the Zulu delegates, in a like
position, on the other.[81]

Care was also necessary to prevent any possible altercations arising
between the Boer and Zulu attendants of either party of delegates,
who, in fact, formed the one real element of danger in the affair.
On one occasion, during the sitting of the Commission, Colonel
Durnford observed a Boer poking at a Zulu with his stick, in a
manner calculated to bring to the surface some of the feelings of
intense irritation common to both sides, and only kept under control
by the presence of the Commissioners. The Colonel at once put a
stop to this, and placing a sentry between the two parties, with
orders to insist on either keeping to its own side of the ground, no
further disturbance took place. Popular rumour, of course, greatly
exaggerated the danger of the situation, catching as usual at the
opportunity for fresh accusations against the Zulu king, who, it was
once reported from Durban, had sent an impi to Rorke’s Drift, and had
massacred the Commissioners and all upon the spot. Fortunately the
same day that brought this report to Pietermaritzburg, brought also
letters direct from the Commissioners themselves, of a later date
than the supposed massacre, and in which the Zulus were spoken of as
“perfectly quiet.”

That the impartial conduct of the Commissioners had the desired
effect is manifest from Cetshwayo’s words, spoken after the
conclusion of the inquiry, but before its result had been made known
to him. His messengers, after thanking Sir Henry Bulwer in the name
of their king and people for appointing the commission, said that
“Cetshwayo and the Zulu people are perfectly satisfied with the way
in which the inquiry was conducted throughout, the way in which
everything went on from day to day in proper order, and without the
least misunderstanding; but that each party understood the subject
that was being talked about.

“Cetshwayo says,” they continued, “he now sees that he is a child
of this Government, that the desire of this Government is to do him
justice....

“Cetshwayo and the Zulu people are awaiting with beating hearts what
the Lieut.-Governor will decide about the land that the Boers have
given the Zulus so much trouble about; for the Zulus wish very much
now to reoccupy the land they never parted with, as it is now the
proper season (of the year) for doing so.”

Such was Cetshwayo’s frame of mind (even before he knew that
the decision was in his favour) at a time when he was popularly
represented as being in an aggressive, turbulent condition, preparing
to try his strength against us, and only waiting his opportunity to
let loose upon Natal the “war-cloud” which he was supposed to keep
“hovering on our borders.”

The boundary question resolved itself into this:

1. To whom did the land in dispute belong in the first instance?

2. Was it ever ceded or sold by the original possessors?

1. In answer to the first question, the Commissioners took the treaty
made in 1843, between the English and the Zulus, as a standpoint
fixing a period when the territory in dispute belonged entirely to
one or other. There was then no question but that the Zulu country
extended over the whole of it.

2. The Zulus deny ever having relinquished any part of their country
to the Boers, who on the other hand assert that formal cessions had
been made to them of considerable districts. With the latter rested
the obligation of proving their assertions, which were simply denied
by the Zulus, who accordingly, as they said themselves, “had no
witnesses to call,” having received no authority from the king to do
more than point out the boundary claimed[82] (2242, p. 80).

The Boer delegates brought various documents, from which they
professed to prove the truth of their assertions, but which were
decided by the Commissioners to be wholly worthless, from the glaring
discrepancies and palpable falsehoods which they contained. One of
these documents, dated March 16th, 1861, “purporting to give an
account of a meeting between Sir T. Shepstone, Panda, and Cetshwayo,”
they decided to be plainly a fabrication, as Sir T. Shepstone did
not arrive at Nodwengu,[83] from Natal, to meet Panda and Cetshwayo,
until May 9th, 1861.

Other records of cessions of land professed to be signed by the king,
but were witnessed by neither Boer nor Zulu, or else by Boers alone.
A definition of boundaries was in one case ratified by one Zulu only,
a man of no rank or importance; and in other documents alterations
were made, and dates inserted, clearly at another time.

Meanwhile it was apparent, from authentic Boer official papers,
that the Zulus were threatened by the Boer Government that, if they
dared to complain again to the British Government, the South African
Republic “would deal severely with them, and that they would also
endanger their lives;” while such expressions used by the Volksraad
of the South African Republic as the following, when they resolve “to
direct the Government to continue in the course it had adopted with
reference to the policy on the eastern frontier, with such caution
as the Volksraad expects from the Government with confidence; and
in this matter to give it the right to take such steps as will more
fully benefit the interests of the population than _the strict words
of the law of the country lay down_” (2220, p. 337), convicts them of
dishonesty out of their own mouths.

Finally the Commissioners report that in their judgment, east of the
Buffalo, “there has been no cession of land at all by the Zulu kings,
past or present, or by the nation.”

They consider, however, that—as the Utrecht district has long been
inhabited by Boers, who have laid out the site for a town, and built
upon it, and as the Zulu nation had virtually acquiesced in the
Boer authority over it by treating with them for the rendition of
fugitives who had taken refuge there—the Transvaal should be allowed
to retain that portion of the land in dispute, compensation being
given to the Zulus inhabiting that district if they surrendered the
lands occupied by them and returned to Zululand, or permission being
given them to become British subjects and to continue to occupy the
land.

Sir Bartle Frere’s version of this is as follows:

“The Commissioners propose to divide the area in dispute between the
Blood River and the Pongolo, giving to neither party the whole of its
claim.” He then quotes the recommendation of the Commissioners, that
compensation should be given to Zulus leaving the Utrecht district,
and wants to know what is to be done for the farmers who “in good
faith, and relying on the right and power of the Transvaal Government
to protect them, had settled for many years past on the tract which
the Commission proposes to assign to the Zulus.” He wishes to know
how they are to be placed on an equality with the Zulus from the
Utrecht district. To this Sir Henry Bulwer ably replies by pointing
out that compensation to the said farmers lies with their own
Government, by whose sanction or permission they had occupied land
over which that Government had no power by right. In fact, far from
“dividing the area in dispute,” and giving half to either party on
equal terms, the reservation of the Utrecht district was rather
an unavoidable concession to the Boers who had long had actual
possession of it—which, with due compensation, the Zulus would have
been ready enough to make, while receiving back so much of their own
land—than an acknowledgment that they could make good their original
claim to it. The Commissioners indeed say distinctly “_there has been
no cession of land at all by the Zulu king, past or present, or by
the nation_.”

But indeed, after the decision in favour of the Zulus was given, Sir
Bartle Frere entirely changed the complacent tone in which he had
spoken of the Commission beforehand. To all appearance his careful
schemes for subjugating the Zulu nation were thrown away—the war and
the South African Empire were on the point of eluding his grasp. He
had sent to England for reinforcements—in direct opposition to the
home policy, which for some years had been gradually teaching the
colonies to depend upon themselves for protection, and therefore
to refrain from rushing headlong into needless and dangerous wars,
which might be avoided by a little exercise of tact and forbearance.
He and his friend General Thesiger had laid out their campaign and
had sent men-of-war to investigate the landing capabilities of the
Zulu coast, and he had recommended Sir Henry Bulwer to inform the
Zulu king—when the latter expressed his disquietude on the subject
of these men-of-war—that the ships he saw were “for the most part
English merchant vessels, but that the war-vessels of the English
Government are quite sufficient to protect his (Cetshwayo’s) coast
from any descent by any other power” (October 6th, 1878, 2220, p.
307).

Sir Henry Bulwer was too honest to carry out this recommendation,
even had he not had the sense to know that Cetshwayo was accustomed
to the passing of merchantmen, and was not to be thus taken in
(supposing him to be likely to fear attacks from “foreign foes”).
But the fact remains that, an English official of Sir Bartle Frere’s
rank has put on record, in an official despatch under his own hand, a
deliberate proposal that the Zulu king should be tranquillised, and
his well-founded suspicions allayed by—a “figure of speech,” shall we
say?

Every possible objection was made by Sir Bartle Frere to the
decision of the Commissioners, and it was with the utmost difficulty
that he was at last persuaded to ratify it, after a considerable
period employed in preparing for a campaign, the idea of which he
appears never for a minute to have relinquished. Sir T. Shepstone
protested against the decision, which, however, Sir Henry Bulwer
upheld; while Sir Bartle Frere finally decides that “Sir H. Bulwer
and I, approaching the question by somewhat different roads, agree
in the conclusion that we must accept the Commissioners’ verdict.”
Their report was made on June 20th, 1878, but it was not until
November 16th that Sir H. Bulwer sent to Cetshwayo to say that “the
Lieut.-Governor is now in a position to inform Cetshwayo that His
Excellency the High Commissioner has pronounced his award, etc.,” and
to fix twenty days from the date of the departure of the messengers
carrying this message from Pietermaritzburg, as a convenient time for
a meeting on the borders of the two countries at the Lower Tugela
Drift, at which the decision should be delivered to the king’s
indunas by officers of the Government appointed for the purpose.

But before this conclusion was arrived at another attempt had been
made to bring accusations against Cetshwayo, who said himself at the
time (June 27th, 1878): “The name of Cetshwayo is always used amongst
the Boers as being the first to wish to quarrel.” Alarming accounts
reached the Natal Government of a fresh military kraal having been
built by the king, and notices to quit being served by him upon Boers
within the disputed territory, in spite of his engagement to await
the decision of the Commissioners. The farmers complained of being
obliged to fly, “leaving homes, homesteads, and improvements to be
destroyed by a savage, unbridled, revengeful nation.”[84] Sir T.
Shepstone re-echoed their complaint (2220, p. 27), and Sir Bartle
Frere comments severely upon the alleged Zulu aggressions.

The matter, however, when sifted, sinks into insignificance. Some
squabbles had taken place between individual Boers and Zulus, such as
were only natural in the unsettled state of things; and Cetshwayo’s
explanation of the so-called “notices to quit” placed them in a very
different light.

Sir Henry Bulwer writes to Sir Bartle Frere as follows on this point
(July 16th): “The Zulu king says that all the message he sent was a
request that the Boers should be warned not to return to the disputed
country, as he was informed they were doing since the meeting of the
Commission. We know that some of the Boers did return to the disputed
territory after the Commission broke up;[85] and this, no doubt, was
looked upon by the Zulus as an attempt on the part of the Boers to
anticipate the result of the inquiry, and led to the giving those
notices.... The fault has been, no doubt, on both sides.”

The military kraal, also, turned out to be no more of the nature
ascribed to it than was its predecessor: “An ordinary private Zulu
kraal”—see report of Mr. Kudolph (2144, p. 186)—“built simply to
have a kraal in that locality, where many of Cetshwayo’s people are
residing without a head or kraal representing the king ... the king
having given instructions that neither the white nor the native
subjects of the Transvaal were in any way to be molested or disturbed
by the Zulus;” and having sent a small force to do the work, because
the large one he had sent on a previous occasion had frightened the
white people.

Colonel Pearson, commanding the troops in Natal and the Transvaal,
writes, June 8th, 1878 (2144, p. 236):

“The Landrost of Utrecht I know to be somewhat of an alarmist, and
the border farmers have all along been in a great fright, and much
given to false reports. I allude more particularly to the Boers. I
enclose Lieut.-Colonel Durnford’s views of the kraal question. He
is an officer who knows South Africa intimately, and his opinion I
consider always sound and intelligent.”

And the following is the statement of Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E.,
June 8th, 1878 (2144, p. 237):

“I know the district referred to, in which are many Zulu kraals,
and believe that, if such a military kraal is in course of erection
on the farm of one Kohrs, believed to be a field-cornet in the
Wakkerstroom district, residing about fifteen miles from the mission
station of the Rev. Mr. Meyer, it is being constructed that order may
be kept amongst the Zulus here residing—who owe allegiance to the
Zulu king alone—and in the interests of peace.... I further believe
that, if the German or other residents at or near Luneburg have been
ordered to leave, it is not by orders of the King of Zululand, who is
far too wise a man to make a false move at present, when the boundary
between himself and the Transvaal is under consideration.”

The excitement concerning the “notices to quit,” and the second
“military kraal,” appears to have been as unnecessary as any other
imaginary Zulu scare; and there are no proofs to be extracted
from the official papers at this period of the slightest signs of
aggressive temper on the part of the Zulu king.

On the contrary; if we turn to the “Message from Cetywayo, King of
the Zulus, to His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of Natal,” dated
November 10th, 1878, we find the concluding paragraph runs: “Cetywayo
hereby swears, in presence of Oham, Mnyamana, Tshingwayo, and all his
other chiefs, that he has no intention or wish to quarrel with the
English.”—(P. P. [C. 2308] p. 16).




CHAPTER XI.

SIHAYO, UMBILINI, AND THE MISSIONARIES IN ZULULAND.


Much has been said of late years concerning the duty imposed by our
superior civilisation upon us English, in our dealings with the South
African races, of checking amongst the latter such cruel and savage
practices as are abhorrent to Christian ideas and practices. We will
proceed to show how this duty has been performed by the Government of
Natal.

One of the commonest accusations brought against the Zulus, and
perhaps the most effectual in rousing English indignation and
disgust, is that of buying and selling women as wives, and the cruel
treatment of young girls who refuse to be thus purchased.

Without entering into the subject upon its merits, or inquiring
how many French and English girls yearly are, to all intents and
purposes, sold in marriage, and what amount of moral pressure is
brought to bear upon the reluctant or rebellious amongst them; or
whether they suffer more or less under the infliction than their wild
sisters in Zululand do under physical correction;—we may observe that
the terrors of the Zulu system have been very much exaggerated. That
cruel and tyrannical things have occasionally been done under it no
one will deny, still less that every effort should have been made
by us to introduce a better one. Amongst the Zulus, both in their
own country and in Natal, marriages are commonly arranged by the
parents, and the young people are expected to submit, as they would
be in civilised France. But the instance which came most directly
under the present writer’s own observation, is one rather tending to
prove that the custom is one which, although occasionally bearing
hardly upon individuals, has been too long the practice of the
people, and to which they have always been brought up, to be looked
upon by them as a crying evil, calling for armed intervention on the
part of England. In the early days of missionary work at Bishopstowe
(between 1860-70), five girls took refuge at the station within a few
days of each other, in order to avoid marriages arranged for them by
their parents, and objected to by them. They dreaded pretty forcible
coercion, although of course, in Natal, they could not actually
be put to death. They were, of course, received and protected at
Bishopstowe, clothed, and put to school, and there they might have
remained in safety for any length of time, or until they could return
home on their own terms. But the restraint of the civilised habits
imposed on them, however gently, and the obligation of learning
to read, sew, and sweep, etc., was too much for these wild young
damsels, accustomed at home to a free and idle life.[86] Within a
few weeks they all elected to return home and marry the very men on
whose account they had fled; and the conclusion finally arrived at
concerning them was, that their escapade was rather for the sake of
attaching a little additional importance to the surrender of their
freedom, than from any real objection to the marriages proposed for
them.

Now let us see what means had been taken by the English to institute
a better state of things and greater liberty for the women. In Natal
itself, of course, any serious act of violence committed to induce
a girl to marry would be punished by law, and girls in fear of such
violence could usually appeal for protection to the magistrates or
missionaries. Let us suppose that a girl, making such an appeal,
receives protection, and is married to the man of her own choice by
English law and with Christian rites. What is the consequence to her?
She has no rights as a wife, in fact she is not lawfully a wife at
all, nor have her children any legal claims upon their father; the
law of the colony protects the rights of native women married by
native custom, which it virtually encourages by giving no protection
at all to those who contract marriages by the English, or civilised
system.[87]

So much for our dealings with the Zulus of Natal; and even less can
be said for us concerning those over the border.

Until quite lately the practice existed in the colony of
surrendering to Zulu demands refugee _women_, as well as cattle, as
“property,” under an order from the Natal Government, which was in
force at the time of Sir H. Bulwer’s arrival, but was at some time
after rescinded.[88]

It was well known that, by the laws of Zululand, the offence of a
woman’s escaping from her husband with another man was punishable by
death, therefore unhappy creatures thus situated were delivered up
by the Natal Government to certain death, and this practice had been
continued through a course of many years.

The law being altered in this respect, and cattle only returned, Sir
H. Bulwer writes, on February 3rd, 1877: “Some few weeks ago I had
occasion to send a message to Cetywayo on account of the forcible
removal from Natal territory of a Zulu girl, who had lately taken
refuge in it from the Zulu country. A party of Zulus had crossed
the Tugela River in pursuit, and taken the girl by force back to
Zululand. I therefore sent to inform Cetywayo of this lawless act on
the part of some of his subjects” (1776, pp. 86, 87); and Cetshwayo
replies with thanks, saying that he knew nothing previously of what
had happened, and that “should anything of the same kind take place
to-morrow he (the Governor of Natal) must still open my ears with
what is done by my people.”

This is apparently all. There is no attempt to make a serious
national matter of it; no demand for the surrender of the offenders,
nor for the payment of a fine. Nor is there even a warning that any
future occurrence of the same description will be viewed in a more
severe light. Sir Henry “informs” Cetshwayo of what has taken place,
and Cetshwayo politely acknowledges the information, and that the
action taken by his people deserves censure. “I do not send and take
by force,” he says; “why should my people do so? It is not right.”

Eighteen months later, on July 28th, 1878, a similar case was
reported. A wife of the chief Sihayo had left him and escaped into
Natal. She was followed by a party of Zulus, under Mehlokazulu, the
chief son of Sihayo, and his brother, seized at the kraal where she
had taken refuge, and carried back to Zululand, where she was put to
death, in accordance with Zulu law.

The Zulus who seized her did no harm to Natal people or property;
in fact their only fault towards England was that of following and
seizing her on Natal soil, an act which for many years, and until
quite lately, they would have been permitted to do, and assisted in
doing, by the border Government officials. A week later the same
young men, with two other brothers and an uncle, captured in like
manner another refugee wife of Sihayo, in the company of the young
man with whom she had fled. This woman was also carried back, and is
supposed to have been put to death likewise; the young man with her,
although guilty in Zulu eyes of a most heinous crime, punishable with
death, was safe from them on English soil—they did not touch him. But
by our own practice for years past, of surrendering _female_ refugees
as _property_, we had taught the Zulus that we regarded women as
cattle.

While fully acknowledging the savagery of the young men’s actions,
and the necessity of putting a stop to such for the future, it must
be conceded that, having so long countenanced the like, we should
have given fair notice that, for the future, it would be an act of
aggression on us for a refugee of either sex to be followed into our
territory, before proceeding to stronger measures.

Sir Henry Bulwer, indeed, though taking a decided view of the young
men’s offence, plainly understood that it was an individual fault,
and not a political action for the performance of which the king
was responsible. “There is no reason whatsoever as yet to believe
that these acts have been committed with the consent or knowledge of
the king,”[89] he says (2220, p. 125), and his message to Cetshwayo
merely _requests_ that he will send in the ringleaders of the party
to be tried by the law of the colony.

On a previous occasion the king had, of his own accord, sent a Zulu
named Jolwana to the Natal Government to be punished by it for the
murder of a white man in the Zulu country. Jolwana was returned upon
his hands with the message that he could not be tried in Natal as he
was a Zulu subject. Under these circumstances it was not unnatural
that Cetshwayo should have taken the opportunity, apparently offered
him by the use of the word _request_, of substituting some other
method of apology for the offence committed than that of delivering
up the young men, who, as he afterwards said, he was afraid would be
“sjambokked” (flogged).

Cetshwayo’s first answer is merely one acknowledging the message, and
regretting the truth of the accusation brought by it. He allows that
the young men deserve punishment, and he engages to send indunas of
his own to the Natal Government on the subject; but he deprecates the
matter being looked upon in a more serious light than as the “act of
rash boys,” who in their zeal for their father’s house (? honour) did
not think what they were doing.

About this date, August, 1878, when all sorts of wild reports
were flying about, in and out of official documents, relative to
Cetshwayo’s supposed warlike preparations, he had ordered that _none
of his people should carry arms on pain of death_.

This was in consequence of a circumstance which had occurred some
months before (January, 1878), when during the Umkosi, or feast of
first-fruits, a great Zulu gathering which annually takes place at
the king’s kraal, two of the regiments fell out and finally came
to blows, resulting in the death of some men on either side. Sir
B. Frere says, in his correspondence with the Bishop (p. 4), that
_many hundred men were killed_ on this occasion; but Mr. F. Colenso,
who happened to be there a few days after the fight, heard from a
white man, who had helped to remove the dead, that about fifty were
killed. In consequence of this, “an order had gone forth, forbidding
native Zulus, when travelling, to carry arms, nothing but switches
being allowed. A fire took place, which burned the grass over Panda’s
grave,[90] and the doctors declared that the spirits of Dingane and
Chaka had stated that they view with surprise and disgust the conduct
of the Zulus at the present day in fighting when called before
their king; that this was the reason Panda’s grave was burned; and
such things would continue until they learned to be peaceful among
themselves, and wait until they are attacked by other natives before
spilling blood.”

Cetshwayo’s next message, September 9th (2260, p. 32), after he had
inquired into the matter of Sihayo’s sons, acknowledges again that
they had done wrong, but observes that he was glad to find that they
had hurt no one belonging to the English. What they had done was
done without his knowledge. The _request_ of the Natal Government
concerning the surrender of the offenders, he said, should be laid
before the great men of the Zulu people, to be decided upon by them;
_he could not do it alone_.

He finally, with full and courteous apologies in the same tone,
begs that the Natal Government will accept, instead of the persons
of the young men, a fine of fifty pounds, which he sent down by his
messengers, but which was promptly refused. Sir Henry Bulwer appears
to have been inclined to allow of the substitution of a larger fine
for the surrender of the culprits (2222, p. 173); but Sir B. Frere
insists on severer measures, saying: “I think it quite necessary that
the delivery up to justice of the offenders in this case should have
been _demanded_,[91] and should now be peremptorily insisted on,
together with a fine for the delay in complying with the reiterated
_demand_.”

John Dunn, who is supposed to have advised the king to send money as
an atonement, affirms that the invasion had been mutual, fugitives
from justice having been fetched out of Zululand by Natal officers;
and he (Dunn) asks whether outraged husbands, even amongst civilised
people, are prone to pay much respect to the rights of nations when
upon the track of their unfaithful spouses. Plainly, neither he nor
the king looked upon the matter in so serious a light as Sir Bartle
Frere chose to do when he said, September 30th, 1878 (2220, p.
280), “and, unless apologised and atoned for by compliance with the
Lieut.-Governor’s demands (?) that the leader of the murderous gangs
shall be given up to justice, it will be necessary to send to the
Zulu king _an ultimatum, which must put an end to pacific relations
with our neighbours_.”[92]

Sir M. Hicks-Beach, in reply to Sir B. Frere’s last-quoted despatch,
writes, November 21st: “The abduction and murder of the Zulu woman
who had taken refuge in Natal is undoubtedly a serious matter, and
no sufficient reparation for it has yet been made. But I observe that
Cetshwayo has expressed his regret for this occurrence; and although
the compensation offered by him was inadequate, there would seem
to have been nothing in his conduct with regard to it which would
preclude the hope of a satisfactory arrangement.”—(P. P. [C. 2220],
p. 320).

But the whole of Sir Bartle Frere’s statements at this period
concerning Cetshwayo are one-sided, exaggerated, or entirely
imaginary accusations, which come in the first instance with force
from a man of his importance, but for which not the slightest grounds
can be traced in any reliable or official source. He brings grave
charges against the king, which are absolutely contradicted by the
official reports from which he draws his information; he places
before the public as actual fact what, on investigation, is plainly
nothing more than his own opinion of what Cetshwayo thinks, wishes,
or intends, and what his thoughts, wishes, and intentions may be at
a future period. Every circumstance is twisted into a proof of his
inimical intentions towards Natal, the worst motives are taken for
granted in all he does. When the king’s messages were sent through
the ordinary native messengers between him and the Government of
Natal, they are termed mere “verbal” messages (as what else should
they be?), not “satisfactory or binding;” when they were sent
through Mr. John Dunn they were called “unofficial,” although Mr.
Dunn had been repeatedly recognised, and by Sir B. Frere himself,
as an official means of communication with Cetshwayo on matters of
grave importance; and, when Mr. Dunn writes, on his own account, his
opinion that the “boys” will not be given up, Sir B. Frere calls his
letter “a similar informal message (_i.e._ from the king), couched
in insolent and defiant terms.” In nothing that passed between the
king and the Government of Natal during this whole period is there
one single word, on Cetshwayo’s part, which could possibly be thus
described. There are, indeed, many apologies and entreaties to
the Government to be satisfied with some other atonement for the
fault committed than the surrender of the culprits, and there is
a great deal from various sources, official and otherwise, about
cattle collected, even beyond the demands of the Government, as a
propitiation; but of Sir B. Frere’s “semi-sarcastic, insolent, and
defiant” messages not one word.

It would take many pages to point out how utterly misleading is
every word spoken by the High Commissioner on this subject, but to
those who are curious in the matter, and in proof of the truth of
our present statements, we can only recommend the South African
Blue-books of 1878-79. We cannot, however, better illustrate our
meaning than by a quotation from Lord Blachford (_Daily News_, March
26th, 1872): “What did Sir B. Frere say to all this? He was really
ashamed to answer that he did not know. He had studied the series
of despatches in which Sir B. Frere defended his conduct, and he
willingly acknowledged the exuberance of literary skill which they
exhibited. But when he tried to grapple with them he felt like a man
who was defending himself with a stick against a cloud of locusts.
He might knock down one, and knock down another, but ‘the cry is
still they come.’ His only consolation was, that they did not appear
to have convinced Her Majesty’s Government, whose replies were from
beginning to end a series of cautions, qualifications, and protests.”

On turning to the subject of the robber chief, Umbilini, and his
raids, we are at once confronted by the fact that he was not a Zulu
at all, but a Swazi, and a claimant to the Swazi throne. His claim
had not been approved by the majority of the Swazi nation, and his
brother Umbandeni, the present king, was appointed instead. Umbilini,
however, was not a man to quietly sink into an inferior position, and
having taken possession, with his followers, of some rocky caves in
the borderland, forming an almost impregnable fortress, he lived for
many years, much in the fashion of the border freebooters of whose
doings we read in Scottish history, making raids upon his neighbours
on all sides, and carrying off cattle, women, and children. His
expeditions were most frequently directed towards the party against
him in his own country, but neither his Boer nor Zulu neighbours
escaped entirely. On first leaving Swaziland he went to offer homage
to the Zulu king, and was given land to settle upon in Zululand. No
doubt Cetshwayo looked upon a warrior of Umbilini’s known prowess as
rather an important vassal, especially in the event of a war between
him and his ancient enemies the Swazis, in which case Umbilini’s
adherence would probably divide the enemy amongst themselves. But
he appears to have been in perpetual trouble on account of his
turbulent vassal, and to have given him up altogether at one time.
After a raid committed by him upon the Dutch, the latter applied to
Cetshwayo to have him delivered up to them. “I could not do this,”
says Cetshwayo; “I should have got a bad name if I had done so, and
people would have said it was not good to _konza_ (pay homage) to
Cetshwayo. I therefore refused, but paid one hundred head of cattle
for the offence he had committed;”[93] and Cetshwayo’s own account to
Mr. Fynney is as follows (1961):

“Umbilini came to me for refuge from his own people, the Ama-Swazis,
and I afforded him shelter; what would the world have said had I
denied it to him? But, while allowing him to settle in the land as my
subject, I have always been particularly careful to warn my people
not to afford him any assistance or become mixed up in any quarrel
between him and the Boers; and although I do not deny that he is my
subject, still I will not endorse his misdeeds. When Mr. Rudolph
complained to me of the trouble Umbilini was giving, I told Mr.
Rudolph to kill him—I should not shield him; this the Boers tried to
do, but, as usual, made a mess of it.”

In fact, on a repetition of Umbilini’s offence against the Boers,
Cetshwayo refused to be longer responsible for his acts, and gave the
Dutch permission to kill him. They fought him, and were beaten by him
with his small band of only nineteen men. On a subsequent occasion,
after a raid committed by Umbilini upon the Swazis, Cetshwayo was so
incensed that he sent out a party to take and kill him; but he got
notice beforehand, and escaped.

Sir Bartle Frere chooses to consider the king responsible for all
Umbilini’s doings, and even Sir H. Bulwer says: “The king disowned
Umbilini’s acts.... But there is nothing to show that he has in any
way punished him, and, on the contrary, it is quite certain (of
which ‘certainty,’ however, no proofs are forthcoming) that even if
Umbilini did not act with the express orders of Cetshwayo, he did so
with the knowledge that what he was doing would be agreeable to the
king” (2260, p. 46).

This accusation was made in January, 1879, and refers to raids of the
previous year, by which time, as the Swazis were our allies and the
Boers our subjects, Umbilini’s raids in all directions except those
on the Zulu side had become offences to us for which Cetshwayo was
held responsible. In point of fact, it was no such simple matter to
“punish” Umbilini, whose natural fortress could be held by a couple
of men against anything short of the cannon which Cetshwayo did
not possess. Nor was it singular that, at a time when the king had
already strong suspicions that his country was about to be attacked,
he should not have wasted his strength in subduing one who, in the
event of war, would be most useful to himself.

That, when the evil day came and his country was invaded, Cetshwayo
should have made common cause with all who would or could assist him
is a mere matter of course, and it was but natural that so bold and
skilful a leader as Umbilini has proved himself to be should then
have been promoted and favoured by the unfortunate king.

We need scarcely say more upon this point, beyond calling our
readers’ attention to the fact that the expressions “_Zulu raids_,”
“_indiscriminate massacres_,” “_violation by the Zulus of Transvaal
territory_,” “_horrible cruelties_” (2308, p. 62, and elsewhere),
so freely scattered through the despatches written to prove the
criminality of the Zulu king, _all, without exception_, apply to acts
committed either by Umbilini and his (chiefly) _Swazi_ followers, or
by Manyonyoba, a small but independent native chief, living north of
the Pongolo.[94]

The “case of Messrs. Smith and Deighton” is the only charge against
the Zulu king, in connection with Natal, which we have now to
consider, and it is one in which, as we shall see, a great deal was
made of a very small matter.

Mr. Smith, a surveyor in the Colonial Engineer’s department, was on
duty inspecting the road down to the Tugela, near Fort Buckingham.
The Zulu mind being in a very excited state at the time—owing to
the obvious preparation for war, of which they heard reports from
Natal, troops stationed at Greytown, and war-ships seen close to
the Zulu shore, as though looking for a landing-place—Mr. Smith was
specially instructed to proceed upon his errand alone, and with great
discretion. By way of carrying out these directions he took with
him only a trader—Deighton by name—and their discretion was shown by
“taking no notice” when, having arrived at the drift into Zululand,
they were questioned by Zulus, who were on guard there in consequence
of rumours that our troops were about to cross.[95]

Mr. Wheelwright (a Government official), to whom the matter was
reported a week after it occurred, not by Mr. Smith, the principal
person concerned, but by Mr. Deighton, says: “The fact that the two
white men took no notice of ‘lots of Zulus shouting out’ from their
own bank, ‘What do you want there?’ but ‘walked quietly along,’[96]
as if they had not heard, or as if they were deaf, very naturally
confirmed the suspicion that they were about no good.”

The consequence was, that when the white men reached an islet in the
middle of the river (or rather one which is generally in the middle
of the stream when it is full—it was low at the time), they were
seized by the Zulus, and detained by them for about an hour and a
half, whilst all sorts of questions were asked: “What are you doing
there?” “What had the soldiers come to Greytown for?” “What did the
white men want coming down there? There were two down not long ago,
then other two only a few days since, and now there is other two; you
must come for some reason.”

However, after a time, they were allowed to depart, an attempt made
to take their horses from them being prevented by the induna of the
Zulus.

Sir Bartle Frere does not seem to have thought very much of the
matter at first, for Sir M. Hicks-Beach, when acknowledging his
despatch reporting it, says (2220, p. 320): “I concur with you in
attributing no special importance to the seizure and temporary arrest
of the surveyors, which was partly due to their own indiscretion, and
was evidently in no way sanctioned by the Zulu authorities.”

But a little later—although with no fresh facts before him—Sir B.
Frere takes a very different tone (2222, p. 176).

“I cannot at all agree with the lenient view taken by the
Lieut.-Governor of this case. Had it stood quite alone, a prompt
apology and punishment of the offenders might have been sufficient.
As the case stands, it was only one of many instances of insult and
threatening, such as cannot possibly be passed over without severe
notice being taken of them. What occurred,” he says, “whether done by
the king’s order, or only by his border-guards, and subsequently only
tacitly approved by his not punishing the offenders, seems to me a
most serious insult and outrage, and should be severely noticed.”

There is no sign that it was ever brought to the king’s knowledge,
and when Sir B. Frere speaks of its being “only one of many
instances of insult and threatening,” he is drawing largely on his
imagination, as there is _no other recorded at all_, unless he means
to refer to the “notices to quit” in the disputed territory of which
we have already treated.

We must now consider the points connected with the internal
management of the Zulu country, which have generally been looked upon
as a partial excuse for our invasion. Foremost amongst these is the
infraction of the so-called “coronation promises,” of which we have
spoken in a previous chapter. Frequent rumours were current in Natal
that the king, in defiance of the said promises, was in the habit of
shedding the blood of his people upon the smallest provocation, and
without any form of trial. Such stories of his inhuman atrocities
were circulated in the colony that many kind-hearted and gentle
people were ready to think that war would be a lesser evil. Yet,
whenever one of these stories was examined into or traced to its
source, it turned out either to be purely imaginary, or to have for
its foundation some small act of more or less arbitrary authority,
the justice of which we might possibly question, but to which no one
would apply the words “barbarities,” “savage murders,” etc.

An instance of the manner in which the Zulu king has obtained
his character of “a treacherous and bloodthirsty sovereign,”[97]
came under the notice of the present writer about December of
last year (1878). Happening to be on a visit to some friends in
Pietermaritzburg, and hearing them mention Cetshwayo’s cruelties,
I observed that I did not much credit them, as I had never yet met
anyone who knew of them from any trustworthy source. I was met with
the assurance that their “kitchen-Kafir,” Tom, from whom they had
received their accounts, was a personal witness, having himself
escaped from a massacre, and they vouched for the truthfulness of
the man’s character. I asked and obtained permission to question
the man in his own language, being myself anxious to find any real
evidence on the subject, especially as, at that time—with military
preparations going on on every side—it was apparent to all that “we”
intended war, and one would have been glad to discover that there
was any justification for it on our side. The same evening I took an
opportunity of interrogating “Tom,” saying, “So I hear that you know
all about this wicked Zulu king. Tell me all about it.” Whereupon the
man launched out into a long account of the slaughter of his people,
from which not even infants were spared, and from which he was one of
the few who had escaped. He had plainly been accustomed to tell the
tale (doubtless a true one), and there were touches in it concerning
the killing of the children which showed that he had been in the
habit of recounting it to tender-hearted and horror-struck English
mothers. When he had finished his tale I asked him when all the
horrors which he had described had taken place. “Oh!” he replied, “it
was at the time of the fight between Cetshwayo and Umbulazi (1856);
that was when I left Zululand.”

“And you have never been there since?”

“No; I should be afraid to go, for Cetshwayo kills always.”

“How do you know that?” I inquired, for he had started upon a fresh
account of horrors relating to the time at which he was speaking.

“Oh! I know it is true,” was the ready and confident reply, “because
the white people here in ’Maritzburg tell me so out of the papers.”

In point of fact the man, on whose word to my own knowledge rested
the belief of a considerable circle of the citizens, could only give
personal evidence concerning what happened at the time of the great
civil war, when Zululand was in such confusion that it would not be
easy to distribute responsibility, and when Cetshwayo himself was a
young man in the hands of his warriors. All he could tell of a later
date he had himself learnt from “white people” in the town, who,
again, had gathered their information from the newspapers; and Bishop
Schreuder, long resident in Zululand, says: “I had not with my own
eyes seen any corpse, and personally only knew of them said to have
been killed.... I myself had my information principally from the same
sources as people in Natal, and often from Natal newspapers.”

The king’s own reply to these accusations may be taken entire from
Mr. Fynney’s report on July 4th, 1877 (1961), with the portions of
the message delivered by the latter to which it refers:

“You have repeatedly acknowledged the house of England to be a great
and powerful house, and have expressed yourself as relying entirely
upon the good-will and power of that house for your own strength and
the strength of the country over which you are king; in fact you have
always looked towards the English Government.

“Which way is your face turned to-day? Do you look, and still desire
to look, in the same direction? Do you rely on the good-will and
support of the British Government as much as you formerly did?

“The Government of Natal has repeatedly heard that you have not
regarded the agreements you entered into with that Government,
through its representative, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, on the occasion
of your coronation. These agreements you entered into with the sun
shining around you, but since that time you have practised great
cruelties upon your people, putting great numbers of them to death.
What do you say?”

In reply to the above, Cetshwayo said: “I have not changed; I still
look upon the English as my friends, as they have not yet done or
said anything to make me feel otherwise. They have not in any way
turned my heart, therefore I feel that we have still hold of each
other’s hands. But you must know that from the first the Zulu nation
grew up alone, separate and distinct from all others, and has never
been subject to any other nation; Tyaka (Chaka) was the first to
find out the English and make friends with them; he saved the lives
of seven Englishmen from shipwreck at the mouth of the Umfolosi, he
took care of them, and from that day even until now the English and
Zulu nations have held each other’s hands. The English nation is
a just one, and we are together” (we are at one with each other).
“I admit that people have been killed. There are three classes of
wrong-doers that I kill—(1) the abatakati—witches, poisoners, etc.;
(2) those who take the women of the great house, those belonging to
the royal household; and (3) those who kill, hide, or make away with
the king’s cattle. I mentioned these three classes of wrong-doers to
Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone), when he came to place me as king over the
Zulu nation, as those who had always been killed. I told him that it
was our law, and that three classes of wrong-doers I would kill, and
he replied: ‘Well, I cannot put aside a standing law of the land.’
I always give a wrong-doer three chances, and kill him if he passes
the last. Evil-doers would go over my head if I did not punish them,
and that is our mode of punishing.... I do not see that I have in any
way departed from, or broken in anything, the compact I made with the
Natal Government through Somtseu.”

The next subject to be considered is that of the treatment of the
missionaries and their converts in Zululand.

Sir T. Shepstone, in his account of what passed at the installation
of Cetshwayo, writes as follows (C. 1137, p. 19): “The fourth point
was the position of Christian missionaries and their converts.
Cetywayo evidently regretted that they had ever been admitted at all,
and had made up his mind to reduce their numbers by some means or
other.... He said they had committed no actual wrong, but they did
no good, and that the tendency of their teaching was mischievous; he
added that he did not wish to harm them, that they might take all
their property with them and go in peace.

“I suggested that they could not take their houses away. He replied
that the materials of which they were built—stone, earth, and
wood—were all Zulu property, but they might take them also if they
wished. He thought that four, however, were entitled to greater
consideration; these were Bishop Schreuder and Mr. Oftebro, of the
Norwegian Mission, because of their long residence—more than twenty
years—and their services in other ways than as missionaries; and
Bishop Wilkinson and Mr. Robertson, because they had brought an
introduction from the Governor of Natal; but that the teaching even
of these was mischievous, and could not be received by the Zulus
without injury.... The advantages of education, the value to a man
of being able to read and write, and the extreme inconvenience of
ignorance were discussed. Cetywayo heartily concurred in all that was
said on these subjects, and said it was education made the English
so great; and that, if he thought he could remember what he might
learn, he would be taught himself; and he expressed regret that the
missionaries did not confine themselves to that kind of teaching.

“The result of our conversations on the subject of the missionaries
was an understanding that those who were already in the country
should not be interfered with, and that, if any of them committed
an offence for which the offender might be considered deserving of
expulsion, the case should be submitted to the Government of Natal,
and its assent be received before the sentence should be carried
out. It is necessary to explain that the Zulus have no idea of
inflicting any punishment upon a missionary except that of expulsion
from the country. _I did not consider it wise to attempt to make any
arrangements in favour of native converts._”[98]

What was meant by the teaching of the missionaries being
_mischievous_ is fully explained by the remarks of the prime
ministers Mnyamana and Vumandaba, reported by Mr. Fynney in 1877
(1961, p. 47) as follows:

“We will not allow the Zulus to become so-called Christians. It is
not the king says so, but every man in Zululand. If a Zulu does
anything wrong, he at once goes to a mission station, and says he
wants to become a Christian; if he wants to run away with a girl,
he becomes a Christian; if he wishes to be exempt from serving
the king, he puts on clothes, and is a Christian; if a man is an
umtagati (evil-doer), he becomes a Christian. All these people are
the subjects of the king; and who will keep a cow for another to milk
it?... The missionaries desire to set up another power in the land,
and, as Zululand has only one king, that cannot be allowed.”

Mr. Fynney continues: “Before I left Zululand (before July, 1877)
most of the missionaries had decided upon leaving; some had already
left, not from any fear of personal danger, but because in some cases
they have been deserted by the natives on their stations; in others
the native converts were uneasy, and wished to leave; and from the
attitude of both the king and chiefs, they could plainly see that all
chances of making fresh converts, or even retaining those around
them, were for the present at an end.... I find there were all sorts
of wild (?) rumours going about from station to station—one that
the British Government intended to annex Zululand at once. I am
afraid that this and the like rumours have done harm. Several of the
missionaries have been frequently to the king of late, and, as he
told me, have worried him to such an extent that he does not want to
see them any more.”[99]

In August of the same year Lord Carnarvon requests Sir Henry Bulwer
to make a special point of causing “the missionaries to understand
distinctly that Her Majesty’s Government cannot undertake to compel
the king to permit the maintenance of the mission stations in
Zululand,” and to recommend them, if they cannot carry on their work
without armed support, to leave it for the present.

Sir Henry Bulwer writes (2000, p. 33):

“The action taken by some of the missionaries in leaving that country
has apparently proved not only unnecessary, but ill-advised for their
own interests. The king was not sorry that they should go, but he was
angry with them for going.”[100] and on January 26th, 1878, a message
arrived from Cetshwayo, concerning those that remained, to this
effect (2100, p. 61):

“Cetshwayo states that he wishes His Excellency to know that he is
not pleased with the missionaries in the Zulu country, as he finds
out that they are the cause of much harm, and are always spreading
false reports about the Zulu country, and (he) would wish His
Excellency to advise them to remove, as they do no good.”

Shortly after the Rev. Mr. Oftebro and Dr. Oftebro, Norwegian
missionaries from Zululand, were granted an interview by the
Lieut.-Governor of Natal for the purpose of laying their case before
His Excellency. The king, they said, had informed them that he was
now quite persuaded that they had communicated to the governors of
Natal and the Transvaal, and to the editors of the public papers in
Natal, all important matters that occurred in the Zulu country—that
the accounts they sent were not even truthful—and that he had
believed these missionaries were “men,” but that he now found them to
be his enemies.

They believed that amongst the “white men,” from whom he had obtained
his information, were Mr. John Mullins, a trader, and Mr. F. E.
Colenso, a son of the Bishop of Natal, who had been at the king’s
kraal for some six days and who, they said, “_had translated, for the
king’s information, accounts of doings in the Zulu country_, from
several newspapers of the colony.” This last, as it happens, was pure
fiction. Sir Henry Bulwer, indeed, believed it at the time, and wrote
upon it as follows (2100, p. 89):

“I notice in Messrs. Smith and Colenso’s letter to the Earl of
Carnarvon, a statement to the effect that the disposition and
dealings of Cetshwayo had been sedulously misrepresented by the
missionaries and by the Press. And this statement tends, I am afraid,
to confirm the belief that Mr. F. E. Colenso, when he lately visited
the Zulu country, ... made certain representations regarding the
missionaries in Zululand, which were greatly calculated to prejudice
the king’s mind against them, or against some of them.”

But Mr. Colenso, on seeing for the first time the above statements in
the Blue-book, wrote to Sir M. Hicks-Beach as follows (2220, p. 318):

“The suspicions expressed by the missionaries as to my proceedings
are entirely without foundation in fact. So far from attempting to
prejudice the king’s mind against them, I confined myself, in the
little I did say to Cetshwayo on the subject, to supporting their
cause with him. The king had received, through some of his various
channels of information, an account of the numerous contributions
made by missionaries and others living under his protection in
Zululand, to the colonial newspapers, and in particular, of an
exaggerated and sensational report, written by the Zululand
correspondent of _The Natal Mercury_, of the catastrophe which
occurred at the annual Feast of Firstfruits some ten days before
my last conversation with the king, which report he attributed to
the Rev. Mr. Robertson, from the fact that his waggon-driver was
the only white man present on the occasion, except Dr. Oftebro, Mr.
Mullins, and Mr. Dunn. Cetshwayo expressed himself as indignant at
the conduct of Mr. Robertson, who, he said, had never, during his
long residence in Zululand, received anything but good treatment at
the hands of his (Cetshwayo’s) father and himself, and, he added,
‘I have borne with him too long.’ To this I replied that, if he had
any distinct ground of complaint against Mr. Robertson, he (the king)
should get it set down in writing, and send it to His Excellency the
Lieut.-Governor of Natal; and I wished him to understand that any
different course would be productive of no good effect. I then told
Cetshwayo, omitting further reference to Mr. Robertson, that in my
opinion the presence of the missionaries as a body in his country
was a great advantage to him, and that they merited his protection.
He disclaimed having ever treated them with anything but great
consideration.”

The particular statement of the two missionaries Oftebro, concerning
the translation of newspapers, also Mr. Colenso specially and
distinctly contradicts, saying that he had no newspapers with him nor
extracts of newspapers, nor were any such read to Cetshwayo in his
presence.

Sir H. Bulwer states, at the request of the Messrs. Oftebro (2100,
p. 61), that no member of the Norwegian mission had supplied this
Government with information as above. But it does not follow that
no such communications had been made to Sir B. Frere and Lord
Carnarvon. Missionaries had written anonymously to the colonial
papers, and the account in _The Natal Mercury_ of the fight at the
Umkosi was attributed by Cetshwayo, not without reason, to the Rev.
E. Robertson. The tone of this letter, and its _accuracy_, may be
gathered from the following extract, referring to the land which,
in the opinion of the Commissioners, “was by right belonging to the
Zulus.”

“Never was a more preposterous demand made upon any Government than
that which Cetshwayo is now making upon the English Government of
the Transvaal.... For be it remembered that, until very lately, the
Zulus have never occupied any portion of it, (!) and even now very
partially. It is most earnestly to be hoped that Sir T. Shepstone,
while doing all in his power to keep the peace, _will be equally firm
in resisting the unjust pretensions of the Zulus_.”[101]

How far the Zulu king was justified in his opinion that the
missionaries were not his friends may be gathered from the above, and
from the replies to Sir B. Frere’s appeal to the “missionaries of all
denominations” for their opinions on native politics, as published in
the Blue-books (2316), of which the following examples may be given:

From letter of the Rev. P. D. Hepburn, December 17th, 1878: “All
in these parts are quiet, and are likely to remain quiet, if His
Excellency overthrows the Zulu chief, and disarms the remaining
Zulus. The Zulus are very warlike; will attack in front, flank, and
rear. They are, and have been, the terror of the neighbouring tribes
since the days of Chaka.[102] Only the utter destruction of the Zulus
can secure future peace in South Africa. May His Excellency not allow
himself to be deceived by the Zulu chief Cetywayo.”

“On full inquiry it will be found that our late war, (Kaffraria)
here was to a great extent attributable to Zulu influence.[103] If
our forces suffer defeat at Natal, all native tribes in South Africa
will rise against us. I am a man of peace; I hate war; but if war,
let there be no dawdling and sentimental nonsense.

“True and faithful to God, our Queen, and the interests of the
empire, we have the approbation of God, our Queen, and our own
conscience. I would have much liked had there been a regiment of
British cavalry at Natal. Sword in hand, the British are irresistible
over all natives. The battle at the Gwanga in 1846, under Sir Henry
Darrell, lasted only about fifteen minutes; about four hundred Kafirs
were cut down....

“God, our God, put it into the minds of our rulers that all tribes in
south-east and east Africa must submit to British power, and that it
is the interest of all Africans to do so. Heathenism must perish; God
wills it so.”[104]

These remarks are from a missionary in Kaffraria, but the tone of
these in Zululand is the same, or even worse. Compare the following
statement made to the Natal Government by two native converts from
the Etshowe mission station—Mr. Oftebro’s (1883, p. 2): “We know that
as many a hundred (Zulus) in one day see the sun rise, but don’t see
it go down.... The people, great and small, are tired of the rule
of Cetshwayo, by which he is finishing his people. The Zulu army is
not what it was, there are only six full regiments. Cetshwayo had
by his rule made himself so disliked, that they knew of no one, and
especially of the headmen, who would raise a hand to save him from
ruin, no matter from what cause.”

Mr. John Shepstone adds, April 27th, 1877 (p. 4): “The above was
confirmed only yesterday by reliable authority, who added that a
power such as the English, stepping in now, would be most welcome to
the Zulus generally, through the unpopularity of the king, by his
cruel and reckless treatment of his subjects.” And Mr. Fynney, in the
report already quoted from, says:

“The king appeared to have a very exaggerated idea both of his
power, the number of his warriors, and their ability as such....
While speaking of the king as having exaggerated ideas as to the
number of his fighting-men, I would not wish to be understood as
underrating the power of the Zulu nation.... I am of opinion that
King Cetywayo could bring six thousand men into the field at a short
notice, great numbers armed with guns; but the question is, would
they fight?... I am of opinion that it would greatly depend against
whom they were called to fight.... While the Zulu nation, to a man,
would have willingly turned out to fight either the Boers or the
Ama-Swazi, the case would be very different, I believe, in the event
of a misunderstanding arising between the British Government and the
Zulu nation.... I further believe, from what I heard, that a quarrel
with the British Government would be the signal for a general split
up amongst the Zulus, and the king would find himself deserted by the
majority of those upon whom he would at present appear to rely.”

While Sir T. Shepstone says, November 30th, 1878 (2222, p. 175): “I
will, however, add my belief that the Zulu power is likely to fall to
pieces when touched.”

Such were the opinions given by men supposed to be intimately
acquainted with Zulu character and feeling, one of them being _the_
great authority on all native matters; and on such statements did
Sir Bartle Frere rely when he laid his scheme for the Zulu War.
How absolutely ignorant, how foolishly mistaken, were these “blind
leaders of the blind” has been amply proved by the events of 1879.

We need not enter very fully into the accusations brought by the
missionaries against the Zulu king of indiscriminate slaughter of
native converts for their religion’s sake. They were thoroughly
believed in Natal at the time; but, upon investigation, they dwindled
down to three separate cases of the execution of men (one in each
case) who happened to be converts, but of whom two were put to death
for causes which had nothing whatsoever to do with their faith (one
of them being indeed a relapsed convert); and the third, an old
man, Maqamsela, whose name certainly deserves to be handed down to
fame in the list of martyrs for religion’s sake, was killed without
the sanction or even knowledge of the king, by the order of his
prime minister Gaozi.[105] That the latter received no punishment,
although the king disapproved of this action, is not a fact of any
importance. It is not always convenient to punish prime ministers and
high commissioners, or powerful indunas.

Sir Bartle Frere of course takes the strongest possible view of
the matter against the king, and speaks of his having killed Zulu
converts (2220, p. 270), “at first rarely, as if with reluctance,
and a desire to conceal what he had ordered, and to shift the
responsibility to other shoulders, latterly more frequently, openly,
and as an avowed part of a general policy for re-establishing the
system of Chaka and Dingane.” This little phrase is of a slightly
imaginative nature, resting on no (produced) evidence. It is, in
fact, a “statement.”[106]

Sir Henry Bulwer’s reply—November 18th, 1878 (2222, p. 171)—which
forms an able refutation of various statements of Sir B. Frere,
contains the following sentence: “I took some pains to find out how
the case really stood, and ascertained that the number of natives,
either converts or living on mission stations, who had been killed,
was _three_. I have never heard since that time of any other mission
natives being killed.... I was, therefore, surprised, on reading
your Excellency’s despatch, to see what Messrs. Oftebro and Staven
had said. I have since made particular inquiries on that point, but
have failed to obtain any information showing that more than _three_
mission natives have been killed. Among others to whom I have spoken
is the Rev. Mr. Robertson, of Zululand, who was in ’Maritzburg a few
weeks ago. He told me that he had not heard of any other than the
_three_ cases.”

Sir Bartle Frere replies, December 6th, 1878 (2222, p. 175):[107]
“I have since made further inquiry (he does not say what), and have
_no doubt_ that though His Excellency _may possibly_ be right as
to the number regarding which there is _judicial evidence_ (Sir H.
Bulwer plainly decides that there was _no evidence at all_); the
missionaries had _every reason to believe_ that the number slain
_on account of their inclination to Christianity_ was considerably
greater than three. One gentleman, who had better means of obtaining
the truth than anyone else, told me _he had no doubt_ the number of
converts killed was considerable.”

This gentleman, Sir Bartle Frere assures us, “knows the Zulus
probably better than _any living European_; he is himself an old
resident in Zululand, and a man _above all suspicion of exaggeration
or misrepresentation_(!). He gave me this information, under
stipulation that his name should not be mentioned, otherwise it
would, I am sure, at once be accepted as a guarantee for the accuracy
of his statements.”

With such phrases, “I have no doubt,” “every reason to believe,” “I
feel sure,” etc. etc., has Sir Bartle Frere continually maligned the
character of the Zulu king, called since the war by Mr. John Dunn,
“the most injured man in South Africa.”

One is rather puzzled who the man may be to whom Sir Bartle Frere
gives so high a character, his opinion of which he evidently expects
will quite satisfy his readers. We should much like to have the
gentleman’s name. The number of gentlemen “long resident in Zululand”
are not so many as to leave a wide field for conjecture. Besides the
missionaries, the only names that occur to us to which the phrase
can apply are those of Mr. John Shepstone, Mr. John Dunn, and Mr.
Robertson.

The only point in the indictment against Cetshwayo which we have
now to consider, is that of the killing of girls under the Zulu
marriage law, and the reply to Sir Henry Bulwer’s remonstrance on
the point, which Sir Bartle Frere speaks of in his final memorandum
as expressed “in terms of unprecedented insolence and defiance;”
while _The Times of Natal_ (generally recognised as the Government
organ) went still further, and has twice charged the Zulu king with
sending _repeatedly_, insolent messages to the Natal Government. As
to the _repetition_ of the offence, it need only be said that there
is no foundation in the Blue-books for the assertion. And as to
this particular offence it is enough to say that no notice had been
taken of it to Cetshwayo himself, till two years afterwards it was
unearthed, and charged upon him, as above, by the High Commissioner,
notwithstanding that, whatever it may have been, it had been
subsequently condoned by friendly messages from this Government.

The marriage law of Zululand is thus described by Sir T. Shepstone
(1137, p. 21): “The Zulu country is but sparsely inhabited when
compared with Natal, and the increase of its population is checked
more by its peculiar marriage regulations than by the exodus of
refugees to surrounding governments. Both boys and girls are formed
into regiments, and are not allowed to marry without special leave
from the king, or until the regiments to which they belong are
fortunate enough to receive his dispensation. Caprice or state
reasons occasionally delay this permission, and it sometimes
happens that years pass before it is given. Contravention of these
regulations is visited by the severest penalties.”[108]

The history of the case which we are now considering may be given in
the following extracts:

On September 22nd, 1876, Mr. Osborn, resident magistrate of
Newcastle, writes: “The Zulu king lately granted permission to two
regiments of middle-aged men to marry. These were, however, rejected
by the girls, on the ground that the men were too old; upon which
the king ordered that those girls who refused to marry the soldiers
were to be put to death. Several girls were killed in consequence,
some fled into the colony, others into the Transvaal Republic, and on
October 9th, Government messengers report (1748, p. 198):

“We heard that the king was causing some of the Zulus to be killed on
account of disobeying his orders respecting the marriage of girls,
and we saw large numbers of cattle which had been taken as fines.
Otherwise the land was quiet.”

As far as the most careful investigations could discover, the number
killed was not more than four or five, while the two Zulus already
quoted said that, although they had _heard_ of the matter, they did
not _know_ of a single instance; and as these young men themselves
belonged to one of the regiments, it can hardly be supposed that any
great slaughter could have taken place unknown to them.

At the time, however, report as usual greatly exaggerated the
circumstances, and Sir Henry Bulwer speaks (1748, p. 198) of
“_numbers of girls and young men_,” and “_large numbers of girls and
others connected with them_,” as having been killed.

He sent a message to Cetshwayo on the subject, which in itself was
a temperate and very proper one for an English governor to send, in
the hope of checking such cruelty in future, and was not unnaturally
somewhat surprised at receiving an answer from the usually courteous
and respectful king, which showed plainly enough that he was highly
irritated and resented the interference with his management of
his people. Sir Henry had reminded him of what had passed at his
coronation, and Cetshwayo replies that if Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone)
had told the white people that he (the king) had promised never to
kill, Somtseu had deceived them. “I have yet to kill,” he says. He
objects to being dictated to about his laws, and says that while
wishing to be friends with the English, he does not intend to govern
his people by laws sent to him by them. He remarks, in a somewhat
threatening way, that in future he shall act on his own account, and
that if the English interfere with him, he will go away and become a
wanderer, but not without first showing what he can do if he chooses.
Finally he points out that he and the Governor of Natal are in like
positions,[109] one being governor of Natal, the other of Zululand.

It is plain that this reply, as reported by the Government
messengers, produced a strong effect on Sir H. Bulwer’s mind, and
considerably affected his feeling towards the king, though, as
already stated, he never brought it, at the time or afterwards,
to the notice of Cetshwayo, and has since exchanged friendly
messages with him. And no doubt the reply was petulant and wanting
in due respect, though a dash of arrogance was added to it by the
interpreter’s use of the expression “we are equal,” instead of “we
are in like positions”—each towards our own people. But that the
formidable words “I have yet to kill,” “I shall now act on my own
account,” meant nothing more than the mere irritation of the moment
is plain from the fact that he never made the slightest attempt to
carry them out, though recent events have taught us what he might
have done had he chosen to “act on his own account.”

The _tone_ of the reply would probably have been very different had
it been brought by Cetshwayo’s own messengers. By an unfortunate
mistake on the part of the Natal Government, one of the messengers
sent was a _Zulu refugee_ of the party of Umbulazi and Umkungo,
between whom and the king there was deadly hostility, which had
lately been intensified by the insulting manner in which Umkungo’s
people had received Cetshwayo’s messengers, sent in a friendly spirit
to inform them of King Umpande’s death. The very presence of this
man, bringing a reproof from the Government of Natal, would naturally
be resented by the Zulu king, who had already declined communications
from the Transvaal sent through refugee subjects of his own (Sir
Henry Bulwer—1748, p. 10); and was now obliged to receive with
courtesy, and listen to words of remonstrance from, one of these very
refugees who had fled to Natal, and, under Zulu law, was liable to be
put to death as a traitor, when he made his appearance in Zululand.
The king’s words, exhibiting the irritation of the moment, whatever
they may have been, would lose nothing of their fierceness and
bitterness by being conveyed through such a medium.

We do not wish to defend such practices as those of forcing girls
into distasteful marriages, or putting them to death for disobedience
in that respect. But we must remember that, after all, the king, in
ordering these executions, was enforcing, not a new law laid down by
himself, but “an old custom” (1748, p. 198). From his point of view
the exercise of such severity was as necessary to maintaining his
authority as the decimation of a regiment for mutiny might appear to
a commander, or the slaughter of hundreds of Langalibalele’s people,
hiding in caves or running away, which we have already described,
appeared to Sir B. Pine and Sir T. Shepstone in 1873-74.

The king himself gave an illustration of his difficulties in a
message sent to Sir H. Bulwer early in 1878 (2079, p. 96). He
reported to His Excellency that two of his regiments had had a
fight, and many of his men had been killed, at which he was much
annoyed. He reports this to show His Excellency that, although he
warned them that he would severely punish any regiment that caused
any disturbance at the Umkosi, he cannot rule them without sometimes
killing them, especially as they know they can run to Natal.

We have now considered in turn every accusation brought against the
Zulu king up to the end of 1878, when Sir Bartle Frere delivered
his ultimatum, which he had said beforehand would put an end to our
peaceful relations with our neighbours. We venture to assert that,
with the exception of the last, every one of these accusations is
distinctly refuted on evidence gathered from official sources. Of
that last, we would observe, that, although it cannot be entirely
denied, the fault has been greatly exaggerated; while that part
of it which referred to the sole instance of a hasty reply to the
Natal Government, has been condoned by two years’ friendly relations
since the offence, before it was raked up by Sir Bartle Frere as an
additional pretext for the war. And, at all events, had Cetshwayo’s
severity to his people been a hundred times greater than it ever was,
he could not in a lifetime have produced the misery which this one
year’s campaign has wrought.

