Initial commitHEADmain

1 files changed, 15936 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/75320-0.txt b/75320-0.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26bfb10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/75320-0.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,15936 @@
+
+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75320 ***
+
+
+
+
+
+  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
+
+  Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.
+
+  Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been
+  placed at the end of the book text, in front of the Catalog.
+
+  The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font.
+
+  Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.
+
+
+
+
+                       HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR
+                           AND ITS ORIGIN.
+
+
+
+
+                       HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR
+
+                           AND ITS ORIGIN.
+
+
+                                  BY
+                         FRANCES E. COLENSO.
+
+
+       ASSISTED IN THOSE PORTIONS OF THE WORK WHICH TOUCH UPON
+                           MILITARY MATTERS
+
+                                  BY
+                   LIEUT.-COLONEL EDWARD DURNFORD.
+
+
+                               London:
+             CHAPMAN AND HALL, LIMITED, 193, PICCADILLY.
+                                1880.
+
+                        _All Rights reserved._
+
+
+
+
+                      CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS,
+                        CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS.
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+It is probable that the Bishop of Natal may be held responsible
+for the contents of a volume written partly by his daughter, and
+having for its subject the Zulu War; more especially if a general
+coincidence can be traced between what are known to be his views
+and those which are expressed in this history. My father’s opinions
+have, naturally, considerable influence over those held or expressed
+by his family, and I do not imagine that much will be found in these
+pages from which he will dissent. Nevertheless, it is desirable that
+my readers should understand from the first that he is in no sense
+responsible for their contents.
+
+When I left Natal, in September last, the idea of writing upon the
+subject of the Zulu War had hardly occurred to me; it has developed
+since to an extent quite beyond my original intentions, and I find
+that its fulfilment has rather taken my father by surprise. I had no
+opportunity of consulting him upon the subject, nor has he yet seen a
+word of what I have written, for on reaching England I found that, to
+be of any use at all, the book should appear almost at once.
+
+I made, indeed, ample use of the pamphlets which the Bishop of Natal
+has written on behalf of Langalibalele and Cetshwayo, which have
+saved me many hours of weary search. Consequently, while the Bishop
+is in no way responsible for such errors or omissions as may occur in
+this volume, any merit or usefulness which my portion of the book
+may contain is due chiefly to his labours.
+
+The general plan of my history was laid out, and the first
+few chapters were written, during the voyage from Natal, and
+upon reaching England I obtained the assistance of my friend
+Lieut.-Colonel Edward Durnford in that portion of the work which
+deals with the military conduct of the war. While it was desirable
+that a record of military events should be made by one whose
+professional knowledge qualified him for the duty, there was an
+additional reason which made his help appropriate. It may easily
+be understood from his name that the interest taken by him in his
+task would be of no ordinary kind. Colonel Durnford has written
+the military portions of the book, but is not responsible for any
+expressions of opinion upon matters strictly political.
+
+I am far from feeling that I am the best person to undertake such a
+work as this, which my father himself would look upon as a serious
+one, and which he, or even my sister, who has worked with him
+throughout, would do so much better than I; but they were not at
+hand, and I have thought it my duty to do what I could, while I could
+have had no better aid than that given me by Colonel Durnford.
+
+However insufficient the result may prove, we shall at least hope
+that our work may give some slight assistance to that cause of
+justice, truth, and mercy, the maintenance of which alone can ensure
+the true honour of the British name.
+
+                                                FRANCES ELLEN COLENSO.
+
+  _January 22nd, 1880._
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+  CHAPTER I.
+                                                           PAGE
+  FIRST CAUSES                                                1
+
+
+  CHAPTER II.
+
+  LANGALIBALELE                                              20
+
+
+  CHAPTER III.
+
+  TRIAL OF LANGALIBALELE                                     38
+
+
+  CHAPTER IV.
+
+  THE BISHOP’S DEFENCE                                       51
+
+
+  CHAPTER V.
+
+  THE PUTINI TRIBE                                           63
+
+
+  CHAPTER VI.
+
+  SIR GARNET WOLSELEY: WHAT HE CAME FOR, WHAT HE DID,
+      AND WHAT HE DID NOT DO                                 78
+
+
+  CHAPTER VII.
+
+  THE MATSHANA INQUIRY AND COLONEL COLLEY                    89
+
+
+  CHAPTER VIII.
+
+  THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL                           112
+
+
+  CHAPTER IX.
+
+  THE DISPUTED TERRITORY                                    138
+
+
+  CHAPTER X.
+
+  THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION                                   163
+
+
+  CHAPTER XI.
+
+  SIHAYO, UMBILINI, AND THE MISSIONARIES IN ZULULAND        192
+
+
+  CHAPTER XII.
+
+  THE ULTIMATUM, DECLARATION OF WAR, AND COMMENCEMENT OF
+      CAMPAIGN                                              235
+
+
+  CHAPTER XIII.
+
+  ISANDHLWANA                                               273
+
+
+  CHAPTER XIV.
+
+  RORKE’S DRIFT—HELPMAKAAR—COURT OF INQUIRY, ETC.           302
+
+
+  CHAPTER XV.
+
+  THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SIKUKUNI                             325
+
+
+  CHAPTER XVI.
+
+  NO. 4 COLUMN—INTOMBI—INDHLOBANE—KAMBULA—KING’S
+      MESSENGERS                                            344
+
+
+  CHAPTER XVII.
+
+  THE LOWER TUGELA—INYEZANE—ETSHOWE                         368
+
+
+  CHAPTER XVIII.
+
+  NGINGINDHLOVU—RELIEF OF ETSHOWE—BORDER RAIDING            380
+
+
+  CHAPTER XIX.
+
+  REINFORCEMENTS—ISANDHLWANA REVISITED                      394
+
+
+  CHAPTER XX.
+
+  THE PRINCE IMPERIAL                                       418
+
+
+  CHAPTER XXI.
+
+  ULUNDI                                                    433
+
+
+  CHAPTER XXII.
+
+  SIR GARNET WOLSELEY—CAPTURE OF CETSHWAYO                  453
+
+
+  CONCLUSION                                                475
+
+
+
+
+THE ZULU WAR.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+FIRST CAUSES.
+
+
+England’s collisions with the savage races bordering upon her
+colonies have in all probability usually been brought about by the
+exigencies of the moment, by border-troubles, and acts of violence
+and insolence on the part of the savages, and from the absolute
+necessity of protecting a small and trembling white population from
+their assaults.
+
+No such causes as these have led up to the war of 1879. For more
+than twenty years the Zulus and the colonists of Natal have lived
+side by side in perfect peace and quietness. The tranquillity of
+our border had been a matter of pride as compared to the disturbed
+and uncertain boundaries between Zululand and the Transvaal. The
+mere fact of the utterly unprotected condition of the frontier
+farmers on _our_ border, and the entire absence of anything like
+precaution, evinced by the common practice of building houses of the
+most combustible description, is a proof that the colonists felt
+no real alarm concerning the Zulus until the idea was suggested to
+them by those in authority over them.[1] The only interruption to
+this tranquil condition of the public mind about the Zulus was in the
+year 1861, when a scare took place in the colony, for which, as it
+afterwards proved, there were no grounds whatsoever. A general but
+unfounded belief was rife that Cetshwayo,[2] king, or rather at that
+time prince, ruling Zululand, was about to invade Natal, in order to
+obtain possession of his young brother Umkungo, a claimant of the
+Zulu crown, and who had escaped over the border at the time of the
+great civil war of which we shall presently treat. This young prince
+had been placed—by the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone—at
+Bishopstowe,[3] for his education in the Native Boys’ School there;
+and it was not until he had been there for years that the fancy
+arose, suggested and fostered by the border farmers and traders in
+Zululand, that Cetshwayo intended to take him by force from amongst
+us, or at all events to make the attempt.
+
+Under the influence of this belief the troops then stationed in
+Natal were ordered to the frontier, the colonial volunteers were
+called out, the defence of the principal towns became a matter for
+consideration; while outlying farmers, and residents in the country,
+hastened to remove their families to places of comparative safety.
+
+Bishopstowe was supposed to be the special object of the expected
+attack; but the Bishop himself, having occasional opportunities of
+learning the state of things in Zululand, through his missionary
+there, could never be brought thoroughly to believe in the gravity
+of the danger. It is true that, as a matter of precaution, and in
+deference to the strongly-expressed opinion of the Lieut.-Governor
+of the Colony and of Mr. Shepstone, he sent away the threatened boy
+to some of his own people, in a more remote and safer part of the
+colony. But he was extremely reluctant to take the further step,
+strongly urged upon him, of removing his family and people to the
+adjacent city of Pietermaritzburg, and only consented to do so
+under protest. During the night following his consent, but before
+the project had been carried out, he had reason for a few hours to
+suppose that he had been mistaken in his own judgment. The family
+at Bishopstowe was knocked up at one o’clock in the morning by a
+messenger from a passing Dutch farmer, who, on his way into town with
+his own family, had sent word to the Bishop that Cetshwayo’s army had
+entered the colony, was already between him and Table Mountain—that
+is to say within a distance of nine miles—and was burning, killing,
+and destroying all upon the way to Bishopstowe. There seemed to be no
+doubt of the fact; so, hastily collecting their native villagers,[4]
+the Colensos left their homes and started for the town, which they
+reached, most of them on foot, about daybreak. The consequence of
+their being accompanied and followed by a considerable party of
+natives (of both sexes and all ages!) was that the townspeople
+immediately supposed that the “Zulus had come;” and some of them
+actually left their houses, and took refuge in the various places of
+safety—such as the fort, the principal churches, and so on—previously
+decided upon by the authorities in case of necessity. In common South
+African terms they “went into laager.”
+
+As the day passed, and still no further tidings arrived of the
+approach of the Zulus or the destruction of Bishopstowe, the Bishop
+began to have strong suspicions that, after all, he had been right in
+his original opinion, and that “the killing, burning, and destroying”
+had been conjured up by some excited imagination. This opinion was
+confirmed, if not completely established, in the course of the day,
+by the reception of a letter from the missionary in Zululand before
+mentioned, in which he inquired, on the Zulu king’s behalf, what
+fault the latter had committed towards the English, that they should
+be preparing to invade his country. The missionary added that all
+was perfectly quiet in Zululand, until the border tribes, seeing
+the British troops approaching, fled inland in alarm, killing their
+cattle to prevent their falling into the hands of the invaders, and
+burying their other possessions where they could not carry them
+away. In point of fact the “scare” had no foundation whatsoever, and
+the Zulus were quite as much alarmed by the actual approach of the
+British troops as the Natalians had been by the imaginary Zulu army.
+The worst immediate consequence of the mistake was the want, almost
+amounting to famine, produced amongst the border Zulus by the loss of
+their cattle. A later and more serious result has been that general
+impression, which has long obtained credence at home in England,
+that the colonists of Natal have not only been in fear of their
+lives on account of the Zulus for many years, but have also had good
+and sufficient reason for their alarm. But for this fixed, though
+groundless idea, England would hardly have been in such a hurry to
+send out additional troops for the protection of the colony as she
+was in the summer of 1878; to her own great loss and to the very
+considerable injury of the colony itself, not to speak of its unhappy
+neighbours and heretofore friends the Zulus.
+
+It is certainly true that during the year 1878 the inhabitants of
+Natal did honestly feel great fear of the Zulus, and of a possible
+invasion of the colony by them, the alarm in many cases amounting
+to absolute panic. But this feeling was produced by no warlike
+menaces from our neighbours, no sinister appearances on our borders.
+The panic—or “scare,” as it would popularly be called in Natal—was
+forced upon the people by the conduct and language of their rulers,
+by the preparations made for war, troops being sent for from England
+“for defensive purposes” (as was so repeatedly asserted by both Sir
+Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford, then Lieut.-General the Hon. F.
+A. Thesiger), and by the perpetual agitation of the local newspaper
+editors.
+
+It is true indeed that a certain section of the colonists eagerly
+desired war. To some the presence of the troops was a source of
+actual fortune, to others the freedom and independence of so large
+a body of black people, whom they could neither tax nor force to
+work for them, was, and had long been, odious; the revenue to be
+derived from a hut-tax levied upon the Zulus, and the cheap labour
+to be obtained when their power and independence should be broken,
+formed one of the chief subjects for speculation when the war was
+first suggested. To others, again, the prospect of war was simply a
+source of pleasurable excitement, a hunt on a large scale, martial
+glory to be won, with just spice enough of danger to give zest to the
+affair; as had been the case in the war just concluded in Kaffraria.
+Naturally this feeling was commonest amongst the volunteers and
+their friends. Some of them looked upon the matter in a light which
+would meet with utter condemnation in any civilised society; but
+many others, especially the young lads who filled up the ranks of
+the volunteer corps, were simply dazzled by visions of military
+distinction, excited by the popular phrases in perpetual use about
+“fighting for their country, and doing their duty as soldiers,” to
+the extent of losing sight altogether of the question as to whether
+or no their country really required any defence at all.
+
+Natal cannot honestly claim to be guiltless in bringing about the
+war with the Zulus, and will hardly deny that in 1878 the prospect
+was a most popular one amongst her sons. Perhaps Sir Bartle Frere
+could not so easily have produced a war out of the materials which
+he had at hand but for the assistance given him by the popular cry
+in the colony, and the general fear of the Zulus, which called forth
+England’s ready sympathy and assistance. But it must be remembered
+that the panic was not a genuine one, nor even one like that of 1861,
+produced by the folly of the people themselves. It was distinctly
+imposed upon them by those in authority, whose policy was to bring
+about a collision with the Zulus, and who then made use of the very
+fears which they had themselves aroused for the furtherance of their
+own purpose.
+
+The subjugation of the Zulus and the annexation of their country,
+formed part of a policy which has occupied the minds of certain
+British statesmen for many years. The ambition of creating a South
+African Empire, to be another jewel in Victoria’s crown, which, if
+no rival, should at least be a worthy pendant to the great Indian
+Empire, was a dazzling one, and towards that object all Government
+action in South Africa has apparently tended since the year 1873.
+When the idea was first conceived those only know who formed it, but
+it took practical and visible form in 1873. In that year by crowning
+the Zulu king we assumed a right to interfere in the internal
+management of the country, thereby establishing a possible future
+cause of offence, which, as the Zulus obstinately refused to put
+themselves in the wrong by any sort of interference with us, was
+necessary in order to bring about a state of things which should
+eventually give us a sufficient excuse for taking possession of the
+country altogether.
+
+The origin of this performance was as follows. In the year 1856 a
+great revolution took place in Zululand, and a civil war broke out
+between two claimants to the heirship of the throne (then filled
+by Umpande), namely, the present king, Cetshwayo, and his brother
+Umbulazi. Cetshwayo was quite young at the time, and appears to have
+been put forward by some ambitious warriors, who intended to rule in
+his name, and did not expect the remarkable power and talent which he
+afterwards developed.
+
+Umbulazi’s party was beaten, he himself being killed in battle, great
+carnage ensuing, and many fugitives escaping into Natal.
+
+Amidst all the bloodshed and horror which naturally attends such
+a warfare as this between savages, there stands out the singular,
+perhaps unprecedented, fact that Cetshwayo, although victorious to
+the extent of carrying the nation with him, not only never made any
+attempt upon the old king, his father’s, life, but did not even
+depose him or seize his throne. The old man lived and—nominally,
+at all events—reigned for many years, though, owing to his age and
+obesity, which was so great as to prevent his walking, he seems to
+have been willing enough to leave the real authority in the hands of
+his son, while retaining the semblance of it himself. He was treated
+with all due respect by Cetshwayo and his followers until he died a
+natural death in the year 1872, when Cetshwayo ascended the throne
+which had long been virtually his own, and was proclaimed king of
+Zululand. This was looked upon as a fitting time for a little display
+of authority by ourselves, hence the friendly expedition to Zululand
+of 1873, when we gave Cetshwayo to understand that, however it might
+appear to him, he held his power from us, and was no true king till
+we made him such. It was also rightly thought to be an opportunity
+for suggesting to the Zulu king such reforms in the government of
+his country as would naturally commend themselves to English ideas.
+We considered, and with some reason, that capital punishment was an
+over-frequent occurrence in Zululand, and that, on the other hand,
+judicial trials before sentence should be the universal rule. It was
+also desirable, if possible, to decrease the belief in witchcraft,
+by which so much power was left in the hands of the witch-doctors
+or priests;[5] and finally it was thought necessary to provide for
+the safety of the missionaries resident in the land.[6] How far this
+was a desirable step depends entirely on whether the men themselves
+were earnest, self-sacrificing, peace-loving teachers of the gospel
+of Christ, or mere traders for their own benefit, under the cloak
+of a divine mission, ready to hail a bloody war. “Only the utter
+destruction of the Zulus can secure future peace in South Africa ...
+we have the approbation of God, our Queen, and our own conscience.”
+(See letter from a missionary clergyman to Sir Bartle Frere,[7] dated
+December 17th, 1878. (P. P. [C. 2316] p. 3.))
+
+It was frequently asserted at the time in Natal that this coronation
+ceremony (1st September, 1873) was nothing better than a farce,
+and the way in which it was carried out seems hardly to have been
+understood by the king himself. The Natalians were puzzled as to what
+could be the meaning or intention of what seemed to them a hollow
+show, and were on the whole rather inclined to put it down to Mr.
+Shepstone’s supposed habit of “petting the natives,” and to “Exeter
+Hall influences,” resulting in a ridiculous fuss on their behalf.
+
+From Mr. Shepstone’s despatch on the subject of the coronation of
+Cetshwayo (P. P. [C. 1137]), and from messages brought from the
+latter to the Government of Natal after his father’s death, there
+appears to have been a strong desire on the part, not only of the
+people, but of the king himself, that his formal succession to the
+throne should be unattended by bloodshed and disorder, such as had
+ushered in the rule of his predecessors for several generations.
+How greatly the character of the Zulu rule had improved in a
+comparatively short period may be judged by a comparison of the fact
+[p. 5, _ibid._] (mentioned by Mr. Shepstone), that during the reigns
+of Chaka and Dingana (grandfather and great-uncle to Cetshwayo), all
+the royal wives were put to death either before the birth of their
+children, or with their infants afterwards, with the behaviour of
+Cetshwayo, both to his father and to his father’s wives.[8] And Mr.
+Shepstone himself speaks of Cetshwayo on the occasion of this visit
+in the following manner:—“Cetywayo is a man of considerable ability,
+much force of character, and has a dignified manner; in all my
+conversations with him,” the Secretary for Native Affairs continues,
+“he was remarkably frank and straightforward, and he ranks in every
+respect far above any native chief I have ever had to do with.”
+Throughout the despatch, indeed, Mr. Shepstone repeatedly speaks of
+the king’s “frankness” and “sagacity,” in direct opposition to the
+charges of craft and duplicity so recklessly brought against the
+latter of late.
+
+King Umpande died in October, 1872, having reigned nearly
+thirty-three years, and on the 26th February, 1873, messengers from
+Cetshwayo brought the news of his father’s death to the Governor
+of Natal, requesting at the same time that Mr. Shepstone might be
+sent to instal Cetshwayo as his successor,[9] in order that the
+Zulu nation should be “more one with the government of Natal,”
+and be “covered by the same mantle.” The message ended with the
+request which Cetshwayo never lost an opportunity of making, that we
+would protect his country from Boer aggressions.[10] “We are also
+commissioned,” say the messengers, “to urge, _what has already been
+urged so frequently_, that the government of Natal be extended so as
+to intervene between the Zulus and the territory of the Transvaal
+Republic.”
+
+The mere fact that this proposition was frequently and earnestly
+pressed upon the Natal Government by the Zulus, is in itself a proof
+positive that the aggressions were not on their side. They desired
+to place what they looked upon as an impassable barrier between the
+two countries, and could therefore have had no wish themselves to
+encroach.
+
+Further messages passed between Cetshwayo and the Natal Government
+upon the subject, until it was finally arranged that the coronation
+should be performed by Mr. Shepstone, in Zululand, and, with a party
+of volunteers as escort, he crossed the Tugela on the 8th August,
+1873, accompanied by Major Durnford, R.E., Captain Boyes, 75th
+Regiment, and several other officers and gentlemen.
+
+Mr. Shepstone’s long despatch, already quoted from, and in which
+he describes, with true native minuteness, the most trivial
+circumstances of the journey, and subsequent proceedings, gives the
+impression that he looked upon his mission as a service of danger to
+all concerned. It was, however, carried out without any break in the
+friendly relations between the Zulus and his party, who returned to
+Pietermaritzburg “without unpleasant incident” on the 19th September.
+
+The coronation mission was carried out—how far _successfully_
+entirely depends upon the results expected or desired by those
+in command. The king himself, while looking upon the fact of his
+recognition as sovereign of Zululand by the English as important,
+is quite keen enough to have detected certain elements of absurdity
+in the proceedings by which they invested him with his dignity.
+There was perhaps a little good-humoured scorn in his reception of
+the somewhat oddly-chosen presents and marks of honour offered him.
+Without losing that respect for and faith in the English which has
+always characterised his dealings with them, he felt impatiently
+that they were rather making a fool of him; especially when they
+put upon his shoulders a little scarlet mantle—formerly a lady’s
+opera-cloak—the curtailed dimensions of which made him ridiculous
+in his own eyes; and upon his head a pasteboard, cloth, and tinsel
+crown, whose worthlessness he was perfectly capable of comprehending.
+Mr. Shepstone’s despatch represents him as greatly impressed by the
+ceremony, etc.; but the impression on the minds of many observers
+was that he put up with much which both seemed and was trifling and
+ridiculous, for the sake of the solid benefits which he hoped he and
+his people would derive from a closer connection with the English.
+
+The portion of Mr. Shepstone’s despatch, however, which it is
+important that we should study with attention is that which refers to
+the “coronation promises” (so called) of Cetshwayo, and treats of the
+political subjects discussed between king and kingmaker.
+
+Sir Bartle Frere repeatedly speaks of the transaction as “a solemn
+act by the king, undertaken as the price of British support and
+recognition;” of Cetshwayo as having “openly violated his coronation
+promises;” of his “undoubted promises;” while Sir Garnet Wolseley,
+in his speech to the assembled chiefs and people of the Zulu nation,
+speaks of the coronation promises as though the want of attention
+to them had been the chief, if not the only, cause of the king’s
+misfortunes; and the same tone is taken in all late despatches on the
+subject.
+
+And now let us turn to Mr. Shepstone’s own report, prepared at the
+time, and see whether we gather from it the impression that the
+conditions of his treaty with Cetshwayo were thought of, or intended
+by him, to stand as solemn and binding promises, of which the
+infraction, or delay in carrying out, would render the king and his
+people liable to punishment at our hands. After giving his reasons
+for objecting to “formal or written” treaties with savages,[11] Mr.
+Shepstone himself remarks, “Ours is an elastic arrangement.” This
+is a singularly candid confession, of the truth of which there can
+be little doubt. Whether such a term _should_ be applicable to the
+treaties made by an English Government is quite another question, to
+which we will leave the English public to find an answer. We have,
+however, but to quote from Mr. Shepstone’s own despatch to prove the
+convenient “elasticity” of his propositions, and how greatly they
+have been magnified of late in seeking a quarrel against the Zulu
+king. At p. 16 of the report, after enumerating the “arrangements
+and laws” proposed by him, and heartily approved by the Zulus, Mr.
+Shepstone remarks: “Although all this was fully, and even vehemently,
+assented to, it cannot be expected that the amelioration described
+will immediately take effect. To have got such principles admitted
+and declared to be what a Zulu may plead when oppressed, was but
+sowing the seed, which will still take many years to grow and
+mature.” And at p. 17 he says: “I told the king that I well knew the
+difficulties of his position, and that he could overcome them only
+by moderation and prudence and justice, but without these they would
+certainly overcome him.” And again (p. 18, par. 82) he explains that
+when he left Natal he had looked upon the “charge” which he knew that
+he would be expected to deliver to Cetshwayo on his installation, as
+something in the nature of an ordination sermon, or bishop’s charge
+to candidates for confirmation, likely to influence only in so far
+as the consciences of those addressed might respond, etc.; but that,
+on entering Zululand, he found that the people thought so much of
+this part of the duty he had undertaken that he felt himself to have
+“become clothed with the power of fundamental legislation,” and
+thought it right to take advantage of the opportunity for introducing
+improvements in the government of the people. “I have already
+described my success,” he continues, “and I attribute it to the
+sagacity of Cetywayo.”
+
+But in all this there is no mention of “solemn promises,” to break
+which would be an insult to the majesty of England, and an excuse
+for war; nor is there, from beginning to end of the despatch, any
+token that Mr. Shepstone looked upon them in that light, or had any
+immediate expectation of proving the usefulness of his “elastic”
+arrangement.
+
+In describing his interviews and political discussions with the Zulu
+king, Mr. Shepstone speaks repeatedly in high praise of the ability
+and behaviour of the former. He says in one place: “Cetywayo received
+us cordially as before.... Major Durnford and my son, with the Natal
+Native Indunas, sat down with me to an interview with Cetywayo and
+the councillors, that lasted for five hours without intermission. It
+was of the most interesting and earnest kind, and was conducted with
+great ability and frankness by Cetywayo. Theoretically, my business
+was with the councillors who represented the nation; but, had it not
+been for the straightforward manner in which Cetywayo insisted upon
+their going direct to the point, it would have been impossible to
+have got through the serious subjects we were bound to decide in the
+time we did.”
+
+Of the points discussed in this way the most important was that
+which, a little later, led directly up to the Zulu War—namely, the
+aggressions of the Transvaal Boers and the disputed boundary between
+them and the Zulus. “The whole of the afternoon,” says Mr. Shepstone,
+“was occupied with this subject, about which he occasionally grew
+very earnest, and declared that he and every Zulu would die rather
+than submit to them—viz. the Boer encroachments. He reproached the
+Government of Natal for not having taken up the Zulu cause, and
+for not even having troubled themselves to examine whether their
+statements were true or not, while they treated them as if without
+foundation.”
+
+In fact, on this, as on every other occasion, the Zulu king lost no
+opportunity of protesting against the encroachments of the Boers,
+lest his peaceable conduct towards these latter, maintained in
+deference to the wishes of the Natal Government, should be brought
+up against him later as a proof of their rights. Whatever may have
+been the intentions and opinions of Mr. Shepstone on the subject of
+the “coronation promises,” he left Cetshwayo unfettered in his own
+opinion, having merely received certain advice as to the government
+of his people from his respected friends the English, to whose wishes
+he should certainly give full attention, and whose counsel he would
+carry out as far as was, in his opinion, wise or feasible. As already
+stated, the principal item of the English advice related to capital
+punishment, which we, with some justice, considered a too frequent
+occurrence in Zululand, especially in cases of supposed witchcraft,
+this superstition being undoubtedly the bane of the country.
+
+But in judging of the king’s acts in this respect, it should be
+remembered that, to rule a nation without any assistance in the form
+of gaols or fetters, capital punishment must needs be resorted to
+rather more frequently than in our own country, where, indeed, it is
+not so long since we hung a man for stealing a sheep, and for other
+acts far short of murder. And as to the superstition concerning
+witches, it can hardly have led to more cruelty and injustice in
+Zululand than in civilised European countries, where at Trèves 7000
+victims were burned alive for witchcraft; 500 at Geneva in three
+months; 1000 in the province of Como; 400, at _once_, at Toulouse;
+with many other like cases on official record.[12] The practice of
+smelling out a witch, as it is called, is one to be put a stop to as
+soon as possible by gradual and gentle means, and Cetshwayo himself
+had arrived at that conclusion without our assistance, as shown in
+his conversation with the native printer Magema, whose account of a
+visit paid to the Zulu king appeared in “Macmillan’s Magazine” for
+March, 1878.
+
+But the custom of a people—the law of a land—is not to be done away
+with or altered in an hour; nor could we English reasonably expect
+such radical changes in the administration of a country to follow
+our orders as immediately and naturally as we should expect a new
+ordinance to be received by the natives of Natal living under our
+own rule. Neither could we justly consider the non-fulfilment of
+our wishes and commands a sufficient cause for attacking Zululand,
+although such supposed non-fulfilment was the first, and for a long
+time the only _casus belli_ which could be found against the Zulu
+king.
+
+The first occasion on which the solemnity of these “coronation
+promises” was made of importance was in 1875, when Bishop Schreuder
+undertook to pay Cetshwayo a visit for the purpose of presenting
+him with a printed and bound copy of Mr. Shepstone’s Report upon
+the coronation in 1873, and impressing him fully with the wishes of
+the English Government. Even then, judging from Bishop Schreuder’s
+account of his interview, neither king nor councillors were
+thoroughly satisfied with the result.[13] Cetshwayo, while admiring
+the exact report given of what took place during Mr. Shepstone’s
+visit, objected that he had reserved his own royal prerogatives and
+the right of putting criminals to death for certain serious crimes,
+and pointed out that Mr. Shepstone had neglected to inform the Queen
+of this fact.
+
+Bishop Schreuder, from his own account, appears to have overruled all
+objections with a very high hand, and almost forced the “book,” with
+his own interpretation of it, upon the seemingly reluctant king, who,
+he says, “evidently felt himself out of his depth.”
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+LANGALIBALELE.
+
+
+Meanwhile in Natal mischief was brewing. A certain chief in the north
+of the colony was supposed to be in a very rebellious frame of mind,
+and it was rumoured that force of arms would prove necessary in order
+to bring him to his senses.
+
+This chief was one Langalibalele, who, with his tribe, the
+Ama-Hlubi, had been driven out of Zululand by Umpande in the year
+1848, and had taken refuge in Natal. He was located by the English
+Government in the country below the Draakensberg Mountains, with
+the duty imposed upon him of defending Natal against the attacks
+of the predatory hordes of Bushmen who, in the early days of the
+colony, made perpetual and destructive raids over the mountains.
+From this point of view it would seem reasonable that the Hlubi
+tribe should be permitted the use of firearms, prohibited, except
+under certain restrictions, to the natives of Natal; inattention to
+which prohibition was the ground upon which the original suspicions
+concerning Langalibalele’s loyalty were based. The law, however,
+by which this prohibition and these restrictions were made was one
+of those enactments which, even when theoretically wise, are often
+practically impossible, and to which new communities are so prone.
+
+Theoretically no native can possess a gun in Natal which has not
+been registered before a magistrate. Practically, in every kraal, in
+every part of the colony, there were, and doubtless still are, many
+unregistered guns, bought by natives, or given to them in lieu of
+wages by their masters (a common practice at the Diamond Fields),
+with very vague comprehension or total ignorance on the part of
+the native that any unlawful act had been committed. This would be
+more especially natural when the masters who thus furnished their
+men with the forbidden weapon were themselves in some way connected
+with the government of the country (Natal), whose sanction would
+therefore be looked upon by the natives as an equivalent to the
+permission of Government itself. But in point of fact the law had
+always been enforced in such an extremely lax way, the evasions of
+it were so easy and numerous, and so many white men of position and
+respectability in the colony were party to the infraction of it,
+that it is no wonder that its reality and importance was but lightly
+engraved upon the native mind.
+
+The special accusation, however, brought against Langalibalele to
+prove his rebellious tendencies was that young men of his tribe were
+in possession of unregistered guns, which, in addition, had not
+been brought in to the magistrate, when demanded, for registration.
+The reason for this unwillingness (on the part of the young men) to
+comply with the above demands, appeared afterwards in the fact that
+other guns which had been properly produced for registration, had,
+after considerable delay, been returned to their owners in an injured
+condition, rendering them unfit for use.
+
+As these guns were the well-earned reward of hard labour, and
+greatly valued by their possessors, it is little to be wondered at
+that there should be considerable reluctance on the part of others
+to risk the same loss. A little forbearance and consideration on
+the part of those in authority might, however, easily have overcome
+the difficulty. But in this case, as in others, the mistake was
+committed of requiring prompt and unquestioning obedience, without
+sufficient care being taken to protect the rights of those who
+rendered it. As usual we would not stop to reason or deal justly
+with the savage. Carelessness of the property of the natives, the
+overbearing impatience of a magistrate, the want of tact and good
+feeling on the part of a commonplace subordinate—all these led to an
+indefinitely uneasy state of things, which soon produced considerable
+anxiety in the colonial mind. This feeling prevailed during Mr.
+Shepstone’s absence in Zululand, and it was generally understood that
+the Secretary for Native Affairs’ next piece of work after crowning
+Cetshwayo would be that of “settling Langalibalele.”
+
+But beyond the reluctance to produce their guns for registration,
+there was nothing in the behaviour of the Hlubi tribe to give the
+colonists cause for apprehension. No lawless acts were committed, no
+cattle stolen, no farmhouse fired, and the vague fears which existed
+amongst the white inhabitants as to what might happen were rather
+the result of the way in which “Government” shook its head over the
+matter as a serious one, than justified by any real cause for alarm.
+It was in fact one of those “Government scares” which occasionally
+were produced from causes or for reasons not apparent on the surface.
+
+On Mr. Shepstone’s return from the coronation of Cetshwayo,
+Government native messengers were sent to Langalibalele, requiring
+the latter to come down in person to Pietermaritzburg, the capital
+of Natal, to answer for the conduct of his tribe concerning their
+guns. The message produced a great—and to those who were ignorant of
+the cause of it—a most unreasonable panic in the tribe, in which the
+chief himself shared considerably. The Ama-Hlubi appeared exceedingly
+suspicious, even of the designs of the Government messengers,
+who were made to take off their great-coats, and were searched
+for concealed weapons before being admitted into the presence of
+Langalibalele. Such distrust of British good faith was held in itself
+to be a crime, the insolence of which could not be overlooked.
+Furthermore it was soon evident that the tribe would not trust their
+chief, nor he his person, in the hands of the Government, now that
+he was in disfavour. Without actually refusing to obey the orders
+he had received and proceed to Pietermaritzburg, Langalibalele sent
+excuses and apologies, chiefly turning upon his own ill-health,
+which made travelling difficult to him. This answer was the signal
+for the military expedition of 1873, which was entered upon without
+any further attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the
+affair, or to find out the real grounds for the evident fear and
+distrust of the Hlubi tribe. In October, 1873, the force, partly
+of regulars, partly colonial, a few Basuto horse, with an entirely
+unorganised and useless addition of untrained Natal natives, started
+from Pietermaritzburg, with all the pomp and circumstance of war;
+and much to the delight of the young colonial blood on the look-out
+for martial distinction. The tribe, however, far from having the
+least wish to fight, or intention of opposing the British force,
+deserted their location as soon as the news reached them that the
+army had started, and fled with their chief over the Draakensberg
+Mountains. Our force, commanded by Colonel Milles of the 75th
+Regiment, and accompanied by the Lieut.-Governor Sir B. C. C. Pine
+and Mr. Shepstone, reached a place called Meshlyn, situated on the
+confines of the district to be subdued, on October 31st; but the
+“enemy” had vanished, and were reported to be making the best of
+their way out of the colony, without, however, committing ravages of
+any description on their way, even to the extent of carrying off any
+of their neighbours’ cattle. In fact they were frightened, and simply
+ran away. Our object now was to arrest the tribe in its flight; and a
+plan was formed for enclosing it in a network of troops, seizing all
+the passes over the mountains, and thus reducing it to submission.
+
+Positions were assigned to the different officers in command, and
+the scheme looked extremely well on paper, and to men who were
+not acquainted with the district and the exceeding difficulty of
+travelling through it. Unfortunately, with the same lamentable
+failure in the Intelligence Department which has characterised
+the more important proceedings of 1879, very little was known, by
+those in command, of the country, or of what was going on in it. Mr.
+Shepstone himself, whose supposed knowledge of the people, their
+land, and all concerning them was so greatly and naturally relied
+upon, proved totally ignorant of the distances which lay between one
+point and another, or of the difficulties to be overcome in reaching
+them.
+
+In consequence of this singular ignorance a little force was sent
+out on the evening of November 2nd, under command of Major Durnford,
+R.E., chief of the staff, with orders to seize and hold a certain
+pass known as the Bushman’s River Pass, over which Langalibalele was
+expected to escape; the distance having been miscalculated by about
+two-thirds, and the difficulties of the way immensely underrated.
+
+Major Durnford was himself a new-comer in the colony at that time,
+and had therefore no personal knowledge of the country; but he
+was supplied with full, though, as it soon appeared, unreliable
+information by those under whose command he served, and who were in
+possession of a plan or diagram of the district which turned out to
+be altogether incorrect. He did, indeed, reach his assigned post,
+though four-and-twenty hours after the time by which he expected
+to be there; while those sent out to take up other positions never
+reached them at all, owing to the same incorrect information
+concerning locality.
+
+Major Durnford was in command of a party composed of 2 officers,
+6 non-commissioned officers, and 47 rank and file of the Natal
+and Karkloof Carbineers, 24 mounted Basutos,[14] and a native
+interpreter. His orders were[15] to seize and hold the Bushman’s
+River Pass, “with a view to preventing the entrance in or out of the
+colony of any natives until the expedition is ready to cross over.”
+Special orders were also given to him that he was on no account to
+fire the first shot.
+
+There was one excellent reason, not generally taken into
+consideration, for this order, in the fact that the three days given
+by Government to the tribe in which to surrender would not be over
+until midday on the 3rd of November.
+
+Starting at 8.30 P.M. on the 2nd November, Major Durnford’s force
+only reached its destination at 6.30 A.M. on the 4th, having
+traversed a most difficult country, broken, pathless, and well-nigh
+inaccessible. On the line of march many men fell out, utterly unable
+to keep up; pack-horses with provisions and spare ammunition were
+lost; and Major Durnford had his left shoulder dislocated, and other
+severe injuries, by his horse falling with him over a precipice on
+the 3rd. He pressed on for some hours, but became quite exhausted at
+the foot of the Giant’s Castle Pass, where he lay some time; he was
+then dragged up with the aid of a blanket, reaching the top of the
+pass at 2 A.M. At 4 A.M. Major Durnford was lifted on his horse, and
+with his force—reduced to 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 33
+troopers, and the Basutos—pushed on to the Bushman’s River Pass, and
+occupied it at 6.30 A.M., finding Langalibalele’s men already in the
+pass.
+
+Major Durnford posted his men, and went forward with the interpreter
+to parley with the chiefs, and induce them to return to their
+allegiance. This was a service of danger, for the young warriors
+were very excited. Seeing that the enemy were getting behind rocks,
+etc., commanding the mouth of the pass, he made every preparation
+for hostilities, though restricted by the order not to fire the
+first shot. Finding that, although the natives drew back when he
+bade them, they pressed on again when his back was turned, and that
+the volunteers were wavering, he at last reluctantly directed an
+orderly retreat to higher ground, from whence he could still command
+the pass. Upon a shot being fired by the natives, the retreat became
+a stampede, and a heavy fire being opened, three of the Carbineers
+and one Basuto fell. The horse of the interpreter was killed, and,
+while Major Durnford was endeavouring to reach the man and lift him
+on his own horse, the interpreter was killed by his side, and Major
+Durnford was surrounded and left alone. Dropping the reins, he drew
+his revolver, and shot his immediate assailants, who had seized his
+horse’s bridle, and, after running the gauntlet of a numerous enemy
+at close quarters, escaped with one serious wound, an assegai-stab in
+the left arm, whereby it was permanently disabled. He received one
+or two trifling cuts besides, and his patrol-jacket was pierced in
+many places. Getting clear of the enemy, Major Durnford rallied a few
+Carbineers and the Basutos, and covered the retreat.
+
+The head-quarters camp was reached about 1 A.M. on the 5th. At 11
+P.M. on that day, Major Durnford led out a volunteer party—artillery
+with rockets, 50 men of the 75th Regiment, 7 Carbineers, and 30
+Basutos—to the rescue of Captain Boyes, 75th Regiment, who had been
+sent out with a support on the 3rd, and was believed to be in great
+danger. Major Durnford had received such serious injuries that the
+doctor endeavoured to dissuade him from further exertion, but as
+those sent to his support were in danger and he knew the country,
+he determined to go. He was lifted on his horse, and left amid the
+cheers of the troops in camp. Having marched all night—resting only
+from 3 to 5 A.M.—they met Captain Boyes’ party about midday; they had
+lost their way, and thus did not find the Giant’s Castle Pass.
+
+After this, Major Durnford, with a considerable force, occupied
+Bushman’s River Pass, recovered and buried the bodies of his
+comrades, and held the pass. He afterwards patrolled the disturbed
+districts. The Lieut.-Governor, Sir B. C. C. Pine, in a despatch
+dated 13th November, 1873, accepted the responsibility of the orders
+not to fire the first shot, and said of Major Durnford: “He behaved,
+by testimony of all present, in the most gallant manner, using his
+utmost exertions to rally his little force, till, left _absolutely_
+alone, he was reluctantly compelled to follow them—wounded.”
+
+Colonel Milles, commanding the field force, published the following
+order:
+
+                                  “CAMP MESHLYN, 7th November, 1873.
+
+  “The Commandant, with deep regret, announces to the field
+  force under his command the loss of three Carbineers, viz.:
+  Mr. Erskine, Mr. Potterill, and Mr. Bond, and of one native
+  interpreter, Elijah, who formed part of the small force sent up
+  with Major Durnford, R.E., to secure the passes, and who were
+  killed during the retreat of that party from the passes, which,
+  although they had gallantly seized, they were unable to hold, the
+  orders being for ‘the forces not to fire the first shot,’ and so
+  having to wait till they were placed at a great disadvantage.
+  The brave conduct of those killed is testified to by all their
+  comrades, and there is consolation alone in the thought that
+  they died nobly fighting for their country. The Commandant must,
+  however, publicly render his thanks to Major Durnford for the way
+  in which he commanded the party, for his courage and coolness,
+  and especially for the noble way in which, after his return from
+  the passes, being almost exhausted, he mustered a volunteer party
+  and marched to the relief of Captain Boyes, who was considered in
+  great danger.
+                                  “By command,
+                                        “A. E. ARENGO CROSS
+                                         “(For Chief of the Staff).”
+
+Although the main body of the fighting-men of the tribe had left
+Natal, most of the women and children, the sick and infirm, with
+a few able-bodied men to watch over them, had taken refuge in
+holes and caves, of which there are a considerable number in that
+mountainous part of the colony. The men of the tribe, indeed, were
+in disgrace with the Government, and thought it best to be out of
+the way when the British force paid their homes a visit, but it was
+not for a moment imagined that the soldiers would make war upon
+women and children. The latter, in any case, could not have taken
+that tremendous and hurried journey across the great mountains; and,
+with what soon proved a very mistaken confidence on the part of the
+people, all who could neither fight nor travel were left in these
+hiding-places, from which they expected to emerge in safety as soon
+as the troops, finding no one to oppose them, should have left the
+district. “The English soldiers will not touch the children,”[16]
+was the expression used. So far, however, was this idea from being
+realised, that the remainder of the expedition consisted of a series
+of attempts, more or less successful, to hunt the unfortunate
+“children” out of their hiding-places and take them prisoners.
+
+During these proceedings many acts were committed under Government
+sanction which can only be characterised by the word “atrocities,”
+and which were as useless and unnecessary as they were cruel.[17]
+
+Poor frightened creatures were smoked to death or killed by rockets
+in caves which they dared not leave for fear of a worse fate at
+the hands of their captors; women and children were killed, men
+were tortured, and prisoners put to death. On one occasion a white
+commander of native forces is said to have given the significant
+information to his men that he _did not wish to see the faces of any
+prisoners_; and it is reported that a prisoner was made over to the
+native force to be put to death as the latter chose. The colonial
+newspapers apologised at the time for some of these acts, on the
+score that they were the result of the youthful enthusiasm of “Young
+Natal” fleshing his maiden sword.
+
+These acts were chiefly committed by the irregular (white) troops
+and native levies, and are a signal proof of how great a crime it
+is to turn undisciplined or savage troops, over whom no responsible
+person has any real control, loose upon a defenceless people. The
+excuse made by those in authority in such cases is always “We did not
+intend these things to take place, but horrors are always attendant
+on savage warfare.” But such excuses are of small value when, in
+campaign after campaign, it has been proved that the use of colonial
+troops under their own officers, and of disorganised masses of armed
+“friendly natives,” is invariably productive of scenes disgraceful to
+the name of England, without any attempt being made to introduce a
+better system. Certainly if “horrors” beyond the fair fortune of war
+_are_ necessarily attendant upon savage warfare, they should not be
+those inflicted by British troops and their allies upon unarmed or
+solitary men, women, and children.
+
+So many women were injured in dislodging them from the caves that
+Major Durnford, on his second return from the mountains, instituted a
+hospital-tent where they might be attended to; but such humanity was
+by no means the general rule.
+
+If acts of barbarity were for the most part committed by the
+irregular troops, there is one instance to the contrary which can
+never be forgotten in connection with this affair—so flagrant a case
+that the friends of the officer in command, when the story first
+appeared in the colonial papers, refused to believe in it until it
+was authenticated beyond a doubt.
+
+A body of troops—infantry, irregular cavalry, and undisciplined
+natives—upon one occasion during this expedition were engaged for
+some hours in trying to dislodge a solitary native from a cave in
+which he had taken refuge. The force had discovered the hiding-place
+by the assistance of a little boy, whom they captured and induced to
+betray his friends.
+
+The “rebel” (in this case there was but one) refused to surrender,
+and for a long while defended himself gallantly against the attacks
+of the whole force. Shots were fired through the apertures of the
+cave, rockets (a new and horrible experience to the poor creature)
+were discharged upon him. At last, after holding out for some hours,
+the man gave up the struggle, and coming out from his insufficient
+shelter, begged for mercy at the hands of his numerous foe. He had a
+good many wounds upon him, but none sufficiently severe to prevent
+his walking out amongst his captors, and asking them to spare his
+life. After a short consultation amongst the officers, a decision was
+arrived at as to the proper treatment of this man, who had proved
+himself a brave soldier and was now a helpless captive.
+
+By order of the officer commanding, a trooper named Moodie put
+his pistol to the prisoner’s head and blew out his brains. A
+court-martial sat upon this officer in the course of the following
+year, and he was acquitted of all blame. The defence was that the man
+was so seriously injured that it was an act of humanity to put an
+end to him, and that the officer dared not trust him in the hands of
+the natives belonging to the English force, who were exasperated by
+the long defence he had made. But the prisoner was not mortally nor
+even dangerously wounded. He was able to walk and to speak, and had
+no wound upon him which need necessarily have caused his death. And
+as to the savage temper of the native force, there was no reason why
+the prisoner should be left in their charge at all, as there was a
+considerable white force present at the time.[18]
+
+The result of the expedition against the Hlubi tribe was so little
+satisfactory that those in authority felt themselves obliged to look
+about for something else to do before taking the troops back to
+Pietermaritzburg. They found what they wanted ready to their hand.
+Next to Langalibalele’s location lay that of the well-to-do and quiet
+little tribe of Putini. “Government” had as yet found no fault with
+these people, and, secure in their own innocence, they had made no
+attempt to get out of the way of the force which had come to destroy
+their neighbours, but remained at home, herded their cattle, and
+planted their crops as usual. Unfortunately, however, some marriages
+had taken place between members of the two tribes, and when that
+of Langalibalele fled, the wives of several of his men took refuge
+in their fathers’ kraals in the next location. No further proof
+was required of the complicity of Putini with Langalibalele, or of
+the rebellious condition of the smaller tribe. Consequently it was
+at once, as the natives term it, “eaten up,” falling an easy prey
+owing to its unsuspecting state. The whole tribe—men, women, and
+children—were taken prisoners and carried down to Pietermaritzburg,
+their cattle and goods were confiscated, and their homes destroyed.
+Several of the Putini men were killed, but there was very little
+resistance, as they were wholly taken by surprise. The colony was
+charmed with this success, and the spoils of the Putini people were
+generally looked to to pay some of the expenses of the campaign.
+Whatever may have been the gain to the Government, by orders of
+which the cattle (the chief wealth of the tribe) were sold, it
+was not long shared by the individual colonists who purchased the
+animals. The pasture in that part of the country from which they had
+come is of a very different description from any to be found in the
+environs of Pietermaritzburg, and, in consequence of the change,
+the captured cattle died off rapidly almost as soon as they changed
+hands. But this was not all, for they had time, before they died, to
+spread amongst the original cattle of their new owners two terrible
+scourges, in the shape of “lung-sickness” and “red-water,” from which
+the midland districts had long been free. One practical result of the
+expedition of 1873 seems to be that neither meat, milk, nor butter
+have ever again been so cheap in the colony as they were before that
+date, the two latter articles being often unobtainable to this day.
+
+The unhappy prisoners of both tribes were driven down like beasts to
+Pietermaritzburg, many of the weaker dying from want and exposure
+on the way. Although summer-time, it happened to be very wet, and
+therefore cold; our native force had been allowed to strip the
+unfortunates of all their possessions, even to their blankets and
+the leather petticoats of the women. The sufferings of these poor
+creatures—many of them with infants a few days old, or born on the
+march down—were very great. A scheme was at first laid, by those in
+authority, for “giving the women and children out” as servants for a
+term of years—that is to say, for making temporary slaves of them to
+the white colonists. This additional enormity was vetoed by the home
+Government, but the fact remains that its perpetration was actually
+contemplated by those entrusted with the government of the colony,
+and especially of the natives, and was hailed by the colonists as
+one of the advantages to accrue to them from the expedition of
+1873. Several children were actually given out in the way referred
+to before the order to the contrary arrived from England, and a
+considerable time elapsed before they were all recovered by their
+relatives.
+
+The unhappy women and children of the Langalibalele tribe were mere
+emaciated skeletons when they reached the various places where they
+were to live under surveillance. They seemed crushed with misery,
+utterly ignorant of the cause of their misfortunes, but silent and
+uncomplaining. Many of the women had lost children—few knew whether
+their male relatives were yet alive. On being questioned, they
+knew nothing of Mr. Shepstone, not even his name, which was always
+supposed to command the love and fear of natives throughout the
+length and breadth of the land. They did not know what the tribe had
+done to get into such trouble; they only knew that the soldiers had
+come, and that they had run away and hidden themselves; that some of
+them were dead, and the rest were ready to die too and have it all
+over. A considerable number of these poor creatures were permitted
+by Government to remain upon the Bishop’s land, where most of them
+gradually regained health and spirits, but retained always the
+longing for their own homes and people and their lost chief which
+characterises them still.[19]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+TRIAL OF LANGALIBALELE.
+
+
+Meanwhile the fugitive chief had at last been captured by the
+treachery of a Basuto chief named Molappo, who enticed him into
+his hands, and then delivered him up to Mr. Griffiths, resident
+magistrate in that part of British Basutoland. When he and his party
+were first captured they had with them a horse laden with all the
+coin which the tribe had been able to get together during the last
+few days before the expedition started from Pietermaritzburg, and
+which they had collected to send down as a ransom for their chief.
+Their purpose was arrested by the news that the soldiers had actually
+started to attack them; when, feeling that all was lost, they fled,
+carrying the chief and his ransom with them. What became of the
+money, whether it became Molappo’s perquisite, or whether it formed
+part of the English spoil, has never been publicly known. But it can
+hardly be denied that the readiness of the people to pay away in
+ransom for their chief the whole wealth of the tribe earned by years
+of labour on the part of the working members, is in itself a proof
+that their tendencies were by no means rebellious.
+
+Langalibalele, with seven of his sons and many indunas (captains) and
+headmen, was brought down to Pietermaritzburg for trial, reaching the
+town on the 21st December.
+
+So strong was the unreasoning hatred of the colonists against him
+on account of the death of the three Carbineers which had resulted
+from the expedition, that the unhappy man, a helpless captive, was
+insulted and pelted by the populace as he was conveyed in irons to
+the capital; and again, after sentence had been passed upon him, upon
+his way to Durban.
+
+It was at this stage of affairs that the Bishop of Natal first
+came upon the scene, and interfered on behalf of the oppressed.
+Until 1873, while earnestly endeavouring to do his best as teacher
+and pastor amongst the natives as well as amongst their white
+fellow-colonists, he had not found it to be his duty to go deeply
+into political matters concerning them. He had great confidence at
+that time in the justice and humanity of their government as carried
+on by Mr. Shepstone, for whom he had a warm personal regard, based
+on the apparent uprightness of his conduct; and he had therefore
+contented himself with accepting Mr. Shepstone’s word in all that
+concerned them.
+
+That so many years should have passed without the Bishop’s having
+discovered how greatly his views and those of his friend differed in
+first principles as to the government of the people, is due partly to
+the fact that the two met but seldom, and then at regular expected
+intervals, and partly because no great crisis had previously taken
+place to prove the principles of either in that respect. Their
+regular interviews were upon Sundays, when the Bishop, going into
+Pietermaritzburg for the cathedral service, invariably spent a
+couple of hours with his friend. During these comparatively short
+meetings doubtless Mr. Shepstone’s real personal regard for the
+Bishop caused him temporarily to feel somewhat as he did, and,
+where he could not do so, to refrain from entering upon political
+discussion. The sympathy with Mr. Shepstone which existed in the
+Bishop’s mind prevented the latter from looking more closely for
+himself into matters which he believed to be in good hands, and which
+did not naturally fall within the sphere of his duties; while the
+comparatively trivial character of the cases with which the native
+department had hitherto dealt, was not such as to force their details
+before a mind otherwise and fully employed.
+
+The Langalibalele expedition, however, opened the Bishop’s eyes.
+While it lasted, although deeply deploring the loss of life on either
+side, and feeling great indignation at the atrocities perpetrated
+on ours, he did not doubt that Mr. Shepstone had done all he could
+to avert the necessity of bloodshed, and expected to find him, upon
+his return to Pietermaritzburg, much grieved and indignant at the
+needless amount of suffering inflicted upon his people, the greater
+portion of whom must be entirely innocent, even although the charges
+against their chief should be proved.
+
+The discovery that Mr. Shepstone entirely ratified what had been
+done[20] was the first blow to his friend’s reliance on him. The
+mockery of justice termed a trial, granted to Langalibalele, was the
+next; and the discovery of how completely he had misconceived Mr.
+Shepstone’s policy closed the intimacy of their friendship.
+
+It soon became apparent that the trial of the chief was indeed to
+be a farce—a pretence, meant to satisfy inquiring minds at home
+that justice had been done, but which could have but one result,
+the condemnation of the prisoner, already prejudged by a Government
+which, having declared him to be a rebel and having treated him as
+such, was hardly likely to stultify itself by allowing him to be
+proved innocent of the charges brought against him.
+
+That there might be no doubt at all upon the subject, the prisoner
+was denied the help of counsel, white or black, in the hearing
+of his case, even to watch the proceedings on his behalf, or to
+cross-examine the witnesses; consequently the official record of the
+trial can only be looked upon as an _ex parte_ statement of the case,
+derived from witnesses selected by the Supreme Chief,[21] examined by
+the Crown Prosecutor, and not cross-examined at all on the prisoner’s
+behalf, although the assistance of counsel was recognised by the
+Crown Prosecutor himself as being in accordance with Kafir law.[22]
+
+But the formation of the court and its whole proceedings were
+palpably absurd, except for the purpose of securing a conviction;
+and that this was the case was generally understood in Natal, Even
+those colonists who were most violent against the so-called “rebel,”
+and would have had him hanged without mercy, asserting that he had
+been “taken red-handed,” saw that the authorities had put themselves
+in the wrong by granting the prisoner a trial against the justice of
+which so much could be alleged.
+
+In point of fact, the Lieut.-Governor had no power to form a court
+such as that by which Langalibalele was tried, consisting of his
+excellency himself as Supreme Chief, the Secretary for Native
+Affairs, certain administrators of native law, and certain native
+chiefs and indunas. Besides which the Lieut.-Governor was not only
+debarred by an ordinance of the colony[23] from sitting as judge in
+such a court, from which he would be the sole judge in a court of
+appeal, but had already committed himself to a decision adverse to
+the prisoner by having issued the proclamation of November 11th,
+1873, declaring that the chief and his tribe had “set themselves
+in open revolt and rebellion against Her Majesty’s Government in
+this colony,” and “proclaiming and making known that they were in
+rebellion, and were hereby declared to be outlaws,” and that “the
+said tribe was broken up, and from that day forth had ceased to
+exist,” and by further seizing and confiscating all the cattle and
+property of the said tribe within reach, deposing Langalibalele from
+his chieftainship, and otherwise treating him and his tribe as rebels.
+
+His Excellency, therefore, could not possibly be looked upon as an
+unprejudiced judge of the first instance in the prisoner’s case;
+nor could the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone, by whose
+advice and with whose approval the expedition had been undertaken.
+As to the minor members of the court, they could hardly be expected
+to have an independent opinion in the matter, especially the “native
+chiefs and indunas,” who knew very well that they would be liable to
+the accusation of disaffection themselves if they ventured to show
+any bearing towards the prisoner, or to do otherwise than blindly
+follow the lead of their white “brother-judges” (!) and masters.
+
+The native names gave a satisfactory air of justice to the
+proceedings of the court in English eyes, but in point of fact they
+were but dummy judges after all.
+
+Not only, however, was the court wrongly constituted, but its
+proceedings were irregular and illegal. It was called, and considered
+to be, a _native_ court, but in point of fact it was a nondescript
+assembly, such usages of either native or supreme court as could
+possibly tell on the prisoner’s side (notably the use of counsel)
+being omitted, and only those which would insure his conviction
+admitted.
+
+It was not the practice of the colony for serious crimes to be tried
+before a native court. But in this case they were obliged to run
+counter to custom for the reason given in a previous note, that most
+of the separate charges against the chief could not be recognised
+as crimes at all in an English court of law. At the same time the
+sentence finally given was one quite beyond the power of the court
+to pronounce. Clause 4 of the ordinance limits the power of the
+Supreme Chief to “appointing or removing the subordinate chiefs or
+other authorities” among the natives, but gives him no power to
+sentence to death, or to “banishment or transportation for life to
+such place as the Supreme Chief or Lieut.-Governor may appoint.”
+When Langalibalele had been “removed” from his chieftainship, and
+himself and the bulk of his tribe “driven over the mountain out of
+the colony” by the Government force, as announced in the bulletin of
+November 13th, 1873, the cattle within the colony seized, and many of
+the tribe killed in resisting the attempt to seize them, the Supreme
+Chief, under native law, had expended his power; while banishment is
+a punishment wholly unknown to Kafir law, as is plainly stated in
+“Kafir Laws and Customs,” p. 39.
+
+Again, throughout the trial, the prisoner was assumed to have pleaded
+guilty, although in point of fact he had merely admitted that he had
+done certain acts, but desired witnesses to be called whose “evidence
+would justify or extenuate what he had done,” a plea which in any
+ordinary court would be recorded as a plea of “Not guilty.”
+
+The native members of the court, also, were made to sign a judgment,
+the contents of which had been “interpreted” to them, and their
+signatures “witnessed,” by which the prisoner is declared to have
+been “convicted, on clear evidence, of several acts, for some of
+which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every
+civilised country in the world.” The absurdity of this is palpable,
+since it was impossible that these men should know anything of the
+law of any civilised land; it is plain, therefore, that in pretending
+to agree with assertions, of the meaning of which they were totally
+ignorant, they were under some strong influence, such as prejudice
+against the prisoner, undue fear of the Supreme Chief, or desire to
+please him—one of them being “Head Induna of the Natal Government,”
+and another the “Induna to the Secretary for Native Affairs.”
+
+To turn to these crimes, “for some of which he would be liable to
+forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the
+world”—to which statement His Excellency the Supreme Chief, the
+Secretary for Native Affairs, and the Administrators of Native Law
+have also signed their names—we find that the charges run as follows:
+
+1. “Setting at naught the authority of the magistrate in a manner[24]
+_not indeed sufficiently palpable to warrant the use of forcible
+coercion to our_ (civilised) laws and customs.” Which charge we may
+at once dismiss as absurd.
+
+2. “Permitting, or _probably_ encouraging, his tribe to possess
+fire-arms, and retain them contrary to law.”
+
+3. “With reference to these fire-arms, defying the authority of the
+magistrate, and once insulting the messenger.”
+
+4. “Refusing to appear before” the Supreme Chief when summoned,
+“excusing his refusal by evasion and falsehood,” and “insulting his
+messenger.”
+
+5. “Directing his cattle and other effects to be taken out of the
+colony under an armed escort.”
+
+6. Causing the death of Her Majesty’s subjects at the Bushman’s River
+Pass.
+
+It is plain to the most casual observation that none of the first
+five accusations, even if fully proved, refer to crimes punishable by
+death in any civilised land; and it is difficult to see how the Chief
+could reasonably be considered responsible for the sixth and last,
+seeing that the action took place in his absence, against his express
+commands, and to his great regret.
+
+Returning to the five first-named offences, we find that the
+statements contained in the second and third charges are the only
+proofs alleged of the truth of the first—to which therefore we need
+give no further attention—the magistrate himself stating that “this
+was the first time the prisoner ever refused to appear before him
+when ordered to do so;” and this was the first time for more than
+twenty years that he had been reported for any fault whatever.
+
+Proceeding to charge No. 2, we find that the prisoner entirely denied
+having encouraged his young men to possess themselves of guns; nor
+could he justly be said to have even “permitted” them to do so merely
+because he did not actively exert himself to prevent it. The men went
+away from home, worked, were paid for their services in guns, or
+purchased them with their earnings, without consulting him. He had
+never considered it to be part of his duty to search the huts of his
+people for unregistered guns, but had simply left them to suffer the
+consequences of breaking the laws of the colony, if discovered. It
+is also to be observed that amongst the seven sons captured with him
+only one had a gun at a time when certainly, if ever, they would have
+carried them; which does not look as though he had greatly encouraged
+them to possess themselves of firearms.