Yet these accusations were the sole pretexts for the war, except
that fear of the proximity of a nation strong enough and warlike
enough to injure us, _if it wished to do so_, which Sir Bartle Frere
declared made it impossible for peaceful subjects of Her Majesty
to feel security for life or property within fifty miles of the
border, and made the existence of a peaceful English community in
the neighbourhood impossible.[110] He speaks in the same despatch
(2269, pp. 1, 2) of the king as “an irresponsible, bloodthirsty, and
treacherous despot,” which terms, and others like them, do duty again
and again for solid facts, but of the justice of which he gives no
proof whatever. We cannot do better than give, in conclusion, and
as a comment upon the above fear, a quotation from Lord Blachford’s
speech in the House of Lords, March 26th, 1879, which runs:

“Some people assumed that the growth of the Zulu power in the
neighbourhood of a British colony constituted such a danger that,
in a common phrase, it had to be got rid of, and that, when a thing
had to be done, it was idle and inconvenient to examine too closely
into the pretexts which were set up. And this was summed up in
a phrase which is used more than once by the High Commissioner,
and had obtained currency in what he might call the light
literature of politics. We might be told to obey our ‘instincts of
self-preservation.’ No doubt the instinct of self-preservation was
one of the most necessary of our instincts. But it was one of those
which we had in common with the lowest brute—one of those which we
are most frequently called on to keep in order. It was in obedience
to the ‘instinct of self-preservation’ that a coward ran away in
battle, that a burglar murdered a policeman, or, what was more to our
present purpose, that a nervous woman jumped out of a carriage lest
she should be upset; or that one man in a fright fired at another
who, he thought, meant to do him an injury, though he had not yet
shown any sign of an intention of doing so. The soldiers who went
down in the _Birkenhead_—what should we have thought of them if,
instead of standing in their ranks to be drowned, they had pushed the
women and children into the hold and saved themselves? A reasonable
determination to do that which our safety requires, so far as it
is consistent with our duty to others, is the duty and interest of
every man. To evade an appeal to the claims of reason and justice,
by a clamorous allegation of our animal instinct, is to abdicate our
privileges as men, and to revert to brutality.”




CHAPTER XII.

THE ULTIMATUM, DECLARATION OF WAR, AND COMMENCEMENT OF CAMPAIGN.


On December 11th the boundary award was delivered to the Zulus
by four gentlemen selected for the purpose, who, by previous
arrangement, met the king’s envoys at the Lower Tugela Drift. The
award itself, as we already know, was in favour of the Zulus;
nevertheless it is impossible to read the terms in which it was given
without feeling that it was reluctantly done. It is fenced in with
warnings to the Zulus against transgressing the limits assigned to
them, without a word assuring them that _their_ rights also shall
in future be respected; and, while touching on _Zulu_ aggressions
on _Boers_ in the late disputed territory, it says nothing of those
committed _by_ Boers.

But perhaps the most remarkable phrase in the whole award is that in
which Sir Bartle Frere gives the Zulus to understand that _they_ will
have to pay the compensation due to the ejected Transvaal farmers,
while he entirely ignores all that can be said on the other side of
injuries to property and person inflicted on Zulus in the disputed
territory (of which the Blue-books contain ample proof), not to speak
of the rights and advantages so long withheld from them, and now
decided to be their due.

Sir Henry Bulwer plainly took a very different view on this point
when he summed up the judgment of the Commissioners (2220, p. 388),
and added as follows: “I would venture to suggest that it is a fair
matter for consideration if those Transvaal subjects, who have been
induced ... under the sanction, expressed or tacit, of the Government
of the Republic, to settle and remain in that portion of the country,
have not a claim for compensation from their Government for the
individual losses they may sustain.”

Sir Bartle Frere, starting with phrases which might be supposed
to agree with the above, gradually and ingeniously shifts his
ground through propositions for compensation to be paid to farmers
“_required_ or _obliged_ to leave” (omitting the detail of _who is to
pay_), and then for compensation to be paid to farmers _wishing_ to
remove, until he finally arrives, by a process peculiarly his own,
at a measure intended to “secure private rights of property,” which
eventually blossomed out into a scheme for maintaining, in spite of
the award, the Boer farmers on the land claimed by them, which we
shall presently relate in full. Although nothing appeared in the
award itself on this point, the whole tone of it was calculated to
take the edge off the pleasure which the justice done them at last
would naturally give the Zulus, and it was promptly followed up by an
“ultimatum” from the High Commissioner calculated to absorb their
whole attention.

This “ultimatum” contained the following thirteen demands, and was
delivered on the same day with the award, an hour later:

  1. Surrender of Sihayo’s three sons and brother to be tried by
  the Natal courts.

  2. Payment of a fine of five hundred head of cattle for the
  outrages committed by the above, and for Ketshwayo’s delay in
  complying with the request (N.B., not _demand_) of the Natal
  Government for the surrender of the offenders.

  3. Payment of a hundred head of cattle for the offence committed
  against Messrs. Smith and Deighton (N.B., twenty days were
  allowed for compliance with the above demands, _i.e._ until
  December 31st, inclusive).

  4. Surrender of the Swazi chief Umbilini, and others to be named
  hereafter, to be tried by the Transvaal courts (N.B., no time was
  fixed for compliance with this demand).

  5. Observance of the coronation “promises.”

  6. That the Zulu army be disbanded, and the men allowed to go
  home.

  7. That the Zulu military system be discontinued, and other
  military regulations adopted, to be decided upon after
  consultation with the Great Council and British Representatives.

  8. That every man, when he comes to man’s estate, shall be free
  to marry.

  9. All missionaries and their converts, who until 1877 lived in
  Zululand, shall be allowed to return and reoccupy their stations.

  10. All such missionaries shall be allowed to teach, and
  any Zulu, if he chooses, shall be free to listen to their
  teaching.[111]

  11. A British Agent shall be allowed to reside in Zululand, who
  will see that the above provisions are carried out.

  12. All disputes in which a missionary or European (_e.g._ trader
  or traveller) is concerned, shall be heard by the king in
  public, and in presence of the Resident.

  13. No sentence of expulsion from Zululand shall be carried out
  until it has been approved by the Resident.

  N.B.—Ten days more were allowed for compliance with the above
  demands (4-13).

_The Natal Colonist_, August 21st, 1879, condenses the opinions of
Sir B. Pine upon the ultimatum—from his article in “The Contemporary
Review,” June, 1879—thus:

“He thinks the depriving Messrs. Smith and Deighton of their
handkerchiefs and pipes hardly a matter deserving of a place in such
a document; that the Sihayo and Umbilini affairs were more serious,
but that ‘full reparation ... might have been obtained by friendly
negotiations.’ He does not attach to the promises alleged to have
been made by Cetshwayo ‘the force of a treaty which we were bound to
see executed.’ And while approving of a British Resident being placed
in the Zulu country, he frankly recalls the fact that ‘Cetshwayo has
himself, on more than one occasion, requested such an arrangement.’
‘At the same time,’ he adds, ‘I think that the powers proposed to be
invested in this officer are more than are necessary or expedient,
and I would especially refer to those relating to the protection of
missionaries. Christianity ought not to be enforced at the point of
the sword.’ In reference to Cetshwayo’s alleged coronation promises,
we may note in passing that Sir B. Pine is careful to point out that
one chief reason for his sanctioning that expedition was ‘out of
deference to Mr. Shepstone’s judgment;’ and that it was expressly
stipulated by the High Commissioner that no British troops should
accompany Mr. Shepstone, ‘so that Her Majesty’s Government might
not be compromised in the matter.’ With such a stipulation it is
amazing that anyone should still contend that Cetshwayo entered into
engagements so solemn as to call for invasion of his country to
punish the breach of them.”

And the Special Correspondent of _The Cape Argus_ writes: “As regards
the alleged coronation engagements, Dunn affirms that no undertaking
was made by, or even asked from, Cetshwayo. In the act of coronation,
Mr. (now Sir T.) Shepstone gave to the king a piece of paternal
counsel, and the conditions were in reality nothing more than
recommendations urged upon his acceptance by the Special Commissioner.

“Lord Kimberley, who was Secretary of State for the Colonies at the
time of Sir T. Shepstone’s installation of Cetshwayo, spoke upon this
subject in the House of Lords;” which _The Daily News_, March 26th,
1879, reports as follows:

“With respect to the so-called coronation promises, nothing had more
astonished him in these papers than to learn that these promises were
supposed to constitute an engagement between us and the Zulu nation.
He happened to have had some concern in that matter; and if he had
supposed that Sir T. Shepstone, in asking for these promises from
Cetshwayo, had rendered us responsible to the Zulu nation to see that
they were enforced, he would not have lost a mail in disavowing any
such responsibility. He was supported in the view which he took by
the late Colonial Secretary (Lord Carnarvon). The fact was that these
were friendly assurances, given in response to friendly advice, and
constituted no engagement. But Sir B. Frere put these ‘coronation
promises’ in the foreground.” Sir M. Hicks-Beach, also, says (2144,
p. 1): “It is obvious that the position of Sir T. Shepstone in this
matter was that of a friendly counsellor, giving advice to the king
as to the good government of the country.”

The demands which we have recorded were delivered to the Zulu envoys,
who were not allowed to discuss or comment upon them, on the ground
that the Commission had no authority for that purpose. The envoys,
indeed, appeared seriously concerned by their import. They denied
that the coronation stipulations had ever been disregarded, and said
that they could not understand why the Zulu army should be disbanded;
the army was a national custom with them as with the English. They
also asked for an extension of time, and considered that on such
important matters no specified time should have been fixed; the reply
to which request was that the time was considered ample.

Sir B. Frere, in his covering despatch to the Secretary of State,
remarks that the “enclosed extracts from demi-official letters,” from
the Hon. Mr. Brownlee and the Hon. Mr. Littleton, “give an outline
of the proceedings, and show that the messages were _carefully
delivered_, _well explained_, and _thoroughly understood_, copies
of the English text with Zulu translations being given to the Zulu
envoys.” On turning to “the enclosed extracts,” however, we do not
find in them a single word of the sort from either gentleman, while
the extract from Mr. Littleton’s letter consists of not a dozen lines
describing the spot where the meeting took place, and in which the
writer’s opinions are limited to these: “they (the Zulus) seemed to
take the award very quietly,” but “were evidently disturbed” by the
ultimatum, and “Mr. Shepstone seemed to me to manage very well.” The
young gentleman could not well say any more, as he did not know a
word of Zulu; but one is puzzled to know how Sir B. Frere draws his
deductions from either extract. How far the opinions of the other
honourable gentleman are to be depended upon, may be gathered from
the following assertion made by him some months after the Boundary
Commissioners had deliberately decided that the Boers had no claim
whatever to the disputed territory, but that it would be expedient to
allow them to retain the Utrecht district.

“The falsehood of the Zulu king with regard to the Utrecht land
question,” says Mr. Brownlee, “is quite on a par with his other
actions. After misleading the Natal Government upon the merits of the
case, it is now discovered on the clearest and most incontrovertible
proof[112] that a formal cession was made of this disputed land to
the Transvaal Republic.”

The special correspondent of _The Cape Argus_, however, writes about
this time as follows: “Dunn states that Cetshwayo does not, even
now, know fully the contents of the ultimatum, and still less of the
subsequent memorandum.[113] The document was read over once, and its
length was such (2222, pp. 203-9)—six pages of the Blue-book—that the
messengers could not possibly fix the whole of it in their memory.”
True, a copy was given to Dunn himself; but, for sufficient reasons
of his own, he did not make known the contents of the document in
person, but sent word to the king by his own messengers, between whom
and the indunas there was a considerable discrepancy. According to
Dunn, Cetshwayo was in a great fury upon hearing the word of the High
Commissioner (? as to the maintenance of Boer “private rights” over
his land). He reproached his adviser with having thwarted his purpose
to exact satisfaction at the hands of the Dutch, and doubly blamed
him for having represented the English as just in their intercourse
and friendly in their intentions. Until this time he had thought, as
Dunn himself had, that the congregation of troops upon his borders
represented nothing but an idle scare. But he saw at length that the
English had thrown the bullock’s skin over his head, while they had
been devouring the tid-bits of the carcass.

The three causes alleged in the ultimatum for war—the raid of
Sihayo’s sons, the assault on Messrs. Smith and Deighton, and the
proceedings of Umbilini—occurred long after Sir B. Frere had been
preparing for war, in the full expectation that the Border Commission
would decide against the Zulu claims, and that Cetshwayo would not
acquiesce peacefully in such a decision. It would seem, indeed, from
his remarks on the subject (Correspondence, Letters II. and IV.),
that he would have even set aside the decision of the Commissioners,
if he had found it possible to do so. Although he failed in doing
this, he sought to attain practically the same end by means of a
remarkable “memorandum,” prepared and signed by himself—not submitted
to Sir Henry Bulwer, but “_prematurely_” published in the Natal
newspapers.

The memorandum in question was on the appointment of a Resident in
Zululand, and, as Sir Bartle Frere himself says, “it was intended to
explain for Cetshwayo’s benefit what was the nature of the cession
to him of the ceded territory,” and it contained the following
clause: “It is intended that in that district (the late disputed
territory) individual rights of property, which were obtained under
the Transvaal Government, shall be respected and maintained, so
that any Transvaal farmers, who obtained rights from the Government
of the Republic, and who may now elect to remain on the territory,
may possess under British guarantee the same rights they would have
possessed had they been grantees holding from the Zulu king under the
guarantee of the great Zulu council.”

The _whole_ of the disputed territory had been apportioned in farms
to Transvaal subjects, and without doubt every one of these farms
would immediately be claimed, since their value would be immensely
raised by the fact that in future they would be held “under British
guarantee.” Therefore, to thus maintain the farmers upon them without
regard to the wishes of the Zulu king and nation was simply to take
away piecemeal with one hand what had just been given as a whole with
the other.

This “memorandum” was hailed with triumph by some of the colonial
papers, and the news that, after all, the Zulus were to get no solid
satisfaction from the award, soon circulated amongst all classes, not
excluding the Zulus themselves.

It was upon this subject that the “Correspondence” between Sir Bartle
Frere and the Bishop of Natal, already referred to, commenced. In
December, 1878, the High Commissioner was good enough to invite
the Bishop, both by message and personally, to “criticise” his
policy towards the Zulus. The invitation, indeed, came far too
late for any arguments or information, which the Bishop might be
able to afford, to be of the very slightest use. However, the High
Commissioner desired criticism, and received it in a series of
letters, which—except the last two, withheld for some reason best
known to himself—were published, with Sir B. Frere’s replies, in the
Blue-books.

The Bishop pointed out that, under the interpretation of this
memorandum, “the award gives back the land in name only to the Zulus,
whereas in reality Ketshwayo will have no control over it; he will
not be able to exercise authority over his own people living on it,
without coming into collision immediately with their Boer masters,
who would fiercely resent any intrusion on his part on their farms;
he will not be able to send any of his people to live on it, or any
of his cattle to graze on it, or even to assign places in it to such
of his people as may elect to move from the Boer to the Zulu side
of the new boundary.”[114] To which Sir Bartle replies, that he had
“a strong impression[115] that, if Cetshwayo were simply told the
disputed land was assigned to him, he would at once conclude that it
was his in full Zulu sovereignty;” which he assumed to be impossible
with regard to any land which had once been under the British flag,
while to eject a settler who had bought the land from the Transvaal
Government, in the belief that it could maintain him upon it, he
regarded as an “unjust and immoral act.” In point of fact, the land
in question could only have been looked upon as “under the British
flag,” in trust for the rightful possessors, and the farmers had
settled upon it in the full knowledge that the title to it was in
dispute; while, even had it been otherwise as to the latter point,
the only just claim that could be raised would be against the Boer
Government, or its representative, and certainly not against the
right of the Zulu people to be restored to actual occupation of the
land.

But that from the first, and long before he left Capetown for Natal,
the High Commissioner was preparing for war with the Zulus, is
evident from his despatch and telegram of January 26th, 1878 (quoted
from at page 179), in the former of which he speaks of the delay
caused by the border inquiry being no disadvantage, as, besides other
reasons, it “will increase our means of defending whatever we may
find to be our unquestionable rights;” and in the latter he says
again: “I hope the delay caused will not be great, and whatever there
is will have compensating advantages, for I have some hopes of being
able to strengthen your hands.”

These phrases, indeed, might merely refer to Sir Bartle Frere’s
desire to be “ready to defend ourselves against further
aggressions;” but certain statements made by Commodore Sullivan show
that he had already in view the invasion of Zululand.

Extracts from these statements run as follows:

“I am informed by the Governor (Sir B. Frere) that there is every
chance of hostility in the debateable land between the Transvaal,
Zululand, and Natal.”—December 16th, 1877 (2000, p. 45).

“His Excellency (Sir B. Frere) pointed out to me that, as it appeared
almost certain that serious complications must shortly arise with the
Zulu tribe of Kafirs on the borders of Natal and the Transvaal, which
will necessitate active operations, he considered it better that the
_Active_ should remain here, in order to render such assistance by
sea and land as may be practicable.”—April 12th, 1878 (2144, p. 32).

“The object of my visit here was ... to make myself acquainted
with such points on the (Zulu) coast as might be available for
co-operating with Her Majesty’s land forces by landing troops or
stores.[116]

“It had been my intention (abandoned by Sir H. Bulwer’s desire) to
have examined the north of the Tugela River both by land and sea,
also a reported landing-place situated almost thirty miles eastward
of the Tugela by sea.”

The High Commissioner was plainly determined not to allow the Zulus
the slightest _law_, which, indeed, was wise in the interests of war,
as there was considerable fear that, in spite of all grievances and
vexations, Cetshwayo, knowing full well, as he certainly did, that
collision with the English must eventually result in his destruction,
might prefer half a loaf to no bread, and submit to our exactions
with what grace he could. And so probably he would; for, from all
accounts, every effort was made by the king to collect the fines of
cattle, to propitiate the Government.

Sir Bartle Frere, accordingly, was very particular in requesting Sir
Henry Bulwer to give Cetshwayo notice (C. 2222, p. 222) that “_rigid
punctuality with regard to time will be insisted on, and, unless
observed, such steps as may appear necessary will be immediately
taken to ensure compliance_,” which Sir H. Bulwer notifies to the
Zulu king upon the same day, December 16th (C. 2308, p. 31).

Two days later Mr. John Dunn wrote to say that he had received a
message from the king (2222, p. 227), requesting him “to write and
say that he agrees to the demands of giving up Sihayo’s sons and
brother, and the fines of cattle; but begs that, should the number
of days (twenty) have expired before the arrival of the cattle, His
Excellency will take no immediate action, as, owing to the many
heavy rains[117] we have had since the meeting of His Excellency’s
Commissioners and his indunas, they have not been able to reach him
yet; and Sihayo’s sons being at their kraals, which are some way from
him, it will take some days to send for them.”

“On the other demands he will give his answer on consulting his
indunas.”

Yet Sir Bartle Frere declares (P. P. [C. 2454] p. 136) that Cetshwayo
“was resolved on war rather than on compliance with any demand of
ours.”

Bishop Schreuder’s opinion, reported through Mr. Fannin on December
22nd (2308, p. 31), was that all the demands would be agreed to
except that of the disbandment of the army and the abolition of the
military system. “The king and nation will consider it a humiliation,
and a descent from their proud position as independent Zulus to
the lower and degrading position of Natal Kafirs, to agree to this
demand. I asked,” says Mr. Fannin, “if the announcement that the
restriction on marriage would be removed would not reconcile the
young men to the change. He (Bishop Schreuder) thinks not; they will
stand by their king, and fight for the old institutions of their
country.”

The king’s request for some indulgence as to time was peremptorily
refused, and was looked upon as “a pitiful evasion,” on the grounds
that he had already had four months to consider the question of
Sihayo’s sons. In point of fact, however, the first “demand” had only
been made a week before, and, until then, the word “request” having
been used, the king was at liberty to offer atonement for the offence
other than the surrender of the offenders, as Sir Henry Bulwer
himself suggested (2222, p. 173), by paying a fine of five thousand
head of cattle from the Zulu nation.

Sir B. Frere’s answer to Cetshwayo through Mr. Dunn (2222, p. 227)
was, “That the word of Government as already given, cannot now be
altered.

“Unless the prisoners and cattle are given up within the term
specified, Her Majesty’s troops will advance. But in consideration
of the disposition expressed in Mr. Dunn’s letter to comply with the
demands of Government, the troops will be halted at convenient posts
within the Zulu border, and will there await the expiration of the
term of thirty days without, in the meantime, taking any hostile
action unless it is provoked by the Zulus.”

And John Dunn adds on his own account (2308, p. 34), that the
king evidently does not attach sufficient importance to the time
stipulated. The cattle, he said, “are still being collected, and it
will be impossible now for them to be up in time.” John Dunn in the
same letter put in a petition on behalf of his own cattle and people,
saying that the latter would be willing to join in with any force
should they be required.

Meanwhile, from accounts given by Mr. Fannin (2308, pp. 35 and 37),
by Mr. Robson (2242, pp. 11, 12) (2308, p. 35), by Mr. Fynney (2308,
p. 36), and from other sources, it is plain that Cetshwayo was doing
his utmost to collect the required cattle in time, though hampered
in doing so by the extreme difficulty of complying in a hurry with
the other demands implying such radical changes in the administration
of the country, and exceedingly distressed at the turn affairs were
taking. Every report shows plainly enough that, far from desiring
war, and looking out for an opportunity to try their strength with
the English, the Zulu king and people, or the major part of it, were
thrown into utmost consternation by the menacing appearance of their
hitherto friendly neighbours. But all explanations were disregarded,
all requests for time treated as impudent pretexts, preparations on
our part for an invasion of Zululand were hurried on, while every
sign of agitation (the natural consequences of our own attitude) on
the other side of the border was construed into an intention on the
part of the Zulu king to attack Natal, and urged as an added reason
for our beginning hostilities. There were, at that time, no grounds
whatsoever for this supposition. It is plain enough that, when it
became apparent that war would be forced upon him by us, the Zulu
king contemplated nothing but self-defence, and that, during these
preliminaries to the unhappy campaign of 1879, there were numerous
occasions on which, by the exercise of a little patience, justice,
and moderation, any ruler less bent on conquering Zululand than was
Sir Bartle Frere could have brought matters to a peaceful issue,
without the loss of honour, men, and money which England has since
sustained.

Lord Chelmsford (then Lieut.-General the Hon. F. Thesiger) arrived
in Natal in August, 1878, and at once began his preparations for
the expected campaign. One of the measures upon which great stress
was laid was that of forming a native contingent to act with the
British troops. The original scheme for the organisation of this
contingent in case of necessity had been prepared and carefully
worked out by Colonel Durnford, R.E., and was based on his thorough
knowledge of the natives. During the eight years of his life in South
Africa he had had ample opportunity of learning, by experience, how
utterly and mischievously useless was the plan, hitherto invariably
followed, of employing disorganised, untrained bodies of natives as
troops under their own leaders, without any proper discipline or
control. The bravest men in the world would be apt to fail under such
circumstances; while mere bands of untaught savages, unaccustomed to
fighting and half-armed, had repeatedly proved themselves in former
campaigns excellent for running away, but otherwise useless except as
messengers, servants, and camp-followers. Added to which there was
no possibility of preventing such “troops” as these committing every
sort of lawless violence upon the wounded or captured enemy.

Colonel Durnford’s scheme was intended to meet both difficulties,
and, when laid before the General on his arrival in Natal, met with
his unqualified approval. So much was he struck with it that he was
at first disposed to entrust the organisation and chief command of
the entire contingent to one who, by the ability and completeness
with which he had worked out the scheme, proved himself the fittest
person to carry it out, and take command of the whole force. But the
General changed his mind, and decided to divide the native contingent
amongst the various columns, the details of its distribution being as
follows:

The 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent of three battalions
(Commandant Montgomery, Major Bengough, and Captain Cherry), and
five troops mounted natives formed No. 2 Column, commanded by
Lieut.-Colonel Durnford.

The 2nd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (two battalions, under
Major Graves) was attached to No. 1 Column, commanded by Colonel
Pearson.

The 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (two battalions, under
Commandant Lonsdale) was attached to No. 3 Column, commanded by
Colonel Glyn, and about two hundred Natal Native Contingent were
attached to No. 4 Column, commanded by Colonel Wood.

Each battalion of Native Contingent was to consist of 5 staff and
90 officers and non-commissioned officers (white), and 110 officers
and non-commissioned officers and 900 privates (natives); the
native non-commissioned officer being armed with a gun, and being a
section-leader of 9 men armed with assegai and shield.

Lord Chelmsford speaks in various despatches (C. 2234) of this Native
Contingent in the following terms:

“The Lieut.-Governor, I am happy to say, has acceded to the request
I made some little time ago for the services of six thousand Natal
natives. I hope to be in a position to equip and officer them very
shortly” (p. 25).

“At the time of my arrival in the colony, three months ago, these
natives possessed no military organisation, nor had any arms provided
for them by Government.”

“The Natal Government have within the last fourteen days allowed me
to raise and organise seven thousand natives for service within or
without the border” (p. 26).

“The arrival of these officers (special service officers from
England) has also enabled me to place Imperial officers in command of
some of the battalions of native levies.”...

“The Natal Contingent consists of three regiments, two of two
battalions and one of three” (p. 39).

“There are in addition five troops of mounted natives and three
companies of pioneers.”...

“The pioneers have been raised, officered, and equipped under the
orders of the Natal Government, and are now placed at my disposal.
The remainder of the Contingent have been raised at the cost and
under the orders of the Imperial authorities” (p. 40).

In none of his despatches is there mention of any special officer
in connection with this native force, but the following officers
were responsible for the organisation of the various regiments: No.
1 Regiment and mounted contingent, Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E.;
No. 2 Regiment, Major Graves; No. 3 Regiment, Commandant Lonsdale.
Great difficulties appear to have been thrown in the way of the
proper equipment, etc. of the native levies; but by untiring effort
and personal determination, better arrangements for pay, clothing,
and discipline were made for (at all events, a portion of) the levy
than had been known amongst South African troops. The indiscriminate
appointment of officers caused considerable trouble, illustrative
of which we may mention an anecdote. Men were repeatedly sent to
Lieut.-Colonel Durnford with orders from the military secretary
that they were to receive commissions, some of these unfitted by
disposition and education for the duties required of them. A friend
has lately furnished an instance very much to the point. “A young
fellow came one day to Colonel Durnford from Colonel Crealock, who
said he had served in the old colony, and boasted that _he_ knew how
to make Kafirs fight. ‘How is that?’ was the inquiry made. ‘Oh!’
replied the youth, ‘just to get behind them with a sjambok (_i.e._
whip)—that’s the way to do it!’ ‘All right,’ replied the Colonel
quietly; ‘I have just one piece of advice to give you though—_make
your will_ before you start! If you’re not stabbed by your own men,
you will deserve it.’”

How successful was the training of the men of the 2nd Column may
be judged by the behaviour of the “Natal Native Horse,” a body of
mounted men (Basuto, Edendale, and Zikali natives) who fought at
Isandhlwana; and did right good service throughout the campaign.[118]
He also raised, equipped, and trained the three companies of Native
Pioneers, organising two field-parks, and providing complete bridge
equipment for crossing the Tugela; besides preparing, mainly from
his own personal observations (having been at Ulundi in 1873, and in
Zululand on many occasions), the map of Zululand in universal use
during the campaign, and mentioned in despatches as “Durnford’s map.”

In reply to Sir Bartle Frere’s inquiries as to proposed movements of
troops up to Natal, Sir H. Bulwer writes, July 18th, 1878, that in
his opinion “it is desirable under the present circumstances, and
pending the final decision in the matter of the boundary dispute, to
avoid as much as possible any military demonstration, as liable to
be misunderstood and to be interpreted as showing our intention to
settle the question by force. The delay, too, that has occurred since
the sitting of the Commission might be attributed by the Zulu king to
our desire to make preparations, and it might be thought that we were
playing false.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] p. 395).

And here we may appropriately refer to the opinion expressed by the
Home Government at a later date.

Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes to Sir B. Frere, 21st November, 1878:
“I trust that ... Cetywayo may have been informed that a decision
regarding the disputed boundary would speedily be communicated to
him. His complaint that the Lieut.-Governor of Natal ‘is hiding from
him the answer that has come from across the sea, about the land
boundary question, and is only making an excuse for taking time, so
as to surprise him,’ is not altogether an unnatural one for a native
chief situated in his circumstances, who is necessarily ignorant of
much that has passed on this subject, and of many of the causes to
which the delay is attributable. But it is a misunderstanding which
it should be the earnest endeavour of the Government to remove, and I
am confident that there is no need to impress upon you the importance
of losing no time in dealing with this question or the beneficial
effect which its satisfactory settlement may be expected to have upon
the strained relations which you describe as now existing between
the colony of Natal and the Zulu nation.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] p. 322).

We must now briefly run through the principal points in despatches
bearing on the question of increasing the military strength in Natal.

Sir B. Frere, writing from Cape Town on September 10th, says: “I
have consulted General Thesiger on the subject. He is very unwilling
to ask for reinforcements on the Natal border without the full
concurrence of the Government of that colony, and I understand that
His Excellency Sir H. Bulwer is specially anxious that nothing should
be done in Natal which could possibly justify to the Zulu chief
the belief that we were preparing for active hostilities against
him. I confess that, as at present informed, I very imperfectly
comprehend the grounds on which the objections of His Excellency the
Lieut.-Governor, as I understand them, to strengthening the Natal
frontier are based.[119] They will doubtless be more fully explained
when I have the advantage of personal communication with him. In
the meantime I feel quite certain that the preservation or speedy
restoration of peace will be rendered much more certain if General
Thesiger had two more battalions of Her Majesty’s Army within his
reach.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] pp. 282, 283).

On September 14th, referring to the above despatch, Sir B. Frere
says he has “since received a telegraphic communication from
General Thesiger, in which he expresses his views in regard to his
military requirements in the event of hostilities breaking out with
the Zulus.” The General asks for six more special duty officers,
and fifteen captains or subalterns for transport duties. “General
Thesiger considers that an addition of two regiments would be
essential, and that the presence of a cavalry regiment would be of
enormous advantage” (_ibid._ p. 254).

From Durban, Sir B. Frere telegraphs on September 23rd to Sir
M. Hicks-Beach: “I find that the urgency of supporting General
Thesiger’s request is much greater even than I supposed. I trust
there will be no delay in complying with his request to its fullest
extent” (_ibid._ p. 255).

There had been serious and disturbing reports of a Zulu force being
assembled on the Tugela River, for the ostensible purpose of hunting,
with reference to which Sir H. Bulwer writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach,
14th September, “on the subject of the gathering of a Zulu force
within a short distance of our border across the Tugela. You will
learn from these papers that the gathering has broken up, and the
Zulus returned home” (_ibid._ p. 270).

Sir M. Hicks-Beach, on October 17th, replies to Sir B. Frere’s
despatches of 14th and 23rd September, that “arrangements will be
made for the early despatch of some additional officers for special
duty. Her Majesty’s Government are, however, not prepared to comply
with the request for a reinforcement of troops. All the information
that has hitherto reached them with respect to the position of
affairs in Zululand appears to them to justify a confident hope that,
by the exercise of prudence, and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of
forbearance and reasonable compromise, it will be possible to avert
the very serious evil of a war with Cetywayo; and they cannot but
think that the forces now at your disposal in South Africa, together
with the additional officers about to be sent, should suffice to meet
any other emergency that may arise, without a further increase to the
Imperial troops” (_ibid._ p. 273).

On September 30th, Sir B. Frere writes from Pietermaritzburg: “I
regret that I find the position of affairs in this colony far more
critical even than I expected;” and, after a very exaggerated
description of the state of affairs, he says: “An attempt of native
tribes to combine to resist the white man and drive him back has
been long foreseen. There can be no doubt that this design is now in
process of attempted execution” (_ibid._ pp. 278-82).

Of the truth of this startling assertion, let Sir H. Bulwer’s
despatches, as well as after-events, speak.

Enclosed in this despatch of Sir B. Frere is General Thesiger’s
memorandum on the military requirements, and his sketch for a
defensive scheme for Natal, for which he requires “6000 natives, 600
mounted men, 6 guns, and 3 battalions of British infantry;” but he
remarks: “I cannot, however, conceal from myself that security from
invasion depends almost entirely upon the forbearance of Cetywayo;”
and says, “for defensive purposes alone, therefore, Natal and
Transvaal colonies require 3 battalions of infantry in addition to
what they have already got” (_ibid._ pp. 285, 286).

In reply, Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes, 21st November: “The several
circumstances which you have reported as tending to cause an open
rupture do not appear, in themselves, to present any difficulties
which are not capable of a peaceful solution.... On a full review,
therefore, of all the circumstances reported by you, and influenced
by the strong representations made by Lord Chelmsford as to the
insufficiency of his present force to ensure the safety of the
European residents in Natal and the Transvaal, Her Majesty’s
Government have felt themselves justified in directing that further
reinforcements of troops, as well as the additional officers recently
placed under orders for special service, should be sent out to Natal,
and the necessary steps will at once be taken for this purpose. But
in conveying to you the decision at which, in compliance with your
urgent representations, Her Majesty’s Government have arrived, it is
my duty to impress upon you that in supplying these reinforcements it
is the desire of Her Majesty’s Government not to furnish means for a
campaign of invasion and conquest, but to afford such protection as
may be necessary at this juncture to the lives and property of the
colonists. Though the present aspect of affairs is menacing in a high
degree, I can by no means arrive at the conclusion that war with the
Zulus should be unavoidable, and I am confident that you, in concert
with Sir H. Bulwer, will use every effort to overcome the existing
difficulties by judgment and forbearance, and to avoid an evil so
much to be deprecated as a Zulu war” (_ibid._ pp. 320, 321).

On November 11th, the Lieut.-General says that he has just been
permitted by the Natal Government to raise and organise 7000
natives, and ventures “to express an opinion that the demand for
two extra battalions cannot be considered unreasonable even for
purely defensive purposes;” but he goes on to say: “a defensive plan,
however, cannot be considered as satisfactory unless there is the
possibility of taking the offensive at the right moment. This I am
doing my best to prepare for; and, so soon as my native contingent is
mobilised, I shall be ready, so far as my limited means will allow,
to enter Zululand, should such a measure become necessary.”—(P. P.
[C. 2222] p. 19).

On December 18th, Sir M. Hicks-Beach says: “I take this occasion,
however, of reminding you that it is the desire of Her Majesty’s
Government, in sending these reinforcements, to assist the local
Government as far as possible in providing for the protection of the
settlers in the present emergency, and not to furnish the means for
any aggressive operations not directly connected with the defence of
Her Majesty’s possessions and subjects” (_ibid._ p. 21).

On December 2nd, Sir B. Frere forwards copies of memoranda by Sir T.
Shepstone and Mr. Brownlee, in which the former proposes measures
which “involve the extinction of the Zulu power as it now is, and
the attempt to adopt them must, if decided upon, be made with the
knowledge that the Zulu chief will oppose them, whatever course the
headmen and common people may adopt” (_ibid._ p. 134).

Mr. Brownlee says plainly: “The time has arrived for decisive action;
we will never again have so favourable an opportunity as the present;
if it is lost, sooner or later we will be taken at a disadvantage”
(_ibid._ p. 138).

On December 10th, Sir B. Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach: “The
chance of avoiding war under such circumstances by any exercise of
prudence, or by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance or
reasonable compromise, may depend upon ourselves or upon the Zulus,
or upon the nature of the issues pending between us.... Can we then
rest on an armed truce?... After the most anxious consideration, I
can arrive at no other conclusion than that it is impossible to evade
the necessity for now settling this Zulu question thoroughly and
finally ... there is clearly no possibility of now evading bringing
matters to an issue with the Zulus” (_ibid._ pp. 183-85).

On the 23rd January, 1879, Sir M. Hicks-Beach acknowledges the
receipt of Sir B. Frere’s despatches containing “the demands with
which Cetywayo has been called upon to comply, together with your
own descriptions of the situation with which you have to deal, as
well as other very important memoranda by Sir H. Bulwer, Sir T.
Shepstone, and Mr. Brownlee,” and says, “I may observe that the
communications which had previously been received from you had not
entirely prepared them” (Her Majesty’s Government) “for the course
which you have deemed it necessary to take. The representations
made by Lord Chelmsford and yourself last autumn as to the urgent
need of strengthening Her Majesty’s forces in South Africa were
based upon the imminent danger of an invasion of Natal by the Zulus,
and the inadequate means at that time at your disposal for meeting
it. In order to afford protection to the lives and property of the
colonists, the reinforcements asked for were supplied, and, in
informing you of the decision of Her Majesty’s Government, I took
the opportunity of impressing upon you the importance of using every
effort to avoid war. But the terms which you have dictated to the
Zulu king, however necessary to relieve the colony in future from
an impending and increasing danger, are evidently such as he may
not improbably refuse, even at the risk of war; and I regret that
the necessity for immediate action should have appeared to you so
imperative as to preclude you from incurring the delay which would
have been involved in consulting Her Majesty’s Government upon a
subject of so much importance as the terms which Cetywayo should be
required to accept before those terms were actually presented to the
Zulu king” (_ibid._ pp. 187, 188).

The preliminary arrangements for the campaign were the formation of
four columns, with sufficient transport, etc. to enter Zululand at
different points, and concentrate on Ulundi.

No. 1 Column, Colonel Pearson, to assemble on the Lower Tugela,
garrison Fort Pearson, and cross and encamp on the Zulu side, under
the protection of the guns of the fort.

This Column at first was composed of 2 guns Royal Artillery, 1
company Royal Engineers, 2nd Battalion “The Buffs,” 99th Regiment,
Naval Brigade (2 guns and 1 Gatling), 1 squadron Mounted Infantry,
about 200 Natal Volunteers, 2nd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (2
battalions), and 1 company Natal Native Pioneers.

No. 2 Column, Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E., to cover the Tugela, and
co-operate with Colonel Pearson, was almost entirely composed of
natives. Its strength, a rocket battery, 1st Regiment (3 battalions)
Natal Native Contingent, 315 “Natal Native Horse,” and 1 company
Natal Native Pioneers.

No. 3 Column, Colonel Glyn, C.B., to cross at Rorke’s Drift, when
the time granted the Zulu king had expired. “On the advance being
ordered,” it would “require two days for this column to reach a good
military position;” and it was to keep up communications “with the
columns on the left and right.” Strength of column, 6 guns Royal
Artillery, 1 squadron Mounted Infantry, 1-24th Regiment, 2-24th
Regiment, about 200 Natal Volunteers, 150 Mounted Police, and 3rd
Regiment (2nd Battalion) Natal Native Contingent, also one company
Natal Native Pioneers. A company of Royal Engineers was ordered to
join this column.

No. 4 Column, Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B., to advance to the Blood
River. Strength, 6 guns Royal Artillery, 1-13th Regiment, 90th
Regiment, Frontier Light Horse, some 200 Native Contingent; and a
small Dutch force was expected to join this column.

A 5th Column (which had been operating against Sekukuni) was under
the command of Colonel Rowlands, V.C., C.B., composed of the 80th
Regiment, three guns, and mounted irregulars.

The strength of the columns is given as:

                Imperial      Native    Conductors
                   and      Contingent.     and     Waggons and Carts.
             Colonial Troops.             Drivers.

  No. 1 Column    1872         2256         238       266 (144 hired)
   ”  2   ”          5         3488          84        30
   ”  3   ”       1747         2566         293       233 (82    ”  )
   ”  4   ”       1843          387         162       102 (21    ”  )
   ”  5   ”       1202          338          25        62 (50    ”  )

Forming a grand total of

     Imperial       Native     Conductors,     Waggons, etc.
        and       Contingent.     etc.
  Colonial Troops.

       6669          9035         802               693
                                           (of which 297 were hired)

with about 1200 horses belonging to cavalry, etc., and 691 horses,
361 mules, and 5231 oxen. In addition, there were the conductors,
drivers, etc., and 4572 oxen of the hired waggons.

The columns to operate on the following bases and lines:

  No. 1. Durban—Lower Tugela.
   ”  2. Pietermaritzburg, Greytown—Middle Drift (Tugela).
   ”  3. Ladysmith—Rorke’s Drift (Buffalo River).
   ”  4. Newcastle—Utrecht—Blood River.
   ”  5. Middleburg—Derby—Pongolo River.

Ulundi being the objective point of the force.

In place of any urgent necessity for commencing the war, putting
political questions on one side, there were strong military reasons
for postponing it.

Sir Bartle Frere, in his despatch of 30th June, 1879 (P. P. [C. 2454]
p. 137), seeks to prove that the time of moving across the border
was “well chosen,” and accorded with information received, yet the
fact remains that advice _was_ given that the most favourable time
for military operations in Zululand was between the periods of summer
rains and winter grass-fires—_i.e._ the months of March, April,
and May. In spite of Sir Bartle Frere’s pleas, we must hold that
no competent “military critic” would recommend invading an enemy’s
country during the rainy season, when rivers are in flood, plains in
many cases marshes, and roads almost impassable; especially if the
invading forces were required to move with a ponderous waggon-train.

Lord Chelmsford himself proves the case: he writes (January 12th)
on the day after crossing the border: “The country is in a terrible
state from the rain, and I do not know how we shall manage to get our
waggons across the valley near Sirayo’s kraals.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p.
43).

And again on January 14th, from the head-quarter camp, Zululand, near
Rorke’s Drift, he writes: “Between this camp and Greytown alone, a
distance of some seventy miles, three rivers are now impassable, and
waggons have to cross by ferries, a laborious operation requiring
more skilled labour than we at present have available.

“The road at various points requires the most constant supervision,
and in some parts the heavy rain frequently dislodges huge boulders
from the hill-sides overhanging the roadway, and in many places
watercourses become torrents after an hour’s rain.

“Beyond this camp towards the Izipezi Hill (my first objective point)
the road will require great labour to make it passable; but strong
working-parties have already been at work. The transport difficulties
are augmented by the great mortality in oxen; this is inevitable, but
it will probably decrease in a few weeks’ time” (_ibid._ p. 47).

It is believed that the first project of operations was to advance
in three lines on Ulundi—from the Lower Tugela, Rorke’s Drift, and
Blood River—the columns to move forward by short marches, entrenching
strongly at each halting-place, doing no injury to the Zulu people,
and thus inducing them to submit quietly. This wise and consistent
idea was unfortunately never even attempted.

On the 8th January, 1879, Lord Chelmsford writes: “All the reports
which reach me tend to show that the Zulus intend, if possible, to
make raids into Natal[120] when the several columns move forward....
The strength of the three columns, Nos. 1, 3, and 4, is only just
sufficient to enable them to advance.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 26).

The directions for the various columns were, briefly—No. 1. To cross
the Tugela at Fort Pearson and encamp on the Zulu side; when ordered
to advance, to move on Etshowe, and there, or in its neighbourhood,
to form a depôt, well entrenched.

No. 2. To form a portion of No. 1 Column, but act separately,
reporting to Colonel Pearson; to remain on the Middle Tugela frontier
till an advance is ordered, and Colonel Pearson has reached Etshowe.

The defence of the frontier was to rest with the Colonial Government;
but on the 8th January the General altered the instructions for No. 2
Column, and directed two-thirds of it to move up to the Sand Spruit
Valley for the protection of the Umsinga border, and to operate in
conjunction with No. 3 Column. The third battalion to remain at
Middle Drift.

No. 3 Column to cross at Rorke’s Drift when the thirty days expired;
to move forward and form an advanced depôt, strongly entrenched,
as found advisable from the nature of the country, etc. To assist
in clearing the border south-east of Rorke’s Drift, and to keep up
communication with the columns on left and right.

No. 4 Column to advance to the Blood River. “The civil authorities
on the border will take every care to warn the Zulus that our first
advance need not be deemed hostile, but that no collection of armed
natives in the vicinity of our forces can be permitted; no act on our
part to unnecessarily bring on hostilities should be permitted.”—(P.
P. [C. 2222] p. 223).

In the event of a further advance, the advanced depôt of this column
to be near the intersection of the roads from Utrecht to Ulundi,
and Rorke’s Drift to Swaziland; but “to delay its advance toward
the Umvolosi River until the border is cleared, and to move in a
southerly direction towards Colonel Glyn’s column to assist it
against Sirayo.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] pp. 27, 28).

On January 11th, the General met Colonel Wood, and arranged with
him that he should “occupy himself with the tribes in his front and
left flank,” till the General was “ready to advance to Izipezi Hill”
(_ibid._ p. 42).

By this unfortunate change of plan, the left of No. 3 Column was
exposed, of which the Zulus took fatal advantage.

We must now return to Sir Bartle Frere, who, considering that
he had “exhausted all peaceable means for obtaining redress for
the past, and security for the future,” “by a notification dated
the 4th of January, 1879, placed in the hands of Lieut.-General
Lord Chelmsford, K.C.B., commanding Her Majesty’s forces in South
Africa, the further enforcement of all demands;” and remarks, “it
only remains for us to await the issue with perfect confidence in
the justice of our cause. The contest has not been provoked by the
British Government. That Government has done its best to avoid war
by every means consistent with honour.” An absolute truth as regards
the Home Government. “_That_” Government, as Sir B. Frere cleverly
remarks, “_had_ done its best to avoid war,” and did not see the
necessity, or, at all events, the immediate necessity, of that war
into which its servant, contrary to its instructions, plunged it.

The period allowed to Cetshwayo having expired, on the 11th January,
1879, the following notification was published in both English and
Zulu:

                            NOTIFICATION.

                                               _January 11th, 1879._

  The British forces are crossing into Zululand to exact from
  Cetywayo reparation for violations of British territory committed
  by the sons of Sirayo and others; and to enforce compliance with
  the promises, made by Cetywayo at his coronation, for the better
  government of his people.

  The British Government has no quarrel with the Zulu people. All
  Zulus who come in unarmed, or who lay down their arms, will be
  provided for till the troubles of their country are over; and
  will then, if they please, be allowed to return to their own
  land; but all who do not so submit will be dealt with as enemies.

  When the war is finished, the British Government will make the
  best arrangements in its power for the future good government of
  the Zulus in their own country, in peace and quietness, and will
  not permit the killing and oppression they have suffered from
  Cetywayo to continue.

                                             H. B. E. FRERE,
                                                _High Commissioner_.

(This is followed by a translation in the Zulu language.)

“This,” Sir B. Frere says, is “a message to the Zulu population which
the General will make as widely known as possible.”—(P. P. [C. 2242]
p. 24).

On December 29th, Mr. Fynney, Border Agent, writes at the request
of the Lieut.-General Commanding to the Lieut.-Governor of Natal
that the General “has taken the opportunity offered by the return of
Sintwangu and Umpepa to send the following message to the Zulu king:

“‘That, in the event of the cattle demanded as a fine, together with
Sirayo’s sons and brother, not being delivered before the expiration
of the time allowed, Her Majesty’s troops will occupy Zulu territory
without delay.

“‘2. That no forward movement into Zululand will be made till the
expiration of the thirty days; but at the end of that time, if all
the demands are not complied with, the troops will advance.

“‘3. That such advance will not be directed against the Zulu nation,
but against the king, who has broken the promises he made at his
coronation. So that in the event of hostilities, all Zulu subjects
willing to lay down their arms, and wishing to take refuge in British
territory, will be fed and protected till such time as peace is
restored, when they will be at liberty to return to their homes; but
that all who remain in Zululand will be considered as enemies.

“‘5. That these are His Excellency’s instructions, which he intends
to carry out to the best of his ability.’” (P. P. [C. 2308] p. 39).

On the 11th January, Lord Chelmsford, with No. 3 Column, crossed
the Buffalo River at Rorke’s Drift, the infantry crossing on a
barrel-raft, a punt, and a small boat; the cavalry and natives by a
ford lower down the river. The force encamped in the Zulu country
where it crossed.

The General, with the cavalry, rode to the left to meet Colonel
Wood—commanding No. 4 Column, which was at Bemba’s Kop—about
thirty-five miles off. They met about halfway. Colonel Wood, on his
return, commenced operations against the Zulus by seizing some 2000
cattle belonging to Inkomi and Sihayo, the Zulus only making “a show
of resistance.” In addition to this, Colonel Wood reports, on the
13th January, that he had also captured 2000 or 3000 head of cattle
from the Sondolosi tribe, and on the same day an attack was made on a
petty chief, Mbuna, whose men refused to disarm, and seven Zulus were
killed.—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 45).

Colonel Wood crossed the Blood River on the 6th January, and here we
must leave No. 4 Column for the present.

No. 1 Column had some difficulty in effecting the passage of the
Tugela, the river being in flood. The fortunes of this column will be
followed in a future chapter.

Colonel Durnford, No. 2 Column, reported to the General (on his
return to camp on the 11th) that the country in his front was quite
quiet. He then returned to his command with further instructions as
to its disposition, when “he and the mounted men and rocket battery
were to join me with No. 3 Column,” writes the General on January
14th.—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 47).

On the 11th, the General writes: “Both Colonel Wood and Major Russell
took a good number of Sirayo’s cattle this morning, which we found
quietly grazing along our line of advance.” And again: “Several
hundred head of cattle, etc. were taken by Nos. 3 and 4 Columns
on the 11th. This I considered desirable on political grounds, as
they all belonged to Usirayo, as well as from military necessities”
(_ibid._ pp. 43-46). It is rather difficult to reconcile this
commencement of operations with the words “The British Government
has no quarrel with the Zulu people;” or with the General’s message
to the Zulu king (through Mr. Fynney, Border Agent, and the Zulu
messengers Sintwangu and Umpepa, December 29th, 1878) ... “if all
the demands are not complied with the troops will advance. That such
advance will not be directed against the Zulu nation, but against the
King....”—(P. P. [C. 2308] p. 39).

On the 12th January, No. 3 Column first came into contact with the
Zulus. The General made a reconnaissance in the Bashi Valley and
towards Izipezi Hill. Sihayo’s people were seen driving the cattle
to the shelter of the hills, “as, however,” the General says, “it is
well known that we had made a distinct demand for the punishment of
the sons of this chief, and that his clan was one of the bravest and
most warlike of the Zulu nation, I considered it very desirable to
punish them at once by capturing their cattle.”

The Ingqutu Mountain was occupied by infantry, when “a fire was
opened upon them by the Zulus, who were occupying very strong
positions in the caves and rocks above.” An officer present states
that the actual first shot was from the side of the British, but
this is not of great importance, as it is impossible to imagine the
Zulus could have been expected to look calmly on, whilst their cattle
were being captured. After about half-an-hour’s fight the cattle and
horses were taken. The mounted force was likewise engaged higher up
the mountain. Our loss, 2 Native Contingent killed and 12 wounded.
The loss inflicted on the enemy, 30 killed, 4 wounded, and 10
prisoners; the cattle, etc. taken, 13 horses, 413 cattle, 332 goats,
and 235 sheep.—(P. P. [C. 2242] pp. 47, 48).

These first steps in Zululand have been given in considerable detail,
as they afford much food for reflection on the contrast between
“words” and “deeds.”




CHAPTER XIII.

ISANDHLWANA.


Having crossed into Zululand, the “difficulties ... in the way of
those who are endeavouring to move forward into an enemy’s country,
over tracts which have never been traversed, except by a very few
traders’ waggons,”[121] began to declare themselves; and Lord
Chelmsford remarks, January 16th: “No. 3 Column at Rorke’s Drift
cannot possibly move forward even eight miles until two swamps, into
which our waggons sank up to the body, have been made passable. This
work will occupy us for at least four days, and we shall find similar
obstacles in front of us in every march we are anxious to make.”

We find Lord Chelmsford, on January 27th, stating: “The country is
far more difficult than I had been led to expect, and the labour of
advancing with a long train of waggons is enormous. It took seven
days hard work, by one half of No. 3 Column, to make the ten miles
of road between Rorke’s Drift and Insalwana Hill practicable, and
even then had it rained hard I feel sure that the convoy could not
have gone on. The line of communication is very much exposed, and
would require a party of mounted men always patrolling, and fixed
intrenched posts of infantry at intervals of about ten miles.”—(P.
P.—C. 2252).

Under these circumstances we can only wonder that the advance with
cumbersome trains of waggons was undertaken, and the apparent want of
knowledge of the invaded country is almost equally surprising. All
previous experience goes to prove that a general moving in an enemy’s
country _with_ his “impedimenta” should form a defensible camp at
every halt; and this Lord Chelmsford apparently recognised when he
promulgated the “Regulations for Field Forces in South Africa;” but
we shall find how fatally he neglected the most ordinary precautions.

A hint for the advance might well have been taken from Sir Garnet
Wolseley’s campaign in Ashantee, and the various columns moved on
Ulundi—about eighty miles—in the lightest possible order, and without
a ponderous waggon-train. Rapid movement was the more imperatively
necessary, the enemy being in force, and able to make most rapid
concentrations. Guns (7-pounders) could have been moved over very
difficult ground with comparative ease, and even carried along
piecemeal if necessary.

The strangeness of the situation is shown plainly in Lord
Chelmsford’s despatch of the 16th January, written at Rorke’s
Drift—on the very borders of Zululand—at the very outset of the
war. Having spoken of “difficulties” (as already quoted), he says:
“Accepting the situation, therefore, it remains for me to determine
what modification of the plan of campaign at first laid down will
be necessary.” His idea still is to drive, “as far as possible, all
the Zulus forward towards the north-east part of their country,” and
“with Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Columns, to thoroughly clear or subjugate
the country ... by means of expeditions made by those columns from
certain fixed positions,” and this, he hopes, will “have the effect
of removing any dangerously large body from the Natal borders.”
Colonel Wood, with No. 4 Column, to act independently. “By these
movements,” he continues, “I hope to be able to clear that portion
of Zululand which is situated south of the Umhlatoosi River;” and
remarks that Cetshwayo will be obliged “to keep his army mobilised,
and it is certain that his troops will have difficulty in finding
sufficient food. If kept inactive, they will become dangerous to
himself; if ordered to attack us, they will be playing our game.”

How these plans answered, one week sufficed to show.

The first step in advance from Rorke’s Drift was to push forward
four companies of the 2-24th Regiment, a battalion of Natal Native
Contingent, and a detachment of Natal Native Pioneers into the Bashi
Valley on the 14th January, for the purpose of repairing the road.
This detachment remained encamped there until the 20th, five miles
from the remainder of the column at Rorke’s Drift, and with no
attempt at “laager” or other defence, Lord Chelmsford did not see the
need of precaution, and his instructions to the officer in command
were, “Use the bayonet” if a night attack took place.

On the 17th the General made a reconnaissance as far as Isandhlwana;
and on January 20th No. 3 Column moved from Rorke’s Drift and Bashi
Valley, to the spot selected for the camp to the east of Isandhlwana
Hill. The post at Rorke’s Drift (where the Buffalo was crossed)—of
vital importance to the safety of the column—was left with a
garrison of one company of 1-24th Regiment, but without any attempt
whatever at entrenchment: nor were any defensive precautions taken
at Helpmakaar, the store depôt in Natal, twelve miles from Rorke’s
Drift. The march to Isandhlwana was accomplished “without much
difficulty,” but “half a battalion 2-24th was obliged to halt short
of this camp owing to the oxen being fatigued.” They bivouacked for
the night in the open.

The position of the camp is thus described: “At the spot where our
road crossed ... we had a small kopje on the right, and then about
fifty yards to our left rises abruptly the Isandhlwana Mountain ...
entirely unapproachable from the three sides nearest us, but on the
farther, viz. that to the north, it slopes more gradually down, and
it is there connected with the large range of hills on our left with
another broad neck of land. We just crossed over the bend, then
turned sharp to the left, and placed our camp facing the valley, with
the eastern precipitous side of the mountain behind us, leaving about
a mile of open country between our left flank and the hills on our
left, the right of the camp extending across the neck of land we had
just come over, and resting on the base of the small kopje described
beforehand.”

The camp was formed in the following order from left to right: 2-3rd
Natal Native Contingent, 1-3rd Natal Native Contingent, 2-24th
Regiment, Royal Artillery, mounted troops, and 1-24th Regiment. “The
waggons were all placed between the camp and the hill at the back,
and behind them, immediately against its base, the head-quarters’
tents were pitched with their waggons beside them.”... “Not a single
step was taken in any way to defend our new position in case of a
night or day attack from the enemy.”[122]

On the same day (20th) the General reconnoitred on the “waggon-track,
which skirts Inhlazatye Mountain, as far as a place called Matyana’s
Stronghold,” at a distance of about twelve miles, but saw nothing of
the enemy. “Not having time to properly examine the country round
this peculiar stronghold,” the General ordered that next day two
separate parties should move out from the camp at an early hour; one
of mounted men under Major Dartnell to reconnoitre on the road he had
taken, whilst two battalions of Native Contingent under Commandant
Lonsdale worked round the Malakata Mountain: the orders being that
these officers were to effect a communication on the Inhlazatye
range, and then return to camp.—(P. P. [C. 2252] pp. 74, 75).

At about ten o’clock the Zulus were found in force by the mounted
men; the contingent being on a range of hills distant about five
miles. The enemy appeared anxious to fight, but Major Dartnell did
not think it prudent to engage without supports. The Zulus occupied
a large kloof, and whenever the mounted men approached they came out
in large numbers. A small body were sent up close, under Mr. Mansel,
to try and make the Zulus show their force, when they advanced
throwing out the “horns,” and tried to surround the party, following
them down into the open, where Major Dartnell and the remainder
of the mounted troops were. The whole then retired and joined the
contingent, about three miles from the kloof.

In the evening, says Major Clery, “a message arrived from
Major Dartnell that the enemy was in considerable force in his
neighbourhood, and that he and Commandant Lonsdale would bivouac out
the night,” which they were permitted to do.[123]

The wisdom of this may be doubted, as the Native Contingent seemed
particularly liable to alarm; twice they “were seized with panic,
rushing about everywhere, the night being very dark. They knocked
us down,” writes an officer, “and stampeded our horses, causing the
greatest confusion. If the Zulus had come on we should all have been
cut to pieces.”

“That night Major Dartnell sent off messengers to Lord Chelmsford
that he had marked the Zulus down in a kloof, and asked for two
companies of infantry to be sent out as a support, and that he would
attack the Zulus in the morning.”

Major Clery says:[124] “About 1.30 A.M. on the 22nd, a messenger
brought me a note from Major Dartnell to say that the enemy was
in greater numbers than when he last reported, and that he did
not think it prudent to attack unless reinforced by two or three
companies of the 24th Regiment. The General ordered the 2nd
Battalion 24th Regiment, the Mounted Infantry, and four guns, to
be under arms at once to march.” The Natal Native Pioneers, about
50 strong, accompanied the force, which “marched out from the camp
as soon as there was light enough to see the road.” Lieut.-Colonel
Pulleine, 1-24th Regiment, was instructed to take “command of the
camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn”—the force left with him
consisting of 5 companies 1-24th and 1 company 2-24th Regiment; 2
guns Royal Artillery; about 20 Mounted Infantry and Volunteers; 30
Natal Carbineers, 31 Mounted Police, and 4 companies Natal Native
Contingent. An order was also despatched to Colonel Durnford (at
Rorke’s Drift) to move up to Isandhlwana. Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine’s
instructions for the defence of the camp were, briefly, to draw
in his “line of defence” and “infantry outposts,” but to keep his
cavalry vedettes “still far advanced.”[125] We may here note that
the only country searched was that direct to the front and right
front—the direction of the waggon-track—although it is stated “the
Lieut.-General had himself noticed mounted men in one direction (our
left front) on the 21st, and in this direction he had _intended_ to
make a reconnaissance.” (P. P. [C. 2260] p. 99).

After the departure of the advance column nothing unusual occurred in
camp until between seven and eight o’clock, when it was reported from
the advanced picquet (on the Ingqutu range of hills, about 1500 yards
to the north) that a body of the enemy could be seen approaching
from the north-east: and various small bodies were afterwards seen.
Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine got his men under arms, and sent a written
message off to head-quarters that a Zulu force had appeared on the
hills on his left front. This was received “between 9.30 and 10 A.M.”

Colonel Durnford received the General’s order when on an expedition
into Natal to obtain waggons, but at once returned to Rorke’s Drift,
and marched for Isandhlwana. Lieutenant Chard, R.E., who had ridden
to camp for orders, “met Colonel Durnford about a quarter of a mile
from the camp at the head of his mounted men” about 10.30 A.M.,
and told him the troops were in column outside the camp, and Zulus
showing “on the crest of the distant hills,” “several parties”
working round so far to the left that he “was afraid they might be
going to make a dash at the Drift.” He took orders to Major Russell
to hurry up with the rocket battery, to detach a company of Sikali
men to protect the baggage, and for all to “look out to the left.”

Colonel Durnford reached the camp, and received all the information
Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine could afford, finding the situation to
be:—Lonsdale’s natives on outpost duty on the hills to the left, the
guns in position on the left of the camp, and the infantry under
arms. The oxen were driven into camp and—Mr. Brickhill says—tied to
the yokes, but not inspanned. Constant reports were coming in from
the hills to the left—“The enemy are in force behind the hills.”
“The enemy are in three columns.” “One column is moving to the left
rear, and one towards the General.” “The enemy are retiring in every
direction.” The enemy’s force was given at 400 to 600.

On hearing these reports, Colonel Durnford sent one troop Natal
Native Horse to reinforce his baggage guard; two troops to the hills
to the left (under Captains G. Shepstone and Barton)—one to move
along the crest of the range, one to search the valley beyond—and
determined himself to go out to the front “and prevent the one column
joining the ‘impi,’ which was supposed at that time to be engaged
with the troops under the General;” he asked Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine
for two companies of the 24th, to which Colonel Pulleine replied,
“that two companies could ill be spared, but that if Colonel Durnford
ordered them, of course they should go.” On consideration, Colonel
Durnford decided only to take his own men,[126] and moved out with
his remaining two troops Natal Native Horse, followed by Major
Russell’s rocket battery, with its escort of a company of Native
Contingent, under Captain Nourse.

A company 1-24th, under Lieutenant Cavaye, was sent out as a picquet
to the hills about 1200 yards north of the camp, and the remainder of
the troops dismissed to their private parades, where the men were to
lie down in readiness to turn out if required. At this time there
was no expectation of an attack during the day, and no idea had been
formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy.[127]

The two troops sent on the hills to the left “to ascertain the
enemy’s movements,” had proceeded “about five miles from the camp,”
when “the Zulu army came forward, advancing straight on towards the
camp.” Captain Shepstone ordered a retreat on the camp, and himself
rode in with the warning that the “whole Zulu army was advancing to
attack it.”[128] Captain Shepstone met Captain Gardner on reaching
the camp, and both officers then went to Colonel Pulleine, but, says
Captain Gardner, the enemy were “already on the hill on our left in
large numbers.”

Colonel Durnford, having despatched his two troops to the left, had
moved out to the front at a canter, followed at a foot’s pace by
the rocket battery, etc. About five miles out, a trooper rode down
from the hills on the left, and reported an immense “impi” behind
the hills, and almost immediately the Zulus appeared in force in
front and on the left, in skirmishing order, ten or twelve deep,
with supports close behind. They opened fire at about 800 yards, and
advanced very rapidly. Colonel Durnford retired a little way—to a
donga—and extended his men, then fell back, keeping up a steady fire,
for about two miles,[129] when he came upon the remains of the rocket
battery, which (it appeared) had turned to the left on hearing firing
on the hills, been cut off, and broken up. Fighting was still going
on here, but the Zulus were speedily driven back.

Colonel Durnford retired slowly on the camp, disputing every yard
of ground, until he reached a donga about 800 yards in front of the
right of the camp; there, prolonging the line of the camp troops, and
the right being reinforced by between thirty and forty mounted men,
under Captain Bradstreet, a stand was made.

“This gully,” Mr. Brickhill, interpreter to No. 3 Column, says, “the
mounted force held most tenaciously, every shot appearing to take
effect,” and with the havoc caused by the guns, “a thousand Zulu dead
must have laid between the conical hill and the gully. They lay just
like peppercorns upon the plain.”

The two troops of native horse sent to reconnoitre the Ingqutu Hills,
retired fighting before the enemy in good order “to a crest in the
neck which joins Sandhlwana to Ingqutu. Leaving their horses well
sheltered here, they held this crest splendidly, keeping up a steady
galling fire.”[130] They were eventually compelled to retire, with
the loss of Captain G. Shepstone.[131]

We must now consider what had taken place at the camp. All was quiet
till about twelve o’clock, when firing was heard on the hill where
the company on picquet was stationed; the troops were immediately
turned out and formed on the left front of the camp. About this
time Captain Gardner, 14th Hussars, arrived with an order from
the General, addressed to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, “to send on
the camp equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to
remain himself at his present camp and entrench it.”[132] Captain
G. Shepstone reached the camp with his warning about the same time.
Colonel Pulleine decided it was impossible to carry out the General’s
order, as the enemy were already in great force on the hills to the
left. Captain Gardner sent off a message to head-quarters, saying
that “our left was attacked by about ten thousand of the enemy. A
message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine.”

One company (Captain Mostyn’s) was moved up to support the picquet;
the enemy distant about 800 yards, moving “towards our left.” Orders
to retire were received almost immediately, and the whole retired to
the foot of the slope, the enemy rushing forward to the crest of the
hill as our men disappeared. Captain Younghusband’s company was at
this time in echelon on the left.[133]

The guns came into action about 400 yards on the left front of the
camp, “where they were able to throw shells into a large mass of the
enemy that remained almost stationary about 3400 yards off.”[134]

The three advanced companies of the 24th retired on the main body,
when the situation was this: The two guns and the whole of the
24th in line, about 300 yards from the left front of the camp; the
natives took post on the right of the 24th; then came Durnford’s
Basutos; and the extreme right was formed by about forty mounted
Europeans[135]—the force holding the only position that afforded
any shelter, viz. broken ground and a “donga” in front of the camp;
the infantry “in good position among the stones and boulders to the
left and left centre of the camp, and who stood their ground most
gallantly.”[136] The enemy approached to within about 400 yards, the
two guns firing case. The heavy fire from the line told so upon the
Zulus that they wavered and lay down; they are said to have covered
the valley in detached groups to the depth of about three-quarters of
a mile.[137]

The enemy now began to work round the rear (which they could do with
impunity owing to the formation of the ground), and Captain Essex
says: “I rode up to Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, who was near the right,
and pointed this out to him. He requested me to take men to that part
of the field, and endeavour to hold the enemy in check;” but at this
moment, he says, “those of the Native Contingent who had remained in
action, rushed past us in the utmost disorder, thus laying open the
right and rear of the 24th, the enemy dashing forward in the most
rapid manner.” The ammunition of the mounted troops failing (supplies
had been repeatedly sent for, but none came), Colonel Durnford
retired them towards the right of the camp (where the waggons and
ammunition of the Native Horse were), and himself galloped off to
the 24th, having previously told Captain Gardner that the position
was too extended, and he desired to concentrate the force. Colonel
Durnford’s intention undoubtedly was to withdraw all the troops to
the rising ground on the right of the camp, to which point he had
retired his Native Horse.

The Zulus rushed on the left in overwhelming numbers, completely
surrounding the 24th. The guns limbered up, and made for the Rorke’s
Drift Road, but found it blocked by the enemy; they therefore
“followed a crowd of natives and camp-followers, who were running
down a ravine; the Zulus were all among them, stabbing men as they
ran.” Down this ravine the fugitives hastened, the enemy round and
among them, the assegai doing its deadly work.

Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine was said by Lieutenant Coghill to have been
killed,[138] and during the flight Major Stuart Smith, R.A. (who had
been wounded), Surgeon-Major Shepherd, and many a man, mounted and
on foot, were killed. The Buffalo was gained at a point about five
miles below Rorke’s Drift, and numbers of the fugitives were either
shot, or carried away by the stream and drowned. Lieutenants Melville
and Coghill rode from the camp, on its being carried by the Zulus,
the former with the Queen’s colours of his regiment. These he bore
into the river, but lost his horse, and was left struggling in the
swift current; Lieutenant Coghill, who had safely crossed, rode in to
his assistance, when his horse was shot. These brave young officers
succeeded in gaining the Natal shore, but were soon overtaken by the
enemy, and died fighting to the last. The Natal Native Horse escaped
with little loss; they assisted many in the retreat, which they
covered as well as they could, especially under Captain Barton on the
banks of the Buffalo. Captain Essex puts the time of the retreat
from the camp at “about 1.30 P.M.”

After this period no one living escaped from Isandhlwana, and it was
supposed that the troops had broken, and, falling into confusion,
that all had perished after a brief struggle.

Nothing was known of the after-events of that fatal day for months,
till, on the 21st May, the scene of the disaster was revisited, and
the truth of the gallant stand made was established. This will be
treated of in another chapter.

We must now turn to the movements of the column under Colonel
Glyn, with the General; and it will be most convenient to take the
occurrences of the day as described by Lord Chelmsford and his
military secretary (Lieut.-Colonel Crealock).

Leaving camp at daybreak,[139] the General “reached Major Dartnell
about 6.30 A.M., and at once ordered him to send out his mounted men
to gain intelligence of the enemy, whose whereabouts did not appear
to be very certain.” (P. P. [C. 2252] p. 75.) The enemy shortly
after showed in considerable strength at some distance, but retired
without firing as the troops advanced. Lieut.-Colonel Crealock says:
“Between 9.30 and 10 A.M. we were off-saddled some twelve miles from
camp. During the three previous hours we had been advancing with
Colonel Glyn’s column against a Zulu force that fell back from hill
to hill as we advanced, giving up, without a shot, most commanding
positions.” (P. P. [C. 2260] p. 99.) It was at this time (“about
9 A.M.,” the General says) that the message was received from
Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills
on his left front. The General says he at once sent his aide-de-camp,
Lieutenant Milne, R.N., to the top of a high hill, from which the
camp could be seen. He had “a very powerful telescope, but could
detect nothing unusual.”[140] Lieut.-Colonel Crealock says that all
the news he gave “was that the cattle had been driven into camp,” and
he acknowledges “our own attention was chiefly bent on the enemy’s
force retiring from the hills in our front, and a party being pursued
by Lieut.-Colonel Russell three miles off.”

The kloof where the enemy had been was found deserted, but a large
body of Zulus were seen beyond it, and a portion of the mounted
force sent after them, Major Dartnell and the rest of his men moving
off to the right in the direction of another body of Zulus. These
turned out to be Matshana’s people, with the chief himself present:
they were engaged, their retreat cut off, and then driven back on
the Native Contingent. Of this party Matshana and one or two of his
people alone escaped.

“Having no cause, therefore, to feel any anxiety about the safety of
the camp,” the General ordered the mounted infantry to sweep round
“to the main waggon-track, whilst a portion of the infantry went over
the hilltop to the same point, and the guns, with an escort, retraced
their steps,” with instructions to join Colonel Glyn near the Mangane
Valley, where the General proceeded with Colonel Glyn to fix upon a
site for a new camp. Captain Gardner, 14th Hussars, was sent back to
camp “with the order to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine to send on the camp
equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to remain at his
present camp, and entrench it.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 101).

The 1st Battalion Native Contingent was ordered to march back to camp
across country, and examine dongas, etc. _en route_.

“Not a sign of the enemy was now seen near us,” says Colonel
Crealock. “Not a suspicion had crossed my mind that the camp was in
any danger, neither did anything occur to make me think of such a
thing until about 1.15,” when it was fancied firing was heard (the
natives were certain of it). “We were then moving back to choose a
camp for the night about twelve miles from Isandula.” About 1.45
P.M., a native reported “heavy firing had been going on round the
camp. We galloped up to a high spot, whence we could see the camp,
perhaps 10 or 11 miles distant. None of us could detect anything
amiss; all looked quiet. This must have been 2 P.M. The General,
however, probably thought it would be well to ascertain what had
happened himself, but not thinking anything was wrong, ordered
Colonel Glyn to bivouac for the night where we stood; and taking
with him some 40 mounted volunteers, proceeded to ride into camp.
Lieut.-Colonel Cecil Russell, 12th Lancers, now joined us, and
informed me that an officer of the Natal Native Contingent had come
to him (about 12 noon, I think) when he was off-saddled, and asked
where the General was, as he had instructions to tell him that heavy
firing had been going on close to the camp.... This officer, however,
did not come to us.

“This information from Colonel Russell was immediately followed
by a message from Commandant Brown, commanding the 1st Battalion
Natal Native Contingent, which had been ordered back to camp at
9.30 A.M.—(the battalion was halted a mile from us, and probably
eight miles from camp)—to the effect that large bodies of Zulus were
between him and the camp, and that his men could not advance without
support. The General ordered an immediate advance of the battalion,
the mounted volunteers and mounted infantry supporting it.

“I am not aware what messages had been sent from[141] the camp and
received by Colonel Glyn or his staff; but I know that neither the
General nor myself had up to this time received any information but
that I have mentioned.

“At 3.15 the General appeared to think that he would be able to brush
through any parties of Zulus that might be in his road to the camp
without any force further than that referred to, viz. 1st Battalion
Native Contingent and some eighty mounted white men.

“At 4 P.M.,[142] however, the native battalion again halted,” when
within about six miles of the camp, “and shortly after—the General
says—Commandant Lonsdale rode up to report that he had ridden into
camp and found it in possession of the Zulus.” The General at
once sent word to Colonel Glyn to bring back all the troops, and
advanced about two miles, sending Lieut.-Colonel Russell forward to
reconnoitre;—he fully confirmed Commandant Lonsdale’s report. Colonel
Glyn rejoined the General about 6 P.M., when the troops were formed
in “fighting order,” and advanced across the plain; “but could not
reach the neighbourhood of our camp until after dark.”

It may properly be here remarked that from the outskirts of the force
firing had been seen at the camp as late as nearly four o’clock; and
about six, large bodies of the enemy were seen retiring from the
camp, through openings in the Ingqutu range.

When a move was first made by the General in the direction of the
camp, an officer who was in advance narrates what he saw when he
came to a rising ground from which the camp was first seen:

“There certainly were some tents standing then, but seemed very few,
and away to the left front of the camp there was some smoke, though
not much, and it was high up, just as if there had been musketry fire
and the smoke had floated away; but there was certainly no musketry
fire going on then. A few seconds afterwards a sergeant ... said:
‘There go the guns, sir.’ I could see the smoke, but we could hear
nothing. In a few seconds we distinctly saw the guns fired again,
one after the other, sharp. This was done several times—a pause, and
then a flash—flash! The sun was shining on the camp at the time,
and then the camp looked dark, just as if a shadow was passing over
it. The guns did not fire after that, and in a few minutes all the
tents had disappeared. The sergeant said, ‘It’s all over now, sir.’ I
said, ‘Yes, and I hope it is the right way.’ We could see there was
fighting going on, but of course did not know which way it had gone.
The men all thought the Zulus had retired, but I felt doubtful in my
own mind, but had no idea really of the catastrophe that had taken
place.... This must have been about 3 P.M.”

“Within two miles of camp,” Lieutenant Milne says, “four men were
seen slowly advancing in front of us; a few mounted men were sent
out; the men in front previously seen then took cover behind some
rocks, but were fired upon by our men; one fell, the remainder ran
out in the open, throwing up their hands to show they were unarmed.
On being taken prisoners, they were found to be Native Contingent,
escaped from the massacre.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 185).

On nearing the camp it was nearly dark, but it was observed that
waggons were drawn up across the neck; the guns were therefore
brought into action and shelled them. Then, no sound being heard,
Major Black, with a wing of his regiment, moved forward to occupy the
small hill close to Isandhlwana. No enemy was seen, and the camp was
found tenanted by those who were taking their last long sleep.

A halt was made for the night amidst the _débris_ of (the proper
right of) the camp, on the “neck;” the infantry covering the west,
and the mounted troops and guns the east side. During the night there
were one or two false alarms, and the whole force, at early dawn,
moved off towards Rorke’s Drift, as the General was anxious about
the safety of that important post; also the troops had no spare
ammunition,[143] but little food, and “it was certain that daylight
would reveal a sight which could not but have a demoralising effect
upon the whole force.”—(P. P. [C. 2252] p. 76).

In Lord Chelmsford’s despatch of 27th January, he gives a narrative
of the attack on the camp, but remarks “the absolute accuracy of
which, however, I cannot vouch for” (pp. 76, 77). On comparing his
“narrative” with the _facts_, it will be found to be _absolutely
inaccurate_. But Lord Chelmsford makes some remarks which cannot be
passed, over in silence. He says: “Had the force in question but
taken up a defensive position in the camp itself, and utilised
there the materials for a hasty entrenchment;” but he does not point
out how the “force in question” was to know of the near approach of
the Zulu army, he himself having neglected to search the country
where that army lay. He had prepared no “defensive position;” but he
had selected a fatal spot for his camp, which, covering a front of
about half a mile, was utterly indefensible as it stood; and he had
“pooh-poohed” the suggestion of taking defensive precautions when
made by Colonel Glyn; and, further, it does not appear that there
was _any time whatever_ for the “force in question” to do anything
but fight. Lord Chelmsford then says: “It appears that the oxen were
yoked to the waggons three hours before the attack took place, so
that there was ample time to construct that waggon-laager which the
Dutch in former days understood so well.” This remark comes with
peculiar ill-grace from Lord Chelmsford, who not only had not taken
any precautions, but had not permitted any laager or other defence to
be made; and whose reply to a suggestion of a laager at Isandhlwana
was, “It would take a week to make.” Also it must not be forgotten
that the attack on Isandhlwana was _without warning_.

He next says: “Had, however, the tents been struck, and the British
troops placed with their backs to the precipitous Isalwana Hill, I
feel sure that they could have made a successful resistance.” Here
again he would blame the dead to cover the faults of the living!
But even had the troops been thus placed (as some eventually appear
to have been), how long could they keep at bay, when ammunition
failed,[144] an enemy armed with weapons they could use with fatal
effect out of reach of the bayonet?

And lastly, Lord Chelmsford speaks of rumours “that the troops were
deceived by a simulated retreat,” and thus “drawn away from the line
of defence.” The _facts_ prove the exact contrary. The only person
deceived by a “simulated retreat” was Lord Chelmsford himself, whose
troops _during three hours_ had advanced “against a Zulu force
that fell back from hill to hill ... giving up without a shot most
commanding positions.” And where was _their_ “_line of defence_?”
We do not find one word of Lord Chelmsford’s own want of the most
ordinary precautions—his want of “intelligence,” and neglect to
obtain it—of his seeing the enemy’s mounted scouts on the left front,
and intending (but not making) a reconnaissance in that direction—his
fixed belief that the enemy _could_ only be in force in his front—the
transparent way in which he was drawn off farther from the camp—the
absence of any attention to the signs that something _was_ wrong at
the camp—the prevention of assistance reaching the beleaguered camp
when one of his officers _had_ recognised the emergency, etc.; to
which must be added that we do not find one word of regret for the
untimely fate of the gallant men who fell doing _their_ duty. In
justice to Colonel Glyn, commanding No. 3 Column, it must be remarked
that the General himself gave the orders for the various movements,
etc. And in justice to Lord Chelmsford also, we note it is asserted
that the shock he experienced told severely upon him at the time; and
he may not have very carefully studied the despatch, which was the
work of his military secretary.

Before finally leaving the events of the 22nd January, we must fully
notice an important episode that occurred, and which had a serious
bearing on the disaster we have to lament.

We have seen that “the guns with an escort” were ordered to retrace
their steps ... to join Colonel Glyn at the rendezvous near the
Mangane Valley. We will now follow their movements.

When Lord Chelmsford discovered that the enemy he had come in
search of had disappeared, 4 guns Royal Artillery, 2 companies
2-24th Regiment (Captains Church and Harvey), and about 50 Natal
Native Pioneers, the whole under the command of Lieut.-Colonel
Harness, R.A., were ordered to march to a rendezvous in advance by
a different route to that taken by the remainder of the column;
this was necessary, as the guns could not go over the ground taken
by the latter. To carry out the order, they had to retrace for over
two miles the route by which they had come in the morning, and then
bear to the left. This was done (a short halt having first been
made, to let men and horses have a rest), and about twelve o’clock
they reached some rising ground, when they again halted, not being
certain of the direction of the rendezvous, to await Major Black,
2-24th, Assistant Quartermaster-General, who had gone on to find it.
Almost immediately after this halt the firing of cannon was heard,
and looking towards the camp, about eight miles off, they saw shells
bursting against the hills to the left of it. Soon afterwards a body
of about 1000 natives suddenly appeared in the plain below, between
them and the camp; the Native Pioneers thought they were Zulus.
Captain Church told Colonel Harness if he would let him have a horse
he would go and find out. Colonel Harness at once gave him one,
and sent a mounted sergeant with him. As they galloped towards the
natives, a European officer rode out, and when they met said: “The
troops behind me are Commandant Browne’s contingent, and I am sent to
give you this message: ‘_Come in every man, for God’s sake! The camp
is surrounded, and will be taken unless helped at once._’” Captain
Church rode back as fast as he could, and found Colonel Harness in
conversation with Major Gosset (aide-de-camp) and Major Black, both
of whom had come up during his absence. Colonel Harness promptly
said: “We will march back;” but Major Gosset ridiculed the idea,
and advised him to carry out his orders. Colonel Harness then asked
Major Black and Captain Church their opinions. They both agreed with
him without hesitation. Colonel Harness gave the order to return,
and started without a moment’s delay; Major Gosset riding off in the
direction of the General. About 1.30 P.M. Lieut.-Colonel Harness was
on his way to the camp, and had got over about two miles of ground
when he was overtaken by Major Gosset with orders from the General to
march back to the rendezvous. The order was obeyed.

Now the startling reflection comes home that to this most important
fact, bearing on the events of the day (for even if too late to
save life, Colonel Harness would have saved the camp), there is not
a hint even in the despatches of Lord Chelmsford, or the official
statement of his military secretary.[145] The latter goes so far
as to say, in paragraph 17 of his statement (P. P. [C. 2260] p.
100): “I am not aware what messages had been sent from the camp and
received by Colonel Glyn or his staff; but I know that neither the
General nor myself had up to this time received any information but
that I have mentioned.” This statement refers to a time _after_ the
General had arrived at a spot about a mile from where Commandant
Browne’s battalion of natives were halted, _after_ he had received
the message, “Come in, every man, for God’s sake,” etc., and _after_
he had met Colonel Harness on his return march to the rendezvous;
and not only that, but apparently _after_ the receipt of a most
important message from Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, described as follows
by the special correspondent of _The Times_ of Natal (Captain
Norris-Newman): “We did halt there, and found the staff there as
well, looking on through the field-glasses at some large bodies of
Kafirs [Zulus], who were in close proximity to our camp about ten
miles off. The Mounted Police were ordered to halt and off-saddle;
but Captain [T.] Shepstone and his volunteers had orders to proceed
back to camp to see what was up. I joined them, and we had not gone
far on the road when a mounted messenger came up with a note from
Colonel Pulleine to the General, saying that the camp was attacked
by large numbers of Kafirs, and asked him to return with all the
help at his command. With this we halted, and awaited the up-coming
of the General, who came along at once, and proceeded up the valley
to reconnoitre. About three miles had been got over, during which we
passed the four guns under Colonel Harness, and some of the 24th ...
on their way to encamp at the new ground. A mounted man was then seen
approaching, and was recognised as Commandant Lonsdale. He brought
the dreadful news that, having chased a Zulu on horseback, he got
separated from his men, and had ridden quietly back to camp; but on
arrival there, within about three hundred yards of it (at about 2
P.M.), he found large bodies of the enemy surrounding it and fighting
with our men. He had just time to discover his mistake, turn, and fly
for his life, when several bullets were fired at him, and many Zulus
started in chase.”—_Natal Colonist_, January 30th, 1879.

The above message is undoubtedly that mentioned by Captain Gardner
as having been despatched from the camp at or soon after twelve
o’clock. (P. P. [C. 2260] p. 81.) And there still remains the fact
that, not only as regards Colonel Harness, does there appear to be an
unaccountable omission in the “statement”[146] alluded to, but also
we find mention of only _one_ message from the camp; whereas other
messages are _known_ to have been received, and to have been in the
possession of the Assistant Military Secretary.

Here also we must allude to Sir Bartle Frere’s despatches of January
27th, and February 3rd and 12th. In the first he says: “In disregard
of Lord Chelmsford’s instructions, the troops left to protect the
camp were taken away from the defensive position they were in at
the camp, with the shelter which the waggons, parked, would have
afforded....” We know that the troops did the best they could, left
as they were by their general in an open camp—we know they had
no “defensive position”—and we know that the waggons were _not_
“parked,” but drawn up in rear of their own camps.

Sir Bartle says, February 3rd: “It is only justice to the General to
note that his orders were clearly not obeyed on that terrible day at
Isandhlwana camp.”

And on February 12th, he says: “It is impossible to shut one’s eyes
to the fact that it was, in all human probability, mainly due to
disregard of the General’s orders that so great a disaster occurred”
(a little qualifying his sweeping assertion of February 3rd).

But yet again Sir Bartle returns to the charge, and says, June 30th:
“It is difficult to over-estimate the effect of such a disaster as
that at Isandhlwana on both armies, but it was clearly due to breach
of the General’s order, and to disregard of well-known maxims of
military science.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 138).

On what grounds Sir Bartle Frere bases those assertions we know
not—no known orders were disobeyed—and, in spite of the special
pleading in these despatches, we must come to the conclusion that
Sir Bartle Frere’s remarks were penned in utter ignorance of facts,
and that the accusations concerning “disregard of well-known maxims
of military science” should have been applied, _not_ to the soldiers
who fell at Isandhlwana, but to those who placed them in that fatal
position.




CHAPTER XIV.

RORKE’S DRIFT—HELPMAKAAR—COURT OF INQUIRY, ETC.


The garrison of the Rorke’s Drift post consisted of B Company 2-24th
Regiment (Lieutenant Bromhead), and (with officers and casuals) was
of a total strength of 139. It was encamped on the Natal side of the
Buffalo, where there was a mission station, one building of which
was used as a hospital and one as a commissariat store. The crossing
of the river was effected by what are called “ponts”—boats used as
a kind of “flying bridge”—and there were drifts, or fords, in the
vicinity. Major Spalding, Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, and
Lieutenant Chard, R.E., were stationed here. The former rode off to
Helpmakaar at 2 P.M., 22nd January, “to bring up Captain Rainforth’s
company, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, to protect the pont,” leaving
Lieutenant Chard in command of the post.

About 3.15 P.M., Lieutenant Chard was at the ponts, when two men came
riding from Zululand at a gallop, and shouted to be taken across the
river. They were Lieutenant Adendorff, Natal Native Contingent, and
a carbineer, who brought tidings of the disaster at Isandhlwana and
the advance of the Zulus towards Rorke’s Drift. Lieutenant Adendorff
remained to assist in the defence of the post, and the carbineer rode
on to take the news to Helpmakaar.

Lieutenant Chard at once gave orders to secure the stores at the
ponts, and rode up to the commissariat store, when he found a
note had been received from the 3rd Column, saying the enemy were
advancing, and directing them to strengthen and hold the post at
all cost. Lieutenant Bromhead was actively at work preparing for
defence, ably assisted by Mr. Dalton, of the Commissariat Department,
loopholing the buildings and connecting them by walls of mealie-bags
and two waggons that were there. Lieutenant Chard then rode down to
the pont, and brought up the guard and stores.

An officer, with about a hundred of “Durnford’s Horse,” now arrived,
and asked for orders. He was instructed to throw out men to watch
the drifts and ponts, to check the enemy’s advance, and fall back
on the post when forced to retire. These men had, however, been in
the saddle since daylight, and had gone through a heavy engagement:
they were quite exhausted (besides being dispirited by the loss of
their beloved leader), and, after remaining a short time, retired to
Helpmakaar. A detachment of Natal Native Contingent also left the
post.

Lieutenant Chard now commenced an inner work—“a retrenchment of
biscuit-boxes.” This was two boxes high when, about 4.30 P.M., 500
or 600 of the enemy came in sight, and advanced at a run against
the south wall. They were met with a well-sustained fire, but, in
spite of their loss, approached to within about fifty yards. Here
they were checked by the cross-fire from the attacked front and the
store-house. Some got under cover and kept up a heavy fire, but
the greater number, without stopping, moved to the left, round the
hospital, and made a rush at the wall of mealie-bags. After a short
but desperate struggle the enemy were driven back with heavy loss
into the bush around the post. The main body of the enemy coming up,
lined the ledge of rock, caves, etc., overlooking the work, at a
distance of about 400 yards to the south, and from whence a constant
fire was kept up, and they also occupied in great force the garden,
hollow road, and bush.

The bush not having been cleared away enabled the enemy to advance
under cover close to the wall, and a series of desperate assaults
were made, extending from the hospital along the wall as far as the
bush reached; each assault was brilliantly met and repulsed with the
bayonet, Corporal Scheiss, Natal Native Contingent, distinguishing
himself greatly. The fire from the rocks took the work completely in
reverse, and was so heavy that about 6 P.M., the garrison was obliged
to retire behind the entrenchment of biscuit-boxes.

During this period the enemy had been storming the hospital, and at
last succeeded in setting fire to the roof. The garrison defended
it most gallantly, bringing out all the sick that could be moved;
Privates Williams, Hook, R. Jones, and W. Jones, 2-24th Regiment,
being the last men to leave, and holding the doorway with the bayonet
when their ammunition was expended. The want of communication and the
burning of the house rendered it impossible to save all the sick.

It was now found necessary to make another entrenchment, which was
done with two heaps of mealie-bags, Assistant-Commissary Dunne
working hard at this, though much exposed. As darkness came on the
little garrison was completely surrounded, but gallantly repulsed
several serious assaults; it was, however, eventually forced to
retire to the inner entrenchment, which it held throughout the night.
The attack continued vigorously till midnight, the men firing on the
assailants with the greatest coolness, aided by the light afforded
by the burning hospital. A desultory fire was kept up by the enemy
throughout the night, but this ceased about 4 A.M. on the 23rd, and
at daybreak the enemy was out of sight. Lieutenant Chard at once
set about patrolling round the post, collecting the Zulu arms, and
strengthening the defences.

About 7 A.M., a large body of the enemy appeared on the hills to
the south-west, and Lieutenant Chard sent off a note to Helpmakaar
asking for assistance. About 8 A.M., No. 3 Column appeared in sight,
the enemy falling back on its approach. Thus ended a most gallant
defence, reflecting the utmost credit on all concerned.

The loss of the garrison was 15 non-commissioned officers and men
killed, and 12 wounded (of whom two died almost immediately). The
attacking force was estimated at 3000 men, of whom upwards of 350
were killed.

Lord Chelmsford, with the remains of No. 3 Column, had moved off from
Isandhlwana, as we have already described, at daybreak that morning.
It had been thought necessary to insist upon absolute inaction
through the night; no attempt was allowed at identifying the dead,
or even at making sure that no life remained in the camp; and men
lay down to rest, ignorant whether a careless hand might not fall
on the lifeless form of a dead comrade or, mayhap, a brother. The
remainder of the Natal Carbineers, as they afterwards discovered,
bivouacked that night on the right of the camp, upon the very “neck”
of land where so gallant a stand was made; their captain recognising
the body of Lieutenant Scott, and therefore being able afterwards to
identify the spot. That life might exist without its being known to
the returning column is proved by the fact that a native groom lay
for dead, although unwounded, in the camp throughout the night. The
man had feigned death when the camp was taken, and did not dare to
move on the return of the General’s party, lest he should be taken by
them for a Zulu, and should share the fate of the few actual Zulus
found intoxicated beneath the waggons, and bayoneted by our soldiers.
He crept out in the morning, and followed the retreating column to
Rorke’s Drift at a distance, meeting on the way with narrow escapes
of losing his life from both friend and foe.

On coming within sight of Rorke’s Drift, heavy smoke was seen rising
from it, and Zulus retiring; this caused the liveliest apprehensions
for the safety of the post. However, to the intense relief of all,
on nearing the Buffalo River the waving of hats was seen from a
hastily-erected entrenchment, and the safety of the little garrison
was known.

Lieut.-Colonel Russell was sent with a mounted escort to Helpmakaar,
to see if the road was open and all safe there; but some officers
of Major Bengough’s battalion Natal Native Contingent rode in and
reported the road open, Helpmakaar laagered, and no attack made on
it. Some men of the Buffalo Border Guard also rode in from Fort Pine
and reported all well there.

The General and staff hurried down to Pietermaritzburg _viâ_
Helpmakaar, while the garrison at Rorke’s Drift was left in utter
confusion,[147] as testified by many of those present at the time.
No one appeared responsible for anything that might happen, and the
result was one disgraceful to our English name, and to all concerned.
A few Zulu prisoners had been taken by our troops—some the day
before, others previous to the disaster at Isandhlwana, and these
prisoners were put to death in cold blood at Rorke’s Drift. It was
intended to set them free, and they were told to run for their lives,
but they were shot down and killed, within sight and sound of the
whole force. An eye-witness—an officer—described the affair to the
present writer, saying that the men whom _he_ saw killed numbered
“not more than seven, nor less than five.” He said that he was
standing with others in the camp, and hearing shots close behind him,
he turned, and saw the prisoners in question in the act of falling
beneath the shots and stabs of a party of our men.[148] The latter,
indeed, were men belonging to the Native Contingent, but they were
supposed to be under white control, and should not have been able to
obtain possession of the prisoners under any circumstances. Scenes
like these were not likely to impress the savages with whom we were
dealing with our merciful and Christian qualities, nor to improve the
chances of European prisoners who might fall into their hands during
the campaign.

As soon as order was a little restored, the cover round the post of
Rorke’s Drift was cleared away, barricades built, the thatched roof
taken off the house, and the four guns placed in position within the
enclosure.

The General and staff reached Pietermaritzburg early on January 26th.
There, as everywhere else, panic reigned, and gloom spread over all.
From the city especially many a son and brother had gone out to fall
upon that fatal day, and grief was mingled there with terror for what
might come next. It was long before any accurate information could
be gained as to what had happened, and who had fallen; and, owing to
the hurried retreat of No. 3 Column from Isandhlwana before daybreak
on the 23rd, the great burden of uncertainty was laid upon many heavy
hearts both upon the spot and at home in England.

At first all who had had friends at the camp hoped they might be
amongst the saved, since it was known that some had escaped by “The
Fugitives’ Drift,” a spot some five miles from Rorke’s Drift, where
those flying from Isandhlwana crossed the river; and day by day the
lists of killed and missing appeared with the names gradually removed
from the latter to the former. Well had an hour’s daylight been spent
that morning to spare the uncertainty that hung over many an English
and South African home for days and weeks, and even months.

No time was now lost in making such preparations for defence as
the principal towns afforded. An invasion of the colony by the
victorious Zulu army was hourly expected, and with some reason, since
retaliation for our invasion might naturally be feared. Sir Bartle
Frere himself remarks, on February 12th (C. 2269): “It has become
painfully evident that the Zulu king has an army at his command which
could almost any day unexpectedly invade Natal; and owing to the
great extent of frontier, and utter helplessness of the undisciplined
hordes of Natal natives to offer effectual resistance, the Zulus
might march at will through the country, devastating and murdering,
without a chance of being checked, as long as they abstained from
attacking the entrenched posts of Her Majesty’s troops, which are
from 50 to 100 miles apart. The capital and all the principal towns
are at this moment in ‘laager,’ prepared for attack, which even if
successfully resisted, would leave two-thirds of them in ashes, and
the country around utterly desolated.”[149]

Whatever reasonable fears of retaliation were entertained by the
people of Natal, they soon rose to panic-height in consequence of the
great alarm displayed by the chief authorities, both military and
civil. By their orders, the central part of ’Maritzburg, including
the Court House, was barricaded with loopholed boarding, as a refuge
for the citizens in case of attack, wells were dug inside the Court
House, and notice given that the usual guns, announcing the arrival
of the English mails, would be discontinued for the present, but that
three guns would be fired as a signal for the citizens to go into
the laager within three hours, while four guns would signify that
the danger was urgent, and they must fly into it at once, taking
stores of food, which they were to have ready beforehand, beside what
the borough council had provided, and they must then comply with an
elaborate series of rules, which was published in the Government
_Gazette_. So great, indeed, was the scare that some of the citizens
of ’Maritzburg did actually take refuge one night in the laager, and
others hurriedly left the colony, while many natives, living near the
city, slept out, with their wives and children, some nights in the
open field. On that night, when terror was at its height, it is said
that the bedding of the Governors and their staff, together with the
official records of Government House, was removed to the neighbouring
gaol, a strong stone building, just under the guns of Fort Napier,
which was chosen as a place of refuge for their Excellencies. It is
also said that Lord Chelmsford’s horse was kept saddled and bridled
all night; and a stretcher was placed, by express order, outside the
window of a lady in delicate health, without her knowledge, so as to
be ready in case of emergency—as if a Zulu impi could drop suddenly,
at a moment’s notice, into the middle of the city, the frontier, at
the nearest point, being sixty miles off.

Whether or no the High Commissioner was really in such a state of
alarm as he appeared to be, the existence of such a scare in Natal
would, no doubt, help to support his policy in the eyes of those at
home, as an actual inroad of Zulus at that time would have still more
effectually justified the charges he had made against Cetshwayo,
and the strong measures he had taken in invading Zululand, for the
good of the Zulus themselves and the safety of the colony. After
the disaster at Isandhlwana, Sir B. Frere of course reiterates his
charges against the king of intending to invade the colony (C. 2269).
But these charges are sufficiently answered by the mere fact that
although, as Sir B. Frere himself points out, Natal lay at his mercy
for some months after the disaster, he made no attack whatever either
upon Swazis, Boers, or English. After Isandhlwana, if ever, such
invasion was to be dreaded, yet not only was none attempted, but even
the Zulus who, in the flush of victory crossed into Natal at Rorke’s
Drift on the 22nd, were called back by their officers with the words,
“Against the orders of your king!”

In startling contrast to the panic which reigned after the 22nd
January was the ignorance and carelessness shown by the authorities
beforehand. At the very time of the disaster to No. 3 Column there
was a train of fifteen waggons, with sixty-five boxes of ammunition
each, moving unguarded up to Helpmakaar, upon a road eight miles from
and parallel to the Zulu border!

With the exception of Rorke’s Drift, no military station was at
this time more open to attack than Helpmakaar, distant from it about
twelve miles. The fugitives from Isandhlwana, Captains Essex and
Gardner, Lieutenants Cochrane, Curling, and Smith-Dorrien, with
about thirty others, reached this place between 5 and 6 P.M., and
at once set about forming a waggon-laager round the stores. The
garrison of two companies of the 1-24th Regiment had marched towards
Rorke’s Drift during the day; but Major Spalding says: “On reaching
the summit of a hill from which the mission-house is visible it
was observed to be in flames; this confirmed the statement of the
fugitives that the post had been captured. This being the case,
it was determined to save, if possible, Helpmakaar and its depôt
of stores” ... and the column reached Helpmakaar by 9 P.M. (P. P.
[C. 2260] p. 88.) Captain Gardner, soon after reaching Helpmakaar,
left for Utrecht, it having occurred to him to carry the news of
the disaster himself to Colonel Wood. Our loss at Isandhlwana is
given as 689 officers and men Imperial troops, and 133 officers
and men of Colonial Volunteers, Mounted Police, and Natal Native
Contingents—Europeans (P. P. [C. 2260] pp. 93-98); but the actual
loss was slightly in excess of those numbers.

The Zulu army appears to have consisted of the following regiments:
’Kandampemvu (or Umcityu), ’Ngobamakosi, Uve, Nokenke, Umbonambi,
Udhloko, Nodwengu, and Undi (which comprises the Tulwana,
’Ndhlondhlo, and Indhluyengwe), whose full nominal strength reaches
a total of 30,900 men; but the actual numbers are estimated at from
20,000 to 25,000.

The Zulus acknowledge to having suffered heavily, and their loss is
estimated at 3000.

Cetshwayo’s youngest brother, Nugwende, who surrendered on 27th
April, said he was present at Isandhlwana. That the front and left
flank attack was beaten, and fell back with great loss until the fire
of the white troops slackened; the right flank entering the camp, the
attack was renewed, the English being unable to prevent their onset
from want of ammunition. The Zulu army, he says, numbered 20,000 of
the king’s best troops.

A court of inquiry, composed of Colonel Hassard, C.B., R.E.,
Lieut.-Colonel Law, R.A., and Lieut.-Colonel Harness, R.A., assembled
at Helpmakaar on the 27th January, when the following officers gave
evidence: Major Clery; Colonel Glyn, C.B.; Captain Gardner, 14th
Hussars; Captain Essex, 75th Regiment; Lieutenant Cochrane, 32nd
Regiment; Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien, 95th Regiment; Captain Nourse,
Natal Native Contingent; and Lieutenant Curling, R.A.

The evidence taken consisted of statements made by the above
officers, not one of whom appears to have been questioned. The
(so-called) inquiry seems to have been strictly limited to the
occurrences at the camp, as we find Major Clery’s evidence finish
abruptly, “I saw the column out of camp and accompanied it.” Colonel
Glyn merely corroborated Major Clery’s statement; and the other
officers gave their respective versions of the occurrences at the
camp; Captain Essex giving a very clear and detailed account of the
movements of the 24th Regiment.

The proceedings were forwarded on the 29th, with these remarks: “The
court has examined and recorded the statements of the chief witnesses.

“The copy of proceedings forwarded was made by a confidential clerk
of the Royal Engineers.

“The court has refrained from giving an opinion, as instructions on
this point were not given to it.”

The proceedings were forwarded from Durban to the Secretary of State
for War on February 8th by Lord Chelmsford, who said: “The court has
very properly abstained from giving an opinion, and I myself refrain
also from making any observations, or from drawing any conclusions
from the evidence therein recorded.”

He regrets that more evidence has not been taken, and has directed
his military secretary “to append a statement of the facts which came
under his cognizance on the day in question.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 80).

On this officer’s “statement” some remarks have been made in the
previous chapter; and we must now quote one or two passages from the
public prints, which appeared when Colonel Harness’s share in the
proceedings of the 22nd January first came to light.

_The Daily News_ of April 8th, referring to this episode and the
court of inquiry, says: “Lord Chelmsford seems to have been as
unfortunate in the selection of his staff-officers as he was in
everything else.”

Lieut.-Colonel Crealock’s “statement” is stigmatised as “palpably
written to establish a preconceived theory;” and _The Daily News_
says most justly that “Colonel Harness should not have sat as member
of the court of inquiry. How it could have been supposed that an
officer who had taken so prominent a part in the doings of the 22nd
January was a fit and suitable member of a court assembled even to
take evidence merely, is more than we can understand. Besides, the
very fact of his being a member, we are told, precluded Colonel
Harness from giving his own valuable evidence.”

_The Natal Witness_ of May 29th, 1879, makes some reflections on
the same subject, which are very pertinent. We need not repeat
its criticisms on the court of inquiry, etc. but it says: “It is
notorious that certain members of Lord Chelmsford’s staff—there is
no need to mention any name or names—came down to ’Maritzburg after
the disaster, prepared to make Colonel Durnford bear the whole
responsibility, and that it was upon their representations that the
High Commissioner’s telegram about ‘poor Durnford’s misfortune’ was
sent.”

How a court of inquiry, assembled without the power, apparently, of
asking a single question, was to throw much light on the causes of
the disaster, does not appear. Its scope was limited to the doings at
the camp; and under any circumstances it could not well criticise the
faults of the General. The proceedings of this court of inquiry can
therefore only be considered as eminently unsatisfactory.

We might here leave this painful subject, were it not for the
undisguised attempts that have been made to throw the blame on the
dead.

In considering the question of blame, we must first put before us the
circumstances in which the camp defenders found themselves when they
were required “to defend the camp.”

Now the orders given to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine are stated by Major
Clery, senior staff-officer of No. 3 Column, thus:—

“Before leaving the camp I sent written instructions to Colonel
Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect: ‘You will be in
command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I
speak from memory) your camp, or your line of defence’—I am not
certain which—‘while the force is out; also draw in the line of
your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry vedettes
still far advanced.’ I told him to have a waggon ready loaded with
ammunition ready to follow the force going out at a moment’s notice,
if required. I went to Colonel Pulleine’s tent just before leaving
camp to ascertain that he had got these instructions, and again
repeated them verbally to him.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 81).

As regards the force left to defend the camp, there were no
instructions to form a defensive post; the General did not think it
necessary, though to him was the almost prescient remark made: “We
should be all right if we only had a laager.” He saw no danger; he
was about to move his camp on, and a laager would be useless work, so
he put the suggestion on one side with the remark: “It would take a
week to make.” Thus Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine was left, and he had no
reason to anticipate danger, till, almost without a moment’s warning,
he found the camp threatened by an overwhelming force; he then, after
trying in vain to check the enemy’s right, endeavoured to hold the
donga and broken ground close in front of the camp, where his men
found some cover; the camp itself being absolutely indefensible.[150]
Colonel Durnford, as we have seen, reached the camp about 10.30 A.M.,
before which time Major Chard says: “The troops were in column ...
out of camp,” and he saw Zulus “on the crest of the distant hills,”
and several parties moving to the left towards Rorke’s Drift. Colonel
Durnford takes out his mounted men to (as he thinks) assist his
General, and to see what the enemy is about.[B]

Again, some assert that the action was brought about by Colonel
Durnford’s Native Horse in the Ingqutu Hills. Even had it been so,
yet this officer’s duty distinctly was to feel and reconnoitre the
enemy.[151] When the Zulu army moved forward to the attack, he, with
his handful of men, fell slowly back, gaining all the time possible
for the camp defenders.

Taking the whole of the circumstances of the day, we may conclude
that, had the enemy remained hidden on the 22nd, we should probably
have lost the entire column instead of part; but the account given by
an English Officer with one of the troops that first saw the enemy,
and other accounts from Zulus, seem to make it clear that the Zulus
were moving on the camp when they came in contact with the horsemen.
That they had no intention of remaining hidden is shown by their
unconcealed movements on the hills throughout the morning.[152]

Now, whether these defenders did or did not take the best measures
“to defend the camp” when it was attacked, the primary causes of the
disaster were undoubtedly these:

1. The fatal position selected for the camp, and the total absence of
any defensive precautions.

2. The absence of systematic scouting, whereby an army of upwards of
20,000 Zulus was enabled to approach Isandhlwana on the 21st, and
remained unobserved till the 22nd, although their mounted scouts were
actually seen by the General and staff on the 21st, watching _them_.

3. The subdivision of the force, and the absence of proper
communications by signalling or otherwise.

4. The neglect of warnings given by the events of the day, and
messages from the camp; also the withdrawal of a force actually on
the march to the relief of the camp.

For these principal causes of the disaster, none of those who fell
were responsible.

That Lord Chelmsford was shaken by the tragic events of January is
evident from his letter to the Secretary of State for War, dated
“Durban, Natal, February 9th, 1879,” and which ran as follows: “I
consider it my duty to lay before you my opinion that it is very
desirable, in view of future contingencies, that an officer of the
rank of major-general shall be sent out to South Africa without
delay. In June last I mentioned privately to His Royal Highness
the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief that the strain of prolonged
anxiety and exertion, physical and mental, was even then telling
on me. What I felt then, I feel still more now. His Excellency Sir
Bartle Frere concurs in this representation, and pointed out to me
that the officer selected should be fitted to succeed him in his
position of High Commissioner. In making this representation, I
need not assure you that it will be my earnest desire to carry on
my duties for Her Majesty’s service up to the fullest extent of my
powers.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 79).

The exact meaning of this letter has never been made clear. No
doubt Lord Chelmsford was feeling “the strain of prolonged anxiety
and exertion, physical and mental,” but His Royal Highness the
Commander-in-Chief said that he had no previous knowledge of it.
Students of Greek history will note the striking parallelism of this
case with that of Nicias, who, when commanding before Syracuse in
the year 414 B.C., applied to be superseded. “Such was the esteem
which the Athenians felt for this union of good qualities, purely
personal and negative, with eminent station, that they presumed the
higher aptitudes of command,” and “the general vote was one not
simply imputing no blame, but even pronouncing continued and unabated
confidence.”—Grote’s “History of Greece.”

But of all the strange and incomprehensible circumstances connected
with that sad time, the one which struck Natal as the strangest was
the utter desertion of the battle-field and the long neglect of the
dead who lay there. On the 4th February Major Black, 2-24th Regiment,
with a small party, found the bodies of Lieutenants Melville and
Coghill about 300 yards from the river on the Natal side, near the
Fugitives’ Drift, and they were buried on the spot, the colours which
they had striven to save being found in the river, and returned next
day to the Regiment at Helpmakaar.

The fatal field of Isandhlwana was not again seen till the 14th
March, when Major Black, 2-24th, with a small mounted party, paid a
flying visit to the spot, a few shots only being fired at them from
a distance. No attempt was made to bury the dead, and until the 21st
of May that ghastly field remained as it was left on the 23rd of
January, although there does not appear to have been any period since
the disaster when a moderate force might not with perfect safety
have done all that was necessary.

On the morning after the return of Colonel Glyn’s Column to Rorke’s
Drift, “Commandant Lonsdale mustered the Contingent and called out
the indunas, and told them in the hearing of all that he wanted
to find out the men who were courageous and would stand by their
officers and die with them if necessary, and that those who were
willing to do this were to come forward. At this time the mounted
infantry and volunteers were moving off to Helpmakaar. The general
reply of the Contingent was that they were willing to go over to
fight along with the white people, their shield against Cetywayo; but
that now that they saw their shield going away they would not go over
by themselves, and that no one could say he was not afraid.”[153]

“They were then dismissed, but in the afternoon they were all
disarmed (of their guns), and their belts and puggaries and blankets
taken from them by their officers. Each company had a flag, which
they asked to take home with them; some were allowed to do so, but
others were not. They were then all told to go home, and to keep
together till they reached the Umsinga, and then to divide each for
his own home.”

On January 24th, Colonel Glyn wrote to Lord Chelmsford: “The whole
of the Native Contingent walked off this morning. Their rifles were
taken from them; all the hospital-bearers then went, and now the
Native Pioneers are going. I am now left without any natives.” The
General immediately forwarded Colonel Glyn’s letter to Sir Henry
Bulwer, with the remark: “Unless these men are at once ordered back
to their regiments, or punished for refusing to go, the most serious
consequences will ensue” (_ibid._ p. 3).

Sir Henry Bulwer very properly abstained from taking any strong
measures as to punishing the men until he had inquired into the
causes which led to their desertion. Eventually, indeed, he
discovered that most of them had not deserted at all, but had been
disbanded by their leader, Commandant Lonsdale. But meanwhile there
was a great deal to be said, and on January 29th Sir Henry writes,
pointing out that “the great disaster which happened to our force at
Isandhlwana Camp on the 22nd inst., the circumstances under which
these men passed the night of the 22nd, and the retirement of the
remainder of the column on Rorke’s Drift and back into Natal, were
all calculated to have their effect on the natives who belonged to
this column;” and proceeds: “I am told, too, that whilst the European
force at Rorke’s Drift on the night of the 23rd were entrenched,
the Native Contingent was not entrenched; and further I am told
that, on an alarm being given that night, the European officers and
non-commissioned officers who were with the Native Contingent left
their men and took refuge within the entrenchments. On the following
morning, the 24th, the General and his staff left the camp; and
this circumstance, those acquainted with the native character tell
me, may very probably have had a further depressing effect upon the
natives.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 4).

On February 7th, Sir Henry Bulwer writes again that he has received
answers from the magistrates whom he had directed to make inquiries
into the causes of the dispersion of the men. These reports speak
of the cheerful spirit and loyal tone of the chiefs, and of very
many of the men having reported themselves to their magistrates on
their return from the front. The accounts given by the different
magistrates are unanimous as to the causes of the dispersion. Some of
the men declared that officers of the Contingent told them to return
home and await further orders, as provisions were short; others, to
use their own words, said: “We saw that the Government was driven
out of Zululand, and the wind blew us back also.” They thought also
that the Commander-in-Chiefs hasty departure from Rorke’s Drift was a
flight from the enemy. Another reason for their retreat, and to them
a very strong one, was the necessity of going home and performing the
rights of purifying after shedding blood.[154] It was also stated
that some of them were led by their officers in their retreat. Others
saw their officers killed, were left without control, and fled. Their
friends were now laughing at them, and they were eager to return to
the front under proper guidance.

These, indeed, were ample explanations for the fact of the dispersion
of the 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent, but they were followed
by many and serious complaints, made by the men and reported by the
magistrates, of the manner in which the former had been treated
since the campaign began. These complaints comprised insufficiency
of food, floggings for disobedience to orders which they had either
never heard, or had not understood, and bad officers.[155] These were
the most important items, the rest referring to their preference for
their own methods of fighting, to which, as we have already shown,
there were the strongest objections.

These reports referred solely to the contingent attached to Colonel
Glyn’s column, with the exception of one, which was concerning the
remnant of the Zikali men, escaped from Isandhlwana.

It was finally decided that the men of the contingents belonging to
No. 1 Column might “be allowed to leave in batches, but they must be
made to understand that they are required for the defence of Natal.”
(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 22.) The contingent forming No. 2 Column remained
steadily serving throughout the war. Major Bengough’s battalion had a
narrow escape of sharing in the disaster of Isandhlwana, and the men
were somewhat shaken and disheartened at seeing the contingent of No.
3 Column dispersing; but this ill-effect soon passed away.

Colonel Pearson’s remarks on the company of Native Pioneers belonging
to his column are concise and valuable. He says: “The men worked
cheerfully. They had eyes like hawks, and they did all their scouting
to perfection. It convinced me that the Natal Zulus, under proper
management, would make excellent troops.”




CHAPTER XV.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SIKUKUNI.


We have already, in a previous chapter, explained the circumstances
which led to the war between the Transvaal Boers and Sikukuni,
independent chief of a mixed race of natives commonly called the
_Makatisi_, more properly the _Bapedi_, tribe. The immediate cause
of the war was a border dispute between some of the gradually
encroaching Boer farmers and the natives whom they had displaced,
which ended in the latter taking possession of some cattle belonging
to the former.

This affair took place during a temporary absence of Mr. Burgers
(then President of the Republic), who, on his return, demanded the
cattle at the hands of Sikukuni, and the restraint of his people
within the limits assigned to them by their Boer neighbours. Sikukuni
expressed his willingness to make the required restitution, but took
the opportunity of reminding the President that he laid claim to a
considerable piece of territory already occupied by Boers, to whom
he denied having ever willingly relinquished it. This reply was the
signal for a declaration of war against Sikukuni on the part of the
President and Volksraad, and a large “commando,” or volunteer force,
was called out to attack him early in July, 1876.

This force, consisting of some 3000 Boers and over 4000 of their
Swazi allies, made its way through the country, ravaging and
destroying as it went, until it reached the famous stronghold known
as “Sikukuni’s Town,” upon which it made an unsuccessful night
attack, on August 2nd.

A single reverse was sufficient to dishearten the gallant Boers, who
immediately discovered various reasons which made their return to
their homes absolutely necessary. The commando dispersed, leaving
a force of volunteers composed of stray Englishmen, Germans, and
half-bred natives to occupy a couple of posts (Fort Burgers and
Fort Weber), which they built for the purpose. From these posts
they carried on a system of raiding expeditions upon Sikukuni’s
people, which effectually prevented the cultivation of their land,
and finally produced a scarcity of food amongst them. This state of
things was too harassing to last, and Sikukuni sued for peace, which
was granted him early in 1877, conditionally upon his paying a heavy
fine in cattle.

A month later, and before the fine had been paid, Sir T. Shepstone
had annexed the Transvaal, and, as we have already described, took
over, with the country, its quarrels and demands. He tried to enforce
the fine imposed by the late Boer Government upon Sikukuni, while
remitting the war-tax levied upon the whites. After having been
subjected to so long a course of marauding on the part of the Dutch,
it is not impossible that the chief really had some difficulty in
procuring, at a moment’s notice, the 2000 head of cattle demanded
by Sir T. Shepstone.[156] At all events, the fine was not paid so
promptly as the administrator expected; and the whole country being
in an unsettled condition, perpetual disturbances still took place
between Sikukuni’s people and the border farmers, and also between
the former and petty chiefs who had placed themselves under British
protection.

The most restless of the independent native rulers seems to have been
a woman, Legolwana, a sister of Sikukuni’s, who had her own clan, and
whose head-quarters was a mountain stronghold, called Masellaroon. In
February, 1878, her people had a quarrel (nor was it for the first
time) with a neighbouring native chief under our rule, from whom
they took some cattle. Whether or no there were two sides to the
question, the despoiled chief was our subject, and it so happened
that Legolwana’s people were met in the act of driving off the cattle
by a patrol of Transvaal volunteers, who promptly interfered. This
occurrence led to a general outbreak of hostilities. Legolwana’s men
attacked the two forts simultaneously, and the officers in command,
Captain Clarke and Lieutenant Eckersley, with their men, escaped
from them, and retired to Lydenburg. From thence Captain Clarke sent
embassies to the Swazi king and another independent chief, asking for
assistance against Sikukuni. His invitations, however, were politely
declined, the chiefs in question not caring to interfere, although
wishing to remain upon friendly terms with the English.

Having obtained reinforcements from the gold-fields and Pretoria,
Captain Clarke marched back to Fort Weber, and re-occupied it with a
force consisting of 40 mounted volunteers under Captains Van Deventer
and Ferreira, 150 Natal Zulus under Lieutenants Lloyd and Dacomb, and
300 Bechuanas under Mr. Tainton.

Captain Clarke’s first intentions were to attack Legolwana and
reduce her to submission. Captain Lacon Hervey, 71st Regiment, gives
the following description of her stronghold in his account of “The
Secocœni War”:

“The town, or kraal, of Legolani consisted of a number of straw and
wattle-and-daub huts, beehive-shaped, situated at the base and on
the terraces of a mountain of rocks and huge boulders 700 feet high,
covered over with thick clumps of bush. The huts at the base of the
mountain were surrounded by an impenetrable hedge of prickly pear;
a single entrance, barricaded with timber, led through an avenue
of prickly pear and cactus into the group of huts surrounded by
palisading, wattle screens, and stone walls. Each group of huts was
commanded by the rocks above; from behind these a direct, flanking,
and enfilade fire could be poured on the attacking party, which, on
account of the intricacy of the ground, would be compelled to advance
in single file along the tortuous goat-paths leading up to the
mountain. In addition to the cover afforded by the caves and fissures
in the rocks, schanzes, or low stone walls, were built up wherever
favourable positions with safe means of retreat presented themselves.
The paths leading from one rock entrenchment, or terrace, to the
one above it, were so concealed by rock and bush as to be difficult
to find. Finally, the Kafirs’ most valued treasure, the cattle, was
placed on the summit of the mountain, on a level plot of ground,
surrounded by a stone wall.”

This stronghold was attacked by Captain Clarke’s orders on the 5th
April, and, “after about two hours’ sharp work, the north of the
hill was carried.”[157] The fighting force, not being sufficient to
complete its work, was ordered to withdraw, after having swept all
the cattle from that side of the hill (277 head of cattle and 211
sheep and goats). A considerable number of Legolwana’s people are
supposed to have fallen in this assault, the loss on our side being
10 killed and 12 wounded, amongst the latter Captain Van Deventer
slightly, and Lieutenant Lloyd severely. These two officers are
reported as having led the attack with great gallantry.

The partial success gained by the storming of Masellaroon (with the
loss of life on our side—considerable under the circumstances) was
not such as to encourage Captain Clarke in the tactics with which
he had commenced his operations. He therefore abandoned all idea of
seizing the native strongholds, and “established a cordon of forts,
about twelve miles from each other ... with a view of harassing the
Kafirs by preventing them from cultivating the Indian corn.”

“Legolwana had sued for peace, but Captain Clarke would not listen to
anything except unconditional surrender, with the guarantee that all
life should be spared.”[158]

Thus, with the usual notion that “no terms can be made with savages,”
which has again and again produced such disastrous consequences for
them and for us, a system of petty warfare was kept up, tedious,
unnecessary, and by which no good could be done nor honour gained. To
the volunteers, many of whom, says Captain Harvey, were “gentlemen
by birth and education,” there may have been some amusement in what
that officer speaks of as “actions of daring individual enterprise,”
and which he describes as follows: “Volunteers went out and lay
ambuscades at night, to surprise and cut off Kafirs proceeding from
kraal to kraal, or to cultivate their fields, and ‘cattle-lifting’
expeditions were planned and boldly carried out;” but the life must
have become monotonous in the extreme before July, when the native
auxiliaries became so discontented with it that some of them were
allowed to return to their homes, while a troop of mounted infantry
was summoned from Pretoria to keep order amongst those who remained.