+
+But if the second charge, in a very modified form, might be
+considered a true one, yet Langalibalele had done no worse in that
+respect than most of the other chiefs in the colony. In proof of
+this assertion may be brought “Perrin’s Register” for the years
+1871-2-3—the years during which a large number of natives received
+payment for their services at the diamond-fields in guns. From this
+register it appears that the total number of guns registered in eight
+of the principal northern tribes of the colony—the two first-named
+chiefs being _indunas_ to the very magistrate who complained of
+Langalibalele—was as follows:
+
+  +---------------------+--------------------+
+  |                     | GUNS REGISTERED IN |
+  |      HUTS.          +--------------------+
+  |                     | 1871.| 1872.| 1873.|
+  +---------------------+------+------+------+
+  | Ndomba         1190 |   —  |   —  |   —  |
+  | Faku           2071 |   —  |   2  |   —  |
+  | Mganu          1277 |   —  |   —  |   —  |
+  | Pakade         2222 |   1  |   —  |   1  |
+  | Zikali         1651 |   —  |   1  |   —  |
+  | Nodada         3000 |   —  |   1  |   2  |
+  | Putini         1239 |   —  |   1  |   —  |
+  | Langalibalele  2244 |   —  |   9  |   4  |
+  +---------------------+------+------+------+
+
+Furthermore, any fault with respect to the guns was not an offence
+under Kafir Law, and could only have been tried in the Colonial
+Court under the ordinary law of the colony.
+
+The third and fourth charges were those which, when first reported in
+Natal, produced considerable alarm and indignation in the minds of
+the colonists. A defiance of the authority, both of magistrate and
+Supreme Chief, and insult offered to their messengers, looked indeed
+like actual rebellion. The charges, however, dwindled down to very
+little when properly examined. The “defiance” in question consisted
+only in an answer made to the magistrate to the effect that he could
+not send in as desired five young men—in possession of unregistered
+guns—because they had run away, he knew not whither, being frightened
+by the course pursued by the magistrate’s messenger; and that he
+could not find eight others, said to have come into the colony with
+guns, and to belong to his tribe, upon such insufficient data,
+and unless their names were given to him. The sincerity of which
+reasoning was shortly proved by the fact that, as soon as their names
+were notified to him, he did send in three of those very lads, with
+their guns, and two more belonging to other members of their party,
+besides sending in with their guns those who had worked for Mr. W. E.
+Shepstone, and who probably thought that the name of their master was
+a sufficient guarantee for their right to possess firearms.
+
+The charge of insulting the native messengers from Government, of
+which a great deal was made at first, proved to be of very little
+consequence when investigated, but it is one to which special
+attention should be given because, indirectly, it is connected with
+the Zulu War.
+
+The facts are as follows: One of the chief witnesses for the
+prosecution, Mawiza, a messenger of the Government, stated in his
+evidence-in-chief on the second day of the trial, that on the
+occasion of his carrying a message from Government, the prisoner’s
+people had “taken all his things from him,” and had “stripped, and
+taken him naked” into the Chiefs presence. But on the fourth day,
+in answer to a question from His Excellency, he said “that they had
+_intended_ to strip him but had allowed him to retain his trousers
+and boots,” thereby contradicting himself flatly. Nevertheless the
+court being asked by His Excellency whether it required further
+evidence on this point, replied in the negative. They did not even
+ask a question, on the subject, of Mawiza’s two companion messengers,
+Mnyembe and Gayede, though both these were examined; Mnyembe’s
+evidence-in-chief being cut short _before_ he came to that part of
+the story, and Gayede’s taken up just _after_ it.
+
+The chief was kept in solitary confinement from the day when he was
+brought down to Pietermaritzburg, December 31st, till the day when
+his sons were sentenced, February 27th; not being allowed to converse
+with any of his sons, or with any members of his tribe, or with any
+friend or adviser, white or black. It was therefore quite out of his
+power to find witnesses who would have shown, as Mnyembe and Gayede
+would have done, that Mawiza’s statements about the “stripping” were
+false; that he still wore his waistcoat, shirt, trousers, boots, and
+gaiters, when he was taken to the chief; and that the “stripping”
+in question only amounted to this, that he himself put off his two
+coats, by the chiefs orders, “as a matter of precaution caused by
+fear” and not for the purpose of insulting the messenger, or defying
+the Supreme Chief. They would have satisfied the court also that
+other acts charged against the prisoner arose from fear, and dread of
+the Supreme Chief, and not from a spirit of defiance.
+
+This affair of the messenger, explained by fear and suspicion on the
+part of Langalibalele, by which, also, he accounted for his refusal
+to “appear before” the Supreme Chief (which is to say that, being
+desired to give himself up into the hands of the Government, he was
+afraid to do so, and ran away), was the turning-point of the whole
+trial. What special reason he had for that fear and distrust will
+be inquired into shortly. Meanwhile the court considered that such
+expressed distrust of the good faith of the authorities was an added
+offence on the part of the prisoner, who was formally condemned to
+death, but his sentence commuted to banishment for life to Robben
+Island, the abode of lunatics and lepers, in which other captive
+native chiefs had languished and died before him.[25]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+THE BISHOP’S DEFENCE.
+
+
+The daily accounts of the trial which appeared in the local papers
+were read with great interest and attention by the Bishop, who
+quickly discerned the injustice of the proceedings. Mawiza’s manifest
+contradiction of his own evidence first attracted his attention, and
+led to his hearing from some of his own natives what was not allowed
+to appear at the trial, that Mawiza’s story was entirely false.
+Seeing how seriously this fact bore upon the prisoner’s case, he went
+to Mr. Shepstone and told him what he had heard.
+
+The Secretary for Native Affairs was at first very indignant with
+the Bishop’s informant, doubting the truth of his statement, and
+declaring that the man must be severely punished if it were proved
+that he had lied. The Bishop, confident in the integrity of his
+native,[26] assented, saying, however, that the same argument should
+apply to Mawiza. The matter was at once privately investigated by Mr.
+Shepstone—the Bishop, Mawiza, Magema, and others being present—with
+the result that Mr. Shepstone himself was obliged to acknowledge the
+untrustworthiness of Mawiza, who was reproved in the severest terms
+for his prevarications by the other native indunas.[27]
+
+Singularly enough, however, _this discovery made no difference
+whatever in the condemnation and sentence of the prisoner_, although
+the charge thus, to a great extent, disposed of, was the most serious
+of those brought against him.
+
+But this was not all. Another point struck the Bishop very forcibly,
+namely, the perpetual recurrence of one phrase from various
+witnesses. “He (Langalibalele) was afraid, remembering what was
+done to Matshana,” and “he was afraid that he should be treated as
+Matshana was, when he was summoned to appear by Government.” Such
+expressions, used in excuse of the Chiefs conduct, would, of course,
+have been inquired into had the prisoner been allowed counsel, or
+had any one watched the case on his behalf. But although the court
+judged the excuse of “fear” to be an added fault on the Chiefs part,
+and although perpetual allusions were made by witnesses to a specific
+cause for this fear, no question was asked, and no notice taken
+by those present of the perpetually recurring phrase. The Bishop,
+however, in the interests of justice and truth, made inquiries
+amongst his own natives as to the meaning of these allusions. He
+knew, of course, in common with the rest of the inhabitants of Natal,
+that, in the year 1858, a native chief named Matshana had got into
+some trouble with the Government of Natal. A commando had gone out
+against him, and, after a skirmish with some native troops under Mr.
+John Shepstone, in which Mr. Shepstone was wounded, and some men on
+the other side killed, he had escaped with his people into Zululand,
+where he had lived ever since. The Bishop had never heard the details
+of the affair, and knew of nothing in connection with this incident
+which could account for the “fear because of what was done to
+Matshana.”
+
+“Can you tell me anything of the story of Matshana’s escape from
+Natal?” was the question put by him at different times to different
+natives; and everyone thus questioned gave substantially the
+same account, of what was plainly among them a well-known, and
+well-remembered incident in the history of the colony.
+
+Matshana, they said, was accused of some offence, and being summoned
+before the authorities to answer for it, had refused to appear. Mr.
+John Shepstone, with a native force, of whom this very Langalibalele,
+then a young chief, with his followers formed a portion, was sent
+out to endeavour to reduce him to obedience. Mr. Shepstone invited
+him to a friendly interview, in which they might talk over matters,
+but to which Matshana’s men were to bring no weapons. In consequence
+of the reluctance of Matshana to fulfil this condition, the proposed
+interview fell through several times before it was finally arranged.
+Matshana’s people, even then, however, brought their weapons with
+them, but they were induced to leave them at a certain spot a short
+distance off. The meeting took place; Mr. Shepstone being seated in
+a chair with his people behind him, Matshana and his men crouched
+native fashion upon the ground, suspicious and alert, in a semicircle
+before him. Suddenly Mr. Shepstone drew a gun from beneath the rug
+at his feet, and fired it (he says, as a signal), whereupon his men,
+some of whom had already ridden between Matshana’s party and their
+arms, fell on, and the struggle became general, resulting in the
+death of many of Matshana’s people. The chief himself, who seems to
+have been on the look-out for a surprise, escaped unhurt. He was
+resting upon one knee only when the first shot was fired, and sprang
+over the man crouching behind him. Another man, named Deke, who was
+sitting close to him, was wounded in the knee, but is alive to this
+day.
+
+This story, which in varied form, but substantially as given above,
+was generally known and believed by the natives, furnished a very
+complete explanation of why Langalibalele ventured to distrust the
+good faith and honour of the Government, having himself taken part
+in, and been witness of, such a disgraceful transaction; which, when
+it came to the knowledge of the Secretary of State, was emphatically
+condemned by him. Remembering this circumstance, it is not wonderful
+that Langalibalele should have taken the precaution of searching the
+Government messengers for concealed weapons.
+
+It seemed strange that Mr. Shepstone, sitting as judge upon the
+bench to try a man for his life, should silently allow so great a
+justification of his chief offence to remain concealed. But it
+seemed stranger still to suppose him ignorant of any part of an
+affair carried out under his authority, and by his own brother.
+
+However, the Bishop took the matter privately to him in the first
+instance, telling him what he had heard, and pointing out what an
+important bearing it had upon the unfortunate prisoner’s case. He was
+met by a total denial on Mr. Shepstone’s part that any such act of
+treachery had ever taken place, or that there were any grounds for
+the accusation.
+
+Nevertheless, after careful consideration, and on thoroughly sifting
+the obtainable evidence, the Bishop could not avoid coming to the
+painful conclusion that the story was substantially true, and was a
+valid excuse for Langalibalele’s fear. Finding that further appeal
+on behalf of the prisoner to those on the spot was in vain, he now
+wrote and printed a pamphlet (giving the usual native version that
+the first shot fired was _at_ Matshana) on the subject for private
+circulation, and especially for Lord Carnarvon’s information.[28]
+
+One of the first results of the appearance of this pamphlet was
+a demand on the part of Mr. J. Shepstone’s solicitor for “an
+immediate, full, and unqualified retraction of the libel falsely and
+maliciously published in the pamphlet, with a claim for £1000 damages
+for the injury done to Mr. J. Shepstone by the same.”
+
+Such an action would have had but a small chance of a decision upon
+the Bishop’s side at that time in Natal, so, to defend himself—and
+not, as generally supposed, out of enmity to the Shepstones—he
+appealed to Lord Carnarvon in the matter, on the grounds that his
+action had been taken for the public good, and in the interests of
+justice.
+
+Meanwhile the unfortunate chief and his eldest son Malambule
+were sent to Robben Island, the former as a prisoner for life,
+the latter for five years. They were secretly conveyed away from
+Pietermaritzburg to the port, and every effort made to prevent the
+Bishop from seeing them, or interfering on their behalf. Other sons,
+two of them mere lads, who had as yet held no more important position
+in the tribe than that of herdboys to their father’s cattle, and many
+of the headmen and indunas, were condemned to imprisonment in the
+gaol at Pietermaritzburg for terms varying in length from six months
+to seven years. The two young sons, lads named Mazwi and Siyepu, were
+kept prisoners for the shortest period named, six months; but it was
+some little time after they left the gaol before they were really
+set at liberty. The family at Bishopstowe, where their mothers and
+many of their other relatives were located, were naturally anxious to
+have the two boys also, and, as soon as their term of imprisonment
+was up, applied for the charge of them. Somewhat to their surprise
+all sorts of difficulties were raised on the point—one would have
+thought a very simple one—and they were at last curtly informed
+that the boys did not wish to go to Bishopstowe, and would remain
+where they were, under surveillance in another district. The Bishop
+himself was away at the time, but his eldest daughter, acting for
+him, soon discovered through native sources that in point of fact the
+boys were extremely anxious to go to Bishopstowe, but were in too
+terrified a condition to express a wish. The question had been put to
+them in this form: “So! you have been complaining! you say you want
+to leave the place you have been sent to, and go to Bishopstowe?”
+Whereupon the frightened lads, their spirits crushed by all that
+had befallen them, naturally answered: “We never complained, nor
+asked to go anywhere”—which, was perfectly true. By dint of a little
+determination on the part of Miss Colenso, however, the desired
+permission was at last obtained, and Mazwi and Siyepu entered the
+Bishopstowe school, which had already been established for the boys
+of the scattered tribe. Under the treatment which they there received
+they soon began to recover from their distress, and to lose the
+terrified expression in the eyes which characterised them painfully
+at first. But the health of Mazwi, the elder, was broken by hardship
+and confinement, and he died of consumption a few years after.[29]
+
+It soon became apparent that there must be something specially
+injurious to the prisoners in their life in gaol beyond the mere
+fact of confinement. Nearly all the men of the Hlubi tribe left it
+labouring under a dreadful complaint of a complicated form (said to
+be some species of elephantiasis), of which a considerable number
+died; others, as in Mazwi’s case, falling victims to consumption. On
+inquiry it appeared that the fault lay in the _excessive washing_
+to which every part of the building was habitually subjected—floors
+and bed-boards being perpetually scrubbed, and therefore seldom
+thoroughly dry. This state of things was naturally a trial to the
+constitutions of people accustomed to life in the warm smoke-laden
+atmosphere of a native hut. However beneficial it might be to the
+natives to instruct them in habits of cleanliness,[30] this was
+hardly the way to do it, and the results were disastrous. The
+peculiar complaint resulting from confinement in the city gaol was
+commonly known amongst the natives as the “gaol-disease,” but it
+had not attracted the same attention while the victims to it were
+occasional convicts, as it did when it attacked a large number of
+innocent prisoners of war!
+
+After the chief had been sent to Robben Island, it was represented,
+by those interested in his welfare, that to leave him there for the
+rest of his life without any of his family or people near him—except
+his son Malambule, who was to be released in five years’ time—would
+be a great and unnecessary addition to the hardship of his position;
+and it was finally decided that one of his wives and a servant of
+his own should be sent to join him in captivity. A few days after
+this decision a story was circulated in the colony, causing some
+amusement, and a little triumph on the part of the special opponents
+of the chief and his cause: it was to the effect that “out of all
+Langalibalele’s wives not one was willing to go to him,” and many
+were the sarcastic comments made upon the want of family affection
+thus evinced by the natives. On due inquiry it turned out that the
+manner in which the question had been put to them was one highly
+calculated to produce a negative answer. Native policemen, who were
+sent to the kraals where they were living, to inquire which of them
+would be willing to go, accosted them with “Come along! come along
+and be killed with your chief!” which proposition was not unnaturally
+looked upon with considerable disfavour. When, however, the matter
+was properly explained to them, they all expressed their willingness
+to go, although a journey across the (to them) great unknown
+element was by no means a trifling matter in their eyes. The woman
+selected in the first instance was one Nokwetuka, then resident at
+Bishopstowe, where she was fitted out for her journey, and provided
+with suitable clothes.[31] She joined her husband upon the island
+as proposed, as also did a lad of the tribe Fife, who happened to
+be residing (free) at the Cape, and obtained permission to attend
+upon his chief. It was not until some time after, when Langalibalele
+had been removed to an adjoining portion of the mainland, bleak and
+barren indeed, but an improvement upon Robben Island, that two other
+women and a little son were added to the party.[32]
+
+For the son, Malambule, however, there was no possibility of making
+any such arrangements during the five years of his captivity, as
+he was a bachelor; although when he was captured he had a bride in
+prospect, the separation from and probable loss of whom weighed
+greatly upon his mind. He could not even learn whether she was yet
+alive, as so many women had been killed, and others had died since
+from the effects of the hardships they had undergone; while it was
+more than probable, supposing her to be yet living, that she might be
+given in marriage to some other more fortunate individual, either by
+the authority of her relatives, or, as happened in another case, by
+that of the Government of Natal.[33]
+
+Towards the end of his imprisonment, Malambule grew very restless and
+morose; and, when he found himself detained some time after the term
+of years had elapsed, he became extremely indignant and difficult
+to manage, being in fact in a far more “rebellious” frame of mind
+than he ever was before. On one occasion he showed so much temper
+that it was thought necessary to put him under temporary restraint
+in the gaol. Apparently he was very wise in giving so much trouble,
+for it was shortly found expedient to let him go, though it remains
+unexplained why he should not have been set free immediately upon
+the expiration of his sentence. He was sent back to Natal, but still
+treated as a prisoner until he reached Pietermaritzburg, where he was
+finally set at liberty; putting in a sudden and unexpected appearance
+at Bishopstowe, where he was joyfully welcomed by his own people.
+He did not, however, spend much time amongst them, but hurried off
+as soon as possible up-country to find his bride. It is pleasant
+to be able to record that he found her just in time to prevent
+another marriage being arranged for her, and that his return was as
+satisfactory an event to her as to himself.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+THE PUTINI TRIBE.
+
+
+To assist in paying the expenses of the expedition, “Government”
+had “eaten up” the small tribe commonly known as the “Putini,” but
+properly called the “Amangwe” tribe, “Putini” being, in reality, the
+name of their late chief, who died shortly before the disturbances,
+leaving the sole custody of their infant son and heir to his young
+widow, who accordingly held the position and dignity of chieftainess
+in the tribe.
+
+To say that the “eating up” of these people was an utter mistake is
+to say no more than can honestly be said concerning Langalibalele’s
+tribe, the Ama-Hlubi; but, in the case of the Putini people, the
+mistake was a more flagrant one, and, when all was said and done,
+there was no possibility of making out a charge against them at all.
+Finally the fact stared the Government (both at home and in Natal) in
+the face that a tribe had been attacked, members of it killed, the
+people taken prisoners and stripped of all their possessions, without
+even the shadow of a reason for such treatment being forthcoming.
+
+Major (by this time Lieutenant-Colonel) Durnford specially took up
+the cause of this injured and innocent people. It was plain enough
+that the Government at home would never ratify the action taken
+against the Amangwe tribe by the Government in Natal; and that sooner
+or later the latter would be forced, in this instance, to undo their
+work as far as possible—to restore the people to their location, and
+to disgorge at least part of their plunder:—and it was evident to
+Colonel Durnford that the sooner this was done the better for all
+parties. The Natal Government would put itself in a more dignified
+position by voluntarily and speedily making full amends for the wrong
+done, and doing of its own accord what eventually it would be obliged
+to do at the command of the home Government. It was also of special
+importance to the people themselves that they should be allowed to
+return to their homes in time to plant their crops for the following
+year.
+
+About May, 1874, it had been decided by the Government that
+Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, in his capacity of Colonial Engineer,
+should take a working-party to the Draakensberg Mountains, and blow
+up, or otherwise destroy, all the passes by which ingress or egress
+could be obtained. The chief object of this demolition was that of
+giving confidence to the up-country districts, the inhabitants of
+which were in perpetual fear of inroads from the scattered members
+of the outlawed tribe. They had indeed certain grounds for such
+apprehensions, as one or two attacks had been made upon farmhouses
+since the expedition. Even these demonstrations were not evidence of
+organised resistance, but mere individual acts of vengeance committed
+by single men or small parties, in return for brutalities inflicted
+upon the women and children belonging to them. They were, however,
+sufficient to keep the country in perpetual alarm, which it was
+highly advisable should be checked.
+
+The demolition of the passes being decided upon, Colonel Durnford
+applied for the services of the male Putini prisoners, some eighty in
+number, and induced the Government to promise the men their liberty,
+with that of the rest of the tribe, if, on their return, when the
+work should be finished, the Colonel could give them a good character.
+
+He left Pietermaritzburg with his party of pioneers and a company of
+the 75th Regiment, under Captain Boyes and Lieutenant Trower, in May,
+and spent some months in the complete destruction of the Draakensberg
+passes, returning to the capital in September. The movement at first
+raised violent though unavailing opposition amongst the colonists,
+who persisted in looking upon the Putini men as bloodthirsty rebels,
+who might at any moment break loose upon them and ravage the country.
+But when the whole party returned from the mountains, without a
+single case of misconduct or desertion amongst them—although they
+had had hard work and undergone great hardships (shared to the full
+by Colonel Durnford, who suffered to the end of his life from the
+effects of intense cold upon his wounded arm)—the colonists ceased to
+look upon them as desperate ruffians, and soon forgot their fears.
+Meanwhile the Colonel found considerable difficulty in obtaining the
+actual freedom of the tribe, for which he and his eighty pioneers had
+worked so hard and suffered so much. Any less resolute spirit would
+have been beaten in the contest, for “Government” was determined not
+to give way an inch more than could possibly be helped.
+
+However, the matter was carried through at last, and the whole tribe
+returned to their devastated homes—including the eighty pioneers,
+to whom the Colonel had paid the full wages of free labourers for
+the time during which they had worked—in good time to plant their
+crops for the coming year. Eventually they also received some small
+compensation for the property of which they had been robbed, though
+nothing even approaching to an equivalent for all that had been taken
+from them or destroyed by the Government force in 1873.
+
+The same party of mounted Basutos who were with Colonel Durnford at
+the Bushman’s River Pass affair, accompanied him throughout this
+second more peaceful expedition, and remained his devoted followers
+for the rest of his life.
+
+The colony was tranquil again, and gradually the immediate
+consequences of the expedition vanished below the surface of everyday
+life, except in the minds of those who had suffered by it. But one
+important result was obtained. England was once more convinced that
+the time for withdrawing her troops from the colony and leaving it
+to protect itself had not yet arrived. Some such project had been
+entertained during the previous year, and its speedy accomplishment
+was frequently foretold; but such a proceeding would have been fatal
+to the plans of the empire-making politicians. The impossibility
+of withdrawing the troops was clearly established by turning a
+mole-hill into a mountain—by proving how critical the condition of
+the native mind within the colony was considered to be by those who
+should be the best judges—so that it was thought necessary to turn
+out the whole available European force, regular and irregular, upon
+the slightest sign of disturbance; and most of all by creating such a
+panic in the colonial mind as had not existed since the early days of
+Natal.
+
+It is doubtful how soon the Secretary of State for the Colonies
+himself knew the extent to which the operations of 1873-4 could be
+made subservient to his great confederation scheme; or rather, to
+speak more correctly, how seriously the latter must be injured by
+any attempt to set right the injustice done to the Hlubi tribe. When
+the Bishop went to England[34] and pleaded in person the cause of
+the injured people, there can be no doubt that Lord Carnarvon was
+fully impressed by the facts then made known to him. None of the
+despatches sent home could in the least justify the proceedings of
+his subordinates in Natal. Lord Carnarvon’s own words, expressing
+his disapproval of the action taken against the two tribes, and
+requiring that all possible restitution should be made to them, show
+plainly enough that at the period of the Bishop’s visit to him, with
+all the facts of the case before him, his judgment in the matter
+coincided with that of the Bishop himself. The latter returned to
+Natal, satisfied that substantial justice would now be done, or at
+all events that the suffering already inflicted upon the innocent
+Hlubi and Amangwe tribes, by the rash and mistaken action of the
+Government, would be alleviated to the utmost extent considered
+possible without lowering that Government in the eyes of the people.
+
+Certain steps, indeed, were immediately taken. Orders were sent out
+for the release of the Putini people, which order Colonel Durnford
+had already induced the Natal Government to anticipate; and a further
+order was notified that the tribe should be compensated for the
+losses sustained by them during the late expedition. In the case of
+Langalibalele and his tribe, although it was not thought advisable
+to reinstate them in their old position, every effort was to be
+made to mitigate the severity with which they had been treated. A
+few extracts from the Earl of Carnarvon’s despatch on the subject
+will best show the tone in which he wrote, and that the Bishop might
+reasonably feel satisfied that mercy and consideration would be shown
+to the oppressed people.
+
+The Earl of Carnarvon, after reviewing the whole proceeding, comments
+somewhat severely upon the manner in which the trial had been
+conducted. On this point he says: “I feel bound to express my opinion
+that there are several points open to grave observation and regret.”
+He speaks of the “peculiar and anomalous” constitution of the court,
+the equally “peculiar” law by which the prisoner was tried, and of
+“the confusion and unsatisfactory result to which such an anomalous
+blending of civilised and savage terms and procedure must lead.” He
+remarks that it was in his judgment “a grave mistake to treat the
+plea of the prisoner as one of guilty;” and he says, “still more
+serious, because it involved practical consequences of a very grave
+nature to the prisoner, was the absence of counsel on his behalf.”
+Entering into the various charges brought against the prisoner, and
+the evidence produced to support them, he dismisses the magistrate’s
+accusation of “general indications, of which, however, it is
+difficult to give special instance, of impatience of control”; and
+the Governor and Secretary for Native Affairs comments on the same
+as unimportant, with the words, “I am bound to say that the evidence
+does not appear to me fully to support these statements.”[35]
+
+Reviewing the circumstances and evidence concerning the unregistered
+guns, he says: “I am brought to the conclusion that, though there
+was probably negligence—it may be more or less culpable—in complying
+with the law, there was no sufficient justification for the charge
+in the indictment that Langalibalele did encourage and conspire
+with the people under him to procure firearms and retain them,
+as he and they well knew contrary to law, for the purpose and
+with the intention of, by means of such firearms, resisting the
+authority of the Supreme Chief.” Of the extent to which the chief’s
+disobedience, in not appearing when summoned by Government, was due
+to a “deliberately-planned scheme of resistance in concert with
+others, or the mere effect of an unfounded panic,” the Earl remarks:
+“Unfortunately this was not made clear.” And, finally, referring to
+the charge of insulting the Government messengers, he says: “I am
+obliged, with great regret, to conclude that this very important
+portion of the evidence given against the prisoner at the trial was
+so far untrustworthy as to leave it an open question whether the
+indignities of which the witness complained may not have amounted to
+no more than being obliged to take off his coat, which might be a
+precaution dictated by fear, and nothing else.”
+
+Having thus censured the proceedings of his subordinates on every
+point, he says:
+
+“That the Amahlubi tribe should be removed from its location may
+have been a political necessity which, after all that had occurred,
+was forced upon you, and I fear[36] it is out of the question
+to reinstate them in the position, whether of land or property,
+which they occupied previously. The relations of the colony with
+the natives, both within and without its boundaries, render this
+impossible. But every care should be taken to obviate the hardships
+and to mitigate the severities which, assuming the offence of the
+chief and his tribe to be _even greater than I have estimated it,
+have far exceeded the limits of justice_.[37] Not only should the
+terms of the amnesty of the 2nd May last be scrupulously observed,
+but as far as possible means should be provided by which the members
+of the tribe may be enabled to re-establish themselves in settled
+occupations.”[38] Lord Carnarvon further says: “With respect to
+the Putili tribe, I have in their case also expressed my opinion
+that no sufficient cause has been shown for removing them from
+their location. I can discover no indication of their conspiracy
+or combination with Langalibalele, beyond the vague and wholly
+uncorroborated apprehension of some movement on their part in
+connection with the supposed tendencies of his tribe; and therefore I
+can see no good reason for any punishment on this ground.”
+
+The proclamation to the native population enclosed in this despatch
+contained the following sentences:
+
+“Langalibalele we release from imprisonment on the island in the sea,
+but he shall not return to Natal. The Amahlubi may, if they choose,
+when that is prepared which is to be prepared, go to him, but he will
+not be allowed to go to the Amahlubi.”
+
+In all that Lord Carnarvon thought fit to say on this occasion he
+does not express the slightest approval of any person concerned,
+or action taken, except of the “conduct of Colonel Durnford, whose
+forbearance and humanity towards the natives” (he says) “has
+attracted my attention.” A despatch of the same date (3rd December,
+1874) recalls Sir Benjamin Pine from the government of Natal.
+
+Anything more thoroughly condemnatory could hardly be imagined,
+although it may be reasonably questioned how far justice was done to
+Sir Benjamin Pine[39] by the whole weight of mismanagement being
+placed upon his shoulders, while his coadjutor and adviser, Mr.
+Shepstone, on whose opinion he had acted throughout, and whose word,
+by his supposed knowledge of native ways and character, was law
+throughout the affair, was promoted and rewarded.
+
+After perusing Lord Carnarvon’s remarks and directions, my readers
+may imagine that some very good result would be produced on the
+fortunes of both tribes, but in this supposition they would be
+greatly mistaken. Nor, unless they had been in the habit of perusing
+South African despatches with attention, would it occur to them how
+easily the proclamation quoted from, drawn up by Mr. Shepstone, could
+be evaded. The proclamation itself is almost childish in its foolish
+way of informing the people that they had behaved very badly, and
+deserved all they had got, but would be relieved of their punishment
+by the mercy of the Queen, and must behave very well and gratefully
+in future. Such exhortations to people who were perfectly aware that
+they had been treated with the utmost injustice were rather likely
+to raise secret contempt than respect in the minds of an intelligent
+people, who would have far better understood an honest declaration
+that “we have punished you, under the impression that you had done
+what we find you did not do, and will therefore make it up to you as
+much as possible.”
+
+The two important sentences of the proclamation (already quoted at
+p. 71), however, were capable of being adapted to an extent of which
+Lord Carnarvon probably did not dream. His lordship can hardly have
+intended the first sentence by which Langalibalele was released
+“from imprisonment on the island in the sea,” simply to mean that
+he was to be conveyed to the nearest (most dreary) mainland, and
+imprisoned there, within the limits of a small and barren farm, where
+every irritating restriction and annoying regulation were still
+imposed five years after. The words “he shall not return to Natal,”
+certainly do not imply rigid confinement to a small extent of land,
+where friends, white or black, are not allowed to visit him, or
+send the most innocent presents without tedious delay and official
+permission. The second sentence is an admirable specimen of South
+African art. The people might go to their chief if they chose, “_when
+that is prepared which is to be prepared_”—but which never has been
+yet.
+
+We give Lord Carnarvon full credit for not having the slightest
+notion that this clause would have no result whatever, as nothing
+ever would be “prepared.” Year after year has dragged on—one or two
+women[40] and a couple of boys being allowed, as a great favour, to
+join the old chief during that time. But every difficulty has always
+been raised about it, and not the slightest attempt has been made to
+enable or permit the tribe or any part of it to follow.
+
+When the chief and his son were first removed from Robben Island to
+Uitvlugt, a desolate and unfruitful piece of ground on the adjoining
+mainland, at a considerable distance from the nearest dwelling-place
+of any description, it was understood that the family would live in
+comparative liberty, being merely “under surveillance;” that is to
+say, that some suitable person or persons would be appointed by the
+Cape Government to live within reach of them, and to be answerable
+for their general good behaviour, for their gratification in every
+reasonable wish or request, and for their making no attempt to escape
+from the Cape Colony and return to their homes in Natal.
+
+Strict justice would have required that the chief and his
+people—those that were left of them—should be restored to their
+location, as was done in the case of the other tribe, and that
+both should be repaid the full ascertainable value of the property
+taken from them or destroyed; but politicians in these our days
+place “expediency” so far above justice and truth, that men who are
+fighting for the latter out-of-date objects may well be thankful for
+the smallest concession to their side.
+
+The Bishop accordingly was satisfied that the new arrangement
+proposed for the captive chief’s comfort was as good a one as he
+could expect from Lord Carnarvon, although not what he might have
+done himself had the power lain with him. But when he signified his
+satisfaction in the matter, it was certainly on the assumption that
+Langalibalele was to be made to feel his captivity as little as
+possible upon the mainland—in fact that it was to consist _merely_ in
+his inability to leave the colony, or, without permission, the land
+assigned to him in it. But that such reasonable permission should be
+easily obtainable—that as many of his family and tribe as desired to
+do so should be allowed to join him there—that no galling restraints
+(such as still exist) should be imposed upon him, were certainly
+conditions proposed by Lord Carnarvon and accepted by the Bishop.
+
+When the Bishop returned to Natal, however, he left behind him in
+England one who, closely following upon his steps, undid much of the
+work which the other had done. Mr. Shepstone could have brought no
+new light to bear upon the subject—he could have given Lord Carnarvon
+no fresh facts which had not appeared already in the despatches,
+through which the Natal Government had been in constant communication
+with him. It was not likely that Mr. Shepstone should possess
+information hitherto unknown to the rest of the world, including Lord
+Carnarvon himself, which should have the power of entirely altering
+the latter’s deliberately-formed judgment upon the subject under
+consideration. But had this been so, Lord Carnarvon would assuredly
+have communicated the fact to the Bishop, with whom he had parted in
+complete unanimity of opinion, and to whom, and through whom to the
+unhappy chief, promises had been made and hopes held out, destined,
+apparently, never to be fulfilled.
+
+It is needless to conjecture what may have passed between Lord
+Carnarvon and the man who reached England somewhat under a cloud,
+with certain errors to answer for to a chief who was well up in facts
+beforehand, but who, in 1876, appears as Sir Theophilus Shepstone,
+K.C.M.G., with a commission as administrator of the Transvaal hidden
+in the depths of his pocket. The facts speak for themselves. The
+desire of the Secretary of State to achieve confederation in South
+Africa (the South African Empire!), the peculiar capabilities of Mr.
+Shepstone for dealing with the native and Dutch races of the country,
+and the considerable check which “strict justice” to the injured
+tribes would be to the great confederation scheme, are sufficient
+grounds for believing that absolution for the past, and immunity
+from the consequences of his acts were purchased by the engagement,
+on Mr. Shepstone’s part, to carry out in quiet and successful manner
+the first decided step towards the great project of confederation and
+empire, namely, the annexation of the Transvaal. In the light cast by
+succeeding events, it is plain that nothing would have been much more
+inconvenient in the scheme of South African politics than any measure
+which would be a censure upon Mr. Shepstone, or prevent his promotion
+to a higher office in the State.
+
+That no such alteration in the opinion of the Secretary of State ever
+took place may be gathered from his very decided though courteous
+replies to the appeals made to him from the colony, to the addresses
+from the Legislative Council and other colonists, containing
+protests against Lord Carnarvon’s decisions, and professing to give
+additional evidence against the tribes in question which would
+completely justify the proceedings of the colonial Government, and
+the severities of their punishment.
+
+To all that could be thus alleged Lord Carnarvon replies: “I did
+not form my opinion until I had received and considered the fullest
+explanation which the Government whose acts are questioned desired
+to place before me, and in considering the case I had the advantage
+of personal communication with an officer who was specially deputed
+to represent the Government of Natal before me, and who, from his
+knowledge, ability, and experience, was perhaps better qualified than
+any other to discharge the duty which was confided to him. I fail to
+find in the present documents the explanations which are promised in
+the address to Her Majesty, or indeed any evidence so specific or
+conclusive as to affect the opinion which, after the most anxious
+consideration, Her Majesty’s Government formed upon this case.”—(P.
+P. [C. 1342-1] p. 45.)
+
+In another despatch of the same date (July 27, 1875, [C. 1342-1] p.
+46), addressed to the officer administering the Government, Natal,
+he concludes: “As there is apparently no prospect of arriving at
+an agreement of opinion on several points, there is, perhaps, no
+advantage in continuing the discussion of them.” Nevertheless,
+although holding so clear and decided a judgment, Lord Carnarvon
+permitted his just and humane directions for the treatment of the
+injured tribes to be practically set aside by those in authority
+under him.[41]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.
+
+WHAT HE CAME FOR, WHAT HE DID, AND WHAT HE DID NOT DO.
+
+
+England, however, was beginning to feel that her South African
+possessions were in an unsettled condition, although in point of fact
+they were quiet enough until she meddled with them in the blundering
+well-meaning fashion in which she has handled them ever since. It was
+patent, indeed, that some interference was required, when innocent
+tribes were liable to such cruel injustice as that inflicted upon
+the Ama-Hlubi and Amangwe in 1873, and, if her interference was
+honestly intended on their behalf, she has at least the credit of the
+“well-meaning” attributed to her above. Whatever her intentions may
+have been, however, the result has been a progress from bad to worse,
+culminating at last in the late unhappy Zulu War.
+
+It is believed by many that England possesses but one man upon whom
+she can place any reliance in times of difficulty and danger, and
+accordingly Natal shortly received notice that Sir Garnet Wolseley
+was coming to “settle her affairs;” and the Natalians, with feelings
+varying from humble and delighted respect to bitter and suspicious
+contempt, prepared themselves to be set straight—or not—according to
+their different sentiments.
+
+The great man and his “brilliant staff,” as it was soon popularly
+called by the colonists—not without a touch of humour—arrived in
+Natal upon the last day of March, 1875, and on the 1st of April he
+took the oaths as Administrator of the Government at Pietermaritzburg.
+
+He immediately commenced a series of entertainments, calculated by
+their unusual number and brilliancy to dazzle the eyes of young
+Natalian damsels. These latter, accustomed as they were to very
+occasional and comparatively quiet festivities, and balls at which
+a few of the subalterns of the small garrison at Fort Napier were
+their most valued partners, found themselves in a new world of a most
+fascinating description, all ablaze with gold and scarlet, V.C.’s,
+C.B.’s, titles, and clever authors. And, what was more, all these
+striking personages paid them the most gracious attentions—attentions
+which varied according to the importance of the young ladies’
+male relatives to the political scheme afoot. Meanwhile dinner
+after dinner was given to the said relatives; Sir Garnet Wolseley
+entertained the whole world, great and small, and the different
+members of his staff had each his separate duty to perform—his list
+of people to be “fascinated” in one way or another. For a short
+time, perhaps, the popularity desired was achieved in consequence of
+their united and persevering efforts, although from the very first
+there were voices to be heard casting suspicion upon those who were
+“drowning the conscience of the colony in sherry and champagne;” and
+there were others, more far-sighted still, who grimly pointed out to
+the gratified and flattered recipients of this “princely hospitality”
+the very reasonable consideration: “You will have to pay for the
+sherry and champagne yourselves in the end.”
+
+Undoubtedly the conviction that the colony would pay dear for its
+unwonted gaiety—that it was being “humbugged” and befooled—soon stole
+upon the people. While the daughters enjoyed their balls, their
+fathers had to buy their ball-dresses; and while the legislative
+councillors and all their families were perpetually and graciously
+entertained at Government House, the question began to arise: “What
+is the object of it all?”
+
+All unusual treatment calls forth special scrutiny, and it is to
+be doubted whether Sir Garnet’s lavish hospitality and (almost)
+universally dropped honey, with all the painful labours of his
+brilliant staff combined, did more than awaken the suspicions which
+a course of proceedings involving less effort would have failed to
+evoke. Even the most ignorant of Dutch councillors would be wise
+enough to know that when a magnate of the land treated him and his
+family as bosom friends and equals of his own, the said magnate
+must want to “get something out of him”—even the most untaught and
+ingenuous of colonial maidens would soon rate at their true value the
+pretty speeches of the “men of note,” who would have had them believe
+that, after frequenting all the gayest and most fashionable scenes of
+the great world, they had come to Natal and found their true ideal
+upon its distant shores.
+
+A vast amount of trouble and of energy was thrown away by all
+concerned, while the few whose eyes were open from the first stood
+by and watched to see what would come of it. The question remains
+unanswered to this day. That the annexation of the Transvaal by Sir
+Garnet Wolseley did _not_ come of it, is to that discreet general’s
+great credit. And had his decision—that the work which he was
+specially sent out to do[42] was one for which the country was not
+ripe, and would not be for many years—been accepted and acted upon by
+England, the expense of his six months’ progress through Natal would
+have been well worth incurring indeed, for in that case there would
+have been no Zulu War. But this, unfortunately for all parties, was
+not the case.
+
+The popular answer in Natal to the question, “What did Sir Garnet
+Wolseley do for you?” is, “He got us up an hour earlier in the
+morning;” an excellent thing truly, but a costly hour, the history
+of which is as follows: For many years the city of Pietermaritzburg,
+known as “Sleepy Hollow” to its rivals of another and, in its own
+opinion, a busier town, had set all its clocks and watches, and
+regulated all its business hours by the sound of a gun, fired daily
+from Fort Napier at nine o’clock A.M., the signal for which came
+from the town itself. The gun was frequently credited with being
+too fast or slow by a few seconds or even minutes, and on one
+occasion was known to have been wrong by half-an-hour; a mistake
+which was remedied in the most original fashion, by setting the gun
+back a minute and a half daily till it should have returned to the
+proper time; to the utter confusion of all the chronometers in the
+neighbourhood. But, right or wrong, the nine-o’clock gun was the
+regulator of city time, including that of all country places within
+reach of its report. The natives understood it, and “gun-fire” was
+their universal hour of call; the shops were opened at its sound, and
+but little business done before it. But during Sir Garnet Wolseley’s
+reign in Natal it occurred, not without reason, to the member of
+his staff whom he placed in temporary authority over the postal and
+other arrangements of the colony, that nine o’clock was too late for
+a struggling community to begin its day, and he therefore altered
+the original hour of gun-fire to that of eight A.M. How far the
+alteration really changed the habits of the people it is hard to
+say, or how many of them may now let the eight-o’clock gun wake them
+instead of sending them to work, but the change remains an actual
+public proof of the fact that in 1875 Sir Garnet Wolseley visited
+Natal.
+
+A more important measure was the bill which he carried through the
+Legislative Assembly for the introduction of eight nominee members to
+be chosen by the Government, thereby throwing the balance of power
+into the hands of the executive, unless, indeed, nominee members
+should be chosen independent enough to take their own course. Whether
+this measure was looked upon as very important by those who proposed
+it, or whether the energy displayed was for the purpose of convincing
+the public mind that such really was Sir Garnet’s great object in
+Natal, it is not so easy to decide. But looking back through the
+events of the last few years one is strongly tempted to suspect that
+the whole visit to Natal, and all the display made there, was nothing
+but a pretence, a blind to hide our designs upon the Transvaal, for
+which Sir Garnet wisely considered that the country was not ripe.
+
+But if in this instance we are bound to admire Sir Garnet Wolseley’s
+good sense, we must, on the other hand, greatly deprecate his
+behaviour towards the two unfortunate tribes whose sorrows have been
+recorded, and towards those who took an interest in their welfare and
+just treatment—more especially towards the Bishop of Natal.[43]
+
+From the very first Sir Garnet’s tone upon native matters, and
+towards the Bishop, were entirely opposed to that used by Lord
+Carnarvon. Every attempt made by the Bishop to place matters upon
+a friendly footing, which would enable the new Governor to take
+advantage of his thorough acquaintance with the natives, was
+checked; nor through the whole of his governorship did he ever invite
+the Bishop’s confidence or meet him in the spirit in which he was
+himself prepared to act; a course of proceeding most unfortunately
+imitated by some of his successors, especially Sir Bartle Frere, who
+only “invited criticism of his policy”—and received it—when too late
+to be of any avail except to expose its fallacies.
+
+It is impossible to rise from a perusal of the despatches written by
+Sir Garnet after his arrival in Natal, in answer or with reference
+to matters in which the Bishop was concerned, without coming to the
+conclusion that from the very beginning his mind was prejudiced
+against the Bishop’s course, and that he had no sympathy with him or
+the people in whom he was interested. Far from attempting to carry
+out Lord Carnarvon’s instructions in the spirit in which they were
+undoubtedly given, he set aside some, and gave an interpretation of
+his own to others, which considerably altered their effect; while his
+two despatches, dated May 12th and 17th, show plainly enough the bias
+of his mind.
+
+The first is on the subject of the return of Langalibalele, which the
+Bishop had recommended, offering to receive him upon his own land
+at Bishopstowe, and to make himself responsible, within reasonable
+limits, for the chief’s good behaviour. Sir Garnet “would deprecate
+in the strongest terms” such return. “Langalibalele,” he says, “as
+I am informed by all classes here, official and non-official (a
+very small knot of men of extreme views excepted), is regarded by
+the native population at large as a chief who, having defied the
+authorities, and in doing so occasioned the murder of some white
+men, is now suffering for that conduct.” While thus avoiding the
+direct responsibility of sitting “in judgment upon past events,” by
+_quoting_ from “all classes here,” he practically confirms their
+opinion by speaking of those who differ from them as “a very small
+knot of men of extreme views;” and he further commits himself to the
+very unsoldierlike expression of “murder” as applied to the death of
+the five men at the Bushman’s River Pass, by speaking in the same
+paragraph of the punishment of the chief as “a serious warning to
+all other Kafir chiefs ... to avoid imitating his example.” Without
+mentioning the Bishop by name, he makes repeated allusions to him in
+a tone calculated to give an utterly false impression of his action
+and character. “To secure these objects” (the future safety of the
+colony and the true interests of white and black) “it is essential
+that a good feeling should exist between the two races; and I am
+bound to say that in my opinion those who, by the line of conduct
+they adopt, keep alive the recollection of past events,”[44] etc.
+etc. “I have no wish to attribute to those who adopt this policy any
+interested motives. I am sure that they are actuated by feelings
+of high philanthropy,” (? simple justice and honesty), “and nothing
+is farther from my mind than a wish to cast any slur upon them. Yet
+I must say that from the manner in which they refuse to believe all
+evidence that does not coincide with their own peculiar views, and
+from the fact of their regarding the condition of affairs in Natal
+from one standpoint alone, I am forced to consider them impractical
+(_sic_), and not to be relied on as advisers by those who are
+responsible for the good government of all classes.” In the following
+paragraphs he speaks of “sensational narratives oftentimes based
+upon unsifted evidence,” “highly-coloured accounts,” and “one-sided,
+highly-coloured, and, in some instances, incorrect statements that
+have been made public in a sensational manner,” all which could
+refer to the Bishop alone. If by regarding the condition of affairs
+in Natal from one standpoint alone, Sir Garnet Wolseley means the
+standpoint of British honour and justice, and looks upon those who
+hold it as “impractical,” there is little more to say. But Sir
+Garnet can never have given his attention to the Bishop’s printed
+pamphlets, and could therefore have no right to an opinion as to his
+reception or treatment of evidence, or he would not venture to use
+the expressions just quoted of one who had never made an assertion
+without the most careful and patient sifting of the grounds for it,
+whose only object was to establish the truth, _whatever that might
+be_, and who was only too glad whenever his investigations threw
+discredit upon a tale of wrong or oppression. That principles of
+strict honour and justice should in these our days be characterised
+as “peculiar views,” is neither to the credit of the English nation
+nor of its “only man.”
+
+In the second despatch mentioned Sir Garnet makes the following
+singular remark: “In the meantime I take the liberty of informing
+your lordship that the words ‘the Amahlubi may, if they choose,
+when that is prepared which is to be prepared, go to him,’ are
+interpreted, by those who have taken an active part in favour of
+the tribe, as binding the Government to convey all members of the
+Amahlubi tribe who may wish to join Langalibalele, to whatever place
+may be finally selected for his location. I do not conceive that
+any such meaning is intended, and should not recommend that such
+an interpretation should be recognised. I think, however, it may
+fairly be matter for consideration whether Langalibalele’s wives and
+children, who have lost all their property,[45] might not be assisted
+with passages by sea to join Langalibalele.”[46]
+
+It is difficult to imagine what other interpretation can be placed
+on the words of the proclamation, or how, after it had once been
+delivered, any narrower measures could be fairly considered, or
+require further “instructions.”
+
+In subsequent letters Sir Garnet scouts altogether representations
+made by the Bishop of the destitute condition of members of the
+Hlubi tribe, replying to Lord Carnarvon on the subject by enclosing
+letters from various magistrates in different parts of the country
+denying that destitution existed; saying that the people were “in
+sufficiently good circumstances;” and most of them suggesting that,
+should anything like starvation ensue, the people have only to hire
+themselves out as labourers to the white people. The Bishop would
+certainly never have made representations unsupported by facts; but
+in any case it is a question whether we had not some further duties
+towards a large number of innocent people whom we had stripped of all
+their possessions, and whose homes and crops we had destroyed, than
+that of allowing them to labour for us at a low rate of wages; or
+whether the mere fact of its being thus possible for all to keep body
+and soul together relieved us of the responsibility of having robbed
+and stripped them.
+
+These facts in themselves prove how different from Lord Carnarvon’s
+feelings and intentions were those of his subordinate, and how real
+Sir Garnet’s antagonism. It is not therefore surprising that the
+commands of the former were not, and have never been, carried out.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+THE MATSHANA INQUIRY AND COLONEL COLLEY.
+
+
+In consequence of the threatened action for libel against the
+Bishop of Natal on account of statements made in his defence of
+Langalibalele, which Mr. John Shepstone considered to be “of a most
+libellous and malicious nature,” the Bishop had laid the matter
+before the Lieut.-Governor, Sir B. Pine, requesting him to direct an
+inquiry to be made into the truth of the said statements. This was
+refused by His Excellency through the acting Colonial Secretary in
+the following terms: “Your lordship has thought it right to make the
+most serious charges against an important and long-tried officer of
+this Government—charges, too, relating to a matter which occurred
+sixteen years ago.[47] That officer has, in His Excellency’s opinion,
+very properly called upon your lordship to retract those charges.
+Instead of doing this, you have appealed to the Lieut.-Governor to
+institute an inquiry as to the truth of the charges you have made.
+This the Lieut.-Governor has no hesitation in declining to do.”
+Thereby prejudging the case without inquiry.
+
+The Bishop’s next action was an appeal to the Secretary of State for
+the Colonies, which he requested the Lieut.-Governor to forward with
+a copy of the correspondence which had already taken place on the
+subject, in order that His Excellency might be fully aware of what
+steps he was taking.
+
+This appeal contained a short account of the facts which had led to
+his making the statements complained of—the trial of Langalibalele,
+and the “fear of treachery” perpetually pleaded by many witnesses
+in excuse of the chiefs conduct, but treated with contempt both by
+the court below and the council, each including the Secretary for
+Native Affairs, and presided over by His Excellency. The statements
+made by the Bishop—not mere “charges” unsupported by evidence, but
+the deposition of four eye-witnesses who might be cross-examined
+at will—would, if proved to be true, greatly tend to palliate the
+offences imputed to the chief, and should therefore not have been
+suppressed by the officer concerned, who had kept silence when a
+word from his mouth would have cleared a prisoner on trial for his
+life from a very serious part of the charge against him. The Bishop
+therefore submitted that the fact of the events in question having
+taken place sixteen years before was no reason why they should not be
+brought to light when required for the prisoner’s defence.
+
+The correspondence which ensued—including a very curious circumstance
+relating to a missing despatch, recorded in the despatch-book
+at Pietermaritzburg, but apparently never received in Downing
+Street—will be found by those interested in the subject in the
+Bishop’s pamphlet, “The History of the Matshana Inquiry.” For our
+present purpose it is sufficient to remark that on the 22nd of April,
+1875, Lord Carnarvon directed Sir Garnet Wolseley to institute a
+careful inquiry into the matter, and suggested that under all the
+circumstances this inquiry might be best conducted by one or more
+of the senior officers of Sir Garnet’s staff, who had accompanied
+him on special service to Natal. The correspondence which followed
+between the parties concerned, with arrangements for the summoning
+of witnesses and for the management of the trial, are also all to be
+found in the above-mentioned pamphlet. The inquiry was to be of a
+private nature, no reporters to be admitted, nor counsel on either
+side permitted.[48] The Bishop and Mr. Shepstone were each to be
+allowed the presence of one friend during the inquiry, who, however,
+was not to speak to the witnesses, or to address the officer holding
+the inquiry. In addition the Bishop asked, and received, permission
+to bring with him the native interpreter, through whom he was in the
+habit of conducting important conversations with natives, as his
+own Zulu, although sufficient for ordinary purposes, was not, in
+his opinion, equal to the requirements of the case, while Mr. J.
+Shepstone was familiar from childhood with colloquial Kafir.
+
+In the Bishop’s pamphlet he points out that the course which Lord
+Carnarvon had thought proper to adopt in this case was wholly his
+own, and proceeds as follows:—a passage which we will quote entire:—
+
+“And I apprehend that this inquiry, though of necessity directed
+mainly to the question whether Mr. John Shepstone fired at Matshana
+or not, is not chiefly concerned with the character of the act
+imputed to him, described by the Secretary for Native Affairs as of
+a treacherous murderous nature, but involves the far more serious
+question whether that act, if really committed, was suppressed by
+Mr. John Shepstone at the time in his official report, was further
+suppressed by him when he appeared last year as Government prosecutor
+against a prisoner on trial for his life—who pleaded it as a very
+important part of his defence, but found his plea treated by the
+court, through Mr. John Shepstone’s silence, as a mere impudent
+‘pretext’—and has been finally denied by him to the Secretary of
+State himself, and is still denied down to the present moment. Such
+an act as that ascribed to him, if duly reported at the time, might,
+I am well aware, have been justified by some, or at least excused, on
+grounds of public policy under the circumstances; though I, for my
+part, should utterly dissent from such a view. In that case, however,
+it would have been unfair and unwarrantable to have reproached Mr.
+Shepstone at the present time for an act which had been brought
+properly under the cognizance of his superiors. But the present
+inquiry, as I conceive, has chiefly in view the question whether
+the facts really occurred as Mr. John Shepstone reported at first
+officially, and has since reaffirmed officially, or not.”
+
+Colonel Colley, C.B., was the officer appointed to conduct the
+inquiry, the commencement of which was fixed for August 2nd, 1875.
+
+The intervening period granted for the purpose was employed by the
+Bishop in summoning witnesses from all parts of the land; from
+Zululand, from the Free State, and distant parts of the colony.
+Matshana himself was summoned as a witness under an offer of safe
+conduct from the Government. He, however, did not find it convenient,
+or was afraid, to trust himself in person; but Cetshwayo sent some
+of his men in his place. The Bishop’s object was to summon as many
+“indunas,” or messengers, or otherwise prominent persons in the
+affair of 1858; men who were thoroughly trustworthy, and “had a
+backbone,” and would not be afraid to speak the truth; his desire
+being to get at that truth, whatever it might be. Thirty-one men
+responded to his call, of whom, however, only twenty were examined
+in court, the Bishop giving way to Colonel Colley’s wish in the
+matter, and to save the court’s time. Four other witnesses summoned
+by _both_ the Bishop and Mr. Shepstone were examined, and nine more
+on Mr. Shepstone’s behalf, called by him. The Bishop had considerable
+difficulty in procuring the attendance of the witnesses he required.
+The simple order of Mr. John Shepstone would suffice, by the mere
+lifting up of his finger, to bring down to Pietermaritzburg at
+once any natives whom he desired as witnesses, invested as he was
+in the native mind with all the weight and all the terrors of the
+magisterial office; and with the additional influence derived from
+the fact of his having only recently filled, during his brother’s
+absence in England, the office of Secretary for Native Affairs,
+with such great—almost despotic—authority over all the natives in
+the colony. The Bishop, on the contrary, had no such influence. He
+had no power at all to insist upon the attendance of witnesses. He
+could only _ask_ them to come, and if they came at his request, they
+would know that they were coming, as it were, with a rope around
+their necks; and if they were proved to have borne false witness,
+calumniating foully so high an official, they had every reason to
+fear that their punishment would be severe, from which the Bishop
+would have had no power—even if, in such a case, he had the will—to
+save them.
+
+When, upon the 2nd August, the inquiry began, out of the many
+witnesses called by the Bishop, upon whom lay the _onus probandi_,
+only three were at hand; and two of these, as will be seen, were
+present merely through the wise forethought of _the_ intelligent
+Zulu, William Ngidi. But for this last, the inquiry would have
+begun, and—as the Commissioner was pressed for time, having other
+important duties on his hands in consequence of Sir Garnet Wolseley
+and staff being about immediately to leave the colony—might even
+(as it seemed) have ended, with only a single witness being heard
+in support of the Bishop’s story. No others were seen or even heard
+of for some days, and then by accident only. The Secretary for
+Native Affairs, it is true, by direction of Sir Garnet Wolseley,
+had desired Cetshwayo to send down Matshana, and the Bishop fully
+expected that this intervention of the Government with a promise
+of safe conduct for him, would have sufficed to bring him. But Mr.
+John Dunn, “Immigration Agent” of the Government in Zululand, and
+Cetshwayo’s confidential adviser, whom the Bishop met in Durban on
+July 8th, told him at once that he did not think there was the least
+chance of Matshana’s coming, as the Secretary for Native Affairs’
+words in 1873, when he went up to crown Cetshwayo (who asked very
+earnestly that Matshana might be forgiven and allowed to return
+to Natal) were so severe—“He had injured the Secretary for Native
+Affairs’ own body;” that is, one of his men had wounded his brother
+(Mr. John Shepstone) fifteen years previously, when thirty or forty
+of Matshana’s men had been killed—that he would be afraid to come at
+a mere summons like this, notwithstanding the promise of safety, the
+value of which he would naturally appreciate by his own experience
+in former days. Mr. Dunn promised to do his best to persuade him to
+go down, but did not expect to succeed. And, in point of fact, he
+never came, alleging the usual “pain in the leg;” and the discussion
+in Zululand about his coming had only the result of delaying for
+some days the starting of the other witnesses whom the Bishop had
+asked Cetshwayo to send. On August 4th, however, Zulu messengers
+arrived, reporting to the Secretary for Native Affairs the sickness
+of Matshana, and to the Bishop the fact that six witnesses from
+Zululand were on the way, and they themselves had pushed on ahead
+to announce their coming, as they knew they were wanted for August
+2nd. Accordingly five of them arrived on August 8th, and the sixth,
+Maboyi, on August 5th, under somewhat singular circumstances, as
+will presently appear. Meanwhile most important witnesses in support
+of the Bishop’s story were expected by him from Matshana’s old
+location—Kwa’ Jobe (at the place of “Jobe”)—partly in consequence of
+a letter written by Magema to William Ngidi, partly in compliance
+with the Bishop’s request sent through Cetshwayo to Matshana himself
+in Zululand. William Ngidi replied to Magema, as follows: “Your
+letter reached me all right, and just in the very nick of time, for
+it came on Saturday, and the day before Mr. John arrived here (Kwa’
+Jobe), and called the men to come to him on Monday, that they might
+talk together about Matshana’s affair. On Sunday my friend Mlingane
+came, and we took counsel together; for by this time it was well
+known that Mr. John had come to speak with the people about that
+matter of Matshana. So we put our heads together, and I got up very
+early on Monday morning and hurried off to Deke, and told him that
+he was called by Sobantu (the Bishop) to go before the Governor. He
+readily agreed to go, and went down at once, on the very day when
+Matshana’s people came together to Mr. John, so that he never went to
+him; but, when I arrived, there had just come already the messenger
+to call him to go to Mr. John, and another came just as he was about
+to set off for ’Maritzburg. I told him to call for Mpupama on his
+way, and take him on with him. I see that you have done well and
+wisely in sending that letter without delay to me.”
+
+Accordingly these two men, Deke and Mpupuma, reached Bishopstowe
+safely in good time. Also Ntambama, Langalibalele’s brother, of whom
+the Bishop had heard as having been present on the occasion, readily
+came at his summons, though he was not asked to give his evidence,
+nor did the Bishop know what it would be before he made his statement
+in court. But for the prudent action of William Ngidi, Ntambama would
+have been the only witness whose testimony would have sustained
+the Bishop’s statements during the first days of the inquiry; and
+his evidence, unsupported, might have been suspected, as that of
+Langalibalele’s brother, of not being disinterested, and would have
+been contradicted at once (see below) by Ncamane’s.
+
+On Saturday, July 31st, the inquiry being about to begin on the
+Monday, Magema received a doleful letter from William Ngidi to the
+effect that the ’Inkos Sobantu must take care what he was about,
+for that all the people were afraid, and would not venture to come
+forward and give evidence against a high government official. He
+spoke, however, of one man “whom I trust most of all the people
+here,” and who had the scar upon his neck of a wound received upon
+the day of Matshana’s arrest.
+
+Discouraging, indeed, as it was to find on the very eve of the
+inquiry that all his efforts through William Ngidi had failed to
+procure witnesses, except the two sent down by him at the first,
+the Bishop was utterly at a loss to understand how his message to
+Cetshwayo had, to all appearance, also entirely failed with respect
+to those men of Matshana still living Kwa’ Jobe, as well as (it
+seemed) those living in Zululand.
+
+On August 5th the mystery with respect to the witnesses Kwa’ Jobe
+was explained. Deke, Mpupuma, Ntambama, and Njuba, who had come
+from Zululand, had all been examined, as well as Ncamane, who,
+when called by the Bishop, had replied that he would only come if
+called by the Government; and when summoned through the Secretary
+for Native Affairs, at the Bishop’s request, withdrew or modified
+important parts of his printed statement. The Bishop had actually
+no other witness to call, and all his efforts to obtain a number
+of well-informed and trustworthy eye-witnesses from Zululand, Kwa’
+Jobe, and Basutoland, seemed likely to end in a complete fiasco. But
+on the evening of Thursday, August 5th, a native came to him in the
+street and said that his name was Maboyi, son of Tole (Matshana’s
+chief induna, who was killed on the occasion in question), and that
+he had been sent by Matshana to Mr. Fynn, the superintendent, and
+Lutshungu, son of Ngoza, the present chief, of the remnant of his
+former tribe living Kwa’ Jobe, to ask to be allowed to take down to
+’Maritzburg as witnesses those men of his who were present on the
+day of the attempt to seize Matshana. Mr. Fynn said that “He did not
+refuse the men, but wished to hear a word by a letter coming from the
+Secretary for Native Affairs—it was not proper that he should hear
+it from a man of Matshana coming from Zululand,” and sent him off
+under charge of a policeman to ’Maritzburg, where he was taken to the
+Secretary for Native Affairs, who said to him: “If Matshana himself
+had come, this matter might have been properly settled; it won’t be
+without him!” But the Secretary for Native Affairs said nothing to
+Maboyi about his going to call the witnesses Kwa’ Jobe; he only asked
+by whom he had been sent, and when informed, he told him to go home
+to Zululand, as he had not been summoned and had nothing to do with
+this affair. Maboyi had reached ’Maritzburg on Monday, August 2nd,
+the day on which the inquiry began. He saw the Secretary for Native
+Affairs on Tuesday, and on that day was dismissed as above. Not a
+word was said to the Bishop about his being brought down in this way
+under arrest, which fully explained the non-arrival of his witnesses
+from the location; since, first, their fear of giving witness against
+a government official, and now the arrest of Maboyi, had spread a
+kind of panic among them all, and deterred them from coming to give
+evidence against Mr. John Shepstone—himself a resident magistrate,
+only lately acting as Secretary for Native Affairs, and the brother
+of the Secretary for Native Affairs himself—merely in answer to the
+Bishop’s unofficial summons. Hearing, however, on Thursday from
+natives that the case was then going on at Government House, Maboyi
+went up to speak with the Bishop, but arrived when the court had
+adjourned. He found him out in town, however, just as he was on the
+point of leaving for Bishopstowe, and was, of course, told to wait
+and give his evidence. Accordingly, he went to Bishopstowe, and
+Magema was charged to bring him in for examination on Saturday, the
+next day of the inquiry. On the way into town for that purpose, Mr.
+Fynn’s policeman most positively refused to let him stay, and went
+off ultimately in great wrath, as Maboyi and Magema insisted that he
+must give his evidence before leaving town to return to Zululand.
+
+On that day, Saturday, August 7th, the Bishop explained the whole
+affair to the Commissioner, and, having obtained a list of names
+from Maboyi, requested that a Government messenger might be sent for
+the men at once, and the Secretary for Native Affairs was instructed
+to summon them. On Monday, August 9th, the Secretary for Native
+Affairs replied that he had summoned all these men, except seven,
+who were already in town, having been called by Mr. John Shepstone,
+and having been, in fact, under his hands—in charge of his induna
+Nozitshina—from the very first day of the inquiry. It seemed as if
+William Ngidi’s statement was really to be verified, and that these
+men had all succumbed to their fears. On the other hand, among these
+seven was Matendeyeka, whom William Ngidi “trusted most of all;” and
+there might be amongst them some who would have the courage to speak
+out and to describe the facts connected with the arrest of Matshana
+to the best of their ability. At all events the Bishop resolved to
+call them, and do his best to bring the truth out of them; and Magema
+afterwards whispered that he had heard from one of Mr. John’s men,
+who was present when he spoke with the people (Kwa’ Jobe), that the
+men there had said: “It was of no use to discuss it beforehand;
+they would say nothing about what they remembered now; but before
+the Governor they would speak the plain truth as they knew it.”
+Accordingly the Bishop called four of these men—Matendeyeka, Faku
+(son of Tole), Magwaza, Gwazizulu—and they all confirmed the story as
+told by his other witnesses. He left the other three to be called by
+Mr. John Shepstone, but he never called them. That these witnesses
+should have been called by Mr. John Shepstone, as well as by the
+Bishop, was satisfactory, showing that they were witnesses to whom
+no objection could be made on the score of character or position in
+the tribe, or as having been in any way, directly or indirectly,
+influenced by the Bishop.
+
+But the result was that, as these men were in the hands of the other
+side from the time they reached until they left ’Maritzburg, the
+Bishop had never even seen them, or had any communication with them,
+until they appeared to give their evidence. He was wholly ignorant
+beforehand of what they _would_ say or what they _could_ say; he knew
+not whether they would confirm or contradict the story told by his
+other witnesses; and he knew not on what particular points, if any,
+they could give special evidence, and was therefore unable to ask the
+questions which might have elicited such evidence.
+
+By this time (August 8th) the witnesses from Zululand had arrived,
+from whom the Bishop learned the names of other important witnesses
+living Kwa’ Jobe, and at his request these also were sent for by
+Government messengers. Unfortunately, through Maboyi’s arrest, some
+of the Bishop’s witnesses summoned by the Secretary for Native
+Affairs arrived too late on the very day (August 21st) on which the
+evidence was closed, and others a day or two afterwards—twelve
+altogether—of whom only one could be heard, whom the Bishop had
+expressly named as a man whose testimony he especially desired to
+take. Upon the whole, Sir Garnet Wolseley, who began by “leaving
+entirely in the Bishop’s hands” the difficult and not inexpensive
+business of “obtaining his witnesses,” summoned ultimately twenty-two
+of them, of whom, however, four only could be heard by the
+Commissioner; two (Matshana and Ngijimi) did not come at all; and
+three, including a most important witness, were called too late to be
+able to arrive till all was over; while four more out of the seven
+who had been called by Mr. John Shepstone gave their evidence in
+support of the Bishop, as doubtless the three others would have done,
+if Mr. John Shepstone had called them.
+
+In the despatch to the Earl of Carnarvon, already quoted from (note
+to p. 91), Sir B. Pine remarks: “I think it further my duty to
+point out to your lordship that much of the evidence adduced by the
+Bishop in this case has been taken in this way (_ex parte_, without
+the safety of publicity, and the opportunity of cross-examination);
+evidence so taken is peculiarly untrustworthy, for everyone
+moderately acquainted with the native character is aware that when a
+question is put to a native, he will intuitively perceive what answer
+is required, and answer accordingly.” The above is a common but
+insufficiently supported accusation against the natives, denied by
+many who are more than “moderately acquainted” with their character;
+although of course it is the natural tendency of a subservient race
+in its dealings with its masters, and possible tyrants. But granting
+for the nonce its truth, it would, in the case of the Matshana
+inquiry, tell heavily on the Bishop’s side. Sir B. Pine was not
+present at the private investigation made by the Bishop, to which he
+alludes in the above sentence, and therefore can be no judge of the
+“cross-examination,” which the four original witnesses underwent; and
+they, if they did “intuitively perceive” what answer was required,
+and “answer accordingly,” must merely have spoken the truth; a truth
+which, at that early period of his investigations, the Bishop was
+_most reluctantly_ receiving, and would gladly have had disproved.
+
+The evidence before the court, however, was given under circumstances
+which, if Sir B. Pine’s account of native witnesses be correct, adds
+enormously to the value of the fact that out of these twenty-four
+witnesses, summoned from various quarters, many of them without
+opportunity of communicating either with the Bishop or with each
+other, but one[49] failed when it came to the point; and he, a feeble
+old man, just released from prison (one of the captured tribe), was
+manifestly in a state of abject alarm at finding himself brought
+up to witness against the Government whose tender mercies he had
+so lately experienced, and contradicted before Colonel Colley the
+greater part of the story which he had originally told the Bishop.
+This poor creature had been intimidated and threatened by a certain
+man named Adam, under whose surveillance he lived after being
+released from gaol, and who actually turned him and his family
+out at night as a punishment for his having obeyed a summons to
+Bishopstowe. He was manifestly ready to say anything which would
+relieve him from the fear of the gaol, which he pleaded to Mr.
+Shepstone a day or two later; on which occasion he unsaid all he had
+previously said, having, as he afterwards confessed, been warned by
+Mr. Shepstone’s policeman Ratsha, who asked him for what purpose he
+had been summoned by the Bishop, _not to speak a word about_ “Mr.
+John’s” treatment of Matshana. But, with the best intentions, the man
+did not succeed in making his story tally entirely with that of Mr.
+Shepstone’s other witnesses, nor with Mr. Shepstone’s own.
+
+With this one exception the Bishop’s witnesses told the same story in
+all essential respects. They were men arriving from many different
+and distant parts of the colony, from Zululand, and from the Free
+State, who could not possibly have combined to tell the same story
+in all its details, which, if false, would have been torn to pieces
+when so many men of different ages and characters were cross-examined
+by one so thoroughly acquainted with all the real facts of the case
+as Mr. Shepstone—men who had nothing to expect from the Bishop, but
+had everything to dread from the Government if proved to have brought
+a false and foul charge against an officer so highly placed and so
+powerfully protected; _yet not the least impression was made upon the
+strength of their united evidence_.
+
+The case, however, is very different when we turn to Mr. Shepstone’s
+witnesses. Of these, nine in number (besides the four natives called
+by both the Bishop and Mr. Shepstone), seven were natives; the other
+two being the Secretary for Native Affairs and Mr. John Taylor—a
+son of Mr. John Shepstone’s first wife by her former husband. Mr.
+Taylor was a lad of nine at the time, but, having been present with
+his mother and little sister on the occasion of the attack upon
+Matshana, was summoned as a witness by Mr. Shepstone. His evidence
+was chiefly important as helping to prove that Matshana’s party had
+not the concealed weapons which Mr. Shepstone’s chief native witness
+Nozitshina said were left by them in immense numbers upon the ground;
+as he stated that he and his sister went over the ground, after the
+affair was over, and picked up the assegais, “about eight or nine” in
+number.
+
+But it is important to remark that the very fact of the presence
+at this meeting of Mrs. Shepstone with her two children, goes
+far to disprove the account given by Mr. Shepstone in his second
+“statement,” prepared by him on the occasion of this trial, but
+which is greatly at variance on some vital points with the narrative
+written by him on the day after the event, dated March 17th, 1858,
+for the information of His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor. It
+seems almost incredible that Mr. John. Shepstone should have, as
+he says in his second statement, “made up his mind to face almost
+certain” death, not only for himself and all his men, but for _his
+wife and her two young children_, on the grounds that it was “too
+late to withdraw at this stage” (same report), when at any time
+since the “day or two previous” (_ibid._), when the information in
+question[50] reached him; according to his account he might have
+put off the meeting, or at all events have sent his wife and her
+children to a place of safety. The Secretary for Native Affairs’
+evidence could of course be of a merely official character, as he
+was not present on the occasion. He stated that Mr. John Shepstone’s
+letters of February 16th and 24th, 1858, asked for by the Bishop, on
+the subject of the approaching interview with Matshana, could not be
+found, although they “must have been recently mislaid,” as he himself
+(the Secretary for Native Affairs) had quoted from one of them in his
+minute for the Secretary of State in June, 1874. Of Mr. Shepstone’s
+native witnesses it can only be said that, amongst the seven called
+by him only, six contradicted themselves and each other to so great
+an extent as to make their evidence of no value, while the evidence
+of the seventh was unimportant, and the four witnesses called by both
+Mr. Shepstone and the Bishop told the same story as did the witnesses
+of the latter, most unexpectedly to him.
+
+Nevertheless Colonel Colley’s judgment, although convicting Mr. John
+Shepstone of having enticed the chief Matshana to an interview with
+the intention of seizing him, was received and acted upon in Natal
+as an acquittal of that officer. So far was this the case, that,
+although Lord Carnarvon directed that the Bishop’s costs should be
+placed upon the colonial estimates, the Legislative Council of the
+colony refused to pay them on the grounds that they were the costs of
+the losing party. In his report Colonel Colley gives his opinions as
+follows:
+
+“That Matyana was enticed to an interview, as stated by the Bishop,
+and was induced to come unarmed, under the belief that it was a
+friendly meeting, such as he had already had with Mr. Shepstone,
+for the purpose of discussing the accusations against him and the
+question of his return to his location.
+
+“That Matyana, though very suspicious and unwilling, came there in
+good faith; and that the accusations against him—of meditating the
+assassination of Mr. Shepstone and his party, of a prearranged plan
+and signal for the purpose, and of carrying concealed arms to the
+meeting—which are made in Mr. J. Shepstone’s statements, are entirely
+without foundation.
+
+“That Mr. Shepstone at that time held no magisterial position, but
+was simply the commander of a small armed force charged with the
+execution of a warrant; and that the manner in which he proposed to
+effect the seizure, viz. at a supposed friendly meeting, was known
+to and sanctioned by, if not the Government, at least the immediate
+representative of the Government and Mr. Shepstone’s superior, Dr.
+Kelly, the resident magistrate of the district.
+
+“That Mr. Shepstone did not attempt to shoot Matyana, as described
+by the Bishop, but fired into the air after the attempt to seize
+Matyana had failed, and in consequence of the attempt made almost
+simultaneously by some of Matyana’s men to reach the huts and seize
+the arms of Mr. Shepstone’s men.
+
+“The concealment of the gun,” he continues, “and the fact that a
+number of Matyana’s men were killed in the pursuit, is not disputed
+by Mr. Shepstone.
+
+“I confess that I have had the greatest difficulty in forming my
+opinion on this latter point, and especially as to whether Mr.
+Shepstone fired into the air as he states. _The weight of direct
+evidence adduced at the inquiry lay altogether on the other
+side._”[51]
+
+Colonel Colley then proceeds to give the considerations by which he
+has been influenced in coming to a conclusion directly opposed to the
+side on which, as he himself says, lay the weight of direct evidence.
+These considerations were threefold. The first is an opinion of
+his own, considerably at variance with most people’s experience,
+namely, that a story handed down by oral tradition “crystallises
+into an accepted form,” by which he explains away the fact that so
+many witnesses told the same story, and one which stood the test of
+cross-examination, without any important variations.
+
+The second consideration was even more singular, namely, that
+allowance must be made on Mr. John Shepstone’s side for the greater
+ability with which the Bishop conducted his case; and the third lay
+in the statement that “Mr. J. W. Shepstone is a man of known courage,
+and a noted sportsman and shot,” and “was not likely to have missed”
+Matyana if he had fired at him; “and, if driven to fire into the
+crowd in self-defence, it is more probable that he would have shot
+one of the men on the right.” The Bishop’s opponents from the very
+first persistently put forward the notion that he had “brought a
+charge against Mr. J. W. Shepstone,” and this was countenanced by the
+Government when they threw upon him the serious task of prosecuting
+before a Court of Enquiry, whereas in point of fact the real question
+at issue was not whether or no a certain shot was actually fired, but
+whether, on a certain occasion, a Government official had acted in
+a treacherous manner towards a native chief, thereby giving reason
+for the excuse of fear on the part of Langalibalele, treated as a
+false pretence by the court, some members of which were fully aware
+of the facts, and the prosecutor himself the official concerned. And,
+further, whether the said facts had been concealed by high Government
+officers, and denied by them repeatedly to their superiors in England.
+
+On the former questions Colonel Colley’s report leaves no doubt,
+and Lord Carnarvon’s comments upon it are of a very decided nature.
+After signifying his acceptance of the decision as a “sound and
+just conclusion,” and complimenting Colonel Colley on the “able
+and conscientious manner in which” he “has acquitted himself of an
+arduous and delicate task,” he continues: “On the other hand, I must,
+even after the lapse of so many years, record my disapprobation of
+the artifices by which it is admitted Matyana was entrapped into the
+meeting with a view to his forcible arrest. Such underhand manœuvres
+are opposed to the morality of a civilised administration; they lower
+English rule in the eyes of the natives; and they even defeat their
+own object, as is abundantly illustrated by the present case.”
+
+Mr. J. W. Shepstone, however, was a subordinate officer, and if
+his mode of executing the warrant was approved by the superior
+authorities in the colony, the blame which may attach to the
+transaction must be borne by them at least in equal proportion.
+
+The gist of Colonel Colley’s decision is altogether condemnatory of
+Mr. J. Shepstone, some of whose statements, he says, “are entirely
+without foundation,” and, by implication, also of his brother, the
+Secretary for Native Affairs; yet virtually, and in the eyes of
+the world, the decision was in their favour. To quote from _The
+Natal Mercury_ of November 2nd, 1875: “It is still understood that
+Mr. Shepstone, in the minds of impartial judges, stands more than
+exonerated from the Bishop’s charges.” Mr. John Shepstone was
+retained in his responsible position, and received further promotion;
+and his brother was immediately appointed to the high office of
+Administrator of Government, and sent out with power to annex the
+Transvaal if he thought proper.
+
+We have dwelt at some length upon the inquiry into the Matshana
+case; for, since the annexation of the Transvaal was one of the
+direct and immediate causes of the Zulu War, and since it seems
+improbable that any other man than Sir Theophilus Shepstone could at
+the moment have been found equally able to undertake the task, it
+becomes a serious question to what extent an inquiry which had no
+practical effect whatsoever upon the position of men whose conduct
+had been stigmatised by the Secretary of State himself as “underhand
+manœuvres, opposed to the morality of a civilised administration,”
+may not be considered chargeable with the disastrous results. And,
+further, we must protest against the spirit of the last sentence of
+Lord Carnarvon’s despatch on the subject, in which he expresses his
+“earnest hope that his (Colonel Colley’s) report will be received
+by all parties to this controversy in the spirit which is to be
+desired, and be accepted as a final settlement of a dispute which
+cannot be prolonged without serious prejudice to public interests,
+and without a renewal of those resentments which, for the good of the
+community—English as well as native—had best be put to rest.”
+
+A dislocated joint must be replaced, or the limb cannot otherwise be
+pressed down into shape and “put to rest;” a thorn must be extracted,
+not skinned over and left in the flesh; and as, with the dislocation
+unreduced or the thorn unextracted, the human frame can never recover
+its healthful condition, so it is with the state with an unrighted
+wrong, an unexposed injustice.
+
+The act of treason towards Matshana, hidden for many years, looked
+upon by its perpetrators as a matter past and gone, has tainted all
+our native policy since—unknown to most English people in Natal or
+at home—and has finally borne bitter fruit in the present unhappy
+condition of native affairs.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL.
+
+
+On the 5th of October, 1876, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G., was
+appointed “to be a Special Commissioner to inquire respecting certain
+disturbances which have taken place in the territories adjoining the
+colony of Natal, and empowering him, in certain events, to exercise
+the power and jurisdiction of Her Majesty over such territories, or
+some of them.” (P. P. [C. 1776] p. 1.)
+
+The commission stated: “Whereas grievous disturbances have broken
+out in the territories adjacent to our colonies in South Africa,
+with war between the white inhabitants and the native races, to
+the great peril of the peace and safety of our said colonies ...
+and, if the emergency should seem to you to be such as to render
+it necessary, in order to secure the peace and safety of our said
+colonies and of our subjects elsewhere, that the said territories,
+or any portion or portions of the same, should provisionally, and
+pending the announcement of our pleasure, be administered in our
+name and on our behalf; then, and in such case only, we do further
+authorise you, the said Sir Theophilus Shepstone, by proclamation
+under your hand, to declare that, from and after a day to be therein
+named, so much of any such territories as aforesaid, as to you after
+due consideration, shall seem fit, shall be annexed to and form part
+of our dominions.... Provided, first, that no such proclamation
+shall be issued by you with respect to any district, territory, or
+state unless you shall be satisfied that the inhabitants thereof, or
+a sufficient number of them, or the Legislature thereof, desire to
+become our subjects, nor if any conditions unduly limiting our power
+and authority therein are sought to be imposed.”
+
+Such was the tenor of the commission which, unknown to the world at
+large, Sir Theophilus Shepstone brought with him when he returned to
+Natal in November, 1876. The sudden annexation which followed was
+a stroke which took all by surprise except the few already in the
+secret; many declaring to the last that such an action on the part of
+the English Government was impossible—because, they thought, unjust.
+It is true that the Republic had for long been going from bad to
+worse in the management of its own affairs; its Government had no
+longer the power to enforce laws or to collect taxes; and the country
+was generally believed to be fast approaching a condition of absolute
+anarchy. Nevertheless it was thought by some that, except by the
+request of those concerned, we had no right to intrude our authority
+for the better control of Transvaal affairs so long as their bad
+management did not affect us.
+
+On one point, however, we undoubtedly had a right to interfere, as
+the stronger, the juster, and more merciful nation—namely, the
+attitude of the Transvaal Boers towards, and their treatment of, the
+native tribes who were their neighbours, or who came under their
+control. On behalf of the latter unfortunates (Transvaal subjects),
+we did not even profess to interfere; but one of the chief causes
+alleged by us for our taking possession of the country was a long and
+desultory war which was taking place between the Boers and Sikukuni,
+the chief of the Bapedi tribe living upon their northern borders, and
+in the course of which the Boers were behaving towards the unhappy
+natives with a treachery, and, when they fell into their power, with
+a brutality unsurpassed by any historical records. The sickening
+accounts of cruelties inflicted upon helpless men, women, and
+children by the Boers, which are to be found on official record in
+the pages of the Blue-book (C. 1776), should be ample justification
+in the eyes of a civilised world for English interference, and
+forcible protection of the sufferers; and it is rather with the
+manner in which the annexation was carried out, and the policy which
+followed it, than with the intervention of English power in itself,
+that an objection can be raised.
+
+The war between the Boers and the Bapedi arose out of similar
+encroachments on the part of the former, which led, as we shall
+presently show, to their border disputes with the Zulus. Boer farmers
+had gradually deprived of their land the native possessors of the
+soil by a simple process peculiarly their own. They first rented
+land from the chiefs for grazing purposes, then built upon it,
+still paying a tax or tribute to the chief; finally, having well
+established themselves, they professed to have purchased the land
+for the sum already paid as rent, announced themselves the owners of
+it, and were shortly themselves levying taxes on the very men whom
+they had dispossessed. In this manner Sikukuni was declared by the
+Boers to have ceded to them the whole of his territory—that is to
+say, hundreds of square miles, for the paltry price of a hundred head
+of cattle.
+
+An officer of the English Government, indeed (His Excellency’s
+Commissioner at Lydenburg, Captain Clarke, R.A.), was of opinion
+[C. 2316, p. 29] that, “had only the Boer element in the Lydenburg
+district been consulted, it is doubtful if there would have been war
+with Sikukuni,” as the Boers, he said, might have continued to pay
+taxes to the native chiefs. And the officer in question appears to
+censure the people who were “willing to submit to such humiliating
+conditions, and ambitious of the position of prime adviser to a
+native chief.” It is difficult to understand why there should be
+anything humiliating in paying rent for land, whether to white or
+black owners, and the position of prime adviser to a powerful native
+chief might be made a very honourable and useful one in the hands of
+a wise and Christian man.
+
+Captain Clarke continues thus: “It was the foreign element under the
+late President which forced matters to a crisis. Since the annexation
+the farmers have, with few exceptions, ceased to pay tribute to the
+Chiefs; their relations with the natives are otherwise unchanged.
+Culture and contact with civilisation will doubtless have the effect
+of re-establishing the self-respect of these people, and teaching
+them the obligation and benefits imposed and conferred on them by
+their new position.” That is to say, apparently, teaching them that
+it is beneath their dignity to pay taxes to native landowners, but
+an “obligation imposed” upon them to rob the latter altogether of
+their land, the future possession of which is one of the “benefits
+conferred on them by their new position” (_i.e._ as subjects of the
+British Crown).
+
+“The Bapedi branch of the Basuto family,” says Captain Clarke, in the
+same despatch, “essentially agricultural and peaceful in its habits
+and tastes, even now irrigate the land, and would, if possible,
+cultivate in excess of their food requirements. The friendly natives
+assure me that their great wish is to live peacefully on their lands,
+and provide themselves with ploughs, waggons, etc. The experience of
+the Berlin missionaries confirms this view. Relieved of their present
+anomalous position, into which they have been forced by the ambition
+of their rulers,[52] and distrust of the Boers, encouraged to follow
+their natural bent, the Basutos would become a peaceful agricultural
+people, capable of a certain civilisation.” How well founded was this
+“distrust of the Boers,” may be gathered from the accounts given in
+the Blue-book already mentioned.
+
+The objects of the Boers in their attacks upon their native
+neighbours appear to have been twofold—the acquisition of territory,
+and that of children to be brought up as slaves.
+
+_The Cape Argus_ of December 12th, 1876, remarks: “Through the whole
+course of this Republic’s existence, it has acted in contravention
+of the Sand River Treaty;[53] and slavery has occurred not only
+here and there in isolated cases, but as an unbroken practice has
+been one of the peculiar institutions of the country, mixed up with
+all its social and political life. It has been at the root of most
+of its wars.... The Boers have not only fallen upon unsuspecting
+kraals simply for the purpose of obtaining the women and children
+and cattle, but they have carried on a traffic through natives, who
+have kidnapped the children of their weaker neighbours, and sold them
+to the white man. Again, the Boers have sold and exchanged their
+victims amongst themselves. Waggon-loads of slaves have been conveyed
+from one end of the country to the other for sale, and that with the
+cognizance and for the direct advantage of the highest officials
+of the land. The writer has himself seen in a town situated in the
+south of the Republic the children who had been brought down from a
+remote northern district.... The circumstances connected with some
+of these kidnapping excursions are appalling, and the barbarities
+practised by cruel masters upon some of these defenceless creatures
+during the course of their servitude are scarcely less horrible than
+those reported from Turkey, although they are spread over a course of
+years instead of being compressed within a few weeks.” This passage
+is taken from a letter to _The Argus_ (enclosed in a despatch from
+Sir Henry Barkly to the Earl of Carnarvon, December 13th, 1876),
+which, with other accompanying letters from the same source, gives an
+account of Boer atrocities too horrible for repetition. [C. 1776].
+A single instance may be mentioned which, however shocking, is less
+appalling than others, but perhaps shows more plainly than anything
+else could do what the natives knew the life of a slave in the
+Transvaal would be. The information is given by a Boer. “In 1864,” he
+says, “the Swazies accompanied the Boers against Males.[54] The Boers
+did nothing but stand by and witness the fearful massacre. The men
+and women were also murdered. One poor woman sat clutching her baby
+of eight days old. The Swazies stabbed her through the body; and when
+she found that she could not live, she wrung her baby’s neck with
+her own hands, to save it from future misery. On the return of that
+commando the children who became too weary to continue the journey
+were killed on the road. The survivors were sold as slaves to the
+farmers.”
+
+Out of this state of things eventually proceeded the war between
+the Boers and Sikukuni, the result of which was a very ambiguous
+one indeed; for although Sikukuni was driven out of the low-lying
+districts of the country, he took refuge in his stronghold, which
+affords such an impregnable position in a thickly-populated range of
+mountains as hitherto to have defied all attempts, whether made by
+Boers or by English, to reduce it.[55]
+
+Another important reason alleged at the time for taking possession of
+the Transvaal was that the border troubles between it and Zululand
+were becoming more serious every day; that, sooner or later, unless
+we interposed our authority, a war would break out between the Boers
+and the Zulus, into which we should inevitably be drawn. The Zulus,
+having continually entreated our protection, while at our desire they
+refrained from defending themselves by force of arms, were naturally
+rejoiced at an action on our part which looked like an answer to
+their oft-repeated prayer, and eagerly expected the reward of their
+long and patient waiting.
+
+But, however strongly we may feel that it was the duty of the more
+powerful nation to put a stop to the doings of the Transvaal Boers,
+even at considerable expense to ourselves, the manner in which we
+have acted, and the consequences which followed, have been such as to
+cause many sensible people to feel that we should have done better
+to withdraw our prohibition from Cetshwayo, and allow him and the
+Boers “to fight it out between them.”[56]
+
+We might have honestly and openly interfered and insisted upon
+putting a stop to the atrocities of the Boers, annexing their country
+if necessary to that end, but then we ourselves should have done
+justice to the natives on whose behalf we professed to interfere,
+instead of taking over with the country and carrying on those very
+quarrels and aggressions which we alleged as a sufficient reason for
+the annexation.
+
+When Sir Theophilus Shepstone went up to Pretoria it was, ostensibly,
+merely to advise the President and Volksraad of the Transvaal
+Republic as to the best means of extricating themselves and the
+country from the difficulties into which they were plunged, and
+with the expressed intention of endeavouring to produce a peaceful
+settlement with Sikukuni, which should protect him and his people
+for the future from the tyranny of the Boers. Up to the last the
+notion that there was any intention of forcibly annexing the country
+was indignantly repudiated by the members of the expedition,
+although their chief meanwhile was in possession of his commission
+as Administrator of the British Government in the Transvaal. There
+were some who suspected that there was more in the movement than
+was confessed to by those concerned. It was argued that, were Sir
+Theophilus Shepstone’s visit of a purely friendly nature, no armed
+force would have been sent to escort him, as he was going, not into
+a savage country, but into one which, at all events, professed to
+have a civilised government and an educated class. The unsettled
+state of feeling amongst the Boers was pleaded in answer to this
+argument, but was commonly met by the suggestion that if, under the
+circumstances, the armed force of mounted police which accompanied
+the important visitor might be looked upon as a justifiable
+precaution, yet the possible danger to strangers from the violence
+of a few lawless men in a country in which the government was not
+strong enough to keep them in check, was not great enough to account
+for the fact that a regiment of British infantry was hastily moved
+up to Newcastle, from whence they could speedily be summoned into
+the Transvaal. The presence of a Zulu army upon the other border,
+where it lay quiet and inoffensive for weeks during Sir Theophilus
+Shepstone’s proceedings in the Transvaal, was naturally looked upon
+as a suspicious circumstance. There can be little doubt that—whether
+or no Cetshwayo obeyed a hint from his old friend the Secretary for
+Native Affairs, and sent his army to support him, and to overawe the
+Boers by a warlike demonstration—the Zulus were present in a spirit,
+however inimical to the Boers, entirely friendly to the English. The
+mere fact that the army lay there so long in harmless repose, and
+dispersed promptly and quietly _immediately_ upon receiving orders to
+do so from Sir Theophilus Shepstone, proves that, at all events, they
+and their king thought that they were carrying out his wishes. The
+feeling expressed at the time by a British officer,[57] in speaking
+of this Zulu army, and recommending that it should be dispersed, that
+“it were better the little band of Englishmen (including, of course,
+himself) should fall by the hand of the Boers than that aught should
+be done by the former to bring about a war of races,” can hardly have
+been shared by Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself, or the message to
+the Zulu king to withdraw his army would have been despatched some
+weeks earlier.
+
+In face of these facts it strikes one as strange that the temporary
+presence of this Zulu army on the Transvaal borders, manifestly in
+our support (whether by request or not), and which retired without
+giving the least offence, or even committing such acts of theft or
+violence as might be expected as necessary evils in the neighbourhood
+of a large European garrison, should have been regarded, later, as a
+sign of Cetshwayo’s inimical feeling towards _the English_.[58]
+
+Mr. Pretorius, member of the Dutch executive council, and other
+influential Transvaalers, assert that Sir T. Shepstone threatened to
+let loose the Zulus upon them, in order to reduce them to submission;
+but the accusation is denied on behalf of the Administrator of the
+Transvaal. And Mr. Fynney (in the report of his mission to Cetshwayo
+from Sir T. Shepstone, upon the annexation of the Transvaal, dated
+July 4, 1877) gives the king’s words to him, as follows: “I am
+pleased that Somtseu (Sir Theophilus Shepstone) has sent you to let
+me know that the land of the Transvaal Boers has now become part of
+the lands of the Queen of England. I began to wonder why he did not
+tell me something of what he was doing. I received one message from
+him, sent by Unkabano, from Newcastle, and I heard the Boers were
+not treating him properly, and that they intended to put him into a
+corner. If they had done so, I should not have wanted for anything
+more. Had one shot been fired, I should have said, ‘What more do I
+wait for? they have touched my father.’”
+
+But all doubt upon the subject of Sir T. Shepstone’s intention
+was quickly and suddenly set at rest—the silken glove of friendly
+counsel and disinterested advice was thrown aside, and the mailed
+hand beneath it seized the reins of government from the slackened
+fingers of the President of the Transvaal. On the 22nd January,
+1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone entered Pretoria, the capital of
+the country, where he was received with all kindness and attention
+by the president, Mr. Burgers, and other important men, to whom he
+spoke of his mission in general terms, as one the object of which
+was “to confer with the Government and people of the Transvaal, with
+the object of initiating a new state of things which would guarantee
+security for the future.”[59]
+
+On April 9th, 1879, Sir T. Shepstone informed President Burgers that
+“the extension over the Transvaal of Her Majesty’s authority and
+rule” was imminent.
+
+The following protest was officially read and handed in to Sir T.
+Shepstone on the 11th April:
+
+  “Whereas I, Thomas François Burgers, State President of the
+  South African Republic, have received a despatch, dated the
+  9th instant, from Her British Majesty’s Special Commissioner,
+  Sir Theophilus Shepstone, informing me that his Excellency has
+  resolved, in the name of Her Majesty’s Government, to bring the
+  South African Republic, by annexation, under the authority of the
+  British Crown:
+
+  “And whereas I have not the power to draw the sword with good
+  success for the defence of the independence of the State against
+  a superior power like that of England, and in consideration of
+  the welfare of the whole of South Africa, moreover, feel totally
+  disinclined to involve its white inhabitants in a disastrous war,
+  without having employed beforehand all means to secure the rights
+  of the people in a peaceable way:
+
+  “So, I, in the name and by the authority of the Government and
+  the people of the South African Republic, do hereby solemnly
+  protest against the intended annexation.
+
+  “Given under my hand and under the Seal of the State at the
+  Government Office at Pretoria, on this the 11th day of April, in
+  the year 1877.
+                              (Signed)     “THOMAS BURGERS,
+                                                  “State President.”
+
+A strong protest was handed in on the same date by the Executive
+Council, in which it was stated “the people, by memorials or
+otherwise, have, by a large majority, plainly stated that they are
+averse to it” (annexation).
+
+On April 17th, 1877, Sir T. Shepstone writes to Lord Carnarvon:
+“On Thursday last, the 12th instant, I found myself in a position
+to issue the proclamations necessary for annexing[60] the South
+African Republic, commonly known as the Transvaal, to Her Majesty’s
+dominions, and for assuming the administration thereof.” P. P. [C.
+1776] pp. 152-56.
+
+His intentions had been so carefully concealed, the proclamation took
+the people so completely by surprise; that it was received in what
+might be called a dead silence, which silence was taken to be of that
+nature which “gives consent.”
+
+It has been amply shown since that the real feeling of the country
+was exceedingly averse to English interference with its liberties,
+and that the congratulatory addresses presented, and demonstrations
+made in favour of what had been done, were but expressions of feeling
+from the foreign element in the Transvaal, and got up by a few
+people personally interested on the side of English authority. But
+at the time they were made to appear as genuine expressions of Boer
+opinions favourable to the annexation, which was looked upon as a
+master-stroke of policy and a singular success.
+
+It was some time before the Transvaalers recovered from the stunning
+effects of the blow by which they had been deprived of their
+liberties, and meanwhile the new Government made rapid advances, and
+vigorous attempts at winning popularity amongst the people. Sir T.
+Shepstone hastened to fill up every office under him with his own
+men, although there were great flourishes of trumpets concerning
+preserving the rights of the people to the greatest extent possible,
+and keeping the original men in office wherever practicable. The
+first stroke by which popularity was aimed at was that of remitting
+the war taxes levied upon the white population (though unpaid)
+to meet the expenses of the war with Sikukuni. It became apparent
+at this point what an empty sham was our proposed protection of
+Sikukuni, and how little the oppression under which he and his people
+suffered had really called forth our interference. Sir T. Shepstone,
+while remitting, as stated, the tax upon the Boers, insisted upon the
+payment in full of the fine in cattle levied by them upon Sikukuni’s
+people. So sternly did he carry out the very oppressions which he
+came to put an end to, that a portion of the cattle paid towards
+the fine (two thousand head, a large number, in the reduced and
+impoverished state of the people) were sent back, by his orders, on
+the grounds that they were too small and in poor condition, with the
+accompanying message that better ones must be sent in their place. A
+commission (composed of Captain Clarke, R.A., and Mr. Osborne) was
+sent, before the annexation, by Sir T. Shepstone, to inquire into a
+treaty pressed by the Boers upon Sikukuni, and rejected by him, as
+it contained a condition by which he was to pay taxes, and thereby
+come under the Transvaal Government.[61] To these gentlemen “Sikukuni
+stated that the English were great and he was little [C. 1776, p.
+147], that he wanted them to save him from the Boers, who hunted him
+to and fro, and shot his people down like wild game. He had lost
+two thousand men” (this included those who submitted to the Boers)
+“by the war, ten brothers, and four sons.... He could not trust
+the Boers as they were always deceiving him.” After saying that “he
+wished to be like Moshesh” (a British subject), and be “happy and at
+peace,” he “asked whether he ought to pay the two thousand head of
+cattle, seeing that the war was not of his making.”
+
+“To this we replied,” say the Commissioners, “that it was the custom
+of us English, when we made an engagement, to fulfil it, cost what it
+might; that our word was our word.”
+
+Small wonder if the oppressed and persecuted people and their chief
+at last resented such treatment, or that some of them should have
+shown that resentment in a manner decided enough to call for military
+proceedings on the part of the new Government of the Transvaal.
+In point of fact, however, it was not Sikukuni, but his sister—a
+chieftainess herself—whose people, by a quarrel with and raid upon
+natives living under our protection, brought on the second or English
+“Sikukuni war.”
+
+Turning to the other chief pretext for the annexation of the
+Transvaal, the disturbed condition of the Zulu border, we find
+precisely the same policy carried out. When it was first announced
+that the English had taken possession of the country of their
+enemies, the Zulus, figuratively speaking, threw up their caps, and
+rejoiced greatly. They thought that now at last, after years of
+patient waiting, and painful repression of angry feelings at the
+desire of the Natal Government, they were to receive their reward in
+a just acknowledgment of the claims which Sir T. Shepstone had so
+long supported, and which he was now in a position to confirm.
+
+But the quiet submission of the Boers would not have lasted, even
+upon the surface, had their new Governor shown the slightest sign
+of leaning to the Zulu side on the bitter boundary question; and as
+Sir T. Shepstone fancied that the power of his word was great enough
+with the Zulus to make them submit, however unwillingly, there was
+small chance of their receiving a rood of land at his hands. He had
+lost sight of, or never comprehended the fact, that that power was
+built upon the strong belief which existed in the minds of the Zulu
+king and people with regard to the justice and honesty of the English
+Government. This feeling is amply illustrated by the messages from
+the Zulu king, quoted in our chapter upon the Disputed Territory, and
+elsewhere in this volume, and need therefore only be alluded to here.
+
+But this belief, so far as Sir T. Shepstone is concerned, was
+destroyed when the Zulus found that, far from acting according to his
+often-repeated words, their quondam friend had turned against them,
+and espoused the cause of their enemies, whom, at his desire, they
+had refrained these many years from attacking, when they could have
+done so without coming into collision with the English.
+
+The Zulus, indeed, still believed in the English, and in the Natal
+Government; but they considered that Sir T. Shepstone, in undertaking
+the government of the Boers, had become a Boer himself, or, as
+Cetshwayo himself said, his old friend and father’s back, which
+had carried him so long, had become too rough for him—if he could
+carry him no longer he would get down, and go to a man his equal
+in Pietermaritzburg (meaning Sir Henry Bulwer, Lieut.-Governor of
+Natal), who would be willing and able to take him up.
+
+It is a curious fact, and one worthy of note, that Sir T. Shepstone,
+who for so many years had held and expressed an opinion favourable
+to the Zulus on this most important boundary question, should yet
+have studied it so little that, when he had been for six months
+Administrator of the Transvaal, with all evidence, written or oral,
+official or otherwise, at his command, he could say, speaking of a
+conversation which he held with some Dutch farmers at Utrecht—Parl.
+p. (2079, p. 51-4): “I then learned for the first time, what
+has since been proved by evidence the most incontrovertible,
+overwhelming, and clear, that this boundary line[62] had been
+formally and mutually agreed upon, and had been formally ratified by
+the giving and receiving of tokens of thanks, and that the beacons
+had been built up in the presence of the President and members of the
+Executive Council of the Republic, in presence of Commissioners from
+both Panda and Cetshwayo, and that the spot on which every beacon was
+to stand was indicated by the Zulu Commissioners themselves placing
+the first stones on it.
+
+“I shall shortly transmit to your Lordship” (the Secretary of State
+for the Colonies) “the further evidence on the subject that has been
+furnished to me.” This “further evidence,” if forwarded, does not
+appear in the Blue-books. It is plain that the Border Commissioners
+of 1878 found both the “evidence the most incontrovertible,
+overwhelming, and clear,” and the “further evidence” promised,
+utterly worthless for the purpose of proving the case of the Boers;
+but, even had it been otherwise, Sir T. Shepstone’s confession
+of ignorance up to so late a date on this most vital question is
+singularly self-condemnatory.
+
+“When I approached the question,”[63] he says, “I did so supposing
+that the rights of the Transvaal to land on the Zulu border had very
+slender foundation. I believed, from the representations which had
+been systematically made by the Zulus to the Natal Government on
+the subject, of which I was fully aware from the position I held in
+Natal, that the beacons along the boundary line had been erected by
+the Republican Government, in opposition to the wishes, and in spite
+of the protests, of the Zulu authorities.[64]
+
+“I, therefore, made no claims or demand whatever for land. I invited
+Cetshwayo to give me his views regarding a boundary, when I informed
+him from Pretoria that I should visit Utrecht on the tour I then
+contemplated making. When I met the Zulu prime minister and the
+indunas on the 18th October last” (six weeks before he discovered,
+in conversation with some Boers, the “evidence incontrovertible,
+overwhelming, and clear”), “on the Blood River, I was fully prepared,
+if it should be insisted on by the Zulus, as I then thought it might
+justly be, to give up a tract of country which had from thirteen
+to sixteen years been occupied by Transvaal farmers, and to whose
+farms title-deeds had been issued by the late Government; and I
+contemplated making compensation to those farmers in some way or
+another for their loss. I intended, however, first to offer to
+purchase at a fair price from the Zulu king all his claims to land
+which had for so many years been occupied and built upon by the
+subjects of the Transvaal, to whom the Government of the country was
+distinctly liable.”[65]
+
+Sir T. Shepstone, when he met the Zulu indunas at the Blood River,
+was prepared to abandon the line of 1861 (claimed by the Boers), for
+that of the Blood River and the Old Hunting Road (“if it should be
+insisted on by the Zulus,” as he “then thought it might justly be”),
+which, in point of fact, would have satisfied neither party; but
+he does not say by what right he proposed to stop short of the old
+line of 1856-7—viz. the Blood River—and insist upon the “Old Hunting
+Road.” If the half-concession were just, so was the whole—or neither.
+
+To these half-measures, however, the Zulus would not submit, and the
+conference failed of its object.
+
+“Fortunately, therefore, for the interests of the Transvaal,”
+says Sir T. Shepstone, “I was prevented by the conduct of the
+Zulus themselves from surrendering to them at that meeting what my
+information on the subject then had led me to think was after all
+due to them, and this I was prepared to do at any sacrifice to the
+Transvaal, seeing, as it then appeared to me, that justice to the
+Zulus demanded it.”
+
+In spite, however, of the concession to the Boers, made in Sir T.
+Shepstone’s altered opinion on the border question, they were by
+no means reconciled to the loss of their independence, although
+Captain Clarke says (C. 2316, p. 28), in speaking of the Boers in
+Lydenburg district, “they, in the majority of cases, would forget
+fancied wrongs if they thought they had security for their lives
+and property, education for their children, and good roads for the
+transport of their produce.”[66]
+
+The following “agreement signed by a large number of farmers at
+the meeting held at Wonderfontein,” and translated from a Dutch
+newspaper, the _Zuid Afrikaan_, published at Capetown on the 15th
+February (C. 2316, p. 1), gives a different impression of the state
+of feeling amongst the Boers:
+
+“In the presence of Almighty God, the Searcher of all hearts, and
+prayerfully waiting on His gracious help and pity, we, burghers of
+the South African Republic, have solemnly agreed, and we do hereby
+agree, to make a holy covenant for us, and for our children, which we
+confirm with a solemn oath.
+
+“Fully forty years ago our fathers fled from the Cape Colony in order
+to become a free and independent people. Those forty years were forty
+years of pain and suffering.
+
+“We established Natal, the Orange Free State, and the South African
+Republic, and three times the English Government has trampled our
+liberty and dragged to the ground our flag, which our fathers had
+baptised with their blood and tears.
+
+“As by a thief in the night has our Republic been stolen from us. We
+may nor can endure this. It is God’s will, and is required of us by
+the unity of our fathers, and by love to our children, that we should
+hand over intact to our children the legacy of the fathers. For that
+purpose it is that we here come together and give each other the
+right hand as men and brethren, solemnly promising to remain faithful
+to our country and our people, and with our eye fixed on God, to
+co-operate until death for the restoration of the freedom of our
+Republic.
+
+“So help us Almighty God.”
+
+These pious words, side by side with the horrible accounts of the
+use made by the Boers of their liberty while they had it, strike one
+as incredibly profane; yet they are hardly more so than part of the
+speech made by Sir T. Shepstone to the burghers of the Transvaal on
+the occasion of the annexation.
+
+“Do you know,” he asks them, “what has recently happened in Turkey?
+Because no civilised government was carried on there, the Great
+Powers interfered and said, ‘Thus far and no farther.’ And if
+this is done to an Empire, will a little Republic be excused when
+it misbehaves? Complain to other powers and seek justice there?
+Yes, thank God! justice is still to be found even for the most
+insignificant, but it is precisely this justice which will convict
+us. If we want justice we must be in a position to ask it with
+unsullied hands.”[67]
+
+Our first quotation was from the words of ignorant Boers, our second
+from those of a man South African born and bred, South African in
+character and education. But perhaps both are surpassed by words
+lately written by an English statesman of rank. Let us turn to a
+“minute” of Sir Bartle Frere’s, forwarded on November 16th, 1878
+(2222, p. 45), and see what he says in defence of Boer conquests and
+encroachments. “The Boers had force of their own, and every right of
+conquest; but they _had also what they seriously believed to be a
+higher title, in the old commands they found in parts of their Bible
+to exterminate the Gentiles, and take their land in possession_.[68]
+We may freely admit that they misinterpreted the text, and were
+utterly mistaken in its application. But _they had at least a sincere
+belief in the Divine authority for what they did, and therefore a far
+higher title than the Zulus could claim for all they acquired_.”[68]
+(P. P. [C. 2222] p. 45).
+
+If the worship of the Boers for their sanguinary deity is to be
+pleaded in their behalf, where shall we pause in finding excuses for
+any action committed by insane humanity in the name of their many
+gods? But the passage hardly needs our comments, and we leave it to
+the consideration of the Christian world.
+
+A paragraph from _The Daily News_ of this day, November 8th, 1879,
+will suitably close our chapter on the Transvaal. It is headed
+“Serious Disturbance in the Transvaal,” and gives a picture of the
+disposition of the Boers, and of the control we have obtained over
+them.
+
+                                            “PRETORIA, October 13th.
+
+  “A somewhat serious disturbance has occurred at Middleberg. A
+  case came in due course before the local court, relating to a
+  matter which took place last July. A Boer, by name Jacobs, had
+  tied up one of his Kaffir servants by his wrists to a beam, so
+  that his feet could not touch the ground. The man was too ill
+  after it to move for some days. The case against the Boer came on
+  on October 8th. A large number of Boers attended _from sympathy
+  with the defendant_,[69] and anxious to _resist any interference
+  between themselves and their Kaffirs_. The Landrost took the
+  opportunity to read out Sir Garnet’s proclamation, declaring the
+  permanency of the annexation of the Transvaal. The attitude of
+  the Boers appeared to be so threatening that after a time the
+  Landrost _thought it better to adjourn the hearing for a couple
+  of hours_.
+
+  “On the court’s reassembling, he was informed that
+  five-and-twenty Boers had visited two of the stores in the town,
+  and had seized gunpowder there, gunpowder being a forbidden
+  article of sale. The following day a much larger attendance of
+  Boers made their appearance at the court. Seventy of them held
+  a meeting, at which they bound themselves to protect those who
+  had seized the gunpowder, and their attitude was so threatening
+  that the Landrost, on the application of the public prosecutor,
+  _adjourned the case sine die_. A fresh case of powder seizing
+  was reported on the same day. Colonel Lanyon has already gone to
+  the scene of disturbance, which will be dealt with purely, _at
+  all events at present_, as a civil case of violence exercised
+  against the owners of the stores. At the same time a troop of
+  dragoons will be there about the day after to-morrow, and a
+  company of infantry in a few days more, while a considerable
+  number of the 90th Regiment will in a short time be, in regular
+  course, passing that way. The spark will therefore no doubt be
+  stamped out quickly where it has been lighted. The only danger is
+  in the tendency to explosion which it perhaps indicates in other
+  directions.”
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+THE DISPUTED TERRITORY.
+
+
+We must now look back and gather up the threads—hitherto interwoven
+with accounts of other matters—connected with what has been rightly
+called the “burning question” of the disputed territory, which led
+eventually to the Zulu War.
+
+The disputes between the Boers and Zulus concerning the boundary line
+of their respective countries had existed for many years, its origin
+and growth being entirely attributable to the well-known and usually
+successful process by which the Dutch Boers, as we have already said,
+have gradually possessed themselves of the land belonging to their
+unlettered neighbours. This process is described by Mr. Osborn,
+formerly resident magistrate of Newcastle, now Colonial Secretary of
+the Transvaal Government, September 22nd, 1876 (1748, p. 196).
+
+“I would point out here that this war (with Sikukuni) arose solely
+out of dispute about land. The Boers—as they have done in other
+cases, and are still doing—encroached by degrees upon native
+territory; commencing by obtaining permission to graze stock upon
+portions of it at certain seasons of the year, followed by individual
+graziers obtaining from native headmen a sort of license to squat
+upon certain defined portions, ostensibly in order to keep other
+Boer squatters away from the same land. These licenses, temporarily
+extended, as friendly or neighbourly acts, by unauthorised, headmen,
+after a few seasons of occupation by the Boer, are construed by him
+as title, and his permanent occupation ensues. Damage for trespass is
+levied by him upon the very men from whom he obtained right to squat,
+to which the natives submit out of fear of the matter reaching the
+ears of the paramount Chief, who would in all probability severely
+punish them for opening the door of encroachment to the Boer. After
+awhile, however, the matter comes to a crisis, in consequence of the
+incessant disputes between the Boers and the natives; one or other
+of the disputants lays the case before the paramount Chief, who,
+upon hearing both parties, is literally frightened with violence
+and threats by the Boer into granting him the land. Upon this,
+the usual plan followed by the Boer is at once to collect a few
+neighbouring Boers, including an Acting Field Cornet, or even an
+Acting Provisional Field Cornet, appointed by the Field Cornet or
+Provisional Cornet, the latter to represent the Government, although
+without instructions authorising him to act in the matter. A few
+cattle are collected among themselves, which the party takes to
+the Chief, and his signature is obtained to a written instrument,
+alienating to the Republican Boers a large slice of, or all, his
+territory. The contents of this document are, so far as I can make
+out, never clearly or intelligibly explained to the Chief, who signs
+it and accepts of the cattle, under the impression that it is all in
+settlement of hire for the grazing licenses granted by his headmen.”
+
+“This, I have no hesitation in saying, is the usual method by which
+the Boers obtain what they call cessions of territories to them by
+native Chiefs. In Sikukuni’s case, they say that his father, Sikwata,
+ceded to them the whole of his territory (hundreds of square miles)
+for one hundred head of cattle.”
+
+Also Sir H. Barkly, late Governor of the Cape, writes as follows,
+October 2nd, 1876 (1748, p. 140):
+
+“The following graphic description of this process (of Boer
+encroachment) is extracted from a letter in the Transvaal _Advocate_
+of a few weeks ago: ‘Frontiers are laid down, the claim to which
+is very doubtful. These frontiers are not occupied, but farms are
+inspected (“guessed at” would be nearer the mark), title-deeds for
+the same are issued, and, when the unlucky purchaser wishes to take
+possession, he finds his farm (if he can find it) occupied by tribes
+of Kafirs, over whom the Government has never attempted to exercise
+any jurisdiction.’ ‘Their Chief,’ it adds, ‘is rather bewildered
+at first to find out that he has for years been a subject of the
+Transvaal.’ ‘The Chief in question is one Lechune, living on the
+north-west of the Republic. But the account is equally applicable
+to the case of Sikukuni, or Umswazi, or half-a-dozen others, the
+entire circuit of the Republic, from the Barolongs and Batlapins on
+the west, to the Zulus on the east, being bordered by a _series of
+encroachments disputed by the natives_.’”
+
+A memorandum from Captain Clarke, R.A., Special Commissioner at
+Lydenburg, dated April 23rd, 1879 (C. 2367, p. 152), also gives
+an account of the way in which the Boers took possession of the
+Transvaal itself, highly illustrative of their usual practice, and
+of which the greater part may be quoted here, with a key to the real
+meaning of phrases which require some study to interpret.
+
+“On the entrance of the Fou Trekkers into the Transvaal, they
+were compelled against their hereditary instincts to combine for
+self-defence against a common foe.” (That is to say, that, having
+forced themselves into a strange country, they necessarily combined
+to oust those they found there.) “External pressure was removed by
+success, and the diffusive instinct asserted itself”—which being
+translated into ordinary English simply signifies that, having
+conquered certain native tribes, they settled themselves upon their
+lands, and returned to their natural disunited condition. “Isolated
+families, whose ambition was to be out of sight of their neighbours’
+smoke, pushed forward into Kafir-land” (as yet unconquered).
+
+“Boundaries were laid down either arbitrarily or by unsatisfactorily
+recorded treaty with savage neighbours. The natives, forced back,
+acquired the powers of coalition lost by the Boers, and in their turn
+brought pressure to bear on their invaders and whilom conquerors;
+farm after farm had to be abandoned, and many of the Boers who
+remained acknowledged by paying tribute that they retained their
+lands by the permission of neighbouring chiefs. The full importance
+of this retrograde movement was not at once felt, as a natural
+safety-valve was found.”
+
+“A considerable portion of the east of the Transvaal is called
+the High Veldt, and consists of tableland at a considerable
+elevation, overlying coal-measures; this district appears bleak and
+inhospitable, overrun by large herds of game and watered by a series
+of apparently stagnant ponds which take the place of watercourses....
+From various sources, within the last six years, it has been
+discovered that the High Veldt is most valuable for the grazing of
+sheep, horses, and cattle; and farms which possess the advantage of
+water are worth from £1,000 to £1,200, where formerly they could have
+been bought for as many pence.”
+
+“This discovery has opened a door of escape for many of the
+_native-pressed borderers_. _The pressure_ on those that remain
+increases, and on the north-east and west of the Transvaal is a
+fringe of farmers who live by the sufferance or in fear of the
+interlacing natives.”
+
+The phrases which I have italicised seem to indicate that the
+writer has lost sight of the fact that, if the border farmers are
+“native-pressed,” it is because they have intruded themselves amongst
+the natives, from which position a just and wise government would
+seek to withdraw them, instead of endeavouring to establish and
+maintain them in it by force. This latter course, however, is the
+one which Captain Clarke recommends. The remainder of his memorandum
+is a series of suggestions for this purpose, one of which runs as
+follows: “To take away the immediate strain on the border farmer, and
+the risk of collision which the present state of affairs involves,
+I would suggest the establishment of Government Agents, who should
+reside _on or beyond the border now occupied by the farmers_.[70] ...
+Each Residency should be a fortress, built of stones and prepared for
+defence against any native force.”
+
+Sir Bartle Frere’s version of Captain Clarke’s account, given to
+the Secretary of State in a despatch enclosing the above, runs as
+follows: “Most of the native chiefs now there have gradually crept
+in, under pressure from the northward, and finding no representatives
+of the Transvaal Government able to exercise authority on the spot,
+have gradually set up some sort of government for themselves, before
+which many of the Boers have retired, leaving only those who were
+willing to pay a sort of tribute for protection, or to avoid being
+robbed of their cattle.”
+
+With whatever oblique vision Sir Bartle Frere may have perused the
+enclosure from which he gathers his facts, no unbiassed mind can
+fail to detect the singular discrepancy between the account given by
+Captain Clarke and that drawn from it by the High Commissioner in his
+enclosing letter.
+
+He makes no mention of the _driving out_ of the natives which
+preceded their _creeping in_, and which figures so largely in Captain
+Clarke’s memorandum, of which he professes to give a sketch. And he
+introduces, entirely on his own account, the accusation against the
+natives implied in the phrase “or to avoid being robbed of their
+cattle,” of which not a single word appears in the memorandum itself.
+
+Properly speaking, there were two disputed boundary lines up to
+1879, the one being that between Zululand and the Transvaal, to
+the south of the Pongolo River; the other that between the Zulus
+and the Swazis, to the north of, and parallel to, that stream.[71]
+The Swazis are the hereditary enemies of the Zulus, and there has
+always been a bitter feeling between the two races, nevertheless the
+acquisitiveness of the Transvaal Boers was at the bottom of both
+disputes. They profess to have obtained, by cession from the Swazi
+king in 1855, a strip of land to the north-east of the Pongolo River
+and down to the Lebomba Mountains, in order that they might form a
+barrier between them and the Zulus; but the Swazis deny having ever
+made such cession.
+
+In addition to the doubt thrown upon the transaction by this denial,
+and the well-known Boer encroachments already described, it remains
+considerably open to question whether the Swazis had the power to
+dispose of the land, which is claimed by the Zulus as their own.
+The commission which sat upon the southern border question was not
+permitted to enter upon that to the north of the Pongolo, which
+therefore remains uncertain. The one fact generally known, however,
+is undoubtedly favourable to the Zulu claim. The territory in
+question was occupied until 1848 by two Zulu chiefs, Putini of the
+Ama-Ngwe, and Langalibalele of the Ama-Hlubi tribe, under the rule
+of the Zulu king Umpande. These chiefs, having fallen into disgrace
+with the king, were attacked by him, and fled into Natal. They were
+ultimately settled in their late locations under the Draakensberg,
+leaving their former places in Zululand, north and south of the
+Pongolo, the inNgcaka (Mountain), and inNgcuba (River) vacant.
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer remarks on this point—(P. P. 2220, pp. 400-2):
+
+“Sir T. Shepstone says indeed, that there is no dispute between the
+Transvaal and the Ama-Swazi; but, as he adds that, should questions
+arise between them, they may be settled on their own merits, it is
+not impossible that questions may arise; and I am certainly informed
+that the Ama-Swazi used formerly to deny that they had ever ceded
+land to the _extent_ claimed by the Republic.” But that the western
+portion, at all events, of the land in dispute was at that time under
+Zulu rule, is apparent from an account given by members of the house
+of Masobuza, principal wife of Langalibalele, and sister to the Swazi
+king, who was sheltered at Bishopstowe after the destruction of the
+Hlubi tribe, and died there in 1877.
+
+“In Chaka’s time, Mate, father of Madhlangampisi, who had lived from
+of old on his land north of the Pongolo, as an _independent_ chief,
+not under Swazi rule, gave, without fighting, his allegiance to
+Chaka; and from that time to this the district in question has been
+under Zulu rule, the Swazi king having never at any time exercised
+any authority over it.” The same statement applies to several other
+tribes living north, and on either side of the Pongolo, amongst them
+those of Langalibalele and Putini.
+
+“Madhlangampisi’s land was transferred by the Boer Government as
+late as January 17th, 1877, to the executors of the late Mr.
+M’Corkindale, and now goes by the name of ‘Londina,’ in which is
+the hamlet of ‘Derby.’... We are perfectly aware that the southern
+portion of the block is held by command of the Zulu chief, and
+the executor’s surveyors have been obstructed in prosecuting the
+survey.”—_Natal Mercury_, July 23rd, 1878.
+
+In 1856 a number of Boers claimed _Natal_ territory _west_ of the
+Buffalo, as far as the Biggarsberg range, now the south-west boundary
+of the Newcastle County, and some of them were in occupation of
+it; and, a commission being sent to trace the northern border of
+the colony along the line of the Buffalo, these latter opposed
+and protested against the mission of the Commissioners; but their
+opposition spent itself in threats, and ended in the withdrawal from
+Natal of the leaders of the party.
+
+Other Boers had settled _east_ of the Buffalo, in the location
+vacated by the tribe of Langalibalele, as to whom the aforesaid
+Commissioners write:
+
+“During our stay among the farmers it was brought to our notice by
+them that they had obtained from Panda the cession of the tract of
+country beyond the Buffalo (inNcome), towards the north-west; they
+had subscribed among themselves one hundred head of cattle for this
+land, which had been accepted by Panda.”
+
+And Sir T. Shepstone says:
+
+“Panda never denied this grant (N.B.—in respect of what lay _west_
+of the Draakensberg), but repudiated the idea that he had sold the
+land. His account was that, when the farmers were defeated by Her
+Majesty’s troops in Natal, some of them asked him for land to live
+upon outside the jurisdiction of the British Government, and that he
+gave them this tract ‘only to live in, as part of Zululand under Zulu
+law’” (P. p. 1961, p. 28). “The cattle they say they paid for it,
+Panda looked upon as a thank-offering, made in accordance with Zulu
+custom” (1961, pp. 1-5).