It was about this time that Colonel Rowlands, V.C., came upon the
scene. This excellent officer, of whose services in 1878-79 so little
mention has been made, was sent out on “special service,” and was
for a short time attached to the staff of Lord Chelmsford (then
General Thesiger) during the Kaffrarian war. He was subsequently
sent by the High Commissioner to Pretoria, which he reached on May
6th. He employed the two following months in an inspection of the
northern and eastern frontiers of the Transvaal,[159] and by dint
of considerable personal exertion was enabled to supply valuable
information to head-quarters. Towards the end of July, Colonel
Rowlands was appointed Commandant of the Transvaal. At this time the
regular forces in the Transvaal consisted only of the 13th Light
Infantry, a few engineers, and departmental staff—quite inadequate
for the work required of them; but the Commander-in-Chief, in
signifying his approval of the manner in which Colonel Rowlands
proposed to distribute the troops already under his command, informed
him that he was about to reinforce the Transvaal with the 80th
Regiment and Frontier Light Horse, with a view to active operations
against Sikukuni.

The promised reinforcements arrived by degrees from Natal, and
meanwhile there were Pretoria, Middleburg, Lydenburg, and Standerton,
where considerable stores of ammunition, etc. were collected, to
be garrisoned, as well as the cordon of forts, already mentioned,
along the Leolu Mountains, which left no large proportion of the
troops—about 800 of the 13th, and under 300 volunteers and Zulu
police—for service in the field.

However, by the 29th August Colonel Rowlands found himself in a
position to leave Pretoria for the confines of the Transvaal, and
reached Fort Weber on the 13th September. From thence to Fort Burgers
was a long and tedious march through a difficult and trackless
country. The column was forced to make its own road as it went, and
had several skirmishes with Sikukuni’s people _en route_. Reinforced
by the Frontier Light Horse under Major Buller, and a party under
Major Russell from Pretoria, Colonel Rowlands at last reached Fort
Burgers, and, after a few days’ halt for repairs, patrolling, and
scouting the country, recommenced his march towards “Sikukuni’s
Town,” distant about twenty-five miles.

On the 3rd October he advanced with 338 mounted men (Mounted
Infantry, Frontier Light Horse, and Transvaal Volunteers), 130
infantry, and 2 7-pounder mountain guns; his intention being to
establish himself before Sikukuni’s town, thoroughly reconnoitre it,
and, should he find that there was a chance of success, and that the
position could be afterwards held, to attack it when he had brought
up reinforcements.

The position was one of extreme difficulty, greatly increased by
the singular drought which was experienced at the time, both in the
Transvaal and Natal.

From Fort Burgers to Sikukuni’s Town, the approach lay chiefly
through a defile commanded by “kopjes” (piles of rock and boulders,
often some hundred feet in height), of which the enemy did not fail
to take advantage. The weather was intensely hot, the thermometer
standing daily at over 100 in the shade, and the unusual drought had
dried up the springs and small watercourses to an extent previously
unknown.

The camp was fired into on the night before the force sighted
Sikukuni’s Town, but from a considerable distance, causing no damage
beyond one horse wounded, and a general stampede of the slaughter
cattle; a determined advance of the piquets, reinforced by their
supports, quickly driving back the enemy, who did not advance again.

The stronghold was sighted upon the following day, but it soon became
apparent to Colonel Rowlands that, while to attempt its capture with
the small force at his disposal would be a mere reckless sacrifice
of the troops under his command, it was equally impossible to carry
out his original intention of establishing himself before it, under
the existing circumstances of absolute want of water and forage.
Deeply disappointing as was this discovery, Colonel Rowlands was
convinced that his only course under the circumstances was to retire,
and, his opinion being confirmed by the senior officers present, he
reluctantly commenced his return march on the 6th October.

Encouraged by the retreat of the force, the enemy, now in large
numbers, followed and harassed it, almost until it reached the
bivouac, eight miles from Fort Burgers. Thirteen thousand rounds of
ammunition were expended in keeping off the foe during the march,
and both man and beast suffered severely from want of water and the
intense heat of the sun. The force reached Fort Burgers the following
day, with the loss of 1 man wounded; 5 horses were killed, 10 died
of horse sickness, and 4 horses and 1 mule were wounded. Here they
remained for several weeks, in hopes that the summer rains, which it
was natural to expect should fall at this time of year, would enable
them to make a second advance upon Sikukuni’s Town. Meanwhile mounted
patrols, under Major Buller, Major Russell, Captain Clarke, and
Lieutenant Eckersley (in command of Swazi levies), swept the country
in every direction, harrying the natives and capturing their cattle,
but without meeting with any armed opposition. Horse sickness now
set in—that South African scourge, from which the force had hitherto
suffered but slightly, and in single cases, but which at this time
became an epidemic, deaths occurring daily, sometimes but a few
hours after the animal was attacked by the disease. This unfortunate
circumstance added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.

After the retreat of the force from before Sikukuni’s Town, the
enemy made several determined attacks upon the forts in the Mamalubi
Valley, especially upon Fort Faugh-a-Ballagh; and although these
attacks were in every case successfully resisted, they necessitated
the strengthening of the garrisons of the forts along this line.

Lord Chelmsford (then General Thesiger) had previously given notice
to Colonel Rowlands that a column from the Transvaal, under the
command of the latter, would be required to co-operate with the
Ama-Swazi in the invasion of Zululand. The 13th Regiment, Frontier
Light Horse, and Lieutenant Nicholson’s guns, were all to be
available for that purpose as soon as the Sikukuni affair (which was
then lightly considered) should be settled. By this arrangement, the
80th Regiment and volunteers alone were reserved for the defence of
the Transvaal. As the season was now far advanced, Colonel Rowlands
was obliged to make the best arrangements he could for the defence
of the border with the force—an absurdly small one, considering
the disturbed state of the country—which would be left after the
withdrawal of those intended by the General for the Zulu invasion.
His chief adviser, Captain Clarke, was of opinion that a precipitate
retirement from the valleys of the Steelport and Speckboom rivers
would be unadvisable. These valleys contained large numbers of Kafir
gardens, and, by holding them a little later, the natives would be
prevented from sowing their crops for another season, and starvation
would ensue. With this object in view, Fort Burgers was garrisoned
with 100 of the 13th Regiment, and some 50 mounted volunteers,
while Colonel Rowlands himself retired to Speckboom Drift, about
thirteen miles from Fort Burgers, where he constructed another
fort in such a position as to cover the junction of four important
roadways. Having completed this work, he determined to attack some
native strongholds in the Steelport Valley, into which he marched,
with 3 guns, 140 mounted men, 340 infantry, and 250 natives, on
the 26th October. Moving before daybreak the following morning, he
commenced the attack, at 7 A.M., upon a large kraal, built upon a
mountain spur. Here there was some sharp work, difficult positions
seized, and the valley finally cleared. Several kraals were burnt,
about 12,000 lb. of grain destroyed, and 100 head of cattle taken.
Sixteen of the enemy were “accounted for,” the loss on the side of
the attacking party being 1 killed and 10 wounded. At 10 o’clock the
same morning the Commandant returned to his camp on the Steelport,
and, a few days later, to the new fort at Speckboom Drift. Despatches
from head-quarters awaited him here, instructing him to withdraw
altogether, and as speedily as possible, from the enemy’s country.

Arrangements were immediately made for the evacuation of Fort
Burgers, which was the advanced post on the direct road to Sikukuni’s
Town, the withdrawal of troops and stores being masked by a strong
patrol under Captain Carrington, composed of mounted volunteers and
native foot levies, who were sent, _viâ_ Fort Burgers and Origstaadt
Valley, to the Oliphant River. The head-quarters of the 13th Regiment
(340), Russell’s Mounted Infantry (63), and Lieutenant Nicholson’s
two mountain guns, left camp for Lydenburg—the whole under the
command of Lieut.-Colonel Gilbert, 13th Light Infantry—immediately;
and in a few days’ time Fort Burgers was emptied and demolished.
Captain Carrington’s patrol having returned, after capturing 345
head of cattle, and meeting no enemy except a small guard and the
cattle-herds, Colonel Rowlands marched from Speckboom about the
7th November, leaving at that fort a sufficient force to guard the
ammunition and stores which remained there. About thirteen miles
from Lydenburg he halted and constructed a small fort, to cover
the principal road leading to that town, and which he purposed to
garrison with a detachment of volunteers.

Considerable difficulty was now experienced by Colonel Rowlands
in arranging the small force to be left at his disposal, so as to
efficiently protect the great length of frontier, extending from
Fort Mamalubi (under the west side of the Leolu range, and about
twenty-five miles from Oliphant’s River) to Kruger’s Post on the
east, besides garrisoning Pretoria, Middleburg, and Lydenburg, in
which were large quantities of supplies and war _matériel_. His plans
were laid with due consideration for the nature of the country and
the enemy, and after careful consultation with those officers who
were supposed to be most fully acquainted with both. Nevertheless
they did not meet with full approval from head-quarters, from whence
Colonel Rowlands finally received orders to remain where he was,
and be responsible for the arrangements he had made, instead of
proceeding at the head of No. 5 Column to the eastern border for the
invasion of Zululand, as originally intended. Shortly afterwards
Lieut.-Colonel Gilbert was directed to proceed with the 13th Light
Infantry and Lieutenant Nicholson’s guns to Derby, Lieut.-Colonel
Buller having preceded him to that place, which was now removed from
under Colonel Rowlands’s command and placed under that of Colonel
Wood.

The attention of the former officer was now turned to the disposition
of the force that remained to him, and to the raising of new corps
of volunteers and strengthening those already formed, which he
deemed necessary for the security of the Transvaal. To this work he
set himself with great energy and considerable success, stifling
thereby the disappointment which it was but natural that he should
feel at being excluded from the Zulu campaign. Towards the close of
the month, however, he received a letter from the General, asking
him to spare two companies of the 80th Regiment to take the place of
the force under Colonel Gilbert, which had been moved to Luneburg,
and which shortly after joined Colonel Wood’s column. Somewhat
to his surprise, he was reminded that Derby was _in his command_,
and was told that the General commanding would be glad if he would
proceed there in person to _reassure the Swazis_. That same day the
two companies of the 80th, under Major Creagh, were put in orders
to march as directed, and Colonel Rowlands followed a week later,
leaving the forces defending the northern border under the able
command of Major Carrington, who, however, took such instructions
from Captain Clarke as he considered necessary to give as
Commissioner of that district under His Excellency the Administrator
of the Transvaal.

At Derby there was, not unnaturally, some slight confusion owing
to this double appointment of officers in command; but having
overcome this difficulty, Colonel Rowlands set himself seriously
to consider the situation, which was by no means a promising one.
A force composed of two companies of Europeans and 250 natives,
collected from the neighbouring country, was clearly useless for any
aggressive purposes, while the Swazis, though ready and willing to
co-operate with an English force large enough to support them, were
evidently far from satisfied with the number collected at Derby.
That town, or hamlet rather, consisting of but two houses in point
of fact, is situated from twenty to five-and-twenty miles from the
Zulu border of a part of Zululand peopled by some of the most warlike
tribes of that nation, and so small a garrison as the above did
but invite attack and disaster. Upon these considerations Colonel
Rowlands determined to reinforce himself from Pretoria and Lydenburg.
He sent instructions to Major Tyler, 80th Regiment, to send him
three companies of the 80th, two Armstrong guns, and a troop of
Weatherley’s Border Horse, but directing him to consult the colonial
authorities as to whether the troops could be safely spared, before
complying with the order.

At this time, about the middle of January, the Zulus throughout this
northern and thickly-populated part of the country were perfectly
quiet and even friendly. There was still a possibility that the
difficulty between their king and the English might be settled
without bloodshed, and the people were evidently anxious to avoid
giving cause of offence. Colonel Rowlands, who employed his time
while waiting for his reinforcements (which would take some weeks to
arrive) in reconnoitring the country, found the roads open and the
inhabitants inoffensive. At this period he also attempted to organise
a frontier force of farmers—Englishmen, Boers, and Germans—whom he
summoned to a meeting for consideration of the question. From fifty
to sixty attended, and, after hearing his address, their spokesman
responded to the effect that they were willing to take service
for the defensive object proposed, but that it was to be clearly
understood that by uniting themselves to a common protective cause
(course?), they did not thereby acknowledge allegiance to the British
crown. But a committee, subsequently formed to consider details
connected with the proposed force, fell out amongst themselves, and
the scheme was abandoned.

On the 26th January, Colonel Rowlands received from Sir T. Shepstone
the news of the disaster at Isandhlwana; and from this time nothing
but contradictory orders and impossible commands seem to have reached
him at his distant post. He heard of the troops he had intended
for special purposes being ordered elsewhere; he was directed by
Lord Chelmsford to take orders from his junior, Colonel Wood; he
received different instructions, entirely opposed to each other,
concerning the calling out of the Swazi allies; nevertheless, in
spite of the confusion which reigned at that unhappy epoch, he kept
his head, and went steadily on with the plans he had formed. By the
second week in February he had, with some difficulty, collected
a force of something under a thousand Europeans and natives, and
was prepared to operate. It seemed, however, impossible to get any
distinct orders or definite instructions from those in command,
either military or civil; and representations having been made to him
by the border Boers that a Zulu impi was about to attack them from
the Tolaka Mountains, he marched out with a portion of his force in
that direction, leaving Major Tucker (80th) in command of the rest.
While halted at the Assegai River upon this expedition, he received
a despatch from Colonel Wood, requesting him to march his force from
Derby to Luneburg to his support. Sending a note to Major Tucker,
directing him to start for Luneburg next morning, he continued his
march, attacked and took the Tolaka Mountain, and then proceeded
towards Luneburg with his own force. He was now about eighteen miles
from where his head-quarters camp under Major Tucker would be, with
a broken and hilly country to pass through, over which he had great
difficulty in conveying his wounded (fortunately but few), and the
captured women and children. These captives were, on this account,
offered their freedom, but refused to accept it, which, perhaps, was
not unnatural, seeing that their homes and crops were destroyed, and
they had no longer any means of livelihood.

The force passed through the Intombi Valley, laying the country waste
for miles on either side of the road as it went, and met on its way
messengers from Colonel Wood, requesting the immediate presence of
the mounted corps. But upon the 23rd February, Colonel Rowlands
received a memorandum to the effect that the Lieut.-General, by
desire of the High Commissioner, wished him to proceed at once back
to Pretoria, to prepare some defence against the Boers, who had
assumed a threatening attitude. Upon the receipt of this order he
quitted the Luneburg district, and arrived on the 6th of March at
the capital of the Transvaal. Here there were but 200 infantry and
some few mounted volunteers; but by Colonel Rowlands’s exertions the
number was soon swelled to 600 or 700, by the addition of city corps
and other volunteers.

A considerable number of Boers who had never willingly accepted
the annexation of their country by the English, had taken the
opportunity, offered by the general confusion which reigned after
the disaster of the 22nd January, of endeavouring to regain the
independence of their state. Mass meetings were held to discuss the
subject, and finally a large body of armed men formed a camp at no
great distance from Pretoria. The situation appeared a very serious
one; and the High Commissioner himself travelled to Pretoria to
endeavour by his honeyed words to calm an agitation which might prove
so singularly inconvenient should the angry feelings of the indignant
Boers find vent in blows. On the 12th of April, just two years from
the day of the annexation, Sir B. Frere met a deputation of the
Transvaal farmers at Erasmus Spruit, about six miles from Pretoria,
and held a long discussion with them upon the subject of their
rights and wrongs. They repeatedly and plainly asserted that Sir
T. Shepstone had coerced the people into submission by threatening
them with the Zulus, and declared unanimously that nothing would
satisfy them but the recovery of their liberties. Sir Bartle Frere
gave them to understand in return that this was the only thing for
which they might not hope. He assured them that he looked upon the
_voortrekkers_ as an honour to their race, and that he felt proud to
belong to the same stock. The Queen, he told them, felt for them “as
for her own children;”[160] and he hoped to tell her that she had “no
better subjects in her empire,” than amongst them. The committee,
however, retired in complete dissatisfaction, and addressed a
petition to Her Majesty, in which they remark, “unwilling subjects
but faithful neighbours we will be;” and more than hint that they are
prepared to “draw the sword” to prove how much they are in earnest.
The excitement, however, calmed down for the time being, and Sir
Bartle Frere departed.

During his stay in Pretoria, he desired Colonel Rowlands to
make preparations to resume hostilities against Sikukuni, and
accordingly, by the end of May, that officer had increased the
number of his mounted volunteers by 450. He then made a vain attempt
to induce Lord Chelmsford to spare him another regiment of regular
troops; but finding that this was decidedly refused, and that no
operations were likely to take place in the Transvaal for some time,
he accepted the General’s offer of a brigade in the lower column.

On the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley at Port Durnford, he applied to
that general for the command in case operations should be resumed in
the Transvaal. To this he had a strong claim, both on account of his
experience and of his laborious services there; but the request was
refused.




CHAPTER XVI.

NO. 4 COLUMN—INTOMBI—INDHLOBANE—KAMBULA—KING’S MESSENGERS.


On January 6th, No. 4 Column, under Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B.—strength
previously detailed—crossed the Blood River (the Zulu boundary
according to the award of the Commission) and advanced to Bemba’s Kop.

On the 11th, Colonel Wood met the General halfway to Rorke’s Drift,
and received instructions “to occupy himself with the tribes on his
front and left flank, notably Seketwayo,” until No. 3 Column was
ready to advance to Isipezi Hill, when he was to proceed to Ingwe,
both columns to establish advanced depôts, bring up supplies, and
then move forward. Colonel Wood induced the Zulu chief Bemba to give
up his arms and come in, which he did on the 10th, bringing with him
about eighty of his people and 1000 head of cattle, sheep, and goats;
they were sent to Utrecht.

On the 11th, Colonel Wood, who had advanced with a portion of the
force from Bemba’s Kop towards Rorke’s Drift to meet the General on
his return march, seized about 2000 head of cattle, the owners of
which were quietly tending them as usual (these were supposed to
be Sihayo’s), and next day attacked a petty chief, who was said to
have “given considerable trouble to the Transvaal farmers”, with
the result of seven Zulus killed and upwards of 500 head of cattle
captured.

Some 2000 to 3000 head of cattle were also taken from the Sondolosi
tribe,[161] a slight resistance being offered by the Zulus, of whom
one was killed. Colonel Wood _thus_ endeavoured to induce Seketwayo’s
people to be pacified, and was “therefore most anxious to refrain
from taking any steps which might discourage these men from coming
in!”

The General, on entering Zululand, finding the difficulties greater
than he had anticipated, instructed Colonel Wood “to act altogether
independently, about the head waters of the White Umveloosi River”
(16th January, 1879), and when Seketwayo had either surrendered
or been defeated, to “take up a position covering Utrecht and the
adjacent Transvaal border, wherever he considers his force can be
most usefully employed,” and not to “attempt to advance towards the
Inhlazatye Mountain until an advance by the other three columns
across the Umhlatoozi River has become possible.” (P. P. [C. 2252]
p. 63.) Colonel Wood, from Bemba’s Kop, communicated with Uhamo—a
brother of Cetshwayo—who had asked for a way to be pointed out by
which he might escape.

No. 4 Column now moved towards Intemgeni River, and encamped there on
18th January, Colonel Wood reporting “many of the natives are giving
themselves up to me; I have captured about 4000 head of cattle.”
On the previous day a party of Wood’s “irregulars” attacked some
Zulus, killing 9, wounding about 20, and taking 5 prisoners and 100
sheep; with a loss to themselves of 2 wounded (_ibid._ p. 66). On the
19th and 20th there were skirmishes with some of Tinta’s people, of
whom about 12 were killed. A prisoner was brought in by the Native
Contingent on the 19th, whom they gravely asked permission to kill
in the evening, “thinking they had done their whole duty in obeying
orders and bringing the man in.”

The column encamped at Tinta’s kraal, on the left bank of the
Umvolosi River, and a stone fort was commenced. A reconnaissance
across the Umvolosi to Zinguni Mountain met the Zulus in force,
and was compelled to retire with a loss of two wounded, the enemy
not being checked until the river was recrossed. January 22nd, the
Zinguni Mountain was patrolled by a strong force, the enemy retiring
hastily, and leaving about 600 head of cattle. In the distance a
large force, estimated at 4000, was seen, and it apparently ascended
the Indhlobane Mountain. The column had a smart engagement with the
enemy on the 24th, and drove them off with a loss of about fifty
killed; but on receiving intelligence of the disaster to No. 3
Column, retired to Fort Tinta.

At Luneburg a laager was formed by the Dutch farmers, under
Commandant Schermbrucker, and Colonel Wood moved his force to Kambula
Hill, to cover Utrecht and the neighbouring border, and there
firmly entrenched himself. The situation chosen was a commanding
and central position between the Umvolosi and Pevana rivers on the
Jagt-pad (Hunter’s path), covering the country northward to Luneburg,
eastward to the Amaqulusi, southward to the Umvolosi, and westward to
Balte’s Spruit and Utrecht.

The Zulus abandoned the open, and remained in the mountains and
broken country, where rocks and caves afforded them secure positions.

On February 1st, Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with 140 irregular cavalry,
made a dash at the Amaqulisini (or Amaqulusi) kraal, thirty miles
distant. This was a military stronghold, deemed by the Boers to be
impregnable. It was situated in a basin at a distance of nearly
two miles from the summit of the rugged heights by which it was
surrounded, and almost hidden from view, although about 300 yards in
diameter and containing at least 250 huts.

Leaving thirty men as a covering party, Colonel Buller moved with the
remainder down the almost precipitous slopes, the horsemen frequently
obliged to dismount and lead their horses. However, the kraal was
not occupied in force, and, after a few shots, the inmates fled. Six
Zulus were killed, 270 head of cattle taken, and the kraal burnt, the
force returning from this daring exploit without casualty, after a
hard day’s work of twenty hours.

A small fort was finished and armed on February 3rd, and, on the
10th, Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with 400 irregular cavalry, reconnoitred
the Indhlobane Mountain, and, after a slight skirmish, captured 490
head of cattle.

A new fort was commenced at Kambula, about two miles higher up the
spur, and the camp moved to this spot on the 13th, the fort being
garrisoned by two companies of infantry and two guns.

It was reported that Manyonyoba (an independent native chief) had
been killing and plundering in the Intombi Valley, so Colonel Buller
was sent with a force to the spot. The Swazi chief Umbilini was also
reported by Commandant Schermbrucker to have raided, in combination
with Manyonyoba, and done much mischief to life and property;
however, a force sent from Luneburg had a successful skirmish with
them.

The king’s brother, Uhamo, came in to Captain McLeod from the Swazi
border with 300 of his people and 1000 cattle, and reached Derby on
February 4th, his following increased to about 600, and was moved
down to Luneburg, where he arrived on March 7th.

A sad disaster occurred on the Intombi River to a detachment of the
80th Regiment on the 12th March. Captain Moriarty, with 104 men of
the 80th, was escorting a convoy from Derby to Luneburg. On reaching
the Intombi Drift (about four miles from Luneburg) the river was
found to be rising, and by the time the advanced guard (thirty-five
men, under Lieutenant Harward) had crossed, it was impossible to take
the waggons over. They were therefore laagered on the river-bank in
the shape of a triangle; and there they remained next day. About
4 A.M. on the 12th a shot was fired, and the troops turned out,
remaining under arms for half an hour, when, all being quiet, they
returned to their tents (it transpired afterwards that the outlying
sentries had been surprised and killed by the enemy). Suddenly the
fog lifted, and a large body of Zulus without any warning rushed on
and took the laager, driving the troops into the river. The party
under Lieutenant Harward, which was encamped on the opposite bank,
opened a brisk fire, but were soon broken, and obliged to fly towards
Luneburg; Lieutenant Harward, galloping in, gave the alarm. Only
forty-four men of this detachment survived.

Major Tucker sallied out from Luneburg, when the enemy slowly
retreated. The waggons were saved, and the bodies of Captain Moriarty
and his unfortunate men buried.

The comparatively quiet time at Kambula was passed thus: Colonel
Wood was up with the first in the early morning, and often out with
the patrols who daily scouted the country round for miles; his force
securely entrenched; himself a very strict but kind commander, who
had the full confidence and good-will of his troops. Sports were
got up for the amusement and occupation of the men. A band played
in the evening, and the singing and laughter in camp showed that
all were in excellent spirits. The daily business was cutting wood
from the mountain-side some three miles distant, escorts, patrols,
and piquet-duty. One of the night piquets (eight men) posted at
some distance from camp was termed “the forlorn hope;” its special
duty was to give early warning of an enemy’s approach. But the most
unpleasant feature in this camp-life was the absence of comfort at
night. The troops necessarily “turned in” dressed, armed, and ready
for instant work, with the _personal_ discomfort illustrated by this
soldier’s joke—that it was “Cetshwayo outside and Catch-away-o!
inside.”

Lieut.-Colonel Buller, having returned to Kambula, patrolled Uhamo’s
district, and in the direction of the Indhlobane range; and on the
16th brought into camp 958 of Uhamo’s people.

On March 28th, a reconnaissance by the whole cavalry force was made
towards Indhlobane. The Zulus were in possession of the mountain,
which was ascended in skirmishing order as rapidly as possible,
the enemy keeping up a heavy fire from caves and from behind huge
rocks. The summit was reached with the loss of one officer—Lieutenant
Williams—and serious fighting was kept up for some time in the
endeavour to dislodge the Zulus from their secure positions. Captain
the Hon. R. Campbell was killed, also Lieutenant von Sticenstron, and
Colonel Wood himself had a very narrow escape.

Whilst engaged in this struggle a Zulu army was moving up to seize
the approaches to the mountain, and cut off the force from the camp.
Immediately on this being observed a retreat was made in rapid but
good order, until a very steep and stony krantz was reached, where
the men could only move in single file; here the enemy got in amongst
the troopers, causing utter confusion. The officers did their best to
steady their men, but it became a case of _sauve qui peut_.

Captain Barton’s troop was sent down the mountain to recover the
body of Lieutenant Williams, and returned, having been joined by Mr.
Uys. On the flats they came up with Colonel Weatherley’s troop, and
found the enemy in front and on the right and left. Retreating a
short distance they were surrounded, so, opening out, they charged
through the enemy and over the neck, which was lined with Zulus. But
few were enabled to win their way through this perilous pass, and of
those who did many were overtaken and killed on the plain. Of Captain
Barton’s troop but eight men returned to camp that night.

The broken force fought its way to the camp, followed by the enemy
for several miles. Many a man’s life was saved by a comrade halting
and taking him up on his own horse, a personal instance of which
Captain D’Arcy gives. His horse had been killed under him in the
descent of the mountain, and he ran for his life for some 300 yards,
when a man named Francis caught a horse for him, which, however,
he shortly relinquished to a wounded comrade, running on himself
on foot. Colonel Buller picked him up when nearly exhausted, but
when he recovered his breath he dismounted; he was a second time
in difficulties, and assisted by Lieutenant Blaine, and again, a
third time, by Major Tremlett, R.A. Indeed, most of the men got into
camp with comrades mounted behind them. The loss was 12 officers
and 84 non-commissioned officers and men killed, and also Colonel
Wood’s staff-officer, Captain the Hon. R. Campbell; Captain Barton,
Coldstream Guards; and Mr. Lloyd, Political Assistant. Colonel Wood’s
horse was shot under him.

Mr. Piet Uys, the leader of the Burgher force, was likewise amongst
those killed in action this day.

Small patrols were sent out next morning to endeavour to find any men
who might have escaped.

Warning of an intended attack on Kambula was brought in by a
native—one of Uhamo’s men—and, about 11 A.M., dense masses of the
enemy were seen in the distance, when all the force was assembled
and the cattle driven into their laager. At 1.30 P.M. the action
commenced by mounted troops, under Colonels Buller and Russell,
engaging the enemy on the north of the camp. They were speedily
forced to return into the laager, followed by the Zulus until they
were within 300 yards, when a heavy fire from the 90th Regiment
checked their advance, and they opened out round the camp.

At 2.15 the right front and rear of the camp were attacked by heavy
masses of the enemy, who, apparently well supplied with Martini-Henry
rifles, occupied a hill commanding the laager, enfilading it so that
the company of the 13th posted at the right rear of the enclosure had
to be withdrawn. The front of the cattle-laager was, however, stoutly
held by a company of the 13th; but the Zulus coming boldly on, Major
Hackett, with two companies of the 90th, was directed to clear the
slope. They sallied out into the open, driving the Zulus back in a
gallant manner under a heavy fire, until ordered to retire by Colonel
Wood.

While bringing his men in, Major Hackett was dangerously wounded.

The two guns in the redoubt were admirably worked by Lieutenant
Nicholson, R.A., until he was mortally wounded; when Major Vaughan,
R.A., replaced him.

Major Tremlett, R.A., with four guns, remained in the open during the
engagement.

The attack began to slacken about 5.30 P.M., enabling Colonel Wood
to assume the offensive; the Zulus were driven from the cattle kraal
into which they penetrated, and from the immediate vicinity of the
camp, the infantry doing great execution among the retreating masses.

The pursuit was taken up by the mounted men under Colonel Buller, and
continued for seven miles, “killing great numbers, the enemy being
too exhausted to fire in their own defence” (_vide_ Colonel Wood’s
despatch of March 30th). All agreed in admiring the pluck of the
Zulus, who, “under tremendous fire, never wavered, but came straight
at us.”

The loss of No. 4 Column was 2 officers killed, 5 wounded, and 80
men killed and wounded. The strength of the enemy was thought to be
about 20,000, of whom 1000 are supposed to have been killed. Colonel
Wood’s operations at Indhlobane were for the purpose of “making
demonstrations against the enemy,” as directed by the General, who
had reason to believe at that time, that he should find the whole
Zulu army between his force and Etshowe. (P. P. [C. 2367] p. 35.) One
trooper, a Frenchman named Grandier, had a very remarkable escape
from Indhlobane, of which the following is his account: On coming
down the mountain we were met by a large Zulu force, and fell back
across the neck assailed on all sides. I was about the last, having
put a comrade on my horse whilst I ran alongside, when a Kafir caught
me by the legs, and I was made prisoner. I was taken to Umbilini’s
kraal and questioned; after which, I passed the night tied to a
tree. Next day I was taken into the middle of a large “impi,” where
I was threatened with death, but the leader said he would send me to
Cetywayo. Next day I started for Ulundi, in charge of four men, who
were riding, but I had all my clothes taken from me, and had to walk,
carrying their food. On the evening of the fourth day we reached
Ulundi, and I was kept tied in the open till about noon next day,
when Cetywayo sent for me, and questioned me about what the English
wanted, where Shepstone was, etc. A Dutchman acted as interpreter,
and I saw a Portuguese, and an English-speaking Zulu, who could
read.[162] Cetywayo had a personal guard of about one hundred men,
but I did not see any large numbers of men at his kraal, but there
were two small cannons there. During my stay I was fed on mealies,
and frequently beaten. At last messengers arrived reporting the death
of Umbilini, and Cetywayo said he would send me to his Kafirs to
kill. On 13th April I started in charge of two Kafirs, one armed with
a gun and both with assegais. About midday we were lying down, the
Kafirs being sleepy, when I seized an assegai and killed the man with
the gun, the other running away. I walked all night guided by the
stars; next day I saw an impi driving cattle towards Ulundi, so had
to lie still. After this I saw no Kafirs, and walked on at night. On
the morning of the 16th I met some of our own people and was brought
into camp. Trooper Grandier, when brought in, was dressed in an old
corduroy coat, cut with assegai stabs, and a pair of regimental
trousers cut off at the knee; these he had picked up on the Veldt. He
had strips of cloth round his feet.

The independent chief Umbilini, who was such a thorn in the side of
the Transvaal, was killed early in April. Small parties had raided
into the Pongolo Valley from Indhlobane, opposite Luneburg, until
they were said to number some hundreds, when they came upon two
companies of the 2-24th on the march; these at once laagered, and the
enemy moved on; Umbilini, Assegai’s son, and four horsemen, going
back with twenty horses. They were pursued by Captain Prior, 80th
Regiment, with seven mounted men (80th), and another European, when
Assegai’s son was killed, and Umbilini mortally wounded.

The raiders were attacked by some parties of natives, but went off to
the Assegai River with several beasts and sheep.—(P. P. [C. 2374] p.
51).

Meanwhile, many attempts were made by the Zulu king to arrest the
tide of invasion, and to bring about a more peaceable solution of the
difficulties between him and the English Government.

When Lord Chelmsford first crossed into Zululand, messengers were
sent by the king to the column on the Lower Tugela asking for an
explanation of the invasion, suggesting that hostilities should be
suspended, that the British troops should re-cross the Tugela, and
that talking should commence.[163] These men did not return to the
king, but remained at the Lower Tugela, Sir Bartle Frere says by
their own desire, since they dared not return with an unsatisfactory
answer.

And Bishop Schreuder narrates on March 3rd that—“Two Zulus arrived
here yesterday with a message from the king.... The king says: ‘Look
here, I have taken care of the deserted mission stations, and not
allowed them to be destroyed, thinking that the missionaries in
time would return to them, such as Mr. Robertson’s at Kwamagwaza,
and Oftibro’s at Ekhowe, but we now see what use the missionaries
make of the station-houses; Robertson has come with an impi (army)
to the Ekhowe mission station, and there has made a fort of it, the
houses being turned to advantage for our enemies. Seeing this, my
people have of their own accord destroyed the other mission stations;
and although I have not ordered this destruction, still I cannot
complain of it, seeing that the houses on the stations will serve as
a shelter for our present invading enemy. I am in a fix what to do
with your station Entumeni, for it is reported ... that the column at
Miltongambill is to ... march to Entumeni, turn the station into a
fort, like Robertson has had the Ekhowe turned into a fort. In that
case I will, much against my wish, be obliged to destroy the house
at Entumeni, as a matter of self-protection, the last thing I ever
thought of doing, as I have no grudge against you or your station.’
This is the substance of the king’s message to me with respect to
my station, Entumeni; it, therefore, now will entirely depend on
the decision of the General Lord Chelmsford, whether the Entumeni
station-houses are to be destroyed or _not_.” Bishop Schreuder says:
“The messengers also report that the king has sent, through a certain
Ikolwa Klass (not known to me), that copy of Sir T. Shepstone’s
report which I, on behalf of the Natal Government, handed over to him
from Her Majesty Queen Victoria, August, 1875.

“Already Umavumendaba had requested the king to send that book with
the deputation that met at Tugela, 11th December, 1878, in order
that there might be proved from that book wherein the king had
sinned, since the English had put forth such warlike demonstrations;
but Umavumendaba’s request was not then acceded to. The king now
sends this book that from the contents of it may be proved wherein he
has broken the compact made at his installation, 1st September, 1875”
[1873].—(P.P. [C. 2318] pp. 35-37).

Bishop Schreuder requested Mr. Fannin, the border agent, “to receive
the message from the messenger’s own lips, and communicate it to
His Excellency.” He reported that Cetshwayo wished to explain to
the Government that he had never desired war. He had not, he said,
refused the terms proposed at the Lower Tugela; he had collected 1000
head of cattle to pay the demand made on him, and would even have
delivered up Sihayo’s sons to the General, but “any Zulu that showed
himself was immediately fired upon.” The attack upon Sandhlwana,
he protested, was not made by his orders, and his induna was in
disgrace for having made it. As regards Inyezane, the king contended
that Colonel Pearson provoked the attack made on him by burning
kraals, and committing other acts of hostility. He asked that both
sides should put aside their arms, and resume negotiations with a
view to a permanent settlement of all questions between himself and
the Government. He would, he said, have sent in a message some time
since, but was afraid, because the last time, when he sent eight
messengers to the Lower Tugela, they were detained, whom he now
begged might be sent back to him (_ibid._ pp. 40, 41).

Mr. Fannin, on the 22nd March, reports the arrival of the messengers
with the book, and says: “Cetywayo sends by the messengers the book
containing the laws promulgated at the time of his coronation, and
presented to him by Her Majesty the Queen.

“It will be remembered that this book was handed to the Zulu king by
Bishop Schreuder at the request of the Natal Government some time
after the coronation took place. The king now returns it, and asks
him to cast his eye over its contents, and say in what way he has
transgressed its provisions” (_ibid._ p. 47).

On March 28th Mr. Fannin reports that “three messengers have arrived
with a message from Cetywayo. Their names are Johannes (a native
of Entumeni), ’Nkisimana, and Umfunzi. On approaching the ferry
they were fired on by the Native Contingent.... The message is
very short; it is simply to say, Cetywayo sees no reason for the
war which is being waged against him, and he asks the Government
to appoint a place at which a conference could be held with a view
to the conclusion of peace.” They further brought a message from
Dabulamanzi, that “a few days ago he sent a white flag with two
messengers to Ekhowe, to ask for a suspension of hostilities, until
the result of this mission was known, but the men have not returned.
He asks that the men may be released.” Mr. Fannin says: “Four other
Entumeni men have arrived with these messengers,” and he suggests,
“that the Entumeni men should not be allowed to return to Zululand”
(_ibid._ pp. 44, 45).

“Owing,” says Sir B. Frere, on June 17th, “to some misunderstanding
between the various civil and military authorities, these messengers
also were detained for several weeks, and have only lately been sent
back.”

“I do not for a moment suppose,” he continues, “that either the civil
or military authorities were aware of this, or could have prevented
it by bringing their detention to notice at an earlier period, but
it shows the difficulties of intercourse on such subjects with the
Zulus, where such things could occur without the slightest ground for
suspicion of bad faith on the part of either the civil or military
authorities.”[164]

It is not easy to discover what unusual and mysterious difficulties
the civil and military authorities can have found in communicating
with the Zulu messengers (men who had been employed for many years
in carrying the “words” of Government and the Zulu king to each
other), and it is still more inexplicable to whose notice the said
authorities could have brought their detention. The whole matter
is about as comprehensible as the statement which appeared at the
time in the Natal papers, that when these same messengers—a small
party—approached our camp, bearing a white flag, “_we fired upon it_
(_i.e._ the flag) _to test its sincerity_.”

The detention of these messengers as prisoners at Kranz Kop came
to the knowledge of the Bishop of Natal about the middle of April,
and he at once brought the fact to the notice of the civil and
military authorities. On the 20th April he saw Lord Chelmsford
in Pietermaritzburg, and spoke to him on the subject. The General
informed him that he had already ordered them to go back to
Cetshwayo, and to say that he must send indunas to meet him (Lord
Chelmsford) at General Wood’s camp, to which he was then bound.
Nevertheless the General’s message, which would take but two days on
the road, had not reached Kranz Kop on the 29th, nor were the men
actually released until the 9th of May. When finally set at liberty
they carried with them a message calculated to discourage any further
attempts on the Zulu king’s part at bringing about a peaceful issue
to the war, being merely that if “Cetywayo sends any more messengers
he must send them to the Upper Column (Dundee).”

Nevertheless on the 12th of June the same two old men appeared again,
brought down, bearing a white flag, to ’Maritzburg by policemen from
Mr. Fynn, resident magistrate at the Umsinga. Apparently they had
been afraid to cross at Kranz Kop, where the “sincerity” of their
white flag had been “tested” before, and were sent, not to the
military authorities, but to the civil magistrate, who sent them
down to Sir Henry Bulwer. He would have nothing to say to them, and
transferred them to General Clifford, who examined them on the 13th,
and sent them off on the following day to Lord Chelmsford. They had
already walked one hundred and fifty miles from Ulundi to ’Maritzburg
with their message of peace, and had then still further to go in
order to reach the General, before they could get any kind of answer.
Meanwhile the campaign was prosecuted without a pause.

General Clifford’s account of this is as follows:

“I began by informing them that I was only going to ask them such
questions as would enable me to judge whether I should be justified
in sending them on to my Chief, Lord Chelmsford, now in Zululand
carrying on the war. The headman, Umfundi, then made the following
statement: ‘We are Umfundi and Umkismana, Zulu messengers from
Cetywayo. I am sent here by Cetywayo to ask for time to arrange a
meeting of Chiefs with a view to arranging peace. We did not go to
the head white Chief, because Fynn at Rorke’s Drift, whom I knew,
told me the Great White Chief was in Zululand, and we had better see
Shepstone and the second White Chief, who were at Pietermaritzburg,
so we came on here advised by Fynn. I have been here about twice a
year for the last six years as King’s messenger, but not as Chief.
I am nothing but a messenger, and I have no authority from the King
to treat for peace, or to do anything besides delivering my message,
asking if time will be given to assemble a meeting of Chiefs. I know
Mr. Shepstone, Mr. Gallway, and Bishop Colenso, and I have seen
Bishop Colenso in this town, and also at his place in the country,
but I do not wish to see him now, and I have not asked to see him.’
(This, according to their custom, merely implied that they had no
message for him.) ‘I want to see the Great Chief, as the King ordered
me to do. I only came here to deliver my message and because Fynn
told me. This is the seventeenth day since I left the King’s kraal.
Am an old man and cannot go so fast as I could when I was young,
and heavy rain detained me three days. The King told me to hurry on
and return quickly. It will take us seven days to get from here to
Ibabamango Mountain if we go by Rorke’s Drift. We only know of two
other messengers sent by the King; one is Sintwango, the name of the
other we do not know. They have been sent to the lower column because
Cetywayo thinks there are two Chiefs of equal power, one with the
upper column and the other with the lower column. They are sent like
us to ask for time to get out by the door. The King does not know
the name of your big Chief, and we do not either. We are the same
messengers the King sent to Fort Buckingham with the same message
we have now. Only then our orders were not to go to your Chief as
now, but to go to Fort Buckingham and wait for the answer there. We
delivered our message to the military Chief there, and he sent the
message on. The Chief was at Etshowe fighting, and the answer did
not come for two months; when it came it was that the great Chief
was surprised we were still there. He thought we had gone back to
the King long ago. The officer at Fort Buckingham advised us to go
to the great white Chief, but we said: “No, those are not the King’s
orders; our orders are to come here, and now we will return and tell
the King;” and it was half of the third month when we got back to
him. We told him what had taken place. He consulted his great Chiefs,
and then sent us with the orders we now have to go and see the great
white Chief, and that is now what we are trying to do. I have no
power given me but to ask for time. The King sends his messengers
first, because it is the custom of the country to do so, and not
to send a great Chief till arrangements have been made where the
Chiefs are to assemble to talk about peace. We have no power to talk
about terms of peace. None but messengers have yet been sent. The
messengers sent to the lower column went before the fighting began;
they were detained and did not return to the King’s kraal till we
did.’ I said I was satisfied they ought to be sent on at once to Lord
Chelmsford.

“I would give a letter, written by me to Lord Chelmsford, to Umfunzi,
to be given by him with his own hand to Lord Chelmsford, and outside
the letter I would say that no one but Lord Chelmsford was to open
it. This appeared to please them much. I said I would write to the
commanding officers along the road they were going to look after
them, and to the officer at Rorke’s Drift to see them safe to
Ibabamango.’ ‘Would a white man be safe going with them?’ ‘Yes,’
they said, ‘quite,’ and they wished one could be sent with them; but
still more, the King would be pleased if a white man was sent to him.
I said I would not send a white man alone into Zululand with them,
because my Chief did not approve, still less could I send one to the
King, because I was only under the big Chief. Anything they wished to
say about peace or anything else they must say to the big Chief when
they saw him.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 111).

At no time during the war, indeed, did we encourage the Zulu king
in his persistent efforts to get peace; but more of this hereafter.
Here we will only add one further instance, namely, that of two
messengers sent to Colonel Pearson at Etshowe, who, although brought
blindfold into the camp, were kept as prisoners in irons until the
garrison was relieved. The pretext for this detention was that they
were _supposed_ to be spies; but officers present were satisfied that
there were no grounds for the supposition, or for the treatment which
they received.

Sir Bartle Frere of course inclines to the opinion that _all_
Cetshwayo’s messengers were spies, his entreaties for peace but
treacherous pretexts to cover his evil intentions. Some of the men
sent were old accredited messengers to the Government, whose names
are frequently mentioned in earlier Blue-books, yet Sir Bartle Frere
says of them: “In no case could they give any satisfactory proof that
they really came from the king.”[165]

But the High Commissioner’s habit of finding evil motives for every
act of the Zulu king, made the case of the latter hopeless from the
first.

Meanwhile the despatches received from Sir Michael Hicks-Beach
contained comments amounting to censure upon the High Commissioner’s
proceedings in forcing on a war with the Zulus. He is plainly told
that he should have waited to consult Her Majesty’s Government upon
the terms that Cetshwayo should be called upon to accept, and that
“they have been unable to find in the documents you have placed
before them that evidence of urgent necessity for immediate action
which alone could justify you in taking, without their full knowledge
and sanction, a course almost certain to result in a war, which, as I
had previously impressed upon you, every effort should have been used
to avoid.”

“The communication which had passed between us,” continues the
Secretary of State, “as to the objects for which the reinforcements
were requested and sent, and as to the nature of the questions in
dispute with the Zulu king, were such as to render it especially
needful that Her Majesty’s Government should understand and approve
any important step, not already suggested to them, before you
were committed to it; and if that step was likely to increase the
probability of war, an opportunity should certainly have been
afforded to them of considering as well the time as the manner of
coming to issue—should it be necessary to come to issue—with the
Zulu king. And though the further correspondence necessary for this
purpose might have involved the loss of a favourable season for
the operations of the British troops, and might have afforded to
Cetywayo the means of further arming and provisioning his forces, the
circumstances rendered it imperative that, even at the risk of this
disadvantage, full explanations should be exchanged.”

The despatch from which the above is quoted was written on the
19th March, and another, dated the following day, expresses the
writer’s “general approval of the principles on which the boundary
award was based,” as intimated in a previous despatch, but gives
a very qualified assent to Sir B. Frere’s emendations by which he
seeks to secure the “private rights” of settlers on the wrongfully
appropriated land, and remarks that he is disposed to think that the
recognition of these said private rights of European settlers in the
district declared to be Zulu territory should have been restricted
as far as possible to those cases in which _bonâ fide_ purchasers
had improved their farms by building, planting, or otherwise, which
restriction would have limited them to a very small number indeed.
Sir M. Hicks-Beach also reminds Sir B. Frere that Her Majesty’s
Government had distinctly said beforehand that “they could not
undertake the obligation of protecting” the missionaries in Zululand.
His comments upon the terms of the ultimatum, he says, are intended
for Sir B. Frere’s guidance when the time for once more proposing
terms should arrive, and he concludes: “It is my wish that, as far
as possible, you should avoid taking any decided step, or committing
yourself to any positive conclusion respecting any of them until you
have received instructions from Her Majesty’s Government.”—(P. P. [C.
2260] pp. 108-111).

Again, upon April 10th, after receiving Sir Bartle Frere’s
explanations, Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes as follows:

“Since I addressed to you my despatches of the 19th and 20th March,
I have received your two despatches of February 12th and March 1st,
further explaining the considerations which induced you to decide
that the demands made upon Ketshwayo must be communicated to him
without delay. The definite expression of the views and policy of
Her Majesty’s Government contained in my despatches already referred
to, which will have reached you before you receive this, makes it
unnecessary that I should enter into any examination of the arguments
or opinions expressed in your present despatches. It is sufficient to
say that Her Majesty’s Government do not find in the reasons now put
forward by you any grounds to modify the tenor of the instructions
already addressed to you on the subject of affairs in South Africa,
and it is their desire that you should regulate your future action
according to these instructions.

“But there is one point alluded to in your despatch of March 1st
which I feel it necessary at once to notice, in order to prevent
any misunderstanding. You refer, in the thirty-second paragraph of
that despatch, to ‘much that will remain to be done on the northern
Swazi border and in Sekukuni’s country,’ and to the probability
that ‘the Transvaal, the Diamond Fields, Basutoland, and other
parts now threatened with disturbance, will not settle down without
at least an exhibition of force.’ I entertain much hope that in
each of these cases, including that of Sekukuni, the troubles now
existing or anticipated may disappear, either independently of or
as a consequence of that complete settlement of the Zulu difficulty
which I join with you in trusting to see speedily effected. But, if
this expectation should unfortunately not be fulfilled, you will
be careful to bear in mind that Her Majesty’s Government are not
prepared to sanction any further extension, without their specific
authority, of our responsibilities in South Africa; that their desire
is that the military operations now proceeding should be directed to
the termination, at the earliest moment consistent with the safety
of our colonies and the honour of our arms, of the Zulu question;
and that any wider or larger action of the kind apparently suggested
in your despatch, should be submitted to them for consideration and
approval, before any steps are taken to carry it into effect.”—(P. P.
[C. 2316] p. 36).




CHAPTER XVII.

THE LOWER TUGELA—INYEZANE—ETSHOWE.


The first step taken towards preparing for the campaign and advance
of a column on Ulundi by the coast road was the landing of a “Naval
Brigade” from H.M.S. _Active_, in November, 1878, under the command
of Commander Campbell, R.N. The “Actives” at once marched up to
Lower Tugela Drift, and commenced preparations for the crossing of
the river. A “pont” was established, and boats collected preparatory
to the passage of the troops. Fifty men from the _Tenedos_, under
Lieutenant Kingscote, R.N., joined the Naval Brigade on January 7th,
1879, but remained at Fort Pearson and took charge of the pont, etc.,
when the “Actives” moved up with No. 1 Column.

The passage of the Tugela was a difficult and rather hazardous
undertaking, the river being nearly 300 yards wide, with a strong
current flowing. The preparations, including taking across a wire
hawser for the working of the pont, were conducted in a very
business-like and satisfactory manner by Commander Campbell and the
Naval Brigade.

The Navy had received early notice of impending hostilities, and,
as early as April, 1878, Sir Bartle Frere had requested Commodore
Sullivan, C.B. (the naval chief), to remain in Natal, “in order
to render such assistance by sea and land as may be practicable,”
“as it appeared almost certain that serious complications must
shortly arise with the Zulu tribe ... which will necessitate active
operations.”—(P. P. 2144, p. 32).

The coast was explored by the Commodore as far as St. Lucia Bay,
and every possible assistance willingly rendered by him and the
force under his command before and throughout the campaign. Valuable
assistance was also given by Captain Baynton, commodore of the Union
Steamship Company’s fleet. The force detailed for Colonel Pearson’s
command—styled No. 1 Column—concentrated on Fort Pearson, on the
Lower Tugela; its detail has been previously given.

It was directed that this column should cross the river and encamp
on the Zulu bank, under the guns of the fort, there to await further
orders; but, from the flooded state of the river and other causes,
the passage was not effected till the 12th January, when the
principal part of the force crossed and encamped in Zululand.

The 2nd (Captain Wynne’s) Company Royal Engineers arrived at Fort
Pearson on the 12th, and crossed on the 13th. It immediately set
about the construction of Fort Tenedos on the left bank, about 600
yards from the river, to cover the crossing, protect stores, etc.

The Naval Brigade were constantly at work, day and night, working the
boats and pontoon across the river, with the exception of the night
of the 14th, when a heavy flood swept away the wharves. Twice the
pontoon was upset, and one of the _Active’s_ men was drowned.

Reconnaissances were made in the Zulu country, and a few prisoners
taken, but there were no signs of any large body of the enemy. One
of John Dunn’s men reported on the 17th that “the whole of his
neighbourhood” was “now deserted and the cattle driven into the
interior.”

Everything being carefully prepared, the advance was made on the
18th, a strong advanced guard and the Natal Native Pioneers[166]
preceding the column. Every precaution was taken to prevent a
surprise, extra vigilance being necessary on account of the long
waggon-train carrying tents, rations for fifteen days, and a large
quantity of food and ammunition destined for an advanced depôt to be
formed at or near Etshowe.

We may here say a few words on the extreme difficulties of South
African transport—difficulties so serious and full of danger that
they should have been eliminated from the plan of the campaign.

The waggons used were, as a rule, the ordinary South African
ox-waggons, clumsy and heavy to move, each drawn by a team of
fourteen to eighteen oxen. The Zulu oxen are much superior to the
up-country oxen, as they stand more work, and will swim rivers; they
even swam the Tugela, whilst the remainder had to be ferried over.

The pace of the ox-waggon is about a mile and a half an hour, and
drifts and hills cause frequent delays. Take for instance the train
of No. 1 Column: it accomplished the march to Etshowe, a distance
of thirty-seven miles, in between five and six days—from daylight
on the 18th to 10 A.M. 23rd—having only been detained by the enemy
at Inyezane for about two hours: the train was necessarily some six
miles in length, an element of the utmost danger had the swift-footed
Zulus been a little more enterprising. Two or three thousand Zulus
might easily have prevented Colonel Pearson reaching Etshowe _with_
his train, in spite of all the precautions he might and did take.
The commanding officers of the various columns had no option in
the matter of waggon-train, and as far as they were concerned the
transport under their control worked well.

The difficulty of moving with a long train of waggons during the
summer, or rainy season, can scarcely be exaggerated. Double spanning
over drifts and soft places, making bad places good with brushwood,
oxen getting tired owing to the length of time they were yoked,
rather than from the distance travelled, all gave endless trouble
and anxiety, and entirely upset all calculations as to distances to
be traversed. The transport duties of No. 1 Column were admirably
carried out by Captain Pelly Clarke and Assistant-Commissary Kevill
Davis.[167]

The force advanced from the Tugela in two columns—the first crossed
the Inyoni and encamped—weather very wet and trying. The second
column started on the following day (19th) and joined its leader
at Umsundusi. At this camp the troops remained during the 20th. The
reconnoitring parties had reported the Amatikulu impassable, and
Colonel Pearson pushed forward engineers (native pioneers), with a
strong working-party and guard, to render the drift practicable,
which, after a day’s hard work, was done. On the 21st the column
again advanced, and, crossing the Amatikulu, encamped in the
evening at Kwasamabela, four miles from Inyezane; during the day a
reconnoitring party burnt a military kraal near Ngingindhlovu. Up to
this time only a few of the enemy’s scouts had been seen, and nothing
had occurred beyond an occasional nocturnal alarm.

On the 22nd the column marched at 5 A.M., crossed the Inyezane River,
and halted for breakfast, and to outspan the oxen for a couple of
hours, in a fairly open spot, though the country round was a good
deal covered with bush. The halt here was unavoidable, as there
was no water for some distance beyond, but the country had been
previously carefully scouted by the mounted troops under Major Barrow.

At eight o’clock piquets were being placed, and the waggons parked,
when a company of the Native Contingent—who were scouting in front,
under the direction of Captain Hart, staff-officer attached to the
regiment—discovered the enemy advancing rapidly over the ridges, and
making for the adjacent clumps of bush. The Zulus now opened a heavy
fire upon this company, and almost immediately inflicted a loss upon
it of 1 officer, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 3 men killed.

The Naval Brigade (with rockets), under Captain Campbell, the guns
of the Royal Artillery, two companies of “The Buffs,” and the Native
Pioneers were at once posted on a knoll close by the road, from
whence the whole of the Zulu advance was commanded. From this knoll
the bush near was well searched with shell, rockets, and musketry.

The waggons continuing to close up and park, two companies of
“The Buffs,” who moved up with them, were ordered to clear
the enemy out of the bush, guided by Captain Macgregor,
Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General. This they did in excellent
style, driving the Zulus into the open, which again exposed them to a
heavy fire from the knoll.

The engineers and mounted troops were now enabled to move up from
the drift, and, supported by a half company of “Buffs” and a half
company of the 99th, sent on by Lieut.-Colonel Welman (99th) from the
rear of the column, cleared the Zulus out of the bush on the right
flank, where they were seriously threatening the convoy. The Gatling
gun also moved up from the rear, and came into action on the knoll.
The enemy now endeavoured to outflank the left, and got possession
of a kraal about 400 yards from the knoll, which assisted their
turning movement. This kraal was carried by Captain Campbell with his
Naval Brigade, supported by a party of officers and non-commissioned
officers of the Native Contingent under Captain Hart, who were posted
on high ground on the left of the road. Lieut.-Colonel Parnell with a
company of “Buffs,” and Captain Campbell with the Naval Brigade, now
attacked some heights beyond the kraal, upon which a considerable
body of the enemy was still posted. This action was completely
successful, and the Zulus fled in all directions. About half-past
nine the last shot was fired, and the column was re-formed, and
resumed its march at noon.

The loss sustained in this action was 2 privates (“The Buffs”)
killed, 2 officers, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 4 natives
killed, and 1 officer and 15 men wounded. Colonels Pearson and
Parnell had their horses shot under them.

The enemy’s force was estimated at 4000—the Umxapu, Udhlambedhlu, and
Ingulubi Regiments, and some 650 men of the district—and their loss
upwards of 300 killed. The wounded appear to have been either carried
away or hidden.

Four miles beyond the scene of this engagement the column bivouacked
for the night; and, moving off at 5 A.M. next day, reached Etshowe at
10 A.M.; the rear guard not getting in till the afternoon.

Etshowe was a mission station, abandoned some months before, but
now selected for an entrenched post, in preference to more open and
commanding ground to the north, in consequence of the necessity
of utilising the buildings for the storage of supplies. The
station consisted of a dwelling-house, school, and workshop, with
store-rooms—three buildings of sun-dried brick, thatched; there
was also a small church, made of the same materials, but with a
corrugated iron roof; and a stream of good water ran close by the
station. Here the column encamped, and preparations for clearing the
ground and establishing a fortified post for a garrison of 400 men
were made.

Two companies of “Buffs,” two companies Native Contingent, and some
mounted men, were sent back to reinforce Lieut.-Colonel Ely, 99th
Regiment, who, with three companies of his regiment, was on the march
to Etshowe with a convoy of sixty waggons.

On the 25th, Major Coates was sent down to the Tugela with a strong
escort and forty-eight empty waggons, for a further supply of stores;
and next day a “runner” arrived with news that a disaster had
occurred on the 22nd. On the 28th a telegram was received from Lord
Chelmsford, hinting at disaster—that he had been compelled to retire
to the frontier—that former instructions were cancelled, and Colonel
Pearson was to hold Etshowe or withdraw to the Tugela, also that he
must be prepared to bear the brunt of an attack from the whole Zulu
army.

Colonel Pearson at once assembled his staff and commanding officers,
when it was finally decided to hold the post, sending back to the
Tugela the mounted troops and Native Contingent. These marched,
unencumbered with baggage, and reached the Tugela in ten hours—a
contrast with the upward march! The various buildings were loopholed,
and the church prepared for use as a hospital, all tents struck, and
the entrenchments supplemented by an inner line of waggons. In the
evening Colonel Ely’s convoy arrived safely.

The mounted men were sent back from Etshowe, because a large
proportion of the horse forage consisted of mealies, which it was
thought might be required for the use of the garrison, as eventually
was the case.

To replace the mounted men, a small vedette corps was formed under
Lieutenant Rowden, 99th Regiment, and Captain Sherrington, of the
Native Contingent, and did excellent service.

These vedettes were constantly under fire. One was killed at his
post. Another was attacked by some dozen Zulus, who crept upon him
through the long grass; he lost two fingers of his right hand, had
a bullet through each leg and one in his right arm; his horse was
assegaied; yet he managed to get back to the fort, retaining his
rifle.

The vedettes being much annoyed in the early morning by the fire
of some Zulus from a high hill, Captain Sherrington and six of the
men went out one night and lay in wait for them, behind some rocks
near the top of the hill, wounding three and putting an end to the
annoyance.

Colonel Pearson felt it to be necessary to reduce the bread and
grocery rations of the troops, but was enabled to increase the meat
ration by a quarter of a pound, as a large number of cattle had been
brought up with Colonel Ely’s convoy. The waggons of the troops
sent back to the Tugela were officially searched, and a quantity of
food, medicines, and medical comforts thus added to the stock, the
two latter subsequently proving of the utmost value. All articles of
luxury were eventually sold by auction, and fetched almost fabulous
prices: matches were sold for 4s. a box, bottles of pickles 15s.
each, and tobacco 30s. a pound!

The water supply was excellent, both in quality and quantity; and in
the lower part of the stream bathing-places for both officers and
men were constructed; and all sanitary arrangements most carefully
attended to.

A waggon-laager was formed for the cattle, and every effort made to
provide for the security of the fort, as we may now call it—deepening
ditches, strengthening parapets, erecting stockades—all most
energetically carried on under the direction of Captain Wynne, R.E.

So things went on, till, on February 9th, Zulus were observed to be
collecting; but nothing occurred beyond an occasional alarm.