+
+In reply to messages sent by the Zulu king to the Natal Government,
+complaining of the encroachments of the Boers on the _north_, as
+well as the west of Zululand, and begging the friendly intervention
+and arbitration of the English, the advice of the Natal authorities
+was always to “sit still,” and use no force, for England would see
+justice done in the end.[72]
+
+From all this it would appear that the claim of Cetshwayo to land
+north of the Pongolo was not an “aggressive act,” without any real
+foundation in right, and merely a defiant challenge intended to
+provoke war; but was a just claim, according to the tests applied
+by Sir Bartle Frere—(P. p. 2222, p. 29)—viz. “actual occupation and
+exercise of sovereign rights.”
+
+The subject is fully gone into, and further evidence produced, in the
+Bishop of Natal’s pamphlet, “Extracts from the Blue-Books;” but the
+main facts are as here stated.
+
+On turning to the subject of the better known border dispute, between
+the Zulus and the Transvaal Boers on the east, we are confronted at
+once by the fact that the decision of the Commissioners, chosen by
+Sir H. Bulwer to investigate the matter, was decidedly favourable
+to the Zulu claim; which, after careful consideration of all the
+evidence on either side, they found to be a just and good one. This
+decision should, in itself, have been sufficient to relieve the Zulu
+king from the accusation of making insolent demands for territory
+with aggressive and warlike intentions. But as, up to July, 1878, the
+above charge was the sole one brought against him, and on account
+of which troops were sent for and preparations made for war; and
+as, also, Sir Bartle Frere has thought fit to cast a doubt upon
+the judgment of the Commissioners by the various expressions of
+dissatisfaction which appear in his correspondence with the Bishop of
+Natal; it will be necessary for us to enter fully into the matter, in
+order to understand the extent to which the question bore fruit in
+the Zulu War.
+
+In 1861 Cetshwayo demanded from the Transvaal Government the persons
+of four fugitives, who had escaped at the time of the Civil War of
+1856, and had taken refuge amongst the Boers. One of these fugitives
+was a younger son of Umpande, by name Umtonga, who took refuge
+at first in Natal; from whence, however, he carried on political
+intrigues in Zululand, with the assistance of his mother, which
+resulted in the death of the latter and in a message from Cetshwayo
+to the Natal Government, complaining of Umtonga’s conduct, and
+requesting that he should be placed in his hands. This was refused,
+but the Government undertook to place the young man under the
+supervision of an old and trusted colonial chief, Zatshuke, living
+in the centre of the colony. Umtonga professed to accept and to be
+grateful for this arrangement; but, upon the first step being taken
+to carry it out, he fired twice at the policeman who was sent to
+conduct him to Zatshuke, but missed him, and then escaped to the
+Transvaal territory.
+
+From thence he, with another brother, and two indunas (captains)
+were given up to Cetshwayo by the Boers, who required, in return for
+their surrender, the cession of land _east_ of the Blood River, and
+a pledge that the young princes should not be killed. Cetshwayo is
+said by the Boers to have agreed to both conditions, and he certainly
+acted up to the latter, three of the four being still alive, and the
+fourth having died a natural death.[73] It is this alleged bargain
+with Cetshwayo (in 1861) on which the Boers found their claim to the
+main portion of the disputed territory—a “bargain in itself base and
+immoral; the selling of the persons of men for a grant of land, and
+which no Christian government, like that of England, could recognise
+for a moment as valid and binding,” even if it were ever made. _But
+it is persistently denied by the Zulus_ that such a bargain was ever
+consented to by them or _by their prince_. On this point Cetshwayo
+himself says: “I have never given or sold any land to the Boers of
+the Transvaal. They wished me to do so when I was as yet an umtwana
+(child, prince). They tried to get me to sign a paper, but I threw
+the pen down, and never would do so, telling them that it was out of
+my power to either grant or sell land, as it belonged to the king,
+my father, and the nation. I know the Boers say I signed a paper,
+and that my brothers Hamu and Ziwedu did also. I never did, and if
+they say I held the pen or made a mark, giving or selling land, it is
+a lie!” The Prince Dabulamanzi, and chiefs sitting round, bore out
+the king in this statement. (From Report of Mr. Fynney on July 4th,
+1877—P. p. 1961, p. 45.)
+
+And so says Sir T. Shepstone (1961, p. 5): “Panda, who is still
+living, repudiated the bargain, and Cetshwayo denied it. The
+Emigrant Farmers, however, insisted on its validity, and proceeded
+to occupy. The Zulus have never ceased to threaten and protest. And
+the Government of Natal, to whom these protests and threats have been
+continually made, has frequently, during a course of fifteen years,
+found it very difficult to impress the Zulus with the hope and belief
+that an amicable solution of the difficulty would some day be found,
+provided that they refrained from reprisals or the use of force.”
+
+The first message from the Zulus on the subject of the disputed
+territory was received on September 5th, 1861, in the very year
+in which (according to the Boers) the cession in question was
+made (1961, p. 7). The Bishop of Natal, in his “Extracts” already
+mentioned, records eighteen messages on the same subject, commencing
+with the above and concluding with one brought on April 20th, 1876
+(1748, p. 49), showing that for a period of fifteen years the Zulu
+king (whether represented by Umpande or by Cetshwayo) had never
+ceased to entreat “the friendly intervention and arbitration of this
+Government between them and the Boer Government” (1961, p. 9). These
+eighteen messages acknowledge the virtual supremacy of the English,
+and the confidence which the Zulus feel in English justice and
+honour, and they request their protection, or, failing that, their
+permission to protect themselves by force of arms; they suggest that
+a Commission sent from Natal should settle the boundary, and that a
+Resident or Agent of the British Government should be stationed on
+the border between them and the Boers, to see that justice was done
+on both sides. They report the various aggressions and encroachments
+by which the Zulus were suffering at the hands of their neighbours,
+but to which they submitted because the question was in the hands of
+the Government of Natal; and they repeatedly beg that the English
+will themselves take possession of the disputed country, or some part
+of it, rather than allow the unsettled state of things to continue.
+“They (the Zulus) beg that the Governor will take a strip of country,
+the length and breadth of which is to be agreed upon between the
+Zulus and the Commissioners (for whom they are asking) sent from
+Natal, the strip to abut on the Colony of Natal, and to run to the
+northward and eastward in such a manner, in a line parallel to the
+sea-coast, as to interpose in all its length between the Boers and
+the Zulus, and to be governed by the Colony of Natal, and form a
+portion of it if thought desirable.
+
+“The Zulu people earnestly pray that this arrangement may be carried
+out immediately, because they have been neighbours of Natal for so
+many years, separated only by a stream of water, and no question has
+arisen between them and the Government of Natal; they know that where
+the boundary is fixed by agreement with the English there it will
+remain.
+
+“Panda, Cetshwayo, and all the heads of the Zulu people assembled,
+directed us to urge in the most earnest manner upon the
+Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the prayer we have stated.”
+
+This is the concluding portion of the fourth message, received
+on June 5th, 1869 (1961, p. 9). The fifth, reporting fresh Boer
+aggressions, was received on December 6th, 1869.
+
+In the course of the same year Lieutenant-Governor Keate addressed
+the President of the South African Republic on the subject, and
+suggested arbitration, which suggestion was accepted by the
+President, provided that the expenses should be paid by the losing
+party; and during the following two years repeated messages were
+sent by Mr. Keate reminding the President that being “already in
+possession of what the Zulu authorities put forward as justifying
+their claims,” he only awaits the like information from the other
+side before “visiting the locality and hearing the respective
+parties.”—(P. p. 1961, p. 24).
+
+On August 16th, 1871, the Government Secretary of the South African
+Republic replies that he has “been instructed to forward to the
+Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the necessary documents bearing on the
+Zulu question, together with a statement of the case, and hopes to do
+so by next post; but that, as the session, of the Volksraad had been
+postponed from May to September, it would be extremely difficult to
+settle the matter in 1871,” he therefore proposed January, 1872, as a
+convenient time for the purpose.
+
+Nearly eight weeks later (October 9th) Lieutenant-Governor Keate
+informs the President that the documents promised, upon the Zulu
+border question, have not yet reached him; but sees nothing, at
+present, likely to prevent his “proceeding, in January next, to the
+Zulu border for the purpose of settling the matter at issue.”
+
+But the promised papers appear never to have been sent. The
+arbitration never took place. Lieutenant-Governor Keate was relieved
+from the government of Natal in 1872; and the next stage of the
+question is marked by the issue on May 25th, 1875, of a proclamation
+by Acting-President Joubert, annexing to the dominion of the South
+African Republic the territory, the right to which was to have been
+decided by this arbitration.
+
+In this proclamation no reference is made to the (alleged) Treaty
+of 1861 (see p. 176), by which “what is now and was then disputed
+territory had been ceded to the South African Republic,” though
+it certainly annexes to the Republic all the country included in
+the Treaty, and seems to annex more. But no ground of claim is set
+forth or alluded to upon which the right to annex is founded, “with
+reservation of all further claims and rights of the said Republic,”
+nor any reason assigned for the act, except to “prevent disagreement”
+between the Boers and the Zulus. And Sir T. Shepstone goes on to say
+(1961, p. 5):
+
+“The officers of the South African Republic proceeded to exercise
+in this annexed territory the ordinary functions of government, and
+among these, the levying taxes on natives. The Zulus, who had been
+persistent in repudiating the cession, and who have continued to
+occupy the territory as theirs, resisted the demand by Cetshwayo’s
+directions, and a collision appeared imminent, when the difficulty
+was avoided by the officers withdrawing the order they had issued.”
+
+Nevertheless, in spite of the repeated disappointments with which
+they met, the Zulus continued to send complaints and entreaties
+to the Government of Natal; which messages, although they never
+varied in their respectful and friendly tone towards the English,
+show plainly how deeply they felt the neglect with which they were
+treated. The English “promises” are spoken of again and again, and
+the thirteenth message contains a sentence worth recording, in its
+simple dignity. “Cetshwayo desired us,” say the messengers, “to urge
+upon the Governor of Natal to interfere, to save the destruction of
+perhaps both countries—Zululand and the Transvaal. He requests us to
+state that he cannot and will not submit to be turned out of his own
+houses. It may be that he will be vanquished; but, as he is not the
+aggressor, death will not be so hard to meet” (1748, p. 14).
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer’s answers to these messages contain passages which
+sufficiently prove that up to this time the Government of Natal
+had no complaints to make against the Zulu king. “This is the
+first opportunity the Lieutenant-Governor has had,” he says, “of
+communicating with Cetshwayo since his (Sir H. Bulwer’s) arrival
+in the Colony. He therefore takes the opportunity of sending him a
+friendly greeting, and of expressing the pleasure with which he had
+heard of the satisfactory relations that have existed between this
+Colony and the Zulus,” November 25th, 1875 (1748, p. 15).
+
+“This Government trusts that Cetshwayo will maintain that moderation
+and forbearance which he has hitherto shown, and which the Government
+has great pleasure in bringing to the notice of the councillors of
+the great Queen, and that nothing will be done which will hinder the
+peaceful solution of the Disputed Territory question,” July 25th,
+1876 (1748, p. 97).
+
+Meanwhile repeated acts of violence and brutality on the part of
+the Boers are reported, and in the Blue-books before us the Zulu
+complaints are confirmed from various official sources, by Mr. Fynn,
+Resident Magistrate of the Umsinga Division (1748, p. 10), by Sir
+Henry Bulwer (1748, pp. 8, 11, 12, 25), by Sir T. Shepstone himself
+(1748, pp. 10, 24, 29, 52, 56), by Mr. Osborn (1748, p. 82), and by
+Sir Henry Barkly (1748, p. 25). No attempt at settlement, however,
+had been made in answer to these appeals up to the time of the
+annexation of the Transvaal, in 1877, by Sir T. Shepstone; after
+which so great a change took place in the tone of the latter upon the
+subject of the disputed territory.
+
+Upon this question we may quote again from Mr. Fynney’s report of
+the king’s answer to him upon the announcement of the annexation of
+the Transvaal. “I hear what you have said about past disputes with
+the Boers, and about the settlement of them,” said the king; “the
+land question is one of them, and a great one. I was in hopes, when I
+heard it was you who visited me, that you had brought me some final
+word about the land, as Somtseu had sent from Newcastle by Umgabana
+to say that his son would come with the word respecting the land so
+long in dispute, and I felt sure it had come to-day, for you are his
+son. Now the Transvaal is English ground, I want Somtseu to send
+the Boers away from the lower parts of the Transvaal, that near my
+country. The Boers are a nation of liars; they are a bad people, bad
+altogether; I do not want them near my people; they lie, and claim
+what is not theirs, and ill-use my people. Where is Thomas (Mr.
+Burgers)?”
+
+“I informed him,” says Mr. Fynney, “that Mr. Burgers had left the
+Transvaal.”
+
+“Then let them pack up and follow Thomas,” said he, “let them go. The
+Queen does not want such people as those about her land. What can
+the Queen make of them or do with them? Their evil ways puzzled both
+Thomas and Rudolph (Landdrost of Utrecht); they will not be quiet.
+They have laid claim to my land, and even down to _N’Zabankulu_ (you
+saw the line), burned it with fire, and my people have no rest.”
+
+“Umnyamana (Prime Minister) here remarked,” continues Mr. Fynney, “we
+want to know what is going to be done about this land; it has stood
+over as an open question for so many years. Somtseu took all the
+papers to England with him to show the great men there, and we have
+not heard since.” To which Mr. Fynney, of course, had no reply to
+make.
+
+Within a fortnight of the annexation the Boers on the Zulu border
+presented Sir T. Shepstone with an address, stating that during the
+last ten or twelve years (_i.e._ from 1861, when this encroachment
+was begun by the Boers) they had “suffered greatly in consequence of
+the hostile behaviour of the Zulu nation, but more so for the last
+two years” (_i.e._ from 1875, when the Boer Government proclaimed the
+disputed territory to belong to the Transvaal, and proceeded to levy
+taxes upon its Zulu inhabitants), so that, they said, their lives and
+goods were in danger (1814, p. 14).
+
+Accordingly Sir T. Shepstone writes to Lord Carnarvon as follows:
+“I shall be forced to take some action with regard to the Disputed
+Territory, of which your lordship has heard so much, but I shall be
+careful to avoid any direct issue.”[74]
+
+“It is of the utmost importance,” he continues, “that all questions
+involving disturbance outside of this territory should be, if
+possible, postponed until the Government of the Transvaal is
+consolidated, and the numerous tribes within its boundaries have
+begun to feel and recognise the hand of the new administration.”
+
+These remarks already show the change in sentiment, on Sir T.
+Shepstone’s part, which was more markedly displayed at the Blood
+River meeting between him and the Zulu indunas. The conference
+proved an utter failure, as also did several other attempts on Sir
+T. Shepstone’s part to persuade the Zulus to relinquish to him, on
+behalf of the Transvaal, the claims upon which they had so long
+insisted.
+
+On December 5th, 1877, two indunas came from Cetshwayo to the
+Bishop of Natal with a request that he would put the Zulu claim in
+writing, to be sent to Sir H. Bulwer and the Queen. The same indunas,
+a few days later, with Umfunzi and ’Nkisimane—messengers from
+Cetshwayo—appointed, before a notary public, Dr. Walter Smith and Mr.
+F. E. Colenso to be “diplomatic agents” for Cetshwayo, “who should
+communicate on his behalf in the English language, and, when needful,
+in writing,” and especially to “treat with the British Government on
+the boundary question” (2000, p. 58);[75] which appointment, however,
+Sir H. Bulwer and Sir T. Shepstone refused to recognise; and the
+former, having proposed the Border Commission before receiving notice
+of this appointment—though the Commissioners had not yet started from
+’Maritzburg—did not feel it advisable, as “no such appointment had
+been made by the Zulu king,”[76] to communicate to Messrs. Smith and
+Colenso Lord Carnarvon’s despatch (January 21st, 1878), which said:
+
+“I request that you will inform Mr. Smith and Mr. Colenso that
+the desire of Her Majesty’s Government in this matter is that the
+boundary question shall be fully and fairly discussed, and a just
+arrangement arrived at, and that you will refer them to Sir T.
+Shepstone, to whom has been committed the duty of negotiating on the
+subject.”[77]
+
+Meanwhile, however, Sir T. Shepstone’s “negotiations” had proved
+unsuccessful, and Sir Henry Bulwer writes to Sir Bartle Frere (2000,
+p. 68): “It seems but too clear, from all that has now happened, that
+the prospect of a settlement of the question by direct negotiations
+between the Government of the Transvaal and the Zulu king is at an
+end. The feeling against the Boers on the part of the Zulu king
+and people is too bitter, and they are now scarcely less angry
+against the new Government of the Transvaal than they were against
+the old Government.” He then suggests arbitration as a way by which
+the Zulu king “can escape the alternative of war, by which he can
+obtain justice, and by which, at the same time, he can avoid direct
+negotiations with the Government of a people whom he dislikes and
+distrusts.”
+
+The diplomatic agents were never recognised by the colonial
+authorities, or allowed to exercise their functions; but a visit
+which Mr. Colenso paid to the Zulu king in connection with the
+appointment is worth recording for the sake of the glimpse it gives
+of Cetshwayo’s habits and daily life, as told by a disinterested
+eye-witness.
+
+The king, it appears, whom so many have delighted to represent as
+a corpulent unwieldy savage, to whom movement must be a painful
+exertion, was in the habit of taking a daily constitutional of about
+six miles out and back. Mr. Colenso observed that this was his
+regular habit, and during his stay at the royal kraal he daily saw
+Cetshwayo start, and could trace his course over the hills by the
+great white shield carried before him as the emblem of kingship.
+
+On his return the king regularly underwent a process of ablution at
+the hands of his attendants, who poured vessels of water over him,
+and rubbed the royal person down with a species of soft stone. This
+performance over, Cetshwayo ascended his throne or chair of state,
+upon which he remained, hearing causes, and trying cases amongst his
+people, until the shades of evening fell, before which time he did
+not break his fast.
+
+This description, of the accuracy of which there can be no question,
+gives a picture of a simple, moderate, and useful kingly existence,
+very different from the idea commonly received of a savage monarch,
+wallowing in sloth and coarse luxury, and using the power which he
+holds over his fellow-creatures only for the gratification of every
+evil or selfish human passion. Cetshwayo ruled his people well
+according to his lights: let us hope that, now we have wrested his
+kingdom from him, our government may prove a _more_ beneficent one.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION.
+
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer’s message proposing arbitration was sent to
+Cetshwayo on December 8th, 1877 (2000, p. 67).
+
+In this message he makes it plain to the king that “the Governments
+of Natal and the Transvaal are now brothers, and what touches one
+touches the other.” “Therefore,” he continues, “the Lieut.-Governor
+of Natal sends these words to Cetshwayo that he may know what is in
+his mind, and that Cetshwayo may do nothing that will interrupt the
+peaceful and friendly relations that have existed for so many years
+between the English and the Zulus.” He then proposes that he should
+write to “the Ministers of the great Queen in England, and also to
+the Queen’s High Commissioner who resides at Capetown, in order that
+they may send fit and proper persons, who will come to the country
+with fresh minds, and who will hear all that the Zulus have to say on
+the question, and all that the Transvaal Government has to say, and
+examine and consider all the rights of the question, and then give
+their decision in such manner that all concerned may receive and
+abide by that decision, and the question be finally set at rest.
+
+“Meanwhile,” he says, “no action should be taken to interfere with
+the existing state of things or to disturb the peace. But the
+disputed territory should be considered and treated as _neutral_
+between the two countries for the time being.”
+
+Before this communication reached him, Cetshwayo had already sent
+messengers to the Bishop of Natal, asking advice how to act in his
+present difficulties. And they had carried back “a word,” which would
+reach the king about November 19th, to the effect that he must on
+no account think of fighting the Transvaal Government, and that he
+had better send down some great indunas to propose arbitration to
+Sir Henry Bulwer, in whose hands he might leave himself with perfect
+confidence, that the right and just thing would be done by him. The
+Bishop knew nothing of Sir Henry’s intentions when he sent this
+reply; and, in point of fact, the two had separately come to the same
+conclusion as to what would be the wisest course to follow.
+
+Cetshwayo therefore was prepared to receive Sir Henry’s proposition,
+which he did, not only with respect, but with delight and relief
+(2000, p. 138). His answer to the message contained the following
+passages: “Cetshwayo hears what the Governor of Natal says ... and
+thanks him for these words, for they are all good words that have
+been sent to Cetshwayo by the Governor of Natal; they show that the
+Natal Government still wishes Cetshwayo to drink water and live.”
+He suggests, however, that before sending for people from across the
+sea to settle the boundary, he should be glad if the Governor would
+send his own representatives to hear both sides of the dispute, and
+if they cannot come to a decision, “a letter can be sent beyond the
+sea” for others to come. The message continues: “Cetshwayo thanks the
+Governor for the words which say the ground in dispute should not be
+occupied while the matter is talked over.”
+
+“Cetshwayo says he hears it said that he intends to make war upon
+the Transvaal. He wishes the Natal Government to watch well and see
+when he will do such a thing. For, if he attended to the wish of the
+English Government in Natal when it said he must not make war on the
+Transvaal _Boers_, why should he wish to do so upon those who are now
+of the same Great House as Natal, to whose voice he has listened?”
+
+“Cetshwayo is informed that he is to be attacked by the Transvaal
+people. If so, and if he is not taken by surprise, he will, as soon
+as he hears of the approach of such a force, send men who will report
+it to the Natal Government before he takes any action.”
+
+“Cetshwayo says he cannot trust the Transvaal Boers any longer; they
+have killed his people, they have robbed them of their cattle on the
+slightest grounds. He had hoped Somtseu would have settled all these
+matters. But he has not done so; he wishes to cast Cetshwayo off;
+he is no more a father, but a firebrand. If he is tired of carrying
+Cetshwayo now, as he did while he was with the Natal Government, then
+why does he not put him down, and allow the Natal Government to look
+after him, as it has always done?”
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer expressed his satisfaction at this reply, speaking
+of it as a far more satisfactory one than they had been led to expect
+(2000, p. 138), and he writes of it to Sir T. Shepstone thus: “You
+will see by the king’s reply that he has met my representations in a
+very proper spirit.... I have no reason to think that what the king
+says is said otherwise than in good faith; and, if this be so, there
+seems to me to be no reason why this dispute should not be settled in
+a peaceable manner” (2097, p. 26), and he says to Cetshwayo himself,
+“The Lieutenant-Governor has heard the words of Cetshwayo. He is glad
+that the words which he lately sent to Cetshwayo were welcome. They
+were words sent in a friendly spirit, and Cetshwayo received them in
+a friendly spirit. This is as it should be,” and he agrees to the
+king’s proposal concerning commissioners from Natal, provided that
+the Transvaal Government agree also.
+
+The following is the account given by the Government messengers, who
+carried Sir H. Bulwer’s message to Cetshwayo of the manner in which
+it was received by the king and his indunas (2079, p. 25):
+
+“While we spoke to Cetshwayo, we saw that what we were saying lifted
+a great weight from his heart, that they were words which he was glad
+to hear; and what he said to us as we finished showed us we were
+right in this belief....
+
+“We could see, when we arrived at the great kraal, that the indunas,
+and even the king, were not easy in their hearts, and from all we
+could see and gather, the chief men under the king did not wish for
+war. After the message was delivered, all of them appeared like men
+who had been carrying a very heavy burden, and who had only then been
+told that they could put it down and rest.”
+
+It is best known to himself how, in the face of these words, and with
+nothing to support his statement, Sir Bartle Frere could venture to
+assert in his fourth letter to the Bishop, “The offers to arbitrate
+originated with the Natal Government, and were by no means willingly
+accepted by Cetshwayo;” Cetshwayo having, in point of fact, earnestly
+asked for arbitration again and again, as we have already shown, and
+rejoicing greatly when at last it was offered him. Mr. J. Shepstone’s
+observation also (2144, p. 184), that “To this suggestion Cetshwayo
+replied ‘that he had no objection,’” hardly gives a fair view of the
+state of the case.
+
+But, before this satisfactory agreement had been arrived at, Sir T.
+Shepstone had managed still further to exasperate the feelings of the
+Zulus against the new Government of the Transvaal, while the fact
+that Natal and the Transvaal were one, and that to touch one was to
+touch the other, and to touch England also, had not been brought home
+to the king’s mind until he received Sir H. Bulwer’s message.
+
+Before the receipt of that message, Cetshwayo had every reason to
+believe that the negotiations concerning the disputed territory were
+broken off. Sir T. Shepstone’s tone on the subject had altered; he
+had parted with the king’s indunas at the Blood River in anger,
+and the messenger whom he had promised to send to the king himself
+had never appeared. Meanwhile, the Boers had gone into laager, by
+direction, they say, of Sir T. Shepstone himself, and with the full
+expectation that he was about to make war upon the Zulus. No offer
+of arbitration had yet been made. Cetshwayo had been played with
+and baffled by the English Government for sixteen years, and to all
+appearance nothing whatever was done, or would be done, to settle
+in a friendly manner this troubled question, unless he took steps
+himself to _assert_ his rights, and he seems to have taken the
+mildest possible way of so doing under the circumstances. According
+to the official reports at the time, he sent a large force of armed
+men to build a military kraal near Luneburg, north of the Pongolo,
+in land which was also disputed with the Transvaal Government, but
+formed no part of the (so called) disputed territory to the south
+of that river, or as Lord Carnarvon said to a deputation of South
+African merchants (_Guardian_, January 9th, 1878): “He (the Zulu
+king) had proceeded to construct, in opposition to Sir T. Shepstone’s
+warnings, a fortified kraal in a disputed territory abutting upon
+English soil.”
+
+But this was a very exaggerated way of describing a comparative
+trifling circumstance. The erection of a kraal—not, as so frequently
+asserted, a military one, but merely an ordinary Zulu kraal for the
+residence of a headman, to keep order among the 15,000 Zulus who
+lived in that district—had long been contemplated, and had once,
+during Umpanda’s lifetime, been attempted, though the Boers had
+driven away the Zulu officer sent for the purpose, and destroyed the
+work he had commenced.
+
+Cetshwayo himself explains his reason for sending so large a force
+for the purpose, on the grounds that he wished the kraal to be built
+in one day, and his men not to be obliged to remain over a night,
+while, as Colonel Durnford, R.E., says (2144, p. 237), “the fact that
+the men at work are armed is of no significance, because every Zulu
+is an armed man, and never moves without his weapon.”
+
+Sir T. Shepstone, however, was greatly alarmed when he first heard of
+the building of this kraal, and writes concerning it—November 16th,
+1877 (1961, p. 224): “I feel, therefore (because of the irritating
+effect of it upon the Transvaal), that the building of this kraal
+must be prevented at all hazards.” The “hazards” do not appear to
+have proved very serious, as a simple representation on the part of
+Captain Clarke, R.A., and Mr. Rudolph, sent to the spot by Sir T.
+Shepstone, resulted in the Zulu force retiring, _having made only
+a small cattle kraal and chopped and collected some poles_, which
+they left on the ground, to be used for the building of the huts
+hereafter, but which were very soon carried off and used as firewood
+by the Luneburg farmers.
+
+But this did not satisfy Sir T. Shepstone, who sent messengers to
+Cetshwayo, complaining of what had been done, and of “finding,” as
+he says, “a Zulu force in the rear of where he was staying;”[78]
+and saying that, in consequence, and in order to restore confidence
+amongst those Boers living on the Blood River border, he (Sir
+T. Shepstone) had decided to send a military force down to the
+waggon-drift on the Blood River, to encamp there on our side of the
+river. Cetshwayo replies that he did not send to have the kraal built
+that trouble might arise, but because his people were already living
+on the ground in dispute. He admits that of course the administrator
+could do as he pleased about sending an armed force to encamp on his
+own borders; but he urges him to think better of it, saying that
+the Zulus would be frightened and run away, and, if he in his turn
+should send an armed force to encamp just opposite Sir T. Shepstone’s
+encampment, to put confidence into _his_ people’s hearts, he asks,
+somewhat quaintly, “would it be possible for the two forces to be
+looking at one another for two days without a row?”
+
+Many expressions are scattered through the Blue-books at this period
+concerning “Zulu aggressions;” and Sir T. Shepstone makes frequent,
+though vague and unproven, accusations concerning Cetshwayo’s
+“mischievous humour,” and the terror of the Boer frontier farmers.
+
+But, so far as these remarks allude to the border squabbles
+inseparable from the state of affairs, the score is so heavily
+against the Boers that the counter-charges are hardly worth
+considering. The only acts chargeable upon the king himself are,
+first, the building of this kraal, which really amounted to no more
+than a practical assertion of the Zulu claim to land north of the
+Pongolo; and, secondly, the execution of a (supposed) Zulu criminal
+there, which was an exercise of Cetshwayo’s authority over his own
+people living in the district.
+
+For the acts of violence committed by the robber chief Umbilini, the
+Zulu king could not justly be considered responsible; but of this
+matter, and of the raid committed by the sons of Sihayo, we will
+treat in a later chapter.
+
+Sir T. Shepstone himself allows that Cetshwayo’s frame of mind was a
+better one after the reception of Sir Henry Bulwer’s message offering
+arbitration (2079, pp. 51-54); and says that his (Sir T. Shepstone’s)
+messengers “describe Cetshwayo as being in a very different temper to
+that which he had on former occasions exhibited;” to use their own
+expression, “it was Cetshwayo, but it was Cetshwayo born again.”...
+“They gleaned from the Zulus ... that a message from the Governor of
+Natal had been delivered, and they concluded that the change which
+they had noticed as so marked in the king’s tone must have been
+produced by that message.”
+
+The fact that Cetshwayo joyfully and thankfully accepted Sir Henry
+Bulwer’s promise—not to give him the land he claimed, but to have the
+matter investigated and justice done—is sufficiently established; but
+from the Boers the proposal met with a very different reception.
+
+Sir T. Shepstone acknowledged the receipt of Sir H. Bulwer’s despatch
+of December 11th, “transmitting copy of a message” which he “had
+thought fit to send to the Zulu king,” and then summoned a few
+leading men in the district, and laid the proposition before them.
+He reports that after some pretty speeches about the “Christian,
+humane, and admirable proposal,” which they should have “no excuse
+for hesitating to accept, if Cetshwayo were a civilised king and the
+Zulu Government a civilised government,” etc. etc., they proceeded to
+state their objections. They had, they said, no misgiving regarding
+the justice of the claim of the State; and they believed that the
+more it was investigated, the more impartial the minds of the
+investigators, the clearer and more rightful would that claim prove
+itself to be. Nevertheless, they professed to fear the delay that
+must necessarily be caused by such an investigation[79] (the dispute
+having already lasted fifteen years!) and to doubt Cetshwayo’s
+abiding by any promise he might make to observe a temporary boundary
+line.
+
+To place the two parties to the dispute on equal terms, they said,
+the land in question should be evacuated by both, or occupied by
+both under the control of Sir Henry Bulwer, who, they proposed, as
+an indispensable condition of the proposed arbitration, should take
+possession of the land in dispute or of some part of it. And Sir T.
+Shepstone remarks:
+
+“My view is that the considerations above set forth are both weighty
+and serious.
+
+“I do not anticipate that, under the circumstances, Cetshwayo would
+venture to make or to authorise any overt attack. I do fear, however,
+the consequences of the lawless condition into which the population
+all along the border is rapidly falling. Cetshwayo, I fear, rather
+encourages than attempts to repress this tendency; and, although he
+will not go to war, he may allow that to go on which he knows will
+produce war.”
+
+The condition of the border seems, as we have already shown, to have
+been “lawless” for many years, though the fault lay rather, with the
+Boers—whose many acts of violence are recorded in the Blue-books—than
+with the Zulus, and Sir T. Shepstone has apparently overlooked the
+fact that he himself had just summarily put a stop to an attempt, on
+Cetshwayo’s part to “repress” any lawless “tendency” amongst his own
+people (of which the Administrator complains) by placing a headman,
+or responsible person, amongst them to keep order.
+
+Under the above-mentioned conditions Sir T. Shepstone accepts
+Sir Henry Bulwer’s proposal, and informs him that, under the
+circumstances, he shall not carry out his expressed intention of
+placing a military post in the neighbourhood of the Blood River.
+
+And again he writes—January 17th, 1878 (2079, p. 58):
+
+“It was, however, necessary to point out to Sir H. Bulwer the
+difficulties and dangers, as well as the loss of property, which
+the white people (Boers?) feel that they will be subjected to by the
+acceptance of His Excellency’s proposal, unless he can devise some
+means by which their safety and interests can be protected during the
+pending of the investigation, _which under existing circumstances it
+is Cetshwayo’s interest to prolong indefinitely_.”
+
+The words which I have italicised show that Sir T. Shepstone took for
+granted beforehand that the decision of the Commissioners would be
+unfavourable to the Zulus.
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer, however, did not see his way to falling in with the
+conditions of the Boers, and replies as follows (2079, p. 128):
+
+“I do not see that I am in a position, or that, as the
+Lieutenant-Governor of this colony, I should have the power to take
+actual possession of the country in dispute. And if to take over the
+country, and hold possession of it, is considered by your Government
+an indispensable condition for the acceptance of the mediating
+course I have proposed, I feel that my proposal falls short of the
+requirements of the case.”
+
+On January 29th, Sir T. Shepstone writes to Sir Henry again, saying
+that “It was felt that, in consequence of the step which you have
+thought it right to take in your communication to the Zulu king of
+the 8th December last, the Government of the Transvaal is placed at
+a disadvantage, and that the longer action on your part is delayed,
+the greater that disadvantage grows. It follows, therefore, that any
+action in the direction of your proposition is better than no action
+at all; and I was urged to beg your Excellency to take some step in
+the matter without delay.”
+
+Accordingly Sir Henry at once sends a message to Cetshwayo,
+suggesting the observance of a “neutral belt,” pending the settlement
+of the boundary question (2079, p. 132), and mentioning the two
+lines, from point to point, which he proposed for the purpose.
+
+The same suggestion was made, of course, to Sir T. Shepstone, who
+replies as follows: “You have rightly assumed the concurrence of
+this Government, and I trust that Cetshwayo will see in your message
+the necessity that is laid upon him to prove that he was sincere in
+asking you to undertake the inquiry.”
+
+This ready acquiescence is fully accounted for by the fact, shortly
+apparent, that _both_ the lines mentioned by Sir Henry, between which
+neutrality should be observed, were within what was claimed by the
+Zulus as their own country, and Sir T. Shepstone says: “At present
+the belt of country indicated is occupied solely by Zulus. The whole
+of it has been apportioned in farms to Transvaal subjects, but has
+not been occupied by them.”
+
+Small wonder that the Zulu king, in reply to this proposal,
+“informs the Governor of Natal that the two roads mentioned in His
+Excellency’s message are both in Zululand, and therefore the king
+cannot see how the ground between the roads can belong to both
+parties.”
+
+Nevertheless Sir Henry Bulwer hardly seems to fall in with Sir T.
+Shepstone’s suggestion, that Cetshwayo’s consent on this point should
+be looked upon as a test of his sincerity: “Either,” he says (2100,
+p. 73), “he has misunderstood the real nature of the proposal, or he
+is disinclined to accept anything which may in his opinion be taken
+to signify a withdrawal of one iota of his claim.” And, in point of
+fact, though no “neutral ground” was marked off, the Commission went
+on just as well without it; all the apprehensions of disturbance and
+disorder having been falsified by the event.
+
+Sir T. Shepstone repeatedly speaks of the border Boers having been
+forced by Zulu acts and threats of aggression to abandon their farms
+and go into laager, etc. etc.; but, on investigation, it is apparent
+that this abandonment of farms, and trekking into laager, took place
+in consequence of an intimation from the Landrost of Utrecht, under
+instructions from Sir T. Shepstone himself; as appears from the
+following passages of an address from seventy-nine Boers, protesting
+against arbitration as “an absurdity and an impossibility,” which was
+presented to Sir T. Shepstone on February 2nd, 1878 (2079, p. 140):
+
+“The undersigned burghers, etc. ... take the liberty to bring to your
+Excellency’s notice that they, in consequence of intimation from the
+Landrost of Utrecht, dated 14th December last, on your Excellency’s
+instructions, partly trekked into laager, and partly deserted their
+farms, in the firm expectation that now a beginning of a war would
+soon be made.... That they have heard with anxiety and understand
+that arbitration is spoken of, which would have to determine our
+property and possessions; which we fear will decide in favour of
+a crowned robber, murderer, and breaker of his word, who knows as
+well as we that he is claiming a thing which does not belong to
+him ... for which reason we are sure that such arbitration is an
+absurdity and an impossibility. We therefore hereby protest against
+all proposed or to be undertaken arbitration; and we will, with all
+legal means at our disposal, etc., resist a decision, etc., over our
+property which we know would be unlawful and unjust.”
+
+They give as a reason for presenting the address from which these
+phrases are taken, “_because it is impossible for us to remain any
+longer in laager without any object_,” which hardly looks as though
+they thought themselves in daily danger from the Zulus, unless the
+“beginning of a war” should “soon be made” by Sir T. Shepstone.
+They request His Excellency “to commence without any further delay
+defending” their “rights and property and lives;” and should His
+Excellency “not be inclined or be without power” to do so, they
+further signify their intention of requesting him to assist them
+with ammunition, and not to hinder them seeking assistance, of
+fellow-countrymen and friends, to maintain their “rights,” and to
+check their “rapacious enemies and to punish them.”
+
+And they conclude: “We, the undersigned, bind ourselves on peril
+of our honour to assist in subduing the Zulu nation, and making it
+harmless.”
+
+Sir T. Shepstone encloses this in a sympathising despatch, but Sir
+Henry Bulwer remarks upon it and upon a subsequent memorial[80] of
+the same description—February 23rd (2100, p. 67):
+
+“Of course, if the object of the memorialists is war, if what they
+desire is a war with the Zulu nation, it is not to be wondered at
+that they should find fault with any steps that have been taken to
+prevent the necessity for war. Nor, if they desire war, is it to be
+expected that they should be favourable to arbitration, though I find
+it difficult to reconcile the expression of the apprehensions of the
+memorialists that arbitration would decide against them, with the
+unanimous expression of opinion, previously given to your Excellency
+by some of the leading men of the district, that the proposal made
+by me was a Christian, humane, and admirable one; that they had no
+misgivings regarding the justice of the claim of the State, and
+that they believed the more it was investigated ... the clearer and
+more rightful would that claim prove itself to be. Your Excellency
+observes that the deep feeling of distrust shown by the memorialists
+is scarcely to be wondered at, when it is remembered that they are
+compelled to occupy with their families fortified camps, while their
+farms in the neighbourhood are being occupied by Zulus, their crops
+reaped, and their cultivated lands tilled by Zulus, and the timber of
+their houses used as Zulu firewood.
+
+“I do not quite understand what farms and cultivated lands are
+referred to; because in a previous despatch—your despatch, No. 7, of
+February 5th—your Excellency, in referring to the disputed territory,
+states, so I understand, that it ‘_is at present occupied solely by
+Zulus_,’ and that, although the whole of it has been apportioned in
+farms to Transvaal subjects, _it has not been occupied by them_.’”
+
+The matter was referred to the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere,
+and the appointment of a commission was approved by him. He plainly
+took it for granted that, as Sir T. Shepstone had said, the Transvaal
+claim was based on “evidence the most incontrovertible, overwhelming,
+and clear,” and looked to the commission for the double advantage of
+enabling Sir T. Shepstone “to clear up or put on record, in a form
+calculated to satisfy Her Majesty’s Government, an answer to all
+doubts as to the facts and equity of the question,” and of gaining
+time for preparing a military force to silence and subjugate the
+Zulus should they object (as he expected) to such an award. That
+nothing short of military coercion of the Zulus would settle the
+matter, was evidently Sir Bartle Frere’s fixed idea; in fact that was
+the foregone conclusion with him from beginning to end.
+
+On February 12th, Sir Henry Bulwer sent a message to Cetshwayo (2079,
+p. 140), to this effect:
+
+“The Lieut.-Governor now sends to let Cetshwayo know that he has
+selected, for the purpose of holding this inquiry, the Queen’s
+Attorney-General in Natal (Hon. M. H. Gallway, Esq.), the Secretary
+for Native Affairs (Hon. J. W. Shepstone, Esq.), and Colonel
+Durnford, an officer in the Queen’s army.
+
+“These gentlemen will proceed by-and-by to the place known as Rorke’s
+Drift, which is on the Buffalo River, and in Natal territory, and
+they will there open the inquiry on Thursday, March 7th.
+
+“The Lieut.-Governor proposes, as the most convenient course to be
+taken, that the Zulu king should appoint two or three indunas to
+represent the Zulu king and the Zulu case at the inquiry, and that
+these should be at Rorke’s Drift on March 7th, and meet the Natal
+Commissioners there. The same thing also the Governor proposes shall
+be done by the Transvaal Government.” And the king’s reply to the
+messengers was expressive: “I am very glad to hear what you say—I
+shall now be able to sleep.”
+
+On March 7th the Commission met at Rorke’s Drift, and sat for
+about five weeks, taking evidence day by day in presence of the
+representatives deputed, three by the Transvaal Government, and three
+by the Zulus.
+
+Of the three gentlemen who formed the Commission, one was Sir T.
+Shepstone’s brother, already mentioned in this history, whose natural
+bias would therefore certainly not be upon the Zulu side of the
+question; another was a Government official and an acute lawyer; and
+the third, Colonel Durnford, to the writer’s personal knowledge,
+entered upon the subject with an entirely unbiassed mind, and with
+but one intention or desire, that of discovering the actual truth,
+whatever it might be. The only thing by which his expectations—rather
+than his opinions—were in the least influenced beforehand, was the
+natural supposition, shared by all, that Sir T. Shepstone, who had
+the reputation of being in his public capacity one of the most
+cautious of men, must have some strong grounds for his very positive
+statement of the Transvaal claim.
+
+There was, plainly, some slight confusion in the minds of the
+three Transvaal delegates, as to their position relative to the
+Commissioners, with whom they apparently expected to be on equal
+terms, and in a different position altogether from the Zulu
+delegates on the other side. This, however, was a manifest mistake.
+It was particularly desirable that the Zulus should be made to feel
+that it was no case of white against black; but a matter in which
+impartial judges treated either side with equal fairness, and without
+respect of persons. One of the Commissioners was the brother of their
+chief opponent, one of the Transvaal delegates his son; it would
+naturally have seemed to the Zulus that the six white men (five out
+of whom were either Englishmen, or claimed to be such) were combining
+together to outwit them, had they seen them, evidently on terms
+of friendship, seated together at the inquiry or talking amongst
+themselves in their own language.
+
+The Commissioners, however, were careful to avoid this mistake.
+Finding, on their arrival at Rorke’s Drift, that the spot intended
+for their encampment was already occupied by the Transvaal delegates,
+who had arrived before them, they caused their own tents to be
+pitched at some little distance, in order to keep the two apart.
+The same system was carried out during the sitting of the Court, at
+which the Commissioners occupied a central position at a table by
+themselves, the Transvaal delegates being placed at a smaller table
+on one hand, mats being spread for the Zulu delegates, in a like
+position, on the other.[81]
+
+Care was also necessary to prevent any possible altercations arising
+between the Boer and Zulu attendants of either party of delegates,
+who, in fact, formed the one real element of danger in the affair.
+On one occasion, during the sitting of the Commission, Colonel
+Durnford observed a Boer poking at a Zulu with his stick, in a
+manner calculated to bring to the surface some of the feelings of
+intense irritation common to both sides, and only kept under control
+by the presence of the Commissioners. The Colonel at once put a
+stop to this, and placing a sentry between the two parties, with
+orders to insist on either keeping to its own side of the ground, no
+further disturbance took place. Popular rumour, of course, greatly
+exaggerated the danger of the situation, catching as usual at the
+opportunity for fresh accusations against the Zulu king, who, it was
+once reported from Durban, had sent an impi to Rorke’s Drift, and had
+massacred the Commissioners and all upon the spot. Fortunately the
+same day that brought this report to Pietermaritzburg, brought also
+letters direct from the Commissioners themselves, of a later date
+than the supposed massacre, and in which the Zulus were spoken of as
+“perfectly quiet.”
+
+That the impartial conduct of the Commissioners had the desired
+effect is manifest from Cetshwayo’s words, spoken after the
+conclusion of the inquiry, but before its result had been made known
+to him. His messengers, after thanking Sir Henry Bulwer in the name
+of their king and people for appointing the commission, said that
+“Cetshwayo and the Zulu people are perfectly satisfied with the way
+in which the inquiry was conducted throughout, the way in which
+everything went on from day to day in proper order, and without the
+least misunderstanding; but that each party understood the subject
+that was being talked about.
+
+“Cetshwayo says,” they continued, “he now sees that he is a child
+of this Government, that the desire of this Government is to do him
+justice....
+
+“Cetshwayo and the Zulu people are awaiting with beating hearts what
+the Lieut.-Governor will decide about the land that the Boers have
+given the Zulus so much trouble about; for the Zulus wish very much
+now to reoccupy the land they never parted with, as it is now the
+proper season (of the year) for doing so.”
+
+Such was Cetshwayo’s frame of mind (even before he knew that
+the decision was in his favour) at a time when he was popularly
+represented as being in an aggressive, turbulent condition, preparing
+to try his strength against us, and only waiting his opportunity to
+let loose upon Natal the “war-cloud” which he was supposed to keep
+“hovering on our borders.”
+
+The boundary question resolved itself into this:
+
+1. To whom did the land in dispute belong in the first instance?
+
+2. Was it ever ceded or sold by the original possessors?
+
+1. In answer to the first question, the Commissioners took the treaty
+made in 1843, between the English and the Zulus, as a standpoint
+fixing a period when the territory in dispute belonged entirely to
+one or other. There was then no question but that the Zulu country
+extended over the whole of it.
+
+2. The Zulus deny ever having relinquished any part of their country
+to the Boers, who on the other hand assert that formal cessions had
+been made to them of considerable districts. With the latter rested
+the obligation of proving their assertions, which were simply denied
+by the Zulus, who accordingly, as they said themselves, “had no
+witnesses to call,” having received no authority from the king to do
+more than point out the boundary claimed[82] (2242, p. 80).
+
+The Boer delegates brought various documents, from which they
+professed to prove the truth of their assertions, but which were
+decided by the Commissioners to be wholly worthless, from the glaring
+discrepancies and palpable falsehoods which they contained. One of
+these documents, dated March 16th, 1861, “purporting to give an
+account of a meeting between Sir T. Shepstone, Panda, and Cetshwayo,”
+they decided to be plainly a fabrication, as Sir T. Shepstone did
+not arrive at Nodwengu,[83] from Natal, to meet Panda and Cetshwayo,
+until May 9th, 1861.
+
+Other records of cessions of land professed to be signed by the king,
+but were witnessed by neither Boer nor Zulu, or else by Boers alone.
+A definition of boundaries was in one case ratified by one Zulu only,
+a man of no rank or importance; and in other documents alterations
+were made, and dates inserted, clearly at another time.
+
+Meanwhile it was apparent, from authentic Boer official papers,
+that the Zulus were threatened by the Boer Government that, if they
+dared to complain again to the British Government, the South African
+Republic “would deal severely with them, and that they would also
+endanger their lives;” while such expressions used by the Volksraad
+of the South African Republic as the following, when they resolve “to
+direct the Government to continue in the course it had adopted with
+reference to the policy on the eastern frontier, with such caution
+as the Volksraad expects from the Government with confidence; and
+in this matter to give it the right to take such steps as will more
+fully benefit the interests of the population than _the strict words
+of the law of the country lay down_” (2220, p. 337), convicts them of
+dishonesty out of their own mouths.
+
+Finally the Commissioners report that in their judgment, east of the
+Buffalo, “there has been no cession of land at all by the Zulu kings,
+past or present, or by the nation.”
+
+They consider, however, that—as the Utrecht district has long been
+inhabited by Boers, who have laid out the site for a town, and built
+upon it, and as the Zulu nation had virtually acquiesced in the
+Boer authority over it by treating with them for the rendition of
+fugitives who had taken refuge there—the Transvaal should be allowed
+to retain that portion of the land in dispute, compensation being
+given to the Zulus inhabiting that district if they surrendered the
+lands occupied by them and returned to Zululand, or permission being
+given them to become British subjects and to continue to occupy the
+land.
+
+Sir Bartle Frere’s version of this is as follows:
+
+“The Commissioners propose to divide the area in dispute between the
+Blood River and the Pongolo, giving to neither party the whole of its
+claim.” He then quotes the recommendation of the Commissioners, that
+compensation should be given to Zulus leaving the Utrecht district,
+and wants to know what is to be done for the farmers who “in good
+faith, and relying on the right and power of the Transvaal Government
+to protect them, had settled for many years past on the tract which
+the Commission proposes to assign to the Zulus.” He wishes to know
+how they are to be placed on an equality with the Zulus from the
+Utrecht district. To this Sir Henry Bulwer ably replies by pointing
+out that compensation to the said farmers lies with their own
+Government, by whose sanction or permission they had occupied land
+over which that Government had no power by right. In fact, far from
+“dividing the area in dispute,” and giving half to either party on
+equal terms, the reservation of the Utrecht district was rather
+an unavoidable concession to the Boers who had long had actual
+possession of it—which, with due compensation, the Zulus would have
+been ready enough to make, while receiving back so much of their own
+land—than an acknowledgment that they could make good their original
+claim to it. The Commissioners indeed say distinctly “_there has been
+no cession of land at all by the Zulu king, past or present, or by
+the nation_.”
+
+But indeed, after the decision in favour of the Zulus was given, Sir
+Bartle Frere entirely changed the complacent tone in which he had
+spoken of the Commission beforehand. To all appearance his careful
+schemes for subjugating the Zulu nation were thrown away—the war and
+the South African Empire were on the point of eluding his grasp. He
+had sent to England for reinforcements—in direct opposition to the
+home policy, which for some years had been gradually teaching the
+colonies to depend upon themselves for protection, and therefore
+to refrain from rushing headlong into needless and dangerous wars,
+which might be avoided by a little exercise of tact and forbearance.
+He and his friend General Thesiger had laid out their campaign and
+had sent men-of-war to investigate the landing capabilities of the
+Zulu coast, and he had recommended Sir Henry Bulwer to inform the
+Zulu king—when the latter expressed his disquietude on the subject
+of these men-of-war—that the ships he saw were “for the most part
+English merchant vessels, but that the war-vessels of the English
+Government are quite sufficient to protect his (Cetshwayo’s) coast
+from any descent by any other power” (October 6th, 1878, 2220, p.
+307).
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer was too honest to carry out this recommendation,
+even had he not had the sense to know that Cetshwayo was accustomed
+to the passing of merchantmen, and was not to be thus taken in
+(supposing him to be likely to fear attacks from “foreign foes”).
+But the fact remains that, an English official of Sir Bartle Frere’s
+rank has put on record, in an official despatch under his own hand, a
+deliberate proposal that the Zulu king should be tranquillised, and
+his well-founded suspicions allayed by—a “figure of speech,” shall we
+say?
+
+Every possible objection was made by Sir Bartle Frere to the
+decision of the Commissioners, and it was with the utmost difficulty
+that he was at last persuaded to ratify it, after a considerable
+period employed in preparing for a campaign, the idea of which he
+appears never for a minute to have relinquished. Sir T. Shepstone
+protested against the decision, which, however, Sir Henry Bulwer
+upheld; while Sir Bartle Frere finally decides that “Sir H. Bulwer
+and I, approaching the question by somewhat different roads, agree
+in the conclusion that we must accept the Commissioners’ verdict.”
+Their report was made on June 20th, 1878, but it was not until
+November 16th that Sir H. Bulwer sent to Cetshwayo to say that “the
+Lieut.-Governor is now in a position to inform Cetshwayo that His
+Excellency the High Commissioner has pronounced his award, etc.,” and
+to fix twenty days from the date of the departure of the messengers
+carrying this message from Pietermaritzburg, as a convenient time for
+a meeting on the borders of the two countries at the Lower Tugela
+Drift, at which the decision should be delivered to the king’s
+indunas by officers of the Government appointed for the purpose.
+
+But before this conclusion was arrived at another attempt had been
+made to bring accusations against Cetshwayo, who said himself at the
+time (June 27th, 1878): “The name of Cetshwayo is always used amongst
+the Boers as being the first to wish to quarrel.” Alarming accounts
+reached the Natal Government of a fresh military kraal having been
+built by the king, and notices to quit being served by him upon Boers
+within the disputed territory, in spite of his engagement to await
+the decision of the Commissioners. The farmers complained of being
+obliged to fly, “leaving homes, homesteads, and improvements to be
+destroyed by a savage, unbridled, revengeful nation.”[84] Sir T.
+Shepstone re-echoed their complaint (2220, p. 27), and Sir Bartle
+Frere comments severely upon the alleged Zulu aggressions.
+
+The matter, however, when sifted, sinks into insignificance. Some
+squabbles had taken place between individual Boers and Zulus, such as
+were only natural in the unsettled state of things; and Cetshwayo’s
+explanation of the so-called “notices to quit” placed them in a very
+different light.
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer writes to Sir Bartle Frere as follows on this point
+(July 16th): “The Zulu king says that all the message he sent was a
+request that the Boers should be warned not to return to the disputed
+country, as he was informed they were doing since the meeting of the
+Commission. We know that some of the Boers did return to the disputed
+territory after the Commission broke up;[85] and this, no doubt, was
+looked upon by the Zulus as an attempt on the part of the Boers to
+anticipate the result of the inquiry, and led to the giving those
+notices.... The fault has been, no doubt, on both sides.”
+
+The military kraal, also, turned out to be no more of the nature
+ascribed to it than was its predecessor: “An ordinary private Zulu
+kraal”—see report of Mr. Kudolph (2144, p. 186)—“built simply to
+have a kraal in that locality, where many of Cetshwayo’s people are
+residing without a head or kraal representing the king ... the king
+having given instructions that neither the white nor the native
+subjects of the Transvaal were in any way to be molested or disturbed
+by the Zulus;” and having sent a small force to do the work, because
+the large one he had sent on a previous occasion had frightened the
+white people.
+
+Colonel Pearson, commanding the troops in Natal and the Transvaal,
+writes, June 8th, 1878 (2144, p. 236):
+
+“The Landrost of Utrecht I know to be somewhat of an alarmist, and
+the border farmers have all along been in a great fright, and much
+given to false reports. I allude more particularly to the Boers. I
+enclose Lieut.-Colonel Durnford’s views of the kraal question. He
+is an officer who knows South Africa intimately, and his opinion I
+consider always sound and intelligent.”
+
+And the following is the statement of Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E.,
+June 8th, 1878 (2144, p. 237):
+
+“I know the district referred to, in which are many Zulu kraals,
+and believe that, if such a military kraal is in course of erection
+on the farm of one Kohrs, believed to be a field-cornet in the
+Wakkerstroom district, residing about fifteen miles from the mission
+station of the Rev. Mr. Meyer, it is being constructed that order may
+be kept amongst the Zulus here residing—who owe allegiance to the
+Zulu king alone—and in the interests of peace.... I further believe
+that, if the German or other residents at or near Luneburg have been
+ordered to leave, it is not by orders of the King of Zululand, who is
+far too wise a man to make a false move at present, when the boundary
+between himself and the Transvaal is under consideration.”
+
+The excitement concerning the “notices to quit,” and the second
+“military kraal,” appears to have been as unnecessary as any other
+imaginary Zulu scare; and there are no proofs to be extracted
+from the official papers at this period of the slightest signs of
+aggressive temper on the part of the Zulu king.
+
+On the contrary; if we turn to the “Message from Cetywayo, King of
+the Zulus, to His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of Natal,” dated
+November 10th, 1878, we find the concluding paragraph runs: “Cetywayo
+hereby swears, in presence of Oham, Mnyamana, Tshingwayo, and all his
+other chiefs, that he has no intention or wish to quarrel with the
+English.”—(P. P. [C. 2308] p. 16).
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+SIHAYO, UMBILINI, AND THE MISSIONARIES IN ZULULAND.
+
+
+Much has been said of late years concerning the duty imposed by our
+superior civilisation upon us English, in our dealings with the South
+African races, of checking amongst the latter such cruel and savage
+practices as are abhorrent to Christian ideas and practices. We will
+proceed to show how this duty has been performed by the Government of
+Natal.
+
+One of the commonest accusations brought against the Zulus, and
+perhaps the most effectual in rousing English indignation and
+disgust, is that of buying and selling women as wives, and the cruel
+treatment of young girls who refuse to be thus purchased.
+
+Without entering into the subject upon its merits, or inquiring
+how many French and English girls yearly are, to all intents and
+purposes, sold in marriage, and what amount of moral pressure is
+brought to bear upon the reluctant or rebellious amongst them; or
+whether they suffer more or less under the infliction than their wild
+sisters in Zululand do under physical correction;—we may observe that
+the terrors of the Zulu system have been very much exaggerated. That
+cruel and tyrannical things have occasionally been done under it no
+one will deny, still less that every effort should have been made
+by us to introduce a better one. Amongst the Zulus, both in their
+own country and in Natal, marriages are commonly arranged by the
+parents, and the young people are expected to submit, as they would
+be in civilised France. But the instance which came most directly
+under the present writer’s own observation, is one rather tending to
+prove that the custom is one which, although occasionally bearing
+hardly upon individuals, has been too long the practice of the
+people, and to which they have always been brought up, to be looked
+upon by them as a crying evil, calling for armed intervention on the
+part of England. In the early days of missionary work at Bishopstowe
+(between 1860-70), five girls took refuge at the station within a few
+days of each other, in order to avoid marriages arranged for them by
+their parents, and objected to by them. They dreaded pretty forcible
+coercion, although of course, in Natal, they could not actually
+be put to death. They were, of course, received and protected at
+Bishopstowe, clothed, and put to school, and there they might have
+remained in safety for any length of time, or until they could return
+home on their own terms. But the restraint of the civilised habits
+imposed on them, however gently, and the obligation of learning
+to read, sew, and sweep, etc., was too much for these wild young
+damsels, accustomed at home to a free and idle life.[86] Within a
+few weeks they all elected to return home and marry the very men on
+whose account they had fled; and the conclusion finally arrived at
+concerning them was, that their escapade was rather for the sake of
+attaching a little additional importance to the surrender of their
+freedom, than from any real objection to the marriages proposed for
+them.
+
+Now let us see what means had been taken by the English to institute
+a better state of things and greater liberty for the women. In Natal
+itself, of course, any serious act of violence committed to induce
+a girl to marry would be punished by law, and girls in fear of such
+violence could usually appeal for protection to the magistrates or
+missionaries. Let us suppose that a girl, making such an appeal,
+receives protection, and is married to the man of her own choice by
+English law and with Christian rites. What is the consequence to her?
+She has no rights as a wife, in fact she is not lawfully a wife at
+all, nor have her children any legal claims upon their father; the
+law of the colony protects the rights of native women married by
+native custom, which it virtually encourages by giving no protection
+at all to those who contract marriages by the English, or civilised
+system.[87]
+
+So much for our dealings with the Zulus of Natal; and even less can
+be said for us concerning those over the border.
+
+Until quite lately the practice existed in the colony of
+surrendering to Zulu demands refugee _women_, as well as cattle, as
+“property,” under an order from the Natal Government, which was in
+force at the time of Sir H. Bulwer’s arrival, but was at some time
+after rescinded.[88]
+
+It was well known that, by the laws of Zululand, the offence of a
+woman’s escaping from her husband with another man was punishable by
+death, therefore unhappy creatures thus situated were delivered up
+by the Natal Government to certain death, and this practice had been
+continued through a course of many years.
+
+The law being altered in this respect, and cattle only returned, Sir
+H. Bulwer writes, on February 3rd, 1877: “Some few weeks ago I had
+occasion to send a message to Cetywayo on account of the forcible
+removal from Natal territory of a Zulu girl, who had lately taken
+refuge in it from the Zulu country. A party of Zulus had crossed
+the Tugela River in pursuit, and taken the girl by force back to
+Zululand. I therefore sent to inform Cetywayo of this lawless act on
+the part of some of his subjects” (1776, pp. 86, 87); and Cetshwayo
+replies with thanks, saying that he knew nothing previously of what
+had happened, and that “should anything of the same kind take place
+to-morrow he (the Governor of Natal) must still open my ears with
+what is done by my people.”
+
+This is apparently all. There is no attempt to make a serious
+national matter of it; no demand for the surrender of the offenders,
+nor for the payment of a fine. Nor is there even a warning that any
+future occurrence of the same description will be viewed in a more
+severe light. Sir Henry “informs” Cetshwayo of what has taken place,
+and Cetshwayo politely acknowledges the information, and that the
+action taken by his people deserves censure. “I do not send and take
+by force,” he says; “why should my people do so? It is not right.”
+
+Eighteen months later, on July 28th, 1878, a similar case was
+reported. A wife of the chief Sihayo had left him and escaped into
+Natal. She was followed by a party of Zulus, under Mehlokazulu, the
+chief son of Sihayo, and his brother, seized at the kraal where she
+had taken refuge, and carried back to Zululand, where she was put to
+death, in accordance with Zulu law.
+
+The Zulus who seized her did no harm to Natal people or property;
+in fact their only fault towards England was that of following and
+seizing her on Natal soil, an act which for many years, and until
+quite lately, they would have been permitted to do, and assisted in
+doing, by the border Government officials. A week later the same
+young men, with two other brothers and an uncle, captured in like
+manner another refugee wife of Sihayo, in the company of the young
+man with whom she had fled. This woman was also carried back, and is
+supposed to have been put to death likewise; the young man with her,
+although guilty in Zulu eyes of a most heinous crime, punishable with
+death, was safe from them on English soil—they did not touch him. But
+by our own practice for years past, of surrendering _female_ refugees
+as _property_, we had taught the Zulus that we regarded women as
+cattle.
+
+While fully acknowledging the savagery of the young men’s actions,
+and the necessity of putting a stop to such for the future, it must
+be conceded that, having so long countenanced the like, we should
+have given fair notice that, for the future, it would be an act of
+aggression on us for a refugee of either sex to be followed into our
+territory, before proceeding to stronger measures.
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer, indeed, though taking a decided view of the young
+men’s offence, plainly understood that it was an individual fault,
+and not a political action for the performance of which the king
+was responsible. “There is no reason whatsoever as yet to believe
+that these acts have been committed with the consent or knowledge of
+the king,”[89] he says (2220, p. 125), and his message to Cetshwayo
+merely _requests_ that he will send in the ringleaders of the party
+to be tried by the law of the colony.
+
+On a previous occasion the king had, of his own accord, sent a Zulu
+named Jolwana to the Natal Government to be punished by it for the
+murder of a white man in the Zulu country. Jolwana was returned upon
+his hands with the message that he could not be tried in Natal as he
+was a Zulu subject. Under these circumstances it was not unnatural
+that Cetshwayo should have taken the opportunity, apparently offered
+him by the use of the word _request_, of substituting some other
+method of apology for the offence committed than that of delivering
+up the young men, who, as he afterwards said, he was afraid would be
+“sjambokked” (flogged).
+
+Cetshwayo’s first answer is merely one acknowledging the message, and
+regretting the truth of the accusation brought by it. He allows that
+the young men deserve punishment, and he engages to send indunas of
+his own to the Natal Government on the subject; but he deprecates the
+matter being looked upon in a more serious light than as the “act of
+rash boys,” who in their zeal for their father’s house (? honour) did
+not think what they were doing.
+
+About this date, August, 1878, when all sorts of wild reports
+were flying about, in and out of official documents, relative to
+Cetshwayo’s supposed warlike preparations, he had ordered that _none
+of his people should carry arms on pain of death_.
+
+This was in consequence of a circumstance which had occurred some
+months before (January, 1878), when during the Umkosi, or feast of
+first-fruits, a great Zulu gathering which annually takes place at
+the king’s kraal, two of the regiments fell out and finally came
+to blows, resulting in the death of some men on either side. Sir
+B. Frere says, in his correspondence with the Bishop (p. 4), that
+_many hundred men were killed_ on this occasion; but Mr. F. Colenso,
+who happened to be there a few days after the fight, heard from a
+white man, who had helped to remove the dead, that about fifty were
+killed. In consequence of this, “an order had gone forth, forbidding
+native Zulus, when travelling, to carry arms, nothing but switches
+being allowed. A fire took place, which burned the grass over Panda’s
+grave,[90] and the doctors declared that the spirits of Dingane and
+Chaka had stated that they view with surprise and disgust the conduct
+of the Zulus at the present day in fighting when called before
+their king; that this was the reason Panda’s grave was burned; and
+such things would continue until they learned to be peaceful among
+themselves, and wait until they are attacked by other natives before
+spilling blood.”
+
+Cetshwayo’s next message, September 9th (2260, p. 32), after he had
+inquired into the matter of Sihayo’s sons, acknowledges again that
+they had done wrong, but observes that he was glad to find that they
+had hurt no one belonging to the English. What they had done was
+done without his knowledge. The _request_ of the Natal Government
+concerning the surrender of the offenders, he said, should be laid
+before the great men of the Zulu people, to be decided upon by them;
+_he could not do it alone_.
+
+He finally, with full and courteous apologies in the same tone,
+begs that the Natal Government will accept, instead of the persons
+of the young men, a fine of fifty pounds, which he sent down by his
+messengers, but which was promptly refused. Sir Henry Bulwer appears
+to have been inclined to allow of the substitution of a larger fine
+for the surrender of the culprits (2222, p. 173); but Sir B. Frere
+insists on severer measures, saying: “I think it quite necessary that
+the delivery up to justice of the offenders in this case should have
+been _demanded_,[91] and should now be peremptorily insisted on,
+together with a fine for the delay in complying with the reiterated
+_demand_.”
+
+John Dunn, who is supposed to have advised the king to send money as
+an atonement, affirms that the invasion had been mutual, fugitives
+from justice having been fetched out of Zululand by Natal officers;
+and he (Dunn) asks whether outraged husbands, even amongst civilised
+people, are prone to pay much respect to the rights of nations when
+upon the track of their unfaithful spouses. Plainly, neither he nor
+the king looked upon the matter in so serious a light as Sir Bartle
+Frere chose to do when he said, September 30th, 1878 (2220, p.
+280), “and, unless apologised and atoned for by compliance with the
+Lieut.-Governor’s demands (?) that the leader of the murderous gangs
+shall be given up to justice, it will be necessary to send to the
+Zulu king _an ultimatum, which must put an end to pacific relations
+with our neighbours_.”[92]
+
+Sir M. Hicks-Beach, in reply to Sir B. Frere’s last-quoted despatch,
+writes, November 21st: “The abduction and murder of the Zulu woman
+who had taken refuge in Natal is undoubtedly a serious matter, and
+no sufficient reparation for it has yet been made. But I observe that
+Cetshwayo has expressed his regret for this occurrence; and although
+the compensation offered by him was inadequate, there would seem
+to have been nothing in his conduct with regard to it which would
+preclude the hope of a satisfactory arrangement.”—(P. P. [C. 2220],
+p. 320).
+
+But the whole of Sir Bartle Frere’s statements at this period
+concerning Cetshwayo are one-sided, exaggerated, or entirely
+imaginary accusations, which come in the first instance with force
+from a man of his importance, but for which not the slightest grounds
+can be traced in any reliable or official source. He brings grave
+charges against the king, which are absolutely contradicted by the
+official reports from which he draws his information; he places
+before the public as actual fact what, on investigation, is plainly
+nothing more than his own opinion of what Cetshwayo thinks, wishes,
+or intends, and what his thoughts, wishes, and intentions may be at
+a future period. Every circumstance is twisted into a proof of his
+inimical intentions towards Natal, the worst motives are taken for
+granted in all he does. When the king’s messages were sent through
+the ordinary native messengers between him and the Government of
+Natal, they are termed mere “verbal” messages (as what else should
+they be?), not “satisfactory or binding;” when they were sent
+through Mr. John Dunn they were called “unofficial,” although Mr.
+Dunn had been repeatedly recognised, and by Sir B. Frere himself,
+as an official means of communication with Cetshwayo on matters of
+grave importance; and, when Mr. Dunn writes, on his own account, his
+opinion that the “boys” will not be given up, Sir B. Frere calls his
+letter “a similar informal message (_i.e._ from the king), couched
+in insolent and defiant terms.” In nothing that passed between the
+king and the Government of Natal during this whole period is there
+one single word, on Cetshwayo’s part, which could possibly be thus
+described. There are, indeed, many apologies and entreaties to
+the Government to be satisfied with some other atonement for the
+fault committed than the surrender of the culprits, and there is
+a great deal from various sources, official and otherwise, about
+cattle collected, even beyond the demands of the Government, as a
+propitiation; but of Sir B. Frere’s “semi-sarcastic, insolent, and
+defiant” messages not one word.
+
+It would take many pages to point out how utterly misleading is
+every word spoken by the High Commissioner on this subject, but to
+those who are curious in the matter, and in proof of the truth of
+our present statements, we can only recommend the South African
+Blue-books of 1878-79. We cannot, however, better illustrate our
+meaning than by a quotation from Lord Blachford (_Daily News_, March
+26th, 1872): “What did Sir B. Frere say to all this? He was really
+ashamed to answer that he did not know. He had studied the series
+of despatches in which Sir B. Frere defended his conduct, and he
+willingly acknowledged the exuberance of literary skill which they
+exhibited. But when he tried to grapple with them he felt like a man
+who was defending himself with a stick against a cloud of locusts.
+He might knock down one, and knock down another, but ‘the cry is
+still they come.’ His only consolation was, that they did not appear
+to have convinced Her Majesty’s Government, whose replies were from
+beginning to end a series of cautions, qualifications, and protests.”
+
+On turning to the subject of the robber chief, Umbilini, and his
+raids, we are at once confronted by the fact that he was not a Zulu
+at all, but a Swazi, and a claimant to the Swazi throne. His claim
+had not been approved by the majority of the Swazi nation, and his
+brother Umbandeni, the present king, was appointed instead. Umbilini,
+however, was not a man to quietly sink into an inferior position, and
+having taken possession, with his followers, of some rocky caves in
+the borderland, forming an almost impregnable fortress, he lived for
+many years, much in the fashion of the border freebooters of whose
+doings we read in Scottish history, making raids upon his neighbours
+on all sides, and carrying off cattle, women, and children. His
+expeditions were most frequently directed towards the party against
+him in his own country, but neither his Boer nor Zulu neighbours
+escaped entirely. On first leaving Swaziland he went to offer homage
+to the Zulu king, and was given land to settle upon in Zululand. No
+doubt Cetshwayo looked upon a warrior of Umbilini’s known prowess as
+rather an important vassal, especially in the event of a war between
+him and his ancient enemies the Swazis, in which case Umbilini’s
+adherence would probably divide the enemy amongst themselves. But
+he appears to have been in perpetual trouble on account of his
+turbulent vassal, and to have given him up altogether at one time.
+After a raid committed by him upon the Dutch, the latter applied to
+Cetshwayo to have him delivered up to them. “I could not do this,”
+says Cetshwayo; “I should have got a bad name if I had done so, and
+people would have said it was not good to _konza_ (pay homage) to
+Cetshwayo. I therefore refused, but paid one hundred head of cattle
+for the offence he had committed;”[93] and Cetshwayo’s own account to
+Mr. Fynney is as follows (1961):
+
+“Umbilini came to me for refuge from his own people, the Ama-Swazis,
+and I afforded him shelter; what would the world have said had I
+denied it to him? But, while allowing him to settle in the land as my
+subject, I have always been particularly careful to warn my people
+not to afford him any assistance or become mixed up in any quarrel
+between him and the Boers; and although I do not deny that he is my
+subject, still I will not endorse his misdeeds. When Mr. Rudolph
+complained to me of the trouble Umbilini was giving, I told Mr.
+Rudolph to kill him—I should not shield him; this the Boers tried to
+do, but, as usual, made a mess of it.”
+
+In fact, on a repetition of Umbilini’s offence against the Boers,
+Cetshwayo refused to be longer responsible for his acts, and gave the
+Dutch permission to kill him. They fought him, and were beaten by him
+with his small band of only nineteen men. On a subsequent occasion,
+after a raid committed by Umbilini upon the Swazis, Cetshwayo was so
+incensed that he sent out a party to take and kill him; but he got
+notice beforehand, and escaped.
+
+Sir Bartle Frere chooses to consider the king responsible for all
+Umbilini’s doings, and even Sir H. Bulwer says: “The king disowned
+Umbilini’s acts.... But there is nothing to show that he has in any
+way punished him, and, on the contrary, it is quite certain (of
+which ‘certainty,’ however, no proofs are forthcoming) that even if
+Umbilini did not act with the express orders of Cetshwayo, he did so
+with the knowledge that what he was doing would be agreeable to the
+king” (2260, p. 46).
+
+This accusation was made in January, 1879, and refers to raids of the
+previous year, by which time, as the Swazis were our allies and the
+Boers our subjects, Umbilini’s raids in all directions except those
+on the Zulu side had become offences to us for which Cetshwayo was
+held responsible. In point of fact, it was no such simple matter to
+“punish” Umbilini, whose natural fortress could be held by a couple
+of men against anything short of the cannon which Cetshwayo did
+not possess. Nor was it singular that, at a time when the king had
+already strong suspicions that his country was about to be attacked,
+he should not have wasted his strength in subduing one who, in the
+event of war, would be most useful to himself.
+
+That, when the evil day came and his country was invaded, Cetshwayo
+should have made common cause with all who would or could assist him
+is a mere matter of course, and it was but natural that so bold and
+skilful a leader as Umbilini has proved himself to be should then
+have been promoted and favoured by the unfortunate king.
+
+We need scarcely say more upon this point, beyond calling our
+readers’ attention to the fact that the expressions “_Zulu raids_,”
+“_indiscriminate massacres_,” “_violation by the Zulus of Transvaal
+territory_,” “_horrible cruelties_” (2308, p. 62, and elsewhere),
+so freely scattered through the despatches written to prove the
+criminality of the Zulu king, _all, without exception_, apply to acts
+committed either by Umbilini and his (chiefly) _Swazi_ followers, or
+by Manyonyoba, a small but independent native chief, living north of
+the Pongolo.[94]
+
+The “case of Messrs. Smith and Deighton” is the only charge against
+the Zulu king, in connection with Natal, which we have now to
+consider, and it is one in which, as we shall see, a great deal was
+made of a very small matter.
+
+Mr. Smith, a surveyor in the Colonial Engineer’s department, was on
+duty inspecting the road down to the Tugela, near Fort Buckingham.
+The Zulu mind being in a very excited state at the time—owing to
+the obvious preparation for war, of which they heard reports from
+Natal, troops stationed at Greytown, and war-ships seen close to
+the Zulu shore, as though looking for a landing-place—Mr. Smith was
+specially instructed to proceed upon his errand alone, and with great
+discretion. By way of carrying out these directions he took with
+him only a trader—Deighton by name—and their discretion was shown by
+“taking no notice” when, having arrived at the drift into Zululand,
+they were questioned by Zulus, who were on guard there in consequence
+of rumours that our troops were about to cross.[95]
+
+Mr. Wheelwright (a Government official), to whom the matter was
+reported a week after it occurred, not by Mr. Smith, the principal
+person concerned, but by Mr. Deighton, says: “The fact that the two
+white men took no notice of ‘lots of Zulus shouting out’ from their
+own bank, ‘What do you want there?’ but ‘walked quietly along,’[96]
+as if they had not heard, or as if they were deaf, very naturally
+confirmed the suspicion that they were about no good.”
+
+The consequence was, that when the white men reached an islet in the
+middle of the river (or rather one which is generally in the middle
+of the stream when it is full—it was low at the time), they were
+seized by the Zulus, and detained by them for about an hour and a
+half, whilst all sorts of questions were asked: “What are you doing
+there?” “What had the soldiers come to Greytown for?” “What did the
+white men want coming down there? There were two down not long ago,
+then other two only a few days since, and now there is other two; you
+must come for some reason.”
+
+However, after a time, they were allowed to depart, an attempt made
+to take their horses from them being prevented by the induna of the
+Zulus.
+
+Sir Bartle Frere does not seem to have thought very much of the
+matter at first, for Sir M. Hicks-Beach, when acknowledging his
+despatch reporting it, says (2220, p. 320): “I concur with you in
+attributing no special importance to the seizure and temporary arrest
+of the surveyors, which was partly due to their own indiscretion, and
+was evidently in no way sanctioned by the Zulu authorities.”
+
+But a little later—although with no fresh facts before him—Sir B.
+Frere takes a very different tone (2222, p. 176).
+
+“I cannot at all agree with the lenient view taken by the
+Lieut.-Governor of this case. Had it stood quite alone, a prompt
+apology and punishment of the offenders might have been sufficient.
+As the case stands, it was only one of many instances of insult and
+threatening, such as cannot possibly be passed over without severe
+notice being taken of them. What occurred,” he says, “whether done by
+the king’s order, or only by his border-guards, and subsequently only
+tacitly approved by his not punishing the offenders, seems to me a
+most serious insult and outrage, and should be severely noticed.”
+
+There is no sign that it was ever brought to the king’s knowledge,
+and when Sir B. Frere speaks of its being “only one of many
+instances of insult and threatening,” he is drawing largely on his
+imagination, as there is _no other recorded at all_, unless he means
+to refer to the “notices to quit” in the disputed territory of which
+we have already treated.
+
+We must now consider the points connected with the internal
+management of the Zulu country, which have generally been looked upon
+as a partial excuse for our invasion. Foremost amongst these is the
+infraction of the so-called “coronation promises,” of which we have
+spoken in a previous chapter. Frequent rumours were current in Natal
+that the king, in defiance of the said promises, was in the habit of
+shedding the blood of his people upon the smallest provocation, and
+without any form of trial. Such stories of his inhuman atrocities
+were circulated in the colony that many kind-hearted and gentle
+people were ready to think that war would be a lesser evil. Yet,
+whenever one of these stories was examined into or traced to its
+source, it turned out either to be purely imaginary, or to have for
+its foundation some small act of more or less arbitrary authority,
+the justice of which we might possibly question, but to which no one
+would apply the words “barbarities,” “savage murders,” etc.
+
+An instance of the manner in which the Zulu king has obtained
+his character of “a treacherous and bloodthirsty sovereign,”[97]
+came under the notice of the present writer about December of
+last year (1878). Happening to be on a visit to some friends in
+Pietermaritzburg, and hearing them mention Cetshwayo’s cruelties,
+I observed that I did not much credit them, as I had never yet met
+anyone who knew of them from any trustworthy source. I was met with
+the assurance that their “kitchen-Kafir,” Tom, from whom they had
+received their accounts, was a personal witness, having himself
+escaped from a massacre, and they vouched for the truthfulness of
+the man’s character. I asked and obtained permission to question
+the man in his own language, being myself anxious to find any real
+evidence on the subject, especially as, at that time—with military
+preparations going on on every side—it was apparent to all that “we”
+intended war, and one would have been glad to discover that there
+was any justification for it on our side. The same evening I took an
+opportunity of interrogating “Tom,” saying, “So I hear that you know
+all about this wicked Zulu king. Tell me all about it.” Whereupon the
+man launched out into a long account of the slaughter of his people,
+from which not even infants were spared, and from which he was one of
+the few who had escaped. He had plainly been accustomed to tell the
+tale (doubtless a true one), and there were touches in it concerning
+the killing of the children which showed that he had been in the
+habit of recounting it to tender-hearted and horror-struck English
+mothers. When he had finished his tale I asked him when all the
+horrors which he had described had taken place. “Oh!” he replied, “it
+was at the time of the fight between Cetshwayo and Umbulazi (1856);
+that was when I left Zululand.”
+
+“And you have never been there since?”
+
+“No; I should be afraid to go, for Cetshwayo kills always.”
+
+“How do you know that?” I inquired, for he had started upon a fresh
+account of horrors relating to the time at which he was speaking.
+
+“Oh! I know it is true,” was the ready and confident reply, “because
+the white people here in ’Maritzburg tell me so out of the papers.”
+
+In point of fact the man, on whose word to my own knowledge rested
+the belief of a considerable circle of the citizens, could only give
+personal evidence concerning what happened at the time of the great
+civil war, when Zululand was in such confusion that it would not be
+easy to distribute responsibility, and when Cetshwayo himself was a
+young man in the hands of his warriors. All he could tell of a later
+date he had himself learnt from “white people” in the town, who,
+again, had gathered their information from the newspapers; and Bishop
+Schreuder, long resident in Zululand, says: “I had not with my own
+eyes seen any corpse, and personally only knew of them said to have
+been killed.... I myself had my information principally from the same
+sources as people in Natal, and often from Natal newspapers.”
+
+The king’s own reply to these accusations may be taken entire from
+Mr. Fynney’s report on July 4th, 1877 (1961), with the portions of
+the message delivered by the latter to which it refers:
+
+“You have repeatedly acknowledged the house of England to be a great
+and powerful house, and have expressed yourself as relying entirely
+upon the good-will and power of that house for your own strength and
+the strength of the country over which you are king; in fact you have
+always looked towards the English Government.
+
+“Which way is your face turned to-day? Do you look, and still desire
+to look, in the same direction? Do you rely on the good-will and
+support of the British Government as much as you formerly did?
+
+“The Government of Natal has repeatedly heard that you have not
+regarded the agreements you entered into with that Government,
+through its representative, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, on the occasion
+of your coronation. These agreements you entered into with the sun
+shining around you, but since that time you have practised great
+cruelties upon your people, putting great numbers of them to death.
+What do you say?”
+
+In reply to the above, Cetshwayo said: “I have not changed; I still
+look upon the English as my friends, as they have not yet done or
+said anything to make me feel otherwise. They have not in any way
+turned my heart, therefore I feel that we have still hold of each
+other’s hands. But you must know that from the first the Zulu nation
+grew up alone, separate and distinct from all others, and has never
+been subject to any other nation; Tyaka (Chaka) was the first to
+find out the English and make friends with them; he saved the lives
+of seven Englishmen from shipwreck at the mouth of the Umfolosi, he
+took care of them, and from that day even until now the English and
+Zulu nations have held each other’s hands. The English nation is
+a just one, and we are together” (we are at one with each other).
+“I admit that people have been killed. There are three classes of
+wrong-doers that I kill—(1) the abatakati—witches, poisoners, etc.;
+(2) those who take the women of the great house, those belonging to
+the royal household; and (3) those who kill, hide, or make away with
+the king’s cattle. I mentioned these three classes of wrong-doers to
+Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone), when he came to place me as king over the
+Zulu nation, as those who had always been killed. I told him that it
+was our law, and that three classes of wrong-doers I would kill, and
+he replied: ‘Well, I cannot put aside a standing law of the land.’
+I always give a wrong-doer three chances, and kill him if he passes
+the last. Evil-doers would go over my head if I did not punish them,
+and that is our mode of punishing.... I do not see that I have in any
+way departed from, or broken in anything, the compact I made with the
+Natal Government through Somtseu.”
+
+The next subject to be considered is that of the treatment of the
+missionaries and their converts in Zululand.
+
+Sir T. Shepstone, in his account of what passed at the installation
+of Cetshwayo, writes as follows (C. 1137, p. 19): “The fourth point
+was the position of Christian missionaries and their converts.
+Cetywayo evidently regretted that they had ever been admitted at all,
+and had made up his mind to reduce their numbers by some means or
+other.... He said they had committed no actual wrong, but they did
+no good, and that the tendency of their teaching was mischievous; he
+added that he did not wish to harm them, that they might take all
+their property with them and go in peace.
+
+“I suggested that they could not take their houses away. He replied
+that the materials of which they were built—stone, earth, and
+wood—were all Zulu property, but they might take them also if they
+wished. He thought that four, however, were entitled to greater
+consideration; these were Bishop Schreuder and Mr. Oftebro, of the
+Norwegian Mission, because of their long residence—more than twenty
+years—and their services in other ways than as missionaries; and
+Bishop Wilkinson and Mr. Robertson, because they had brought an
+introduction from the Governor of Natal; but that the teaching even
+of these was mischievous, and could not be received by the Zulus
+without injury.... The advantages of education, the value to a man
+of being able to read and write, and the extreme inconvenience of
+ignorance were discussed. Cetywayo heartily concurred in all that was
+said on these subjects, and said it was education made the English
+so great; and that, if he thought he could remember what he might
+learn, he would be taught himself; and he expressed regret that the
+missionaries did not confine themselves to that kind of teaching.
+
+“The result of our conversations on the subject of the missionaries
+was an understanding that those who were already in the country
+should not be interfered with, and that, if any of them committed
+an offence for which the offender might be considered deserving of
+expulsion, the case should be submitted to the Government of Natal,
+and its assent be received before the sentence should be carried
+out. It is necessary to explain that the Zulus have no idea of
+inflicting any punishment upon a missionary except that of expulsion
+from the country. _I did not consider it wise to attempt to make any
+arrangements in favour of native converts._”[98]
+
+What was meant by the teaching of the missionaries being
+_mischievous_ is fully explained by the remarks of the prime
+ministers Mnyamana and Vumandaba, reported by Mr. Fynney in 1877
+(1961, p. 47) as follows:
+
+“We will not allow the Zulus to become so-called Christians. It is
+not the king says so, but every man in Zululand. If a Zulu does
+anything wrong, he at once goes to a mission station, and says he
+wants to become a Christian; if he wants to run away with a girl,
+he becomes a Christian; if he wishes to be exempt from serving
+the king, he puts on clothes, and is a Christian; if a man is an
+umtagati (evil-doer), he becomes a Christian. All these people are
+the subjects of the king; and who will keep a cow for another to milk
+it?... The missionaries desire to set up another power in the land,
+and, as Zululand has only one king, that cannot be allowed.”
+
+Mr. Fynney continues: “Before I left Zululand (before July, 1877)
+most of the missionaries had decided upon leaving; some had already
+left, not from any fear of personal danger, but because in some cases
+they have been deserted by the natives on their stations; in others
+the native converts were uneasy, and wished to leave; and from the
+attitude of both the king and chiefs, they could plainly see that all
+chances of making fresh converts, or even retaining those around
+them, were for the present at an end.... I find there were all sorts
+of wild (?) rumours going about from station to station—one that
+the British Government intended to annex Zululand at once. I am
+afraid that this and the like rumours have done harm. Several of the
+missionaries have been frequently to the king of late, and, as he
+told me, have worried him to such an extent that he does not want to
+see them any more.”[99]
+
+In August of the same year Lord Carnarvon requests Sir Henry Bulwer
+to make a special point of causing “the missionaries to understand
+distinctly that Her Majesty’s Government cannot undertake to compel
+the king to permit the maintenance of the mission stations in
+Zululand,” and to recommend them, if they cannot carry on their work
+without armed support, to leave it for the present.
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer writes (2000, p. 33):
+
+“The action taken by some of the missionaries in leaving that country
+has apparently proved not only unnecessary, but ill-advised for their
+own interests. The king was not sorry that they should go, but he was
+angry with them for going.”[100] and on January 26th, 1878, a message
+arrived from Cetshwayo, concerning those that remained, to this
+effect (2100, p. 61):
+
+“Cetshwayo states that he wishes His Excellency to know that he is
+not pleased with the missionaries in the Zulu country, as he finds
+out that they are the cause of much harm, and are always spreading
+false reports about the Zulu country, and (he) would wish His
+Excellency to advise them to remove, as they do no good.”
+
+Shortly after the Rev. Mr. Oftebro and Dr. Oftebro, Norwegian
+missionaries from Zululand, were granted an interview by the
+Lieut.-Governor of Natal for the purpose of laying their case before
+His Excellency. The king, they said, had informed them that he was
+now quite persuaded that they had communicated to the governors of
+Natal and the Transvaal, and to the editors of the public papers in
+Natal, all important matters that occurred in the Zulu country—that
+the accounts they sent were not even truthful—and that he had
+believed these missionaries were “men,” but that he now found them to
+be his enemies.
+
+They believed that amongst the “white men,” from whom he had obtained
+his information, were Mr. John Mullins, a trader, and Mr. F. E.
+Colenso, a son of the Bishop of Natal, who had been at the king’s
+kraal for some six days and who, they said, “_had translated, for the
+king’s information, accounts of doings in the Zulu country_, from
+several newspapers of the colony.” This last, as it happens, was pure
+fiction. Sir Henry Bulwer, indeed, believed it at the time, and wrote
+upon it as follows (2100, p. 89):
+
+“I notice in Messrs. Smith and Colenso’s letter to the Earl of
+Carnarvon, a statement to the effect that the disposition and
+dealings of Cetshwayo had been sedulously misrepresented by the
+missionaries and by the Press. And this statement tends, I am afraid,
+to confirm the belief that Mr. F. E. Colenso, when he lately visited
+the Zulu country, ... made certain representations regarding the
+missionaries in Zululand, which were greatly calculated to prejudice
+the king’s mind against them, or against some of them.”
+
+But Mr. Colenso, on seeing for the first time the above statements in
+the Blue-book, wrote to Sir M. Hicks-Beach as follows (2220, p. 318):
+
+“The suspicions expressed by the missionaries as to my proceedings
+are entirely without foundation in fact. So far from attempting to
+prejudice the king’s mind against them, I confined myself, in the
+little I did say to Cetshwayo on the subject, to supporting their
+cause with him. The king had received, through some of his various
+channels of information, an account of the numerous contributions
+made by missionaries and others living under his protection in
+Zululand, to the colonial newspapers, and in particular, of an
+exaggerated and sensational report, written by the Zululand
+correspondent of _The Natal Mercury_, of the catastrophe which
+occurred at the annual Feast of Firstfruits some ten days before
+my last conversation with the king, which report he attributed to
+the Rev. Mr. Robertson, from the fact that his waggon-driver was
+the only white man present on the occasion, except Dr. Oftebro, Mr.
+Mullins, and Mr. Dunn. Cetshwayo expressed himself as indignant at
+the conduct of Mr. Robertson, who, he said, had never, during his
+long residence in Zululand, received anything but good treatment at
+the hands of his (Cetshwayo’s) father and himself, and, he added,
+‘I have borne with him too long.’ To this I replied that, if he had
+any distinct ground of complaint against Mr. Robertson, he (the king)
+should get it set down in writing, and send it to His Excellency the
+Lieut.-Governor of Natal; and I wished him to understand that any
+different course would be productive of no good effect. I then told
+Cetshwayo, omitting further reference to Mr. Robertson, that in my
+opinion the presence of the missionaries as a body in his country
+was a great advantage to him, and that they merited his protection.
+He disclaimed having ever treated them with anything but great
+consideration.”
+
+The particular statement of the two missionaries Oftebro, concerning
+the translation of newspapers, also Mr. Colenso specially and
+distinctly contradicts, saying that he had no newspapers with him nor
+extracts of newspapers, nor were any such read to Cetshwayo in his
+presence.
+
+Sir H. Bulwer states, at the request of the Messrs. Oftebro (2100,
+p. 61), that no member of the Norwegian mission had supplied this
+Government with information as above. But it does not follow that
+no such communications had been made to Sir B. Frere and Lord
+Carnarvon. Missionaries had written anonymously to the colonial
+papers, and the account in _The Natal Mercury_ of the fight at the
+Umkosi was attributed by Cetshwayo, not without reason, to the Rev.
+E. Robertson. The tone of this letter, and its _accuracy_, may be
+gathered from the following extract, referring to the land which,
+in the opinion of the Commissioners, “was by right belonging to the
+Zulus.”
+
+“Never was a more preposterous demand made upon any Government than
+that which Cetshwayo is now making upon the English Government of
+the Transvaal.... For be it remembered that, until very lately, the
+Zulus have never occupied any portion of it, (!) and even now very
+partially. It is most earnestly to be hoped that Sir T. Shepstone,
+while doing all in his power to keep the peace, _will be equally firm
+in resisting the unjust pretensions of the Zulus_.”[101]
+
+How far the Zulu king was justified in his opinion that the
+missionaries were not his friends may be gathered from the above, and
+from the replies to Sir B. Frere’s appeal to the “missionaries of all
+denominations” for their opinions on native politics, as published in
+the Blue-books (2316), of which the following examples may be given:
+
+From letter of the Rev. P. D. Hepburn, December 17th, 1878: “All
+in these parts are quiet, and are likely to remain quiet, if His
+Excellency overthrows the Zulu chief, and disarms the remaining
+Zulus. The Zulus are very warlike; will attack in front, flank, and
+rear. They are, and have been, the terror of the neighbouring tribes
+since the days of Chaka.[102] Only the utter destruction of the Zulus
+can secure future peace in South Africa. May His Excellency not allow
+himself to be deceived by the Zulu chief Cetywayo.”
+
+“On full inquiry it will be found that our late war, (Kaffraria)
+here was to a great extent attributable to Zulu influence.[103] If
+our forces suffer defeat at Natal, all native tribes in South Africa
+will rise against us. I am a man of peace; I hate war; but if war,
+let there be no dawdling and sentimental nonsense.
+
+“True and faithful to God, our Queen, and the interests of the
+empire, we have the approbation of God, our Queen, and our own
+conscience. I would have much liked had there been a regiment of
+British cavalry at Natal. Sword in hand, the British are irresistible
+over all natives. The battle at the Gwanga in 1846, under Sir Henry
+Darrell, lasted only about fifteen minutes; about four hundred Kafirs
+were cut down....
+
+“God, our God, put it into the minds of our rulers that all tribes in
+south-east and east Africa must submit to British power, and that it
+is the interest of all Africans to do so. Heathenism must perish; God
+wills it so.”[104]
+
+These remarks are from a missionary in Kaffraria, but the tone of
+these in Zululand is the same, or even worse. Compare the following
+statement made to the Natal Government by two native converts from
+the Etshowe mission station—Mr. Oftebro’s (1883, p. 2): “We know that
+as many a hundred (Zulus) in one day see the sun rise, but don’t see
+it go down.... The people, great and small, are tired of the rule
+of Cetshwayo, by which he is finishing his people. The Zulu army is
+not what it was, there are only six full regiments. Cetshwayo had
+by his rule made himself so disliked, that they knew of no one, and
+especially of the headmen, who would raise a hand to save him from
+ruin, no matter from what cause.”
+
+Mr. John Shepstone adds, April 27th, 1877 (p. 4): “The above was
+confirmed only yesterday by reliable authority, who added that a
+power such as the English, stepping in now, would be most welcome to
+the Zulus generally, through the unpopularity of the king, by his
+cruel and reckless treatment of his subjects.” And Mr. Fynney, in the
+report already quoted from, says:
+
+“The king appeared to have a very exaggerated idea both of his
+power, the number of his warriors, and their ability as such....
+While speaking of the king as having exaggerated ideas as to the
+number of his fighting-men, I would not wish to be understood as
+underrating the power of the Zulu nation.... I am of opinion that
+King Cetywayo could bring six thousand men into the field at a short
+notice, great numbers armed with guns; but the question is, would
+they fight?... I am of opinion that it would greatly depend against
+whom they were called to fight.... While the Zulu nation, to a man,
+would have willingly turned out to fight either the Boers or the
+Ama-Swazi, the case would be very different, I believe, in the event
+of a misunderstanding arising between the British Government and the
+Zulu nation.... I further believe, from what I heard, that a quarrel
+with the British Government would be the signal for a general split
+up amongst the Zulus, and the king would find himself deserted by the
+majority of those upon whom he would at present appear to rely.”
+
+While Sir T. Shepstone says, November 30th, 1878 (2222, p. 175): “I
+will, however, add my belief that the Zulu power is likely to fall to
+pieces when touched.”
+
+Such were the opinions given by men supposed to be intimately
+acquainted with Zulu character and feeling, one of them being _the_
+great authority on all native matters; and on such statements did
+Sir Bartle Frere rely when he laid his scheme for the Zulu War.
+How absolutely ignorant, how foolishly mistaken, were these “blind
+leaders of the blind” has been amply proved by the events of 1879.
+
+We need not enter very fully into the accusations brought by the
+missionaries against the Zulu king of indiscriminate slaughter of
+native converts for their religion’s sake. They were thoroughly
+believed in Natal at the time; but, upon investigation, they dwindled
+down to three separate cases of the execution of men (one in each
+case) who happened to be converts, but of whom two were put to death
+for causes which had nothing whatsoever to do with their faith (one
+of them being indeed a relapsed convert); and the third, an old
+man, Maqamsela, whose name certainly deserves to be handed down to
+fame in the list of martyrs for religion’s sake, was killed without
+the sanction or even knowledge of the king, by the order of his
+prime minister Gaozi.[105] That the latter received no punishment,
+although the king disapproved of this action, is not a fact of any
+importance. It is not always convenient to punish prime ministers and
+high commissioners, or powerful indunas.
+
+Sir Bartle Frere of course takes the strongest possible view of
+the matter against the king, and speaks of his having killed Zulu
+converts (2220, p. 270), “at first rarely, as if with reluctance,
+and a desire to conceal what he had ordered, and to shift the
+responsibility to other shoulders, latterly more frequently, openly,
+and as an avowed part of a general policy for re-establishing the
+system of Chaka and Dingane.” This little phrase is of a slightly
+imaginative nature, resting on no (produced) evidence. It is, in
+fact, a “statement.”[106]
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer’s reply—November 18th, 1878 (2222, p. 171)—which
+forms an able refutation of various statements of Sir B. Frere,
+contains the following sentence: “I took some pains to find out how
+the case really stood, and ascertained that the number of natives,
+either converts or living on mission stations, who had been killed,
+was _three_. I have never heard since that time of any other mission
+natives being killed.... I was, therefore, surprised, on reading
+your Excellency’s despatch, to see what Messrs. Oftebro and Staven
+had said. I have since made particular inquiries on that point, but
+have failed to obtain any information showing that more than _three_
+mission natives have been killed. Among others to whom I have spoken
+is the Rev. Mr. Robertson, of Zululand, who was in ’Maritzburg a few
+weeks ago. He told me that he had not heard of any other than the
+_three_ cases.”
+
+Sir Bartle Frere replies, December 6th, 1878 (2222, p. 175):[107]
+“I have since made further inquiry (he does not say what), and have
+_no doubt_ that though His Excellency _may possibly_ be right as
+to the number regarding which there is _judicial evidence_ (Sir H.
+Bulwer plainly decides that there was _no evidence at all_); the
+missionaries had _every reason to believe_ that the number slain
+_on account of their inclination to Christianity_ was considerably
+greater than three. One gentleman, who had better means of obtaining
+the truth than anyone else, told me _he had no doubt_ the number of
+converts killed was considerable.”
+
+This gentleman, Sir Bartle Frere assures us, “knows the Zulus
+probably better than _any living European_; he is himself an old
+resident in Zululand, and a man _above all suspicion of exaggeration
+or misrepresentation_(!). He gave me this information, under
+stipulation that his name should not be mentioned, otherwise it
+would, I am sure, at once be accepted as a guarantee for the accuracy
+of his statements.”
+
+With such phrases, “I have no doubt,” “every reason to believe,” “I
+feel sure,” etc. etc., has Sir Bartle Frere continually maligned the
+character of the Zulu king, called since the war by Mr. John Dunn,
+“the most injured man in South Africa.”
+
+One is rather puzzled who the man may be to whom Sir Bartle Frere
+gives so high a character, his opinion of which he evidently expects
+will quite satisfy his readers. We should much like to have the
+gentleman’s name. The number of gentlemen “long resident in Zululand”
+are not so many as to leave a wide field for conjecture. Besides the
+missionaries, the only names that occur to us to which the phrase
+can apply are those of Mr. John Shepstone, Mr. John Dunn, and Mr.
+Robertson.
+
+The only point in the indictment against Cetshwayo which we have
+now to consider, is that of the killing of girls under the Zulu
+marriage law, and the reply to Sir Henry Bulwer’s remonstrance on
+the point, which Sir Bartle Frere speaks of in his final memorandum
+as expressed “in terms of unprecedented insolence and defiance;”
+while _The Times of Natal_ (generally recognised as the Government
+organ) went still further, and has twice charged the Zulu king with
+sending _repeatedly_, insolent messages to the Natal Government. As
+to the _repetition_ of the offence, it need only be said that there
+is no foundation in the Blue-books for the assertion. And as to
+this particular offence it is enough to say that no notice had been
+taken of it to Cetshwayo himself, till two years afterwards it was
+unearthed, and charged upon him, as above, by the High Commissioner,
+notwithstanding that, whatever it may have been, it had been
+subsequently condoned by friendly messages from this Government.
+
+The marriage law of Zululand is thus described by Sir T. Shepstone
+(1137, p. 21): “The Zulu country is but sparsely inhabited when
+compared with Natal, and the increase of its population is checked
+more by its peculiar marriage regulations than by the exodus of
+refugees to surrounding governments. Both boys and girls are formed
+into regiments, and are not allowed to marry without special leave
+from the king, or until the regiments to which they belong are
+fortunate enough to receive his dispensation. Caprice or state
+reasons occasionally delay this permission, and it sometimes
+happens that years pass before it is given. Contravention of these
+regulations is visited by the severest penalties.”[108]
+
+The history of the case which we are now considering may be given in
+the following extracts:
+
+On September 22nd, 1876, Mr. Osborn, resident magistrate of
+Newcastle, writes: “The Zulu king lately granted permission to two
+regiments of middle-aged men to marry. These were, however, rejected
+by the girls, on the ground that the men were too old; upon which
+the king ordered that those girls who refused to marry the soldiers
+were to be put to death. Several girls were killed in consequence,
+some fled into the colony, others into the Transvaal Republic, and on
+October 9th, Government messengers report (1748, p. 198):
+
+“We heard that the king was causing some of the Zulus to be killed on
+account of disobeying his orders respecting the marriage of girls,
+and we saw large numbers of cattle which had been taken as fines.
+Otherwise the land was quiet.”
+
+As far as the most careful investigations could discover, the number
+killed was not more than four or five, while the two Zulus already
+quoted said that, although they had _heard_ of the matter, they did
+not _know_ of a single instance; and as these young men themselves
+belonged to one of the regiments, it can hardly be supposed that any
+great slaughter could have taken place unknown to them.
+
+At the time, however, report as usual greatly exaggerated the
+circumstances, and Sir Henry Bulwer speaks (1748, p. 198) of
+“_numbers of girls and young men_,” and “_large numbers of girls and
+others connected with them_,” as having been killed.
+
+He sent a message to Cetshwayo on the subject, which in itself was
+a temperate and very proper one for an English governor to send, in
+the hope of checking such cruelty in future, and was not unnaturally
+somewhat surprised at receiving an answer from the usually courteous
+and respectful king, which showed plainly enough that he was highly
+irritated and resented the interference with his management of
+his people. Sir Henry had reminded him of what had passed at his
+coronation, and Cetshwayo replies that if Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone)
+had told the white people that he (the king) had promised never to
+kill, Somtseu had deceived them. “I have yet to kill,” he says. He
+objects to being dictated to about his laws, and says that while
+wishing to be friends with the English, he does not intend to govern
+his people by laws sent to him by them. He remarks, in a somewhat
+threatening way, that in future he shall act on his own account, and
+that if the English interfere with him, he will go away and become a
+wanderer, but not without first showing what he can do if he chooses.
+Finally he points out that he and the Governor of Natal are in like
+positions,[109] one being governor of Natal, the other of Zululand.
+
+It is plain that this reply, as reported by the Government
+messengers, produced a strong effect on Sir H. Bulwer’s mind, and
+considerably affected his feeling towards the king, though, as
+already stated, he never brought it, at the time or afterwards,
+to the notice of Cetshwayo, and has since exchanged friendly
+messages with him. And no doubt the reply was petulant and wanting
+in due respect, though a dash of arrogance was added to it by the
+interpreter’s use of the expression “we are equal,” instead of “we
+are in like positions”—each towards our own people. But that the
+formidable words “I have yet to kill,” “I shall now act on my own
+account,” meant nothing more than the mere irritation of the moment
+is plain from the fact that he never made the slightest attempt to
+carry them out, though recent events have taught us what he might
+have done had he chosen to “act on his own account.”
+
+The _tone_ of the reply would probably have been very different had
+it been brought by Cetshwayo’s own messengers. By an unfortunate
+mistake on the part of the Natal Government, one of the messengers
+sent was a _Zulu refugee_ of the party of Umbulazi and Umkungo,
+between whom and the king there was deadly hostility, which had
+lately been intensified by the insulting manner in which Umkungo’s
+people had received Cetshwayo’s messengers, sent in a friendly spirit
+to inform them of King Umpande’s death. The very presence of this
+man, bringing a reproof from the Government of Natal, would naturally
+be resented by the Zulu king, who had already declined communications
+from the Transvaal sent through refugee subjects of his own (Sir
+Henry Bulwer—1748, p. 10); and was now obliged to receive with
+courtesy, and listen to words of remonstrance from, one of these very
+refugees who had fled to Natal, and, under Zulu law, was liable to be
+put to death as a traitor, when he made his appearance in Zululand.
+The king’s words, exhibiting the irritation of the moment, whatever
+they may have been, would lose nothing of their fierceness and
+bitterness by being conveyed through such a medium.
+
+We do not wish to defend such practices as those of forcing girls
+into distasteful marriages, or putting them to death for disobedience
+in that respect. But we must remember that, after all, the king, in
+ordering these executions, was enforcing, not a new law laid down by
+himself, but “an old custom” (1748, p. 198). From his point of view
+the exercise of such severity was as necessary to maintaining his
+authority as the decimation of a regiment for mutiny might appear to
+a commander, or the slaughter of hundreds of Langalibalele’s people,
+hiding in caves or running away, which we have already described,
+appeared to Sir B. Pine and Sir T. Shepstone in 1873-74.
+
+The king himself gave an illustration of his difficulties in a
+message sent to Sir H. Bulwer early in 1878 (2079, p. 96). He
+reported to His Excellency that two of his regiments had had a
+fight, and many of his men had been killed, at which he was much
+annoyed. He reports this to show His Excellency that, although he
+warned them that he would severely punish any regiment that caused
+any disturbance at the Umkosi, he cannot rule them without sometimes
+killing them, especially as they know they can run to Natal.
+
+We have now considered in turn every accusation brought against the
+Zulu king up to the end of 1878, when Sir Bartle Frere delivered
+his ultimatum, which he had said beforehand would put an end to our
+peaceful relations with our neighbours. We venture to assert that,
+with the exception of the last, every one of these accusations is
+distinctly refuted on evidence gathered from official sources. Of
+that last, we would observe, that, although it cannot be entirely
+denied, the fault has been greatly exaggerated; while that part
+of it which referred to the sole instance of a hasty reply to the
+Natal Government, has been condoned by two years’ friendly relations
+since the offence, before it was raked up by Sir Bartle Frere as an
+additional pretext for the war. And, at all events, had Cetshwayo’s
+severity to his people been a hundred times greater than it ever was,
+he could not in a lifetime have produced the misery which this one
+year’s campaign has wrought.
+
+Yet these accusations were the sole pretexts for the war, except
+that fear of the proximity of a nation strong enough and warlike
+enough to injure us, _if it wished to do so_, which Sir Bartle Frere
+declared made it impossible for peaceful subjects of Her Majesty
+to feel security for life or property within fifty miles of the
+border, and made the existence of a peaceful English community in
+the neighbourhood impossible.[110] He speaks in the same despatch
+(2269, pp. 1, 2) of the king as “an irresponsible, bloodthirsty, and
+treacherous despot,” which terms, and others like them, do duty again
+and again for solid facts, but of the justice of which he gives no
+proof whatever. We cannot do better than give, in conclusion, and
+as a comment upon the above fear, a quotation from Lord Blachford’s
+speech in the House of Lords, March 26th, 1879, which runs:
+
+“Some people assumed that the growth of the Zulu power in the
+neighbourhood of a British colony constituted such a danger that,
+in a common phrase, it had to be got rid of, and that, when a thing
+had to be done, it was idle and inconvenient to examine too closely
+into the pretexts which were set up. And this was summed up in
+a phrase which is used more than once by the High Commissioner,
+and had obtained currency in what he might call the light
+literature of politics. We might be told to obey our ‘instincts of
+self-preservation.’ No doubt the instinct of self-preservation was
+one of the most necessary of our instincts. But it was one of those
+which we had in common with the lowest brute—one of those which we
+are most frequently called on to keep in order. It was in obedience
+to the ‘instinct of self-preservation’ that a coward ran away in
+battle, that a burglar murdered a policeman, or, what was more to our
+present purpose, that a nervous woman jumped out of a carriage lest
+she should be upset; or that one man in a fright fired at another
+who, he thought, meant to do him an injury, though he had not yet
+shown any sign of an intention of doing so. The soldiers who went
+down in the _Birkenhead_—what should we have thought of them if,
+instead of standing in their ranks to be drowned, they had pushed the
+women and children into the hold and saved themselves? A reasonable
+determination to do that which our safety requires, so far as it
+is consistent with our duty to others, is the duty and interest of
+every man. To evade an appeal to the claims of reason and justice,
+by a clamorous allegation of our animal instinct, is to abdicate our
+privileges as men, and to revert to brutality.”
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+
+THE ULTIMATUM, DECLARATION OF WAR, AND COMMENCEMENT OF CAMPAIGN.
+
+
+On December 11th the boundary award was delivered to the Zulus
+by four gentlemen selected for the purpose, who, by previous
+arrangement, met the king’s envoys at the Lower Tugela Drift. The
+award itself, as we already know, was in favour of the Zulus;
+nevertheless it is impossible to read the terms in which it was given
+without feeling that it was reluctantly done. It is fenced in with
+warnings to the Zulus against transgressing the limits assigned to
+them, without a word assuring them that _their_ rights also shall
+in future be respected; and, while touching on _Zulu_ aggressions
+on _Boers_ in the late disputed territory, it says nothing of those
+committed _by_ Boers.
+
+But perhaps the most remarkable phrase in the whole award is that in
+which Sir Bartle Frere gives the Zulus to understand that _they_ will
+have to pay the compensation due to the ejected Transvaal farmers,
+while he entirely ignores all that can be said on the other side of
+injuries to property and person inflicted on Zulus in the disputed
+territory (of which the Blue-books contain ample proof), not to speak
+of the rights and advantages so long withheld from them, and now
+decided to be their due.
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer plainly took a very different view on this point
+when he summed up the judgment of the Commissioners (2220, p. 388),
+and added as follows: “I would venture to suggest that it is a fair
+matter for consideration if those Transvaal subjects, who have been
+induced ... under the sanction, expressed or tacit, of the Government
+of the Republic, to settle and remain in that portion of the country,
+have not a claim for compensation from their Government for the
+individual losses they may sustain.”
+
+Sir Bartle Frere, starting with phrases which might be supposed
+to agree with the above, gradually and ingeniously shifts his
+ground through propositions for compensation to be paid to farmers
+“_required_ or _obliged_ to leave” (omitting the detail of _who is to
+pay_), and then for compensation to be paid to farmers _wishing_ to
+remove, until he finally arrives, by a process peculiarly his own,
+at a measure intended to “secure private rights of property,” which
+eventually blossomed out into a scheme for maintaining, in spite of
+the award, the Boer farmers on the land claimed by them, which we
+shall presently relate in full. Although nothing appeared in the
+award itself on this point, the whole tone of it was calculated to
+take the edge off the pleasure which the justice done them at last
+would naturally give the Zulus, and it was promptly followed up by an
+“ultimatum” from the High Commissioner calculated to absorb their
+whole attention.
+
+This “ultimatum” contained the following thirteen demands, and was
+delivered on the same day with the award, an hour later:
+
+  1. Surrender of Sihayo’s three sons and brother to be tried by
+  the Natal courts.
+
+  2. Payment of a fine of five hundred head of cattle for the
+  outrages committed by the above, and for Ketshwayo’s delay in
+  complying with the request (N.B., not _demand_) of the Natal
+  Government for the surrender of the offenders.
+
+  3. Payment of a hundred head of cattle for the offence committed
+  against Messrs. Smith and Deighton (N.B., twenty days were
+  allowed for compliance with the above demands, _i.e._ until
+  December 31st, inclusive).
+
+  4. Surrender of the Swazi chief Umbilini, and others to be named
+  hereafter, to be tried by the Transvaal courts (N.B., no time was
+  fixed for compliance with this demand).
+
+  5. Observance of the coronation “promises.”
+
+  6. That the Zulu army be disbanded, and the men allowed to go
+  home.
+
+  7. That the Zulu military system be discontinued, and other
+  military regulations adopted, to be decided upon after
+  consultation with the Great Council and British Representatives.
+
+  8. That every man, when he comes to man’s estate, shall be free
+  to marry.
+
+  9. All missionaries and their converts, who until 1877 lived in
+  Zululand, shall be allowed to return and reoccupy their stations.
+
+  10. All such missionaries shall be allowed to teach, and
+  any Zulu, if he chooses, shall be free to listen to their
+  teaching.[111]
+
+  11. A British Agent shall be allowed to reside in Zululand, who
+  will see that the above provisions are carried out.
+
+  12. All disputes in which a missionary or European (_e.g._ trader
+  or traveller) is concerned, shall be heard by the king in
+  public, and in presence of the Resident.
+
+  13. No sentence of expulsion from Zululand shall be carried out
+  until it has been approved by the Resident.
+
+  N.B.—Ten days more were allowed for compliance with the above
+  demands (4-13).
+
+_The Natal Colonist_, August 21st, 1879, condenses the opinions of
+Sir B. Pine upon the ultimatum—from his article in “The Contemporary
+Review,” June, 1879—thus:
+
+“He thinks the depriving Messrs. Smith and Deighton of their
+handkerchiefs and pipes hardly a matter deserving of a place in such
+a document; that the Sihayo and Umbilini affairs were more serious,
+but that ‘full reparation ... might have been obtained by friendly
+negotiations.’ He does not attach to the promises alleged to have
+been made by Cetshwayo ‘the force of a treaty which we were bound to
+see executed.’ And while approving of a British Resident being placed
+in the Zulu country, he frankly recalls the fact that ‘Cetshwayo has
+himself, on more than one occasion, requested such an arrangement.’
+‘At the same time,’ he adds, ‘I think that the powers proposed to be
+invested in this officer are more than are necessary or expedient,
+and I would especially refer to those relating to the protection of
+missionaries. Christianity ought not to be enforced at the point of
+the sword.’ In reference to Cetshwayo’s alleged coronation promises,
+we may note in passing that Sir B. Pine is careful to point out that
+one chief reason for his sanctioning that expedition was ‘out of
+deference to Mr. Shepstone’s judgment;’ and that it was expressly
+stipulated by the High Commissioner that no British troops should
+accompany Mr. Shepstone, ‘so that Her Majesty’s Government might
+not be compromised in the matter.’ With such a stipulation it is
+amazing that anyone should still contend that Cetshwayo entered into
+engagements so solemn as to call for invasion of his country to
+punish the breach of them.”
+
+And the Special Correspondent of _The Cape Argus_ writes: “As regards
+the alleged coronation engagements, Dunn affirms that no undertaking
+was made by, or even asked from, Cetshwayo. In the act of coronation,
+Mr. (now Sir T.) Shepstone gave to the king a piece of paternal
+counsel, and the conditions were in reality nothing more than
+recommendations urged upon his acceptance by the Special Commissioner.
+
+“Lord Kimberley, who was Secretary of State for the Colonies at the
+time of Sir T. Shepstone’s installation of Cetshwayo, spoke upon this
+subject in the House of Lords;” which _The Daily News_, March 26th,
+1879, reports as follows:
+
+“With respect to the so-called coronation promises, nothing had more
+astonished him in these papers than to learn that these promises were
+supposed to constitute an engagement between us and the Zulu nation.
+He happened to have had some concern in that matter; and if he had
+supposed that Sir T. Shepstone, in asking for these promises from
+Cetshwayo, had rendered us responsible to the Zulu nation to see that
+they were enforced, he would not have lost a mail in disavowing any
+such responsibility. He was supported in the view which he took by
+the late Colonial Secretary (Lord Carnarvon). The fact was that these
+were friendly assurances, given in response to friendly advice, and
+constituted no engagement. But Sir B. Frere put these ‘coronation
+promises’ in the foreground.” Sir M. Hicks-Beach, also, says (2144,
+p. 1): “It is obvious that the position of Sir T. Shepstone in this
+matter was that of a friendly counsellor, giving advice to the king
+as to the good government of the country.”
+
+The demands which we have recorded were delivered to the Zulu envoys,
+who were not allowed to discuss or comment upon them, on the ground
+that the Commission had no authority for that purpose. The envoys,
+indeed, appeared seriously concerned by their import. They denied
+that the coronation stipulations had ever been disregarded, and said
+that they could not understand why the Zulu army should be disbanded;
+the army was a national custom with them as with the English. They
+also asked for an extension of time, and considered that on such
+important matters no specified time should have been fixed; the reply
+to which request was that the time was considered ample.
+
+Sir B. Frere, in his covering despatch to the Secretary of State,
+remarks that the “enclosed extracts from demi-official letters,” from
+the Hon. Mr. Brownlee and the Hon. Mr. Littleton, “give an outline
+of the proceedings, and show that the messages were _carefully
+delivered_, _well explained_, and _thoroughly understood_, copies
+of the English text with Zulu translations being given to the Zulu
+envoys.” On turning to “the enclosed extracts,” however, we do not
+find in them a single word of the sort from either gentleman, while
+the extract from Mr. Littleton’s letter consists of not a dozen lines
+describing the spot where the meeting took place, and in which the
+writer’s opinions are limited to these: “they (the Zulus) seemed to
+take the award very quietly,” but “were evidently disturbed” by the
+ultimatum, and “Mr. Shepstone seemed to me to manage very well.” The
+young gentleman could not well say any more, as he did not know a
+word of Zulu; but one is puzzled to know how Sir B. Frere draws his
+deductions from either extract. How far the opinions of the other
+honourable gentleman are to be depended upon, may be gathered from
+the following assertion made by him some months after the Boundary
+Commissioners had deliberately decided that the Boers had no claim
+whatever to the disputed territory, but that it would be expedient to
+allow them to retain the Utrecht district.
+
+“The falsehood of the Zulu king with regard to the Utrecht land
+question,” says Mr. Brownlee, “is quite on a par with his other
+actions. After misleading the Natal Government upon the merits of the
+case, it is now discovered on the clearest and most incontrovertible
+proof[112] that a formal cession was made of this disputed land to
+the Transvaal Republic.”
+
+The special correspondent of _The Cape Argus_, however, writes about
+this time as follows: “Dunn states that Cetshwayo does not, even
+now, know fully the contents of the ultimatum, and still less of the
+subsequent memorandum.[113] The document was read over once, and its
+length was such (2222, pp. 203-9)—six pages of the Blue-book—that the
+messengers could not possibly fix the whole of it in their memory.”
+True, a copy was given to Dunn himself; but, for sufficient reasons
+of his own, he did not make known the contents of the document in
+person, but sent word to the king by his own messengers, between whom
+and the indunas there was a considerable discrepancy. According to
+Dunn, Cetshwayo was in a great fury upon hearing the word of the High
+Commissioner (? as to the maintenance of Boer “private rights” over
+his land). He reproached his adviser with having thwarted his purpose
+to exact satisfaction at the hands of the Dutch, and doubly blamed
+him for having represented the English as just in their intercourse
+and friendly in their intentions. Until this time he had thought, as
+Dunn himself had, that the congregation of troops upon his borders
+represented nothing but an idle scare. But he saw at length that the
+English had thrown the bullock’s skin over his head, while they had
+been devouring the tid-bits of the carcass.
+
+The three causes alleged in the ultimatum for war—the raid of
+Sihayo’s sons, the assault on Messrs. Smith and Deighton, and the
+proceedings of Umbilini—occurred long after Sir B. Frere had been
+preparing for war, in the full expectation that the Border Commission
+would decide against the Zulu claims, and that Cetshwayo would not
+acquiesce peacefully in such a decision. It would seem, indeed, from
+his remarks on the subject (Correspondence, Letters II. and IV.),
+that he would have even set aside the decision of the Commissioners,
+if he had found it possible to do so. Although he failed in doing
+this, he sought to attain practically the same end by means of a
+remarkable “memorandum,” prepared and signed by himself—not submitted
+to Sir Henry Bulwer, but “_prematurely_” published in the Natal
+newspapers.
+
+The memorandum in question was on the appointment of a Resident in
+Zululand, and, as Sir Bartle Frere himself says, “it was intended to
+explain for Cetshwayo’s benefit what was the nature of the cession
+to him of the ceded territory,” and it contained the following
+clause: “It is intended that in that district (the late disputed
+territory) individual rights of property, which were obtained under
+the Transvaal Government, shall be respected and maintained, so
+that any Transvaal farmers, who obtained rights from the Government
+of the Republic, and who may now elect to remain on the territory,
+may possess under British guarantee the same rights they would have
+possessed had they been grantees holding from the Zulu king under the
+guarantee of the great Zulu council.”
+
+The _whole_ of the disputed territory had been apportioned in farms
+to Transvaal subjects, and without doubt every one of these farms
+would immediately be claimed, since their value would be immensely
+raised by the fact that in future they would be held “under British
+guarantee.” Therefore, to thus maintain the farmers upon them without
+regard to the wishes of the Zulu king and nation was simply to take
+away piecemeal with one hand what had just been given as a whole with
+the other.
+
+This “memorandum” was hailed with triumph by some of the colonial
+papers, and the news that, after all, the Zulus were to get no solid
+satisfaction from the award, soon circulated amongst all classes, not
+excluding the Zulus themselves.
+
+It was upon this subject that the “Correspondence” between Sir Bartle
+Frere and the Bishop of Natal, already referred to, commenced. In
+December, 1878, the High Commissioner was good enough to invite
+the Bishop, both by message and personally, to “criticise” his
+policy towards the Zulus. The invitation, indeed, came far too
+late for any arguments or information, which the Bishop might be
+able to afford, to be of the very slightest use. However, the High
+Commissioner desired criticism, and received it in a series of
+letters, which—except the last two, withheld for some reason best
+known to himself—were published, with Sir B. Frere’s replies, in the
+Blue-books.