On the 11th two “runners” arrived from the Lower Tugela with a
despatch[168] from the General, almost requiring Colonel Pearson to
retire with half his force to the Tugela, leaving the remainder to
garrison the fort. This, after a council of war, was decided not to
be practicable, the country being occupied by the Zulus in force. A
flying column, however, was organised, in case it became necessary to
carry out what the General seemed to desire.

Having questioned the messengers, and ascertained that they were
willing to return on the following Saturday, Colonel Pearson sent a
despatch, asking for further instructions, and saying he would be
prepared to start on Sunday night at twelve o’clock if necessary.

This message was twice repeated on different days, but no reply
received.

Alterations and improvements in the defences, to enable the fort
to be held by a smaller garrison, went steadily on in spite of bad
weather; ranges from 600 to 700 yards were marked round the fort, and
_trous-de-loups_ and wire entanglements formed on the north, south,
and east faces.

On March 1st an expedition was led out by Colonel Pearson to attack a
military kraal (Dabulamanzi’s) six miles distant; this was done and
the kraal burnt, a smart skirmish being kept up with the Zulus during
the homeward march.

On the 2nd it was noticed that heliograph signals were being flashed
from the Lower Tugela, but no message was made out.

Next day further signalling, though vague, was taken to mean
that a convoy was to be expected on the 13th instant with 1000
men, and that on its approach Colonel Pearson was to sally out
and meet it. A heliograph was improvised by Captain Macgregor,
Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, by means of a small
looking-glass, and efforts made to flash back signals, but bad
weather ensued, preventing further communication till the 10th.

A new road to Inyezane, shortening the distance by about three
miles, and avoiding much of the bush, was commenced, and reported
fit for use on the 13th, though the work had been hindered by very
bad weather, and by the working-parties being constantly under fire.
Fortunately no one was hit, except Lieutenant Lewis, of “The Buffs.”

On March 23rd two Zulus came up with a white flag, and were brought
in to the fort each with a mealie-bag over his head; they are said
to have come with a message from the king to the effect that if our
force would return to Natal he would order the officers commanding
his large armies not to touch it. These men were detained as
prisoners in irons, and interviewed by Lord Chelmsford on his arrival
at Etshowe; but of their subsequent disposal nothing appears known.

At first the health of the troops was extremely good, but before
the end of February the percentage of sick had largely increased,
there being 9 officers and upwards of 100 men on the sick-list when
it was relieved. The principal disorders were diarrhœa, dysentery,
and fevers, aggravated by the want of proper medicines and medical
comforts, which had been soon exhausted. The church was used as the
hospital, and both officers and men lived under the waggons, over
which the waggon-sails were spread, propped up with tent-poles; thus
the troops actually lived at their alarm-posts.

The relief took place none too soon, there being then but six days’
further supply of reduced rations available for the garrison.

“From first to last, the men showed an excellent spirit, the highest
discipline was maintained, and the reduction of the food was never
grumbled at or regarded in any other light than a necessity and
a privation to be borne, and which they were determined to bear
cheerfully.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 39).




CHAPTER XVIII.

NGINGINDHLOVU—RELIEF OF ETSHOWE—BORDER RAIDING.


Lord Chelmsford, having moved down to Durban, reports (February
8th) that No. 1 Column is secure at Etshowe; that he is about to
forward troops to the Lower Tugela; and that Durban, Stanger,
Pietermaritzburg, and Greytown are prepared for defence, “with
garrisons which should prevent panic among those living around;” the
frontier quiet, and the road from Greytown quite open.

The first reinforcement for Natal was brought by H.M.S. _Shah_, which
chanced to be at St. Helena (on her voyage home from the Pacific),
when the news of the disaster in Zululand arrived. Captain Bradshaw,
R.N., immediately decided to proceed to Natal with his ship; the
Governor, after consultation with the officer commanding the troops,
Colonel Philips, R.E., arranging to send in her all the available
force that could be spared from the island. Accordingly she sailed on
February 12th, with 3 officers and 52 men of the Royal Artillery, and
2 officers and 109 men of the 88th Regiment.

H.M.S. _Boadicea_ also arrived on the station, bringing Commodore
Richards, who relieved Rear-Admiral Sullivan, C.B.

Communications had been established with Etshowe by means of flashing
signals, which were conducted by Lieutenant Haynes, R.E., who, after
some failure and discouragement at first, persevered until complete
success was attained.

Previous to this there had been no communications with Colonel
Pearson for a considerable time, but on March 11th a cypher message
from him (dated 9th) said that the flashing signals had been
understood, and that as officers and men were generally sickly, it
would be desirable to relieve the whole of the garrison, and that any
relieving force should bring a convoy and be prepared to fight.—(P.
P. [C. 2316] p. 81).

On March 16th the signals from Etshowe were first made out, and
one of the messages received was: “Short rations until 3rd April.
Breadstuffs until 4th April. Plenty of trek oxen. Captain Williams,
‘The Buffs,’ died at Ekowe on 13th March” (_ibid._ p. 83).

Reinforcements arriving from England, Lord Chelmsford determined to
effect the relief of Etshowe, and assembled a strong force on the
Lower Tugela for that purpose. The column to be in two divisions: the
first, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Law, R.A., composed of the
Naval Brigade of _Shah_ and _Tenedos_, 57th Regiment, 2 companies
“Buffs,” 5 companies 99th Regiment, mounted infantry, volunteers,
and natives, and 5th Battalion Natal Native Contingent; artillery—2
9-pounders, 2 24-pounder rocket-tubes, and 1 Gatling gun; also 150
of John Dunn’s people as scouts. The second division—Lieut.-Colonel
Pemberton, 60th Rifles, commanding—Naval Brigade of H.M.S.
_Boadicea_, Royal Marines of _Shah_ and _Boadicea_, 60th Rifles, 91st
Highlanders, and 4th Battalion Natal Native Contingent; artillery, 2
24-pounder rocket-tubes and 1 Gatling gun; making a total fighting
strength of 3390 white troops and 2280 natives. The Lieut.-General
decided to take command of the column himself, and directed that it
should advance by the coast road, so as to avoid the bush country; to
advance without tents, and with only a blanket and waterproof-sheet
for each man. The convoy, taking one month’s provisions for the
garrison and ten days’ supplies for the column, consisted of about
100 waggons and 44 carts.—(P. P. [C. 2318] pp. 74, 75).

The assembling of this column and preparation for an advance
occupied some weeks, and on the 23rd March Lord Chelmsford assumed
the personal command, the force being assembled on the left bank of
the Tugela and organised in two brigades, as already detailed, by
the 28th. Next day, at 6 A.M., the column marched from the Tugela
and encamped at Inyone, reaching next day the Amatakulu River.
_Now_, profiting by bitter experience, every precaution was taken,
and an entrenched waggon-laager formed before nightfall at each
halting-place.

The crossing of the Amatakulu River took nine hours, and the column
encamped a mile and a half beyond it. Nothing had been seen of the
enemy until the 31st, when the scouts noticed small bodies of Zulus
near the Amatakulu bush. Captain Barrow, with a mounted force,
reconnoitred towards the Engoya Forest, and burnt the kraal of one of
the king’s brothers.

On April 1st, the column marched to Ngingindhlovu, and about a mile
from the Inyezane River a laager was formed in a favourable position.
From this point to Etshowe, the track, after crossing swampy ground,
winds through a bushy and difficult country for about fifteen miles,
the country covered with high grass, and thus affording easy cover.

Etshowe could be plainly seen from the laager, and flash signalling
was at once established.

As this laager was destined to be the scene of an important
engagement, we will describe the disposition of the troops: Front
face (north), 60th Rifles; right flank, 57th Regiment; left flank,
99th Regiment and “Buffs;” rear face, 91st Regiment; the angles
manned by blue-jackets and marines, and armed with the guns,
Gatlings, and rocket-tubes. The night passed without alarm, and
the troops stood to arms at 4 A.M., the mounted men being sent out
scouting as usual at earliest dawn. From scouts and piquets came
reports, at 5.45 A.M., that the enemy was advancing, and at six
the attack commenced on the north front. The Zulus advanced with
great rapidity and courage, taking advantage of every bit of cover;
they even pushed forward to within twenty or thirty yards of the
entrenchments, but were checked by the steady fire of the 60th and
the Gatling gun. Lieut.-Colonel Northey, 3-60th Rifles, received a
dangerous wound, but cheered on his men to the end of the engagement.

The attack, checked here, rolled round to the left face; and, whilst
this was being developed, a fresh force came up against the rear,
probably anticipating that all the faces of the laager could not be
defended at the same time. Here they obstinately held their ground,
finding cover in the long grass and undulations.

The mounted troops were now sent out, the mounted infantry and
volunteers to clear the front face, and Captain Barrow to attack
the enemy’s right flank. On their appearance the Zulus commenced
to retreat. It was now 7.30 A.M.; and the Natal Native Contingent,
clearing the ditch of the rear face, dashed out in pursuit, which,
led by Captain Barrow’s horsemen, was carried on for several miles.

The loss of the enemy in this engagement is estimated at 1000: 671
bodies were actually counted. The attacking force is said to have
numbered about 11,000 men.

Colonel Pearson, who had watched the fight through a glass,
telegraphed his congratulations to the General.

The loss of the column was 2 officers and 9 men killed (including
Lieut.-Colonel Northey, 60th Rifles), 5 officers and 57 men wounded.

On the 3rd April, leaving a garrison in the laager, Lord Chelmsford
pushed on to Etshowe with a convoy of fifty-eight carts with stores.
The advance was unopposed, but the difficulties of the country were
such that it was nearly midnight before the rear guard had traversed
the fifteen miles and entered Etshowe.

The garrison had suffered severely from sickness during the preceding
month, losing by disease 4 officers and 20 non-commissioned officers
and men; and when relieved there were sick in hospital, 8 officers
and 44 non-commissioned officers and men, and attending hospital,
1 officer and 78 non-commissioned officers and men—out of a total
force of 53 officers, 1289 non-commissioned officers and men, and 121
natives.

The constant wet weather and close quarters in the fort, with little
or no shelter, the want of medicines, and insufficient food, might
well have caused even heavier loss.

The General determined to evacuate Etshowe, as he found it so
difficult of approach: future operations being planned to be carried
on by the coast road. On the 4th Colonel Pearson evacuated the fort
he had so tenaciously held, taking with him his waggons and all his
stores that were of any use; unserviceable tools and metal-work were
buried, but the fort was not destroyed.

Colonel Pearson’s march to the Tugela was performed without any
interruption from the enemy.

On the 4th a kraal of Dabulamanzi’s on the Entumeni Hill was
destroyed by a patrol from Etshowe, and on the 5th the relieving
column left, and bivouacked near the Infuchini mission station. Early
next morning an unfortunate alarm occurred, causing the death of
three men. A sentry fired at what he thought was a body of the enemy,
and the piquet on the opposite side of the entrenchment retired into
shelter, together with native scouts who were out in front. Although
it was a bright moonlight night, and no mistakes should have been
made, fire was opened from the entrenchment, and five of the 60th
were wounded and nine natives bayoneted as they attempted to gain the
shelter of the laager.

On reaching Ngingindhlovu a new laager was formed, about a mile from
the old one; this was garrisoned on the 7th, the column moving on to
the Tugela.

The small mounted force under Captain Barrow, 19th Hussars, rendered
excellent service, both during the engagement at Ngingindhlovu, and
by the manner in which the scouting duties were carried out.

A party of Mr. John Dunn’s people (natives), 150 in number, were also
of the greatest utility in scouting and outpost duties. Mr. Dunn
himself accompanied the General; his knowledge of the country and
sound advice being of much use (_ibid._ p. 122).

John Dunn was an Englishman, resident in Zululand, where he had
lived for many years and adopted many Zulu customs. He amassed a
considerable property, and had an extensive following. He invariably
received the greatest kindness and consideration from the Zulu king,
and was frequently employed by him in various communications with the
English Government. When the danger of war between English and Zulus
appeared imminent, John Dunn appealed to the English for protection
for himself, his property, and people, who were ready, he said, to
fight on the English side. At the same time Cetshwayo sent him a
message to the effect that he saw the English were going to attack
him, and therefore Dunn had better leave his country, with his people
and cattle, and go to a place of safety. This John Dunn did, crossing
the Tugela about the 3rd of January, and settling near Fort Pearson.

At the time the General determined to move to the relief of Etshowe
he “sent secret instructions to the different commanders along the
border, from the Lower Tugela up to Kambula Hill, requesting them
to make strong demonstrations all along the line, and, if possible,
to raid into Zululand in order to make a diversion in favour of the
relieving column,” thinking he “might possibly have to meet the full
strength of the Zulu army.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 56).

On the 2nd of April a small force of Native Contingent crossed the
Tugela and burnt two large kraals, no resistance being made. On
the next day a force crossed again and burnt an unoccupied kraal,
exchanging a few shots with Zulus, of whom a considerable number
were seen at a distance. On the following day the natives refused
to cross, and the Border Agent, Mr. Fannin, remarks: “I think it
is fortunate it was not attempted, as the Zulus had assembled a
considerable body of men to resist.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 104).

The reserve native force had co-operated in these movements by being
assembled and placed in position along the Tugela, but the colonial
commander declined to proceed over the border, or send any of his
force into Zululand, without the sanction of the Lieut.-Governor.

The Government of Natal had placed at Lord Chelmsford’s disposal a
number of natives (over 8000) for service in the Zulu country. Some
of these were intended for fighting purposes, and formed what we
have already described as the Natal Native Contingent. The rest were
supplied for transport, pioneer, and hospital-corps services, and all
were expected to cross the border.

But besides these men, native levies were called out, when the war
began, for service _in the colony_—that is to say, for the defence
of the border under colonial district commanders. These levies were
to be used solely as a border-guard, and were not intended to cross
into Zululand at all. Sir Henry Bulwer, in permitting them to be
raised, had been careful to protect as far as possible the interests
of both the white and the native population of Natal, and had made
very proper stipulations as to the services for which he placed these
levies at the disposal of the General. The latter, indeed, expressed
it as his opinion that every available fighting native in the colony
should be called out; but Sir Henry, with a greater comprehension
of consequences, demurred to this rash proposal, and a personal
interview between the two resulted in the above-mentioned arrangement.

Consequently the Lieut.-Governor was not a little surprised to
learn on the 8th April that the native levies had been ordered, in
conjunction with the other troops, to make raids across the border
into Zululand. To this he objected, writing to the High Commissioner
on April 9th in the following terms: “I venture to suggest for your
Excellency’s consideration the question of the policy of raids of
this kind. The burning of empty kraals will neither inflict much
damage upon the Zulus, nor be attended with much advantage to
us; whilst acts of this nature are, so it seems to me, not only
calculated to invite retaliation, but to alienate from us the whole
of the Zulu nation, men, women, and children, including those who are
well disposed to us. We started on this war on the ground that it was
a war against the king and the Zulu Government, and not against the
nation....”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 103).

A correspondence ensued between the Lieut.-Governor and the
Lieut.-General, in which the two differed in a very decided
manner. Lord Chelmsford complained that the action taken by the
Lieut.-Governor, “in refusing to allow the orders issued by” him to
the native forces to be carried out, appeared to him “fraught with
such dangerous consequences” that he considered it necessary to refer
the question to the Home Government. (P. P. [C. 2318] p. 56.) He
implied that this interference had (in conjunction with the state of
the Tugela River) prevented a general raid being made, which might
have proved an important diversion in favour of the column relieving
Etshowe, and he declared, in behalf of the raiding system, that
“it would be madness to refrain from inflicting as much damage as
possible upon our enemy” (_ibid._ p. 56).

It was a well-known fact that the fighting-men of the Zulu nation
were with their army, and that the only occupants of the kraals
to be raided were the women, children, and the infirm and other
non-combatants; therefore the General’s following remark, “I am
satisfied that the more the Zulu nation at large feels the strain
brought upon them by the war, the more anxious will they be to see it
brought to an end,” was of a highly Christian, wise, and soldierly
nature, hardly to be matched by anything attributed to the Zulu
monarch himself.

Sir Henry Bulwer’s replies were temperate but decided. He pointed
out that the statement contained in Lord Chelmsford’s despatch
to the Secretary of State for War, implying that the Governor’s
interference had (or might have) seriously interfered with the relief
of Etshowe, was erroneous; Etshowe having been relieved on the 3rd
of April, five days before Sir Henry even heard of the order for
the Natal natives to make raids. To the General himself he observes
that his interference had been limited to approval of the action of
the district commander, who declined to employ his force in a manner
contrary to the express stipulations under which they were raised,
and concludes: “The views of this Government are very strongly
against the employment, under the present circumstances, of the
native levies or native population along the border in making raids
into the Zulu country, as being, in the opinion of the Government,
calculated to invite retaliation, and also as being demoralising to
the natives engaged in raiding” (_ibid._ p. 55).

The Lieut.-Governor’s views were that these native levies “were
called out expressly and solely for service in the colony, and
for the defence of the colony, and were placed under the colonial
district commanders for that purpose only,” and that no authority had
been given to employ these native levies “on any service in the Zulu
country” (_ibid._ p. 54).

And it seems that raids along the border had been ordered _after_ the
relief of Etshowe was effected.

Sir H. Bulwer writes, 16th April, that he had received, on the 7th,
a copy of a military telegram written after the relief of Etshowe,
showing that the General had “ordered raids to be made across the
border wherever feasible,” and, on the following day, a copy of a
memorandum, written from Etshowe by Colonel Crealock, the Assistant
Military Secretary, and addressed to the officer commanding at the
Lower Tugela, and, among other things, it contained the following
instruction: “Send word up to the frontier to raid across the river
wherever the river permits.” And the same evening he heard of the
native levies having been required to cross (_ibid._ p. 53).

The question of the employment of the native levies in making
raids across the border was referred by the Lieut.-Governor to the
Executive Council of Natal, which, on the 23rd April, expressed
itself as “strongly opposed to the employment, in making raids into
the Zulu country, of the native levies, who ... have been called
out for the _defence_ of the colony only.” But, in view of the
Lieut.-General’s strongly-expressed opinions, the Council felt there
was no alternative but that the General “should have the power of
so employing the native levies on the border. At the same time, the
Council desires ... to record emphatically its objections to the
course proposed, and to such employment of the levies.”—(P. P. [C.
2367] p. 132).

This decision of the Executive Council was communicated to the
General on April 25th by the Lieut.-Governor, with the remark:
“Your Excellency will therefore have the power to employ the native
levies across the border in the way named by you, should you think
it imperatively necessary for military reasons. Your Excellency will
not fail to perceive, however, that such employment of the native
levies is against the decided opinion of this colony as to its
inexpediency” (_ibid._ p. 133).

On the 20th May raids were again made into Zululand from three
different points, under Major Twentyman’s command. One party crossed
at the Elibomvu Drift, and burnt fifteen kraals and large quantities
of grain; another burnt three kraals and captured a large herd of
cattle; and the third burnt two kraals, and then, seeing the Zulus
assembling in force, beat a hurried retreat across the Tugela.—(P. P.
[C. 2374] p. 91).

Sir Henry Bulwer, on the 24th May, writes to the High Commissioner:
“Major-General the Hon. H. H. Clifford, commanding the base of
operations ... was wholly unaware that any such raid was being
organised by Major Twentyman, who, I believe, acted under general
instructions received from head-quarters.... The views of the
Government of Natal on the subject of these raids, your Excellency is
already acquainted with. The material advantage to be gained by the
work of destruction or of plunder of Zulu property can be at the best
but trifling and insignificant, and on every other account I fear
our action will prove positively injurious to us, to our interests,
and to our cause. We are absolutely provoking retaliation. Already,
I am informed, since the raid reported in these papers took place,
some native huts on the Natal side of the Tugela have been burned by
Zulus; and to what extent this work of revenge and retaliation may be
carried, with what losses of property, and even of life, inflicted
on our border natives, it is impossible to say.... What result we
have gained to justify even the risk of such retaliation against us,
and of such a sacrifice to our own native population, I know not”
(_ibid._ pp. 89, 90).

The fears of the Lieutenant-Governor were in some measure realised
on the 25th June, when he writes: “A raid was made by two bodies
of Zulus, numbering, it is estimated, about 1000, into the Tugela
Valley, below the Krans Kop in this colony. The Zulus destroyed
several kraals, and carried off a number of cattle. I regret to say
also that several of our Natal natives, including women, were killed,
and some women and children carried off.”

“There can be little doubt that this raid has been made in
retaliation for the one that was made into the Zulu country opposite
the Krans Kop by a force under Major Twentyman, of Her Majesty’s
4th Regiment, on the 20th May, and which was reported to you in my
despatch of the 31st of that month.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 150).

Thus the opinions expressed in Sir H. Bulwer’s despatch of 24th May
were to some extent justified, with the probability of a blood-feud
being set up between the two border populations, and widening the
breach between ourselves and the Zulu people; and with it the
increased difficulty of obtaining a satisfactory settlement for the
future.




CHAPTER XIX.

REINFORCEMENTS—ISANDHLWANA REVISITED.


During the latter part of March and April reinforcements
kept steadily pouring into Natal, and with them four general
officers—Major-General the Hon. H. H. Clifford, V.C., C.B., who
was stationed at Pietermaritzburg, to command at the base of
operations; Major-General Crealock, C.B., to command No. 1 Division,
concentrating on the Lower Tugela; Major-General Newdigate, to
command No. 2 Division, head-quarters Dundee; and Major-General
Marshall, to command the Cavalry Brigade attached to No. 2 Division;
Brigadier-General Wood, V.C., C.B., retaining his previous command—to
be styled the Flying Column.

By the middle of March the available force consisted of an effective
strength of non-commissioned officers and men—Imperial troops,
7520; volunteer cavalry, etc., 1367; Europeans, attached to native
contingents, 495; making a total of 9382 Europeans, with 5769
natives.—(P. P. [C. 2316] p. 85).

No operations of any consequence took place beyond concentrating
troops and forwarding supplies. On the 20th April, Lord Chelmsford
reported that Major-General Crealock had taken up his command
and, if transport arrangements permitted, would shortly commence
operations. Major-General Newdigate was on his way to his command.

The reinforcements alone considerably exceeded the strength of the
force with which the war was so rashly undertaken. They consisted of
the 1st Dragoon Guards, 17th Lancers; 21st, 57th, 58th, 60th, 88th
(one company), 91st, 94th Foot; two batteries Royal Artillery, and
detachments from St. Helena and Mauritius; one company and half C
troop Royal Engineers; drafts for various regiments; detachments of
Army Service and Army Hospital Corps; etc. etc.;—a total (including
the staff embarked in February from England) of 387 officers and 8901
men.

But even after the arrival of this enormous accession of strength,
further reinforcements of three battalions were demanded “for reserve
and garrison purposes.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 162).

At the end of April the effective force was:

  First Division, Major-General Crealock:
    Imperial and irregular troops               6508
    Native Contingent (151 mounted)             2707

  Second Division, Major-General Newdigate:
    Imperial and irregular troops               6867
    Natives (243 mounted)                       3371

  Flying Column, Brigadier-General Wood:
    Imperial and irregular troops               2285
    Natives (75 mounted)                         807

  Making a total strength of 22,545 men available for the conquest
  of Zululand.

On the 14th May, Lord Chelmsford reported: “The troops are in
position, and are only waiting for sufficient supplies and transport
to advance.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 97).

The transport difficulties naturally increased with the increasing
force. The colony did not eagerly press forward to the rescue, and
although transport for service in the colony could be obtained, that
for trans-frontier work was not procurable in any quantity on any
terms.

The colonial view somewhat appeared to be, “No government has
power, either legally or morally, to force any man to perform acts
detrimental to his own interest.” No doubt the colony felt itself
more secure whilst the troops remained within its borders, and
naturally was not anxious to assist in their departure; and it may
have thought the war “was an Imperial concern, brought about by an
Imperial functionary;” and therefore the Empire should be left “to
worry out the affair for itself;” as remarked by a colonial paper at
the time.

On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the necessities
of the troops, during this campaign, taxed the resources of the
colonists to the utmost. If some profited in a mercantile point of
view, and were unpatriotic enough to try to make every penny they
could out of the army intended for their protection, there were
others who acted in a very different spirit. The sacrifice and loss
of both life and property through the Zulu war has been as great, in
proportion, to Natal as to the mother country; and if the former was
weak and wicked—or perhaps only _thoughtless_—enough to wish for war,
she has now received a lesson which will prevent her ever making
so great a mistake again. While upon the one side we hear stories
of transport riders and others who lost no opportunity of fleecing
at every turn both Government and military in their necessity, on
the other hand we have equally well-authenticated accounts of strict
honesty, and even generosity, on the part of other Natalians. One
story is told of a transport rider who had earned the sum of £1500,
which was to be paid by instalments of £500 each: after he had
received two of these the officer who paid him was removed, and his
successor, unaware of previous payments, handed over to the transport
rider’s messenger the whole £1500. The honest fellow at once returned
the £1000 overpaid.

It is also a well-known fact that many of the principal tradesmen
permitted their shopmen to join the volunteer corps to which they
belonged, still continuing to pay them their respective salaries
during their absence.

The colony was not revelling in a shower of gold, as some at home
imagine: a few individuals, doubtless, thought to “make hay while the
sun shines,” but to the population at large the war was certainly not
advantageous. For some months fresh provisions were almost at famine
prices, or even unattainable by private persons.

Many farmers were with the army, either as volunteers or with the
transport train; others again had sold their waggons and oxen, and
thus had no means of bringing in their produce. The market supply
was consequently very small, and generally at once bought up for the
garrisons.

Transport difficulties, we have said, increased with the increasing
force. The 9000 Imperial troops sent as reinforcements had to be fed,
and their food conveyed to where they were stationed. Three or four
thousand horses and mules also had to be fed in a country from which
grass was disappearing, and in which supplies of forage were small.
The larger part of the troops and horses were sent up-country—some
two hundred miles from the coast—where winter grass-fires might be
expected, and nature’s stores were certain soon to be exhausted; and
thus arose the terrible strain in the transport resources of the
country.

But much more was required than was necessary. In place of the
ponderous train accompanying each column—a fruitful source of
difficulty and danger on the march by day, if a protection when
halted at night—the advance should have been made from entrenched
depôts in the lightest possible order. A rapid advance on the king’s
kraal in compact formation, and, wherever the enemy might stand, a
decisive battle fought—the result of which, with the most ordinary
care, could not be doubtful—and the war would be virtually over.
There need have been no weary inactivity, with its following of
disease and death, and the saving to the country would have been
enormous.

Supplies were pushed forward from the Lower Tugela to the Inyezane,
where a fort was constructed (Fort Chelmsford); and from the base up
to Conference Hill—the supplies required by Lord Chelmsford before an
advance could be made being two months’ with the forces advancing,
and one month’s at the advanced depôts.[169]

But little further was done through this period of indecision and
vacillation, in which plans were made only to be changed, and orders
given one day to be countermanded the next. Sickness laid its heavy
hand on many a man—exposure and inaction in the first place, then
want of proper care and nursing, gradually swelling the death-roll.
Before the war, and throughout its course, a body of ladies of Natal
were most anxious to place themselves under the orders of the medical
staff as nurses for the sick and wounded; but their offers, though
repeatedly pressed upon the authorities, were declined.

It was at this period that the following message was telegraphed by
Lord Chelmsford to the High Commissioner:

“May 16th, 1879.—General Crealock telegraphs: Messengers from king
are at his advanced post. King sues for peace. John Dunn sent to
see them. Message as follows: ‘White man has made me king, and I
am their son. Do they kill the man in the afternoon whom they have
made king in the morning? What have I done? I want peace; I ask for
peace.’ King asks for a black man or white man to return with his
messengers to say message delivered rightly. Undwana, one of the
messengers, states that he has sent to Dabulamunzi to order him to
go to the king. Message had been delivered to him by Undwana, and
he ought to have reached king yesterday. All principal chiefs have
been sent for to the king. He says army is dispersed. Chiefs have
been urging peace on king. General C. has only informed Clifford
and Lieutenant-Governor of the above. I have telegraphed back to
Crealock: ‘Tell messengers I informed king’s messenger at Etshowe
that any message must be sent to me at Colonel Wood’s camp. I am
ready to receive any messenger under flag of truce. Tell them
something more than words will be required. Supply them with flag
of truce; relax no preparations or precautions.’” End of quotation.
“I shall be glad to receive your Excellency’s early instructions. I
consider the king should not be allowed to remain on the throne, and
that the terms of peace should be signed at Ulundi in presence of
British force. I shall not make any change in my arrangements in the
meantime.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] pp. 100, 101).

To Major-General Marshall belongs the credit of performing the
long-neglected duty of revisiting the fatal battle-field of
Isandhlwana, and burying as many as possible of those that fell
there. With General Newdigate’s permission, the Cavalry Brigade
under General Marshall made a reconnaissance of the Bashi Valley and
Isandhlwana, having moved down to Rorke’s Drift for that purpose.

The left column of the brigade proceeded up the Bashi Valley,
and moving round the Ingqutu range, joined the right column at
Isandhlwana.

The reconnaissance was proposed to include burying the dead, bringing
away the waggons, etc.; but an order was received prohibiting
touching the 24th, who were to be interred by their own comrades.

The battle-field was a fearful sight—though softened much by the
kindly hand of nature. There plainly lay revealed the widely-spread
camp (or rather line of camps), the hopeless position in which it was
placed; the absolute impossibility, circumstanced as it was, of any
result but the sad one we have already chronicled. And there, too,
were the evidences of a gallant resistance, and a stand made by men
“faithful unto death.”

It was well said: “The field of Isandhlwana is beginning to give up
its secrets; the mists of fiction are being dispersed by the dry
light of fact. It has not been through mere idle curiosity that
there has been a desire to know what passed during the final moments
of that fatal struggle. There were difficulties to be explained,
reputations to be cleared, allegations to be contradicted. There was
the desire to know how those who were lost had died. To be sure that
they died with their faces to the foe; to be satisfied that their
death was not attended with any excess of cruelty or suffering. And
there can be little doubt that it is the very anxiety to be assured
of all this that stands responsible for the numerous fictions—as we
must now hold them to be—which have been circulated with regard to
what passed on that memorable day.”—_Natal Witness_, 29th May, 1879.

A short description of the spot, taken from that written by Mr.
Archibald Forbes, may be of interest: At the top of the ascent beyond
the Bashi we saw, on our left front, rising above the surrounding
country, the steep, isolated, and almost inaccessible hill, or rather
crag, of Isandhlwana; the contour of its rugged crest strangely
resembling a side view of a couchant lion. On the lower neck of
the high ground on its right were clearly visible up against the
sky-line the abandoned waggons of the destroyed column. Now we
crossed the rocky bed of the little stream and were cantering up the
slope leading to the crest on which were the waggons, and already
tokens of the combat and bootless flight were apparent. The line of
retreat towards Fugitives’ Drift, along which, through a gap in the
Zulu environment, our unfortunate comrades who thus far survived
tried to escape, lay athwart a rocky slope to our right front, with
a precipitous ravine at its base. In this ravine dead men lay thick.
All the way up the slope could be traced the fitful line of flight.
Most of the dead here were 24th men; single bodies and groups where
they seemed to have gathered to make a hopeless gallant stand and
die. On the edge of a gully was a gun-limber jammed, its horses
hanging in their harness down the steep face of the ravine; a little
farther on a broken ambulance-waggon, with its team of mules dead
in their harness, and around were the bodies of the poor fellows
who had been dragged from the intercepted vehicle. Following the
trail of bodies through long grass and scattered stores, the crest
was reached. Here the dead lay thick, many in the uniform of the
Natal Mounted Police. On the bare ground on the crest itself, among
the waggons, the dead were less thick; but on the slope beyond, on
which from the crest we looked down, the scene was the saddest and
more full of weird desolation than any I had yet gazed upon. There
was none of the horror of a recent battle-field; nothing of all that
makes the scene of yesterday’s battle so rampantly ghastly shocked
the senses. A strange dead calm reigned in this solitude; grain had
grown luxuriantly round the waggons, sprouting from the seed that
dropped from the loads, falling on soil fertilised by the life-blood
of gallant men. So long in most places had grown the grass that it
mercifully shrouded the dead, whom four long months to-morrow we
have left unburied. In a patch of long grass, near the right flank
of the camp, lay Colonel Durnford’s body, a central figure of a knot
of brave men who had fought it out around their chief to the bitter
end. A stalwart Zulu, covered by his shield, lay at the Colonel’s
feet. Around him lay fourteen Natal Carbineers and their officer,
Lieutenant Scott, with a few Mounted Police[170] (twenty). Clearly
they had rallied round Colonel Durnford in a last despairing attempt
to cover the flank of the camp, and had stood fast from choice, when
they might have essayed to fly for their horses, who were close by
their side at the piquet-line. With this group were about thirty
gallant fellows of the 24th. In other places the 24th men were found
as if fallen in rallying square, and there were bodies scattered all
along the front of the camp.

The fallen were roughly buried, except those of the men of the 24th
Regiment. These were ordered to be left untouched. General Marshall
had nourished a natural and seemly wish to give interment to all
the dead who so long had lain at Isandhlwana, but it appeared that
the 24th desired to perform the ceremony themselves in presence
of both battalions. One has much sympathy with the regiment, but
General Marshall offered to convey a burial-party with tools from
Rorke’s Drift in waggons, and it seemed scarcely right to postpone
longer than absolutely necessary what respect for our honoured dead
required. Thus, the Zulus, who have carefully buried their own dead,
will return to find we visited the place, not to bury our dead, but
to remove a batch of waggons!

In the desolate camp were many sad relics, and the ground was strewn
with them and the spoil of the plundered waggons. Scarcely any
arms were found, and no ammunition—a few stray rusted bayonets and
assegais only were to be seen.

Teams of horses were hitched on to the soundest of the waggons, till
forty fit to travel were collected on the crest, and sent under
escort to Rorke’s Drift, and meantime scouting-parties had fired the
kraals around, but found no Zulus.

“I shall offer few comments on the Isandhlwana position. Had the
world been searched for a position offering the easiest facilities
for being surprised, none could have been well found to surpass it.
The position seems to offer a premium on disaster, and asks to be
attacked. In the rear laagered waggons would have discounted its
defects; but the camp was more defenceless than an English village.
Systematic scouting could alone have justified such a position, and
this too clearly cannot have been carried out.”—_Daily News_, 20th
June, 1879.

On the 20th, 23rd, and 26th June the burial of the remainder of those
who fell at Isandhlwana was completed by a force under the command
of Lieut.-Colonel Black, 24th Regiment. He carefully noted the signs
of the fight, and reported that the bodies of the slain lay thickest
in the 1-24th camp, in which 130 dead lay (in two distinct spots),
with their officers, Captain Wardell, Lieutenant Dyer, and a captain
and a subaltern not recognisable; close to the place where the bodies
of Colonel Durnford, Lieutenant Scott, and other Carbineers, and men
of the Natal Mounted Police were found. This is described as being a
“centre of resistance,” as the bodies of men of all arms were found
converging as it were to the spot. About sixty bodies, with those of
Captain Younghusband and two other officers, lay in a group under the
southern precipice of Isandhlwana, as if they had held the crags and
fought till ammunition failed. The proofs of hand-to-hand fighting
were frequent. The fugitives’ track, too, told its tale: “Here and
there around a waggon, here and there around a tree, a group had
formed and stood at bay; shoulder to shoulder they fired their last
cartridge, and shoulder to shoulder they plied the steel; side by
side their bones are lying and tell the tale.”

Eight hundred yards from the road the guns had come upon ground no
wheels could pass, and from here the bodies were more and more apart
till, about two miles from camp, the last one lies and marks the
limit reached by white men on foot.

The fatal trail again began near the river’s bank, where Major Smith,
R.A., and others rest, a river’s breadth from Natal; across the river
it runs until the graves of Melville and Coghill nearly mark its end.

_The Standard and Mail_ of September 16th says: “It is a noticeable
fact that Cetywayo declares that his men were completely disheartened
by Isandula, and that as a matter of fact he was never able to get
them thoroughly together again after that event. He says that a large
part of the forces engaged on that occasion were actually retreating
when another part made the fatal rush.... Of course these statements
are of interest as showing what Cetywayo said, but they must be
accepted with reservation, as he has throughout taken up the theory
that he and his men had no intention of inflicting so much injury
upon us as they did.”

Bishop Schreuder, on the 3rd March, says: “The Zulus’ version of the
Isan’lwana story tells us some most remarkable things with respect
to the battle and the effect of it on the Zulus. The Zulus, after
having ransacked the camp, bolted off with the booty as fast as they
could when the English army was seen returning to the camp, even at a
great distance. The detachment of the Zulu army seen by Glyn’s column
on its way, the 23rd January, back to Rorke’s Drift, was a part of
the Undi corps and Utako (Udhloko) retreating from the unsuccessful
attack on the Commissariat stores at Rorke’s Drift. Among the
horsemen was Udabulamanzi, who says that they were so tired, and glad
that Glyn’s column did not attack them, for if attacked they would
have bolted every one. Comparatively few and inferior oxen were
brought to the king, as the izinduna appropriated to themselves the
best and most of the captured oxen; Udabulamanzi, for instance, took
home twenty good oxen. The Zulus say that the affair at Isan’lwana
commenced with a victory and ended with a flight, for, as it is the
case after a defeat, the whole army did not return to the king, but
the soldiers dispersed, making the best of their way with what booty
they had got to their respective homes, and to this day they have not
reassembled to the king, who is very much displeased with his two
generals, Umnkingwayo (Tsingwayo) and Umavumengwane (Mavumengwana),
and other izinduna.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 37).

Some of the Zulu and native accounts of Isandhlwana are worth
noticing. One says the engagement “lasted till late in the
afternoon.” (P. P. [C. 2374] p. 24.) Another speaks of the fighting
when the 24th retired on the tents, and of their ammunition failing.
Another (Nugwende, a brother of Cetshwayo) says that the main, or
front and the left flank attack of the Zulu army were beaten and fell
back with great loss until the fire of the white troops slackened.
The right flank entering the camp, the main body was ordered to renew
the attack, which the English were unable to prevent from want of
ammunition.

The following “Statement of a Zulu Deserter regarding the Isan’lwana
Battle” was taken by Mr. Drummond, head-quarter staff:

  The Zulu army, consisting of the Ulundi corps, about 3000 strong;
  the Nokenke Regiment, 2000 strong; the Ngobamakosi Regiment,
  including the Uve, about 5000 strong; the Umcityu, about 4000
  strong; the Nodwengu, 2000 strong; the Umbonambi, 3000 strong;
  and the Udhloko, about 1000 strong, or a total of about 20,000
  men in all, left the military kraal of Nodwengu on the afternoon
  of the 17th of January. It was first addressed by the King, who
  said:

  “I am sending you out against the whites, who have invaded
  Zululand and driven away our cattle. You are to go against the
  column at Rorke’s Drift, and drive it back into Natal; and, if
  the state of the river will allow, follow it up through Natal,
  right up to the Draakensburg. You will attack by daylight, as
  there are enough of you to ‘eat it up,’ and you will march
  slowly, so as not to tire yourselves.”

  We accordingly left Nodwengu late in the afternoon, and marched
  in column to the west bank of the White Umfolosi, about six miles
  distant, where we bivouacked for the night. Next day we marched
  to the Isipezi military kraal, about nine miles off, where we
  slept; and on the 19th we ascended to the tableland near the
  Isihlungu hills, a march of about equal duration with that of
  the day previous. On this day the army, which had hitherto been
  marching in single column, divided into two, marching parallel to
  and within sight of each other, that on the left consisting of
  the Nokenke, Umcityu, and Nodwengu Regiments, under the command
  of Tyingwayo, the other commanded by Mavumingwana. There were a
  few mounted men belonging to the chief Usirayo, who were made
  use of as scouts. On the 20th we moved across the open country
  and slept by the Isipezi hill. We saw a body of mounted white
  men on this day to our left (a strong reconnaissance was made on
  the 20th, to the west of the Isipezi hill, which was probably
  the force here indicated). On the 21st, keeping away to the
  eastward, we occupied a valley running north and south under the
  spurs of the Ngutu hill, which concealed the Isandlana hill,
  distant from us about four miles, and nearly due west of our
  encampment. We had been well fed during our whole march, our
  scouts driving in cattle and goats, and on that evening we lit
  our camp-fires as usual. Our scouts also reported to us that
  they had seen the vedettes of the English force at sunset on
  some hills west-south-west of us (Lord Chelmsford with some of
  his staff rode up in this direction, and about this time, and
  saw some of the mounted enemy). Our order of encampment on the
  21st of January was as follows: On the extreme right were the
  Nodwengu, Nokenke, and Umcityu; the centre was formed by the
  Ngobamakosi and Mbonambi; and the left, of the Undi Corps and
  the Udhloko Regiment. On the morning of the 22nd of January
  there was no intention whatever of making any attack, on account
  of a superstition regarding the state of the moon, and we were
  sitting resting, when firing was heard on our right (the narrator
  was in the Nokenke Regiment), which we at first imagined was
  the Ngobamakosi engaged, and we armed and ran forward in the
  direction of the sound. We were, however, soon told it was the
  white troops fighting with Matyana’s people some ten miles away
  to our left front, and returned to our original position. Just
  after we had sat down again, a small herd of cattle came past our
  line from our right, being driven down by some of our scouts,
  and just when they were opposite to the Umcityu Regiment, a body
  of mounted men, on the hill to the west, were seen galloping,
  evidently trying to cut them off. When several hundred yards off,
  they perceived the Umcityu, and, dismounting, fired one volley at
  them and then retired. The Umcityu at once jumped up and charged,
  an example which was taken up by the Nokenke and Nodwengu on
  their right, and the Ngobamakosi and Mbonambi on the left, while
  the Undi Corps and the Udhloko formed a circle (as is customary
  in Zulu warfare when a force is about to be engaged) and remained
  where they were. With the latter were the two commanding
  officers, Mavumingwana and Tyingwayo, and several of the king’s
  brothers, who with these two corps bore away to the north-west,
  after a short pause, and keeping on the northern side of the
  Isandlana, performed a turning movement on the right without any
  opposition from the whites, who, from the nature of the ground,
  could not see them. Thus the original Zulu left became their
  extreme right, while their right became their centre, and the
  centre the left. The two regiments which formed the latter, the
  Ngobamakosi and Mbonambi, made a turning along the front of the
  camp towards the English right, but became engaged long before
  they could accomplish it; and the Uve Regiment, a battalion of
  the Ngobamakosi, was repulsed and had to retire until reinforced
  by the other battalion, while the Mbonambi suffered very severely
  from the artillery fire. Meanwhile, the centre, consisting of the
  Umcityu on the left centre, and the Nokenke and Nodwengu higher
  up on the right, under the hill, were making a direct attack on
  the left of the camp. The Umcityu suffered very severely, both
  from artillery and musketry fire; the Nokenke from musketry fire
  alone; while the Nodwengu lost least. When we at last carried
  the camp, our regiments became mixed up; a portion pursued the
  fugitives down to the Buffalo River, and the remainder plundered
  the camp; while the Undi and Udhloko Regiments made the best
  of their way to Rorke’s Drift to plunder the post there—in
  which they failed, and lost very heavily, after fighting all
  the afternoon and night. We stripped the dead of all their
  clothes. To my knowledge no one was made prisoner, and I saw
  no dead body carried away or mutilated. If the doctors carried
  away any dead bodies for the purpose of afterwards doctoring the
  army, it was done without my knowing of it; nor did I see any
  prisoner taken and afterwards killed. I was, however, one of the
  men who followed the refugees down to the Buffalo River, and
  only returned to the English camp late in the afternoon. (This
  portion of the prisoner’s statement was made very reluctantly.)
  The portion of the army which had remained to plunder the camp
  did so thoroughly, carrying off the maize, breadstuffs (_sic_),
  and stores of all kinds, and drinking such spirits as were in
  camp. Many were drunk, and all laden with their booty; and
  towards sunset the whole force moved back to the encampment of
  the previous night, hastened by having seen another English
  force approaching from the south. Next morning the greater part
  of the men dispersed to their homes with their plunder, a few
  accompanying the principal officers to the king, and they have
  not reassembled since.—_The Times_, March 22nd, 1879.

Another account, taken by the interpreter of one of the column
commanding officers (a version of which has appeared in the columns
of _The Army and Navy Gazette_, of 11th October 1879, and is
described as a “full and accurate account”), is selected as being
corroborated in all main points by survivors of the British force,
and by the battle-field itself. It is the story of Uguku, a Zulu
belonging to the Kandampenvu (or Umcityu) Regiment, who says: “We
arrived at Ingqutu eight regiments strong (20,000 to 25,000 men) and
slept in the valley of a small stream which runs into the Nondweni
river to the eastward of Sandhlwana. The regiments were Kandampenvu
(or Umcityu), Ngobamakosi, Uve, Nokenke, Umbonambi, Udhloko, Nodwengu
(name of military kraal of the Inkulutyane Regiment), and Undi (which
comprises the Tulwana, Ndhlondhlo, and Indhluyengwe): The army was
under the joint command of Mavumengwana, Tsingwayo, and Sihayo. It
was intended that Matshana ka Mondisa was to be in chief command, but
he having been a Natal Kafir, the other three were jealous of him,
and did not like him to be put over them; they therefore devised a
plan of getting him out of the way on the day of the battle. They
accomplished this plan by getting him to go forward with Undwandwe
to the Upindo to reconnoitre, and promised to follow. As soon as
he had gone they took another road, viz. north of Babanango, while
Matshana and Undwandwe went south of it, being accompanied by six
mavigo (companies). It was our intention to have rested for a day in
the valley where we arrived the night before the battle, but having
on the morning of the battle heard firing of the English advance
guard who had engaged Matshana’s men, and it being reported that the
Ngobamakosi were engaged, we went up from the valley to the top of
Ingqutu, which was between us and the camp; we then found that the
Ngobamakosi were not engaged, but were quietly encamped lower down
the valley. We saw a body of horse coming up the hill towards us from
the Sandhlwana side. We opened fire on them, and then the whole of
our army rose and came up the hill. The enemy returned our fire, but
retired down the hill, leaving one dead man (a black) and a horse
on the field. The Uve and Ngobamakosi then became engaged on our
left with the enemy’s skirmishers, and soon afterwards we were all
engaged with the skirmishers of the enemy. We were not checked by
them” (_i.e._ stopped), “but continued our march on the camp until
the artillery opened upon us. The first shell took effect in the
ranks of my regiment, just above the kraal of Baza. The Nokenke then
ran out in the shape of a horn towards the kraal of Nyenzani on the
road between Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift (the continuation of the
road, to the eastward of the camp). The engagement now became very
hot between the Mangwane (mounted natives) and us, the Mangwane being
supported by the infantry, who were some distance in their rear. We
were now falling very fast. The Mangwane had put their horses in a
donga, and were firing away at us on foot. We shouted ‘Izulu!’ (‘The
heavens!’)[171] and made for the donga, driving out the Mangwane
towards the camp. The infantry then opened fire on us, and their fire
was so hot, that those of us who were not in the donga retired back
over the hill. It was then that the Nokenke and Nodwengu regiments
ran out towards Nyenzani’s kraal. We then shouted ‘Izulu!’ again,
and got up out of the dongas. The soldiers opened fire on us again,
and we laid down. We then got up again, and the whole of my regiment
charged the infantry, who formed into two separate parties—one party
standing four deep with their backs towards Sandhlwana, the other
standing about fifty yards from the camp in like formation. We were
checked by the fire of the soldiers standing near Sandhlwana, but
charged on towards those standing in front of the camp, in spite of
a very heavy fire on our right flank from those by Sandhlwana. As
we got nearer we saw the soldiers were beginning to fall from the
effects of our fire. On our left we were supported by the Umbonambi,
half the Undi, Ngobamakosi, and Uve. Behind us were the other half
of the Undi and Udhloko, who never came into action at Sandhlwana,
but formed the reserve (which passed on and attacked Rorke’s Drift).
As we rushed on the soldiers retired on the camp, fighting all the
way, and as they got into the camp we were intermingled with them. It
was a disputed point as to which of the following regiments was the
first in the English camp, viz.: Undi, Kandampenvu, Ngobamakosi, and
Umbonambi; but it was eventually decided that the Umbonambi was the
first, followed by Undi.

“One party of soldiers came out from among the tents and formed
up a little above the ammunition-waggons. They held their ground
there until their ammunition failed them, when they were nearly all
assegaied. Those that were not killed at this place formed again
in a solid square in the neck of Sandhlwana. They were completely
surrounded on all sides, and stood back to back, and surrounding
some men who were in the centre. Their ammunition was now done,
except that they had some revolvers which they fired at us at close
quarters. We were quite unable to break their square until we had
killed a great many of them, by throwing our assegais at short
distances. We eventually overcame them in this way.”[172]

When all we have narrated was known in Natal, the question was asked
in the public prints: “Who, in the light of these recently-discovered
facts, were the real heroes of that day? Surely the two officers who
commanded in that narrow pass at the rear of the camp.... Surely,
too, no smaller heroism was that of the fourteen carbineers ... who,
mere boys as they were, gave their lives away in order to afford
their comrades-in-arms a chance of retreat.... Any one of these men
might have had a chance for his life, had he chosen to follow the
example set by so many. They remained, however, and they died, and
only after four months of doubt, contradiction, and despatch-writing,
is it made known to the world who they were who have most deserved
the coveted decoration ‘For Valour.’”

“‘The dead shall live, the living die!’ Never was this well-known
line of Dryden’s more strikingly illustrated than by the events of
the past fortnight,” writes _The Natal Witness_ of June 7th, 1879.
“‘The dead shall live,’ the mists of doubt, overclouding many a
reputation, have been cleared up by a visit to the now sacred field
of Isandhlwana.

“‘The living die:’ the hopes of a large party in an European nation
have been extinguished by the assegais of a mere handful of savages.”
(Alluding to the death of the Prince Imperial of France.) “The
two events stand side by side in startling contrast, and suggest
thoughts which even the wisest might with advantage ponder. Turn, for
instance, to the story of the field of Isandhlwana, as now told in
plain though interrupted and awful characters by the remains found
resting near the ‘neck.’ Could it have been guessed that, while human
recollection and human intelligence failed so utterly to convey to
the world a history of the events of that too memorable day, Nature
herself would have taken the matter in hand, and told us such a
story as no one who hears it will ever forget? Four months, all but
a day, had elapsed since the defenders of the field stood facing
the Zulu myriads—four months of rain and sun, of the hovering of
slow-sailing birds of prey, and of the predatory visits, as it might
well be deemed, of unregarding enemies. Four months! and during all
that time, while the world was ringing from one end to the other
with the news of a terrible disaster, while reinforcements were
crowding on to our shores, and special correspondents were flooding
the telegraph-wires with the last new thing, all through those four
months the dead slept quietly on, waiting almost consciously, as one
might think, for the revelation which was to establish their fame,
and, where necessary, relieve their unjustly sullied reputation.
For four months was there a sleep of honour slept upon that bitter
field—a sleep unbroken by any of the noise of the war that rolled
both to southward and to northward. The defeat of Indlobane had been
suffered; the victory of Kambula had been gained; the defenders of
Rorke’s Drift had been rewarded, at least with a nation’s praise; the
imprisoned column had been released from Etshowe; all the roads in
Natal had rung to the tread of men and the rolling of waggon-wheels,
as the force which was to “wipe out” the disaster of Isandhlwana
moved up to the front. Yet still the honoured dead slept in silence.
Only the grasses that waved round them in the autumn breeze murmured
to them of their coming resurrection; only the stars that looked down
on them, when the night wind even had ceased, and the hills loomed
black and silent in the morning hours, bade them be patient and wait.
There were many and varied fates entwined in that quiet group: there
was the trained officer, there was the private soldier, there was the
man who had come to find employment in a colonial service, there were
the lads from the colony itself; all these were there, waiting till
the moment should come when their heroism should be recognised, when
the vague slanders of interest or of cowardice should be dispelled,
and the wreath of undying fame hung round each name in the historic
temple. And the moment, long waited for—long promised, as it might
almost seem, by the beneficent hand of Nature herself, who held
firmly to some unmistakable tokens of recognition—the moment at last
arrived. There could be no mistake about it. Those lying here were
those who had often been called by name by those who found them.
If one means of recognition was absent, another took its place. If
the features were past identification, there was the letter from a
sister, the ornament so well known to companions, the marks of rank,
the insignia of office. Ghastly tokens, it will be said, making up
the foreground of a ghastly scene. Yes, ghastly tokens, but glorious
tokens also—tokens enabling many a family to name those that died
with a regret no longer mingled with doubt or with pain; tokens
that will long be cherished, and which will be shown to children as
preserving the memory of lives that are to be imitated. A black cloud
has, by these revelations, been lifted from the rocks of Isandhlwana,
and many whom we deemed dead are living again—living as examples,
never to be defaced, of the honour which tradition has so fondly
attached to a British soldier’s name.”




CHAPTER XX.

THE PRINCE IMPERIAL.


Early in April the South African community was greatly impressed and
interested by the arrival of the young Prince Imperial, who came
out to Natal to take his share in the fortunes of war, and to see
something of active service against the Zulus. The colonists were not
a little gratified by the fact of this young hope of an illustrious
house having come to fight for and with them against their dreaded
foes; yet amongst them all there was hardly one, great or small,
gentle or simple, whose second thought was not one of sincere regret
that he, who, besides being of such importance in the future of
Europe, was also his widowed mother’s only son and sole comfort,
should be allowed to risk his life in a savage warfare. Many a
thought of kindly sympathy was directed from Natal towards that royal
mother for whom English men and women have always had so sincere a
feeling, whether in prosperity or adversity; and many a warm-hearted
woman’s eyes filled with tears at the sight of the gallant youth, and
at the very thought of what his loss would be to her who remained
to pray for him at home, the home which she had found amongst our
countrymen in England. On every side anxious hopes were expressed
that the Prince would be carefully guarded from danger, and not
allowed needlessly to throw away his precious young life; all these
hopes and anxieties were redoubled when he arrived, and, by his
winning ways and gallant bearing, won the hearts of all who came
in contact with him. Had Natal been asked, he would have been sent
straight home again instead of across the borders, and yet it would
have been hard to resist and thwart the eager wish to be of use, to
work, and to see service which characterised him throughout his short
campaign, and which, combined with gentleness and humanity as it was,
proved him to be a true soldier to the heart’s core.

Since he had come to Natal he could not, of course, be kept away
from the front, and the day he left ’Maritzburg good wishes from all
classes attended him along the road. It was thought, indeed, that
in all human probability he was safe, except in the event of some
such battle as would make the chances equal for all, from general
to drummer-boy. “At all events,” it was said, “Lord Chelmsford will
keep him by his side.” Others, again, opined that the General would
find it no easy task to restrain the eager young spirit that scorned
to be treated with more care than others of his age. But this doubt
was answered by one who knew the Prince, and who said that he was too
good a soldier ever to disobey an order. Throw himself in the way of
difficulty and danger he might wherever possible, but any distinct
_order_ would be promptly and fully obeyed.

For some little time the Prince acted as extra aide-de-camp to Lord
Chelmsford, and accompanied him in that capacity to Colonel Wood’s
camp at Kambula, and back to Utrecht. Colonel Harrison, R.E., was
also of the party, and during the journey very friendly relations
were established between him and the Prince, which lasted to the end,
and were drawn closer by the former’s careful attendance during an
indisposition which befell the latter.

Whilst at Kambula the General reconnoitred the Indhlobane Mountain
on May 4th, and on return to camp was joined by the Prince Imperial,
when, to show him the defence of a laager, the alarm was sounded. In
three minutes every man was at his allotted post, and an inspection
of the camp, with its double tier of rifles ready for work, was
made by the General and staff. Next day the camp was broken up, and
the column moved to about a mile from the White Umvolosi, near the
Zinguin range—Lord Chelmsford and staff, with the Prince, proceeding
to Utrecht.

On May 8th, the General, having appointed Colonel Harrison, R.E.,
Assistant-Quartermaster-General of the army, and Lieutenant Carey,
98th Regiment, Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, requested the
former “to give some work to the Prince Imperial, as he was anxious
for it, and did not find enough to do in the duties of an extra
aide-de-camp.” This request was a verbal one, and the words used
may not be letter for letter, but of the purport there is no doubt;
and such a request from the Commander-in-Chief was, of course, an
order which was immediately carried out. The Prince was directed
to collect and record information respecting the distribution of
troops, location of depôts, and the like, and he worked hard at this
for some days. Lord Chelmsford shortly afterwards left for Newcastle,
but before his departure Colonel Harrison suggested that it would be
advisable, during his lordship’s absence, to make a reconnaissance
into Zululand, on the borders of which they had been hovering so
long, so as to determine the exact line of route which the columns
ought to take in the impending invasion.

Lord Chelmsford accepted the suggestion, asking Colonel Harrison
to take the Prince with him on the expedition, and appointing an
intelligent officer to accompany them. The reconnoitring party
started with a strong escort, and reached Conference Hill on May
13th. Here they were joined by Colonel Buller and 200 horsemen, and
were engaged on their reconnaissance till May 17th, bivouacking at
night with horses saddled and bridled, and marching at dawn, scouring
the country, and sweeping Zulu scouts before them. The Prince
was delighted with the life, the simple fare of the officers—his
comrades—cooked by themselves at their camp-fire, the strange
country, the sight of the enemy, the exhilarating gallops over the
grass up hill and down dale after fleet Zulu spies, the bivouac under
the star-lit heavens. All this pleased him immensely; as he told
Colonel Harrison: “Made him feel that he was really doing soldiers’
work such as he had never done before.” Always anxious to be of use,
he made most careful and copious notes and observations on all they
saw or did.

On the 17th the party returned to Conference Hill, Colonel Harrison
and Colonel Buller having arranged for a combined and further
reconnaissance of the country from that place and Brigadier-General
Wood’s camp; but as the special duty to which the Prince and the
intelligence officer had been assigned was over, Colonel Harrison
would not allow them to accompany him farther, but directed them
to return to Utrecht. They obeyed; but, on the 18th, after Colonel
Harrison had started on his expedition and was already in Zululand,
he was surprised by the appearance of the Prince Imperial, who had
galloped all the way from Balte Spruit by himself to overtake him,
bringing with him the permission, for which he had sent a messenger
to Lord Chelmsford, to go on the new reconnaissance. The party now
consisted of Colonel Harrison, the Prince, Lieutenant Carey, one
officer and five men Bettington’s Horse, and one officer and twenty
men Natal Native Horse (Basutu). The escort would have been stronger,
but that the junction with Colonel Buller from Wood’s camp was looked
for to add to it. The first day was occupied in searching the country
as before, and in looking out for Buller; and the party bivouacked at
night with vedettes and sentries posted all round, as Zulus had been
seen on the hills, although they did not molest the reconnoitring
party.

On the following day (the 19th), whilst exploring a deep rough
valley, the party was suddenly confronted by a number of Zulus, who
came down the hill at one side of the donga, and spread out in the
usual way in two wings or horns, in order to overlap or outflank it,
firing as they advanced. The officer in command of the advance at
once put spurs to his horse and rode straight up the hill at the weak
centre of the Zulu detachment, followed by the rest of the party.
They pushed right through the centre of the Zulus, and the horns at
once broke away, and escaped among the rocks with some loss. Smaller
bodies of Zulus were met with subsequently, but did not attempt to
try conclusions with the horsemen, who were obliged to keep on the
move the greater part of the night, as the enemy was all around them.

Next morning they reached Conference Hill, without meeting Colonel
Buller; Colonel Harrison and the Prince proceeding to Utrecht to
report to Lord Chelmsford.

Lord Chelmsford now informed Colonel Harrison that “He
was to consider the Prince Imperial as attached to the
Quartermaster-General’s staff for duty, but it was not put in orders,
in consequence of the Prince not being in the army.” The Prince
lived, as before, with the General’s personal staff, and Colonel
Harrison, therefore, only saw him when he came for work or orders,
which was very frequently.

On May 25th—the head-quarters having been established at Landman’s
Drift—the Prince, having called for work as usual, was directed to
prepare a plan of a divisional camp. That evening Colonel Harrison
was spoken to by Lord Chelmsford, because the Prince Imperial had
gone outside the lines without an escort, but replied “That the work
he had given the Prince to do referred to the camp inside the outpost
lines.” The General then told Colonel Harrison “To take care that the
Prince was not to go out without an escort when working for him, and
in the matter of escort to treat him, not as a royal person, but the
same as any other officer, taking all due precautions.”

Colonel Harrison then said that “He would see the Prince, and tell
him he was never to leave the camp without a suitable escort, and
that he was to apply to him for one when it was wanted;” and Lord
Chelmsford replied that “That would do.”

The same day Colonel Harrison saw the Prince, and told him this,
and to make the matter quite sure, he then and there gave him the
instructions in writing.

He next directed him to make a map of the country, from the
reconnaissance sketches of Lieutenant Carey and others. This work the
Prince executed very well, and so eager was he for employment, so
desirous to be always up and doing, that he went, not once or twice,
but often every day to Colonel Harrison’s tent asking for more.

On the 28th of May, head-quarters were at Kopje Allein, and on that
and the two following days reconnaissances were pushed far into the
enemy’s country, but no enemy was seen. Small parties, even single
officers, rode about unmolested all over the district round, and went
beyond the spot where so sad a scene was shortly afterwards enacted.

On the 31st of May the Prince went to Colonel Harrison’s tent with a
report which he had written, and, as usual, asked for some more work.
He was told that the army was to march next day, and that he might
go out and report on the roads and camps for the day following; with
which instructions the Prince was greatly pleased. Next day the 2nd
Division (with which were Lord Chelmsford and the head-quarters’
staff) were ordered to march towards Ulundi; Wood’s column being
in advance some miles, on the other side of the Blood River, on a
road which would take it out eventually on the line of march of
the head-quarters’ column. Lieutenant Carey, whilst conversing on
duty matters with Colonel Harrison, expressed a wish to go out with
the Prince, as he desired to verify a sketch he had made on the
previous day; and, although Colonel Harrison had intended to ask
one of the General’s personal staff to accompany the Prince, he
said, when Lieutenant Carey volunteered to go: “All right; you can
look after the Prince!” At the same time he told Lieutenant Carey
to let the Prince do the work for which he was going out, namely,
a detailed report on the road and the selection of a site for the
camp. Lieutenant Carey was known to Colonel Harrison as a cautious
and experienced officer, who had been frequently out on patrol duties
with Colonel Buller and others, who was acquainted with the nature of
the work he had to do, the precautions to be taken, and the actual
ground to be gone over; and there was every reason to believe that he
thoroughly understood his position, and would make, as he had done
before, the proper arrangements for an escort.

On the morning of the 1st, Colonel Harrison, hearing that no escort
had arrived at the hour fixed for the departure of the reconnoitring
party, went over to General Marshall’s tent, and obtained from him
the order for the number of men he thought sufficient—“six Europeans
and six Basutos;” and, having informed Lieutenant Carey of this,
he rode off to attend to his own duties—superintending the march of
the army, inspecting the fords, and moving on in advance (in company
with Major Grenfell) to select the site for watering-places and the
next camp. On a ridge in front of the column Colonel Harrison and
his companion presently found the Prince and Lieutenant Carey halted
with the European troopers only, and heard from them that they were
waiting for the Basutos, who had not joined them in camp; but some
were now in sight on the hillside flanking the line of march, and
moving in a direction which would bring them upon it a little in
advance of the spot where the party was waiting.

As Lieutenant Carey had been already over the country, he was asked
by Colonel Harrison to point out the place where the water supply
for the next camp was, and the whole party rode slowly along a donga
towards the supposed stream or ponds. Colonel Harrison did not think
the water sufficient for their purpose, and rode back to the high
ground, where he was rejoined by Major Grenfell, who told him that
the Prince’s party had just discovered a better supply a little
farther on. There was a ridge in front of them which they considered
marked the end of the day’s march, and the officers dispersed to
attend to their own duties, not imagining for an instant that the
reconnoitring party would go on without the Basutos, who, from their
wonderful power of sight and hearing, and quickness at detecting the
approach of danger, were always regarded as essential to an escort.

Unhappily, however, such was the case. The party rode on until they
came to a deserted kraal, situated some 200 yards from the river, and
consisting of five huts, one with the usual small cattle enclosure.
Between the kraal and the river stretched a luxuriant growth of
tambookie grass, five or six feet in height, with mealies and Kafir
corn interspersed. This dense covert, however, did not completely
surround the kraal, for in front there was an open space, apparently
used by the Zulus, judging from the ashes and broken earthenware
strewn about, as a common cooking-ground.

Here the party halted, and the Prince, having first sent a native
guide to make sure that the huts were all uninhabited, gave the
order that the horses should be off-saddled and turned out to
graze. Some of them lit a fire and made coffee, while the Prince
and Lieutenant Carey, after the latter had taken a look round with
his glass, proceeded to make sketches of the surrounding country.
It is said that the Prince’s talent with pen and pencil, combined
with his remarkable proficiency in military surveying—that great
gift of recognising at once the strategic capabilities of any spot
which distinguished the First Napoleon—made his contributions to our
knowledge of the country to be traversed of great value; and he never
lost an opportunity of making himself of use in this and every other
way.

It was about 3 P.M. when the party halted at this deserted kraal, the
Prince deciding that they should leave again in an hour’s time. That
the Zulus had been upon the spot not long before was apparent from
signs of freshly-chewed _imfi_ (native sugar-cane) upon the ground,
while a few dogs lingering about might have suggested that their
masters were not far off. Before the hour was over, however, the
native guide came in to report that he had seen a Zulu coming over
the hill, and it was now thought prudent to retire, the Prince giving
directions to collect and up-saddle the horses, followed by the order
to “Mount.”

Some of the men were already in the saddle, others in the act of
mounting, when a sudden volley fired upon them from amongst the
tall stalks of the mealies (Indian corn) which grew on every side,
betrayed the presence of a numerous armed foe, who had returned
unseen to those who were in temporary occupation of their kraals.
The distance was not twenty yards, and the long grass swayed to the
sudden rush of the Zulus, as with a tremendous shout, they charged
towards the Prince and his companions. The horses all swerved at the
suddenness of the tumult, and one broke away, its rider being shot
before he could recover it and mount. The young Prince was riding
a fine gray charger, a gray of sixteen hands, always difficult to
mount, and on this occasion, frightened by the firing, it became
restive and could not be controlled. Lieutenant Carey, apparently,
had at this moment been carried by his horse in a direction which
brought one of the huts between him and the Prince, of whose
difficulties he was therefore unaware. From the moment of the attack
no man seems to have known much of what the rest were doing; to
gallop away was the only chance for life, and all hurried off, the
Prince in vain endeavouring to mount his restive steed unaided. He
was passed by Trooper Letocq: “_Dépêchez vous, s’il vous plait,
Monsieur!_” he cried, as he dashed past, himself only lying across
his saddle, but the Prince made no answer; he was already doing his
utmost, and in another minute he was alone. He was seen endeavouring
to mount his rearing charger, as it followed the retreat, while he
ran beside it, the enemy close at hand. He made one desperate attempt
to leap into the saddle by the help of the holster-flap; _that_ gave
way, and then he fell. The charger dashed riderless past some of the
mounted men, who, looking back, saw the Prince running after them
on foot, with the Zulus but a few paces behind him. Alas! not a man
turned back, they galloped wildly on, and carried back to camp the
news that the gallant young Prince, for or with whom each of them
should have died that day, lay slain upon the hillside where he had
made his last brave stand alone. Two troopers fell besides—one was
struck down by a bullet as he rode away; the other was the man who
had lost his horse, Trooper Rogers, and who was last seen in the
act of levelling his carbine at the enemy. The native guide was
killed as well, after a hard fight with the foe, witnessed to by the
blood-stained and broken weapons found by his side next day. The
fugitives rode on for some distance, when they met General Wood and
Colonel Buller, to whom they made their report. From the brow of an
adjacent hill these officers, looking through their glasses, could
see the Zulus leading away the horses they had taken—the trophies of
their successful attack.

That evening Colonel Harrison was in his tent, engaged in writing
orders for the next day’s march, when Lord Chelmsford came in to
tell him “The Prince is killed!” and Lieutenant Carey soon after
confirmed the dreadful, well-nigh incredible news. He said they were
off-saddled at a kraal, when they were surrounded and fired into,
and that the Prince must have been killed, for no one had seen him
afterwards.

Colonel Harrison asked the General to let him take a few men to the
kraal, and see if, by any chance, the Prince were only wounded, or
were hidden near at hand, but his request was not granted, and the
testimony of the survivors extinguished all hope.

Next day General Marshall, with a cavalry patrol, went out to search
for the Prince, being assisted by scouts of the Flying Column. The
bodies of the troopers were soon found, and shortly afterwards that
of His Imperial Highness was found by Captain Cochrane, lying in a
donga about 200 yards from the kraal where the party had halted. The
body was stripped with the exception of a gold chain with medallions
attached, which was still round his neck. Sword, revolver, helmet,
and clothes were gone; but in the grass were found the Prince’s spurs
and one sock.

The body had eighteen assegai wounds, all in front, and the marks on
the ground and on the spurs indicated a desperate resistance.

The two white troopers were laid together beside a cairn of stones,
which was erected to mark the exact spot where the Prince was found,
and later in the day they were buried there, the chaplain on duty
with the column performing the funeral service.

But for the Prince himself a true soldiers’ bier was formed of lances
lashed together and horse blankets, and, borne thus, the body of the
noble lad was carried up the hill towards the camp which he had left
the previous day so full of energy and life.

The melancholy news was telegraphed throughout the colony, causing
universal grief and consternation. Every heart was wrung with
sympathy for _the mother_; and even those to whose homes and hearts
the war had already brought desolation, felt their own grief hushed
for awhile in the presence of a bereavement which seemed to surpass
all others in bitterness and depth.

What citizen of ’Maritzburg will ever forget the melancholy Sunday
afternoon, cold and storm-laden, when, at the first distant sound of
the sad approaching funeral music, all left their homes and lined the
streets through which the violet-adorned coffin passed on its way to
its temporary resting-place.

In Durban, too, the solemn scene was repeated; the whole colony being
deeply moved at the sad and untimely death of the gallant Prince.
H.M.S. _Boadicea_, flag-ship of Commodore Richards, had the honour of
conveying the body to Simon’s Bay, when it was transferred to H.M.S.
_Orontes_ with every possible mark of respect for conveyance to
England.

A court of inquiry was at once assembled by Lord Chelmsford, and
reported that Lieutenant Carey had not understood the position in
which he stood towards the Prince, and, as a consequence, failed to
estimate aright the responsibility which fell to his lot; also that
he was much to blame for having proceeded on the duty in question
with a portion only of the escort; and that the selection of the
kraal where the halt was made, surrounded as it was by cover for the
enemy, and adjacent to difficult ground, showed a lamentable want of
military prudence. And, finally, the court deeply regretted that no
effort was made after the attack to rally the escort and to show a
front to the enemy, whereby the possibility of aiding those who had
failed to make good their retreat might have been ascertained.

Lieutenant Carey was then tried by court-martial and found guilty.
The home authorities decided, however, that the conviction and
sentence could not be maintained, and consequently ordered this
officer to be released from arrest and to return to his duty.

In justice to Lieutenant Carey it must be said that the Prince
appears to have been actually in command of the party; Lieutenant
Carey accompanied it, by permission, for the purpose of completing
some of his own work, taking advantage of the protection of the
escort to enable him to do so; he received no order about the command
of the escort, or other instructions beyond the words, “You can look
after the Prince,” which were evidently interpreted as _advise him_,
but could scarcely warrant controlling his movements.

The Prince’s written instructions from Colonel Harrison were lost
with him.

On dangerous duties pertaining to the Quartermaster-General’s
Department in an enemy’s country the Prince Imperial should _never_
have been employed; as long as he remained with the British forces
he should have been retained on the personal staff of the General
commanding.




CHAPTER XXI.

ULUNDI.


Before entering on the history of the advance of the main column on
Ulundi, we will glance at the doings of No. 1 Division, which was to
operate against Ulundi from the eastward.

During May entrenched posts had been established—Fort Crealock,
on the left bank of the Amatikulu River and close to John Dunn’s
Road, about fourteen miles from Fort Pearson, on the Tugela; Fort
Chelmsford, on the right bank of the Inyezane, also on John Dunn’s
Road, and eight miles from Fort Crealock; and, in June, Fort
Napoleon, on the left bank of the Umlalazi River, between Fort
Chelmsford and Port Durnford, where a landing-place was established—a
brief account of which may be interesting. The spot is described as
a straight sandy coast near the mouth of the Umlalazi River, always
having a boiling surf rolling in on the beach. The landing operations
were carried out by means of large decked surf-boats of about forty
tons burden each.

The mode of working them was as follows: One end of a long hawser
was made fast to an anchor dropped some distance outside the surf,
and the other end taken on shore by a small line, hauled taut, and
secured to shore moorings.

By means of this “warp” the surf-boat travels to and from the beach.
Having picked up the warp by the buoy-rope, it is placed in grooves
in the bow and stern of the boat, and there retained by pins. The
roll of the surf takes the boat in, large rope-stoppers being used to
check her should she be going too fast.

In this way some 3000 tons of stores were landed, at a very great
saving of expense over land transport. The landing operations were
at all times difficult, sometimes impossible; they were conducted
by Commander Caffin, R.N., and to him and the Naval Brigade there
stationed is due the entire credit of the excellent work done.

Forwarding supplies and bridging the Tugela was the work of the
1st Division through May and well into June; everything military,
except convoy duty, appeared at a standstill. There was a great
deal of sickness amongst the troops, but General Crealock did much
in providing proper hospital accommodation and improving sanitary
arrangements.

Fort Pearson was converted into an extensive hospital, where there
were as many as 400 patients at times, and whose garrison, after
the advance of the division, was composed of the convalescents. At
this hospital some wily patients managed to appropriate £5000 of the
public moneys; but this fortunately was all recovered, except about
£33.

Telegraphic communication was established by the Royal Engineers
between Fort Chelmsford and the Lower Tugela; and Colonel Walker,
C.B., Scots Guards, was appointed to the command of this portion of
the base, and stationed at Fort Pearson.

On the 18th June the long-expected move was made by No. 1 Division,
and General Crealock, with the advanced portion of the force, left
Fort Pearson and the Lower Tugela. Moving by Fort Chelmsford, he
reached the Umlalazi River on the 22nd. The river was bridged by the
train under Captain Blood, R.E., and a work commenced on the left
bank called “Fort Napoleon.”

The General was engaged reconnoitring on the 23rd and following days,
capturing a few cattle, one of which appeared to resent its capture,
charging the General, and severely injuring his horse. On the 28th
the force encamped near Port Durnford.

But little interest attaches to this division, which had great
opportunities before it. An earlier advance and a little dash
would have given the laurels of the second campaign to the 1st
Division, which at the beginning of May consisted of upwards of 9000
men—6500 being Europeans—a sufficient force to have accomplished the
destruction of Ulundi with ease; but it was not to be.

Many absurd stories are told as to causes of delays, one being the
want of so many rations of _pepper_; and the whole ending in the
well-known telegram, “Where is Crealock?”

We may here devote a few remarks to the Naval Brigade, which rendered
such good service throughout the campaign; and, had opportunity
offered, would have largely added to the laurels it won.

After the relief of Etshowe, the Naval Brigade was divided between
Lower Tugela and Fort Chelmsford, Commander Brackenbury in command at
the latter post, Captain Campbell in chief command. The main force
advanced with General Crealock—545 officers and men of _Active_,
_Boadicea_, and _Shah_, with 3 9-pounder guns, 6 rocket-troughs, and
5 Gatling guns. At Port Durnford they remained disembarking stores
till July 21st, when, after being reviewed by Sir Garnet Wolseley,
the _Active’s_ and _Shah’s_ men embarked, leaving the _Boadicea’s_ to
continue temporarily the duties of the landing station.

Captain Bradshaw of the _Shah_, and Captain Adeane of the _Tenedos_,
rendered good service at Durban and Simon’s Bay respectively.

The Royal Marines of the squadron served with the Naval Brigade.
Lieutenant Dowding, R.M.L.I., was at first the senior officer, and
advanced with Colonel Pearson’s column to Etshowe, remaining there
until its relief. Captain Phillips, R.M.L.I., and Captain Burrowes,
R.M.A., were landed from H.M.S. _Shah_, the former senior officer,
and in command of the Marines at the battle of Ngingindhlovu.

We must now return to the 2nd Division and Flying Column, which
at last began to move in the right direction. Zululand had been
carefully reconnoitred to the Babanango Mountain by Colonel Buller,
and the advance of the 2nd Division, with the head-quarters, in this
direction was covered by the Flying Column, which was always within
striking distance.

The troops now were carefully protected at night by laagers; the
ordinary form being a rectangle in three compartments, with a
shelter trench two yards outside the waggons, so that there might be
a second line of fire from the top of the waggons, without risk to
the defenders of the shelter trench.

The Flying Column bore the brunt of work in the advances, scouting
the country in every direction, the most reliable “eyes and ears”
of the force the “Natal Native Horse,” then commanded by Captain
Cochrane. These men (Edendale men and Basutu) in small numbers
crowned the summit of every hill right and left of the route, and
miles in front they were pushed to feel the way. On the 4th June the
scouts reported a considerable number of the enemy, these, after the
exchange of a few shots, Colonel Buller tried to draw towards the
camp, but in vain, and the patrol, not being strong enough to risk an
engagement, returned to camp. There three messengers from Cetshwayo
were being received by Lord Chelmsford.

They were sent back on June 6th with the following message: “He must
at once give proof of being earnest in desiring peace, proof to
be—1st. Two 7-pounder guns, and the oxen now with him taken from us
to be sent in with the ambassadors. 2nd. A promise from Ketchwayo
that all the arms taken during war, etc., when collected shall be
given up. 3rd. One regiment to come to my camp and lay down its arms
as a sign of submission. Pending Cetywayo’s answer, there will be no
military operations on our part; when he has complied with them, I
will order cessation of hostilities pending discussion of final terms
of peace.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 107).

On the previous day (5th June), Colonel Buller took a force of about
300 men to reconnoitre the proposed route. The Zulus seen the day
before came out from their kraals, and formed as if for an attack.
The ground in their rear was broken and covered with thorny bush,
the kraals large, apparently belonging to a chief; and beside one of
them were four waggons, evidently taken from Isandhlwana. Colonel
Buller determined to burn the kraals, but as he approached the enemy
broke and retired into the cover, opening a heavy fire. A portion
of the force engaged the Zulus from the edge of the bush whilst the
remainder set fire to the kraals, which was accomplished with the
loss of two men wounded.

Major-General Marshall came up with a portion of the Cavalry Brigade,
and, with a view to ensuring the safety of Colonel Buller’s retreat,
advanced three troops of the 17th Lancers under Colonel Drury-Lowe to
hold the enemy in check.

The enemy was found to be very strongly posted in the thorns, and
the ground being impracticable for cavalry, the Lancers were ordered
to retire. Their Adjutant, Lieutenant Frith, was in this fruitless
skirmish shot through the heart.

During this affair an incident occurred (told by an officer present
at the time), showing the individual bravery of the Zulus: A single
warrior, chased by several Lancers, found himself run down and escape
impossible. He turned and faced his enemies; spreading his arms
abroad he presented his bare breast unflinchingly to the steel, and
fell, face to the foe, as a brave soldier should.

On the 6th a post called Fort Newdigate was established, and on this
evening the warmth of the double line of fire from the laager of the
2nd Division was unpleasantly experienced by the 5th Company Royal
Engineers. This company had marched up that afternoon in advance
of the Flying Column (which was going down-country for supplies),
and had camped close to one of the unfinished redoubts outside the
laager; an alarm was given in the laager, and a heavy fire opened
therefrom. The Engineers coolly lay down flat on the ground, and
waited till the excitement was over. It was due entirely to their
own steadiness that the casualties were not greater; as it was, one
sergeant was wounded and two horses killed.

On the 7th, the division advanced, clearing the country of Zulus and
burning their kraals, and encamped at the Upoko River; remaining
there till the arrival of Brigadier-General Wood’s Column with a
large convoy of supplies for which it had been sent. The time was
usefully employed in reconnoitring, examining the road in advance,
making drifts practicable, etc.

A line of telegraph was laid by the half Telegraph Troop (C) Royal
Engineers, from Quagga’s kraal (on the road between Newcastle
and Ladysmith), where it joined the colonial line to Doornberg
_viâ_ Dundee and Landtmann’s Drift, thus placing head-quarters in
communication with Pietermaritzburg, etc.; flag-signalling being
employed to communicate with Doornberg.

On the 16th June the correspondent of _The Times_ wrote: “We are
wandering towards Ulundi much as the Children of Israel wandered
towards Canaan, without plans, or even definite notions for
the future. It would seem not impossible to form some plan of
campaign—something, at any rate, more definite than the hand-to-mouth
manner in which we are now proceeding. Deep science and tactical
skill are not necessary to contend with savages; a simple method
and plain common-sense suffice, if backed by energy, decision, and
determination.”

The intelligence now telegraphed that Sir Garnet Wolseley was on
his way to Natal to unravel the various tangled skeins of civil and
military policy, doubtless acted as the “spur in the head” which
expedited Lord Chelmsford’s movements.

On the 17th, Brigadier-General Wood arrived with the supplies, and
next day the force advanced to the Upoko River, where the road from
Rorke’s Drift to Ulundi crosses it. Here there was a halt for a day,
and a depôt formed, called Fort Marshall. Colonel Collingwood was
left in charge of the two posts, Forts Newdigate and Marshall; and
the whole line of communication in the enemy’s country, and such
of the garrison as were left in frontier-posts for the purpose of
patrolling, were placed under the command of Major-General Marshall.

Fort Marshall was about twenty-five miles from Rorke’s Drift, and
sixteen from Fort Newdigate; from this post to Koppie Allein (on the
Blood River) the distance was twenty-one miles.

Having struck down into this road, which runs into Zululand in an
easterly direction, a glance at the map will show how needless
was the waste of time and money spent in concentrating stores at
Conference Hill—so far removed from the line of communications with
Pietermaritzburg.

The combined column reached the Umhlatusi River on the 21st, having
traversed difficult and mountainous ground, where in many places the
train was obliged to pass by single waggons.

The Zulus took no advantage of the many opportunities for attack
that presented themselves, and the march to Ulundi was practically
unopposed. At this halting-place Fort Evelyn was built; and on the
24th the march was resumed.

Cetshwayo’s messengers, ’Mfunzi and ’Nkisimane, came up from
Pietermaritzburg on the 24th, and next morning were sent to the king
with Lord Chelmsford’s reply to his message.

A very awkward drift on the Uvulu River was passed by the column,
after crossing which a day’s halt was made, when a cavalry patrol was
sent out to destroy some military kraals. Two more indunas came in to
ask for peace, and were sent back to Ulundi in the evening. On the
27th the force arrived at Entonjaneni, where the arrangements for the
final advance on Ulundi were made, tents and all unnecessary baggage
left behind, and a strong post formed with the aid of waggons. Four
hundred waggons, 6000 oxen, and 800 mules were left entrenched here;
the remaining 200 waggons, with ten days’ provisions, accompanying
the advancing force. This evening two more messengers came in from
the king with elephant tusks, some hundred head of oxen, and two
trunks, the property of Lord Chelmsford. The messengers were sent
back next day.

_The Natal Colonist_ of June 28th says: “Again we hear that Ketshwayo
has sent to Government, asking why Lord Chelmsford continues to
advance. He (the king) hopes the General will not persist in
advancing, as in that case he will be forced to fight, and what he
wants is peace. This, we believe, makes the eleventh message he has
sent in to the same effect. The General affects to doubt his _bonâ
fides_. How is this to be established? Can his lordship think of
no better guarantee than one which the most vigorous supporters of
the war cannot term anything but childish?” This latter question is
explained in another issue of the same paper, in which the editor
remarks: “It is argued that the Zulus or the Zulu king cannot be
sincere in desiring peace, because when the chance offers our troops
are fired upon. If people would but consider for a moment, that until
there is a truce or armistice agreed on we are living in a state of
war; that our troops are in the Zulu country, making war upon its
inhabitants, missing no opportunity of inflicting damage and injury
upon them, burning their kraals, destroying their grain, ravaging
their gardens, and firing on the natives themselves at every chance,
what right, they would ask themselves, have we to expect that the
Zulus should refrain from retaliation, however desirous they may be
of seeing peace restored, and an end put to all the devastation and
horror of prolonged warfare? _We_ do not profess to be otherwise than
desirous of peace—peace with honour and security for the future—and
yet are we not invading their country, and almost vaunting that we
shall dictate its terms only when our invading columns have met at
Ulundi, and planted the English flag there?”

On the 30th the descent into the valley of the White Umvolosi was
commenced, through a country covered with scattered bush and aloes.
Two indunas were escorted in during the day, one bearing a letter
from Cetshwayo to Lord Chelmsford,[173] and the other the sword of
the Prince Imperial, which the king sent in immediately on learning
the value attached to it.[174]

Sir Garnet Wolseley—having been ordered out to Natal as Governor of
Natal and the Transvaal, and Her Majesty’s High Commissioner for the
eastern portion of South Africa—landed at Durban on the 28th June. On
the 30th Lord Chelmsford sent him the following message: “Five miles
from Entonganini; ten miles from Umvolosi River. King’s messengers
have just left with message from me. I must advance to position on
left bank of river. This I do to-morrow, but will stop hostilities,
pending negotiations, if communicated demands are complied with by
3rd July, noon. There are indunas come with cattle and guns. I have
consented to receive 1000 captured rifles instead of a regiment
laying down its arms. As my supplies will only permit of my remaining
here until the 10th July, it is desirable I should be informed by
you of the conditions of peace to be demanded. White man with king
states he has 20,000 men. King anxious to fight; Princes not so.
Where is Crealock’s column? Signal.”

On the 1st July the Flying Column and General Newdigate’s division
reached, without opposition, the southern bank of the White Umvolosi,
within five or six miles of the royal kraals of Ulundi. Defensible
laagers were at once formed, and the position made secure before
night. Large bodies of Zulus were seen in motion at Ulundi. Next day
the 2nd Division closed up their laager to that of the Flying Column,
and a stone redoubt was erected on knoll in rear; so that a small
garrison might hold the post, leaving the main force unencumbered to
operate as desired. The Zulu army was not seen, and no messengers
arrived from the king; but a large herd of white (royal) cattle was
observed being driven from the king’s kraal towards the camp, and
shortly afterwards driven back again.

On the 3rd, as the Zulus were firing on watering-parties at the
river, and no message had come in, a reconnaissance on the farther
side was ordered. At noon, the cattle, sent in with the last
messengers from the king, were driven back across the river, and
about the same time Colonel Buller crossed lower down with the
mounted men of the Flying Column to reconnoitre towards Ulundi.
Detaching parties to cover his flank, he advanced rapidly to within
about 200 yards of the Ulundi river, and about three-quarters of a
mile from Ulundi, when he came upon about 5000 Zulus concealed in the
river-bed, who at once opened fire, while large bodies of the enemy,
moving down on each flank, endeavoured to cut off his retreat.

Colonel Buller, having effected the purpose for which he had gone
forward—feeling the enemy and reconnoitring the ground—retired
with a loss of three men killed and four wounded. Many officers
distinguished themselves in endeavouring to save the men who were
lost, as well as in bringing in dismounted men: Commandant D’Arcy,
Lieut.-Colonel Buller, Captain Prior, Lord William Beresford,
Lieutenant Hayward, and also Sergeant Kerr are mentioned.

On the 4th, at 6.45 A.M., the force crossed the river, leaving the
camp garrisoned by the 1-24th Regiment, a company of Engineers, and
casualties (about 900 Europeans, 250 natives, with one Gatling gun).

Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with the light cavalry of the Flying Column,
crossed in advance, and occupied the high ground in front without
opposition; the main body following, marched up the broken ground
out of the valley, and formed a hollow square, the ammunition-carts,
etc., in the centre, and the guns in position ready to come into
action without delay. The Flying Column formed the front half, and
the 2nd Division the rear half of the square; front, flanks, and
rear covered by the cavalry. In this formation the troops advanced
to the spot selected by Colonel Buller, which was about 700 yards
beyond the Nodwengo kraal, and about the same distance from a stream
that crossed the road halfway to Ulundi; high ground, commanding the
adjacent country, and with little cover beyond long grass, near it.

The guns were posted in the angles and in the centre of each face of
the square, and each face had a company of infantry in reserve.

Large numbers of Zulus were now seen coming from the hills on the
left and left front, and other masses on the right, partly concealed
by the mist from the river, passed the Nodwengo kraal to surround the
square.

The cavalry on the right and left became engaged at 8.45 A.M., and,
slowly retiring as the enemy advanced, passed into the square, which
immediately opened fire.

The Zulu advance was made with great determination, but their
movements appeared to be without order. Some individuals managed to
reach within thirty or forty yards of the rear face, where there
was some cover, but the main advance on all sides was checked at
some distance by the heavy artillery fire and steady volleys of the
infantry. These were so effective that within half an hour the enemy
wavered and gave way, when the cavalry dashed out to complete their
discomfiture. Passing out by the rear face of the square, Colonel
Drury-Lowe (who had been already wounded) led the 17th Lancers in the
direction of the Nodwengo kraal, dispersing the enemy and killing
those that could not reach the shelter of the kraal or the bush
below; then wheeling to the right, he charged through the enemy, who
were endeavouring to reach the mountains beyond.

In this manner the whole of the level ground was cleared.
Lieut.-Colonel Buller’s command also took up the pursuit, doing much
execution until the enemy mounted the slopes of the hills and were
beyond their reach. But even then a place of safety was not gained,
for some guns were moved out from the square, and got the range of
the enemy retreating over the hills. The brunt of this day’s work
fell on the cavalry. Even in the pursuit the greater part of the
Zulus turned and fought for their lives. Overtaken by a Lancer, a
Zulu would stop just before the fatal thrust was delivered, and,
dodging like lightning, evade the lance, sometimes seizing it and
holding on till the Lancer was relieved by a comrade.

The Irregular Horse, Mounted Infantry, and Native Horse (Captain
T. Shepstone’s Basutu and the Natal Native Horse under Captain
Cochrane), thoroughly searched the ground, disposing of the enemy who
had taken refuge in dongas, bush, and long grass. 600 Zulus are said
to have fallen before the cavalry alone—150 of them being credited to
the Lancers.

Thus was fought the battle of Ulundi.

It was impossible for the ill-armed enemy to pass the belt of fire
that encircled the square, even had they not been shaken by the
accurate artillery fire whilst yet at a distance.

The ease with which the attack was repelled may be gathered from the
fact that the average number of rounds fired by the infantry actually
in the ranks was less than six-and-a-half rounds per man (6·4 rounds).

The troops certainly were very steady, and the firing—generally
volley-firing by sections—was as a rule under perfect command.

We have heard of an officer calmly smoking his pipe whilst in command
of his company during the engagement.

As soon as the wounded had been attended to, the force advanced to
the banks of the stream near Ulundi, whilst the cavalry swept the
country beyond. Ulundi was fired at 11.40 A.M., and the adjacent
kraals shortly afterwards. At 2 P.M., the return march to the camp
commenced. Every military kraal in the valley that had not previously
been destroyed was in flames; and not a sign of the Zulu army was to
be perceived.

The British force engaged consisted of 4062 Europeans and 1103
natives, with 12 guns and 2 Gatlings. The loss: killed, 2 officers
(Captain Wyatt-Edgell, 17th Lancers, and the Hon. W. Drummond, in
charge of the Intelligence Department), 13 non-commissioned officers
and men, and 3 natives; wounded, 19 officers, 59 non-commissioned
officers and men, and 7 natives.

The Zulu force is estimated variously; some put it at 12,000, some at
20,000. Being scattered over a large extent of country, and some of
the regiments engaged having already suffered heavily, it is not easy
to arrive at a reliable conclusion. It is probable that the correct
number lay between 15,000 and 20,000.

As regards the Zulu loss, Lord Chelmsford says: “It is impossible to
estimate with any correctness the loss of the enemy, owing to the
extent of country over which they attacked and retreated; but it
could not have been less, I consider, than 1000 killed.”—(Despatch,
4th July).

Using the same reasoning on the 6th, Lord Chelmsford says: “But
judging by the reports of those engaged, it cannot be placed at a
less number than 1500 killed.”

From the statements of prisoners it would seem that the attacking
force was about 15,000 strong, 5000 being in reserve. At a meeting
of the Zulu Council on the 2nd July, it appears that it was resolved
by the King to send in the royal coronation white cattle as a
peace-offering; but as they were being driven towards the English
camp on the 2nd, they were turned back at Nodwengo by the Umcityu
Regiment, who refused to let them pass, saying, as they could not
fulfil all the demands, it was useless to give up the cattle, and
therefore they would fight. The king was then at Ulundi; he said that
“as the Inkandampemvu (Umcityu) Regiment would not let the cattle go
in as a peace-offering, and as we wished to fight, the white army
being now at his home, we could fight, but we were to fight the white
men in the open, and attack before the Nodwengo and Ulundi kraals,
where we were on the day of the fight.... The army is now thoroughly
beaten, and as it was beaten in the open, it will not reassemble and
fight again. No force is watching the lower column, and none has been
sent there. How could there be, when all were ordered to be here
to-day? We mustered here by the king’s orders at the beginning of
this moon, about ten days ago. We have not been called out before.”

The natives belonging to the British force were exceedingly struck at
the idea of their being brought into the square, whilst the soldiers
formed “a laager” of their bodies round them.

The special correspondent of _The Daily News_, Mr. Archibald Forbes,
performed a very gallant act after the battle of Ulundi. Finding
that no despatch was being sent off by the General to announce the
victory, he determined to take the news himself, and, “taking his
life in his hand,” set out alone to ride right through the Zulu
country. This he did, riding the whole night, having frequently to
dismount and actually _feel_ his way—the tracks of the waggons on the
upward route.

Next day, after a ride of nearly a hundred miles, he reached
Landtmann’s Drift (in fifteen hours), and was enabled to telegraph to
Sir Garnet Wolseley the news of the victory of the 4th.

A few brief remarks on the return march are all that are necessary.
The day after the battle of Ulundi (5th July) the whole force retired
to Entonjaneni, and remained there till the 9th, when the Flying
Column moved on the road towards the coast to Kwamagwasa, _en route_
to meet Sir Garnet Wolseley.

On the 10th the 2nd Division marched from Entonjaneni, and arrived at
the Upoko River on the 15th.

Lord Chelmsford accompanied the Flying Column. We cannot leave
Brigadier-General Wood’s command without a word of notice. From
the beginning to the end of the campaign its work was done in
a thoroughly soldierlike manner, leaving little or nothing to
be desired. There was a thorough reciprocal confidence between
commander and men, and a total absence of those “scares” which were
occasionally heard of during the campaign.

Where all did well, it may seem a little invidious to single
one out for mention, but we will quote the concluding words
of Brigadier-General Wood’s despatch of 5th July, referring to
Lieut.-Colonel Redvers Buller, not only on account of this officer’s
merit, but “to point the moral” as to where was the neglect which led
primarily to the disaster to the Head-quarter Column in January:

“He has never failed to cover the column with his mounted men, for
from ten to twelve miles in front, and on the flanks.

“Constitutionally fearless, he is prudent in counsel, and though
resolute, is very careful of the lives of his troops in action. He
possesses, in my opinion, all the attributes of a perfect leader of
light cavalry.”

It is stated (_Standard_, August 22nd, 1879) that, on reaching
the White Umvolosi, despatches arrived from Sir Garnet Wolseley,
requesting Lord Chelmsford to fall back and meet him at Kwamagwasa—a
mission station, where it had at one time been proposed that the 1st
and 2nd Divisions should effect a junction.

On the 4th, Lord Chelmsford sent a despatch to Sir Garnet Wolseley,
in which he said: “As I have fully accomplished the object for which
I advanced, I consider I shall now be best carrying out Sir Garnet
Wolseley’s instructions by moving at once to Entonjanini, and thence
to Kwamagwaza.”

Why the blow struck at Ulundi was not followed up it is difficult to
say. If Lord Chelmsford’s instructions permitted him to advance and
engage the enemy, they would be sufficiently elastic to enable him
to follow up the victory. The king was known to have a new kraal in
a strong position at the junction of the White and Black Umvolosi
Rivers, within a day’s march of Ulundi; the Zulu army was thoroughly
beaten and dispersed, and there was absolutely nothing to prevent an
advance for the destruction of this stronghold, the moral effect of
which on the native mind would have been very great. There was an
ample force, willing hearts, and no lack of supplies. The solution of
the problem must be sought in Lord Chelmsford’s words: “I have fully
accomplished the object for which I advanced.” He withdrew at once
from the scene of his victory, and—resigned his command.




CHAPTER XXII.

SIR GARNET WOLSELEY—CAPTURE OF CETSHWAYO.


Sir Bartle Frere, whose continued popularity spoke somewhat of
colonial approval of the war, had returned to the Cape in June, and
his reception at Cape Town “capped the climax of an uninterrupted
triumph,” according to _The Natal Mercury_. That he thought himself
deserving of the honours due to a conqueror returning home in triumph
we may gather from the fact that he sent no instructions to suppress
any demonstrations of delight at his return, although at that very
time the latest and perhaps the saddest tragedy of all the sad
results of his policy had just been enacted, and Natal, as with one
voice, was lamenting the Prince Imperial’s death.

“So be it,” says _The Natal Witness_ of June 12th, 1879, commenting
upon this text; “Sir Bartle Frere’s reception capped the climax of an
uninterrupted triumph. We are quite ready to believe this, and, as
we have said, we are glad at last to have so decided an intimation
of what Sir Bartle Frere has intended to do. There are triumphs of
various kinds. There is the triumph which surrounds the statesman,
who, by gentle persuasion, by cautious reforms, by a personal
example of uprightness and unselfishness, has reduced threatening
elements of danger, and evolved peace and security out of storm and
terror. There is the triumph which is his who, impressed with a deep
sense of the value of human life, lays his head upon his pillow every
night in the happy confidence that never through his means, either
directly or indirectly, has a human life been needlessly sacrificed.
There is the triumph of the philanthropist, who, feeling deep in
his heart the claims of an aboriginal people to the consideration
of a civilised power, has, in his dealings with that people, been
careful rather to strain doubtful points in their favour, than to
take advantage of their presumed simplicity. There is the triumph
of the Christian legislator, who regards the authority entrusted
to him as entrusted with a solemn injunction to use that authority
in the name of his divine Master, for the purpose of spreading and
confirming the kingdom of peace and good will. There is the triumph
of the diplomatist, who, in respect of his dealings with state
questions, can lay his hand upon his heart, and affirm that he never
misled his superiors, ... never wrote a line which he did not believe
to be true. All these triumphs we doubt not will be yet achieved by
Sir Bartle Frere, if only the fatigue caused by his ‘troubles and
journeying’ does not suggest an early return to Europe.”

Would Sir Bartle Frere be supported by the Home Government? and would
Lord Chelmsford be upheld by his military superiors in England?
Such were the questions perpetually asked in the colony, to which
there seemed no full and sufficient answer. True, both had received
messages of sympathy and confidence; but these were sent palpably on
the spur of the moment, and long before all the facts of the case had
been brought to light; and, on the other hand, Sir Bartle Frere had
received a very severe rebuke in the despatches mentioned in Chapter
XII. Still the tide of events was permitted to flow on, and many
doubted the reality of the condemnation.

From the time of the disaster at Isandhlwana, prophecies were current
that Lord Chelmsford would be recalled, and as misfortune pursued our
arms the prophecies were renewed. Many were the conjectures as to who
would be sent to replace Lord Chelmsford should he be recalled, and a
general idea was prevalent that the sprightly Sir Garnet Wolseley and
his “brilliant staff” would once more grace the shores of Natal. The
despatch announcing his approach reached the colony in the middle of
June, and the telegram to Lord Chelmsford announcing his appointment
ran as follows: “Her Majesty’s Government have determined to send out
Sir Garnet Wolseley as Administrator in that part of South-Eastern
Africa in the neighbourhood of the seat of war, with plenary powers,
both civil and military. Sir Bartle Frere, instructed accordingly by
Colonial Office. The appointment of a senior officer is not intended
as a censure on yourself, but you will, as in ordinary course of
service, submit and subordinate your plans to his control. He leaves
this country by next mail” (sent _viâ_ St. Vincent, 29th May, 1879).

Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Durban on the 28th June, and proceeded
direct to Pietermaritzburg, where he was the same day sworn in as
Governor of Natal. Certainly Sir Garnet did not let the grass grow
under his feet. On Sunday, the 29th, he telegraphed to Colonel Walker
at Fort Pearson: “Send back Zulu messengers immediately to the king
with following message from me: ‘If the king wants peace he must
send Umnyamana, Umfanawendhela, and Vumandaba to General Crealock’s
column, where I will depute an officer of rank to hear what the king
has to say. I alone have power to make peace. All the other Generals
are under my orders.’ Explain to the messengers who I am. They are to
tell the king, and remind him that I was here as Governor before, and
had many communications with him then.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 149).

The message from Cetshwayo was delivered by two Zulu messengers at
the Lower Tugela, on June 25th, to Mr. Fynney, Administrator and
Border Agent.

“We are sent by the king straight to you. We were ordered not to go
to the troop at the Umlatazi, as other messengers (Sintwangu) will
go there.... The king asks you to speak to the great white Chief
with the Upper Column, and ask to stay the advance of the troops
till he (the king) can hear plainly what he has done, what great sin
he has committed. If he ever killed a white man or white woman, or
ever took cattle from a white man before the war? Did he ever walk
over the words spoken at the Umlambongwenya Kraal by Somtseu? (Sir
T. Shepstone). The king wished us to say if he is to be destroyed
he could die happy if he knew first really what wrong he had done.
The king begs you will speak to the great white Chief with the Upper
Column to stay a further advance till chosen representatives from
both sides can meet and hear really the cause of the war, and what
wrong he has done. The king does not ask for favour if it is proved
he has been wrong. He wants to hear, and he wishes the troops not to
advance till he can hear; for if they do he cannot help fighting,
as there will be nothing left but to try and push aside a tree if
falling upon him.”

“This is our message from the king to you, and he ordered us to tell
you that it is from himself; even the indunas do not know he has sent
it” (_ibid._ p. 154).

On the same day (29th) Sir Garnet sent the following order to Captain
McLeod: “Make arrangements at once, with Swazis, for massing north
of Pongolo River, with view to invading Zululand. Spread abroad news
that the invasion will take place immediately, but do not let them
cross river without my orders. When they are ready to cross let me
know, and I will send you further instructions. Impress urgently upon
them that women and children must not be murdered, but promise them
all cattle they take. This promise to be made as public as possible.
I am now High Commissioner, with full powers to decide all terms of
peace. All reports must be sent to me, care of General Clifford,
’Maritzburg” (_ibid._ p. 150).

The object of this message was “to establish a standing menace, and
to bring formidable pressure to bear in that quarter upon the Zulus.”

The barbarity of the Swazis in warfare, and the keen delight
with which they would have found themselves let loose upon their
hereditary enemies the Zulus, whose army was either scattered or
destroyed, was a well-known fact, and many wondered that such a
course should be proposed.

Captain McLeod, a hardy soldier and brave man, had been for many
months in about as unenviable a position as can well be imagined—in
an unsettled border district in war time, threatened both by Boers
and Zulus. He had been posted at Derby, to guide and control the
movements of our ally the Swazi king, who, it was imagined, would be
stanch to us or not, according to the fortunes of the Zulu war.

Captain McLeod knew the Swazis well, and how little chance there
would be of keeping them under control if once let loose upon the
helpless Zulu people; he therefore begged that they might be used
only as a last resource.

With the view of still further spreading alarm through the Zulu
country, Sir Garnet sent a message to the Amatongas that he might
“possibly ascend the Maputa River with a force and use their
territory as a base of operations against the Zulus from the north”
(_ibid._ p. 149).

On the 30th, after a long conference with General Clifford and
Commissary-General Strickland, Sir Garnet Wolseley had an interview
with about seventy Natal native chiefs, who had been assembled at
his request, and addressed them, through an interpreter, to the
effect that the great English Queen had sent him to carry on the
war against Cetshwayo, and to thank them for what they had already
done. That the chiefs need have no fear but that the Queen would
send as many armies as are necessary, if the troops sent were not
sufficient. “They may depend upon it, and the past history of our
nation is a guarantee thereof, that when we give a promise we will
perform it. Our war is not against the Zulu people, but against
Ketshwayo, who has broken all his promises. We have no wish to rob
the Zulu people of their property or their land; but tell the chiefs
this, that I say this war is going to be finished by us, and finished
in a satisfactory manner. The Queen is most anxious that the war in
Natal should be finished.” Then (as there was a scarcity of grass for
draught-oxen) Sir Garnet requested the chiefs to furnish a certain
number (2000) of their young men to carry provisions for the troops;
the men to carry their arms whilst so employed, and to be paid and
fed by him.

Once more, then, we hear the words: “_Our war is not against the Zulu
people!_”

These “carriers” were taken from the Tugela Valley, which had lately
suffered from the Zulu raid, and where many of the men had belonged
to the native levies raised for the defence of the border; they
naturally did not appreciate an employment which removed them from
the protection of their families, and which was at variance with
their customs[175] and prejudices.

There was not much work for these “carriers” after all; they were
assembled at the Lower Tugela, and marched up to Fort Chelmsford,
each man with a fifty-pound mealie-bag on his head.[176] Their
commander, Major Schwabe, left the loads there, and took the men on
to Port Durnford, where they were employed as required. Having, after
some time, received their pay, the “carriers” quietly walked off to
their homes.

The Commander-in-Chief remained but two days in Pietermaritzburg,
returning to Durban on the 1st of July. The same evening he embarked
on board H.M.S. _Shah_, intending to land at Port Durnford, and
thus reach the scene of action. For once in his life Sir Garnet’s
good fortune deserted him; the heavy surf on the beach prevented
his landing, and the _Shah_ brought him back to Durban. Here he
received the news of the battle of Ulundi, telegraphed to him by Mr.
Archibald Forbes.

No one quite knew what Lord Chelmsford was about, but everyone
understood that he would try and end the war before he was
superseded; and the general feeling in the colony was certainly one
of hope that “poor Lord Chelmsford” might get a chance, win a battle,
and have his bonfire in the enemy’s city of straw. Some few, indeed,
argued that as Lord Chelmsford could not possibly, in the time left
him, settle the Zulu question by the sword, it might occur to him
at last to pay some attention to the hard-pressed Zulu monarch’s
repeated messages imploring peace, and propose some conditions
possible for Cetshwayo to accept and fulfil. Without further
bloodshed an honourable peace might thus have been concluded before
Sir Garnet Wolseley could step upon the scene.

We left the 1st Division at the Umlalazi River, close to the
landing-place, Port Durnford. There the force remained, General
Crealock occupied in receiving the submission of the neighbouring
Zulus, who were flocking in from every direction.

But whilst Lord Chelmsford, on his approach to Ulundi, was inquiring,
“Where is Crealock?” Crealock was quietly established near the coast,
his military activity being displayed in the burning of Empangeni
and other kraals north of the Umlatuzi River. As the Zulus all round
were coming in, and no “impi” was even heard of, the object of this
exhibition of force seems a little doubtful. As was remarked by
_The Cape Times_: “Why the British soldier was ordered to destroy
the shelter, and, with the shelter, the store of grain food of some
thousands of poor women and children whose husbands and fathers
were making their submission, we can no more understand than we can
comprehend the strategy by which a large British force was held back
for months at the edge of the enemy’s country, while commissariat
supplies were accumulating sufficient to support a long campaign,
the whole work before them being to march a hundred miles, and with
one fight close up the war. If they were beaten they could fall back
on the base; but with caution and generalship defeat was out of the
question.” However, Major-General Crealock must have the credit of
quieting the eastern portion of Zululand before the termination of
the war. From his despatches of the 5th July we gather that the
“district people are all wanting to come in,” that he was “sending
back the people to their districts; difficulty of feeding them would
be great.” His division paraded under arms to receive the “official
submission” of “Mabilwana, Manyingo, and other chiefs,” who, with
some 250 men, double that number of women and children, and their
cattle, etc., had come in—these people belonging to the coast
district, but were not strictly speaking warriors, or necessarily
belonging to the Zulu army; nor could their submission be looked upon
as any desertion of their king by the fighting-men of the nation.
They were told that the General accepted their submission, and should
look to them in future to keep peace in that district. If any Zulus
were found in arms, their chief or headman would suffer; but, if they
behaved themselves well, he would give them back their cattle and
his protection. The men then received passes (or tickets) and were
permitted to return to their districts.[177]

Sir Garnet Wolseley crossed the Tugela with his staff and escort on
July 6th, and proceeded to the head-quarters of the 1st Division,
near Port Durnford, which he reached on the 7th. He at once set
to work “to reduce the excessive rate of expenditure which has so
far been maintained in connection with this war,” and “arranged
with the Commodore to embark the Naval Brigade at the earliest
opportunity,” and also “dispensed with the services of some of the
colonial troops.” Reinforcements of all kinds were stopped, including
a fine battalion of Marine Infantry and strong detachment of Marine
Artillery, just arrived at the Cape in H.M.S. _Jumna_.

On July 10th, Sir Garnet also put on one side “the plan of a Swazi
invasion.” (P. P. [C. 2454] p. 163.) All the chiefs up to St. Lucia
Bay tendered their submission, and sent in their arms.

Sir Garnet Wolseley and Lord Chelmsford met at St. Paul’s on the
15th July, the latter arriving with Brigadier-General Wood’s Flying
Column. This Sir Garnet inspected on the following day, taking the
opportunity of decorating Major Chard, R.E., with the Victoria Cross,
awarded him for his gallantry at Rorke’s Drift.

Lord Chelmsford left St. Paul’s on the 17th, on his way home. His
“brilliant victory” had turned the tide of popular favour somewhat in
his direction, and he found that (as he said) “nothing succeeds like
success.”

In Durban he was accorded a reception which must have been highly
gratifying to his feelings. One of his last remarks in Natal,
in reply to a speech made as he was about to embark, was to the
following effect: “I think I may say confidently that we have now
seen the beginning of the end of this campaign, and any success which
has attended my efforts, I feel, is due to the prayers of the people,
and the kindly ordinations of Divine Providence; for I am one of
those who believe firmly and implicitly in the efficacy of prayer and
in the intervention of Providence.”

In this comfortable frame of mind Lord Chelmsford passes from the
scene.

Sir Garnet Wolseley completed the chain of forts across Zululand,
commencing with St. Paul’s, an English mission station on the coast
road a little north of where it crosses the Umlatusi. Fifteen miles
west of this is Kwamagwasa. Twenty miles a little south of west lies
Fort Evelyn, on the road from Rorke’s Drift to Ulundi. Fort Marshall
about twenty miles west-south-west of Fort Evelyn, Fort Newdigate,
twelve miles north-west of Fort Evelyn, and a fort on Itelezi Hill
completes the chain to the Blood River. Some of these forts were
constructed on the upward march of the 2nd Division and Flying
Column, to keep open their communications. In addition to these,
Fort Cambridge was built near where the road from Conference Hill
crosses the White Umvolosi; and a little later an entrenched post
(Fort George) was thrown up near Enhlongana mission station, thus
thoroughly, by these detached posts, commanding the country.

Patrols were pushed out in various directions, by one of which
the two guns lost at Isandhlwana were found between Ulundi and
Maizekanye. They had not been spiked, but the Zulus had screwed
rifle-nipples into the vents, and had also apparently tried to load
the guns by ramming home shells, but without cartridges.

The Cavalry Brigade was broken up, and a fresh disposition of the
troops made. Sir Garnet visited various posts, interviewing the Zulu
chiefs who had surrendered themselves. Some of the most important,
however, of those who came in, and were supposed to have submitted
and deserted their king, had, in point of fact, no such intention,
appearing merely to make their often and vainly repeated attempt at
procuring “terms” for Cetshwayo and themselves. It had always been
prophesied that the Zulu nation would desert their king. Before the
war began, some of those who professed to understand the people best,
declared that they would be thankful to throw off the yoke of one
whom, it was alleged, they regarded with fear and hatred, and would
side with the English as soon as the latter crossed their border.

The fallacy of this idea was discovered to our cost.

It was then asserted that the Zulu army had given a temporary
strength to the authority of their king, which would last until we
had beaten his troops and proved our superiority, and this assertion
was used by those who insisted that no peace must be made, however
earnestly desired by the Zulus, until we had beaten them and shown
them that we were their masters.

After Ulundi, it was argued that the people would be glad to procure
peace by giving up their king, whose unconditional submission, or
capture, was announced by us to be the only possible conclusion to
the war.

The Zulus had ceased to struggle with their powerful conquerors, and
it now only remained to find Cetshwayo, who was said to be north
of the Black Umvolosi River, with a very small following. A flying
column, under Lieut.-Colonel Baker Russell, was sent out from Fort
Newdigate early in August, but his patrols were not successful.

On August 14th, a cavalry force under Major Barrow, with Lord
Gifford, started from Ulundi to try and find Cetshwayo, who had
hitherto eluded all attempts to capture him. Day after day it was
reported that the pursuers were close upon the fugitive: they had
come to a kraal where he had slept the previous night, they reached
another where he had been that very morning, and then they lost “the
scent,” and for some time could trace him no farther. They tried in
vain to persuade his people to betray him, but this “hated tyrant,”
although beaten and powerless, flying through the land now in the
possession of his conquerors, had still such a hold over the loyalty
and affection of his people, that they were true to him in his
adversity, and refused to give him up or to set his enemies on his
track.

Severe measures were taken to procure by force the information which
could not otherwise be obtained. Orders were given to one party of
the pursuers that at each kraal they reached, if the inhabitants
refused to speak, so many huts should be burnt, so many principal men
and women taken prisoners, and all cattle confiscated. Many kraals
were thus treated, and so many prisoners collected in this manner,
that the number to be taken at each kraal had to be reduced from
eight to four, then to two, and at last to one of each sex; thus
proving how steadfast were the people generally in their loyalty to
their king. On approaching some of these kraals, the headmen came out
and offered the passes or papers promising protection, given them
on surrendering their arms; but the unhappy people received another
lesson on the text, “When we give a promise we will perform it,”
and were told that their papers were worthless now; they must tell
where the king was, or suffer like the rest. One of the officers
concerned in carrying out these orders, exclaimed at the time with
natural indignation: “I don’t care what may be said of the necessity
of catching Cetshwayo; necessary or not, we are committing a crime in
what we are doing now!”

These measures proving useless, five prisoners were flogged to make
them speak—yet they held their peace. An interpreter, who accompanied
Major Barrow’s party, writes: “I had been a long time in Zululand. I
knew the people and their habits, and although I believed they would
be true to their king, I never expected such devotion. Nothing would
move them. Neither the loss of their cattle, the fear of death, or
the offering of large bribes, would make them false to their king.”

For many days this work of trying to persuade or force the people
to betray their king was continued, and, at last a woman was
frightened into giving a clue, which resulted in taking prisoners
three brothers, at whose kraal the king had slept the night before.
“They were questioned,” says the interpreter, “but denied in the most
solemn way that they knew anything about the king. We threatened to
shoot them, but they said: ‘If you kill us we shall die innocently.’
This was about nine o’clock at night, a beautiful moonlight night,
and the picture was rather an effective one. There were all our men
sitting round at their fireplaces, our select tribunal facing the
three men, who were calm and collected, whilst we, as a sort of
inquisition, were trying to force them to divulge their secret. As
a last resource we took one man and led him away blindfolded behind
a bush, and then a rifle was fired off to make believe that he was
shot. We then separated and blindfolded the remaining two, and said
to one of them: ‘You saw your brother blindfolded and led away;
we have shot him. Now we shall shoot you. You had better tell the
truth.’ After a good deal of coaxing (?) one told us where the king
had slept the night before, and which was about fifteen miles away,
and also where he had seen him that very morning ... it was now
eleven o’clock. Lord Gifford gave orders for our party to saddle up,
which was smartly done, and we started off with the two brothers as
guides. We left the one brother behind so as to keep on the screw, to
make the two believe he had been shot. They took us over as ugly a
piece of country as ever horse crossed, and at daybreak we surrounded
the kraal. But disappointment was again in store for us, for our bird
had flown about twelve hours previously.”

The direction he had taken being pointed out, the party followed
until they got within four or five miles of a kraal, where the king
had halted for the day. Lord Gifford sent off a note addressed to
Captain Maurice, saying he was on the track and hoped for speedy
capture; and, finding the kraal could not be approached without his
being seen, seems to have made up his mind to wait till nightfall. It
is perhaps fortunate that this arrangement was not carried out, as,
in the darkness and hurry of a night attack, it is possible that we
might have had the additional wrong laid upon us of having shot the
Zulu king.

Amongst other patrols sent out to look for Cetshwayo was one under
Major Marter, King’s Dragoon Guards, consisting of one squadron
Dragoons, ten men Mounted Infantry and Lonsdale’s Horse, and one
company Natal Native Contingent, their orders being to get on the
king’s track and capture him, if possible, and to reconnoitre the
Ngome Forest, and report if it could be traversed.

This force started on the 27th August, Major Marter sending two
natives on in the direction of the Ngome to impress upon the people
that until the king was captured they could not have rest, as troops
would be constantly on the move amongst them, and require supplies,
etc., and to suggest it would be to their advantage to give him some
hint or sign about the king. He had found the natives friendly,
but they said frankly that if they knew the king to be close by
they would not tell him; he, therefore, remembering the language of
symbols was pleasant to the native mind, endeavoured, by indirect
means, to obtain the information he sought. Having got over about
twenty-four miles of rough country, the little column halted on
the summit of the Inenge Mountain, and, starting at daylight next
morning, had crossed the Ibuluwane River about ten o’clock, when
a Zulu came from the hill in front, sent by a headman to whom
the scouts had been, and began to talk on indifferent subjects,
not appearing to wish to speak about the king. After some time
he casually remarked: “I have heard the wind blow from this side
to-day,” pointing to the Ngome Forest, “but you should take that road
until you come to Nisaka’s kraal,” showing a track leading upwards
and along the side of the range.

About half an hour afterwards a native brought a note addressed to
Captain Maurice. As this officer was out in another direction on
the same service, Major Marter opened and read it. It was from Lord
Gifford, who said he was on the track again and hoped for a speedy
capture of the king, but gave no information as to where either the
king or Lord Gifford were. Sending the man on in Captain Maurice’s
direction, Major Marter proceeded to Nisaka’s kraal, some distance
up the mountain. After some talk a suggestion of guides was made to
Nisaka, who said they had better go to his brother’s kraal on top of
the mountain, and called two men to go as guides. On reaching this
kraal the guides made signs for the party to halt where trees hid
them from being seen from below, and then took Major Marter on to the
edge of the precipice, crawling along on hands and knees; they then
stopped, and told him to go to a bush a little farther on and look
down. He did so, and saw a kraal in an open space about 2000 feet
below, in a basin, three sides of which were precipitous and covered
with dense forest. He considered it would be useless to approach the
kraal from the open side, as one minute’s warning would enable the
king to escape to the nearest point of the forest; and therefore
decided to venture down the side of the mountain under cover of the
forest, feeling that the importance of the capture would warrant the
risk.

Having rejoined his men, Major Marter ordered the natives to take off
their uniform, and, with their arms and ammunition only, pass down
the precipitous mountain to the lower edge of the forest nearest to
the kraal, and remain concealed till the cavalry were seen coming
from the forest on the other side; they were then to rush out towards
the open side of the kraal and surround it. The cavalry left led
horses, pack-animals, and every article which could make a noise
or impede their progress, and followed Major Marter, leading their
horses down the descent in single file. They left the upper part
of the mountain at 1.45 P.M., and, after a scramble over rocks and
watercourses, floundering in bogs, and hampered everywhere by trees
and gigantic creepers, reached the foot about three o’clock, having
lost two horses killed in the descent, and one man having his arm
badly hurt. In a little dell they mounted, and at a gallop dashed
out—one troop to the right, one to the left, the irregulars straight
to the front—over boulders, through high grass and every impediment,
up to the kraal; the natives reaching it at the same moment.

Seeing that the men in the kraal were armed with guns as well as
assegais, Major Marter desired his interpreter to call out that if
any resistance were offered he would shoot down every one and burn
the kraal; and then dismounting, with a few of his men, he entered
the enclosure, which was strongly stockaded. A chief—Umkosana—met
him, and was asked where the king was; after some delay, seeing it
was a hopeless case, he pointed out a hut on the farther side of
the enclosure. Major Marter called on the king to come out, but he
insisted the officer should go in to him. A threat of setting fire to
the hut was then made, when the king asked the rank of the officer,
and, after some further parley, came out and stood erect and quite
the king, looking at Major Marter, saying: “You would not have taken
me, but I never thought troops could come down the mountain through
the forest.”