+
+The Bishop pointed out that, under the interpretation of this
+memorandum, “the award gives back the land in name only to the Zulus,
+whereas in reality Ketshwayo will have no control over it; he will
+not be able to exercise authority over his own people living on it,
+without coming into collision immediately with their Boer masters,
+who would fiercely resent any intrusion on his part on their farms;
+he will not be able to send any of his people to live on it, or any
+of his cattle to graze on it, or even to assign places in it to such
+of his people as may elect to move from the Boer to the Zulu side
+of the new boundary.”[114] To which Sir Bartle replies, that he had
+“a strong impression[115] that, if Cetshwayo were simply told the
+disputed land was assigned to him, he would at once conclude that it
+was his in full Zulu sovereignty;” which he assumed to be impossible
+with regard to any land which had once been under the British flag,
+while to eject a settler who had bought the land from the Transvaal
+Government, in the belief that it could maintain him upon it, he
+regarded as an “unjust and immoral act.” In point of fact, the land
+in question could only have been looked upon as “under the British
+flag,” in trust for the rightful possessors, and the farmers had
+settled upon it in the full knowledge that the title to it was in
+dispute; while, even had it been otherwise as to the latter point,
+the only just claim that could be raised would be against the Boer
+Government, or its representative, and certainly not against the
+right of the Zulu people to be restored to actual occupation of the
+land.
+
+But that from the first, and long before he left Capetown for Natal,
+the High Commissioner was preparing for war with the Zulus, is
+evident from his despatch and telegram of January 26th, 1878 (quoted
+from at page 179), in the former of which he speaks of the delay
+caused by the border inquiry being no disadvantage, as, besides other
+reasons, it “will increase our means of defending whatever we may
+find to be our unquestionable rights;” and in the latter he says
+again: “I hope the delay caused will not be great, and whatever there
+is will have compensating advantages, for I have some hopes of being
+able to strengthen your hands.”
+
+These phrases, indeed, might merely refer to Sir Bartle Frere’s
+desire to be “ready to defend ourselves against further
+aggressions;” but certain statements made by Commodore Sullivan show
+that he had already in view the invasion of Zululand.
+
+Extracts from these statements run as follows:
+
+“I am informed by the Governor (Sir B. Frere) that there is every
+chance of hostility in the debateable land between the Transvaal,
+Zululand, and Natal.”—December 16th, 1877 (2000, p. 45).
+
+“His Excellency (Sir B. Frere) pointed out to me that, as it appeared
+almost certain that serious complications must shortly arise with the
+Zulu tribe of Kafirs on the borders of Natal and the Transvaal, which
+will necessitate active operations, he considered it better that the
+_Active_ should remain here, in order to render such assistance by
+sea and land as may be practicable.”—April 12th, 1878 (2144, p. 32).
+
+“The object of my visit here was ... to make myself acquainted
+with such points on the (Zulu) coast as might be available for
+co-operating with Her Majesty’s land forces by landing troops or
+stores.[116]
+
+“It had been my intention (abandoned by Sir H. Bulwer’s desire) to
+have examined the north of the Tugela River both by land and sea,
+also a reported landing-place situated almost thirty miles eastward
+of the Tugela by sea.”
+
+The High Commissioner was plainly determined not to allow the Zulus
+the slightest _law_, which, indeed, was wise in the interests of war,
+as there was considerable fear that, in spite of all grievances and
+vexations, Cetshwayo, knowing full well, as he certainly did, that
+collision with the English must eventually result in his destruction,
+might prefer half a loaf to no bread, and submit to our exactions
+with what grace he could. And so probably he would; for, from all
+accounts, every effort was made by the king to collect the fines of
+cattle, to propitiate the Government.
+
+Sir Bartle Frere, accordingly, was very particular in requesting Sir
+Henry Bulwer to give Cetshwayo notice (C. 2222, p. 222) that “_rigid
+punctuality with regard to time will be insisted on, and, unless
+observed, such steps as may appear necessary will be immediately
+taken to ensure compliance_,” which Sir H. Bulwer notifies to the
+Zulu king upon the same day, December 16th (C. 2308, p. 31).
+
+Two days later Mr. John Dunn wrote to say that he had received a
+message from the king (2222, p. 227), requesting him “to write and
+say that he agrees to the demands of giving up Sihayo’s sons and
+brother, and the fines of cattle; but begs that, should the number
+of days (twenty) have expired before the arrival of the cattle, His
+Excellency will take no immediate action, as, owing to the many
+heavy rains[117] we have had since the meeting of His Excellency’s
+Commissioners and his indunas, they have not been able to reach him
+yet; and Sihayo’s sons being at their kraals, which are some way from
+him, it will take some days to send for them.”
+
+“On the other demands he will give his answer on consulting his
+indunas.”
+
+Yet Sir Bartle Frere declares (P. P. [C. 2454] p. 136) that Cetshwayo
+“was resolved on war rather than on compliance with any demand of
+ours.”
+
+Bishop Schreuder’s opinion, reported through Mr. Fannin on December
+22nd (2308, p. 31), was that all the demands would be agreed to
+except that of the disbandment of the army and the abolition of the
+military system. “The king and nation will consider it a humiliation,
+and a descent from their proud position as independent Zulus to
+the lower and degrading position of Natal Kafirs, to agree to this
+demand. I asked,” says Mr. Fannin, “if the announcement that the
+restriction on marriage would be removed would not reconcile the
+young men to the change. He (Bishop Schreuder) thinks not; they will
+stand by their king, and fight for the old institutions of their
+country.”
+
+The king’s request for some indulgence as to time was peremptorily
+refused, and was looked upon as “a pitiful evasion,” on the grounds
+that he had already had four months to consider the question of
+Sihayo’s sons. In point of fact, however, the first “demand” had only
+been made a week before, and, until then, the word “request” having
+been used, the king was at liberty to offer atonement for the offence
+other than the surrender of the offenders, as Sir Henry Bulwer
+himself suggested (2222, p. 173), by paying a fine of five thousand
+head of cattle from the Zulu nation.
+
+Sir B. Frere’s answer to Cetshwayo through Mr. Dunn (2222, p. 227)
+was, “That the word of Government as already given, cannot now be
+altered.
+
+“Unless the prisoners and cattle are given up within the term
+specified, Her Majesty’s troops will advance. But in consideration
+of the disposition expressed in Mr. Dunn’s letter to comply with the
+demands of Government, the troops will be halted at convenient posts
+within the Zulu border, and will there await the expiration of the
+term of thirty days without, in the meantime, taking any hostile
+action unless it is provoked by the Zulus.”
+
+And John Dunn adds on his own account (2308, p. 34), that the
+king evidently does not attach sufficient importance to the time
+stipulated. The cattle, he said, “are still being collected, and it
+will be impossible now for them to be up in time.” John Dunn in the
+same letter put in a petition on behalf of his own cattle and people,
+saying that the latter would be willing to join in with any force
+should they be required.
+
+Meanwhile, from accounts given by Mr. Fannin (2308, pp. 35 and 37),
+by Mr. Robson (2242, pp. 11, 12) (2308, p. 35), by Mr. Fynney (2308,
+p. 36), and from other sources, it is plain that Cetshwayo was doing
+his utmost to collect the required cattle in time, though hampered
+in doing so by the extreme difficulty of complying in a hurry with
+the other demands implying such radical changes in the administration
+of the country, and exceedingly distressed at the turn affairs were
+taking. Every report shows plainly enough that, far from desiring
+war, and looking out for an opportunity to try their strength with
+the English, the Zulu king and people, or the major part of it, were
+thrown into utmost consternation by the menacing appearance of their
+hitherto friendly neighbours. But all explanations were disregarded,
+all requests for time treated as impudent pretexts, preparations on
+our part for an invasion of Zululand were hurried on, while every
+sign of agitation (the natural consequences of our own attitude) on
+the other side of the border was construed into an intention on the
+part of the Zulu king to attack Natal, and urged as an added reason
+for our beginning hostilities. There were, at that time, no grounds
+whatsoever for this supposition. It is plain enough that, when it
+became apparent that war would be forced upon him by us, the Zulu
+king contemplated nothing but self-defence, and that, during these
+preliminaries to the unhappy campaign of 1879, there were numerous
+occasions on which, by the exercise of a little patience, justice,
+and moderation, any ruler less bent on conquering Zululand than was
+Sir Bartle Frere could have brought matters to a peaceful issue,
+without the loss of honour, men, and money which England has since
+sustained.
+
+Lord Chelmsford (then Lieut.-General the Hon. F. Thesiger) arrived
+in Natal in August, 1878, and at once began his preparations for
+the expected campaign. One of the measures upon which great stress
+was laid was that of forming a native contingent to act with the
+British troops. The original scheme for the organisation of this
+contingent in case of necessity had been prepared and carefully
+worked out by Colonel Durnford, R.E., and was based on his thorough
+knowledge of the natives. During the eight years of his life in South
+Africa he had had ample opportunity of learning, by experience, how
+utterly and mischievously useless was the plan, hitherto invariably
+followed, of employing disorganised, untrained bodies of natives as
+troops under their own leaders, without any proper discipline or
+control. The bravest men in the world would be apt to fail under such
+circumstances; while mere bands of untaught savages, unaccustomed to
+fighting and half-armed, had repeatedly proved themselves in former
+campaigns excellent for running away, but otherwise useless except as
+messengers, servants, and camp-followers. Added to which there was
+no possibility of preventing such “troops” as these committing every
+sort of lawless violence upon the wounded or captured enemy.
+
+Colonel Durnford’s scheme was intended to meet both difficulties,
+and, when laid before the General on his arrival in Natal, met with
+his unqualified approval. So much was he struck with it that he was
+at first disposed to entrust the organisation and chief command of
+the entire contingent to one who, by the ability and completeness
+with which he had worked out the scheme, proved himself the fittest
+person to carry it out, and take command of the whole force. But the
+General changed his mind, and decided to divide the native contingent
+amongst the various columns, the details of its distribution being as
+follows:
+
+The 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent of three battalions
+(Commandant Montgomery, Major Bengough, and Captain Cherry), and
+five troops mounted natives formed No. 2 Column, commanded by
+Lieut.-Colonel Durnford.
+
+The 2nd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (two battalions, under
+Major Graves) was attached to No. 1 Column, commanded by Colonel
+Pearson.
+
+The 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (two battalions, under
+Commandant Lonsdale) was attached to No. 3 Column, commanded by
+Colonel Glyn, and about two hundred Natal Native Contingent were
+attached to No. 4 Column, commanded by Colonel Wood.
+
+Each battalion of Native Contingent was to consist of 5 staff and
+90 officers and non-commissioned officers (white), and 110 officers
+and non-commissioned officers and 900 privates (natives); the
+native non-commissioned officer being armed with a gun, and being a
+section-leader of 9 men armed with assegai and shield.
+
+Lord Chelmsford speaks in various despatches (C. 2234) of this Native
+Contingent in the following terms:
+
+“The Lieut.-Governor, I am happy to say, has acceded to the request
+I made some little time ago for the services of six thousand Natal
+natives. I hope to be in a position to equip and officer them very
+shortly” (p. 25).
+
+“At the time of my arrival in the colony, three months ago, these
+natives possessed no military organisation, nor had any arms provided
+for them by Government.”
+
+“The Natal Government have within the last fourteen days allowed me
+to raise and organise seven thousand natives for service within or
+without the border” (p. 26).
+
+“The arrival of these officers (special service officers from
+England) has also enabled me to place Imperial officers in command of
+some of the battalions of native levies.”...
+
+“The Natal Contingent consists of three regiments, two of two
+battalions and one of three” (p. 39).
+
+“There are in addition five troops of mounted natives and three
+companies of pioneers.”...
+
+“The pioneers have been raised, officered, and equipped under the
+orders of the Natal Government, and are now placed at my disposal.
+The remainder of the Contingent have been raised at the cost and
+under the orders of the Imperial authorities” (p. 40).
+
+In none of his despatches is there mention of any special officer
+in connection with this native force, but the following officers
+were responsible for the organisation of the various regiments: No.
+1 Regiment and mounted contingent, Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E.;
+No. 2 Regiment, Major Graves; No. 3 Regiment, Commandant Lonsdale.
+Great difficulties appear to have been thrown in the way of the
+proper equipment, etc. of the native levies; but by untiring effort
+and personal determination, better arrangements for pay, clothing,
+and discipline were made for (at all events, a portion of) the levy
+than had been known amongst South African troops. The indiscriminate
+appointment of officers caused considerable trouble, illustrative
+of which we may mention an anecdote. Men were repeatedly sent to
+Lieut.-Colonel Durnford with orders from the military secretary
+that they were to receive commissions, some of these unfitted by
+disposition and education for the duties required of them. A friend
+has lately furnished an instance very much to the point. “A young
+fellow came one day to Colonel Durnford from Colonel Crealock, who
+said he had served in the old colony, and boasted that _he_ knew how
+to make Kafirs fight. ‘How is that?’ was the inquiry made. ‘Oh!’
+replied the youth, ‘just to get behind them with a sjambok (_i.e._
+whip)—that’s the way to do it!’ ‘All right,’ replied the Colonel
+quietly; ‘I have just one piece of advice to give you though—_make
+your will_ before you start! If you’re not stabbed by your own men,
+you will deserve it.’”
+
+How successful was the training of the men of the 2nd Column may
+be judged by the behaviour of the “Natal Native Horse,” a body of
+mounted men (Basuto, Edendale, and Zikali natives) who fought at
+Isandhlwana; and did right good service throughout the campaign.[118]
+He also raised, equipped, and trained the three companies of Native
+Pioneers, organising two field-parks, and providing complete bridge
+equipment for crossing the Tugela; besides preparing, mainly from
+his own personal observations (having been at Ulundi in 1873, and in
+Zululand on many occasions), the map of Zululand in universal use
+during the campaign, and mentioned in despatches as “Durnford’s map.”
+
+In reply to Sir Bartle Frere’s inquiries as to proposed movements of
+troops up to Natal, Sir H. Bulwer writes, July 18th, 1878, that in
+his opinion “it is desirable under the present circumstances, and
+pending the final decision in the matter of the boundary dispute, to
+avoid as much as possible any military demonstration, as liable to
+be misunderstood and to be interpreted as showing our intention to
+settle the question by force. The delay, too, that has occurred since
+the sitting of the Commission might be attributed by the Zulu king to
+our desire to make preparations, and it might be thought that we were
+playing false.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] p. 395).
+
+And here we may appropriately refer to the opinion expressed by the
+Home Government at a later date.
+
+Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes to Sir B. Frere, 21st November, 1878:
+“I trust that ... Cetywayo may have been informed that a decision
+regarding the disputed boundary would speedily be communicated to
+him. His complaint that the Lieut.-Governor of Natal ‘is hiding from
+him the answer that has come from across the sea, about the land
+boundary question, and is only making an excuse for taking time, so
+as to surprise him,’ is not altogether an unnatural one for a native
+chief situated in his circumstances, who is necessarily ignorant of
+much that has passed on this subject, and of many of the causes to
+which the delay is attributable. But it is a misunderstanding which
+it should be the earnest endeavour of the Government to remove, and I
+am confident that there is no need to impress upon you the importance
+of losing no time in dealing with this question or the beneficial
+effect which its satisfactory settlement may be expected to have upon
+the strained relations which you describe as now existing between
+the colony of Natal and the Zulu nation.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] p. 322).
+
+We must now briefly run through the principal points in despatches
+bearing on the question of increasing the military strength in Natal.
+
+Sir B. Frere, writing from Cape Town on September 10th, says: “I
+have consulted General Thesiger on the subject. He is very unwilling
+to ask for reinforcements on the Natal border without the full
+concurrence of the Government of that colony, and I understand that
+His Excellency Sir H. Bulwer is specially anxious that nothing should
+be done in Natal which could possibly justify to the Zulu chief
+the belief that we were preparing for active hostilities against
+him. I confess that, as at present informed, I very imperfectly
+comprehend the grounds on which the objections of His Excellency the
+Lieut.-Governor, as I understand them, to strengthening the Natal
+frontier are based.[119] They will doubtless be more fully explained
+when I have the advantage of personal communication with him. In
+the meantime I feel quite certain that the preservation or speedy
+restoration of peace will be rendered much more certain if General
+Thesiger had two more battalions of Her Majesty’s Army within his
+reach.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] pp. 282, 283).
+
+On September 14th, referring to the above despatch, Sir B. Frere
+says he has “since received a telegraphic communication from
+General Thesiger, in which he expresses his views in regard to his
+military requirements in the event of hostilities breaking out with
+the Zulus.” The General asks for six more special duty officers,
+and fifteen captains or subalterns for transport duties. “General
+Thesiger considers that an addition of two regiments would be
+essential, and that the presence of a cavalry regiment would be of
+enormous advantage” (_ibid._ p. 254).
+
+From Durban, Sir B. Frere telegraphs on September 23rd to Sir
+M. Hicks-Beach: “I find that the urgency of supporting General
+Thesiger’s request is much greater even than I supposed. I trust
+there will be no delay in complying with his request to its fullest
+extent” (_ibid._ p. 255).
+
+There had been serious and disturbing reports of a Zulu force being
+assembled on the Tugela River, for the ostensible purpose of hunting,
+with reference to which Sir H. Bulwer writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach,
+14th September, “on the subject of the gathering of a Zulu force
+within a short distance of our border across the Tugela. You will
+learn from these papers that the gathering has broken up, and the
+Zulus returned home” (_ibid._ p. 270).
+
+Sir M. Hicks-Beach, on October 17th, replies to Sir B. Frere’s
+despatches of 14th and 23rd September, that “arrangements will be
+made for the early despatch of some additional officers for special
+duty. Her Majesty’s Government are, however, not prepared to comply
+with the request for a reinforcement of troops. All the information
+that has hitherto reached them with respect to the position of
+affairs in Zululand appears to them to justify a confident hope that,
+by the exercise of prudence, and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of
+forbearance and reasonable compromise, it will be possible to avert
+the very serious evil of a war with Cetywayo; and they cannot but
+think that the forces now at your disposal in South Africa, together
+with the additional officers about to be sent, should suffice to meet
+any other emergency that may arise, without a further increase to the
+Imperial troops” (_ibid._ p. 273).
+
+On September 30th, Sir B. Frere writes from Pietermaritzburg: “I
+regret that I find the position of affairs in this colony far more
+critical even than I expected;” and, after a very exaggerated
+description of the state of affairs, he says: “An attempt of native
+tribes to combine to resist the white man and drive him back has
+been long foreseen. There can be no doubt that this design is now in
+process of attempted execution” (_ibid._ pp. 278-82).
+
+Of the truth of this startling assertion, let Sir H. Bulwer’s
+despatches, as well as after-events, speak.
+
+Enclosed in this despatch of Sir B. Frere is General Thesiger’s
+memorandum on the military requirements, and his sketch for a
+defensive scheme for Natal, for which he requires “6000 natives, 600
+mounted men, 6 guns, and 3 battalions of British infantry;” but he
+remarks: “I cannot, however, conceal from myself that security from
+invasion depends almost entirely upon the forbearance of Cetywayo;”
+and says, “for defensive purposes alone, therefore, Natal and
+Transvaal colonies require 3 battalions of infantry in addition to
+what they have already got” (_ibid._ pp. 285, 286).
+
+In reply, Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes, 21st November: “The several
+circumstances which you have reported as tending to cause an open
+rupture do not appear, in themselves, to present any difficulties
+which are not capable of a peaceful solution.... On a full review,
+therefore, of all the circumstances reported by you, and influenced
+by the strong representations made by Lord Chelmsford as to the
+insufficiency of his present force to ensure the safety of the
+European residents in Natal and the Transvaal, Her Majesty’s
+Government have felt themselves justified in directing that further
+reinforcements of troops, as well as the additional officers recently
+placed under orders for special service, should be sent out to Natal,
+and the necessary steps will at once be taken for this purpose. But
+in conveying to you the decision at which, in compliance with your
+urgent representations, Her Majesty’s Government have arrived, it is
+my duty to impress upon you that in supplying these reinforcements it
+is the desire of Her Majesty’s Government not to furnish means for a
+campaign of invasion and conquest, but to afford such protection as
+may be necessary at this juncture to the lives and property of the
+colonists. Though the present aspect of affairs is menacing in a high
+degree, I can by no means arrive at the conclusion that war with the
+Zulus should be unavoidable, and I am confident that you, in concert
+with Sir H. Bulwer, will use every effort to overcome the existing
+difficulties by judgment and forbearance, and to avoid an evil so
+much to be deprecated as a Zulu war” (_ibid._ pp. 320, 321).
+
+On November 11th, the Lieut.-General says that he has just been
+permitted by the Natal Government to raise and organise 7000
+natives, and ventures “to express an opinion that the demand for
+two extra battalions cannot be considered unreasonable even for
+purely defensive purposes;” but he goes on to say: “a defensive plan,
+however, cannot be considered as satisfactory unless there is the
+possibility of taking the offensive at the right moment. This I am
+doing my best to prepare for; and, so soon as my native contingent is
+mobilised, I shall be ready, so far as my limited means will allow,
+to enter Zululand, should such a measure become necessary.”—(P. P.
+[C. 2222] p. 19).
+
+On December 18th, Sir M. Hicks-Beach says: “I take this occasion,
+however, of reminding you that it is the desire of Her Majesty’s
+Government, in sending these reinforcements, to assist the local
+Government as far as possible in providing for the protection of the
+settlers in the present emergency, and not to furnish the means for
+any aggressive operations not directly connected with the defence of
+Her Majesty’s possessions and subjects” (_ibid._ p. 21).
+
+On December 2nd, Sir B. Frere forwards copies of memoranda by Sir T.
+Shepstone and Mr. Brownlee, in which the former proposes measures
+which “involve the extinction of the Zulu power as it now is, and
+the attempt to adopt them must, if decided upon, be made with the
+knowledge that the Zulu chief will oppose them, whatever course the
+headmen and common people may adopt” (_ibid._ p. 134).
+
+Mr. Brownlee says plainly: “The time has arrived for decisive action;
+we will never again have so favourable an opportunity as the present;
+if it is lost, sooner or later we will be taken at a disadvantage”
+(_ibid._ p. 138).
+
+On December 10th, Sir B. Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach: “The
+chance of avoiding war under such circumstances by any exercise of
+prudence, or by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance or
+reasonable compromise, may depend upon ourselves or upon the Zulus,
+or upon the nature of the issues pending between us.... Can we then
+rest on an armed truce?... After the most anxious consideration, I
+can arrive at no other conclusion than that it is impossible to evade
+the necessity for now settling this Zulu question thoroughly and
+finally ... there is clearly no possibility of now evading bringing
+matters to an issue with the Zulus” (_ibid._ pp. 183-85).
+
+On the 23rd January, 1879, Sir M. Hicks-Beach acknowledges the
+receipt of Sir B. Frere’s despatches containing “the demands with
+which Cetywayo has been called upon to comply, together with your
+own descriptions of the situation with which you have to deal, as
+well as other very important memoranda by Sir H. Bulwer, Sir T.
+Shepstone, and Mr. Brownlee,” and says, “I may observe that the
+communications which had previously been received from you had not
+entirely prepared them” (Her Majesty’s Government) “for the course
+which you have deemed it necessary to take. The representations
+made by Lord Chelmsford and yourself last autumn as to the urgent
+need of strengthening Her Majesty’s forces in South Africa were
+based upon the imminent danger of an invasion of Natal by the Zulus,
+and the inadequate means at that time at your disposal for meeting
+it. In order to afford protection to the lives and property of the
+colonists, the reinforcements asked for were supplied, and, in
+informing you of the decision of Her Majesty’s Government, I took
+the opportunity of impressing upon you the importance of using every
+effort to avoid war. But the terms which you have dictated to the
+Zulu king, however necessary to relieve the colony in future from
+an impending and increasing danger, are evidently such as he may
+not improbably refuse, even at the risk of war; and I regret that
+the necessity for immediate action should have appeared to you so
+imperative as to preclude you from incurring the delay which would
+have been involved in consulting Her Majesty’s Government upon a
+subject of so much importance as the terms which Cetywayo should be
+required to accept before those terms were actually presented to the
+Zulu king” (_ibid._ pp. 187, 188).
+
+The preliminary arrangements for the campaign were the formation of
+four columns, with sufficient transport, etc. to enter Zululand at
+different points, and concentrate on Ulundi.
+
+No. 1 Column, Colonel Pearson, to assemble on the Lower Tugela,
+garrison Fort Pearson, and cross and encamp on the Zulu side, under
+the protection of the guns of the fort.
+
+This Column at first was composed of 2 guns Royal Artillery, 1
+company Royal Engineers, 2nd Battalion “The Buffs,” 99th Regiment,
+Naval Brigade (2 guns and 1 Gatling), 1 squadron Mounted Infantry,
+about 200 Natal Volunteers, 2nd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (2
+battalions), and 1 company Natal Native Pioneers.
+
+No. 2 Column, Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E., to cover the Tugela, and
+co-operate with Colonel Pearson, was almost entirely composed of
+natives. Its strength, a rocket battery, 1st Regiment (3 battalions)
+Natal Native Contingent, 315 “Natal Native Horse,” and 1 company
+Natal Native Pioneers.
+
+No. 3 Column, Colonel Glyn, C.B., to cross at Rorke’s Drift, when
+the time granted the Zulu king had expired. “On the advance being
+ordered,” it would “require two days for this column to reach a good
+military position;” and it was to keep up communications “with the
+columns on the left and right.” Strength of column, 6 guns Royal
+Artillery, 1 squadron Mounted Infantry, 1-24th Regiment, 2-24th
+Regiment, about 200 Natal Volunteers, 150 Mounted Police, and 3rd
+Regiment (2nd Battalion) Natal Native Contingent, also one company
+Natal Native Pioneers. A company of Royal Engineers was ordered to
+join this column.
+
+No. 4 Column, Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B., to advance to the Blood
+River. Strength, 6 guns Royal Artillery, 1-13th Regiment, 90th
+Regiment, Frontier Light Horse, some 200 Native Contingent; and a
+small Dutch force was expected to join this column.
+
+A 5th Column (which had been operating against Sekukuni) was under
+the command of Colonel Rowlands, V.C., C.B., composed of the 80th
+Regiment, three guns, and mounted irregulars.
+
+The strength of the columns is given as:
+
+                Imperial      Native    Conductors
+                   and      Contingent.     and     Waggons and Carts.
+             Colonial Troops.             Drivers.
+
+  No. 1 Column    1872         2256         238       266 (144 hired)
+   ”  2   ”          5         3488          84        30
+   ”  3   ”       1747         2566         293       233 (82    ”  )
+   ”  4   ”       1843          387         162       102 (21    ”  )
+   ”  5   ”       1202          338          25        62 (50    ”  )
+
+Forming a grand total of
+
+     Imperial       Native     Conductors,     Waggons, etc.
+        and       Contingent.     etc.
+  Colonial Troops.
+
+       6669          9035         802               693
+                                           (of which 297 were hired)
+
+with about 1200 horses belonging to cavalry, etc., and 691 horses,
+361 mules, and 5231 oxen. In addition, there were the conductors,
+drivers, etc., and 4572 oxen of the hired waggons.
+
+The columns to operate on the following bases and lines:
+
+  No. 1. Durban—Lower Tugela.
+   ”  2. Pietermaritzburg, Greytown—Middle Drift (Tugela).
+   ”  3. Ladysmith—Rorke’s Drift (Buffalo River).
+   ”  4. Newcastle—Utrecht—Blood River.
+   ”  5. Middleburg—Derby—Pongolo River.
+
+Ulundi being the objective point of the force.
+
+In place of any urgent necessity for commencing the war, putting
+political questions on one side, there were strong military reasons
+for postponing it.
+
+Sir Bartle Frere, in his despatch of 30th June, 1879 (P. P. [C. 2454]
+p. 137), seeks to prove that the time of moving across the border
+was “well chosen,” and accorded with information received, yet the
+fact remains that advice _was_ given that the most favourable time
+for military operations in Zululand was between the periods of summer
+rains and winter grass-fires—_i.e._ the months of March, April,
+and May. In spite of Sir Bartle Frere’s pleas, we must hold that
+no competent “military critic” would recommend invading an enemy’s
+country during the rainy season, when rivers are in flood, plains in
+many cases marshes, and roads almost impassable; especially if the
+invading forces were required to move with a ponderous waggon-train.
+
+Lord Chelmsford himself proves the case: he writes (January 12th)
+on the day after crossing the border: “The country is in a terrible
+state from the rain, and I do not know how we shall manage to get our
+waggons across the valley near Sirayo’s kraals.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p.
+43).
+
+And again on January 14th, from the head-quarter camp, Zululand, near
+Rorke’s Drift, he writes: “Between this camp and Greytown alone, a
+distance of some seventy miles, three rivers are now impassable, and
+waggons have to cross by ferries, a laborious operation requiring
+more skilled labour than we at present have available.
+
+“The road at various points requires the most constant supervision,
+and in some parts the heavy rain frequently dislodges huge boulders
+from the hill-sides overhanging the roadway, and in many places
+watercourses become torrents after an hour’s rain.
+
+“Beyond this camp towards the Izipezi Hill (my first objective point)
+the road will require great labour to make it passable; but strong
+working-parties have already been at work. The transport difficulties
+are augmented by the great mortality in oxen; this is inevitable, but
+it will probably decrease in a few weeks’ time” (_ibid._ p. 47).
+
+It is believed that the first project of operations was to advance
+in three lines on Ulundi—from the Lower Tugela, Rorke’s Drift, and
+Blood River—the columns to move forward by short marches, entrenching
+strongly at each halting-place, doing no injury to the Zulu people,
+and thus inducing them to submit quietly. This wise and consistent
+idea was unfortunately never even attempted.
+
+On the 8th January, 1879, Lord Chelmsford writes: “All the reports
+which reach me tend to show that the Zulus intend, if possible, to
+make raids into Natal[120] when the several columns move forward....
+The strength of the three columns, Nos. 1, 3, and 4, is only just
+sufficient to enable them to advance.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 26).
+
+The directions for the various columns were, briefly—No. 1. To cross
+the Tugela at Fort Pearson and encamp on the Zulu side; when ordered
+to advance, to move on Etshowe, and there, or in its neighbourhood,
+to form a depôt, well entrenched.
+
+No. 2. To form a portion of No. 1 Column, but act separately,
+reporting to Colonel Pearson; to remain on the Middle Tugela frontier
+till an advance is ordered, and Colonel Pearson has reached Etshowe.
+
+The defence of the frontier was to rest with the Colonial Government;
+but on the 8th January the General altered the instructions for No. 2
+Column, and directed two-thirds of it to move up to the Sand Spruit
+Valley for the protection of the Umsinga border, and to operate in
+conjunction with No. 3 Column. The third battalion to remain at
+Middle Drift.
+
+No. 3 Column to cross at Rorke’s Drift when the thirty days expired;
+to move forward and form an advanced depôt, strongly entrenched,
+as found advisable from the nature of the country, etc. To assist
+in clearing the border south-east of Rorke’s Drift, and to keep up
+communication with the columns on left and right.
+
+No. 4 Column to advance to the Blood River. “The civil authorities
+on the border will take every care to warn the Zulus that our first
+advance need not be deemed hostile, but that no collection of armed
+natives in the vicinity of our forces can be permitted; no act on our
+part to unnecessarily bring on hostilities should be permitted.”—(P.
+P. [C. 2222] p. 223).
+
+In the event of a further advance, the advanced depôt of this column
+to be near the intersection of the roads from Utrecht to Ulundi,
+and Rorke’s Drift to Swaziland; but “to delay its advance toward
+the Umvolosi River until the border is cleared, and to move in a
+southerly direction towards Colonel Glyn’s column to assist it
+against Sirayo.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] pp. 27, 28).
+
+On January 11th, the General met Colonel Wood, and arranged with
+him that he should “occupy himself with the tribes in his front and
+left flank,” till the General was “ready to advance to Izipezi Hill”
+(_ibid._ p. 42).
+
+By this unfortunate change of plan, the left of No. 3 Column was
+exposed, of which the Zulus took fatal advantage.
+
+We must now return to Sir Bartle Frere, who, considering that
+he had “exhausted all peaceable means for obtaining redress for
+the past, and security for the future,” “by a notification dated
+the 4th of January, 1879, placed in the hands of Lieut.-General
+Lord Chelmsford, K.C.B., commanding Her Majesty’s forces in South
+Africa, the further enforcement of all demands;” and remarks, “it
+only remains for us to await the issue with perfect confidence in
+the justice of our cause. The contest has not been provoked by the
+British Government. That Government has done its best to avoid war
+by every means consistent with honour.” An absolute truth as regards
+the Home Government. “_That_” Government, as Sir B. Frere cleverly
+remarks, “_had_ done its best to avoid war,” and did not see the
+necessity, or, at all events, the immediate necessity, of that war
+into which its servant, contrary to its instructions, plunged it.
+
+The period allowed to Cetshwayo having expired, on the 11th January,
+1879, the following notification was published in both English and
+Zulu:
+
+                            NOTIFICATION.
+
+                                               _January 11th, 1879._
+
+  The British forces are crossing into Zululand to exact from
+  Cetywayo reparation for violations of British territory committed
+  by the sons of Sirayo and others; and to enforce compliance with
+  the promises, made by Cetywayo at his coronation, for the better
+  government of his people.
+
+  The British Government has no quarrel with the Zulu people. All
+  Zulus who come in unarmed, or who lay down their arms, will be
+  provided for till the troubles of their country are over; and
+  will then, if they please, be allowed to return to their own
+  land; but all who do not so submit will be dealt with as enemies.
+
+  When the war is finished, the British Government will make the
+  best arrangements in its power for the future good government of
+  the Zulus in their own country, in peace and quietness, and will
+  not permit the killing and oppression they have suffered from
+  Cetywayo to continue.
+
+                                             H. B. E. FRERE,
+                                                _High Commissioner_.
+
+(This is followed by a translation in the Zulu language.)
+
+“This,” Sir B. Frere says, is “a message to the Zulu population which
+the General will make as widely known as possible.”—(P. P. [C. 2242]
+p. 24).
+
+On December 29th, Mr. Fynney, Border Agent, writes at the request
+of the Lieut.-General Commanding to the Lieut.-Governor of Natal
+that the General “has taken the opportunity offered by the return of
+Sintwangu and Umpepa to send the following message to the Zulu king:
+
+“‘That, in the event of the cattle demanded as a fine, together with
+Sirayo’s sons and brother, not being delivered before the expiration
+of the time allowed, Her Majesty’s troops will occupy Zulu territory
+without delay.
+
+“‘2. That no forward movement into Zululand will be made till the
+expiration of the thirty days; but at the end of that time, if all
+the demands are not complied with, the troops will advance.
+
+“‘3. That such advance will not be directed against the Zulu nation,
+but against the king, who has broken the promises he made at his
+coronation. So that in the event of hostilities, all Zulu subjects
+willing to lay down their arms, and wishing to take refuge in British
+territory, will be fed and protected till such time as peace is
+restored, when they will be at liberty to return to their homes; but
+that all who remain in Zululand will be considered as enemies.
+
+“‘5. That these are His Excellency’s instructions, which he intends
+to carry out to the best of his ability.’” (P. P. [C. 2308] p. 39).
+
+On the 11th January, Lord Chelmsford, with No. 3 Column, crossed
+the Buffalo River at Rorke’s Drift, the infantry crossing on a
+barrel-raft, a punt, and a small boat; the cavalry and natives by a
+ford lower down the river. The force encamped in the Zulu country
+where it crossed.
+
+The General, with the cavalry, rode to the left to meet Colonel
+Wood—commanding No. 4 Column, which was at Bemba’s Kop—about
+thirty-five miles off. They met about halfway. Colonel Wood, on his
+return, commenced operations against the Zulus by seizing some 2000
+cattle belonging to Inkomi and Sihayo, the Zulus only making “a show
+of resistance.” In addition to this, Colonel Wood reports, on the
+13th January, that he had also captured 2000 or 3000 head of cattle
+from the Sondolosi tribe, and on the same day an attack was made on a
+petty chief, Mbuna, whose men refused to disarm, and seven Zulus were
+killed.—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 45).
+
+Colonel Wood crossed the Blood River on the 6th January, and here we
+must leave No. 4 Column for the present.
+
+No. 1 Column had some difficulty in effecting the passage of the
+Tugela, the river being in flood. The fortunes of this column will be
+followed in a future chapter.
+
+Colonel Durnford, No. 2 Column, reported to the General (on his
+return to camp on the 11th) that the country in his front was quite
+quiet. He then returned to his command with further instructions as
+to its disposition, when “he and the mounted men and rocket battery
+were to join me with No. 3 Column,” writes the General on January
+14th.—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 47).
+
+On the 11th, the General writes: “Both Colonel Wood and Major Russell
+took a good number of Sirayo’s cattle this morning, which we found
+quietly grazing along our line of advance.” And again: “Several
+hundred head of cattle, etc. were taken by Nos. 3 and 4 Columns
+on the 11th. This I considered desirable on political grounds, as
+they all belonged to Usirayo, as well as from military necessities”
+(_ibid._ pp. 43-46). It is rather difficult to reconcile this
+commencement of operations with the words “The British Government
+has no quarrel with the Zulu people;” or with the General’s message
+to the Zulu king (through Mr. Fynney, Border Agent, and the Zulu
+messengers Sintwangu and Umpepa, December 29th, 1878) ... “if all
+the demands are not complied with the troops will advance. That such
+advance will not be directed against the Zulu nation, but against the
+King....”—(P. P. [C. 2308] p. 39).
+
+On the 12th January, No. 3 Column first came into contact with the
+Zulus. The General made a reconnaissance in the Bashi Valley and
+towards Izipezi Hill. Sihayo’s people were seen driving the cattle
+to the shelter of the hills, “as, however,” the General says, “it is
+well known that we had made a distinct demand for the punishment of
+the sons of this chief, and that his clan was one of the bravest and
+most warlike of the Zulu nation, I considered it very desirable to
+punish them at once by capturing their cattle.”
+
+The Ingqutu Mountain was occupied by infantry, when “a fire was
+opened upon them by the Zulus, who were occupying very strong
+positions in the caves and rocks above.” An officer present states
+that the actual first shot was from the side of the British, but
+this is not of great importance, as it is impossible to imagine the
+Zulus could have been expected to look calmly on, whilst their cattle
+were being captured. After about half-an-hour’s fight the cattle and
+horses were taken. The mounted force was likewise engaged higher up
+the mountain. Our loss, 2 Native Contingent killed and 12 wounded.
+The loss inflicted on the enemy, 30 killed, 4 wounded, and 10
+prisoners; the cattle, etc. taken, 13 horses, 413 cattle, 332 goats,
+and 235 sheep.—(P. P. [C. 2242] pp. 47, 48).
+
+These first steps in Zululand have been given in considerable detail,
+as they afford much food for reflection on the contrast between
+“words” and “deeds.”
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.
+
+ISANDHLWANA.
+
+
+Having crossed into Zululand, the “difficulties ... in the way of
+those who are endeavouring to move forward into an enemy’s country,
+over tracts which have never been traversed, except by a very few
+traders’ waggons,”[121] began to declare themselves; and Lord
+Chelmsford remarks, January 16th: “No. 3 Column at Rorke’s Drift
+cannot possibly move forward even eight miles until two swamps, into
+which our waggons sank up to the body, have been made passable. This
+work will occupy us for at least four days, and we shall find similar
+obstacles in front of us in every march we are anxious to make.”
+
+We find Lord Chelmsford, on January 27th, stating: “The country is
+far more difficult than I had been led to expect, and the labour of
+advancing with a long train of waggons is enormous. It took seven
+days hard work, by one half of No. 3 Column, to make the ten miles
+of road between Rorke’s Drift and Insalwana Hill practicable, and
+even then had it rained hard I feel sure that the convoy could not
+have gone on. The line of communication is very much exposed, and
+would require a party of mounted men always patrolling, and fixed
+intrenched posts of infantry at intervals of about ten miles.”—(P.
+P.—C. 2252).
+
+Under these circumstances we can only wonder that the advance with
+cumbersome trains of waggons was undertaken, and the apparent want of
+knowledge of the invaded country is almost equally surprising. All
+previous experience goes to prove that a general moving in an enemy’s
+country _with_ his “impedimenta” should form a defensible camp at
+every halt; and this Lord Chelmsford apparently recognised when he
+promulgated the “Regulations for Field Forces in South Africa;” but
+we shall find how fatally he neglected the most ordinary precautions.
+
+A hint for the advance might well have been taken from Sir Garnet
+Wolseley’s campaign in Ashantee, and the various columns moved on
+Ulundi—about eighty miles—in the lightest possible order, and without
+a ponderous waggon-train. Rapid movement was the more imperatively
+necessary, the enemy being in force, and able to make most rapid
+concentrations. Guns (7-pounders) could have been moved over very
+difficult ground with comparative ease, and even carried along
+piecemeal if necessary.
+
+The strangeness of the situation is shown plainly in Lord
+Chelmsford’s despatch of the 16th January, written at Rorke’s
+Drift—on the very borders of Zululand—at the very outset of the
+war. Having spoken of “difficulties” (as already quoted), he says:
+“Accepting the situation, therefore, it remains for me to determine
+what modification of the plan of campaign at first laid down will
+be necessary.” His idea still is to drive, “as far as possible, all
+the Zulus forward towards the north-east part of their country,” and
+“with Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Columns, to thoroughly clear or subjugate
+the country ... by means of expeditions made by those columns from
+certain fixed positions,” and this, he hopes, will “have the effect
+of removing any dangerously large body from the Natal borders.”
+Colonel Wood, with No. 4 Column, to act independently. “By these
+movements,” he continues, “I hope to be able to clear that portion
+of Zululand which is situated south of the Umhlatoosi River;” and
+remarks that Cetshwayo will be obliged “to keep his army mobilised,
+and it is certain that his troops will have difficulty in finding
+sufficient food. If kept inactive, they will become dangerous to
+himself; if ordered to attack us, they will be playing our game.”
+
+How these plans answered, one week sufficed to show.
+
+The first step in advance from Rorke’s Drift was to push forward
+four companies of the 2-24th Regiment, a battalion of Natal Native
+Contingent, and a detachment of Natal Native Pioneers into the Bashi
+Valley on the 14th January, for the purpose of repairing the road.
+This detachment remained encamped there until the 20th, five miles
+from the remainder of the column at Rorke’s Drift, and with no
+attempt at “laager” or other defence, Lord Chelmsford did not see the
+need of precaution, and his instructions to the officer in command
+were, “Use the bayonet” if a night attack took place.
+
+On the 17th the General made a reconnaissance as far as Isandhlwana;
+and on January 20th No. 3 Column moved from Rorke’s Drift and Bashi
+Valley, to the spot selected for the camp to the east of Isandhlwana
+Hill. The post at Rorke’s Drift (where the Buffalo was crossed)—of
+vital importance to the safety of the column—was left with a
+garrison of one company of 1-24th Regiment, but without any attempt
+whatever at entrenchment: nor were any defensive precautions taken
+at Helpmakaar, the store depôt in Natal, twelve miles from Rorke’s
+Drift. The march to Isandhlwana was accomplished “without much
+difficulty,” but “half a battalion 2-24th was obliged to halt short
+of this camp owing to the oxen being fatigued.” They bivouacked for
+the night in the open.
+
+The position of the camp is thus described: “At the spot where our
+road crossed ... we had a small kopje on the right, and then about
+fifty yards to our left rises abruptly the Isandhlwana Mountain ...
+entirely unapproachable from the three sides nearest us, but on the
+farther, viz. that to the north, it slopes more gradually down, and
+it is there connected with the large range of hills on our left with
+another broad neck of land. We just crossed over the bend, then
+turned sharp to the left, and placed our camp facing the valley, with
+the eastern precipitous side of the mountain behind us, leaving about
+a mile of open country between our left flank and the hills on our
+left, the right of the camp extending across the neck of land we had
+just come over, and resting on the base of the small kopje described
+beforehand.”
+
+The camp was formed in the following order from left to right: 2-3rd
+Natal Native Contingent, 1-3rd Natal Native Contingent, 2-24th
+Regiment, Royal Artillery, mounted troops, and 1-24th Regiment. “The
+waggons were all placed between the camp and the hill at the back,
+and behind them, immediately against its base, the head-quarters’
+tents were pitched with their waggons beside them.”... “Not a single
+step was taken in any way to defend our new position in case of a
+night or day attack from the enemy.”[122]
+
+On the same day (20th) the General reconnoitred on the “waggon-track,
+which skirts Inhlazatye Mountain, as far as a place called Matyana’s
+Stronghold,” at a distance of about twelve miles, but saw nothing of
+the enemy. “Not having time to properly examine the country round
+this peculiar stronghold,” the General ordered that next day two
+separate parties should move out from the camp at an early hour; one
+of mounted men under Major Dartnell to reconnoitre on the road he had
+taken, whilst two battalions of Native Contingent under Commandant
+Lonsdale worked round the Malakata Mountain: the orders being that
+these officers were to effect a communication on the Inhlazatye
+range, and then return to camp.—(P. P. [C. 2252] pp. 74, 75).
+
+At about ten o’clock the Zulus were found in force by the mounted
+men; the contingent being on a range of hills distant about five
+miles. The enemy appeared anxious to fight, but Major Dartnell did
+not think it prudent to engage without supports. The Zulus occupied
+a large kloof, and whenever the mounted men approached they came out
+in large numbers. A small body were sent up close, under Mr. Mansel,
+to try and make the Zulus show their force, when they advanced
+throwing out the “horns,” and tried to surround the party, following
+them down into the open, where Major Dartnell and the remainder
+of the mounted troops were. The whole then retired and joined the
+contingent, about three miles from the kloof.
+
+In the evening, says Major Clery, “a message arrived from
+Major Dartnell that the enemy was in considerable force in his
+neighbourhood, and that he and Commandant Lonsdale would bivouac out
+the night,” which they were permitted to do.[123]
+
+The wisdom of this may be doubted, as the Native Contingent seemed
+particularly liable to alarm; twice they “were seized with panic,
+rushing about everywhere, the night being very dark. They knocked
+us down,” writes an officer, “and stampeded our horses, causing the
+greatest confusion. If the Zulus had come on we should all have been
+cut to pieces.”
+
+“That night Major Dartnell sent off messengers to Lord Chelmsford
+that he had marked the Zulus down in a kloof, and asked for two
+companies of infantry to be sent out as a support, and that he would
+attack the Zulus in the morning.”
+
+Major Clery says:[124] “About 1.30 A.M. on the 22nd, a messenger
+brought me a note from Major Dartnell to say that the enemy was
+in greater numbers than when he last reported, and that he did
+not think it prudent to attack unless reinforced by two or three
+companies of the 24th Regiment. The General ordered the 2nd
+Battalion 24th Regiment, the Mounted Infantry, and four guns, to
+be under arms at once to march.” The Natal Native Pioneers, about
+50 strong, accompanied the force, which “marched out from the camp
+as soon as there was light enough to see the road.” Lieut.-Colonel
+Pulleine, 1-24th Regiment, was instructed to take “command of the
+camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn”—the force left with him
+consisting of 5 companies 1-24th and 1 company 2-24th Regiment; 2
+guns Royal Artillery; about 20 Mounted Infantry and Volunteers; 30
+Natal Carbineers, 31 Mounted Police, and 4 companies Natal Native
+Contingent. An order was also despatched to Colonel Durnford (at
+Rorke’s Drift) to move up to Isandhlwana. Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine’s
+instructions for the defence of the camp were, briefly, to draw
+in his “line of defence” and “infantry outposts,” but to keep his
+cavalry vedettes “still far advanced.”[125] We may here note that
+the only country searched was that direct to the front and right
+front—the direction of the waggon-track—although it is stated “the
+Lieut.-General had himself noticed mounted men in one direction (our
+left front) on the 21st, and in this direction he had _intended_ to
+make a reconnaissance.” (P. P. [C. 2260] p. 99).
+
+After the departure of the advance column nothing unusual occurred in
+camp until between seven and eight o’clock, when it was reported from
+the advanced picquet (on the Ingqutu range of hills, about 1500 yards
+to the north) that a body of the enemy could be seen approaching
+from the north-east: and various small bodies were afterwards seen.
+Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine got his men under arms, and sent a written
+message off to head-quarters that a Zulu force had appeared on the
+hills on his left front. This was received “between 9.30 and 10 A.M.”
+
+Colonel Durnford received the General’s order when on an expedition
+into Natal to obtain waggons, but at once returned to Rorke’s Drift,
+and marched for Isandhlwana. Lieutenant Chard, R.E., who had ridden
+to camp for orders, “met Colonel Durnford about a quarter of a mile
+from the camp at the head of his mounted men” about 10.30 A.M.,
+and told him the troops were in column outside the camp, and Zulus
+showing “on the crest of the distant hills,” “several parties”
+working round so far to the left that he “was afraid they might be
+going to make a dash at the Drift.” He took orders to Major Russell
+to hurry up with the rocket battery, to detach a company of Sikali
+men to protect the baggage, and for all to “look out to the left.”
+
+Colonel Durnford reached the camp, and received all the information
+Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine could afford, finding the situation to
+be:—Lonsdale’s natives on outpost duty on the hills to the left, the
+guns in position on the left of the camp, and the infantry under
+arms. The oxen were driven into camp and—Mr. Brickhill says—tied to
+the yokes, but not inspanned. Constant reports were coming in from
+the hills to the left—“The enemy are in force behind the hills.”
+“The enemy are in three columns.” “One column is moving to the left
+rear, and one towards the General.” “The enemy are retiring in every
+direction.” The enemy’s force was given at 400 to 600.
+
+On hearing these reports, Colonel Durnford sent one troop Natal
+Native Horse to reinforce his baggage guard; two troops to the hills
+to the left (under Captains G. Shepstone and Barton)—one to move
+along the crest of the range, one to search the valley beyond—and
+determined himself to go out to the front “and prevent the one column
+joining the ‘impi,’ which was supposed at that time to be engaged
+with the troops under the General;” he asked Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine
+for two companies of the 24th, to which Colonel Pulleine replied,
+“that two companies could ill be spared, but that if Colonel Durnford
+ordered them, of course they should go.” On consideration, Colonel
+Durnford decided only to take his own men,[126] and moved out with
+his remaining two troops Natal Native Horse, followed by Major
+Russell’s rocket battery, with its escort of a company of Native
+Contingent, under Captain Nourse.
+
+A company 1-24th, under Lieutenant Cavaye, was sent out as a picquet
+to the hills about 1200 yards north of the camp, and the remainder of
+the troops dismissed to their private parades, where the men were to
+lie down in readiness to turn out if required. At this time there
+was no expectation of an attack during the day, and no idea had been
+formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy.[127]
+
+The two troops sent on the hills to the left “to ascertain the
+enemy’s movements,” had proceeded “about five miles from the camp,”
+when “the Zulu army came forward, advancing straight on towards the
+camp.” Captain Shepstone ordered a retreat on the camp, and himself
+rode in with the warning that the “whole Zulu army was advancing to
+attack it.”[128] Captain Shepstone met Captain Gardner on reaching
+the camp, and both officers then went to Colonel Pulleine, but, says
+Captain Gardner, the enemy were “already on the hill on our left in
+large numbers.”
+
+Colonel Durnford, having despatched his two troops to the left, had
+moved out to the front at a canter, followed at a foot’s pace by
+the rocket battery, etc. About five miles out, a trooper rode down
+from the hills on the left, and reported an immense “impi” behind
+the hills, and almost immediately the Zulus appeared in force in
+front and on the left, in skirmishing order, ten or twelve deep,
+with supports close behind. They opened fire at about 800 yards, and
+advanced very rapidly. Colonel Durnford retired a little way—to a
+donga—and extended his men, then fell back, keeping up a steady fire,
+for about two miles,[129] when he came upon the remains of the rocket
+battery, which (it appeared) had turned to the left on hearing firing
+on the hills, been cut off, and broken up. Fighting was still going
+on here, but the Zulus were speedily driven back.
+
+Colonel Durnford retired slowly on the camp, disputing every yard
+of ground, until he reached a donga about 800 yards in front of the
+right of the camp; there, prolonging the line of the camp troops, and
+the right being reinforced by between thirty and forty mounted men,
+under Captain Bradstreet, a stand was made.
+
+“This gully,” Mr. Brickhill, interpreter to No. 3 Column, says, “the
+mounted force held most tenaciously, every shot appearing to take
+effect,” and with the havoc caused by the guns, “a thousand Zulu dead
+must have laid between the conical hill and the gully. They lay just
+like peppercorns upon the plain.”
+
+The two troops of native horse sent to reconnoitre the Ingqutu Hills,
+retired fighting before the enemy in good order “to a crest in the
+neck which joins Sandhlwana to Ingqutu. Leaving their horses well
+sheltered here, they held this crest splendidly, keeping up a steady
+galling fire.”[130] They were eventually compelled to retire, with
+the loss of Captain G. Shepstone.[131]
+
+We must now consider what had taken place at the camp. All was quiet
+till about twelve o’clock, when firing was heard on the hill where
+the company on picquet was stationed; the troops were immediately
+turned out and formed on the left front of the camp. About this
+time Captain Gardner, 14th Hussars, arrived with an order from
+the General, addressed to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, “to send on
+the camp equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to
+remain himself at his present camp and entrench it.”[132] Captain
+G. Shepstone reached the camp with his warning about the same time.
+Colonel Pulleine decided it was impossible to carry out the General’s
+order, as the enemy were already in great force on the hills to the
+left. Captain Gardner sent off a message to head-quarters, saying
+that “our left was attacked by about ten thousand of the enemy. A
+message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine.”
+
+One company (Captain Mostyn’s) was moved up to support the picquet;
+the enemy distant about 800 yards, moving “towards our left.” Orders
+to retire were received almost immediately, and the whole retired to
+the foot of the slope, the enemy rushing forward to the crest of the
+hill as our men disappeared. Captain Younghusband’s company was at
+this time in echelon on the left.[133]
+
+The guns came into action about 400 yards on the left front of the
+camp, “where they were able to throw shells into a large mass of the
+enemy that remained almost stationary about 3400 yards off.”[134]
+
+The three advanced companies of the 24th retired on the main body,
+when the situation was this: The two guns and the whole of the
+24th in line, about 300 yards from the left front of the camp; the
+natives took post on the right of the 24th; then came Durnford’s
+Basutos; and the extreme right was formed by about forty mounted
+Europeans[135]—the force holding the only position that afforded
+any shelter, viz. broken ground and a “donga” in front of the camp;
+the infantry “in good position among the stones and boulders to the
+left and left centre of the camp, and who stood their ground most
+gallantly.”[136] The enemy approached to within about 400 yards, the
+two guns firing case. The heavy fire from the line told so upon the
+Zulus that they wavered and lay down; they are said to have covered
+the valley in detached groups to the depth of about three-quarters of
+a mile.[137]
+
+The enemy now began to work round the rear (which they could do with
+impunity owing to the formation of the ground), and Captain Essex
+says: “I rode up to Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, who was near the right,
+and pointed this out to him. He requested me to take men to that part
+of the field, and endeavour to hold the enemy in check;” but at this
+moment, he says, “those of the Native Contingent who had remained in
+action, rushed past us in the utmost disorder, thus laying open the
+right and rear of the 24th, the enemy dashing forward in the most
+rapid manner.” The ammunition of the mounted troops failing (supplies
+had been repeatedly sent for, but none came), Colonel Durnford
+retired them towards the right of the camp (where the waggons and
+ammunition of the Native Horse were), and himself galloped off to
+the 24th, having previously told Captain Gardner that the position
+was too extended, and he desired to concentrate the force. Colonel
+Durnford’s intention undoubtedly was to withdraw all the troops to
+the rising ground on the right of the camp, to which point he had
+retired his Native Horse.
+
+The Zulus rushed on the left in overwhelming numbers, completely
+surrounding the 24th. The guns limbered up, and made for the Rorke’s
+Drift Road, but found it blocked by the enemy; they therefore
+“followed a crowd of natives and camp-followers, who were running
+down a ravine; the Zulus were all among them, stabbing men as they
+ran.” Down this ravine the fugitives hastened, the enemy round and
+among them, the assegai doing its deadly work.
+
+Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine was said by Lieutenant Coghill to have been
+killed,[138] and during the flight Major Stuart Smith, R.A. (who had
+been wounded), Surgeon-Major Shepherd, and many a man, mounted and
+on foot, were killed. The Buffalo was gained at a point about five
+miles below Rorke’s Drift, and numbers of the fugitives were either
+shot, or carried away by the stream and drowned. Lieutenants Melville
+and Coghill rode from the camp, on its being carried by the Zulus,
+the former with the Queen’s colours of his regiment. These he bore
+into the river, but lost his horse, and was left struggling in the
+swift current; Lieutenant Coghill, who had safely crossed, rode in to
+his assistance, when his horse was shot. These brave young officers
+succeeded in gaining the Natal shore, but were soon overtaken by the
+enemy, and died fighting to the last. The Natal Native Horse escaped
+with little loss; they assisted many in the retreat, which they
+covered as well as they could, especially under Captain Barton on the
+banks of the Buffalo. Captain Essex puts the time of the retreat
+from the camp at “about 1.30 P.M.”
+
+After this period no one living escaped from Isandhlwana, and it was
+supposed that the troops had broken, and, falling into confusion,
+that all had perished after a brief struggle.
+
+Nothing was known of the after-events of that fatal day for months,
+till, on the 21st May, the scene of the disaster was revisited, and
+the truth of the gallant stand made was established. This will be
+treated of in another chapter.
+
+We must now turn to the movements of the column under Colonel
+Glyn, with the General; and it will be most convenient to take the
+occurrences of the day as described by Lord Chelmsford and his
+military secretary (Lieut.-Colonel Crealock).
+
+Leaving camp at daybreak,[139] the General “reached Major Dartnell
+about 6.30 A.M., and at once ordered him to send out his mounted men
+to gain intelligence of the enemy, whose whereabouts did not appear
+to be very certain.” (P. P. [C. 2252] p. 75.) The enemy shortly
+after showed in considerable strength at some distance, but retired
+without firing as the troops advanced. Lieut.-Colonel Crealock says:
+“Between 9.30 and 10 A.M. we were off-saddled some twelve miles from
+camp. During the three previous hours we had been advancing with
+Colonel Glyn’s column against a Zulu force that fell back from hill
+to hill as we advanced, giving up, without a shot, most commanding
+positions.” (P. P. [C. 2260] p. 99.) It was at this time (“about
+9 A.M.,” the General says) that the message was received from
+Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills
+on his left front. The General says he at once sent his aide-de-camp,
+Lieutenant Milne, R.N., to the top of a high hill, from which the
+camp could be seen. He had “a very powerful telescope, but could
+detect nothing unusual.”[140] Lieut.-Colonel Crealock says that all
+the news he gave “was that the cattle had been driven into camp,” and
+he acknowledges “our own attention was chiefly bent on the enemy’s
+force retiring from the hills in our front, and a party being pursued
+by Lieut.-Colonel Russell three miles off.”
+
+The kloof where the enemy had been was found deserted, but a large
+body of Zulus were seen beyond it, and a portion of the mounted
+force sent after them, Major Dartnell and the rest of his men moving
+off to the right in the direction of another body of Zulus. These
+turned out to be Matshana’s people, with the chief himself present:
+they were engaged, their retreat cut off, and then driven back on
+the Native Contingent. Of this party Matshana and one or two of his
+people alone escaped.
+
+“Having no cause, therefore, to feel any anxiety about the safety of
+the camp,” the General ordered the mounted infantry to sweep round
+“to the main waggon-track, whilst a portion of the infantry went over
+the hilltop to the same point, and the guns, with an escort, retraced
+their steps,” with instructions to join Colonel Glyn near the Mangane
+Valley, where the General proceeded with Colonel Glyn to fix upon a
+site for a new camp. Captain Gardner, 14th Hussars, was sent back to
+camp “with the order to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine to send on the camp
+equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to remain at his
+present camp, and entrench it.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 101).
+
+The 1st Battalion Native Contingent was ordered to march back to camp
+across country, and examine dongas, etc. _en route_.
+
+“Not a sign of the enemy was now seen near us,” says Colonel
+Crealock. “Not a suspicion had crossed my mind that the camp was in
+any danger, neither did anything occur to make me think of such a
+thing until about 1.15,” when it was fancied firing was heard (the
+natives were certain of it). “We were then moving back to choose a
+camp for the night about twelve miles from Isandula.” About 1.45
+P.M., a native reported “heavy firing had been going on round the
+camp. We galloped up to a high spot, whence we could see the camp,
+perhaps 10 or 11 miles distant. None of us could detect anything
+amiss; all looked quiet. This must have been 2 P.M. The General,
+however, probably thought it would be well to ascertain what had
+happened himself, but not thinking anything was wrong, ordered
+Colonel Glyn to bivouac for the night where we stood; and taking
+with him some 40 mounted volunteers, proceeded to ride into camp.
+Lieut.-Colonel Cecil Russell, 12th Lancers, now joined us, and
+informed me that an officer of the Natal Native Contingent had come
+to him (about 12 noon, I think) when he was off-saddled, and asked
+where the General was, as he had instructions to tell him that heavy
+firing had been going on close to the camp.... This officer, however,
+did not come to us.
+
+“This information from Colonel Russell was immediately followed
+by a message from Commandant Brown, commanding the 1st Battalion
+Natal Native Contingent, which had been ordered back to camp at
+9.30 A.M.—(the battalion was halted a mile from us, and probably
+eight miles from camp)—to the effect that large bodies of Zulus were
+between him and the camp, and that his men could not advance without
+support. The General ordered an immediate advance of the battalion,
+the mounted volunteers and mounted infantry supporting it.
+
+“I am not aware what messages had been sent from[141] the camp and
+received by Colonel Glyn or his staff; but I know that neither the
+General nor myself had up to this time received any information but
+that I have mentioned.