Besides the Chief Umkosana, there were with Cetshwayo seven men and a
lad, five women and a girl, of his personal attendants.

There were twenty guns in the kraal, four of them rifles that had
belonged to the 24th Regiment, much ammunition, some belts of the
24th, and many assegais, one of which—the king’s—was sent by Sir
Garnet Wolseley to the Queen.

Taking the most open line of country, the party set out for Ulundi,
Major Marter taking personal charge of the king, who was in good
health, and showing no signs of over-fatigue.

On the evening of the second day three men and a woman sprang
suddenly into the thick bush through which they were passing and
tried to escape; but two of the men were shot. They had been
repeatedly warned that anyone trying to escape would be shot.

On the morning of the 31st August, Major Marter safely reached the
camp at Ulundi with Cetshwayo; who is described by his captor as “a
noble specimen of a man, without any bad expression, and the king all
over in appearance and manner.”

Sir Garnet Wolseley did not receive the fallen king himself, or
accord him any of the signs of respect to which he was entitled, and
which at least generosity demanded. That this was deeply felt is
apparent from the words of an eye-witness, the interpreter attached
to Major Barrow’s force. “Cetywayo,” he says, “who appreciates nicely
the courtesies due to rank—as those who knew him tell me—felt this
keenly. Sir Garnet Wolseley did not see him at all, and Mr. John
Shepstone only had an interview with him to tell him that he would
leave under the charge of Major Poole, R.A., for—no one knew where.
The instructions to the Major were, on leaving Ulundi, to proceed to
Pietermaritzburg _viâ_ Rorke’s Drift, but the camp had not been left
many miles behind before a messenger to the Major from the General
gave Port Durnford as the port of embarkation.

“Cetshwayo spent less than three hours amidst the ruins of Ulundi,
and when he left them he was not aware of his destination. His hope
was that he was going to Pietermaritzburg.... This he believed was
where he was going until he came to Kwamagwasa, and he said, ‘This
is not the way to the Tugela.’ He grew moody after this, and used to
moan, ‘It was better to be killed than sent over the sea.’”

The party reached Port Durnford on the 4th September, and was
immediately embarked for Cape Town. There the king met with a fitting
reception, and was conveyed to the castle, where he remained under
strict surveillance in the custody of Colonel Hassard, C.B., R.E.,
Commandant at Cape Town.

One peculiarity regarding the treatment of Cetshwayo may be
illustrated by the following personal anecdote:

A son and daughter of the Bishop of Natal, on their way to England,
called at Cape Town on board a steamer at the time of the king’s
arrival. They asked permission to see him, feeling that if anything
could be a solace to the captive it would be an interview with
members of a family which he knew had kindly feelings towards
him.[178] This request was refused by Sir Bertie Frere, who regretted
that he could not “at present give anyone permission to visit
Cetewayo,” and said that “all intercourse with him must be regulated
by the orders of the General Commanding H. M. Forces in the Field,
to whom all applications to communicate with the prisoner should be
referred.” After this communication, it was rather surprising to find
that several of the passengers on board the mail-steamer, leaving
the Cape the next day, had not only seen the king, but had found no
difficulty in so doing.[179]




CONCLUSION.


The fall of Ulundi was looked upon by some as the finishing touch
to the Zulu power and the end of the war, while others considered
peace ensured only and completely by the capture of the king. Much,
however, remained to be done before Natal could be thought of as at
peace with her neighbours and herself, and what has been commonly
called the “Settlement of Zululand,” was a task which required the
gravest consideration and the most careful handling.

Sir Garnet Wolseley’s first act in this direction was to call
together as many of the principal Zulu chiefs and officials as could
be found, and to address them upon the situation. This meeting took
place at Ulundi on the 1st of September, the day after the captive
king’s departure for Port Durnford. About 200 Zulus, including two of
Cetshwayo’s brothers, and his prime minister Mnyamana, had responded
to the summons; and seating themselves in rows four deep, with the
principal chiefs in front, a few paces from the flagstaff at Sir G.
Wolseley’s tent, waited in perfect silence. When Sir Garnet, with his
staff, at last appeared, he addressed the assembled chiefs through
Mr. John Shepstone, who accompanied him as interpreter. He informed
them that it was six years that very day since Cetshwayo was crowned
king of the Zulus, and that he was now carried away never to return.
This, he told them, was in consequence of his having broken his
coronation promises, and having failed to make and keep such laws
amongst his people as the Queen of England could approve, therefore
his kingdom was taken from him; and would now be divided amongst a
number of chiefs, who would be expected to rule with justice. In
future no life was to be taken without trial, and trivial offences
were to be punished by fines; no standing army would be allowed, nor
the possession of guns and ammunition by any Zulu; nor would any
stores be permitted to be landed on the Zulu coast, in case, under
the guise of merchandise, arms should be brought into the country.
The young men would be allowed to marry when and whom they pleased,
provided they had sufficient for the support of a wife, and could
obtain the consent of the girl’s parents, and “smelling out” for
witchcraft was to be put down. Nevertheless, the Queen had no wish to
force our laws and customs upon them. By their own rules of war and
conquest, Zululand now belonged to her; but she had already enough
land in Africa, and had therefore no intention of depriving the Zulus
of theirs. Finally, the missionaries were not to be forced upon them,
and the Zulus were even forbidden to encourage their settling amongst
them.

To secure the fulfilment of all these commands, Sir G. Wolseley told
the chiefs that he intended to leave an English officer as resident,
to be the eyes and ears of England, to watch over the people, and
to see the laws observed and that the chiefs ruled with justice and
equity. With what machinery the officer in question was to perform
so wide a task does not appear. Whether his position is to be a real
one, requiring several British regiments to support it, or whether it
is to be a mere farce, a fine-sounding pretence, remains yet to be
proved.

At the conclusion of the General’s discourse he produced a document,
the purport of which, he said, he had now told them, and which was to
be signed by all the chiefs whom he had chosen as rulers of the land,
to each of whom a duplicate copy would be given, while he retained a
similar one himself.

The first to sign his name was Mr. John Dunn, whose chieftainship
was by far the largest; and after him the Zulu chiefs touched the
pen while Mr. Shepstone made their crosses for them, in place of the
signature which they could not form.

For once in the history of Natal, all classes, from whatever widely
differing motives, were united in condemning the arrangement.

“The so-called settlement of Zululand,” says _The Cape Times_, on
September 16th, “is regarded with anything but satisfaction in Natal,
if we may accept the press of that colony as representative of public
opinion. Sir Garnet Wolseley was probably acting under instructions
in making peace on a barbarian basis; such a peace, however, has no
guarantee for continuance, but on the contrary an inherent weakness,
forbidding any hope of permanence. A savage nation is now divided
into a number of savage nations, each leaning to the other with all
the force of common blood and common traditions, while to check
the impulses of that force there is absolutely nothing beyond the
influence of two or three British residents, unsupported by any armed
retinue, and clothed with no more than a shadow of authority. And
as the embodiment of British civilisation, and as Her Majesty the
Queen’s own representative in Zululand, is placed Mr. John Dunn....
But whatever John Dunn’s merits may be, his appointment as Chief
Resident in Zululand is a shock to civilisation. His ways are Zulu
ways; his associations, Zulu associations; his very habits of thought
imbued with the Zulu character. A white man who for twenty years or
more has lived the Zulu life, wedded Zulu wives, and chosen their
society in preference to that of such women as a white man should
love and honour, is not the man to represent the Queen of England
in a nation of savages. The settlement of Zululand means simply
the appointment of a dozen Cetywayos, with a white man to look
after them, who is a Cetywayo in all but colour. And now Sir Garnet
Wolseley skips off in his light and airy fashion to the Transvaal,
flattering himself that he has made things pleasant in Zululand. It
is a miserable delusion....”

The “engagements” into which the Zulu chiefs entered are:

“1. I will observe and respect whatever boundaries shall be assigned
to my territory by the British Government through the Resident of the
division in which my territory is situated.

“2. I will not permit the existence of the Zulu military system, or
the existence of any military system of organisation whatever, in my
territory, and I will proclaim and make it a rule that all men shall
be allowed to marry when they choose and as they choose, according
to the good ancient customs of my people, known and followed in the
days preceding the establishment by Chaka of the system known as the
military system; and I will allow and encourage all men living within
my territory to go and come freely for peaceful purposes, and to work
in Natal and the Transvaal and elsewhere for themselves or for hire.

“3. I will not import or allow to be imported into my territory by
any person, upon any pretext or for any object whatever, any arms
or ammunition from any part whatsoever, or any goods or merchandise
by the sea-coast of Zululand, without the express sanction of the
Resident of the division in which my territory is situated; and I
will not encourage or promote, or take part in, or countenance in any
way whatever, the importation in any other part of Zululand of arms
or ammunition from any part whatever, or goods or merchandise by the
sea-coast of Zululand, without such sanction, and I will confiscate
and hand over to the Natal Government all arms and ammunition, and
goods and merchandise, so imported into my territory, and I will
punish by fine or by other sufficient punishment any person guilty
of or concerned in any such unsanctioned importation, and any person
found possessing arms or ammunition, or goods or merchandise,
knowingly obtained thereby.

“4. I will not allow the life of any of my people to be taken for
any cause, except after sentence passed in a council of the chief men
of my territory, and after fair and impartial trial in my presence
and after the hearing of witnesses; and I will not tolerate the
employment of witch-doctors, or the practice known as smelling-out,
or any practices of witchcraft.

“5. The surrender of persons fugitive in my territory from justice,
when demanded by the government of any British colony, territory, or
province, in the interests of justice, shall be readily and promptly
made to such government; and the escape into my territory of persons
accused or convicted of offences against British laws shall be
prevented by all possible means, and every exertion shall be made to
seize and deliver up such persons to British authority.

“6. I will not make war upon any chief or chiefs, or people, without
the sanction of the British Government, through the Resident of the
division in which my territory is situated.

“7. The succession to the chieftainship of my territory shall be
according to the ancient laws and customs of my people, and the
nomination of each successor shall be subject to the approval of the
British Government.

“8. I will not sell, or in any way alienate, or permit, or
countenance any sale or alienation of any part of the land in my
territory.

“9. I will permit all people residing in my territory to there
remain, upon the condition that they recognise my authority as chief,
and any persons not wishing to recognise my authority and desiring
to quit my territory I will permit to quit and to pass unmolested
elsewhere.

“10. In all cases of dispute in which British subjects are involved
I will appeal to and abide by the decision of the British Resident
of the division in which my territory is situated. In all cases when
accusations of offence or crime committed in my territory are brought
against British subjects, or against my people in relation to British
subjects, I will hold no trial and pass no sentence except with the
approval of such British Resident.

“11. In all matters not included within these terms, conditions, and
limitations, and in all cases provided for herein, and in all cases
when there may be doubt or uncertainty as to the laws, rules, or
stipulations applicable to matters to be dealt with, I will govern,
order, or decide in accordance with the ancient laws and usage of my
people.”

The following letter, addressed to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone,
and published in _The Guardian_ of December 10th, 1879, by the Dean
of ’Maritzburg, contains such valuable and important matter that we
quote it verbatim:

                           THE DEANERY, ’MARITZBURG, NATAL,
                                             _September 27th, 1879_.

  SIR,—Though I have not the honour of being known to you, yet,
  as the affairs of South Africa must necessarily engage the
  attention of Parliament when it next meets, I venture to hope
  you will not consider it an intrusion if I lay before you
  some of the conclusions I have arrived at after thirty years’
  residence as a clergyman in Natal. I do so as I know from
  experience how extremely difficult it is for those who have
  passed their lives in the midst of a highly organised society,
  to realise the conditions of a colony, and especially of one
  which is brought into contact with the undeveloped races of South
  Africa. The first question that presents itself is, What is
  the meaning of the apparent antagonism of the native races, at
  the present time, to the white man? I attribute it immediately
  to the natives suddenly and unexpectedly finding themselves in
  the possession of firearms. When the Diamond Fields were first
  opened out, no restrictions were placed on the gun-trade by the
  Cape Government, and so soon as this became known the natives
  flocked there in thousands from all parts of South Africa,
  hiring themselves out to work, and stipulating to be paid in
  rifles. Young men everywhere will arm themselves if they can,
  and especially in a country in which there is abundant room for
  hunting, and still more so when the young men are savages, and
  know of no distinction except that which comes from exhibiting
  prowess in war. I do not myself think they were influenced by
  any feelings of hatred to the white man, or that there existed
  any deep-seated conspiracy amongst the chiefs or old men. But
  the young men suddenly discovered they could obtain firearms, so
  got them; and having got them, they then desired to use them.
  Everywhere they were armed, and so everywhere they began to
  talk of fighting; the leaven had been put in and the whole lump
  worked. The war which arose is now over, and the Cape Government
  is engaged in steadily disarming the natives under its rule;
  its loyal subjects, the Fingoes and the Basutos, as well as the
  recently conquered tribes. Sir Garnet Wolseley told the Zulus
  also to bring in their guns; but they have treated his order with
  contempt, and he has made no attempt to enforce it; the Zulus
  themselves, I am afraid, will soon adduce this as evidence that
  they were not beaten. I may say, also, the Natal Governor always
  placed restrictions on the natives possessing firearms, and, so
  far as he could, enforced those restrictions on his own natives
  returning from the Diamond Fields, and they have proved perfectly
  loyal. Whilst at the time I deprecated the reckless trade allowed
  by the Cape Government, still it seems to me rather hard, after
  having allowed the natives to purchase guns, to set to work to
  disarm them. The wisest course I consider would be to impose a
  tax on the possession of firearms generally, granting privileges
  to members of volunteer corps, etc. In that way, without drawing
  invidious distinctions between white and coloured, our own young
  men would be exempted from paying by serving as volunteers; and
  if the tax were a heavy one the natives would be deterred from
  keeping guns, and, further, the Government would know exactly to
  what extent they were armed.

  To leave, however, the native races in general, and to confine
  ourselves to the Zulus. They never went to war with us, but
  we with them; they have always been excellent neighbours; for
  thirty years they have never been accused of stealing a sheep,
  or an ox, or a horse from the Natal side. Natal had no quarrel
  with them nor Cetywayo with us; it has been our misfortune that
  it has been found convenient to carry on the war from Natal;
  but Sir H. Bulwer, our Governor, has been true to the colony
  in insisting that it was no war of ours. If there was any
  justification of the war, it must be sought in the interests of
  Transvaal, and then it can only be accepted as a judgment. The
  Crown had not a shadow of right to annex the Transvaal. True,
  they were not governing themselves very well in that State;
  neither, perhaps, is Germany, but we do not annex Germany. We
  did take over the Transvaal, however, in direct violation of
  engagements which had been entered into with the Dutch Boers.
  Shepstone, in his proclamation, was obliged to say that we must
  read between the lines of that engagement—_i.e._ the promises
  of the British Government were worth nothing. The simple fact
  was that the Cape and Transvaal merchants had been overtrading
  in that republic; it was bankrupt, so many of them were on the
  brink of insolvency. I cannot say more without mentioning names,
  but there was no difficulty in seeing what influences were
  brought to bear on Lord Carnarvon. The Republic was annexed;
  farms were accepted at a nominal price in payment of debts, and
  resold again in London, say at sixpence per acre, which amply
  repaid the merchant, who thus saved himself, whilst the Boers
  were left without their independence, and poorer than ever. Had
  we stayed our hand, finding themselves hopelessly bankrupt, in
  a few months they might probably have sought our assistance,
  and then we could have annexed them without their having a
  grievance; as it is they cannot forget it. I am sorry for them,
  for they are a simple people. Shepstone went up as Governor, and
  Cetywayo at once asked to have his old disputes with the Boers
  arranged—in former days both he and his father, whenever they had
  had any difference with the Transvaal, always sent messengers
  in to the Natal Government to advise with it—and Shepstone,
  the Secretary for Natal Affairs, according to his wont, always
  temporised, admitting in a half-and-half way that they were
  right, but advising patience. When, however, he found himself
  at the Transvaal he suddenly sided with the Dutch, and Cetywayo
  became greatly incensed and declared himself betrayed. I believe
  he would at once have invaded the Transvaal, but from fear of us
  in Natal. He hesitated, however, and according to the old maxim,
  he who hesitates does not fight; but before he had quieted down
  Sir B. Frere interfered with his _ultimatum_, and Cetywayo stood
  grandly on the defensive. He is a savage, and his ambition was
  to be a great savage; I do not mean a cruel one, but a powerful,
  influential savage. He was ambitious, but disliked progress,
  and such men must fail; so he has fallen, but with dignity. He
  has never attacked a neighbour, white or black; he has defended
  his country bravely, and has been guilty of no excesses. It has
  been our war, not his. Sir B. Frere says most truly that almost
  everyone he spoke to encouraged him to go to war; but I am afraid
  he avoided those who, he was told, were against war—and when
  will not Englishmen advise war? No argument was used, except
  the one that Cetywayo might overrun Natal at any moment; but he
  had never shown a disposition to do so, and we were stronger
  than men would allow. Men who do not trust in the arm of God do
  not see the defences which surround them. The Tugela, the river
  which separates Natal from Zululand, was a great protection,
  as in summer-time, even if fordable, the Zulus would not cross
  it, lest it should rise in their rear; and in the winter, our
  dry season, they cannot keep the field, as their naked bodies
  are quite unable to bear exposure to the cold nights. Moreover,
  though our own army will never acknowledge it, Cetywayo’s force
  did not exceed 30,000 naked savages. Of course we are told they
  were 60,000 or 80,000 strong; but if you casually inquire of any
  officer who has been in Zululand whether the kraals were thickly
  dotted over the country, he will tell you artlessly, “No, quite
  the contrary.” I have again and again inquired of traders as to
  the density of the population relative to Natal. I have inquired
  of those who have lived at Ulundi, and have seen Cetywayo’s
  regiments mustered, and I am confident that 30,000 is the very
  outside at which the Zulu force could be put. I may return to
  this. I mention it now to show why I do not agree with Sir Bartle
  in his view of our position; and certainly I cannot admit,
  because a neighbour is powerful, that therefore we are justified
  in going to war with him.

  But, now that we have been at war, on what terms is peace to
  be arranged? In the Cape Colony the natives—as the Basutos,
  the Fingoes, and others—live in districts to themselves, not
  intermingled with the white man. The young men leave their homes,
  and go into the colony, and work for a time in the towns or on
  the farms; but their home is in Basutoland, Fingoland, etc. The
  same holds good in the Transvaal. The natives there are on the
  border; but Natal is the one exception to this rule; in this
  colony we live intermingled; and a few years ago we were regarded
  as living in the crater of a volcano. It was thought that the
  Natal natives, who outnumber the European settlers eighteenfold,
  might at any moment overwhelm us, so that Cape politicians and
  others refused to be connected with this colony. In 1876,
  however, before the rising of the natives on the frontier, I was
  bold enough to point out to my fellow-colonists that our supposed
  weakness was in reality our strength. And so it has proved.
  During the last two years Natal has been the oasis of South
  Africa; everywhere else the natives have either been in arms,
  or shown themselves disaffected, if we except the Fingoes; but
  the position in which they stand to the Kafir tribes around them
  compels them to be loyal, so they are scarcely to be taken into
  account.

  Whilst, then, throughout South Africa the natives have been a
  source of uneasiness, the overwhelming native population of
  Natal (360,000, against 22,000 whites) has been perfectly true
  to the Government, and the grounds of their loyalty are now, I
  think, recognised in Natal. They are these: 1. The natives are
  not, like Englishmen, self-reliant, but naturally dependent;
  consequently, they use the machinery of Government much more
  than we do. An Englishman dislikes appealing to a magistrate, as
  it implies a want of power to take care of himself or to govern
  his dependents. Not so the native; he habitually leans upon the
  magistrate. Thirty years ago in Natal the native leant upon his
  chief; now he has become familiar with the magistrate, who has
  become a necessity to him. I argue, therefore, that a people will
  not plot or even desire to throw off an authority which enters
  into their daily life. 2. Natives who have resided amongst white
  men feel the need of their presence. The native races cannot
  develop themselves—nor, when in some degree developed, can they
  stand by themselves—as their wills are weak, and intellectually
  they are lawyers, fond of argument, but without imagination; so
  they can neither plan nor construct. In their independent state
  they have no criminal law, no commercial code, no municipal one,
  no law of tenure of landed property; they possess only a few
  customs regulating marriage and the division of their cattle
  amongst the family; but, scattered amongst white men, they are
  able to expand. The effect is seen in many ways—amongst others,
  in the increase of their families. 3. They are naturally fond of
  trading. In many ways they may be compared to the Celtic race, as
  they cannot rise above the tribal organisation; but, unlike the
  Celt, they are not intellectual; and, unlike him, their natural
  bent is towards trading. They are good soldiers, but they prefer
  trading to everything; consequently, on this account, they are
  unwilling to separate from the white man. 4. The natives never
  go to war unless they can first send their cattle to the rear;
  but this they cannot do when distributed amongst the Europeans,
  and this operates alone as a great check. During the thirty years
  I have been in Natal we have only had three chiefs give the
  slightest trouble, and these three have all been on the borders,
  and so have been able to send their cattle away. I am convinced,
  therefore, that, if the Government wishes to maintain peace and
  to develop the native races, it should intermingle them with the
  Europeans. The Aborigines Society at home will probably object.
  It is easy to say the white man seeks only to dispossess the
  native, but whatever the individual motive, the white man is the
  benefactor by his presence. He may have hunted down the North
  American Indian and the Aborigines of Australia, but not so in
  South Africa. Here not only does the magistrate protect him,
  but the Kafir is a worker, which the North American Indian and
  the native of Australia is not. The white man wants the Kafir’s
  labour, and to secure it has to be just and kind. A farm-servant
  in England is by no means so independent as a Kafir out here. Mix
  up the races therefore, and to some extent at least the problem
  of governing and improving the native race is solved. After the
  defeat at Isandhlwana, new-comers like the military thought our
  natives might rise; but their wives, children, waggons, cattle,
  etc., were in the colony, so they made common cause with us, and
  showed themselves zealously loyal. I consider it, therefore,
  to be most foolish to try and keep the races apart; we must
  intermingle them. It was Alexander’s principle and the Roman
  rule; the present European families have been founded on this
  method—so we must go on mingling, not separating.

  I send you a copy of Sir Garnet Wolseley’s conditions of peace,
  as published in _The Natal Witness_. They are universally
  condemned here. 1. The chiefs are to be under British Residents,
  and they must be supported by a force. But who is to pay? It
  is said the Zulus are not to be taxed, as that would amount to
  annexation; or, rather, it would test Sir Garnet’s arrangements.
  If he is afraid to tax the Zulus the Residents will be afraid
  to control them. The test of defeat with Kafirs is the loss of
  cattle—they do not estimate the loss of life; but we have not
  taken cattle. Indeed, the balance is on their side: they have
  carried off more than we have.[180] The test of submission is
  obedience, and they have with one accord disobeyed the order to
  give up their guns. The test of the Queen’s authority in South
  Africa is the payment of taxes. Even Cetywayo offered to pay a
  hut-tax; and if Sir Garnet does not impose one, all the young men
  in Zululand, before a year is over, will point to their cattle,
  their guns, and their immunity from taxes, and boast that they
  were not beaten. If the Zulus are to be controlled by British
  Residents they should pay a hut-tax. Our natives pay a hut-tax
  of 14s. per hut. I have understood that the Cape Government wish
  it to be uniform throughout South Africa, and to be fixed at £1.
  We estimate the population at three-and-a-half persons to a hut,
  and at 14s. it amounts to 4s. per head. Besides that the natives
  on farms pay rent to the farmer, and the more they adopt our
  habits the more do they pay through the Customs. The Zulus could
  readily pay £1 per hut, or, say £36,000 per annum. Cetywayo’s
  Government was an expensive one. His commissariat alone was a
  heavy drain upon the resources of the people. Savages, as well
  as civilised persons, understand that they must support their
  Government; the Zulus, therefore, would recognise the justice
  of being taxed; and not to tax them is, I consider, to abandon
  one of the duties of Government. Moreover, it is said we are to
  be taxed to pay our quota of the recent expenditure. But our
  natives will hardly understand first fighting the Zulus, and then
  having to pay for it. It will seem to them as if they were the
  offending party, if they, and not the Zulus, are taxed. 2. The
  conditions discourage trade. It ought to be encouraged to the
  utmost. Instead of forbidding importation by sea, a Custom-house
  should be established at the one port or landing-place, 3. The
  alienation of land is forbidden, in order to keep out the white
  man; but he should be encouraged to enter, and so long as the
  land is held in common by the whole tribe there will be no
  improvement in agriculture. Or, to take the conditions in order—2
  is impossible; the young men will be quarrelling with one another
  at weddings and other gatherings, tribal fights will ensue, and
  the chiefs must have a force at their command. 3 I have touched
  upon. 4 is nugatory; if a chief wishes to put to death he can
  give a man a mock trial and have done with it. 6 overlooks that
  wars often do not begin with the chiefs; the young men bring
  them about. 8 I have touched upon. The whole implies the active
  and constant superintendence of the Resident, and that will be
  resisted: some kraal or kraals will be disobedient to orders,
  the chief will be unable or unwilling to enforce obedience, and
  the Resident must call in other assistance at great expense; and
  at whose? There is nothing enduring, nothing practical in this
  settlement, if it deserves to be called such. It is not likely
  to last, and everyone expects, after a short interval, more
  bloodshed and more reckless expenditure. The burden cannot be
  thrown on the Colony, as the Government has not been consulted on
  the terms of peace. The whole thing is a cruelty to the Zulus,
  to the colonists, and to the suffering home population, for
  there will be another £3,000,000 or more to be voted yet; but
  during the whole time meat was 8d. and bread 4d. per pound. 1s.
  6d. per diem was consequently ample allowance for the keep of a
  soldier; of course I am aware there were numerous other sources
  of expenditure, but it is extreme folly to send an army out to
  a distant place, with power to draw upon the Treasury at will;
  it is too great a trial for human nature. As a blind, all sorts
  of things are said about the colonists; a great deal or even all
  may be true, but it does not explain half. That, however, is by
  the way; but I must mention, before concluding, that one of the
  newly-appointed chiefs is a white man named John Dunn. He left
  home when about fifteen or sixteen, and has since lived with the
  Zulus, taking to himself a number of wives. This appointment is
  looked upon as an outrage to public morals and as an insult to
  the colonists. I say nothing about the missionaries, as I do
  not wish that they should lean upon the civil power; the Church
  must do her proper work in her proper way. I simply write as an
  Englishman, to one who largely guides the counsels of the nation,
  to lift up my voice against what has been done, and is being
  done, in this part of the empire. Trusting you will excuse my
  thus trespassing upon your time, believe me to remain yours most
  respectfully,
                                        JAMES GREEN,
                                              _Dean of ’Maritzburg_.

But at all events we had gained one definite result by all the blood
and money spent in the Zulu war. The most important and earnestly
insisted on immediate cause of our attack upon Zululand was the
invasion of our soil, and the violation of our sanctuary, committed
by Mehlokazulu and his brother, sons of Sihayo, when they seized and
carried off two women who had taken refuge in Natal. We “requested”
the Zulu king to deliver up the young men to us for judgment and for
punishment, and he begged us to accept a fine in lieu of the persons
of the offenders. We declined this proposal and repeated our request,
which suddenly became a “demand” when it appeared in the ultimatum,
and as such remained.

It was said at the time that, had the young men been given up even
after the troops had crossed the border, hostilities would have been
suspended until the rest of the demands could be complied with. But
they were not, so we went to war.

And now, at last, the war was over, one of Sihayo’s sons had fallen
in battle, and Mehlokazulu, the other, was in our hands. Here was
what we had fought for, and obtained! What would be done with him?
By the military authorities he could only be treated like any
other prisoner of war, and released unharmed amongst the other
Zulus. He was therefore handed over to the civil authorities at
Pietermaritzburg to be tried by them, although he was denied the
same advantages of counsel which are accorded by law to other civil
prisoners.

This denial was commented upon unfavourably by those who desired
justice to be done, but, apparently, Mehlokazulu required no counsel,
for he was not tried. He had committed no offence on British soil
punishable in a Zulu subject by British law. His own king could have
punished him by our request, but we had deposed and transported
that king, and there was no law by which we could have inflicted
anything beyond a trifling fine for trespass upon the man whom we had
compassed heaven and earth, and shed so much of England’s noblest
blood, to seize. The magistrate declined to commit him for trial,
and Mehlokazulu was permitted to return to his home. “Doubtless,”
remarks _The Natal Colonist_ of October 27th, “the legal adviser of
the Crown was concerned in the case, and framed the charge which
there was the best chance of being substantiated. And this is the
result—‘there was no evidence to maintain the charge.’... It is a
miserable conclusion to a most miserable affair.... The charge which,
as we have seen, is almost made the chief occasion of the war which
has desolated so many homes, and cost millions of money, completely
breaks down when brought to the test of legal trial, and the prisoner
is, of necessity, set at liberty. We never believed much in the
other pretexts for the war put forward by Sir Bartle Frere, but we
confess that we always thought the outrage by Sihayo’s sons was one
to be visited with condign punishment, whether it was one which would
justify war or not; and even though we knew it was only a pretext,
seeing that it only took place long after war had been determined on,
and preparations for it had been begun to be made.”

“But the ultimatum and its demands are things of the past. Rivers of
blood have flowed to enforce these demands, and now they are put on
one side as utterly valueless, both by the settlement of Zululand and
the release of Sirayo’s son.”[181]

With this humiliating fact we must close our record of the Zulu War.
In doing so, we feel that too many of the circumstances which we have
thus recorded reflect no credit on the name of England—that name
which as English men and women we most desire should be honoured by
the world at large; and we realise with pain that, so far as our work
may be perused by dwellers upon other shores, so far have we lessened
the glory of our motherland in their eyes. But, however much we may
regret the necessity, we do not therefore think it a less imperative
duty to bring to the light as much as possible whatever wrong and
injustice has been committed and concealed by those to whom England
has entrusted her power and her fame. That the light of publicity
should be thrown upon them is the first step towards their cure,
or at least towards the prevention of any further wrong, and it is
with the truest loyalty to our Sovereign, and the deepest love and
reverence for our country, that we have undertaken the task now
completed.


THE END.


CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS, CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS.


FOOTNOTES:

[1] “Few things struck me more than the evident haste and temporary
character of the defensive measures undertaken by the English part of
the population”—in the border districts of Natal. (See letter from
Sir Bartle Frere to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, dated March 28th, 1879.
P. P. [C. 2318] p. 32.)

[2] Spelt thus to give the nearest proper pronunciation of “Cetywayo.”

[3] Residence of the Bishop of Natal.

[4] These people had refused to leave their homes, or desert their
Bishop, as long as he and his family remained at Bishopstowe,
although both black and white, for miles around, had sought shelter
elsewhere.

[5] A system not unlike the Inquisition in its evil results.

[6] Who, it may be remarked, have always been well treated in
Zululand.

[7] Portions of this letter are omitted from the Blue-book. It would
be interesting to see the letter as originally received.

[8] One put to death in 1861 was condemned on a charge of high
treason.

[9] As he had previously, in the year 1861, visited Zululand for the
purpose of fixing the succession upon the house of Cetshwayo.

[10] Since by our desire he refrained from protecting it by force of
arms.

[11] He gives as reasons for his objections: first, that such
treaties “involve an admission of equality between the contracting
parties,” and therefore “encourage presumption” on the part of the
inferior, etc.; secondly, that “men who cannot read are apt to forget
or distort the words of a treaty.” A third reason, which does not
seem to have occurred to Mr. Shepstone, lies in the ease with which
a savage may be deceived as to the contents of a written document,
which facility we shall soon largely illustrate in the matter of Boer
treaties with the natives.

[12] See Lecky’s “Rationalism in Europe”:—7000 at Trèves; 600 by a
single Bishop of Bamberg; 800 in _one_ year, in the bishopric of
Wurtzburg; 1000 in the province of Como; 400 at _once_, at Toulouse;
500 in three months, at Geneva; 48 at Constance; 80 at the little
town of Valary in Saxony; 70 in Sweden; and one _Christian_ judge
boasted that he himself had been the means of putting to death, in
sixteen years, 800 witches!

In Scotland, two centuries ago, but after many centuries of
Christianity and civilisation, John Brown, the Ayrshire carrier, was
shot, and, within a fortnight, an aged widow and a young maid were
tied to stakes in the Solway and drowned by the rising tide, for the
crime of neglecting episcopal worship, and going aside into the moor
to spend the Sabbath day in prayer and praise.

[13] P. P. [C. 1401] p. 30.

[14] Natives of Basutoland, resident for many years in Natal.

[15] See Field Force Order, 1873.

[16] In the Zulu language the word _abantwana_ (children) is a
general one, including both women and children.

[17] It is only fair to Major Durnford to state that during the whole
of these proceedings he was away over the mountains, in vain pursuit
of an enemy to be fought.

[18] 1. The following account of the above transaction was given by
one of those concerned, in a letter to _The Natal Times_ of that
date: “Twenty of us volunteered yesterday to go up and into a cave
about eight miles from here. We found only one native, whom we shot,
took a lot of goats (eighty-seven), and any amount of assegais and
other weapons. We also searched about the country and killed a few
niggers, taking fourteen prisoners. One fellow in a cave loaded his
rifle with stones, and slightly wounded Wheelwright and Lieutenant
Clarke, R.A. We, however, got him out, and Moodie shot him through
the brains. Fifteen of ours have just volunteered to go to a cave
supposed to contain niggers. We are gradually wiping out the three
poor fellows who were shot, and all our men are determined to have
some more.”

2. _The Natal Government Gazette_, December 9th, 1873, contains the
following enactment: “All officers and other persons who have acted
under the authority of Sir Benjamin Chillay Campbell Pine, K.C.M.G.,
as Lieut.-Governor of the colony of Natal, or as Supreme Chief over
the native population, or have acted _bonâ fide_ for the purposes
and during the time aforesaid, whether such acts were done in any
district, county, or division of the colony in which martial law was
proclaimed or not, are hereby indemnified in respect of all acts,
matters, and things done, in order to suppress the rebellion and
prevent the spread thereof; and such acts so done are hereby made and
declared to be lawful, and are confirmed.”

[19] It is hard to understand why these people should yet be detained
and their harmless old chief still kept prisoner at Capetown. The
common saying that they are all content and the chief better off than
he ever was before in his life, is an entirely and cruelly false one.
Langalibalele is wearying for his freedom and his own people; the few
women with him are tired of their loneliness, and longing to be with
their children in Natal. The present writer paid the chief a visit in
September of this year (1879), and found him very sad. “I am weary;
when will they let me go?” was his continual question.

[20] Not including those individual acts of cruelty which no one
could defend, although many speak of them as unavoidable.

[21] The Lieut.-Governor of the colony.

[22] Kafir law, under which Langalibalele was tried, because most
of the offences with which he was charged were not recognisable by
English law.

[23] Ordinance No. 3, 1849.

[24] The italics are the Author’s own in this and following charge.

[25] The other rebel chiefs of the Cape Colony here alluded to,
however, were not “banished,” but merely imprisoned in a portion of
their own Supreme Chiefs territory, where, at proper times, they
could be visited by members of their families and tribes; moreover,
they were duly tried and convicted before the ordinary courts of
serious crimes committed by themselves individually, and they had
actually resisted by force their Supreme Chief within his territory;
whereas Langalibalele had made no resistance—he was a runaway, but
no rebel; he had not been tried and condemned for any crime in the
Colonial Court, and banishment for life to Robben Island, away from
all his people, was a fate worse than death in his and their eyes.

[26] The same Magema, the Bishop’s printer, before mentioned.

[27] Although Mawiza’s lies were plainly exposed, he was never
punished, but remains to this day in charge of a large tribe, over
which he has been placed by the Government.

[28] On June 24th, 1874, the Bishop presented this “Appeal on behalf
of Langalibalele” to His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of Natal
and the executive committee of the Colony. The appeal was made in
the first instance to Sir B. C. C. Pine, who altogether refused to
listen to it. On this the Bishop forwarded a letter through the
Lieut.-Governor to the Earl of Carnarvon, enclosing a copy of his
correspondence with Sir B. C. C. Pine, and stating his reasons for
acting as he had done in the matter. This letter was dated August
6th, 1874, and on August 16th the Bishop left home _en route_ to
England.

[29] He was a bright intelligent lad, keenly anxious for
self-improvement, and with a great desire, unusual amongst his kind,
to go to England, and see a civilised country.

[30] The Zulus and Zulu-Kafirs bathe their persons frequently, but
they have not our ideas of cleanliness in respect to dress and
habitations, although they are very particular about their food,
utensils, and other matters.

[31] This was done at the expense of Government, which likewise
allowed certain supplies of meal, salt, and a little meat to the
captives.

[32] The boy was one of those who in the meanwhile had learnt at
Bishopstowe to read and write, and who therefore could be of some
use to his father as scribe, although his usefulness in that respect
is much curtailed by the exceeding caution of the Government, which
in its absurd and causeless fear of “treasonable correspondence,”
will not allow written words of any description to reach or leave
the poor old chief without official inspection. This precaution
goes so far that in one instance some mats made by the women for
Miss Colenso, and sent from Uitvlugt (the place of Langalibalele’s
confinement after he was removed from the island), never reached
their destination, owing to the paper attached, signifying for whom
they were intended, being removed, as coming under the head of
prohibited liberties. Another case is that of a lady who visited the
family in September, 1879, and asked them to tell her what trifles
they would like her to send them from Cape Town, but found that she
had no power to send some babies’ socks which the women had chosen,
and a comforter for the old man’s neck, except through an official
individual and by formal permission.

[33] A woman, wife of one of the fugitives, being taken prisoner
during the expedition, found favour, much against her will, in the
eyes of one Adam (a follower of the Secretary for Native Affairs),
who asked to be allowed to take her as his wife. Permission was
granted, but the woman refused, saying that she had a husband
already, to whom she was attached. Her wishes were disregarded, and
she was conveyed home by Adam, from whom she shortly escaped. Adam
applied to the nearest magistrate for an order to take forcible
possession of the fugitive, and the woman was thrown into gaol by
the magistrate, until she should consent to be Adam’s wife. The man
took her home a second time, and she again escaped from him; in fact
her determination was so great that the matter was finally given up
altogether. Eventually she rejoined her own husband, who received her
and her child with the kindness which her constancy deserved.

[34] Reaching home early in October, 1874.

[35] Acts of “defiance” and “resistance,” too vague for any special
instance to be given, probably striking his lordship as being of a
slightly imaginary character.

[36] Implying plainly that strict justice would demand it.

[37] Author’s italics.

[38] No notice was ever taken of the recommendation.

[39] It is reported that Sir B. Pine has felt the injustice to
himself so keenly that he refuses longer to acknowledge his title of
K.C.M.G., and styles himself simply Mr. Pine. There can be little
doubt that in point of fact Mr. Shepstone was mainly responsible for
all that happened; but “the right man to annex the Transvaal” could
not well be spared, and a scapegoat was found for him in Sir Benjamin
Pine.

[40] Three at last.

[41] It would be an injustice to an association, called into
existence and maintained by a true spirit of Christian charity, to
pass over in silence the active, if seemingly ineffectual, efforts
of the Aborigines Protection Society to obtain justice for the
unfortunate people of the Putini tribe.

[42] The annexation of the Transvaal:—so stated by one of his own
staff.

[43] It is neither customary nor convenient to speak publicly of a
parent, and I desire to let facts speak for themselves as much as
possible. I feel, however, bound to remark that of all the mistakes
made by a succession of rulers in Natal, perhaps the most foolish
and unnecessary has been that jealousy of episcopal “or unofficial”
interference, which has blinded them to the fact that the Bishop has
always been ready to give any assistance in his power to the local
Government in carrying out all just and expedient measures towards
the natives, without claiming any credit or taking any apparently
prominent position beyond his own; and, so long as justice is done,
would greatly prefer its being done by those in office. He has never
interfered, except when his duty as a man, and as the servant of a
just and merciful Master, has made it imperatively necessary that he
should do so; nor does he covet any political power or influence. To
a government which intends to carry out a certain line of policy in
defiance of justice and honour, he would ever be an opponent; but
one which honestly aims at the truth would assuredly meet with his
earnest support.

[44] “The recollection of past events”—that is to say, of the
slaughter of many men, women, and children, the destruction of homes,
and the sufferings of the living;—this can hardly with reason be said
to be _kept alive_ by attempts to ameliorate the condition of those
that remained, and to show them some small kindness and pity. How
“a good feeling” was to be restored between the victims and their
conquerors by other means, Sir Garnet does not suggest.

[45] In common only with the rest of the tribe.

[46] Three women and two children only have been allowed to join him.

[47] Which did not prevent their being of the utmost importance
in considering the case of the chief under trial at the time the
statements were made.

[48] Sir B. Pine complains in his despatch, December 31st, 1874, of
the “intolerable injustice” of charges being made against Mr. J.
Shepstone, upon evidence taken by the Bishop _ex parte_, without
the _safety of publicity_ and the opportunity of cross-examination.
Yet Sir Garnet Wolseley refused to allow publicity or searching
cross-examination by experienced advocates.

[49] One of the original four.

[50] Mr. Shepstone says in his second report that a day or two
previous to the meeting with Matshana, he had received information to
the effect that the chief’s intentions were to put him and his people
to death at the expected interview, and all the efforts made by Mr.
Shepstone and his witnesses were to prove, first, the murderous
intentions of Matshana; and, secondly, that _nevertheless_ Mr.
Shepstone had no counter-plans for violence, and did not fire upon
the people.

[51] Author’s italics.

[52] Rather by the determination of their rulers to preserve their
land from Boer encroachments.

[53] SAND RIVER TREATY.—“Evidence was adduced that the Transvaal
Boers, who, by the Sand River Convention, and in consideration of
the independence which that convention assured to them, had solemnly
pledged themselves to this country (England) not to reintroduce
slavery into their Republic, had been in the habit of capturing,
buying, selling, and holding in forced servitude, African children,
called by the cant name of ‘black ivory,’ murdering the fathers,
and driving off the mothers; that this slave trade was carried on
with the sanction of the subordinate Transvaal authorities, and that
the President did actually imprison and threaten to ruin by State
prosecution a fellow-countryman who brought it to the notice of
the English authority—an authority which, if it had not the power
to prevent, had at any rate a treaty right to denounce it. This
and more was done, sometimes in a barbarous way, under an assumed
divine authority to exterminate those who resisted them. So much was
established by Dutch and German evidence. But it was supplemented
and carried farther by the evidence of natives as to their own
sufferings, and of English officers as to that general notoriety
which used to be called _publica fama_.”—_From an article by Lord
Blachford in The Nineteenth Century Review, August 1879_, p. 265.

[54] A native chief.

[55] Written in October, 1879.

[56] Lord Blachford says in the article already quoted from: “The
citizens of these Republics have gone out from among us into a
hostile wilderness, because they could not endure a humanitarianism
which not only runs counter to their habits and interest, but
blasphemes that combination of gain with godliness which is part of
their religion. While that humanitarianism forms a leading principle
of our government they will not submit to it. Why should we bribe
or force them to do so? It is no doubt right and wise to remain, if
possible, on good terms with them. It is wise and generous to save
them, if possible, in their day of calamity—as, with our own opposite
policy, we have been able to save them—by a wave of the hand—twice
from the Basutos, and once from the Zulus. (Once for all rather,
through the course of many years, during which we have restrained
the Zulus from asserting their own rights to the disputed territory,
by promises that we would see justice done.—_Author._) But it is
neither wise nor necessary to embroil ourselves in their quarrels
until they call for help, until they have had occasion to feel the
evil effects of their own methods, and the measure of their weakness,
and are ready, not in whispers or innuendos and confidential corners,
but outspokenly in public meetings, or through their constituted
authorities, to accept with gratitude our intervention on our own
terms, until they are, if they ever can be, thus taught by adversity.
I do not myself believe that we could enter into any political union
with them except at the sacrifice of that character for justice to
which, I persist in saying, we owe so much of our power and security
in South Africa. Nor so long as we observe the rules of justice to
them shall we do any good by disguising our substantial differences,
or refraining from indignant remonstrances against proceedings which
are not only repugnant to humanity, but violate their engagements
with us and endanger our security.”

[57] Colonel Durnford, R.E., who paid a flying visit to Pretoria at
the time.

[58] Mr. John Dunn is said to have stated to the Special
Correspondent of _The Cape Argus_, and to have since reaffirmed his
statement, that Sir T. Shepstone “sent word to Cetshwayo that he was
being hemmed in, and the king was to hold himself in readiness to
come to his assistance.” This assertion has also been denied by Sir
T. Shepstone’s supporters.

[59] P. P. [C. 1776] p. 88.

[60] It may be interesting to compare the above with the wording of
Sir T. Shepstone’s “Commission”—P. P. [C. 1776] p. 111.

[61] The chief repeatedly refused to sign any paper presented to
him by the Boers, on the grounds that he could not tell what it
might contain, beyond the points explained to him, to which he might
afterwards be said to have agreed; showing plainly to what the
natives were accustomed in their dealings with the Transvaal.

[62] That claimed by the Boers.

[63] P. P. (2079, pp. 51-54).

[64] The conclusion arrived at, after a careful consideration of all
producible evidence, by the Rorke’s Drift Commission, in 1878.

[65] A liability transferred to the Zulu king by Sir Bartle Frere in
his correspondence with the Bishop of Natal.

[66] That is to say, that they may be bribed by substantial benefits
to acquiesce in the loss of their liberties.

[67] Was it by inadvertence that Sir T. Shepstone speaks of “us” and
“we,” thus producing a sentence so strangely and unhappily applicable?

[68] Italics not Sir B. Frere’s.

[69] Author’s italics throughout.

[70] Author’s italics.

[71] “_Ama_-Swazi” for the plural correctly, as also “Ama-Zulu.”

[72] Sir Henry Bulwer, speaking of the disputed territory generally,
writes as follows: “The Zulu king had always, in deference very
much to the wishes and advice of this Government (Natal), forborne
from doing anything in respect of the question that might produce
a collision, trusting to the good offices of this Government to
arrange the difficulty by other means. But no such arrangement had
ever been made; and thus the question had drifted on until the
formal annexation of the disputed territory by the Government of the
Republic last year, and their subsequent attempt to give a practical
effect to their proclamation of annexation by levying taxes upon the
Zulus residing in the territory, provoked a resistance and a feeling
of resentment which threatened to precipitate a general collision at
any moment.”—SIR H. BULWER, _June 29th, 1876_ (C. 1961, p. 1).

[73] Umtonga escaped again, and is now living in the Transvaal. His
brother was still living in Zululand, as head of Umtonga’s kraal, at
the beginning of the war, and no injury appears to have been done to
any of the four.

[74] Thereby pointing the truth of his own remark at a previous
date—March 30th, 1876 (1748, p. 24): “But messages from the Zulu king
are becoming more frequent and urgent, and _the replies he receives
seem to him to be both temporising and evasive_.” (Author’s italics).

[75] Immediately after they had signed the instrument of appointment
the two Zulu messengers were sent in to the Government by Messrs.
Smith and Colenso, and took with them a letter (C. 2000) which
mentioned them as its bearers, and announced what they had done.

[76] ’Mfunzi and ’Nkisimane were sent down again to ’Maritzburg by
Cetshwayo, at the request of Sir H. Bulwer, and denied the whole
transaction, though it was attested by the signatures of the notary
and two white witnesses. It was afterwards discovered that they had
been frightened into this denial by a Natal Government messenger,
who told them that they had made the Governor very angry with them
and their king by making this appointment; and John Dunn also, after
receiving letters from ’Maritzburg, told them that they had committed
a great fault, and that he saw that they would never _all_ come home
again.

[77] Messrs. Smith and Colenso’s explanatory letter to Sir M.
Hicks-Beach, dated June 9th, 1878, concludes as follows:

“This business, as far as we are concerned, is, therefore, ended. We
had hoped to be instrumental in embodying in a contract a proposal
which we knew was advantageous to both parties. To do so only
required the intervention of European lawyers trusted by Cetewayo.
We knew that he trusted us, and would trust no others. The task of
acting for the king was, therefore, imposed on us as lawyers and as
gentlemen. Of pecuniary reward, or its equivalent, our labours have
brought us nothing. We do not require it. Honour we did not desire,
nor had a savage prince any means of conferring it. The duty thus
undertaken we give up only in despair, and we have nothing to regret.

“Such information, however, as we have gleaned in the course of our
agency you are entitled to hear from us, as we are British subjects.

“The Zulus are hostile to the Boers of the Transvaal, and would
fight with them but for fear of being involved in a quarrel with the
English. But neither Cetewayo himself, who is wise and peaceful, nor
the most hot-blooded of his young warriors have any desire to fight
with England, _i.e._ Natal.

“If they wished to do so there is nothing to prevent them, and never
has been. As they march, they could march from their border to this
city or to Durban in a little more than twenty-four hours. Their only
fear is, that the English will come with an army ‘to make them pay
taxes.’ They say they will rather die than do so. The king says the
same. Almost every man has a gun. Guns and ammunition are cheaper at
any military kraal in Zululand than at Port Natal. These goods are
imported by Tonga men, who come in large gangs from Delagoa Bay, for
white merchants. An Enfield rifle may be had for a sheep of a Tonga
man; many have breech-loaders. The missionaries, whose principal
occupation was trading, deal in ammunition. The missionaries have
recently lost most of their converts, who have gone trading on their
own account. Without these converts the missionaries cannot do
business, and they have left the country, except Bishop Schreuder,
who has gone back, that it may not be said that a white man is not
safe there. Cetewayo says that he has asked the missionaries to stop.
They have certainly not been turned out or threatened. Their going
makes the Zulus think that we are about to invade the country.

“Nothing but gross mismanagement will bring about a quarrel between
England and the Zulus.”—(P. P. [C. 2144] pp. 215, 216).

[78] This is apparently a figure of speech, since Luneburg, near
which the kraal was being built, would seem by the map _not_ to
lie “to the rear”—as seen from Zululand—of Utrecht, where Sir T.
Shepstone was staying.

[79] Compare the account of the delay on the part of the Boer
Government when Mr. Keate proposed to arbitrate. See last chapter, p.
182.

[80] 2144, p. 191.

[81] The Zulus, of course, would not have appreciated the convenience
of a table and chairs; they had no “documents” to lay upon the
former; and their opinion of the comfort of the latter is best
expressed by the well-known Zulu saying that, “_Only Englishmen
and chickens sit upon perches._” The mats provided for them were,
therefore, a proper equivalent to the tables and seats placed for the
other delegates.

[82] Sir Bartle Frere gives a very unfair account of this
matter-of-course fact when he transmits to the Secretary of State
the above despatch, “informing me of the incomplete result, in
consequence of the attitude of Cetshwayo’s representatives at the
Commission of Inquiry.”

[83] The king’s kraal at that time.

[84] The homestead specially spoken of in this case does not appear
to have been destroyed or injured till March, 1879, in the midst of
the war, nor was any human being, white or black, belonging to these
farms, killed by this “savage, unbridled, revengeful nation,” before
the war began.

[85] Apparently by Sir T. Shepstone’s orders, as the following phrase
appears in one of the Boer protests against arbitration, April 25th,
1873: “The majority of the people have, by order of your Excellency,
trekked into laager on December 14th last, and after having remained
in laager for nearly five months, _we are to go and live on our farms
again_.”

[86] The married women work in the mealie-gardens, etc., and the
_little_ girls carry the babies; but the marriageable young women
seem to have an interval of happy freedom from all labour and care.

[87] This was comprehensible during the attempt, which proved so
signal a failure, on the part of Sir T. Shepstone, to impose a
_marriage tax_ upon the natives. The tax was so extremely unpopular
that it was thought advisable to relinquish it, and to make the
desired increase in the revenue of the colony by doubling the hut-tax.

[88] Sir T. Shepstone, when he says (1137, p. 18) “Natal gives up the
_cattle_ of Zulu refugees.... The refugees themselves are not given
up,” plainly includes women amongst the cattle or “property” of the
Zulus.

[89] And later, Nov. 18, 1878 (2222, p. 173), he says: “I do not
hold the King responsible for the commission of the act, because
there is nothing to show that it had his previous concurrence or
even cognizance. But he becomes responsible for the act after its
commission, and for such reparation as we may consider is due for it.”

[90] Since rifled by our troops, and the bones of the old king
brought over to England.

[91] No “demand” was made until it appeared in Sir B. Frere’s
ultimatum.

[92] On perusing the above italicised words, one learns for the first
time that the ultimatum, which Sir Bartle Frere sent to the Zulu king
a few months later, was actually sent for the express purpose of
putting “an end to pacific relations with our neighbours.” This is
hardly the light in which the British public has been taught to look
upon the matter.

[93] Mr. H. Shepstone (Secretary for Native Affairs in the Transvaal)
acknowledges that this fine was paid (2222, p. 99).

[94] Manyonyoba owed allegiance to Cetshwayo (as did Umbilini). He
lived north of the Pongolo, in a part of the country over which
Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Henry Bulwer altogether deny Cetshwayo’s
supremacy, and was claimed as a subject of the Transvaal Government.

[95] Sir H. Bulwer says “they have suspected, quite wrongly, that
we had some design against them in making it” (the new road to the
drift). It is to be questioned how far their suspicion was a wrongful
one, seeing that it was understood from the first that the drift
was intended especially for military purposes, and was undoubtedly
inspected by Mr. Smith for the same.

[96] Quotations from Mr. Deighton’s report to Mr. Wheelwright.

[97] Words applied to him by Mr. Brownlee, late Secretary for Native
Affairs of the Cape Government.

[98] Author’s italics.

[99] On one of these visits a missionary is reported to have said to
the king coarsely in Zulu, “You are a liar!” (unamanga!) upon which
Cetshwayo turned his back to him, and spoke with him no more.

[100] Or rather he was angry with them for the rudeness which they
committed in going _without taking leave_. He said they had never
received anything but kindness from him, and might as well have paid
him the compliment of a farewell salutation.

[101] Author’s italics.

[102] “Our Correspondent” of _The Daily News_ speaks, in to-day’s
issue (November 17th, 1879), of the “tranquillising fear” of
Cetshwayo having been removed from “our own native population.”

[103] A mere assertion, often made, but never supported by the
slightest proof.

[104] And so the Rev. Mr. Glockner, speaking of the late war, says
that they (the missionaries) had often warned the native chiefs of
what would befall them, if they refused to become Christians.—_Vide
The Scotsman, February 5th, 1880._

[105] Story of Maqamsela, from _The Natal Colonist_ of May 4th, 1877:
“Another case referred to in our previous article was that of a man
named Maqamsela, particulars of which, derived from eye-witnesses,
we have received from different sources. On Friday, March 9th, he
attended morning service at Etshowe mission station as usual, went
home to his kraal, and at noon started to go over to the kraal of
Minyegana, but was seized on the road and killed because he was a
Christian!

“For many years he had wished to become a Christian, and this at his
own desire was reported to Gaozi, his immediate chief, who _scolded
him, saying, ‘it would occasion him_ (Gaozi) _trouble_.’ The earnest
and repeated solicitation of Maqamsela was that the missionary
(Mr. Oftebro) would take him to the king to obtain his permission
to profess Christianity. Last winter the missionary consented to
mention it to the king; but, _failing to see Gaozi first, deemed
it imprudent to do so at that time_. Maqamsela was greatly grieved
at this, saying, ‘I am not afraid of death; it will be well if I
am killed for being a Christian.’ When an opportunity occurred of
speaking to Gaozi about Maqamsela’s wish to be baptized, _he would
give no direct answer, but complained of his bad conduct_. Maqamsela,
however, persisted in his entreaties that his case should be reported
to the king. ‘If they kill me because I believe, they may do so; the
Lord will receive me. Has not Christ died for me? Why should I fear?’
A favourable opportunity of naming the matter to the king presented
itself some time after. Cetshwayo appeared very friendly, and
proposed that the Christians should pay a tax, but said that their
service should be building houses for him when called; otherwise
they might remain in peace. Maqamsela was then mentioned as being
desirous to become a Christian. He was an old man, who could not
leave his kraal, and could not come up to serve. He had therefore
been eaten up, and had not now a single head of cattle. On his name
being mentioned, the king replied that _he would say nothing, Gaozi,
Minyegana, and Xubane not being there_. Maqamsela was glad when he
heard what had been done, and said, ‘If they kill me now, it is all
right.’

“A week later his time came. An induna, named Jubane, sent for him,
and on his return from Jubane’s, an impi came to him, saying they
had orders to kill him. He asked for what reason, and being told it
was because he was a Christian and for nothing else, he said again,
‘Well, I rejoice to die for the word of the Lord.’ He begged leave to
kneel down and pray, which he was allowed to do. After praying, he
said, ‘Kill me now.’ They had never seen any man act in this manner
before, when about to be killed, and seemed afraid to touch him.
After a long pause, however, a young lad took a gun and shot him, and
they all ran away.”

[106] This indiscriminate killing is disproved and denied by
Cetshwayo himself and his principal chiefs (_vide_ “A Visit to King
Ketshwayo,” “Macmillan’s Magazine,” March, 1878).

[107] Author’s italics throughout.

[108] Two Zulu prisoners, captured while on a peaceful errand, just
before the commencement of hostilities, and who were permitted to
reside at Bishopstowe when released from gaol, until they could
safely return home, were questioned concerning these regulations,
and said that they applied only to those who voluntarily joined the
regiments, concerning which there was no compulsion at all, beyond
the moral effect produced by the fact that it was looked upon, by
the young people themselves, as rather a poor thing to do to decline
joining. Once joined, however, they were obliged to obey orders
unhesitatingly. These young men said that in the coast, and outlying
districts, there were large numbers of people who had retained
their liberty and married as they pleased, but that strict loyalty
was the _fashion_ nearer the _court_. It was in these very coast
districts that the Zulus surrendered during the late war, the _loyal_
inhabitants proving their loyalty to _the bitter end_.

[109] “We are equal,” said the interpreter; but the expression used
is more correctly translated as above.

[110] The natives of Natal, “peaceful subjects of Her Majesty,” were
living in perfect security on one side of the border, and the Zulus
on the other, the two populations intermarrying and mingling in the
most friendly manner, without the smallest apprehension of injury to
life or property, when Sir B. Frere landed at Durban.

[111] Compare with 9 and 10 the distinct instructions on this point
given by Lord Carnarvon during the previous year (1961, p. 60):
“I request, therefore, that you will cause the missionaries to
understand distinctly that Her Majesty’s Government cannot undertake
to compel the king to permit the maintenance of the mission stations
in Zululand.” Yet here the clause is made one of the conditions of an
ultimatum, the alternative of which is war.

[112] Sir T. Shepstone’s incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear
evidence, sifted and proved worthless by the Commissioners.

[113] Sir Bartle Frere declares (Correspondence, p. 57) that
Cetshwayo “could have known nothing of the memorandum,” although
(_ibid._ p. 6) he himself asserts that “it was intended to explain
for Cetshwayo’s benefit what was the nature of the cession to him,”
and it was plainly very generally known, and therefore naturally by
the king.

[114] Correspondence, p. 3.

[115] Ibid. p. 6.

[116] Compare with Sir Bartle Frere’s suggestion to Sir Henry Bulwer
that the latter should persuade the Zulu king that the _Active_
and her fellows were mostly merchant vessels, but that the English
war-vessels would be sufficient to _protect his coast_!

[117] Our own troops’ experience showed that this was no idle excuse.

[118] One of Colonel Durnford’s officers writes, January 26th,
“that he (the Colonel) had worked so hard at equipping this Native
Contingent, against much opposition, and took special pride in his
mounted men, three hundred men, that he called ‘The Natal Native
Horse.’”

[119] These words deserve special remark.

[120] After-events proved the fallacy of these “reports.” Even when
the Zulus could have swept Natal with fatal effect, they refrained.

[121] Lord Chelmsford, January 16th, 1879. (P. P. [C. 2252] p. 63.)

[122] Captain N. Newman.

[123] Some Zulus (a chief named Gandama, and others) came into the
camp on the 21st, saw the General, and were allowed to depart.—(P. P.
[C. 2454] p. 182).

[124] P. P. (C. 2260) p. 81.

[125] Major Clery.

[126] “There were no high words,” Lieutenant Cochrane says, of
any kind between the colonels, as some would lead the public to
suppose. The above remarks are taken from Lieutenant Cochrane’s
account of what passed; and he says: “I think no one lives who was
present during the conversation but myself; so that anything said
contradictory to my statement is _invented_.”