+
+“At 3.15 the General appeared to think that he would be able to brush
+through any parties of Zulus that might be in his road to the camp
+without any force further than that referred to, viz. 1st Battalion
+Native Contingent and some eighty mounted white men.
+
+“At 4 P.M.,[142] however, the native battalion again halted,” when
+within about six miles of the camp, “and shortly after—the General
+says—Commandant Lonsdale rode up to report that he had ridden into
+camp and found it in possession of the Zulus.” The General at
+once sent word to Colonel Glyn to bring back all the troops, and
+advanced about two miles, sending Lieut.-Colonel Russell forward to
+reconnoitre;—he fully confirmed Commandant Lonsdale’s report. Colonel
+Glyn rejoined the General about 6 P.M., when the troops were formed
+in “fighting order,” and advanced across the plain; “but could not
+reach the neighbourhood of our camp until after dark.”
+
+It may properly be here remarked that from the outskirts of the force
+firing had been seen at the camp as late as nearly four o’clock; and
+about six, large bodies of the enemy were seen retiring from the
+camp, through openings in the Ingqutu range.
+
+When a move was first made by the General in the direction of the
+camp, an officer who was in advance narrates what he saw when he
+came to a rising ground from which the camp was first seen:
+
+“There certainly were some tents standing then, but seemed very few,
+and away to the left front of the camp there was some smoke, though
+not much, and it was high up, just as if there had been musketry fire
+and the smoke had floated away; but there was certainly no musketry
+fire going on then. A few seconds afterwards a sergeant ... said:
+‘There go the guns, sir.’ I could see the smoke, but we could hear
+nothing. In a few seconds we distinctly saw the guns fired again,
+one after the other, sharp. This was done several times—a pause, and
+then a flash—flash! The sun was shining on the camp at the time,
+and then the camp looked dark, just as if a shadow was passing over
+it. The guns did not fire after that, and in a few minutes all the
+tents had disappeared. The sergeant said, ‘It’s all over now, sir.’ I
+said, ‘Yes, and I hope it is the right way.’ We could see there was
+fighting going on, but of course did not know which way it had gone.
+The men all thought the Zulus had retired, but I felt doubtful in my
+own mind, but had no idea really of the catastrophe that had taken
+place.... This must have been about 3 P.M.”
+
+“Within two miles of camp,” Lieutenant Milne says, “four men were
+seen slowly advancing in front of us; a few mounted men were sent
+out; the men in front previously seen then took cover behind some
+rocks, but were fired upon by our men; one fell, the remainder ran
+out in the open, throwing up their hands to show they were unarmed.
+On being taken prisoners, they were found to be Native Contingent,
+escaped from the massacre.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 185).
+
+On nearing the camp it was nearly dark, but it was observed that
+waggons were drawn up across the neck; the guns were therefore
+brought into action and shelled them. Then, no sound being heard,
+Major Black, with a wing of his regiment, moved forward to occupy the
+small hill close to Isandhlwana. No enemy was seen, and the camp was
+found tenanted by those who were taking their last long sleep.
+
+A halt was made for the night amidst the _débris_ of (the proper
+right of) the camp, on the “neck;” the infantry covering the west,
+and the mounted troops and guns the east side. During the night there
+were one or two false alarms, and the whole force, at early dawn,
+moved off towards Rorke’s Drift, as the General was anxious about
+the safety of that important post; also the troops had no spare
+ammunition,[143] but little food, and “it was certain that daylight
+would reveal a sight which could not but have a demoralising effect
+upon the whole force.”—(P. P. [C. 2252] p. 76).
+
+In Lord Chelmsford’s despatch of 27th January, he gives a narrative
+of the attack on the camp, but remarks “the absolute accuracy of
+which, however, I cannot vouch for” (pp. 76, 77). On comparing his
+“narrative” with the _facts_, it will be found to be _absolutely
+inaccurate_. But Lord Chelmsford makes some remarks which cannot be
+passed, over in silence. He says: “Had the force in question but
+taken up a defensive position in the camp itself, and utilised
+there the materials for a hasty entrenchment;” but he does not point
+out how the “force in question” was to know of the near approach of
+the Zulu army, he himself having neglected to search the country
+where that army lay. He had prepared no “defensive position;” but he
+had selected a fatal spot for his camp, which, covering a front of
+about half a mile, was utterly indefensible as it stood; and he had
+“pooh-poohed” the suggestion of taking defensive precautions when
+made by Colonel Glyn; and, further, it does not appear that there
+was _any time whatever_ for the “force in question” to do anything
+but fight. Lord Chelmsford then says: “It appears that the oxen were
+yoked to the waggons three hours before the attack took place, so
+that there was ample time to construct that waggon-laager which the
+Dutch in former days understood so well.” This remark comes with
+peculiar ill-grace from Lord Chelmsford, who not only had not taken
+any precautions, but had not permitted any laager or other defence to
+be made; and whose reply to a suggestion of a laager at Isandhlwana
+was, “It would take a week to make.” Also it must not be forgotten
+that the attack on Isandhlwana was _without warning_.
+
+He next says: “Had, however, the tents been struck, and the British
+troops placed with their backs to the precipitous Isalwana Hill, I
+feel sure that they could have made a successful resistance.” Here
+again he would blame the dead to cover the faults of the living!
+But even had the troops been thus placed (as some eventually appear
+to have been), how long could they keep at bay, when ammunition
+failed,[144] an enemy armed with weapons they could use with fatal
+effect out of reach of the bayonet?
+
+And lastly, Lord Chelmsford speaks of rumours “that the troops were
+deceived by a simulated retreat,” and thus “drawn away from the line
+of defence.” The _facts_ prove the exact contrary. The only person
+deceived by a “simulated retreat” was Lord Chelmsford himself, whose
+troops _during three hours_ had advanced “against a Zulu force
+that fell back from hill to hill ... giving up without a shot most
+commanding positions.” And where was _their_ “_line of defence_?”
+We do not find one word of Lord Chelmsford’s own want of the most
+ordinary precautions—his want of “intelligence,” and neglect to
+obtain it—of his seeing the enemy’s mounted scouts on the left front,
+and intending (but not making) a reconnaissance in that direction—his
+fixed belief that the enemy _could_ only be in force in his front—the
+transparent way in which he was drawn off farther from the camp—the
+absence of any attention to the signs that something _was_ wrong at
+the camp—the prevention of assistance reaching the beleaguered camp
+when one of his officers _had_ recognised the emergency, etc.; to
+which must be added that we do not find one word of regret for the
+untimely fate of the gallant men who fell doing _their_ duty. In
+justice to Colonel Glyn, commanding No. 3 Column, it must be remarked
+that the General himself gave the orders for the various movements,
+etc. And in justice to Lord Chelmsford also, we note it is asserted
+that the shock he experienced told severely upon him at the time; and
+he may not have very carefully studied the despatch, which was the
+work of his military secretary.
+
+Before finally leaving the events of the 22nd January, we must fully
+notice an important episode that occurred, and which had a serious
+bearing on the disaster we have to lament.
+
+We have seen that “the guns with an escort” were ordered to retrace
+their steps ... to join Colonel Glyn at the rendezvous near the
+Mangane Valley. We will now follow their movements.
+
+When Lord Chelmsford discovered that the enemy he had come in
+search of had disappeared, 4 guns Royal Artillery, 2 companies
+2-24th Regiment (Captains Church and Harvey), and about 50 Natal
+Native Pioneers, the whole under the command of Lieut.-Colonel
+Harness, R.A., were ordered to march to a rendezvous in advance by
+a different route to that taken by the remainder of the column;
+this was necessary, as the guns could not go over the ground taken
+by the latter. To carry out the order, they had to retrace for over
+two miles the route by which they had come in the morning, and then
+bear to the left. This was done (a short halt having first been
+made, to let men and horses have a rest), and about twelve o’clock
+they reached some rising ground, when they again halted, not being
+certain of the direction of the rendezvous, to await Major Black,
+2-24th, Assistant Quartermaster-General, who had gone on to find it.
+Almost immediately after this halt the firing of cannon was heard,
+and looking towards the camp, about eight miles off, they saw shells
+bursting against the hills to the left of it. Soon afterwards a body
+of about 1000 natives suddenly appeared in the plain below, between
+them and the camp; the Native Pioneers thought they were Zulus.
+Captain Church told Colonel Harness if he would let him have a horse
+he would go and find out. Colonel Harness at once gave him one,
+and sent a mounted sergeant with him. As they galloped towards the
+natives, a European officer rode out, and when they met said: “The
+troops behind me are Commandant Browne’s contingent, and I am sent to
+give you this message: ‘_Come in every man, for God’s sake! The camp
+is surrounded, and will be taken unless helped at once._’” Captain
+Church rode back as fast as he could, and found Colonel Harness in
+conversation with Major Gosset (aide-de-camp) and Major Black, both
+of whom had come up during his absence. Colonel Harness promptly
+said: “We will march back;” but Major Gosset ridiculed the idea,
+and advised him to carry out his orders. Colonel Harness then asked
+Major Black and Captain Church their opinions. They both agreed with
+him without hesitation. Colonel Harness gave the order to return,
+and started without a moment’s delay; Major Gosset riding off in the
+direction of the General. About 1.30 P.M. Lieut.-Colonel Harness was
+on his way to the camp, and had got over about two miles of ground
+when he was overtaken by Major Gosset with orders from the General to
+march back to the rendezvous. The order was obeyed.
+
+Now the startling reflection comes home that to this most important
+fact, bearing on the events of the day (for even if too late to
+save life, Colonel Harness would have saved the camp), there is not
+a hint even in the despatches of Lord Chelmsford, or the official
+statement of his military secretary.[145] The latter goes so far
+as to say, in paragraph 17 of his statement (P. P. [C. 2260] p.
+100): “I am not aware what messages had been sent from the camp and
+received by Colonel Glyn or his staff; but I know that neither the
+General nor myself had up to this time received any information but
+that I have mentioned.” This statement refers to a time _after_ the
+General had arrived at a spot about a mile from where Commandant
+Browne’s battalion of natives were halted, _after_ he had received
+the message, “Come in, every man, for God’s sake,” etc., and _after_
+he had met Colonel Harness on his return march to the rendezvous;
+and not only that, but apparently _after_ the receipt of a most
+important message from Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, described as follows
+by the special correspondent of _The Times_ of Natal (Captain
+Norris-Newman): “We did halt there, and found the staff there as
+well, looking on through the field-glasses at some large bodies of
+Kafirs [Zulus], who were in close proximity to our camp about ten
+miles off. The Mounted Police were ordered to halt and off-saddle;
+but Captain [T.] Shepstone and his volunteers had orders to proceed
+back to camp to see what was up. I joined them, and we had not gone
+far on the road when a mounted messenger came up with a note from
+Colonel Pulleine to the General, saying that the camp was attacked
+by large numbers of Kafirs, and asked him to return with all the
+help at his command. With this we halted, and awaited the up-coming
+of the General, who came along at once, and proceeded up the valley
+to reconnoitre. About three miles had been got over, during which we
+passed the four guns under Colonel Harness, and some of the 24th ...
+on their way to encamp at the new ground. A mounted man was then seen
+approaching, and was recognised as Commandant Lonsdale. He brought
+the dreadful news that, having chased a Zulu on horseback, he got
+separated from his men, and had ridden quietly back to camp; but on
+arrival there, within about three hundred yards of it (at about 2
+P.M.), he found large bodies of the enemy surrounding it and fighting
+with our men. He had just time to discover his mistake, turn, and fly
+for his life, when several bullets were fired at him, and many Zulus
+started in chase.”—_Natal Colonist_, January 30th, 1879.
+
+The above message is undoubtedly that mentioned by Captain Gardner
+as having been despatched from the camp at or soon after twelve
+o’clock. (P. P. [C. 2260] p. 81.) And there still remains the fact
+that, not only as regards Colonel Harness, does there appear to be an
+unaccountable omission in the “statement”[146] alluded to, but also
+we find mention of only _one_ message from the camp; whereas other
+messages are _known_ to have been received, and to have been in the
+possession of the Assistant Military Secretary.
+
+Here also we must allude to Sir Bartle Frere’s despatches of January
+27th, and February 3rd and 12th. In the first he says: “In disregard
+of Lord Chelmsford’s instructions, the troops left to protect the
+camp were taken away from the defensive position they were in at
+the camp, with the shelter which the waggons, parked, would have
+afforded....” We know that the troops did the best they could, left
+as they were by their general in an open camp—we know they had
+no “defensive position”—and we know that the waggons were _not_
+“parked,” but drawn up in rear of their own camps.
+
+Sir Bartle says, February 3rd: “It is only justice to the General to
+note that his orders were clearly not obeyed on that terrible day at
+Isandhlwana camp.”
+
+And on February 12th, he says: “It is impossible to shut one’s eyes
+to the fact that it was, in all human probability, mainly due to
+disregard of the General’s orders that so great a disaster occurred”
+(a little qualifying his sweeping assertion of February 3rd).
+
+But yet again Sir Bartle returns to the charge, and says, June 30th:
+“It is difficult to over-estimate the effect of such a disaster as
+that at Isandhlwana on both armies, but it was clearly due to breach
+of the General’s order, and to disregard of well-known maxims of
+military science.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 138).
+
+On what grounds Sir Bartle Frere bases those assertions we know
+not—no known orders were disobeyed—and, in spite of the special
+pleading in these despatches, we must come to the conclusion that
+Sir Bartle Frere’s remarks were penned in utter ignorance of facts,
+and that the accusations concerning “disregard of well-known maxims
+of military science” should have been applied, _not_ to the soldiers
+who fell at Isandhlwana, but to those who placed them in that fatal
+position.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.
+
+RORKE’S DRIFT—HELPMAKAAR—COURT OF INQUIRY, ETC.
+
+
+The garrison of the Rorke’s Drift post consisted of B Company 2-24th
+Regiment (Lieutenant Bromhead), and (with officers and casuals) was
+of a total strength of 139. It was encamped on the Natal side of the
+Buffalo, where there was a mission station, one building of which
+was used as a hospital and one as a commissariat store. The crossing
+of the river was effected by what are called “ponts”—boats used as
+a kind of “flying bridge”—and there were drifts, or fords, in the
+vicinity. Major Spalding, Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, and
+Lieutenant Chard, R.E., were stationed here. The former rode off to
+Helpmakaar at 2 P.M., 22nd January, “to bring up Captain Rainforth’s
+company, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, to protect the pont,” leaving
+Lieutenant Chard in command of the post.
+
+About 3.15 P.M., Lieutenant Chard was at the ponts, when two men came
+riding from Zululand at a gallop, and shouted to be taken across the
+river. They were Lieutenant Adendorff, Natal Native Contingent, and
+a carbineer, who brought tidings of the disaster at Isandhlwana and
+the advance of the Zulus towards Rorke’s Drift. Lieutenant Adendorff
+remained to assist in the defence of the post, and the carbineer rode
+on to take the news to Helpmakaar.
+
+Lieutenant Chard at once gave orders to secure the stores at the
+ponts, and rode up to the commissariat store, when he found a
+note had been received from the 3rd Column, saying the enemy were
+advancing, and directing them to strengthen and hold the post at
+all cost. Lieutenant Bromhead was actively at work preparing for
+defence, ably assisted by Mr. Dalton, of the Commissariat Department,
+loopholing the buildings and connecting them by walls of mealie-bags
+and two waggons that were there. Lieutenant Chard then rode down to
+the pont, and brought up the guard and stores.
+
+An officer, with about a hundred of “Durnford’s Horse,” now arrived,
+and asked for orders. He was instructed to throw out men to watch
+the drifts and ponts, to check the enemy’s advance, and fall back
+on the post when forced to retire. These men had, however, been in
+the saddle since daylight, and had gone through a heavy engagement:
+they were quite exhausted (besides being dispirited by the loss of
+their beloved leader), and, after remaining a short time, retired to
+Helpmakaar. A detachment of Natal Native Contingent also left the
+post.
+
+Lieutenant Chard now commenced an inner work—“a retrenchment of
+biscuit-boxes.” This was two boxes high when, about 4.30 P.M., 500
+or 600 of the enemy came in sight, and advanced at a run against
+the south wall. They were met with a well-sustained fire, but, in
+spite of their loss, approached to within about fifty yards. Here
+they were checked by the cross-fire from the attacked front and the
+store-house. Some got under cover and kept up a heavy fire, but
+the greater number, without stopping, moved to the left, round the
+hospital, and made a rush at the wall of mealie-bags. After a short
+but desperate struggle the enemy were driven back with heavy loss
+into the bush around the post. The main body of the enemy coming up,
+lined the ledge of rock, caves, etc., overlooking the work, at a
+distance of about 400 yards to the south, and from whence a constant
+fire was kept up, and they also occupied in great force the garden,
+hollow road, and bush.
+
+The bush not having been cleared away enabled the enemy to advance
+under cover close to the wall, and a series of desperate assaults
+were made, extending from the hospital along the wall as far as the
+bush reached; each assault was brilliantly met and repulsed with the
+bayonet, Corporal Scheiss, Natal Native Contingent, distinguishing
+himself greatly. The fire from the rocks took the work completely in
+reverse, and was so heavy that about 6 P.M., the garrison was obliged
+to retire behind the entrenchment of biscuit-boxes.
+
+During this period the enemy had been storming the hospital, and at
+last succeeded in setting fire to the roof. The garrison defended
+it most gallantly, bringing out all the sick that could be moved;
+Privates Williams, Hook, R. Jones, and W. Jones, 2-24th Regiment,
+being the last men to leave, and holding the doorway with the bayonet
+when their ammunition was expended. The want of communication and the
+burning of the house rendered it impossible to save all the sick.
+
+It was now found necessary to make another entrenchment, which was
+done with two heaps of mealie-bags, Assistant-Commissary Dunne
+working hard at this, though much exposed. As darkness came on the
+little garrison was completely surrounded, but gallantly repulsed
+several serious assaults; it was, however, eventually forced to
+retire to the inner entrenchment, which it held throughout the night.
+The attack continued vigorously till midnight, the men firing on the
+assailants with the greatest coolness, aided by the light afforded
+by the burning hospital. A desultory fire was kept up by the enemy
+throughout the night, but this ceased about 4 A.M. on the 23rd, and
+at daybreak the enemy was out of sight. Lieutenant Chard at once
+set about patrolling round the post, collecting the Zulu arms, and
+strengthening the defences.
+
+About 7 A.M., a large body of the enemy appeared on the hills to
+the south-west, and Lieutenant Chard sent off a note to Helpmakaar
+asking for assistance. About 8 A.M., No. 3 Column appeared in sight,
+the enemy falling back on its approach. Thus ended a most gallant
+defence, reflecting the utmost credit on all concerned.
+
+The loss of the garrison was 15 non-commissioned officers and men
+killed, and 12 wounded (of whom two died almost immediately). The
+attacking force was estimated at 3000 men, of whom upwards of 350
+were killed.
+
+Lord Chelmsford, with the remains of No. 3 Column, had moved off from
+Isandhlwana, as we have already described, at daybreak that morning.
+It had been thought necessary to insist upon absolute inaction
+through the night; no attempt was allowed at identifying the dead,
+or even at making sure that no life remained in the camp; and men
+lay down to rest, ignorant whether a careless hand might not fall
+on the lifeless form of a dead comrade or, mayhap, a brother. The
+remainder of the Natal Carbineers, as they afterwards discovered,
+bivouacked that night on the right of the camp, upon the very “neck”
+of land where so gallant a stand was made; their captain recognising
+the body of Lieutenant Scott, and therefore being able afterwards to
+identify the spot. That life might exist without its being known to
+the returning column is proved by the fact that a native groom lay
+for dead, although unwounded, in the camp throughout the night. The
+man had feigned death when the camp was taken, and did not dare to
+move on the return of the General’s party, lest he should be taken by
+them for a Zulu, and should share the fate of the few actual Zulus
+found intoxicated beneath the waggons, and bayoneted by our soldiers.
+He crept out in the morning, and followed the retreating column to
+Rorke’s Drift at a distance, meeting on the way with narrow escapes
+of losing his life from both friend and foe.
+
+On coming within sight of Rorke’s Drift, heavy smoke was seen rising
+from it, and Zulus retiring; this caused the liveliest apprehensions
+for the safety of the post. However, to the intense relief of all,
+on nearing the Buffalo River the waving of hats was seen from a
+hastily-erected entrenchment, and the safety of the little garrison
+was known.
+
+Lieut.-Colonel Russell was sent with a mounted escort to Helpmakaar,
+to see if the road was open and all safe there; but some officers
+of Major Bengough’s battalion Natal Native Contingent rode in and
+reported the road open, Helpmakaar laagered, and no attack made on
+it. Some men of the Buffalo Border Guard also rode in from Fort Pine
+and reported all well there.
+
+The General and staff hurried down to Pietermaritzburg _viâ_
+Helpmakaar, while the garrison at Rorke’s Drift was left in utter
+confusion,[147] as testified by many of those present at the time.
+No one appeared responsible for anything that might happen, and the
+result was one disgraceful to our English name, and to all concerned.
+A few Zulu prisoners had been taken by our troops—some the day
+before, others previous to the disaster at Isandhlwana, and these
+prisoners were put to death in cold blood at Rorke’s Drift. It was
+intended to set them free, and they were told to run for their lives,
+but they were shot down and killed, within sight and sound of the
+whole force. An eye-witness—an officer—described the affair to the
+present writer, saying that the men whom _he_ saw killed numbered
+“not more than seven, nor less than five.” He said that he was
+standing with others in the camp, and hearing shots close behind him,
+he turned, and saw the prisoners in question in the act of falling
+beneath the shots and stabs of a party of our men.[148] The latter,
+indeed, were men belonging to the Native Contingent, but they were
+supposed to be under white control, and should not have been able to
+obtain possession of the prisoners under any circumstances. Scenes
+like these were not likely to impress the savages with whom we were
+dealing with our merciful and Christian qualities, nor to improve the
+chances of European prisoners who might fall into their hands during
+the campaign.
+
+As soon as order was a little restored, the cover round the post of
+Rorke’s Drift was cleared away, barricades built, the thatched roof
+taken off the house, and the four guns placed in position within the
+enclosure.
+
+The General and staff reached Pietermaritzburg early on January 26th.
+There, as everywhere else, panic reigned, and gloom spread over all.
+From the city especially many a son and brother had gone out to fall
+upon that fatal day, and grief was mingled there with terror for what
+might come next. It was long before any accurate information could
+be gained as to what had happened, and who had fallen; and, owing to
+the hurried retreat of No. 3 Column from Isandhlwana before daybreak
+on the 23rd, the great burden of uncertainty was laid upon many heavy
+hearts both upon the spot and at home in England.
+
+At first all who had had friends at the camp hoped they might be
+amongst the saved, since it was known that some had escaped by “The
+Fugitives’ Drift,” a spot some five miles from Rorke’s Drift, where
+those flying from Isandhlwana crossed the river; and day by day the
+lists of killed and missing appeared with the names gradually removed
+from the latter to the former. Well had an hour’s daylight been spent
+that morning to spare the uncertainty that hung over many an English
+and South African home for days and weeks, and even months.
+
+No time was now lost in making such preparations for defence as
+the principal towns afforded. An invasion of the colony by the
+victorious Zulu army was hourly expected, and with some reason, since
+retaliation for our invasion might naturally be feared. Sir Bartle
+Frere himself remarks, on February 12th (C. 2269): “It has become
+painfully evident that the Zulu king has an army at his command which
+could almost any day unexpectedly invade Natal; and owing to the
+great extent of frontier, and utter helplessness of the undisciplined
+hordes of Natal natives to offer effectual resistance, the Zulus
+might march at will through the country, devastating and murdering,
+without a chance of being checked, as long as they abstained from
+attacking the entrenched posts of Her Majesty’s troops, which are
+from 50 to 100 miles apart. The capital and all the principal towns
+are at this moment in ‘laager,’ prepared for attack, which even if
+successfully resisted, would leave two-thirds of them in ashes, and
+the country around utterly desolated.”[149]
+
+Whatever reasonable fears of retaliation were entertained by the
+people of Natal, they soon rose to panic-height in consequence of the
+great alarm displayed by the chief authorities, both military and
+civil. By their orders, the central part of ’Maritzburg, including
+the Court House, was barricaded with loopholed boarding, as a refuge
+for the citizens in case of attack, wells were dug inside the Court
+House, and notice given that the usual guns, announcing the arrival
+of the English mails, would be discontinued for the present, but that
+three guns would be fired as a signal for the citizens to go into
+the laager within three hours, while four guns would signify that
+the danger was urgent, and they must fly into it at once, taking
+stores of food, which they were to have ready beforehand, beside what
+the borough council had provided, and they must then comply with an
+elaborate series of rules, which was published in the Government
+_Gazette_. So great, indeed, was the scare that some of the citizens
+of ’Maritzburg did actually take refuge one night in the laager, and
+others hurriedly left the colony, while many natives, living near the
+city, slept out, with their wives and children, some nights in the
+open field. On that night, when terror was at its height, it is said
+that the bedding of the Governors and their staff, together with the
+official records of Government House, was removed to the neighbouring
+gaol, a strong stone building, just under the guns of Fort Napier,
+which was chosen as a place of refuge for their Excellencies. It is
+also said that Lord Chelmsford’s horse was kept saddled and bridled
+all night; and a stretcher was placed, by express order, outside the
+window of a lady in delicate health, without her knowledge, so as to
+be ready in case of emergency—as if a Zulu impi could drop suddenly,
+at a moment’s notice, into the middle of the city, the frontier, at
+the nearest point, being sixty miles off.
+
+Whether or no the High Commissioner was really in such a state of
+alarm as he appeared to be, the existence of such a scare in Natal
+would, no doubt, help to support his policy in the eyes of those at
+home, as an actual inroad of Zulus at that time would have still more
+effectually justified the charges he had made against Cetshwayo,
+and the strong measures he had taken in invading Zululand, for the
+good of the Zulus themselves and the safety of the colony. After
+the disaster at Isandhlwana, Sir B. Frere of course reiterates his
+charges against the king of intending to invade the colony (C. 2269).
+But these charges are sufficiently answered by the mere fact that
+although, as Sir B. Frere himself points out, Natal lay at his mercy
+for some months after the disaster, he made no attack whatever either
+upon Swazis, Boers, or English. After Isandhlwana, if ever, such
+invasion was to be dreaded, yet not only was none attempted, but even
+the Zulus who, in the flush of victory crossed into Natal at Rorke’s
+Drift on the 22nd, were called back by their officers with the words,
+“Against the orders of your king!”
+
+In startling contrast to the panic which reigned after the 22nd
+January was the ignorance and carelessness shown by the authorities
+beforehand. At the very time of the disaster to No. 3 Column there
+was a train of fifteen waggons, with sixty-five boxes of ammunition
+each, moving unguarded up to Helpmakaar, upon a road eight miles from
+and parallel to the Zulu border!
+
+With the exception of Rorke’s Drift, no military station was at
+this time more open to attack than Helpmakaar, distant from it about
+twelve miles. The fugitives from Isandhlwana, Captains Essex and
+Gardner, Lieutenants Cochrane, Curling, and Smith-Dorrien, with
+about thirty others, reached this place between 5 and 6 P.M., and
+at once set about forming a waggon-laager round the stores. The
+garrison of two companies of the 1-24th Regiment had marched towards
+Rorke’s Drift during the day; but Major Spalding says: “On reaching
+the summit of a hill from which the mission-house is visible it
+was observed to be in flames; this confirmed the statement of the
+fugitives that the post had been captured. This being the case,
+it was determined to save, if possible, Helpmakaar and its depôt
+of stores” ... and the column reached Helpmakaar by 9 P.M. (P. P.
+[C. 2260] p. 88.) Captain Gardner, soon after reaching Helpmakaar,
+left for Utrecht, it having occurred to him to carry the news of
+the disaster himself to Colonel Wood. Our loss at Isandhlwana is
+given as 689 officers and men Imperial troops, and 133 officers
+and men of Colonial Volunteers, Mounted Police, and Natal Native
+Contingents—Europeans (P. P. [C. 2260] pp. 93-98); but the actual
+loss was slightly in excess of those numbers.
+
+The Zulu army appears to have consisted of the following regiments:
+’Kandampemvu (or Umcityu), ’Ngobamakosi, Uve, Nokenke, Umbonambi,
+Udhloko, Nodwengu, and Undi (which comprises the Tulwana,
+’Ndhlondhlo, and Indhluyengwe), whose full nominal strength reaches
+a total of 30,900 men; but the actual numbers are estimated at from
+20,000 to 25,000.
+
+The Zulus acknowledge to having suffered heavily, and their loss is
+estimated at 3000.
+
+Cetshwayo’s youngest brother, Nugwende, who surrendered on 27th
+April, said he was present at Isandhlwana. That the front and left
+flank attack was beaten, and fell back with great loss until the fire
+of the white troops slackened; the right flank entering the camp, the
+attack was renewed, the English being unable to prevent their onset
+from want of ammunition. The Zulu army, he says, numbered 20,000 of
+the king’s best troops.
+
+A court of inquiry, composed of Colonel Hassard, C.B., R.E.,
+Lieut.-Colonel Law, R.A., and Lieut.-Colonel Harness, R.A., assembled
+at Helpmakaar on the 27th January, when the following officers gave
+evidence: Major Clery; Colonel Glyn, C.B.; Captain Gardner, 14th
+Hussars; Captain Essex, 75th Regiment; Lieutenant Cochrane, 32nd
+Regiment; Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien, 95th Regiment; Captain Nourse,
+Natal Native Contingent; and Lieutenant Curling, R.A.
+
+The evidence taken consisted of statements made by the above
+officers, not one of whom appears to have been questioned. The
+(so-called) inquiry seems to have been strictly limited to the
+occurrences at the camp, as we find Major Clery’s evidence finish
+abruptly, “I saw the column out of camp and accompanied it.” Colonel
+Glyn merely corroborated Major Clery’s statement; and the other
+officers gave their respective versions of the occurrences at the
+camp; Captain Essex giving a very clear and detailed account of the
+movements of the 24th Regiment.
+
+The proceedings were forwarded on the 29th, with these remarks: “The
+court has examined and recorded the statements of the chief witnesses.
+
+“The copy of proceedings forwarded was made by a confidential clerk
+of the Royal Engineers.
+
+“The court has refrained from giving an opinion, as instructions on
+this point were not given to it.”
+
+The proceedings were forwarded from Durban to the Secretary of State
+for War on February 8th by Lord Chelmsford, who said: “The court has
+very properly abstained from giving an opinion, and I myself refrain
+also from making any observations, or from drawing any conclusions
+from the evidence therein recorded.”
+
+He regrets that more evidence has not been taken, and has directed
+his military secretary “to append a statement of the facts which came
+under his cognizance on the day in question.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 80).
+
+On this officer’s “statement” some remarks have been made in the
+previous chapter; and we must now quote one or two passages from the
+public prints, which appeared when Colonel Harness’s share in the
+proceedings of the 22nd January first came to light.
+
+_The Daily News_ of April 8th, referring to this episode and the
+court of inquiry, says: “Lord Chelmsford seems to have been as
+unfortunate in the selection of his staff-officers as he was in
+everything else.”
+
+Lieut.-Colonel Crealock’s “statement” is stigmatised as “palpably
+written to establish a preconceived theory;” and _The Daily News_
+says most justly that “Colonel Harness should not have sat as member
+of the court of inquiry. How it could have been supposed that an
+officer who had taken so prominent a part in the doings of the 22nd
+January was a fit and suitable member of a court assembled even to
+take evidence merely, is more than we can understand. Besides, the
+very fact of his being a member, we are told, precluded Colonel
+Harness from giving his own valuable evidence.”
+
+_The Natal Witness_ of May 29th, 1879, makes some reflections on
+the same subject, which are very pertinent. We need not repeat
+its criticisms on the court of inquiry, etc. but it says: “It is
+notorious that certain members of Lord Chelmsford’s staff—there is
+no need to mention any name or names—came down to ’Maritzburg after
+the disaster, prepared to make Colonel Durnford bear the whole
+responsibility, and that it was upon their representations that the
+High Commissioner’s telegram about ‘poor Durnford’s misfortune’ was
+sent.”
+
+How a court of inquiry, assembled without the power, apparently, of
+asking a single question, was to throw much light on the causes of
+the disaster, does not appear. Its scope was limited to the doings at
+the camp; and under any circumstances it could not well criticise the
+faults of the General. The proceedings of this court of inquiry can
+therefore only be considered as eminently unsatisfactory.
+
+We might here leave this painful subject, were it not for the
+undisguised attempts that have been made to throw the blame on the
+dead.
+
+In considering the question of blame, we must first put before us the
+circumstances in which the camp defenders found themselves when they
+were required “to defend the camp.”
+
+Now the orders given to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine are stated by Major
+Clery, senior staff-officer of No. 3 Column, thus:—
+
+“Before leaving the camp I sent written instructions to Colonel
+Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect: ‘You will be in
+command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I
+speak from memory) your camp, or your line of defence’—I am not
+certain which—‘while the force is out; also draw in the line of
+your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry vedettes
+still far advanced.’ I told him to have a waggon ready loaded with
+ammunition ready to follow the force going out at a moment’s notice,
+if required. I went to Colonel Pulleine’s tent just before leaving
+camp to ascertain that he had got these instructions, and again
+repeated them verbally to him.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 81).
+
+As regards the force left to defend the camp, there were no
+instructions to form a defensive post; the General did not think it
+necessary, though to him was the almost prescient remark made: “We
+should be all right if we only had a laager.” He saw no danger; he
+was about to move his camp on, and a laager would be useless work, so
+he put the suggestion on one side with the remark: “It would take a
+week to make.” Thus Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine was left, and he had no
+reason to anticipate danger, till, almost without a moment’s warning,
+he found the camp threatened by an overwhelming force; he then, after
+trying in vain to check the enemy’s right, endeavoured to hold the
+donga and broken ground close in front of the camp, where his men
+found some cover; the camp itself being absolutely indefensible.[150]
+Colonel Durnford, as we have seen, reached the camp about 10.30 A.M.,
+before which time Major Chard says: “The troops were in column ...
+out of camp,” and he saw Zulus “on the crest of the distant hills,”
+and several parties moving to the left towards Rorke’s Drift. Colonel
+Durnford takes out his mounted men to (as he thinks) assist his
+General, and to see what the enemy is about.[B]
+
+Again, some assert that the action was brought about by Colonel
+Durnford’s Native Horse in the Ingqutu Hills. Even had it been so,
+yet this officer’s duty distinctly was to feel and reconnoitre the
+enemy.[151] When the Zulu army moved forward to the attack, he, with
+his handful of men, fell slowly back, gaining all the time possible
+for the camp defenders.
+
+Taking the whole of the circumstances of the day, we may conclude
+that, had the enemy remained hidden on the 22nd, we should probably
+have lost the entire column instead of part; but the account given by
+an English Officer with one of the troops that first saw the enemy,
+and other accounts from Zulus, seem to make it clear that the Zulus
+were moving on the camp when they came in contact with the horsemen.
+That they had no intention of remaining hidden is shown by their
+unconcealed movements on the hills throughout the morning.[152]
+
+Now, whether these defenders did or did not take the best measures
+“to defend the camp” when it was attacked, the primary causes of the
+disaster were undoubtedly these:
+
+1. The fatal position selected for the camp, and the total absence of
+any defensive precautions.
+
+2. The absence of systematic scouting, whereby an army of upwards of
+20,000 Zulus was enabled to approach Isandhlwana on the 21st, and
+remained unobserved till the 22nd, although their mounted scouts were
+actually seen by the General and staff on the 21st, watching _them_.
+
+3. The subdivision of the force, and the absence of proper
+communications by signalling or otherwise.
+
+4. The neglect of warnings given by the events of the day, and
+messages from the camp; also the withdrawal of a force actually on
+the march to the relief of the camp.
+
+For these principal causes of the disaster, none of those who fell
+were responsible.
+
+That Lord Chelmsford was shaken by the tragic events of January is
+evident from his letter to the Secretary of State for War, dated
+“Durban, Natal, February 9th, 1879,” and which ran as follows: “I
+consider it my duty to lay before you my opinion that it is very
+desirable, in view of future contingencies, that an officer of the
+rank of major-general shall be sent out to South Africa without
+delay. In June last I mentioned privately to His Royal Highness
+the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief that the strain of prolonged
+anxiety and exertion, physical and mental, was even then telling
+on me. What I felt then, I feel still more now. His Excellency Sir
+Bartle Frere concurs in this representation, and pointed out to me
+that the officer selected should be fitted to succeed him in his
+position of High Commissioner. In making this representation, I
+need not assure you that it will be my earnest desire to carry on
+my duties for Her Majesty’s service up to the fullest extent of my
+powers.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 79).
+
+The exact meaning of this letter has never been made clear. No
+doubt Lord Chelmsford was feeling “the strain of prolonged anxiety
+and exertion, physical and mental,” but His Royal Highness the
+Commander-in-Chief said that he had no previous knowledge of it.
+Students of Greek history will note the striking parallelism of this
+case with that of Nicias, who, when commanding before Syracuse in
+the year 414 B.C., applied to be superseded. “Such was the esteem
+which the Athenians felt for this union of good qualities, purely
+personal and negative, with eminent station, that they presumed the
+higher aptitudes of command,” and “the general vote was one not
+simply imputing no blame, but even pronouncing continued and unabated
+confidence.”—Grote’s “History of Greece.”
+
+But of all the strange and incomprehensible circumstances connected
+with that sad time, the one which struck Natal as the strangest was
+the utter desertion of the battle-field and the long neglect of the
+dead who lay there. On the 4th February Major Black, 2-24th Regiment,
+with a small party, found the bodies of Lieutenants Melville and
+Coghill about 300 yards from the river on the Natal side, near the
+Fugitives’ Drift, and they were buried on the spot, the colours which
+they had striven to save being found in the river, and returned next
+day to the Regiment at Helpmakaar.
+
+The fatal field of Isandhlwana was not again seen till the 14th
+March, when Major Black, 2-24th, with a small mounted party, paid a
+flying visit to the spot, a few shots only being fired at them from
+a distance. No attempt was made to bury the dead, and until the 21st
+of May that ghastly field remained as it was left on the 23rd of
+January, although there does not appear to have been any period since
+the disaster when a moderate force might not with perfect safety
+have done all that was necessary.
+
+On the morning after the return of Colonel Glyn’s Column to Rorke’s
+Drift, “Commandant Lonsdale mustered the Contingent and called out
+the indunas, and told them in the hearing of all that he wanted
+to find out the men who were courageous and would stand by their
+officers and die with them if necessary, and that those who were
+willing to do this were to come forward. At this time the mounted
+infantry and volunteers were moving off to Helpmakaar. The general
+reply of the Contingent was that they were willing to go over to
+fight along with the white people, their shield against Cetywayo; but
+that now that they saw their shield going away they would not go over
+by themselves, and that no one could say he was not afraid.”[153]
+
+“They were then dismissed, but in the afternoon they were all
+disarmed (of their guns), and their belts and puggaries and blankets
+taken from them by their officers. Each company had a flag, which
+they asked to take home with them; some were allowed to do so, but
+others were not. They were then all told to go home, and to keep
+together till they reached the Umsinga, and then to divide each for
+his own home.”
+
+On January 24th, Colonel Glyn wrote to Lord Chelmsford: “The whole
+of the Native Contingent walked off this morning. Their rifles were
+taken from them; all the hospital-bearers then went, and now the
+Native Pioneers are going. I am now left without any natives.” The
+General immediately forwarded Colonel Glyn’s letter to Sir Henry
+Bulwer, with the remark: “Unless these men are at once ordered back
+to their regiments, or punished for refusing to go, the most serious
+consequences will ensue” (_ibid._ p. 3).
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer very properly abstained from taking any strong
+measures as to punishing the men until he had inquired into the
+causes which led to their desertion. Eventually, indeed, he
+discovered that most of them had not deserted at all, but had been
+disbanded by their leader, Commandant Lonsdale. But meanwhile there
+was a great deal to be said, and on January 29th Sir Henry writes,
+pointing out that “the great disaster which happened to our force at
+Isandhlwana Camp on the 22nd inst., the circumstances under which
+these men passed the night of the 22nd, and the retirement of the
+remainder of the column on Rorke’s Drift and back into Natal, were
+all calculated to have their effect on the natives who belonged to
+this column;” and proceeds: “I am told, too, that whilst the European
+force at Rorke’s Drift on the night of the 23rd were entrenched,
+the Native Contingent was not entrenched; and further I am told
+that, on an alarm being given that night, the European officers and
+non-commissioned officers who were with the Native Contingent left
+their men and took refuge within the entrenchments. On the following
+morning, the 24th, the General and his staff left the camp; and
+this circumstance, those acquainted with the native character tell
+me, may very probably have had a further depressing effect upon the
+natives.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 4).
+
+On February 7th, Sir Henry Bulwer writes again that he has received
+answers from the magistrates whom he had directed to make inquiries
+into the causes of the dispersion of the men. These reports speak
+of the cheerful spirit and loyal tone of the chiefs, and of very
+many of the men having reported themselves to their magistrates on
+their return from the front. The accounts given by the different
+magistrates are unanimous as to the causes of the dispersion. Some of
+the men declared that officers of the Contingent told them to return
+home and await further orders, as provisions were short; others, to
+use their own words, said: “We saw that the Government was driven
+out of Zululand, and the wind blew us back also.” They thought also
+that the Commander-in-Chiefs hasty departure from Rorke’s Drift was a
+flight from the enemy. Another reason for their retreat, and to them
+a very strong one, was the necessity of going home and performing the
+rights of purifying after shedding blood.[154] It was also stated
+that some of them were led by their officers in their retreat. Others
+saw their officers killed, were left without control, and fled. Their
+friends were now laughing at them, and they were eager to return to
+the front under proper guidance.
+
+These, indeed, were ample explanations for the fact of the dispersion
+of the 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent, but they were followed
+by many and serious complaints, made by the men and reported by the
+magistrates, of the manner in which the former had been treated
+since the campaign began. These complaints comprised insufficiency
+of food, floggings for disobedience to orders which they had either
+never heard, or had not understood, and bad officers.[155] These were
+the most important items, the rest referring to their preference for
+their own methods of fighting, to which, as we have already shown,
+there were the strongest objections.
+
+These reports referred solely to the contingent attached to Colonel
+Glyn’s column, with the exception of one, which was concerning the
+remnant of the Zikali men, escaped from Isandhlwana.
+
+It was finally decided that the men of the contingents belonging to
+No. 1 Column might “be allowed to leave in batches, but they must be
+made to understand that they are required for the defence of Natal.”
+(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 22.) The contingent forming No. 2 Column remained
+steadily serving throughout the war. Major Bengough’s battalion had a
+narrow escape of sharing in the disaster of Isandhlwana, and the men
+were somewhat shaken and disheartened at seeing the contingent of No.
+3 Column dispersing; but this ill-effect soon passed away.
+
+Colonel Pearson’s remarks on the company of Native Pioneers belonging
+to his column are concise and valuable. He says: “The men worked
+cheerfully. They had eyes like hawks, and they did all their scouting
+to perfection. It convinced me that the Natal Zulus, under proper
+management, would make excellent troops.”
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV.
+
+THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SIKUKUNI.
+
+
+We have already, in a previous chapter, explained the circumstances
+which led to the war between the Transvaal Boers and Sikukuni,
+independent chief of a mixed race of natives commonly called the
+_Makatisi_, more properly the _Bapedi_, tribe. The immediate cause
+of the war was a border dispute between some of the gradually
+encroaching Boer farmers and the natives whom they had displaced,
+which ended in the latter taking possession of some cattle belonging
+to the former.
+
+This affair took place during a temporary absence of Mr. Burgers
+(then President of the Republic), who, on his return, demanded the
+cattle at the hands of Sikukuni, and the restraint of his people
+within the limits assigned to them by their Boer neighbours. Sikukuni
+expressed his willingness to make the required restitution, but took
+the opportunity of reminding the President that he laid claim to a
+considerable piece of territory already occupied by Boers, to whom
+he denied having ever willingly relinquished it. This reply was the
+signal for a declaration of war against Sikukuni on the part of the
+President and Volksraad, and a large “commando,” or volunteer force,
+was called out to attack him early in July, 1876.
+
+This force, consisting of some 3000 Boers and over 4000 of their
+Swazi allies, made its way through the country, ravaging and
+destroying as it went, until it reached the famous stronghold known
+as “Sikukuni’s Town,” upon which it made an unsuccessful night
+attack, on August 2nd.
+
+A single reverse was sufficient to dishearten the gallant Boers, who
+immediately discovered various reasons which made their return to
+their homes absolutely necessary. The commando dispersed, leaving
+a force of volunteers composed of stray Englishmen, Germans, and
+half-bred natives to occupy a couple of posts (Fort Burgers and
+Fort Weber), which they built for the purpose. From these posts
+they carried on a system of raiding expeditions upon Sikukuni’s
+people, which effectually prevented the cultivation of their land,
+and finally produced a scarcity of food amongst them. This state of
+things was too harassing to last, and Sikukuni sued for peace, which
+was granted him early in 1877, conditionally upon his paying a heavy
+fine in cattle.
+
+A month later, and before the fine had been paid, Sir T. Shepstone
+had annexed the Transvaal, and, as we have already described, took
+over, with the country, its quarrels and demands. He tried to enforce
+the fine imposed by the late Boer Government upon Sikukuni, while
+remitting the war-tax levied upon the whites. After having been
+subjected to so long a course of marauding on the part of the Dutch,
+it is not impossible that the chief really had some difficulty in
+procuring, at a moment’s notice, the 2000 head of cattle demanded
+by Sir T. Shepstone.[156] At all events, the fine was not paid so
+promptly as the administrator expected; and the whole country being
+in an unsettled condition, perpetual disturbances still took place
+between Sikukuni’s people and the border farmers, and also between
+the former and petty chiefs who had placed themselves under British
+protection.
+
+The most restless of the independent native rulers seems to have been
+a woman, Legolwana, a sister of Sikukuni’s, who had her own clan, and
+whose head-quarters was a mountain stronghold, called Masellaroon. In
+February, 1878, her people had a quarrel (nor was it for the first
+time) with a neighbouring native chief under our rule, from whom
+they took some cattle. Whether or no there were two sides to the
+question, the despoiled chief was our subject, and it so happened
+that Legolwana’s people were met in the act of driving off the cattle
+by a patrol of Transvaal volunteers, who promptly interfered. This
+occurrence led to a general outbreak of hostilities. Legolwana’s men
+attacked the two forts simultaneously, and the officers in command,
+Captain Clarke and Lieutenant Eckersley, with their men, escaped
+from them, and retired to Lydenburg. From thence Captain Clarke sent
+embassies to the Swazi king and another independent chief, asking for
+assistance against Sikukuni. His invitations, however, were politely
+declined, the chiefs in question not caring to interfere, although
+wishing to remain upon friendly terms with the English.
+
+Having obtained reinforcements from the gold-fields and Pretoria,
+Captain Clarke marched back to Fort Weber, and re-occupied it with a
+force consisting of 40 mounted volunteers under Captains Van Deventer
+and Ferreira, 150 Natal Zulus under Lieutenants Lloyd and Dacomb, and
+300 Bechuanas under Mr. Tainton.
+
+Captain Clarke’s first intentions were to attack Legolwana and
+reduce her to submission. Captain Lacon Hervey, 71st Regiment, gives
+the following description of her stronghold in his account of “The
+Secocœni War”:
+
+“The town, or kraal, of Legolani consisted of a number of straw and
+wattle-and-daub huts, beehive-shaped, situated at the base and on
+the terraces of a mountain of rocks and huge boulders 700 feet high,
+covered over with thick clumps of bush. The huts at the base of the
+mountain were surrounded by an impenetrable hedge of prickly pear;
+a single entrance, barricaded with timber, led through an avenue
+of prickly pear and cactus into the group of huts surrounded by
+palisading, wattle screens, and stone walls. Each group of huts was
+commanded by the rocks above; from behind these a direct, flanking,
+and enfilade fire could be poured on the attacking party, which, on
+account of the intricacy of the ground, would be compelled to advance
+in single file along the tortuous goat-paths leading up to the
+mountain. In addition to the cover afforded by the caves and fissures
+in the rocks, schanzes, or low stone walls, were built up wherever
+favourable positions with safe means of retreat presented themselves.
+The paths leading from one rock entrenchment, or terrace, to the
+one above it, were so concealed by rock and bush as to be difficult
+to find. Finally, the Kafirs’ most valued treasure, the cattle, was
+placed on the summit of the mountain, on a level plot of ground,
+surrounded by a stone wall.”
+
+This stronghold was attacked by Captain Clarke’s orders on the 5th
+April, and, “after about two hours’ sharp work, the north of the
+hill was carried.”[157] The fighting force, not being sufficient to
+complete its work, was ordered to withdraw, after having swept all
+the cattle from that side of the hill (277 head of cattle and 211
+sheep and goats). A considerable number of Legolwana’s people are
+supposed to have fallen in this assault, the loss on our side being
+10 killed and 12 wounded, amongst the latter Captain Van Deventer
+slightly, and Lieutenant Lloyd severely. These two officers are
+reported as having led the attack with great gallantry.
+
+The partial success gained by the storming of Masellaroon (with the
+loss of life on our side—considerable under the circumstances) was
+not such as to encourage Captain Clarke in the tactics with which
+he had commenced his operations. He therefore abandoned all idea of
+seizing the native strongholds, and “established a cordon of forts,
+about twelve miles from each other ... with a view of harassing the
+Kafirs by preventing them from cultivating the Indian corn.”
+
+“Legolwana had sued for peace, but Captain Clarke would not listen to
+anything except unconditional surrender, with the guarantee that all
+life should be spared.”[158]
+
+Thus, with the usual notion that “no terms can be made with savages,”
+which has again and again produced such disastrous consequences for
+them and for us, a system of petty warfare was kept up, tedious,
+unnecessary, and by which no good could be done nor honour gained. To
+the volunteers, many of whom, says Captain Harvey, were “gentlemen
+by birth and education,” there may have been some amusement in what
+that officer speaks of as “actions of daring individual enterprise,”
+and which he describes as follows: “Volunteers went out and lay
+ambuscades at night, to surprise and cut off Kafirs proceeding from
+kraal to kraal, or to cultivate their fields, and ‘cattle-lifting’
+expeditions were planned and boldly carried out;” but the life must
+have become monotonous in the extreme before July, when the native
+auxiliaries became so discontented with it that some of them were
+allowed to return to their homes, while a troop of mounted infantry
+was summoned from Pretoria to keep order amongst those who remained.
+
+It was about this time that Colonel Rowlands, V.C., came upon the
+scene. This excellent officer, of whose services in 1878-79 so little
+mention has been made, was sent out on “special service,” and was
+for a short time attached to the staff of Lord Chelmsford (then
+General Thesiger) during the Kaffrarian war. He was subsequently
+sent by the High Commissioner to Pretoria, which he reached on May
+6th. He employed the two following months in an inspection of the
+northern and eastern frontiers of the Transvaal,[159] and by dint
+of considerable personal exertion was enabled to supply valuable
+information to head-quarters. Towards the end of July, Colonel
+Rowlands was appointed Commandant of the Transvaal. At this time the
+regular forces in the Transvaal consisted only of the 13th Light
+Infantry, a few engineers, and departmental staff—quite inadequate
+for the work required of them; but the Commander-in-Chief, in
+signifying his approval of the manner in which Colonel Rowlands
+proposed to distribute the troops already under his command, informed
+him that he was about to reinforce the Transvaal with the 80th
+Regiment and Frontier Light Horse, with a view to active operations
+against Sikukuni.
+
+The promised reinforcements arrived by degrees from Natal, and
+meanwhile there were Pretoria, Middleburg, Lydenburg, and Standerton,
+where considerable stores of ammunition, etc. were collected, to
+be garrisoned, as well as the cordon of forts, already mentioned,
+along the Leolu Mountains, which left no large proportion of the
+troops—about 800 of the 13th, and under 300 volunteers and Zulu
+police—for service in the field.
+
+However, by the 29th August Colonel Rowlands found himself in a
+position to leave Pretoria for the confines of the Transvaal, and
+reached Fort Weber on the 13th September. From thence to Fort Burgers
+was a long and tedious march through a difficult and trackless
+country. The column was forced to make its own road as it went, and
+had several skirmishes with Sikukuni’s people _en route_. Reinforced
+by the Frontier Light Horse under Major Buller, and a party under
+Major Russell from Pretoria, Colonel Rowlands at last reached Fort
+Burgers, and, after a few days’ halt for repairs, patrolling, and
+scouting the country, recommenced his march towards “Sikukuni’s
+Town,” distant about twenty-five miles.
+
+On the 3rd October he advanced with 338 mounted men (Mounted
+Infantry, Frontier Light Horse, and Transvaal Volunteers), 130
+infantry, and 2 7-pounder mountain guns; his intention being to
+establish himself before Sikukuni’s town, thoroughly reconnoitre it,
+and, should he find that there was a chance of success, and that the
+position could be afterwards held, to attack it when he had brought
+up reinforcements.
+
+The position was one of extreme difficulty, greatly increased by
+the singular drought which was experienced at the time, both in the
+Transvaal and Natal.
+
+From Fort Burgers to Sikukuni’s Town, the approach lay chiefly
+through a defile commanded by “kopjes” (piles of rock and boulders,
+often some hundred feet in height), of which the enemy did not fail
+to take advantage. The weather was intensely hot, the thermometer
+standing daily at over 100 in the shade, and the unusual drought had
+dried up the springs and small watercourses to an extent previously
+unknown.
+
+The camp was fired into on the night before the force sighted
+Sikukuni’s Town, but from a considerable distance, causing no damage
+beyond one horse wounded, and a general stampede of the slaughter
+cattle; a determined advance of the piquets, reinforced by their
+supports, quickly driving back the enemy, who did not advance again.
+
+The stronghold was sighted upon the following day, but it soon became
+apparent to Colonel Rowlands that, while to attempt its capture with
+the small force at his disposal would be a mere reckless sacrifice
+of the troops under his command, it was equally impossible to carry
+out his original intention of establishing himself before it, under
+the existing circumstances of absolute want of water and forage.
+Deeply disappointing as was this discovery, Colonel Rowlands was
+convinced that his only course under the circumstances was to retire,
+and, his opinion being confirmed by the senior officers present, he
+reluctantly commenced his return march on the 6th October.
+
+Encouraged by the retreat of the force, the enemy, now in large
+numbers, followed and harassed it, almost until it reached the
+bivouac, eight miles from Fort Burgers. Thirteen thousand rounds of
+ammunition were expended in keeping off the foe during the march,
+and both man and beast suffered severely from want of water and the
+intense heat of the sun. The force reached Fort Burgers the following
+day, with the loss of 1 man wounded; 5 horses were killed, 10 died
+of horse sickness, and 4 horses and 1 mule were wounded. Here they
+remained for several weeks, in hopes that the summer rains, which it
+was natural to expect should fall at this time of year, would enable
+them to make a second advance upon Sikukuni’s Town. Meanwhile mounted
+patrols, under Major Buller, Major Russell, Captain Clarke, and
+Lieutenant Eckersley (in command of Swazi levies), swept the country
+in every direction, harrying the natives and capturing their cattle,
+but without meeting with any armed opposition. Horse sickness now
+set in—that South African scourge, from which the force had hitherto
+suffered but slightly, and in single cases, but which at this time
+became an epidemic, deaths occurring daily, sometimes but a few
+hours after the animal was attacked by the disease. This unfortunate
+circumstance added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.
+
+After the retreat of the force from before Sikukuni’s Town, the
+enemy made several determined attacks upon the forts in the Mamalubi
+Valley, especially upon Fort Faugh-a-Ballagh; and although these
+attacks were in every case successfully resisted, they necessitated
+the strengthening of the garrisons of the forts along this line.
+
+Lord Chelmsford (then General Thesiger) had previously given notice
+to Colonel Rowlands that a column from the Transvaal, under the
+command of the latter, would be required to co-operate with the
+Ama-Swazi in the invasion of Zululand. The 13th Regiment, Frontier
+Light Horse, and Lieutenant Nicholson’s guns, were all to be
+available for that purpose as soon as the Sikukuni affair (which was
+then lightly considered) should be settled. By this arrangement, the
+80th Regiment and volunteers alone were reserved for the defence of
+the Transvaal. As the season was now far advanced, Colonel Rowlands
+was obliged to make the best arrangements he could for the defence
+of the border with the force—an absurdly small one, considering
+the disturbed state of the country—which would be left after the
+withdrawal of those intended by the General for the Zulu invasion.
+His chief adviser, Captain Clarke, was of opinion that a precipitate
+retirement from the valleys of the Steelport and Speckboom rivers
+would be unadvisable. These valleys contained large numbers of Kafir
+gardens, and, by holding them a little later, the natives would be
+prevented from sowing their crops for another season, and starvation
+would ensue. With this object in view, Fort Burgers was garrisoned
+with 100 of the 13th Regiment, and some 50 mounted volunteers,
+while Colonel Rowlands himself retired to Speckboom Drift, about
+thirteen miles from Fort Burgers, where he constructed another
+fort in such a position as to cover the junction of four important
+roadways. Having completed this work, he determined to attack some
+native strongholds in the Steelport Valley, into which he marched,
+with 3 guns, 140 mounted men, 340 infantry, and 250 natives, on
+the 26th October. Moving before daybreak the following morning, he
+commenced the attack, at 7 A.M., upon a large kraal, built upon a
+mountain spur. Here there was some sharp work, difficult positions
+seized, and the valley finally cleared. Several kraals were burnt,
+about 12,000 lb. of grain destroyed, and 100 head of cattle taken.
+Sixteen of the enemy were “accounted for,” the loss on the side of
+the attacking party being 1 killed and 10 wounded. At 10 o’clock the
+same morning the Commandant returned to his camp on the Steelport,
+and, a few days later, to the new fort at Speckboom Drift. Despatches
+from head-quarters awaited him here, instructing him to withdraw
+altogether, and as speedily as possible, from the enemy’s country.
+
+Arrangements were immediately made for the evacuation of Fort
+Burgers, which was the advanced post on the direct road to Sikukuni’s
+Town, the withdrawal of troops and stores being masked by a strong
+patrol under Captain Carrington, composed of mounted volunteers and
+native foot levies, who were sent, _viâ_ Fort Burgers and Origstaadt
+Valley, to the Oliphant River. The head-quarters of the 13th Regiment
+(340), Russell’s Mounted Infantry (63), and Lieutenant Nicholson’s
+two mountain guns, left camp for Lydenburg—the whole under the
+command of Lieut.-Colonel Gilbert, 13th Light Infantry—immediately;
+and in a few days’ time Fort Burgers was emptied and demolished.
+Captain Carrington’s patrol having returned, after capturing 345
+head of cattle, and meeting no enemy except a small guard and the
+cattle-herds, Colonel Rowlands marched from Speckboom about the
+7th November, leaving at that fort a sufficient force to guard the
+ammunition and stores which remained there. About thirteen miles
+from Lydenburg he halted and constructed a small fort, to cover
+the principal road leading to that town, and which he purposed to
+garrison with a detachment of volunteers.
+
+Considerable difficulty was now experienced by Colonel Rowlands
+in arranging the small force to be left at his disposal, so as to
+efficiently protect the great length of frontier, extending from
+Fort Mamalubi (under the west side of the Leolu range, and about
+twenty-five miles from Oliphant’s River) to Kruger’s Post on the
+east, besides garrisoning Pretoria, Middleburg, and Lydenburg, in
+which were large quantities of supplies and war _matériel_. His plans
+were laid with due consideration for the nature of the country and
+the enemy, and after careful consultation with those officers who
+were supposed to be most fully acquainted with both. Nevertheless
+they did not meet with full approval from head-quarters, from whence
+Colonel Rowlands finally received orders to remain where he was,
+and be responsible for the arrangements he had made, instead of
+proceeding at the head of No. 5 Column to the eastern border for the
+invasion of Zululand, as originally intended. Shortly afterwards
+Lieut.-Colonel Gilbert was directed to proceed with the 13th Light
+Infantry and Lieutenant Nicholson’s guns to Derby, Lieut.-Colonel
+Buller having preceded him to that place, which was now removed from
+under Colonel Rowlands’s command and placed under that of Colonel
+Wood.
+
+The attention of the former officer was now turned to the disposition
+of the force that remained to him, and to the raising of new corps
+of volunteers and strengthening those already formed, which he
+deemed necessary for the security of the Transvaal. To this work he
+set himself with great energy and considerable success, stifling
+thereby the disappointment which it was but natural that he should
+feel at being excluded from the Zulu campaign. Towards the close of
+the month, however, he received a letter from the General, asking
+him to spare two companies of the 80th Regiment to take the place of
+the force under Colonel Gilbert, which had been moved to Luneburg,
+and which shortly after joined Colonel Wood’s column. Somewhat
+to his surprise, he was reminded that Derby was _in his command_,
+and was told that the General commanding would be glad if he would
+proceed there in person to _reassure the Swazis_. That same day the
+two companies of the 80th, under Major Creagh, were put in orders
+to march as directed, and Colonel Rowlands followed a week later,
+leaving the forces defending the northern border under the able
+command of Major Carrington, who, however, took such instructions
+from Captain Clarke as he considered necessary to give as
+Commissioner of that district under His Excellency the Administrator
+of the Transvaal.