[127] Captain Essex, 75th Regiment.

[128] Lieutenant Raw, Natal Native Horse.

[129] Lieutenant Cochrane, 32nd Regiment.

[130] Mr. Brickhill.

[131] Having disengaged his men, Captain G. Shepstone said: “I must
go and see where my Chief is,” and rode in again. His devotion cost
him his life.

[132] Captain Gardner.

[133] Captain Essex.

[134] Lieutenant Curling, R.A.

[135] Captain Essex.

[136] Lieutenant Cochrane.

[137] Mr. Brickhill.

[138] Lieutenant Curling.

[139] Three mounted Zulu scouts were seen on the hills on the right
from the rear guard, by an officer, who pointed them out to one of
the staff.

[140] Some remarks made by Lieutenant Milne, R.N. (aide-de-camp),
are worthy of notice: “_January 21st._—We then rode up to the high
land to the left of our camp, the ascent very steep, but possible
for horses. On reaching the summit of the highest hill, I counted
fourteen Zulu horsemen watching us at the distance of about four
miles; they ultimately disappeared over a slight rise. Two vedettes
were stationed at the spot from where I saw these horsemen; they
said they had seen these men several times during the day, and had
reported the fact.... We then returned to camp, the General having
determined to send out a patrol in this direction the next day.”—(P.
P. [C. 2454] p. 183).

_January 22nd._—Lieutenant Milne was sent to the top of a hill to see
what was doing in camp, and says: “On reaching the summit I could see
the camp; all the cattle had been driven in close around the tents. I
could see nothing of the enemy on the left” (_ibid._ p. 184).

“We are not quite certain about the time. But it is just possible
that what I took to be the cattle having been driven into camp may
possibly have been the Zulu ‘impi’” (_ibid._ p. 187).

[141] One message only is mentioned by the General or his military
secretary as having been received from the camp. But an officer
(of rank) _who had seen them_, says that five or six messages were
received from the camp during the day by the General or his staff;
and he says distinctly that the messages were in the possession of
Lieut.-Colonel Crealock.

[142] About this hour the tents in camp suddenly disappeared.

[143] No spare ammunition was taken by the force with the General.

[144] The reserve ammunition is said to have been packed in waggons,
which were then filled up with stores.

[145] The _first_ official mention of this appears in a Blue-book of
August, 1879, where Lieutenant Milne, R.N. (aide-de-camp), says: “In
the meantime, news came that Colonel Harness had heard the firing,
and was proceeding with his guns and companies of infantry escorting
them to camp. Orders were immediately sent to him to return and
rejoin Colonel Glyn.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 184).

[146] By the General’s directions this statement was to be “of the
facts which came under his cognizance on the day in question.”—(P. P.
[C. 2260] p. 80).

[147] “The panic and confusion were fearful,” says one of themselves.

[148] The number of prisoners thus killed is said to have been about
twenty.

[149] Yet Sir B. Frere, on the 30th June, writes: “The position of
Wood’s and Pearson’s columns effectually checked the execution of
an attempt at invasion.” These two columns, being some ninety miles
apart and secure in their own positions _only_, would have been of
little avail _had_ the Zulu king desired to make “an attempt at
invasion.” It needed no better strategists than Cetshwayo and his
chiefs to have masked each of the posts at Kambula and Etshowe with
some 5000 men, and then “the Zulus might march at will through the
country.”

[150] Some officers who were with the advance column, and who
afterwards visited Isandhlwana, say that they appear to have “tried
to get the waggons together to form a laager,” but there was not time.

[151] With respect to this, Lord Chelmsford lays down a principle
(relative to the border raids, but even more strongly applicable
here) that if a force remains “on the passive defensive, without
endeavouring by means of scouting in small bodies or by raiding in
large ones, to discover what the enemy is doing in its immediate
front, it deserves to be surprised and overpowered.”—(P. P. [C. 2318]
p. 80).

[152] It is stated that on the previous evening there was no
intention on the part of the Zulus to attack the camp upon the
22nd, which was not thought by them a propitious day, being that of
the new moon. It is also said that the Zulu army came with pacific
intentions, in order to give up Sihayo’s sons, and the cattle for the
fine. In all probability they _left the king_ with such orders—that
is to say, to make terms if possible, but to fight if forced to it,
and if the English intentions were plainly hostile. This hostility
was thoroughly proved before the morning of the 22nd, when the
departure of Lord Chelmsford’s force from the camp must have been a
strong temptation to the Zulus to attack the latter.

Warning of the Zulu army moving against Nos. 1 and 3 Columns was
received on the border, and communicated to Mr. Fannin, Border Agent,
on January 20th. The warning stated that the whole Zulu army, over
35,000 strong (except about 4000 who remained with the king), was
marched in two columns, the strongest against Colonel Glyn’s column,
the other against Colonel Pearson; this was to take up its position
on the 20th or 21st January at the royal kraal near Inyezane, and
the first to approach Rorke’s Drift. The writer complains of the
little and inadequate use made of the information, which might have
been communicated from Fort Pearson to Rorke’s Drift in time to have
averted the fearful disaster of the 22nd January.—(P. P. [C. 2308]
pp. 69, 70).

[153] P. P. (C. 2318) p. 12.

[154] Had Lord Chelmsford been acquainted with this peculiarity of
the Zulus, he might not have thought it necessary to hurry away
from Isandhlwana on the 23rd. There was no fear of the same force
attacking again for some days to come.

[155] P. P. (C. 2318) pp. 11-17.

[156] Who, it is said, insisted upon the animals being fine and in
good condition, returning some which were sent in below the required
mark.

[157] Captain Clarke’s report (C. 2144), p. 37.

[158] Sir T. Shepstone to Sir H. Bulwer, April 16th, 1878 (C. 2144).

[159] Upon the Zulu border.

[160] C. 2367, p. 90.

[161] Sondolosi, deceased brother of Seketwayo.

[162] Trooper Grandier’s story of ill-treatment has since been
contradicted by this Dutchman.

[163] C. 2374, p. 109.

[164] Nevertheless, during the end of March and beginning of April
communications took place between the Lieut.-Governor and the General
commanding, on this subject (C. 2318, p. 45); therefore _both_ the
military and civil authorities _were_ aware of it.

[165] John Dunn is understood to have come back from his interview
with the last peace messengers, and to have reported that the message
was _bonâ fide_, and that Cetshwayo “means to have peace if possible.”

[166] This company of Native Pioneers (one of those organised
by Colonel Durnford, R.E., before the war) was raised from the
_employés_ of the Colonial Engineer Department, and commanded by
Captain Beddoes of the same department; this officer being highly
commended by his chief. The company worked under the supervision
of Lieutenant Main, R.E., and rendered excellent service. Colonel
Pearson remarked: “The men worked cheerfully. They had eyes like
hawks, and they did their scouting to perfection.”

[167] One of the hardest workers in this department was Commissary J.
W. Elmes, who distinguished himself by his untiring zeal and energy.

[168] P. P. (C. 2260) p. 104.

[169] P. P. (C. 2374) p. 115.

[170] Mr. Mansel, the officer commanding this troop of Natal Mounted
Police, says: “When we went out the morning before the fight we left
thirty-one men behind, men whose horses had sore backs, etc. These
men were in charge of only a corporal. Seven men escaped, and we
buried all of the twenty-four that were killed. Twenty were killed
just around Colonel Durnford. Three about two hundred yards away, and
one at the Fugitives’ Drift.”

[171] Properly Uzulu—the Zulu nation.

[172] The above is corroborated on all main points by Mehlokazulu,
son of Sihayo, who states that he was sent with three other indunas
(mounted), on the morning of the 22nd, to see what the English were
doing. On reporting to Tshingwayo, he said, “All right, we will
see what they are going to do.” “Presently,” says Mehlokazulu, “I
heard Tshingwayo give orders for the Tulwana and Ngyaza regiments to
assemble. When they had done so, he gave orders for the others to
assemble and advance in the direction of the English camp. We were
fired on first by the mounted men, who checked our advance for some
little time.” He says the soldiers were at first “in loose order,”
but afterwards he saw them “massing together,” when “they fired at a
fearful rate.” When the Zulus broke the infantry and closed in, they
“came on to a mixed party of mounted men and infantry men,” about one
hundred, who “made a desperate resistance, some firing with pistols
and others using swords, and I repeatedly heard the word ‘Fire!’
given by someone. But we proved too many for them, and killed them
all where they stood. When all was over I had a look at these men,
and saw a dead officer, with his arm in a sling and a big moustache
(Colonel Durnford, R.E.), surrounded by dead carbineers, soldiers,
and other men whom I did not know.”—_Vide R. E. Journal, Feb. 1880._

[173] Written for him by a Dutch trader, residing with him.

[174] This information he obtained through his messengers ’Mfunzi and
’Nkisimane, who were in Pietermaritzburg in June. The message (sent
by Mr. Colenso) being, that the young officer killed at the Styotyozi
river was a Prince; that his sword would be desired by his family,
and that if Cetshwayo wanted to make peace he had better return it.
The result was that, as soon as the king received the message, he
sent the sword on to Lord Chelmsford.

[175] Amongst the wild natives of South Africa it is thought that the
carrying of burdens is not a manly task. In a family of travelling
Zulus the women and lads perform the duties of carriers, while the
man of the party marches ahead, unencumbered except by his weapons,
ready if necessary to defend his flock against the attack of man or
beast. An officer, travelling in the eastern province some years
ago, met and questioned a party proceeding in this fashion. “Why,”
he asked the leader of the little band, “do you allow these women
and girls to carry heavy loads, while you, a strong able-bodied man,
have nothing but your assegais and knob-kerries in your hand?” Such
questions are not seldom resented when they touch on native customs,
and are asked in an overbearing manner. This officer was uniformly
kind and courteous to the natives, and the man smilingly replied, “It
is our custom, and the women prefer it;” referring his questioner to
the women themselves for their opinion. The chief of these latter
thereupon replied, with much grace and dignity: “Does the white chief
think we would let _our man_ do woman’s work? It is our work to
carry, and we should not like to see him do it.”

[176] The appearance of the native carrier on the march was very
ludicrous. Picture a stalwart Kafir carrying his sleeping mats,
provisions, cooking-pot, drinking-gourd, shield, bundle of assegais
and knob-kerries, and perched on top of all, on his head, a
fifty-pound mealie-bag; the result was likened to a Christmas-tree.

[177] A splendid elephant’s tusk (the Zulu emblem of international
good-will and sincerity) had been sent by Cetshwayo, with one of his
messages, to General Crealock; this Sir Garnet Wolseley sent home to
the Queen, who thus has received a valuable present from her dusky
antagonist.

[178] Mr. Colenso was acquainted with him, having, as already
related, paid him a visit in 1877.

[179] At the same time many residents in Cape Town obtained, from
mere motives of curiosity, that interview which, to those who had
desired it for humanity’s sake, had been refused, while all who know
his language, or are likely to sympathise, are rigidly excluded.
Orders were given afterwards that the name of the Bishop of Natal
should not be mentioned to Cetshwayo, “because it excited the
prisoner.”

[180] We think this statement is hardly correct.

[181] _The Daily News_, 30th October, 1879.




       *       *       *       *       *
       *       *       *       *       *


                                                _February 16, 1880._

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  be found very useful by the beginner, as they show the sort of
  designs best adapted for the purpose in hand. For the general
  reader, who does not aspire to become a crockery painter, some
  interesting chapters on pottery and porcelain are provided,
  in which they will find descriptions of many of the chief
  manufactories, with particulars of the special productions that
  have rendered them famous. Any person bitten with the china mania
  cannot fail to be pleased with the information given in this part
  of the book.”—_Globe._


_HALL (SIDNEY)_—

  A TRAVELLING ATLAS OF THE ENGLISH COUNTIES. Fifty Maps, Coloured.
  New Edition, including the Railways, corrected up to the present
  date. Demy 8vo, in roan tuck, 10_s._ 6_d._


_HILL (MISS G.)_—

  THE PLEASURES AND PROFITS OF OUR LITTLE POULTRY FARM. Small crown
  8vo, 3_s._


_HITCHMAN (FRANCIS)_—

  THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD. 2 vols. Demy 8vo,
  32_s._


_HOLBEIN_—

  TWELVE HEADS AFTER HOLBEIN. Selected from Drawings in Her
  Majesty’s Collection at Windsor. Reproduced in Autotype, in
  portfolio. 36_s._


_HOVELACQUE (ABEL)_—

  THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE: LINGUISTICS, PHILOLOGY, AND ETYMOLOGY.
  With Maps. Large crown 8vo, cloth, 5_s._ Being the first volume
  of “The Library of Contemporary Science.”

  “This is a translation of the first work of a new French series
  of Popular Scientific Works. The high character of the series,
  and also its bias, may be inferred from the names of some of its
  writers, _e.g._ P. Broca, Ch. Martins, C. Vogt, &c. The English
  publishers announce that the present volume will be followed
  immediately by others on Anthropology and Biology. If they are
  like their precursor, they will be clear and well written,
  somewhat polemical, and nobly contemptuous of opponents....
  The translator has done his work throughout with care and
  success.”—_Athenæum._


_JARRY (GENERAL)_—

  NAPIER (MAJ.-GEN. W. C. E.)—OUTPOST DUTY. Translated, with
  TREATISES ON MILITARY RECONNAISSANCE AND ON ROAD-MAKING. Third
  Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._


_KEMPIS (THOMAS À)_—

  ON THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. Four Books, Beautifully Illustrated
  Edition. Demy 8vo, 16_s._

  “It is illustrated with great ability—even the head and tail
  pieces are themselves complete pictures, suggestive, quaint,
  beautiful. The paper is of the best, and the printing very
  careful. On the whole, for a gift or for presentation, we hardly
  know where else to look for a book to match it. Clearly neither
  care nor expense has been spared in producing this tasteful but
  sumptuous volume.”—_Nonconformist._


_KLACZKO (M. JULIAN)_—

  TWO CHANCELLORS: PRINCE GORTCHAKOF and PRINCE BISMARCK.
  Translated by Mrs. Tait. New and cheaper edition, 6_s._

  “This is a most interesting and valuable book.... The object
  is to trace out the working and the results of a ten years’
  partnership between the two famous Chancellors of Russia and
  Germany, Prince Gortchakoff and Prince Bismarck and these are
  delineated with considerable artistic power, and in a manner
  which betokens considerable political insight, and an intimate
  acquaintance with the diplomatic world.”—_Blackwood’s Magazine._


_LEFÈVRE (ANDRÉ)_—

  PHILOSOPHY, Historical and Critical. Translated, with an
  introduction, by A. W. KEANE, B.A. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._


_LETOURNEAU (DR. CHARLES)_—

  BIOLOGY. Translated by William MacCall. With Illustrations. Large
  crown 8vo, 6_s._


_LUCAS (CAPTAIN)_—

  THE ZULUS AND THE BRITISH FRONTIER. Demy 8vo, 16_s._

  “Even if South Africa did not so much engage public attention
  at this moment, Mr. Lucas’s book would be well worth reading.
  It is not a catchpenny publication, but a well written and
  well arranged study of our relations with the Zulus. Mr. Lucas
  expresses himself in a vigorous and manly style, without waste
  of words; and, though he makes use occasionally of the figure
  of irony, he never declaims, and never tries to be humorous out
  of place. He himself has had some military experience near the
  scene of the present disturbances, and he writes with a military
  clearness and directness which command attention.”—_Saturday
  Review._

  CAMP LIFE AND SPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA. With Episodes in Kaffir
  Warfare. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 12_s._

  “Mr. Lucas has admirably executed the task which he set himself
  to perform, and that was to touch upon some of the salient points
  of life and character in South Africa, at the same time weaving
  into them some of the everyday incidents of garrison life whilst
  serving with his old regiment, the Cape Mounted Rifles. The book
  is full of interest from the first page to the last, containing
  as it does descriptions of the chief places in South Africa, its
  various inhabitants, the peculiarities of Kaffir warfare, and the
  sport to be met with.”—_Naval and Military Gazette._


_LYTTON (ROBERT, LORD)_—

  POETICAL WORKS—COLLECTED EDITION. Complete in 5 vols.

  FABLES IN SONG. 2 vols. Fcap. 8vo, 12_s._ LUCILE. Fcap. 8vo,
  6_s._ THE WANDERER. Fcap. 8vo, 6_s._ POEMS, HISTORICAL AND
  CHARACTERISTIC. Fcap. 6_s._


_MAXSE (FITZH.)_—

  PRINCE BISMARCK’S LETTERS. Translated from the German. Second
  Edition. Small crown 8vo, cloth, 6_s._


_MAZADE (CHARLES DE)_—

  THE LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. Translated from the French. Demy 8vo,
  16_s._

  “The arrangement of incidents, the juxtaposition of historical
  contrasts, and the entire elaboration of M. de Mazade’s material,
  are very artistic and very effective.... There is also much in
  M. de Mazade’s work, which, by-the-bye, is well translated,
  that may gratify English pride as well as instruct English
  politicians.”—_World._


_McCOAN (J. CARLILE)_—

  OUR NEW PROTECTORATE. TURKEY IN ASIA: ITS GEOGRAPHY, RACES,
  RESOURCES, AND GOVERNMENT. With a Map, showing the Existing and
  Projected Public Works. 2 vols. large crown 8vo, 24_s._

  “If a good book was to be made about Asiatic Turkey, it is
  difficult to see how it could have been made with greater success
  than has attended the efforts of Mr. McCoan. He has told us all
  that we could wish to know; he has put his information into a
  compact and readable shape; and he has supplied just as much
  detail as gives body to his work without overloading it. He has,
  too, a personal knowledge of many parts of the vast district he
  describes; and has been for years familiar with the Turks, their
  ways and work.”—_Saturday Review._


_MOLESWORTH (W. NASSAU)_—

  HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE YEAR 1830 TO THE RESIGNATION OF THE
  GLADSTONE MINISTRY.

  A Cheap Edition, carefully revised, and carried up to March,
  1874. 3 vols. crown 8vo, 18_s._

  A School Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

  “It is a great misfortune that the history of our country that
  is nearest our own times young men are least acquainted with. It
  is not written in histories that were read at school, and they
  are not old enough, as I am old enough, to remember almost every
  political fact since the great Reform Bill of 1832. I wish young
  men would read some history of this period. A neighbour and a
  friend of mine, a most intelligent and accomplished clergyman—Mr.
  Molesworth—has published a work, being a political history
  of England from the year 1830—that is, from the first Reform
  Bill—until within the last two or three years; a book honestly
  written, in which facts are plainly—and I believe truly—stated,
  and a work which would give great information to all the young
  men of the country, if they could be prevailed upon to read
  it.”—_From the Right Hon. John Bright’s Speech at Birmingham._


_MORLEY (HENRY)_—

  ENGLISH WRITERS. Vol. I. Part I. THE CELTS AND ANGLO-SAXONS. With
  an Introductory Sketch of the Four Periods of English Literature.
  Part II. FROM THE CONQUEST TO CHAUCER. (Making 2 vols.) 8vo,
  cloth, £1 2_s._

  ⁂ Each Part is indexed separately. The Two Parts complete the
  account of English Literature during the Period of the Formation
  of the Language, or of THE WRITERS BEFORE CHAUCER.

  “Mr. Morley’s volume, looks, at first sight, a formidable
  addition to the existing mass of English writings after Chaucer;
  but it is well worth reading. It comprises the foundation and
  ground story, so to speak, of a work upon the whole sequence of
  English literature. If carried out with the same spirit and on
  the same scale as the volume already published, the complete work
  will undoubtedly form a valuable contribution towards the story
  of the growth of the literary mind of England, told as a national
  biography of continuous interest.”—_Saturday Review._

  Vol. II. Part I. FROM CHAUCER TO DUNBAR. 8vo, cloth, 12_s._

  TABLES OF ENGLISH LITERATURE. Containing 20 Charts. Second
  Edition, with Index. Royal 4to, cloth, 12_s._

  In Three Parts. Parts I. and II., containing Three Charts, each
  1_s._ 6_d._

  Part III., containing 14 Charts, 7_s._ Part III., also kept in
  Sections, 1, 2, and 1_s._ 6_d._ each; 3 and 4 together, 3_s._ ⁂
  The Charts sold separately.


_MORLEY (JOHN)_—

  DIDEROT AND THE ENCYCLOPÆDISTS. 2 vols. demy 8vo, 26_s._

  “We have here the story of a life, full in itself of human
  interest, vividly and dramatically told; we have also glimpses
  of the lives of others whose interest is scarcely inferior; have
  a perfect treasure-house of social and political knowledge,
  literary and artistic criticism; and we have another of those
  singularly valuable contributions to the history of the
  ‘modern spirit,’ which Mr. Morley is perhaps better qualified
  than any living English writer to furnish, and which are
  achieving for him a reputation that is more than English in its
  comprehensiveness.”—_World._

  CRITICAL MISCELLANIES. Second Series. France in the Eighteenth
  Century—Robespierre—Turgot—Death of Mr. Mill—Mr. Mill on
  Religion—On Popular Culture—Macaulay. Demy 8vo, cloth, 14_s._

  VOLTAIRE. Large crown 8vo, 6_s._

  “It is impossible to read his volume without being struck by
  its independence of thought, its sincerity and candour of
  expression, as well as by its ability and literary power. We have
  freely expressed our dissent from the views which it presents
  of the value and wholesomeness of the Voltairean philosophy,
  if that name can fairly be applied to anything so essentially
  unphilosophical; but at the same time it is well that such views
  should be fairly argued out, and that, whatever inconvenience it
  may occasion to people who, having once made up their minds on
  a subject, dislike to have them disturbed, accepted conclusions
  should be occasionally tested over again. Mr. Morley has given us
  a valuable and highly suggestive study of the great man of a very
  critical age.”—_Saturday Review._

  ROUSSEAU. Large crown 8vo, 9_s._

  CRITICAL MISCELLANIES. First Series. Large crown 8vo, 6_s._

  CRITICAL MISCELLANIES. Second Series. [_In the Press._

  “The papers one and all will bear reading not once but
  twice—papers full of suggestive thought on subjects of undying
  interest.”—_Graphic._

  DIDEROT AND THE ENCYCLOPÆDISTS. Large crown 8vo, 12_s._

  ON COMPROMISE. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

  STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL EDUCATION. Third Edition. 8vo, cloth, 3_s._


_MORRIS (M. O’CONNOR)_—

  HIBERNIA VENATICA. With Portraits of the Marchioness of
  Waterford, the Marchioness of Ormonde, Lady Randolph Churchill,
  Hon. Mrs. Malone, Miss Persse (of Moyode Castle), Mrs. Stewart
  Duckett, and Miss Myra Watson. Large crown 8vo, 18_s._

  TRIVIATA; or, Cross Road Chronicles of Passages in Irish Hunting
  History during the season of 1875-76. With illustrations. Large
  crown 8vo, 16_s._

  “The highest compliment paid to the merits of ‘Triviator’s’
  volume will be found to proceed from outsiders beyond the circle
  of ‘hunting men,’ who have found interest and amusement in its
  pages. The illustrations do not pretend to high line in art, but
  are not lacking in humour and fidelity, and altogether we can
  without scruple commend a perusal of ‘Triviata’ to all lovers
  of hunting, on whose shelves it should find a place among the
  standard works of that enthusiastic body.”—_Illustrated Sporting
  and Dramatic News._


_MURPHY (J. M.)_—

  RAMBLES IN NORTH-WEST AMERICA. With Frontispiece and Map. 16_s._

  “Mr. Murphy has not only written a very readable volume,
  but must have employed infinite pains in collecting his
  materials.”—_Saturday Review._


_OLIVER (PROFESSOR), F.R.S., &c._—

  ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL NATURAL ORDERS OF THE VEGETABLE
  KINGDOM, PREPARED FOR THE SCIENCE AND ART DEPARTMENT, SOUTH
  KENSINGTON. Oblong 8vo, with 109 Plates. Price, plain, 16_s._;
  coloured, £1 6_s._


_PIERCE (GILBERT A.)_—

  THE DICKENS DICTIONARY: a Key to the Characters and Principal
  Incidents in the Tales of Charles Dickens. With additions by
  WILLIAM A. WHEELER. Large crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

  “The description of the external and internal peculiarities of
  the characters is, as far as possible, given in Dickens’s own
  words, a sign of laudable discretion on the editor’s part. The
  volume forms a useful, we may say necessary, supplement to the
  library edition of Dickens’s works.”—_Mayfair._


_POLLOK (LIEUT.-COLONEL)_—

  SPORT IN BRITISH BURMAH, ASSAM, AND THE CASSYAH AND JYNTIAH
  HILLS. With Notes of Sport in the Hilly Districts of the Northern
  Division, Madras Presidency. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, with Illustrations
  and 2 Maps. 24_s._

  “Colonel Pollok’s ‘Sport in British Burmah’ must be ranked among
  the best books of its class.”—_Graphic._


_POYNTER (E. J.), R.A._—

  TEN LECTURES ON ART. Second Edition. Large crown 8vo, 9_s._

  “This is a fine book, probably one of the books on art for a good
  many years, full of clearly and deftly wrought-out explanations
  upon subjects of much intricacy.... The remaining contents of
  this remarkable book we must not even indicate. Its chief lessons
  will, perhaps, centre upon the skilful teaching of thoroughness,
  nobility, and patience that appears in almost every page, and
  upon the remarkable illustrations and exposure of false taste in
  decorative art.”—_Spectator._


_PRINSEP (VAL), A.R.A._—

  IMPERIAL INDIA. Containing numerous Illustrations and Maps made
  during a Tour to the Courts of the Principal Rajahs and Princes
  of India. Second Edition. Demy, 8vo, 21_s._

  “It is to be hoped that the author of this work may be as
  successful in his delineation of the Great Durbar on canvas as
  he has been in the wood pictures we have noticed. His book is
  one of the most readable that has lately appeared on the subject
  of India, full of interest and of touches of humour which make
  it a pleasant companion from the first chapter to the last....
  It may be added that the illustrations are superlatively
  good.”—_Athenæum._


_REDGRAVE (SAMUEL)_—

  A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF THE HISTORICAL COLLECTION OF
  WATER-COLOUR PAINTINGS IN THE SOUTH KENSINGTON MUSEUM. With
  an Introductory Notice by SAMUEL REDGRAVE. With numerous
  Chromo-lithographs and other Illustrations. Published for the
  Science and Art Department of the Committee of Council on
  Education. Royal 8vo, £1 1_s._

  “A book which is a real contribution to British art.”—_Graphic._


_ROBSON (REV. J. H., M.A., LL.M.)—late Foundation Scholar of Downing
College, Cambridge_—

  AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON ALGEBRA. Post 8vo. 6_s._


_ROLAND (ARTHUR)_—

  FARMING FOR PLEASURE AND PROFIT.

  VOL. I.—DAIRY FARMING, MANAGEMENT OF COWS, &c. Edited by WILLIAM
  ABLETT. Large crown 8vo, 6_s._

  “We cannot follow our author in detail, but we may confidently
  recommend his book, not only to the attention of amateurs, but
  also to that of experts, who will find a good many hints of
  advantage to them.”—_Gardeners’ Chronicle._

  “The book contains much information that will be useful to people
  who may wish to keep their own cows and utilize their produce,
  but are at present ignorant as to the best methods of going to
  work.”—_Queen._

  VOL. II.—POULTRY-KEEPING. Edited by WILLIAM ABLETT. Large crown
  8vo, 5_s._

  “Mr. Roland’s book gives much useful and instructive information
  on the keeping and management of fowls; but we particularly
  recommend his directions for the construction of a proper
  fowl-house, which, though of the utmost importance and
  absolutely necessary to success, is, as often as not, hopelessly
  neglected.”—_Graphic._

  VOL. III.—TREE-PLANTING, for Ornamentation or Profit, suitable to
  every Soil and Situation. Edited by WILLIAM ABLETT. Large crown
  8vo, 5_s._

  “The book comprises much useful and practical information as
  to the nature, uses, and growth of various kinds of trees; it
  possesses the additional merit of being very readable, and
  interesting to all admirers of sylvan beauty.”—_Queen._

  VOL. IV.—STOCK-KEEPING AND CATTLE-REARING. [_In the Press._

  VOL. V.—DRAINAGE OF LAND, MANURES, &c. [_In the Press._

  VOL. VI.—ROOT-GROWING, HOPS, &c. [_In the Press._


_SCOTT-STEVENSON (MRS.)_—

  OUR HOME IN CYPRUS. With a Map and Illustrations. Demy 8vo,
  14_s._ Second Edition.

  “Mrs. Scott-Stevenson tells her story with delightful _naïveté_
  and womanly simplicity; she gives us many amusing pictures of
  life in Cyprus, and her sketches of her interesting female
  friends at Kyrenia are particularly graphic. Her book is
  altogether really attractive reading, gives one a fair idea of
  several aspects of the island, and would prove useful to any
  one contemplating a stay, especially for the sake of health.
  It is accompanied by an excellent new map, containing many
  important corrections on existing maps and a number of attractive
  illustrations.”—_Times._


_STORY (W. W.)_—

  ROBA DI ROMA. Seventh Edition, with Additions and Portrait. Post
  8vo, cloth, 10_s._ 6_d._

  THE PROPORTIONS OF THE HUMAN FRAME, ACCORDING TO A NEW CANON.
  With Plates. Royal 8vo, cloth, 10_s._

  CASTLE ST. ANGELO. Uniform with “Roba di Roma.” With
  Illustrations. Large crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._


_STREETER (E. W.)_—

  GOLD; OR, LEGAL REGULATIONS FOR THIS METAL IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
  OF THE WORLD. Crown 8vo cloth, 3_s._ 6_d._


_TANNER (PROFESSOR HENRY), F.C.S._—

  JACK’S EDUCATION; OR, HOW HE LEARNT FARMING. Large crown 8vo,
  4_s._

  “Few people now fail to appreciate the value of popular
  lectures on science and education, and the result of studies
  in agricultural science is put into a taking narrative form by
  Professor H. Tanner in ‘Jack’s Education,’ wherein he traces the
  spread of agricultural knowledge in a certain district from a
  stray remark dropped by a student at some provincial lectures.
  Even the most unenlightened in farming matters could not fail to
  understand and be interested in Professor Tanner’s volume.”


_TOPINARD (DR. PAUL)_—

  ANTHROPOLOGY. With a Preface by Professor PAUL BROCA, Secretary
  of the Société d’Anthropologie, and Translated by ROBERT J. H.
  BARTLETT, M.D. With numerous Illustrations. Large crown 8vo,
  7_s._ 6_d._


_TREVELYAN (L. R.)_—

  A YEAR IN PESHAWUR AND A LADY’S RIDE INTO THE KHYBER PASS. Crown
  8vo, 9_s._

  “Mrs. Trevelyan has made the best of her opportunities for
  observing what was worth noting while she was stationed at
  Peshawur. The incidents of frontier life are well described,
  as also are all the doings that go to make up life at that
  important station, the whole being told in a pleasantly written
  story.”—_Naval and Military Gazette._


_TROLLOPE (ANTHONY)_—

  THE CHRONICLES OF BARSETSHIRE. A Uniform Edition, consisting of 8
  vols., large crown 8vo, 6_s._ each, handsomely printed, each vol.
  containing Frontispiece.

  THE WARDEN.
  BARCHESTER TOWERS.
  DR. THORNE.
  FRAMLEY PARSONAGE.
  THE SMALL HOUSE AT ALLINGTON. 2 vols.
  LAST CHRONICLE OF BARSET. 2 vols.

  AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. A Cheap Edition with Maps. 2 vols.
  Small 8vo, cloth, 7_s._ 6_d._

  SOUTH AFRICA. 2 vols. Large crown 8vo, with Maps. Fourth Edition,
  £1 10_s._

  SOUTH AFRICA, 1 vol. Crown 8vo, 6_s._


_VÉRON (EUGÈNE)_—

  ÆSTHETICS. Translated by W. H. ARMSTRONG. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._
  6_d._

  “It is utterly impossible, within our limits, to go far into so
  vast a subject as æsthetics, which M. Véron himself can only
  treat briefly and summarily in a volume of 473 pages. We can only
  say that it is, on the whole, by far the best book on the subject
  we ever met with. M. Véron is at the same time a master of his
  subject and singularly free from those traditional prejudices
  which usually hamper the judgment of a Frenchman in art matters.
  He is quite independent of the stupid and tiresome official
  teaching, and in perfect sympathy with true artistic genius in
  its various manifestations.”—_Saturday Review._


_WHITE (WALTER)_—

  HOLIDAYS IN TYROL: Kufstein, Klobenstein, and Paneveggio. Large
  crown 8vo, 14_s._

  “A delightful holiday volume, full of pleasant chat and valuable
  hints. Mr. Walter White has an eye that sees everything, a memory
  which forgets nothing, a judgment to discriminate between what
  is and is not worth repeating, and a fluent and cheery style,
  neither striving artificially at epigram, nor relapsing through
  feebleness into platitude.”—_World._

  LONDONER’S WALK TO THE LAND’S END, AND A TRIP TO THE SCILLY
  ISLES. Post 8vo. With 4 Maps. Third Edition. 4_s._

  MONTH IN YORKSHIRE. Post 8vo. With a Map. Fifth Edition. 4_s._

  “These volumes are written with intelligence, and are full of
  information which should be welcome to every reader. There
  are few parts of England which will not yield delight to
  the pedestrian: but the counties visited by Mr. White are
  inexhaustible in wealth of association and beauty of scenery, and
  if his pleasantly written books excite a desire for home travel
  they will not have been published in vain.”—_Pall Mall Gazette._


_WORNUM (R. N.)_—

  ANALYSIS OF ORNAMENT: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF STYLES. An
  Introduction to the Study of the History of Ornamental Art. With
  many Illustrations. Sixth Edition. Royal 8vo, cloth, 8_s._


_WYLDE (ATHERTON)_—

  MY CHIEF AND I; or, Six Months in Natal after the Langalibalele
  Outbreak. With Portrait of Colonel Durnford. Demy 8vo, 14_s._

  “We may add that the book is extremely interesting. Written
  simply, but in good, plain English, without any attempt at
  ‘word-painting,’ the very first pages gain the reader’s sympathy,
  and when the last is reached, he parts from Mr. Wylde with
  regret.”—_Examiner._


_YOUNGE (C. D.)_—

  PARALLEL LIVES OF ANCIENT AND MODERN HEROES. New Edition. 12mo,
  cloth, 4_s._ 6_d._


OFFICIAL HANDBOOK FOR THE NATIONAL TRAINING SCHOOL FOR COOKERY.
Containing Lessons on Cookery; forming the Course of Instruction in
the School. With List of Utensils Necessary, and Lessons on Cleaning
Utensils. Compiled by “R. O. C.” Large crown 8vo. Fifth Edition, 8_s._

“The good point about the book is that it presupposes complete
ignorance on the part of the pupil; nothing is left to haphazard;
every quantity is given in its exact and due proportion, and the
price of each ingredient carefully set down. All these lessons,
moreover, have been practically tested in the National Training
School, and may therefore be accepted in good faith. It is not,
however, to be supposed that any cunning recipes or rare and costly
dishes are to be found in this book; the ‘first principles’ of good
cookery is the lesson it professes to teach, and certainly the method
of tuition is direct and easy to follow.”—_Times._


FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW.—First Series, May, 1865, to Dec. 1866. 6 vols.
Cloth, 13_s._ each.

New Series, 1867 to 1872. In Half-yearly Volumes. Cloth, 13_s._ each.

From January, 1873, to June 30, 1879, in Half-yearly Volumes. Cloth,
16_s._ each.




WHYTE-MELVILLE’S WORKS.


CHEAP EDITION.

_Crown 8vo, fancy boards, 2s. each, or 2s. 6d. in cloth._

  UNCLE JOHN.
  THE WHITE ROSE.
  CERISE.
  BROOKES OF BRIDLEMERE.
  “BONES AND I.”
  “M., OR N.”
  CONTRABAND.
  MARKET HARBOROUGH.
  SARCHEDON.
  SONGS AND VERSES.
  SATANELLA.
  THE TRUE CROSS.
  KATERFELTO.
  SISTER LOUISE.
  ROSINE.
  ROY’S WIFE.
  BLACK BUT COMELY.




CARLYLE’S (THOMAS) WORKS.


LIBRARY EDITION COMPLETE.

Handsomely printed in 34 vols. Demy 8vo, cloth, £15.

  SARTOR RESARTUS. The Life and Opinions of Herr Teufelsdrockh.
  With a Portrait, 7_s._ 6_d._

  THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. A History. 3 vols., each 9_s._

  LIFE OF FREDERICK SCHILLER AND EXAMINATION OF HIS WORKS. With
  Supplement of 1872. Portrait and Plates, 9_s._ The Supplement
  _separately_, 2_s._

  CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS. With Portrait. 6 vols., each
  9_s._

  ON HEROES, HERO WORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY. 7_s._ 6_d._

  PAST AND PRESENT. 9_s._

  OLIVER CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES. With Portraits. 5 vols.,
  each 9_s._

  LATTER-DAY PAMPHLETS. 9_s._

  LIFE OF JOHN STERLING. With Portrait, 9_s._

  HISTORY OF FREDERICK THE SECOND. 10 vols., each 9_s._

  TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GERMAN. 3 vols., each 9_s._

  GENERAL INDEX TO THE LIBRARY EDITION. 8vo, cloth, 6_s._

  EARLY KINGS OF NORWAY; also AN ESSAY ON THE PORTRAITS OF JOHN
  KNOX. Crown 8vo, with Portrait Illustrations, 7_s._ 6_d._


CHEAP AND UNIFORM EDITION.

_In 23 vols., Crown 8vo, cloth, £7 5s._

  THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A History. 2 vols., 12_s._

  OLIVER CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES, with Elucidations, &c. 3
  vols., 18_s._

  LIVES OF SCHILLER AND JOHN STERLING, 1 vol., 6_s._

  CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS. 2 vols., £1 4_s._

  SARTOR RESARTUS AND LECTURES ON HEROES, 1 vol., 6_s._

  LATTER-DAY PAMPHLETS. 1 vol., 6_s._

  CHARTISM AND PAST AND PRESENT. 1 vol., 6_s._

  TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GERMAN OF MUSÆUS, TIECK, AND RICHTER. 1
  vol., 6_s._

  WILHELM MEISTER, by Göthe. A Translation. 2 vols., 12_s._

  HISTORY OF FRIEDRICH THE SECOND, called Frederick the Great.
  Vols. I. and II., containing Part I.—“Friedrich till his
  Accession.” 14_s._ Vols. III. and IV., containing Part II.—“The
  First Two Silesian Wars.” 14_s._ Vols. V. VI., VII., completing
  the Work, £1 1_s._


PEOPLE’S EDITION.

_In 37 vols., small Crown 8vo. Price 2s. each vol. bound in cloth; or
in sets of 37 vols. in 18, cloth gilt, for £3 14s._

  SARTOR RESARTUS.

  FRENCH REVOLUTION. 3 vols.

  LIFE OF JOHN STERLING.

  OLIVER CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES. 5 vols.

  ON HEROES AND HERO WORSHIP.

  PAST AND PRESENT.

  CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS. 7 vols.

  LATTER-DAY PAMPHLETS.

  LIFE OF SCHILLER.

  FREDERICK THE GREAT. 10 vols.

  WILHELM MEISTER. 3 vols.

  TRANSLATIONS FROM MUSÆUS, TIECK, AND RICHTER. 2 vols.

  THE EARLY KINGS OF NORWAY; also an Essay on the Portraits of John
  Knox, with Illustrations. Small crown 8vo. Bound up with the
  Index and uniform with the “People’s Edition.”




DICKENS’S (CHARLES) WORKS.


ORIGINAL EDITIONS.

_In Demy 8vo._

  THE MYSTERY OF EDWIN DROOD. With Illustrations by S. L. Fildes,
  and a Portrait engraved by Baker. Cloth, 7_s._ 6_d._

  OUR MUTUAL FRIEND. With Forty Illustrations by Marcus Stone.
  Cloth, £1 1_s._

  THE PICKWICK PAPERS. With Forty-three Illustrations by Seymour
  and Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._

  NICHOLAS NICKLEBY. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1
  1_s._

  SKETCHES BY “BOZ.” With Forty Illustrations by George Cruikshank.
  Cloth, £1 1_s._

  MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1
  1_s._

  DOMBEY AND SON. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._

  DAVID COPPERFIELD. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1
  1_s._

  BLEAK HOUSE. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._

  LITTLE DORRIT. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._

  THE OLD CURIOSITY SHOP. With Seventy-five Illustrations by George
  Cattermole and H. K. Browne. A New Edition. Uniform with the
  other volumes, £1 1_s._

  BARNABY RUDGE: a Tale of the Riots of ’Eighty. With Seventy-eight
  Illustrations by G. Cattermole and H. K. Browne. Uniform with the
  other volumes, £1 1_s._

  CHRISTMAS BOOKS: Containing—The Christmas Carol; The Cricket on
  the Hearth; The Chimes; The Battle of Life; The Haunted House.
  With all the original Illustrations. Cloth, 12_s._

  OLIVER TWIST and TALE OF TWO CITIES. In one volume. Cloth, £1
  1_s._

  OLIVER TWIST. Separately. With Twenty-four Illustrations by
  George Cruikshank.

  A TALE OF TWO CITIES. Separately. With Sixteen Illustrations by
  Phiz. Cloth, 9_s._

⁂ _The remainder of Dickens’s Works were not originally printed in
Demy 8vo._


LIBRARY EDITION.

_In Post 8vo. With the Original Illustrations, 30 vols., cloth, £12._

                                                                _s. d._
  PICKWICK PAPERS                     43 Illustrations, 2 vols.  16  0
  NICHOLAS NICKLEBY                   39       ”        2 vols.  16  0
  MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT                   40       ”        2 vols.  16  0
  OLD CURIOSITY SHOP and REPRINTED
      PIECES                          36       ”        2 vols.  16  0
  BARNABY RUDGE and HARD TIMES        36       ”        2 vols.  16  0
  BLEAK HOUSE                         40       ”        2 vols.  16  0
  LITTLE DORRIT                       40       ”        2 vols.  16  0
  DOMBEY AND SON                      38       ”        2 vols.  16  0
  DAVID COPPERFIELD                   38       ”        2 vols.  16  0
  OUR MUTUAL FRIEND                   40       ”        2 vols.  16  0
  SKETCHES BY “BOZ”                   39       ”        1 vol.    8  0
  OLIVER TWIST                        24       ”        1 vol.    8  0
  CHRISTMAS BOOKS                     17       ”        1 vol.    8  0
  A TALE OF TWO CITIES                16       ”        1 vol.    8  0
  GREAT EXPECTATIONS                   8       ”        1 vol.    8  0
  PICTURES FROM ITALY and AMERICAN
      NOTES                            8       ”        1 vol.    8  0
  UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER               8       ”        1 vol.    8  0
  CHILD’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND           8       ”        1 vol.    8  0
  EDWIN DROOD and MISCELLANIES        12       ”        1 vol.    8  0
  CHRISTMAS STORIES from “Household
      Words,” &c.                     14       ”        1 vol.    8  0

THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. By JOHN FORSTER. A New Edition. With
Illustrations. Uniform with the Library Edition, post 8vo, of his
Works. 10_s._ 6_d._


THE “CHARLES DICKENS” EDITION.

_In Crown 8vo. In 21 vols., cloth, with Illustrations, £3 9s. 6d._

                                                               _s.  d._
  PICKWICK PAPERS                               8 Illustrations  3   6
  MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT                             8       ”        3   6
  DOMBEY AND SON                                8       ”        3   6
  NICHOLAS NICKLEBY                             8       ”        3   6
  DAVID COPPERFIELD                             8       ”        3   6
  BLEAK HOUSE                                   8       ”        3   6
  LITTLE DORRIT                                 8       ”        3   6
  OUR MUTUAL FRIEND                             8       ”        3   6
  BARNABY RUDGE                                 8       ”        3   6
  OLD CURIOSITY SHOP                            8       ”        3   6
  A CHILD’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND                  4       ”        3   6
  EDWIN DROOD and OTHER STORIES                 8       ”        3   6
  CHRISTMAS STORIES, from “Household Words”     8       ”        3   6
  TALE OF TWO CITIES                            8       ”        3   0
  SKETCHES BY “BOZ”                             8       ”        3   0
  AMERICAN NOTES and REPRINTED PIECES           8       ”        3   0
  CHRISTMAS BOOKS                               8       ”        3   0
  OLIVER TWIST                                  8       ”        3   0
  GREAT EXPECTATIONS                            8       ”        3   0
  HARD TIMES and PICTURES FROM ITALY            8       ”        3   0
  UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER                        4       ”        3   0

THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. Uniform with this Edition, with numerous
Illustrations. 2 vols. 7_s._


THE ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY EDITION.

_Complete in 30 Volumes. Demy 8vo, 10s. each; or set, £15._

This Edition is printed on a finer paper and in a larger type
than has been employed in any previous edition. The type has been
cast especially for it, and the page is of a size to admit of the
introduction of all the original illustrations.

No such attractive issue has been made of the writings of Mr.
Dickens, which, various as have been the forms of publication adapted
to the demands of an ever widely-increasing popularity, have never
yet been worthily presented in a really handsome library form.

The collection comprises all the minor writings it was Mr. Dickens’s
wish to preserve.

  SKETCHES BY “BOZ.” With 40 Illustrations by George Cruikshank.

  PICKWICK PAPERS. 2 vols. With 42 Illustrations by Phiz.

  OLIVER TWIST. With 24 Illustrations by Cruikshank.

  NICHOLAS NICKLEBY. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.

  OLD CURIOSITY SHOP and REPRINTED PIECES. 2 vols. With
  Illustrations by Cattermole, &c.

  BARNABY RUDGE and HARD TIMES. 2 vols. With Illustrations by
  Cattermole, &c.

  MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.

  AMERICAN NOTES and PICTURES FROM ITALY. 1 vol. With 8
  Illustrations.

  DOMBEY AND SON. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.

  DAVID COPPERFIELD. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.

  BLEAK HOUSE. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.

  LITTLE DORRIT. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.

  A TALE OF TWO CITIES. With 16 Illustrations by Phiz.

  THE UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER. With 8 Illustrations by Marcus Stone.

  GREAT EXPECTATIONS. With 8 Illustrations by Marcus Stone.

  OUR MUTUAL FRIEND. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Marcus Stone.

  CHRISTMAS BOOKS. With 17 Illustrations by Sir Edwin Landseer,
  R.A., Maclise, R.A., &c. &c.

  HISTORY OF ENGLAND. With 8 Illustrations by Marcus Stone.

  CHRISTMAS STORIES. (From “Household Words” and “All the Year
  Round.”) With 14 Illustrations.

  EDWIN DROOD AND OTHER STORIES. With 12 Illustrations by S. L.
  Fildes.


HOUSEHOLD EDITION.

This Edition consists of 22 Volumes, containing nearly 900
Illustrations by F. Barnard, J. Mahony, F. A. Fraser, C. Green, &c.
Price £3 14_s._ 6_d._ in cloth; and £2 15_s._ in paper binding.

  OLIVER TWIST, with 28 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._; paper,
  1_s._ 9_d._

  MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT, with 59 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper,
  3_s._

  DAVID COPPERFIELD, with 60 Illustrations and a Portrait, cloth,
  4_s._; paper, 3_s._

  BLEAK HOUSE, with 61 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._

  LITTLE DORRIT, with 58 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._

  PICKWICK PAPERS, with 56 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._

  BARNABY RUDGE, with 46 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._

  A TALE OF TWO CITIES, with 25 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._;
  paper, 1_s._ 9_d._

  OUR MUTUAL FRIEND, with 58 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper,
  3_s._

  NICHOLAS NICKLEBY, with 59 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper,
  3_s._

  GREAT EXPECTATIONS, with 26 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._;
  paper, 1_s._ 9_d._

  OLD CURIOSITY SHOP, with 39 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper,
  3_s._

  SKETCHES BY “BOZ,” with 36 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._;
  paper, 1_s._ 9_d._

  HARD TIMES, with 20 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._; paper, 1_s._
  6_d._

  DOMBEY AND SON, with 61 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._

  UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER, with 26 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._
  6_d._; paper, 1_s._ 9_d._

  CHRISTMAS BOOKS, with 28 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._;
  sewed, 1_s._ 9_d._

  THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, with 15 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._
  6_d._; paper, 1_s._ 9_d._

  AMERICAN NOTES and PICTURES FROM ITALY, with 18 New
  Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._; paper, 1_s._ 9_d._

  EDWIN DROOD; REPRINTED PIECES; and other STORIES, with 30
  Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._

  CHRISTMAS STORIES, with 23 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper,
  3_s._

  THE LIFE OF DICKENS. By JOHN FORSTER. With 40 Illustrations.
  Cloth, 4_s._ 6_d._; paper, 3_s._ 6_d._

Messrs. CHAPMAN & HALL trust that by this Edition they will be
enabled to place the works of the most popular British Author of the
present day in the hands of all English readers.


_THE CHEAPEST AND HANDIEST EDITION OF_

THE WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS.

THE POCKET VOLUME EDITION.

_30 vols., small fcap. 8vo, £2 5s._


MR. DICKENS’S READINGS.

_Fcap. 8vo. sewed._

  CHRISTMAS CAROL IN PROSE.                          1_s._
  CRICKET ON THE HEARTH.                             1_s._
  CHIMES: A GOBLIN STORY.                            1_s._
  STORY OF LITTLE DOMBEY.                            1_s._
  POOR TRAVELLER, BOOTS AT THE HOLLY-TREE INN,
      and MRS. GAMP.                                 1_s._

  A CHRISTMAS CAROL, with the Original Coloured Plates; being a
  reprint of the Original Edition. Small 8vo, red cloth, gilt
  edges, 5_s._




LEVER’S (CHARLES) WORKS.

THE ORIGINAL EDITION WITH THE ILLUSTRATIONS.

_In 17 vols. Demy 8vo. Cloth, 6s. each._


CHEAP EDITION.

_Fancy boards, 2s. 6d._

  CHARLES O’MALLEY.
  TOM BURKE.
  THE KNIGHT OF GWYNNE.
  MARTINS OF CROMARTIN.
  THE DALTONS.
  ROLAND CASHEL.
  DAVENPORT DUNN.
  DODD FAMILY.

_Fancy boards, 2s._

  THE O’DONOGHUE.
  FORTUNES OF GLENCORE.
  HARRY LORREQUER.
  ONE OF THEM.
  A DAY’S RIDE.
  JACK HINTON.
  BARRINGTON.
  TONY BUTLER.
  MAURICE TIERNAY.
  SIR BROOKE FOSBROOKE.
  BRAMLEIGHS OF BISHOP’S FOLLY.
  LORD KILGOBBI.
  LUTTRELL OF ARRAN.
  RENT IN THE CLOUD and ST. PATRICK’S EVE.
  CON CREGAN.
  ARTHUR O’LEARY.
  THAT BOY OF NORCOTTS.
  CORNELIUS O’DOWD.
  SIR JASPER CAREW.
  NUTS AND NUT-CRACKERS.

_Also in sets, 27 vols., cloth, for £4 4s._




TROLLOPE’S (ANTHONY) WORKS.


CHEAP EDITION.

_Boards, 2s. 6d.; cloth, 3s. 6d._

  THE PRIME MINISTER.
  PHINEAS FINN.
  ORLEY FARM.
  CAN YOU FORGIVE HER?
  PHINEAS REDUX.
  HE KNEW HE WAS RIGHT.
  EUSTACE DIAMONDS.

_Boards, 2s.; cloth, 3s._

  VICAR OF BULLHAMPTON.
  RALPH THE HEIR.
  THE BERTRAMS.
  KELLYS AND O’KELLYS.
  McDERMOT OF BALLYCLORAN.
  CASTLE RICHMOND.
  BELTON ESTATE.
  MISS MACKENSIE.
  AN EYE FOR AN EYE.
  LADY ANNA.
  HARRY HOTSPUR.
  RACHEL RAY.
  TALES OF ALL COUNTRIES.
  MARY GRESLEY.
  LOTTA SCHMIDT.
  LA VENDÉE.
  DOCTOR THORNE.
  IS HE POPENJOY?




SOUTH KENSINGTON MUSEUM SCIENCE AND ART HANDBOOKS.

_Published for the Committee of Council on Education._

  THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS IN SPAIN. By JUAN F. RIANO. Illustrated.
  Large crown 8vo, 4_s._

  GLASS. By ALEXANDER NESBITT. Illustrated. Large Crown 8vo, 2_s._
  6_d._

  GOLD AND SILVER SMITHS’ WORK. By JOHN HUNGERFORD POLLEN. With
  numerous Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

  TAPESTRY. By ALFRED CHAMPEAUX. With Woodcuts. 2_s._ 6_d._

  BRONZES. By C. DRURY E. FORTNUM, F.S.A. With numerous Woodcuts.
  Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

  PLAIN WORDS ABOUT WATER. By A. H. CHURCH, M.A., Oxon. Large crown
  8vo, sewed, 6_d._

  ANIMAL PRODUCTS: their Preparation, Commercial Uses and Value. By
  T. L. SIMMONDS. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

  FOOD: A Short Account of the Sources, Constituents, and Uses of
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  SCIENCE CONFERENCES. Delivered at the South Kensington Museum.
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  VOL. I.—Physics and Mechanics.

  VOL. II.—Chemistry, Biology, Physical Geography, Geology,
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  ECONOMIC ENTOMOLOGY. By ANDREW MURRAY, F.L.S. APTERA. With
  numerous Illustrations. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

  HANDBOOK TO THE SPECIAL LOAN COLLECTION of Scientific Apparatus.
  Large crown 8vo, 3_s._

  THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS: Historical Sketches. With 242 Illustrations.
  Demy 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

  TEXTILE FABRICS. By the Very Rev. DANIEL ROCK, D.D. With numerous
  Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

  IVORIES: ANCIENT AND MEDIÆVAL. By WILLIAM MASKELL. With numerous
  Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

  ANCIENT & MODERN FURNITURE & WOODWORK. By JOHN HUNGERFORD POLLEN.
  With numerous Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

  MAIOLICA. By C. DRURY E. FORTNUM, F.S.A. With numerous Woodcuts.
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  MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS. By CARL ENGEL. With numerous Woodcuts. Large
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  MANUAL OF DESIGN, compiled from the Writings and Addresses of
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  PERSIAN ART. By MAJOR R. MURDOCK SMITH, R.E. Second Edition. With
  Additional Illustrations. [_In the Press._

  FREE EVENING LECTURES. Delivered in connection with the Special
  Loan Collection of Scientific Apparatus, 1876. Large crown 8vo,
  8_s._




CHAPMAN AND HALL’S

LIST OF DIAGRAMS.

_Issued under the Authority of the Science and Art Department, South
Kensington_,

For the use of Schools and Art and Science Classes.


LARGE DIAGRAMS.

ASTRONOMICAL:

  TWELVE SHEETS. By JOHN DREW, Ph. Dr., F.R.S.A. Prepared for the
  Committee of Council on Education. Sheets, £2 8_s._; on rollers
  and varnished, £4 4_s._

BOTANICAL:

  NINE SHEETS. Illustrating a Practical Method of Teaching Botany.
  By Professor HENSLOW, F.L.S. £2; on rollers, and varnished, £3
  3_s._

     CLASS.           DIVISION.        SECTION.     DIAGRAM.
                  {                { Thalamifloral     1
                  {                { Calycifloral    2 & 3
  Dicotyledon     { Angiospermous  { Corollifloral     4
                  {                { Incomplete        5
                  { Gymnospermous                      6

                  { Petaloid       { Superior          7
  Monocotyledons  {                { Inferior          8
                  { Glumaceous                         9

BUILDING CONSTRUCTION:

  TEN SHEETS. By WILLIAM J. GLENNY, Professor of Drawing, King’s
  College. In sets, £1 1_s._

GEOLOGICAL:

  DIAGRAM OF BRITISH STRATA. By H. W. BRISTOW, F.R.S., F.G.S. A
  Sheet, 4_s._; on roller and varnished, 7_s._ 6_d._

MECHANICAL:

  DIAGRAMS OF THE MECHANICAL POWERS, AND THEIR APPLICATIONS IN
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  8 Diagrams, highly coloured on stout paper, 3 feet 6 inches by 2
  feet 6 inches. Sheets £1 per set; mounted on rollers, £2.

  DIAGRAMS OF THE STEAM-ENGINE. By Professor GOODEVE and Professor
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  Sets of 41 Diagrams (52½ Sheets), £6 6_s._; varnished and mounted
  on rollers, £11 11_s._

  MACHINE DETAILS. By Professor UNWIN. 16 Coloured Diagrams.
  Sheets, £2 2_s._; mounted on rollers and varnished, £3 14_s._

ZOOLOGICAL:

  TEN SHEETS. Illustrating the Classification of Animals. By ROBERT
  PATTERSON, £2; on canvas and rollers, varnished, £3 10_s._

  The same, reduced in size on Royal paper, in 9 sheets uncoloured,
  12_s._




THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW.

Edited by JOHN MORLEY.

THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW is published on the 1st of every month (the
issue on the 15th being suspended), and a Volume is completed every
Six Months.


_The following are among the Contributors_:—

  SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.
  PROFESSOR BAIN.
  PROFESSOR BEESLY.
  DR. BRIDGES.
  HON. GEORGE C. BRODRICK.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL, M.P.
  J. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P.
  PROFESSOR SYDNEY COLVIN.
  MONTAGUE COOKSON, Q.C.
  L. H. COURTNEY, M.P.
  G. H. DARWIN.
  F. W. FARRAR.
  PROFESSOR FAWCETT, M.P.
  EDWARD A. FREEMAN.
  MRS. GARRET-ANDERSON.
  M. E. GRANT DUFF, M.P.
  THOMAS HARE.
  F. HARRISON.
  LORD HOUGHTON.
  PROFESSOR HUXLEY.
  PROFESSOR JEVONS.
  ÉMILE DE LAVELEYE.
  T. E. CLIFFE LESLIE.
  RIGHT HON. R. LOWE, M.P.
  SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, M.P.
  LORD LYTTON.
  SIR H. S. MAINE.
  DR. MAUDSLEY.
  PROFESSOR MAX MÜLLER.
  PROFESSOR HENRY MORLEY.
  G. OSBORNE MORGAN, Q.C., M.P.
  WILLIAM MORRIS.
  F. W. NEWMAN.
  W. G. PALGRAVE.
  WALTER H. PATER.
  RT. HON. LYON PLAYFAIR, M.P.
  DANTE GABRIEL ROSSETTI.
  HERBERT SPENCER.
  HON. E. L. STANLEY.
  SIR J. FITZJAMES STEPHEN, Q.C.
  LESLIE STEPHEN.
  J. HUTCHISON STIRLING.
  A. C. SWINBURNE.
  DR. VON SYBEL.
  J. A. SYMONDS.
  W. T. THORNTON.
  HON. LIONEL A. TOLLEMACHE.
  ANTHONY TROLLOPE.
  PROFESSOR TYNDALL.
  THE EDITOR.

&c. &c. &c.


          THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW _is published at 2s. 6d._


              CHAPMAN & HALL LIMITED, 193, PICCADILLY.

  BRADBURY, AGNEW, & CO.,]                     [PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS.




  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

  Footnote [68] is referenced twice from page 135.

  Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
  corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
  the text and consultation of external sources.

  Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
  when a predominant preference was found in the original book.

  Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings of names
  and words in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have
  been left unchanged.

  Pg viii: page number ‘23’ replaced by ‘273’.
  Pg 56: ‘retractation of the’ replaced by ‘retraction of the’.
  Pg 124: ‘African Rupublic’ replaced by ‘African Republic’.
  Pg 295: ‘the beleagured camp’ replaced by ‘the beleaguered camp’.
  Pg 348: ‘Schumbrucker’ replaced by ‘Schermbrucker’.
  Pg 398: ‘where-ever the enemy’ replaced by ‘wherever the enemy’.
  Pg 439: ‘casualities were’ replaced by ‘casualties were’.
  Pg 457: ‘will send yon’ replaced by ‘will send you’.

  Catalog
  Pg c6: ‘trace ou the’ replaced by ‘trace out the’.
  Pg c9: ‘knowledge,  terary’ replaced by ‘knowledge, literary’.
  Pg c23: ‘Sheets, £2 2.’ replaced by ‘Sheets, £2 2_s._.



*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75320 ***