+
+At Derby there was, not unnaturally, some slight confusion owing
+to this double appointment of officers in command; but having
+overcome this difficulty, Colonel Rowlands set himself seriously
+to consider the situation, which was by no means a promising one.
+A force composed of two companies of Europeans and 250 natives,
+collected from the neighbouring country, was clearly useless for any
+aggressive purposes, while the Swazis, though ready and willing to
+co-operate with an English force large enough to support them, were
+evidently far from satisfied with the number collected at Derby.
+That town, or hamlet rather, consisting of but two houses in point
+of fact, is situated from twenty to five-and-twenty miles from the
+Zulu border of a part of Zululand peopled by some of the most warlike
+tribes of that nation, and so small a garrison as the above did
+but invite attack and disaster. Upon these considerations Colonel
+Rowlands determined to reinforce himself from Pretoria and Lydenburg.
+He sent instructions to Major Tyler, 80th Regiment, to send him
+three companies of the 80th, two Armstrong guns, and a troop of
+Weatherley’s Border Horse, but directing him to consult the colonial
+authorities as to whether the troops could be safely spared, before
+complying with the order.
+
+At this time, about the middle of January, the Zulus throughout this
+northern and thickly-populated part of the country were perfectly
+quiet and even friendly. There was still a possibility that the
+difficulty between their king and the English might be settled
+without bloodshed, and the people were evidently anxious to avoid
+giving cause of offence. Colonel Rowlands, who employed his time
+while waiting for his reinforcements (which would take some weeks to
+arrive) in reconnoitring the country, found the roads open and the
+inhabitants inoffensive. At this period he also attempted to organise
+a frontier force of farmers—Englishmen, Boers, and Germans—whom he
+summoned to a meeting for consideration of the question. From fifty
+to sixty attended, and, after hearing his address, their spokesman
+responded to the effect that they were willing to take service
+for the defensive object proposed, but that it was to be clearly
+understood that by uniting themselves to a common protective cause
+(course?), they did not thereby acknowledge allegiance to the British
+crown. But a committee, subsequently formed to consider details
+connected with the proposed force, fell out amongst themselves, and
+the scheme was abandoned.
+
+On the 26th January, Colonel Rowlands received from Sir T. Shepstone
+the news of the disaster at Isandhlwana; and from this time nothing
+but contradictory orders and impossible commands seem to have reached
+him at his distant post. He heard of the troops he had intended
+for special purposes being ordered elsewhere; he was directed by
+Lord Chelmsford to take orders from his junior, Colonel Wood; he
+received different instructions, entirely opposed to each other,
+concerning the calling out of the Swazi allies; nevertheless, in
+spite of the confusion which reigned at that unhappy epoch, he kept
+his head, and went steadily on with the plans he had formed. By the
+second week in February he had, with some difficulty, collected
+a force of something under a thousand Europeans and natives, and
+was prepared to operate. It seemed, however, impossible to get any
+distinct orders or definite instructions from those in command,
+either military or civil; and representations having been made to him
+by the border Boers that a Zulu impi was about to attack them from
+the Tolaka Mountains, he marched out with a portion of his force in
+that direction, leaving Major Tucker (80th) in command of the rest.
+While halted at the Assegai River upon this expedition, he received
+a despatch from Colonel Wood, requesting him to march his force from
+Derby to Luneburg to his support. Sending a note to Major Tucker,
+directing him to start for Luneburg next morning, he continued his
+march, attacked and took the Tolaka Mountain, and then proceeded
+towards Luneburg with his own force. He was now about eighteen miles
+from where his head-quarters camp under Major Tucker would be, with
+a broken and hilly country to pass through, over which he had great
+difficulty in conveying his wounded (fortunately but few), and the
+captured women and children. These captives were, on this account,
+offered their freedom, but refused to accept it, which, perhaps, was
+not unnatural, seeing that their homes and crops were destroyed, and
+they had no longer any means of livelihood.
+
+The force passed through the Intombi Valley, laying the country waste
+for miles on either side of the road as it went, and met on its way
+messengers from Colonel Wood, requesting the immediate presence of
+the mounted corps. But upon the 23rd February, Colonel Rowlands
+received a memorandum to the effect that the Lieut.-General, by
+desire of the High Commissioner, wished him to proceed at once back
+to Pretoria, to prepare some defence against the Boers, who had
+assumed a threatening attitude. Upon the receipt of this order he
+quitted the Luneburg district, and arrived on the 6th of March at
+the capital of the Transvaal. Here there were but 200 infantry and
+some few mounted volunteers; but by Colonel Rowlands’s exertions the
+number was soon swelled to 600 or 700, by the addition of city corps
+and other volunteers.
+
+A considerable number of Boers who had never willingly accepted
+the annexation of their country by the English, had taken the
+opportunity, offered by the general confusion which reigned after
+the disaster of the 22nd January, of endeavouring to regain the
+independence of their state. Mass meetings were held to discuss the
+subject, and finally a large body of armed men formed a camp at no
+great distance from Pretoria. The situation appeared a very serious
+one; and the High Commissioner himself travelled to Pretoria to
+endeavour by his honeyed words to calm an agitation which might prove
+so singularly inconvenient should the angry feelings of the indignant
+Boers find vent in blows. On the 12th of April, just two years from
+the day of the annexation, Sir B. Frere met a deputation of the
+Transvaal farmers at Erasmus Spruit, about six miles from Pretoria,
+and held a long discussion with them upon the subject of their
+rights and wrongs. They repeatedly and plainly asserted that Sir
+T. Shepstone had coerced the people into submission by threatening
+them with the Zulus, and declared unanimously that nothing would
+satisfy them but the recovery of their liberties. Sir Bartle Frere
+gave them to understand in return that this was the only thing for
+which they might not hope. He assured them that he looked upon the
+_voortrekkers_ as an honour to their race, and that he felt proud to
+belong to the same stock. The Queen, he told them, felt for them “as
+for her own children;”[160] and he hoped to tell her that she had “no
+better subjects in her empire,” than amongst them. The committee,
+however, retired in complete dissatisfaction, and addressed a
+petition to Her Majesty, in which they remark, “unwilling subjects
+but faithful neighbours we will be;” and more than hint that they are
+prepared to “draw the sword” to prove how much they are in earnest.
+The excitement, however, calmed down for the time being, and Sir
+Bartle Frere departed.
+
+During his stay in Pretoria, he desired Colonel Rowlands to
+make preparations to resume hostilities against Sikukuni, and
+accordingly, by the end of May, that officer had increased the
+number of his mounted volunteers by 450. He then made a vain attempt
+to induce Lord Chelmsford to spare him another regiment of regular
+troops; but finding that this was decidedly refused, and that no
+operations were likely to take place in the Transvaal for some time,
+he accepted the General’s offer of a brigade in the lower column.
+
+On the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley at Port Durnford, he applied to
+that general for the command in case operations should be resumed in
+the Transvaal. To this he had a strong claim, both on account of his
+experience and of his laborious services there; but the request was
+refused.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI.
+
+NO. 4 COLUMN—INTOMBI—INDHLOBANE—KAMBULA—KING’S MESSENGERS.
+
+
+On January 6th, No. 4 Column, under Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B.—strength
+previously detailed—crossed the Blood River (the Zulu boundary
+according to the award of the Commission) and advanced to Bemba’s Kop.
+
+On the 11th, Colonel Wood met the General halfway to Rorke’s Drift,
+and received instructions “to occupy himself with the tribes on his
+front and left flank, notably Seketwayo,” until No. 3 Column was
+ready to advance to Isipezi Hill, when he was to proceed to Ingwe,
+both columns to establish advanced depôts, bring up supplies, and
+then move forward. Colonel Wood induced the Zulu chief Bemba to give
+up his arms and come in, which he did on the 10th, bringing with him
+about eighty of his people and 1000 head of cattle, sheep, and goats;
+they were sent to Utrecht.
+
+On the 11th, Colonel Wood, who had advanced with a portion of the
+force from Bemba’s Kop towards Rorke’s Drift to meet the General on
+his return march, seized about 2000 head of cattle, the owners of
+which were quietly tending them as usual (these were supposed to
+be Sihayo’s), and next day attacked a petty chief, who was said to
+have “given considerable trouble to the Transvaal farmers”, with
+the result of seven Zulus killed and upwards of 500 head of cattle
+captured.
+
+Some 2000 to 3000 head of cattle were also taken from the Sondolosi
+tribe,[161] a slight resistance being offered by the Zulus, of whom
+one was killed. Colonel Wood _thus_ endeavoured to induce Seketwayo’s
+people to be pacified, and was “therefore most anxious to refrain
+from taking any steps which might discourage these men from coming
+in!”
+
+The General, on entering Zululand, finding the difficulties greater
+than he had anticipated, instructed Colonel Wood “to act altogether
+independently, about the head waters of the White Umveloosi River”
+(16th January, 1879), and when Seketwayo had either surrendered
+or been defeated, to “take up a position covering Utrecht and the
+adjacent Transvaal border, wherever he considers his force can be
+most usefully employed,” and not to “attempt to advance towards the
+Inhlazatye Mountain until an advance by the other three columns
+across the Umhlatoozi River has become possible.” (P. P. [C. 2252]
+p. 63.) Colonel Wood, from Bemba’s Kop, communicated with Uhamo—a
+brother of Cetshwayo—who had asked for a way to be pointed out by
+which he might escape.
+
+No. 4 Column now moved towards Intemgeni River, and encamped there on
+18th January, Colonel Wood reporting “many of the natives are giving
+themselves up to me; I have captured about 4000 head of cattle.”
+On the previous day a party of Wood’s “irregulars” attacked some
+Zulus, killing 9, wounding about 20, and taking 5 prisoners and 100
+sheep; with a loss to themselves of 2 wounded (_ibid._ p. 66). On the
+19th and 20th there were skirmishes with some of Tinta’s people, of
+whom about 12 were killed. A prisoner was brought in by the Native
+Contingent on the 19th, whom they gravely asked permission to kill
+in the evening, “thinking they had done their whole duty in obeying
+orders and bringing the man in.”
+
+The column encamped at Tinta’s kraal, on the left bank of the
+Umvolosi River, and a stone fort was commenced. A reconnaissance
+across the Umvolosi to Zinguni Mountain met the Zulus in force,
+and was compelled to retire with a loss of two wounded, the enemy
+not being checked until the river was recrossed. January 22nd, the
+Zinguni Mountain was patrolled by a strong force, the enemy retiring
+hastily, and leaving about 600 head of cattle. In the distance a
+large force, estimated at 4000, was seen, and it apparently ascended
+the Indhlobane Mountain. The column had a smart engagement with the
+enemy on the 24th, and drove them off with a loss of about fifty
+killed; but on receiving intelligence of the disaster to No. 3
+Column, retired to Fort Tinta.
+
+At Luneburg a laager was formed by the Dutch farmers, under
+Commandant Schermbrucker, and Colonel Wood moved his force to Kambula
+Hill, to cover Utrecht and the neighbouring border, and there
+firmly entrenched himself. The situation chosen was a commanding
+and central position between the Umvolosi and Pevana rivers on the
+Jagt-pad (Hunter’s path), covering the country northward to Luneburg,
+eastward to the Amaqulusi, southward to the Umvolosi, and westward to
+Balte’s Spruit and Utrecht.
+
+The Zulus abandoned the open, and remained in the mountains and
+broken country, where rocks and caves afforded them secure positions.
+
+On February 1st, Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with 140 irregular cavalry,
+made a dash at the Amaqulisini (or Amaqulusi) kraal, thirty miles
+distant. This was a military stronghold, deemed by the Boers to be
+impregnable. It was situated in a basin at a distance of nearly
+two miles from the summit of the rugged heights by which it was
+surrounded, and almost hidden from view, although about 300 yards in
+diameter and containing at least 250 huts.
+
+Leaving thirty men as a covering party, Colonel Buller moved with the
+remainder down the almost precipitous slopes, the horsemen frequently
+obliged to dismount and lead their horses. However, the kraal was
+not occupied in force, and, after a few shots, the inmates fled. Six
+Zulus were killed, 270 head of cattle taken, and the kraal burnt, the
+force returning from this daring exploit without casualty, after a
+hard day’s work of twenty hours.
+
+A small fort was finished and armed on February 3rd, and, on the
+10th, Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with 400 irregular cavalry, reconnoitred
+the Indhlobane Mountain, and, after a slight skirmish, captured 490
+head of cattle.
+
+A new fort was commenced at Kambula, about two miles higher up the
+spur, and the camp moved to this spot on the 13th, the fort being
+garrisoned by two companies of infantry and two guns.
+
+It was reported that Manyonyoba (an independent native chief) had
+been killing and plundering in the Intombi Valley, so Colonel Buller
+was sent with a force to the spot. The Swazi chief Umbilini was also
+reported by Commandant Schermbrucker to have raided, in combination
+with Manyonyoba, and done much mischief to life and property;
+however, a force sent from Luneburg had a successful skirmish with
+them.
+
+The king’s brother, Uhamo, came in to Captain McLeod from the Swazi
+border with 300 of his people and 1000 cattle, and reached Derby on
+February 4th, his following increased to about 600, and was moved
+down to Luneburg, where he arrived on March 7th.
+
+A sad disaster occurred on the Intombi River to a detachment of the
+80th Regiment on the 12th March. Captain Moriarty, with 104 men of
+the 80th, was escorting a convoy from Derby to Luneburg. On reaching
+the Intombi Drift (about four miles from Luneburg) the river was
+found to be rising, and by the time the advanced guard (thirty-five
+men, under Lieutenant Harward) had crossed, it was impossible to take
+the waggons over. They were therefore laagered on the river-bank in
+the shape of a triangle; and there they remained next day. About
+4 A.M. on the 12th a shot was fired, and the troops turned out,
+remaining under arms for half an hour, when, all being quiet, they
+returned to their tents (it transpired afterwards that the outlying
+sentries had been surprised and killed by the enemy). Suddenly the
+fog lifted, and a large body of Zulus without any warning rushed on
+and took the laager, driving the troops into the river. The party
+under Lieutenant Harward, which was encamped on the opposite bank,
+opened a brisk fire, but were soon broken, and obliged to fly towards
+Luneburg; Lieutenant Harward, galloping in, gave the alarm. Only
+forty-four men of this detachment survived.
+
+Major Tucker sallied out from Luneburg, when the enemy slowly
+retreated. The waggons were saved, and the bodies of Captain Moriarty
+and his unfortunate men buried.
+
+The comparatively quiet time at Kambula was passed thus: Colonel
+Wood was up with the first in the early morning, and often out with
+the patrols who daily scouted the country round for miles; his force
+securely entrenched; himself a very strict but kind commander, who
+had the full confidence and good-will of his troops. Sports were
+got up for the amusement and occupation of the men. A band played
+in the evening, and the singing and laughter in camp showed that
+all were in excellent spirits. The daily business was cutting wood
+from the mountain-side some three miles distant, escorts, patrols,
+and piquet-duty. One of the night piquets (eight men) posted at
+some distance from camp was termed “the forlorn hope;” its special
+duty was to give early warning of an enemy’s approach. But the most
+unpleasant feature in this camp-life was the absence of comfort at
+night. The troops necessarily “turned in” dressed, armed, and ready
+for instant work, with the _personal_ discomfort illustrated by this
+soldier’s joke—that it was “Cetshwayo outside and Catch-away-o!
+inside.”
+
+Lieut.-Colonel Buller, having returned to Kambula, patrolled Uhamo’s
+district, and in the direction of the Indhlobane range; and on the
+16th brought into camp 958 of Uhamo’s people.
+
+On March 28th, a reconnaissance by the whole cavalry force was made
+towards Indhlobane. The Zulus were in possession of the mountain,
+which was ascended in skirmishing order as rapidly as possible,
+the enemy keeping up a heavy fire from caves and from behind huge
+rocks. The summit was reached with the loss of one officer—Lieutenant
+Williams—and serious fighting was kept up for some time in the
+endeavour to dislodge the Zulus from their secure positions. Captain
+the Hon. R. Campbell was killed, also Lieutenant von Sticenstron, and
+Colonel Wood himself had a very narrow escape.
+
+Whilst engaged in this struggle a Zulu army was moving up to seize
+the approaches to the mountain, and cut off the force from the camp.
+Immediately on this being observed a retreat was made in rapid but
+good order, until a very steep and stony krantz was reached, where
+the men could only move in single file; here the enemy got in amongst
+the troopers, causing utter confusion. The officers did their best to
+steady their men, but it became a case of _sauve qui peut_.
+
+Captain Barton’s troop was sent down the mountain to recover the
+body of Lieutenant Williams, and returned, having been joined by Mr.
+Uys. On the flats they came up with Colonel Weatherley’s troop, and
+found the enemy in front and on the right and left. Retreating a
+short distance they were surrounded, so, opening out, they charged
+through the enemy and over the neck, which was lined with Zulus. But
+few were enabled to win their way through this perilous pass, and of
+those who did many were overtaken and killed on the plain. Of Captain
+Barton’s troop but eight men returned to camp that night.
+
+The broken force fought its way to the camp, followed by the enemy
+for several miles. Many a man’s life was saved by a comrade halting
+and taking him up on his own horse, a personal instance of which
+Captain D’Arcy gives. His horse had been killed under him in the
+descent of the mountain, and he ran for his life for some 300 yards,
+when a man named Francis caught a horse for him, which, however,
+he shortly relinquished to a wounded comrade, running on himself
+on foot. Colonel Buller picked him up when nearly exhausted, but
+when he recovered his breath he dismounted; he was a second time
+in difficulties, and assisted by Lieutenant Blaine, and again, a
+third time, by Major Tremlett, R.A. Indeed, most of the men got into
+camp with comrades mounted behind them. The loss was 12 officers
+and 84 non-commissioned officers and men killed, and also Colonel
+Wood’s staff-officer, Captain the Hon. R. Campbell; Captain Barton,
+Coldstream Guards; and Mr. Lloyd, Political Assistant. Colonel Wood’s
+horse was shot under him.
+
+Mr. Piet Uys, the leader of the Burgher force, was likewise amongst
+those killed in action this day.
+
+Small patrols were sent out next morning to endeavour to find any men
+who might have escaped.
+
+Warning of an intended attack on Kambula was brought in by a
+native—one of Uhamo’s men—and, about 11 A.M., dense masses of the
+enemy were seen in the distance, when all the force was assembled
+and the cattle driven into their laager. At 1.30 P.M. the action
+commenced by mounted troops, under Colonels Buller and Russell,
+engaging the enemy on the north of the camp. They were speedily
+forced to return into the laager, followed by the Zulus until they
+were within 300 yards, when a heavy fire from the 90th Regiment
+checked their advance, and they opened out round the camp.
+
+At 2.15 the right front and rear of the camp were attacked by heavy
+masses of the enemy, who, apparently well supplied with Martini-Henry
+rifles, occupied a hill commanding the laager, enfilading it so that
+the company of the 13th posted at the right rear of the enclosure had
+to be withdrawn. The front of the cattle-laager was, however, stoutly
+held by a company of the 13th; but the Zulus coming boldly on, Major
+Hackett, with two companies of the 90th, was directed to clear the
+slope. They sallied out into the open, driving the Zulus back in a
+gallant manner under a heavy fire, until ordered to retire by Colonel
+Wood.
+
+While bringing his men in, Major Hackett was dangerously wounded.
+
+The two guns in the redoubt were admirably worked by Lieutenant
+Nicholson, R.A., until he was mortally wounded; when Major Vaughan,
+R.A., replaced him.
+
+Major Tremlett, R.A., with four guns, remained in the open during the
+engagement.
+
+The attack began to slacken about 5.30 P.M., enabling Colonel Wood
+to assume the offensive; the Zulus were driven from the cattle kraal
+into which they penetrated, and from the immediate vicinity of the
+camp, the infantry doing great execution among the retreating masses.
+
+The pursuit was taken up by the mounted men under Colonel Buller, and
+continued for seven miles, “killing great numbers, the enemy being
+too exhausted to fire in their own defence” (_vide_ Colonel Wood’s
+despatch of March 30th). All agreed in admiring the pluck of the
+Zulus, who, “under tremendous fire, never wavered, but came straight
+at us.”
+
+The loss of No. 4 Column was 2 officers killed, 5 wounded, and 80
+men killed and wounded. The strength of the enemy was thought to be
+about 20,000, of whom 1000 are supposed to have been killed. Colonel
+Wood’s operations at Indhlobane were for the purpose of “making
+demonstrations against the enemy,” as directed by the General, who
+had reason to believe at that time, that he should find the whole
+Zulu army between his force and Etshowe. (P. P. [C. 2367] p. 35.) One
+trooper, a Frenchman named Grandier, had a very remarkable escape
+from Indhlobane, of which the following is his account: On coming
+down the mountain we were met by a large Zulu force, and fell back
+across the neck assailed on all sides. I was about the last, having
+put a comrade on my horse whilst I ran alongside, when a Kafir caught
+me by the legs, and I was made prisoner. I was taken to Umbilini’s
+kraal and questioned; after which, I passed the night tied to a
+tree. Next day I was taken into the middle of a large “impi,” where
+I was threatened with death, but the leader said he would send me to
+Cetywayo. Next day I started for Ulundi, in charge of four men, who
+were riding, but I had all my clothes taken from me, and had to walk,
+carrying their food. On the evening of the fourth day we reached
+Ulundi, and I was kept tied in the open till about noon next day,
+when Cetywayo sent for me, and questioned me about what the English
+wanted, where Shepstone was, etc. A Dutchman acted as interpreter,
+and I saw a Portuguese, and an English-speaking Zulu, who could
+read.[162] Cetywayo had a personal guard of about one hundred men,
+but I did not see any large numbers of men at his kraal, but there
+were two small cannons there. During my stay I was fed on mealies,
+and frequently beaten. At last messengers arrived reporting the death
+of Umbilini, and Cetywayo said he would send me to his Kafirs to
+kill. On 13th April I started in charge of two Kafirs, one armed with
+a gun and both with assegais. About midday we were lying down, the
+Kafirs being sleepy, when I seized an assegai and killed the man with
+the gun, the other running away. I walked all night guided by the
+stars; next day I saw an impi driving cattle towards Ulundi, so had
+to lie still. After this I saw no Kafirs, and walked on at night. On
+the morning of the 16th I met some of our own people and was brought
+into camp. Trooper Grandier, when brought in, was dressed in an old
+corduroy coat, cut with assegai stabs, and a pair of regimental
+trousers cut off at the knee; these he had picked up on the Veldt. He
+had strips of cloth round his feet.
+
+The independent chief Umbilini, who was such a thorn in the side of
+the Transvaal, was killed early in April. Small parties had raided
+into the Pongolo Valley from Indhlobane, opposite Luneburg, until
+they were said to number some hundreds, when they came upon two
+companies of the 2-24th on the march; these at once laagered, and the
+enemy moved on; Umbilini, Assegai’s son, and four horsemen, going
+back with twenty horses. They were pursued by Captain Prior, 80th
+Regiment, with seven mounted men (80th), and another European, when
+Assegai’s son was killed, and Umbilini mortally wounded.
+
+The raiders were attacked by some parties of natives, but went off to
+the Assegai River with several beasts and sheep.—(P. P. [C. 2374] p.
+51).
+
+Meanwhile, many attempts were made by the Zulu king to arrest the
+tide of invasion, and to bring about a more peaceable solution of the
+difficulties between him and the English Government.
+
+When Lord Chelmsford first crossed into Zululand, messengers were
+sent by the king to the column on the Lower Tugela asking for an
+explanation of the invasion, suggesting that hostilities should be
+suspended, that the British troops should re-cross the Tugela, and
+that talking should commence.[163] These men did not return to the
+king, but remained at the Lower Tugela, Sir Bartle Frere says by
+their own desire, since they dared not return with an unsatisfactory
+answer.
+
+And Bishop Schreuder narrates on March 3rd that—“Two Zulus arrived
+here yesterday with a message from the king.... The king says: ‘Look
+here, I have taken care of the deserted mission stations, and not
+allowed them to be destroyed, thinking that the missionaries in
+time would return to them, such as Mr. Robertson’s at Kwamagwaza,
+and Oftibro’s at Ekhowe, but we now see what use the missionaries
+make of the station-houses; Robertson has come with an impi (army)
+to the Ekhowe mission station, and there has made a fort of it, the
+houses being turned to advantage for our enemies. Seeing this, my
+people have of their own accord destroyed the other mission stations;
+and although I have not ordered this destruction, still I cannot
+complain of it, seeing that the houses on the stations will serve as
+a shelter for our present invading enemy. I am in a fix what to do
+with your station Entumeni, for it is reported ... that the column at
+Miltongambill is to ... march to Entumeni, turn the station into a
+fort, like Robertson has had the Ekhowe turned into a fort. In that
+case I will, much against my wish, be obliged to destroy the house
+at Entumeni, as a matter of self-protection, the last thing I ever
+thought of doing, as I have no grudge against you or your station.’
+This is the substance of the king’s message to me with respect to
+my station, Entumeni; it, therefore, now will entirely depend on
+the decision of the General Lord Chelmsford, whether the Entumeni
+station-houses are to be destroyed or _not_.” Bishop Schreuder says:
+“The messengers also report that the king has sent, through a certain
+Ikolwa Klass (not known to me), that copy of Sir T. Shepstone’s
+report which I, on behalf of the Natal Government, handed over to him
+from Her Majesty Queen Victoria, August, 1875.
+
+“Already Umavumendaba had requested the king to send that book with
+the deputation that met at Tugela, 11th December, 1878, in order
+that there might be proved from that book wherein the king had
+sinned, since the English had put forth such warlike demonstrations;
+but Umavumendaba’s request was not then acceded to. The king now
+sends this book that from the contents of it may be proved wherein he
+has broken the compact made at his installation, 1st September, 1875”
+[1873].—(P.P. [C. 2318] pp. 35-37).
+
+Bishop Schreuder requested Mr. Fannin, the border agent, “to receive
+the message from the messenger’s own lips, and communicate it to
+His Excellency.” He reported that Cetshwayo wished to explain to
+the Government that he had never desired war. He had not, he said,
+refused the terms proposed at the Lower Tugela; he had collected 1000
+head of cattle to pay the demand made on him, and would even have
+delivered up Sihayo’s sons to the General, but “any Zulu that showed
+himself was immediately fired upon.” The attack upon Sandhlwana,
+he protested, was not made by his orders, and his induna was in
+disgrace for having made it. As regards Inyezane, the king contended
+that Colonel Pearson provoked the attack made on him by burning
+kraals, and committing other acts of hostility. He asked that both
+sides should put aside their arms, and resume negotiations with a
+view to a permanent settlement of all questions between himself and
+the Government. He would, he said, have sent in a message some time
+since, but was afraid, because the last time, when he sent eight
+messengers to the Lower Tugela, they were detained, whom he now
+begged might be sent back to him (_ibid._ pp. 40, 41).
+
+Mr. Fannin, on the 22nd March, reports the arrival of the messengers
+with the book, and says: “Cetywayo sends by the messengers the book
+containing the laws promulgated at the time of his coronation, and
+presented to him by Her Majesty the Queen.
+
+“It will be remembered that this book was handed to the Zulu king by
+Bishop Schreuder at the request of the Natal Government some time
+after the coronation took place. The king now returns it, and asks
+him to cast his eye over its contents, and say in what way he has
+transgressed its provisions” (_ibid._ p. 47).
+
+On March 28th Mr. Fannin reports that “three messengers have arrived
+with a message from Cetywayo. Their names are Johannes (a native
+of Entumeni), ’Nkisimana, and Umfunzi. On approaching the ferry
+they were fired on by the Native Contingent.... The message is
+very short; it is simply to say, Cetywayo sees no reason for the
+war which is being waged against him, and he asks the Government
+to appoint a place at which a conference could be held with a view
+to the conclusion of peace.” They further brought a message from
+Dabulamanzi, that “a few days ago he sent a white flag with two
+messengers to Ekhowe, to ask for a suspension of hostilities, until
+the result of this mission was known, but the men have not returned.
+He asks that the men may be released.” Mr. Fannin says: “Four other
+Entumeni men have arrived with these messengers,” and he suggests,
+“that the Entumeni men should not be allowed to return to Zululand”
+(_ibid._ pp. 44, 45).
+
+“Owing,” says Sir B. Frere, on June 17th, “to some misunderstanding
+between the various civil and military authorities, these messengers
+also were detained for several weeks, and have only lately been sent
+back.”
+
+“I do not for a moment suppose,” he continues, “that either the civil
+or military authorities were aware of this, or could have prevented
+it by bringing their detention to notice at an earlier period, but
+it shows the difficulties of intercourse on such subjects with the
+Zulus, where such things could occur without the slightest ground for
+suspicion of bad faith on the part of either the civil or military
+authorities.”[164]
+
+It is not easy to discover what unusual and mysterious difficulties
+the civil and military authorities can have found in communicating
+with the Zulu messengers (men who had been employed for many years
+in carrying the “words” of Government and the Zulu king to each
+other), and it is still more inexplicable to whose notice the said
+authorities could have brought their detention. The whole matter
+is about as comprehensible as the statement which appeared at the
+time in the Natal papers, that when these same messengers—a small
+party—approached our camp, bearing a white flag, “_we fired upon it_
+(_i.e._ the flag) _to test its sincerity_.”
+
+The detention of these messengers as prisoners at Kranz Kop came
+to the knowledge of the Bishop of Natal about the middle of April,
+and he at once brought the fact to the notice of the civil and
+military authorities. On the 20th April he saw Lord Chelmsford
+in Pietermaritzburg, and spoke to him on the subject. The General
+informed him that he had already ordered them to go back to
+Cetshwayo, and to say that he must send indunas to meet him (Lord
+Chelmsford) at General Wood’s camp, to which he was then bound.
+Nevertheless the General’s message, which would take but two days on
+the road, had not reached Kranz Kop on the 29th, nor were the men
+actually released until the 9th of May. When finally set at liberty
+they carried with them a message calculated to discourage any further
+attempts on the Zulu king’s part at bringing about a peaceful issue
+to the war, being merely that if “Cetywayo sends any more messengers
+he must send them to the Upper Column (Dundee).”
+
+Nevertheless on the 12th of June the same two old men appeared again,
+brought down, bearing a white flag, to ’Maritzburg by policemen from
+Mr. Fynn, resident magistrate at the Umsinga. Apparently they had
+been afraid to cross at Kranz Kop, where the “sincerity” of their
+white flag had been “tested” before, and were sent, not to the
+military authorities, but to the civil magistrate, who sent them
+down to Sir Henry Bulwer. He would have nothing to say to them, and
+transferred them to General Clifford, who examined them on the 13th,
+and sent them off on the following day to Lord Chelmsford. They had
+already walked one hundred and fifty miles from Ulundi to ’Maritzburg
+with their message of peace, and had then still further to go in
+order to reach the General, before they could get any kind of answer.
+Meanwhile the campaign was prosecuted without a pause.
+
+General Clifford’s account of this is as follows:
+
+“I began by informing them that I was only going to ask them such
+questions as would enable me to judge whether I should be justified
+in sending them on to my Chief, Lord Chelmsford, now in Zululand
+carrying on the war. The headman, Umfundi, then made the following
+statement: ‘We are Umfundi and Umkismana, Zulu messengers from
+Cetywayo. I am sent here by Cetywayo to ask for time to arrange a
+meeting of Chiefs with a view to arranging peace. We did not go to
+the head white Chief, because Fynn at Rorke’s Drift, whom I knew,
+told me the Great White Chief was in Zululand, and we had better see
+Shepstone and the second White Chief, who were at Pietermaritzburg,
+so we came on here advised by Fynn. I have been here about twice a
+year for the last six years as King’s messenger, but not as Chief.
+I am nothing but a messenger, and I have no authority from the King
+to treat for peace, or to do anything besides delivering my message,
+asking if time will be given to assemble a meeting of Chiefs. I know
+Mr. Shepstone, Mr. Gallway, and Bishop Colenso, and I have seen
+Bishop Colenso in this town, and also at his place in the country,
+but I do not wish to see him now, and I have not asked to see him.’
+(This, according to their custom, merely implied that they had no
+message for him.) ‘I want to see the Great Chief, as the King ordered
+me to do. I only came here to deliver my message and because Fynn
+told me. This is the seventeenth day since I left the King’s kraal.
+Am an old man and cannot go so fast as I could when I was young,
+and heavy rain detained me three days. The King told me to hurry on
+and return quickly. It will take us seven days to get from here to
+Ibabamango Mountain if we go by Rorke’s Drift. We only know of two
+other messengers sent by the King; one is Sintwango, the name of the
+other we do not know. They have been sent to the lower column because
+Cetywayo thinks there are two Chiefs of equal power, one with the
+upper column and the other with the lower column. They are sent like
+us to ask for time to get out by the door. The King does not know
+the name of your big Chief, and we do not either. We are the same
+messengers the King sent to Fort Buckingham with the same message
+we have now. Only then our orders were not to go to your Chief as
+now, but to go to Fort Buckingham and wait for the answer there. We
+delivered our message to the military Chief there, and he sent the
+message on. The Chief was at Etshowe fighting, and the answer did
+not come for two months; when it came it was that the great Chief
+was surprised we were still there. He thought we had gone back to
+the King long ago. The officer at Fort Buckingham advised us to go
+to the great white Chief, but we said: “No, those are not the King’s
+orders; our orders are to come here, and now we will return and tell
+the King;” and it was half of the third month when we got back to
+him. We told him what had taken place. He consulted his great Chiefs,
+and then sent us with the orders we now have to go and see the great
+white Chief, and that is now what we are trying to do. I have no
+power given me but to ask for time. The King sends his messengers
+first, because it is the custom of the country to do so, and not
+to send a great Chief till arrangements have been made where the
+Chiefs are to assemble to talk about peace. We have no power to talk
+about terms of peace. None but messengers have yet been sent. The
+messengers sent to the lower column went before the fighting began;
+they were detained and did not return to the King’s kraal till we
+did.’ I said I was satisfied they ought to be sent on at once to Lord
+Chelmsford.
+
+“I would give a letter, written by me to Lord Chelmsford, to Umfunzi,
+to be given by him with his own hand to Lord Chelmsford, and outside
+the letter I would say that no one but Lord Chelmsford was to open
+it. This appeared to please them much. I said I would write to the
+commanding officers along the road they were going to look after
+them, and to the officer at Rorke’s Drift to see them safe to
+Ibabamango.’ ‘Would a white man be safe going with them?’ ‘Yes,’
+they said, ‘quite,’ and they wished one could be sent with them; but
+still more, the King would be pleased if a white man was sent to him.
+I said I would not send a white man alone into Zululand with them,
+because my Chief did not approve, still less could I send one to the
+King, because I was only under the big Chief. Anything they wished to
+say about peace or anything else they must say to the big Chief when
+they saw him.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 111).
+
+At no time during the war, indeed, did we encourage the Zulu king
+in his persistent efforts to get peace; but more of this hereafter.
+Here we will only add one further instance, namely, that of two
+messengers sent to Colonel Pearson at Etshowe, who, although brought
+blindfold into the camp, were kept as prisoners in irons until the
+garrison was relieved. The pretext for this detention was that they
+were _supposed_ to be spies; but officers present were satisfied that
+there were no grounds for the supposition, or for the treatment which
+they received.
+
+Sir Bartle Frere of course inclines to the opinion that _all_
+Cetshwayo’s messengers were spies, his entreaties for peace but
+treacherous pretexts to cover his evil intentions. Some of the men
+sent were old accredited messengers to the Government, whose names
+are frequently mentioned in earlier Blue-books, yet Sir Bartle Frere
+says of them: “In no case could they give any satisfactory proof that
+they really came from the king.”[165]
+
+But the High Commissioner’s habit of finding evil motives for every
+act of the Zulu king, made the case of the latter hopeless from the
+first.
+
+Meanwhile the despatches received from Sir Michael Hicks-Beach
+contained comments amounting to censure upon the High Commissioner’s
+proceedings in forcing on a war with the Zulus. He is plainly told
+that he should have waited to consult Her Majesty’s Government upon
+the terms that Cetshwayo should be called upon to accept, and that
+“they have been unable to find in the documents you have placed
+before them that evidence of urgent necessity for immediate action
+which alone could justify you in taking, without their full knowledge
+and sanction, a course almost certain to result in a war, which, as I
+had previously impressed upon you, every effort should have been used
+to avoid.”
+
+“The communication which had passed between us,” continues the
+Secretary of State, “as to the objects for which the reinforcements
+were requested and sent, and as to the nature of the questions in
+dispute with the Zulu king, were such as to render it especially
+needful that Her Majesty’s Government should understand and approve
+any important step, not already suggested to them, before you
+were committed to it; and if that step was likely to increase the
+probability of war, an opportunity should certainly have been
+afforded to them of considering as well the time as the manner of
+coming to issue—should it be necessary to come to issue—with the
+Zulu king. And though the further correspondence necessary for this
+purpose might have involved the loss of a favourable season for
+the operations of the British troops, and might have afforded to
+Cetywayo the means of further arming and provisioning his forces, the
+circumstances rendered it imperative that, even at the risk of this
+disadvantage, full explanations should be exchanged.”
+
+The despatch from which the above is quoted was written on the
+19th March, and another, dated the following day, expresses the
+writer’s “general approval of the principles on which the boundary
+award was based,” as intimated in a previous despatch, but gives
+a very qualified assent to Sir B. Frere’s emendations by which he
+seeks to secure the “private rights” of settlers on the wrongfully
+appropriated land, and remarks that he is disposed to think that the
+recognition of these said private rights of European settlers in the
+district declared to be Zulu territory should have been restricted
+as far as possible to those cases in which _bonâ fide_ purchasers
+had improved their farms by building, planting, or otherwise, which
+restriction would have limited them to a very small number indeed.
+Sir M. Hicks-Beach also reminds Sir B. Frere that Her Majesty’s
+Government had distinctly said beforehand that “they could not
+undertake the obligation of protecting” the missionaries in Zululand.
+His comments upon the terms of the ultimatum, he says, are intended
+for Sir B. Frere’s guidance when the time for once more proposing
+terms should arrive, and he concludes: “It is my wish that, as far
+as possible, you should avoid taking any decided step, or committing
+yourself to any positive conclusion respecting any of them until you
+have received instructions from Her Majesty’s Government.”—(P. P. [C.
+2260] pp. 108-111).
+
+Again, upon April 10th, after receiving Sir Bartle Frere’s
+explanations, Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes as follows:
+
+“Since I addressed to you my despatches of the 19th and 20th March,
+I have received your two despatches of February 12th and March 1st,
+further explaining the considerations which induced you to decide
+that the demands made upon Ketshwayo must be communicated to him
+without delay. The definite expression of the views and policy of
+Her Majesty’s Government contained in my despatches already referred
+to, which will have reached you before you receive this, makes it
+unnecessary that I should enter into any examination of the arguments
+or opinions expressed in your present despatches. It is sufficient to
+say that Her Majesty’s Government do not find in the reasons now put
+forward by you any grounds to modify the tenor of the instructions
+already addressed to you on the subject of affairs in South Africa,
+and it is their desire that you should regulate your future action
+according to these instructions.
+
+“But there is one point alluded to in your despatch of March 1st
+which I feel it necessary at once to notice, in order to prevent
+any misunderstanding. You refer, in the thirty-second paragraph of
+that despatch, to ‘much that will remain to be done on the northern
+Swazi border and in Sekukuni’s country,’ and to the probability
+that ‘the Transvaal, the Diamond Fields, Basutoland, and other
+parts now threatened with disturbance, will not settle down without
+at least an exhibition of force.’ I entertain much hope that in
+each of these cases, including that of Sekukuni, the troubles now
+existing or anticipated may disappear, either independently of or
+as a consequence of that complete settlement of the Zulu difficulty
+which I join with you in trusting to see speedily effected. But, if
+this expectation should unfortunately not be fulfilled, you will
+be careful to bear in mind that Her Majesty’s Government are not
+prepared to sanction any further extension, without their specific
+authority, of our responsibilities in South Africa; that their desire
+is that the military operations now proceeding should be directed to
+the termination, at the earliest moment consistent with the safety
+of our colonies and the honour of our arms, of the Zulu question;
+and that any wider or larger action of the kind apparently suggested
+in your despatch, should be submitted to them for consideration and
+approval, before any steps are taken to carry it into effect.”—(P. P.
+[C. 2316] p. 36).
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII.
+
+THE LOWER TUGELA—INYEZANE—ETSHOWE.
+
+
+The first step taken towards preparing for the campaign and advance
+of a column on Ulundi by the coast road was the landing of a “Naval
+Brigade” from H.M.S. _Active_, in November, 1878, under the command
+of Commander Campbell, R.N. The “Actives” at once marched up to
+Lower Tugela Drift, and commenced preparations for the crossing of
+the river. A “pont” was established, and boats collected preparatory
+to the passage of the troops. Fifty men from the _Tenedos_, under
+Lieutenant Kingscote, R.N., joined the Naval Brigade on January 7th,
+1879, but remained at Fort Pearson and took charge of the pont, etc.,
+when the “Actives” moved up with No. 1 Column.
+
+The passage of the Tugela was a difficult and rather hazardous
+undertaking, the river being nearly 300 yards wide, with a strong
+current flowing. The preparations, including taking across a wire
+hawser for the working of the pont, were conducted in a very
+business-like and satisfactory manner by Commander Campbell and the
+Naval Brigade.
+
+The Navy had received early notice of impending hostilities, and,
+as early as April, 1878, Sir Bartle Frere had requested Commodore
+Sullivan, C.B. (the naval chief), to remain in Natal, “in order
+to render such assistance by sea and land as may be practicable,”
+“as it appeared almost certain that serious complications must
+shortly arise with the Zulu tribe ... which will necessitate active
+operations.”—(P. P. 2144, p. 32).
+
+The coast was explored by the Commodore as far as St. Lucia Bay,
+and every possible assistance willingly rendered by him and the
+force under his command before and throughout the campaign. Valuable
+assistance was also given by Captain Baynton, commodore of the Union
+Steamship Company’s fleet. The force detailed for Colonel Pearson’s
+command—styled No. 1 Column—concentrated on Fort Pearson, on the
+Lower Tugela; its detail has been previously given.
+
+It was directed that this column should cross the river and encamp
+on the Zulu bank, under the guns of the fort, there to await further
+orders; but, from the flooded state of the river and other causes,
+the passage was not effected till the 12th January, when the
+principal part of the force crossed and encamped in Zululand.
+
+The 2nd (Captain Wynne’s) Company Royal Engineers arrived at Fort
+Pearson on the 12th, and crossed on the 13th. It immediately set
+about the construction of Fort Tenedos on the left bank, about 600
+yards from the river, to cover the crossing, protect stores, etc.
+
+The Naval Brigade were constantly at work, day and night, working the
+boats and pontoon across the river, with the exception of the night
+of the 14th, when a heavy flood swept away the wharves. Twice the
+pontoon was upset, and one of the _Active’s_ men was drowned.
+
+Reconnaissances were made in the Zulu country, and a few prisoners
+taken, but there were no signs of any large body of the enemy. One
+of John Dunn’s men reported on the 17th that “the whole of his
+neighbourhood” was “now deserted and the cattle driven into the
+interior.”
+
+Everything being carefully prepared, the advance was made on the
+18th, a strong advanced guard and the Natal Native Pioneers[166]
+preceding the column. Every precaution was taken to prevent a
+surprise, extra vigilance being necessary on account of the long
+waggon-train carrying tents, rations for fifteen days, and a large
+quantity of food and ammunition destined for an advanced depôt to be
+formed at or near Etshowe.
+
+We may here say a few words on the extreme difficulties of South
+African transport—difficulties so serious and full of danger that
+they should have been eliminated from the plan of the campaign.
+
+The waggons used were, as a rule, the ordinary South African
+ox-waggons, clumsy and heavy to move, each drawn by a team of
+fourteen to eighteen oxen. The Zulu oxen are much superior to the
+up-country oxen, as they stand more work, and will swim rivers; they
+even swam the Tugela, whilst the remainder had to be ferried over.
+
+The pace of the ox-waggon is about a mile and a half an hour, and
+drifts and hills cause frequent delays. Take for instance the train
+of No. 1 Column: it accomplished the march to Etshowe, a distance
+of thirty-seven miles, in between five and six days—from daylight
+on the 18th to 10 A.M. 23rd—having only been detained by the enemy
+at Inyezane for about two hours: the train was necessarily some six
+miles in length, an element of the utmost danger had the swift-footed
+Zulus been a little more enterprising. Two or three thousand Zulus
+might easily have prevented Colonel Pearson reaching Etshowe _with_
+his train, in spite of all the precautions he might and did take.
+The commanding officers of the various columns had no option in
+the matter of waggon-train, and as far as they were concerned the
+transport under their control worked well.
+
+The difficulty of moving with a long train of waggons during the
+summer, or rainy season, can scarcely be exaggerated. Double spanning
+over drifts and soft places, making bad places good with brushwood,
+oxen getting tired owing to the length of time they were yoked,
+rather than from the distance travelled, all gave endless trouble
+and anxiety, and entirely upset all calculations as to distances to
+be traversed. The transport duties of No. 1 Column were admirably
+carried out by Captain Pelly Clarke and Assistant-Commissary Kevill
+Davis.[167]
+
+The force advanced from the Tugela in two columns—the first crossed
+the Inyoni and encamped—weather very wet and trying. The second
+column started on the following day (19th) and joined its leader
+at Umsundusi. At this camp the troops remained during the 20th. The
+reconnoitring parties had reported the Amatikulu impassable, and
+Colonel Pearson pushed forward engineers (native pioneers), with a
+strong working-party and guard, to render the drift practicable,
+which, after a day’s hard work, was done. On the 21st the column
+again advanced, and, crossing the Amatikulu, encamped in the
+evening at Kwasamabela, four miles from Inyezane; during the day a
+reconnoitring party burnt a military kraal near Ngingindhlovu. Up to
+this time only a few of the enemy’s scouts had been seen, and nothing
+had occurred beyond an occasional nocturnal alarm.
+
+On the 22nd the column marched at 5 A.M., crossed the Inyezane River,
+and halted for breakfast, and to outspan the oxen for a couple of
+hours, in a fairly open spot, though the country round was a good
+deal covered with bush. The halt here was unavoidable, as there
+was no water for some distance beyond, but the country had been
+previously carefully scouted by the mounted troops under Major Barrow.
+
+At eight o’clock piquets were being placed, and the waggons parked,
+when a company of the Native Contingent—who were scouting in front,
+under the direction of Captain Hart, staff-officer attached to the
+regiment—discovered the enemy advancing rapidly over the ridges, and
+making for the adjacent clumps of bush. The Zulus now opened a heavy
+fire upon this company, and almost immediately inflicted a loss upon
+it of 1 officer, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 3 men killed.
+
+The Naval Brigade (with rockets), under Captain Campbell, the guns
+of the Royal Artillery, two companies of “The Buffs,” and the Native
+Pioneers were at once posted on a knoll close by the road, from
+whence the whole of the Zulu advance was commanded. From this knoll
+the bush near was well searched with shell, rockets, and musketry.
+
+The waggons continuing to close up and park, two companies of
+“The Buffs,” who moved up with them, were ordered to clear
+the enemy out of the bush, guided by Captain Macgregor,
+Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General. This they did in excellent
+style, driving the Zulus into the open, which again exposed them to a
+heavy fire from the knoll.
+
+The engineers and mounted troops were now enabled to move up from
+the drift, and, supported by a half company of “Buffs” and a half
+company of the 99th, sent on by Lieut.-Colonel Welman (99th) from the
+rear of the column, cleared the Zulus out of the bush on the right
+flank, where they were seriously threatening the convoy. The Gatling
+gun also moved up from the rear, and came into action on the knoll.
+The enemy now endeavoured to outflank the left, and got possession
+of a kraal about 400 yards from the knoll, which assisted their
+turning movement. This kraal was carried by Captain Campbell with his
+Naval Brigade, supported by a party of officers and non-commissioned
+officers of the Native Contingent under Captain Hart, who were posted
+on high ground on the left of the road. Lieut.-Colonel Parnell with a
+company of “Buffs,” and Captain Campbell with the Naval Brigade, now
+attacked some heights beyond the kraal, upon which a considerable
+body of the enemy was still posted. This action was completely
+successful, and the Zulus fled in all directions. About half-past
+nine the last shot was fired, and the column was re-formed, and
+resumed its march at noon.
+
+The loss sustained in this action was 2 privates (“The Buffs”)
+killed, 2 officers, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 4 natives
+killed, and 1 officer and 15 men wounded. Colonels Pearson and
+Parnell had their horses shot under them.
+
+The enemy’s force was estimated at 4000—the Umxapu, Udhlambedhlu, and
+Ingulubi Regiments, and some 650 men of the district—and their loss
+upwards of 300 killed. The wounded appear to have been either carried
+away or hidden.
+
+Four miles beyond the scene of this engagement the column bivouacked
+for the night; and, moving off at 5 A.M. next day, reached Etshowe at
+10 A.M.; the rear guard not getting in till the afternoon.
+
+Etshowe was a mission station, abandoned some months before, but
+now selected for an entrenched post, in preference to more open and
+commanding ground to the north, in consequence of the necessity
+of utilising the buildings for the storage of supplies. The
+station consisted of a dwelling-house, school, and workshop, with
+store-rooms—three buildings of sun-dried brick, thatched; there
+was also a small church, made of the same materials, but with a
+corrugated iron roof; and a stream of good water ran close by the
+station. Here the column encamped, and preparations for clearing the
+ground and establishing a fortified post for a garrison of 400 men
+were made.
+
+Two companies of “Buffs,” two companies Native Contingent, and some
+mounted men, were sent back to reinforce Lieut.-Colonel Ely, 99th
+Regiment, who, with three companies of his regiment, was on the march
+to Etshowe with a convoy of sixty waggons.
+
+On the 25th, Major Coates was sent down to the Tugela with a strong
+escort and forty-eight empty waggons, for a further supply of stores;
+and next day a “runner” arrived with news that a disaster had
+occurred on the 22nd. On the 28th a telegram was received from Lord
+Chelmsford, hinting at disaster—that he had been compelled to retire
+to the frontier—that former instructions were cancelled, and Colonel
+Pearson was to hold Etshowe or withdraw to the Tugela, also that he
+must be prepared to bear the brunt of an attack from the whole Zulu
+army.
+
+Colonel Pearson at once assembled his staff and commanding officers,
+when it was finally decided to hold the post, sending back to the
+Tugela the mounted troops and Native Contingent. These marched,
+unencumbered with baggage, and reached the Tugela in ten hours—a
+contrast with the upward march! The various buildings were loopholed,
+and the church prepared for use as a hospital, all tents struck, and
+the entrenchments supplemented by an inner line of waggons. In the
+evening Colonel Ely’s convoy arrived safely.
+
+The mounted men were sent back from Etshowe, because a large
+proportion of the horse forage consisted of mealies, which it was
+thought might be required for the use of the garrison, as eventually
+was the case.
+
+To replace the mounted men, a small vedette corps was formed under
+Lieutenant Rowden, 99th Regiment, and Captain Sherrington, of the
+Native Contingent, and did excellent service.
+
+These vedettes were constantly under fire. One was killed at his
+post. Another was attacked by some dozen Zulus, who crept upon him
+through the long grass; he lost two fingers of his right hand, had
+a bullet through each leg and one in his right arm; his horse was
+assegaied; yet he managed to get back to the fort, retaining his
+rifle.
+
+The vedettes being much annoyed in the early morning by the fire
+of some Zulus from a high hill, Captain Sherrington and six of the
+men went out one night and lay in wait for them, behind some rocks
+near the top of the hill, wounding three and putting an end to the
+annoyance.
+
+Colonel Pearson felt it to be necessary to reduce the bread and
+grocery rations of the troops, but was enabled to increase the meat
+ration by a quarter of a pound, as a large number of cattle had been
+brought up with Colonel Ely’s convoy. The waggons of the troops
+sent back to the Tugela were officially searched, and a quantity of
+food, medicines, and medical comforts thus added to the stock, the
+two latter subsequently proving of the utmost value. All articles of
+luxury were eventually sold by auction, and fetched almost fabulous
+prices: matches were sold for 4s. a box, bottles of pickles 15s.
+each, and tobacco 30s. a pound!
+
+The water supply was excellent, both in quality and quantity; and in
+the lower part of the stream bathing-places for both officers and
+men were constructed; and all sanitary arrangements most carefully
+attended to.
+
+A waggon-laager was formed for the cattle, and every effort made to
+provide for the security of the fort, as we may now call it—deepening
+ditches, strengthening parapets, erecting stockades—all most
+energetically carried on under the direction of Captain Wynne, R.E.
+
+So things went on, till, on February 9th, Zulus were observed to be
+collecting; but nothing occurred beyond an occasional alarm.
+
+On the 11th two “runners” arrived from the Lower Tugela with a
+despatch[168] from the General, almost requiring Colonel Pearson to
+retire with half his force to the Tugela, leaving the remainder to
+garrison the fort. This, after a council of war, was decided not to
+be practicable, the country being occupied by the Zulus in force. A
+flying column, however, was organised, in case it became necessary to
+carry out what the General seemed to desire.
+
+Having questioned the messengers, and ascertained that they were
+willing to return on the following Saturday, Colonel Pearson sent a
+despatch, asking for further instructions, and saying he would be
+prepared to start on Sunday night at twelve o’clock if necessary.
+
+This message was twice repeated on different days, but no reply
+received.
+
+Alterations and improvements in the defences, to enable the fort
+to be held by a smaller garrison, went steadily on in spite of bad
+weather; ranges from 600 to 700 yards were marked round the fort, and
+_trous-de-loups_ and wire entanglements formed on the north, south,
+and east faces.
+
+On March 1st an expedition was led out by Colonel Pearson to attack a
+military kraal (Dabulamanzi’s) six miles distant; this was done and
+the kraal burnt, a smart skirmish being kept up with the Zulus during
+the homeward march.
+
+On the 2nd it was noticed that heliograph signals were being flashed
+from the Lower Tugela, but no message was made out.
+
+Next day further signalling, though vague, was taken to mean
+that a convoy was to be expected on the 13th instant with 1000
+men, and that on its approach Colonel Pearson was to sally out
+and meet it. A heliograph was improvised by Captain Macgregor,
+Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, by means of a small
+looking-glass, and efforts made to flash back signals, but bad
+weather ensued, preventing further communication till the 10th.
+
+A new road to Inyezane, shortening the distance by about three
+miles, and avoiding much of the bush, was commenced, and reported
+fit for use on the 13th, though the work had been hindered by very
+bad weather, and by the working-parties being constantly under fire.
+Fortunately no one was hit, except Lieutenant Lewis, of “The Buffs.”
+
+On March 23rd two Zulus came up with a white flag, and were brought
+in to the fort each with a mealie-bag over his head; they are said
+to have come with a message from the king to the effect that if our
+force would return to Natal he would order the officers commanding
+his large armies not to touch it. These men were detained as
+prisoners in irons, and interviewed by Lord Chelmsford on his arrival
+at Etshowe; but of their subsequent disposal nothing appears known.
+
+At first the health of the troops was extremely good, but before
+the end of February the percentage of sick had largely increased,
+there being 9 officers and upwards of 100 men on the sick-list when
+it was relieved. The principal disorders were diarrhœa, dysentery,
+and fevers, aggravated by the want of proper medicines and medical
+comforts, which had been soon exhausted. The church was used as the
+hospital, and both officers and men lived under the waggons, over
+which the waggon-sails were spread, propped up with tent-poles; thus
+the troops actually lived at their alarm-posts.
+
+The relief took place none too soon, there being then but six days’
+further supply of reduced rations available for the garrison.
+
+“From first to last, the men showed an excellent spirit, the highest
+discipline was maintained, and the reduction of the food was never
+grumbled at or regarded in any other light than a necessity and
+a privation to be borne, and which they were determined to bear
+cheerfully.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 39).
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII.
+
+NGINGINDHLOVU—RELIEF OF ETSHOWE—BORDER RAIDING.
+
+
+Lord Chelmsford, having moved down to Durban, reports (February
+8th) that No. 1 Column is secure at Etshowe; that he is about to
+forward troops to the Lower Tugela; and that Durban, Stanger,
+Pietermaritzburg, and Greytown are prepared for defence, “with
+garrisons which should prevent panic among those living around;” the
+frontier quiet, and the road from Greytown quite open.
+
+The first reinforcement for Natal was brought by H.M.S. _Shah_, which
+chanced to be at St. Helena (on her voyage home from the Pacific),
+when the news of the disaster in Zululand arrived. Captain Bradshaw,
+R.N., immediately decided to proceed to Natal with his ship; the
+Governor, after consultation with the officer commanding the troops,
+Colonel Philips, R.E., arranging to send in her all the available
+force that could be spared from the island. Accordingly she sailed on
+February 12th, with 3 officers and 52 men of the Royal Artillery, and
+2 officers and 109 men of the 88th Regiment.
+
+H.M.S. _Boadicea_ also arrived on the station, bringing Commodore
+Richards, who relieved Rear-Admiral Sullivan, C.B.
+
+Communications had been established with Etshowe by means of flashing
+signals, which were conducted by Lieutenant Haynes, R.E., who, after
+some failure and discouragement at first, persevered until complete
+success was attained.
+
+Previous to this there had been no communications with Colonel
+Pearson for a considerable time, but on March 11th a cypher message
+from him (dated 9th) said that the flashing signals had been
+understood, and that as officers and men were generally sickly, it
+would be desirable to relieve the whole of the garrison, and that any
+relieving force should bring a convoy and be prepared to fight.—(P.
+P. [C. 2316] p. 81).
+
+On March 16th the signals from Etshowe were first made out, and
+one of the messages received was: “Short rations until 3rd April.
+Breadstuffs until 4th April. Plenty of trek oxen. Captain Williams,
+‘The Buffs,’ died at Ekowe on 13th March” (_ibid._ p. 83).
+
+Reinforcements arriving from England, Lord Chelmsford determined to
+effect the relief of Etshowe, and assembled a strong force on the
+Lower Tugela for that purpose. The column to be in two divisions: the
+first, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Law, R.A., composed of the
+Naval Brigade of _Shah_ and _Tenedos_, 57th Regiment, 2 companies
+“Buffs,” 5 companies 99th Regiment, mounted infantry, volunteers,
+and natives, and 5th Battalion Natal Native Contingent; artillery—2
+9-pounders, 2 24-pounder rocket-tubes, and 1 Gatling gun; also 150
+of John Dunn’s people as scouts. The second division—Lieut.-Colonel
+Pemberton, 60th Rifles, commanding—Naval Brigade of H.M.S.
+_Boadicea_, Royal Marines of _Shah_ and _Boadicea_, 60th Rifles, 91st
+Highlanders, and 4th Battalion Natal Native Contingent; artillery, 2
+24-pounder rocket-tubes and 1 Gatling gun; making a total fighting
+strength of 3390 white troops and 2280 natives. The Lieut.-General
+decided to take command of the column himself, and directed that it
+should advance by the coast road, so as to avoid the bush country; to
+advance without tents, and with only a blanket and waterproof-sheet
+for each man. The convoy, taking one month’s provisions for the
+garrison and ten days’ supplies for the column, consisted of about
+100 waggons and 44 carts.—(P. P. [C. 2318] pp. 74, 75).
+
+The assembling of this column and preparation for an advance
+occupied some weeks, and on the 23rd March Lord Chelmsford assumed
+the personal command, the force being assembled on the left bank of
+the Tugela and organised in two brigades, as already detailed, by
+the 28th. Next day, at 6 A.M., the column marched from the Tugela
+and encamped at Inyone, reaching next day the Amatakulu River.
+_Now_, profiting by bitter experience, every precaution was taken,
+and an entrenched waggon-laager formed before nightfall at each
+halting-place.
+
+The crossing of the Amatakulu River took nine hours, and the column
+encamped a mile and a half beyond it. Nothing had been seen of the
+enemy until the 31st, when the scouts noticed small bodies of Zulus
+near the Amatakulu bush. Captain Barrow, with a mounted force,
+reconnoitred towards the Engoya Forest, and burnt the kraal of one of
+the king’s brothers.
+
+On April 1st, the column marched to Ngingindhlovu, and about a mile
+from the Inyezane River a laager was formed in a favourable position.
+From this point to Etshowe, the track, after crossing swampy ground,
+winds through a bushy and difficult country for about fifteen miles,
+the country covered with high grass, and thus affording easy cover.
+
+Etshowe could be plainly seen from the laager, and flash signalling
+was at once established.
+
+As this laager was destined to be the scene of an important
+engagement, we will describe the disposition of the troops: Front
+face (north), 60th Rifles; right flank, 57th Regiment; left flank,
+99th Regiment and “Buffs;” rear face, 91st Regiment; the angles
+manned by blue-jackets and marines, and armed with the guns,
+Gatlings, and rocket-tubes. The night passed without alarm, and
+the troops stood to arms at 4 A.M., the mounted men being sent out
+scouting as usual at earliest dawn. From scouts and piquets came
+reports, at 5.45 A.M., that the enemy was advancing, and at six
+the attack commenced on the north front. The Zulus advanced with
+great rapidity and courage, taking advantage of every bit of cover;
+they even pushed forward to within twenty or thirty yards of the
+entrenchments, but were checked by the steady fire of the 60th and
+the Gatling gun. Lieut.-Colonel Northey, 3-60th Rifles, received a
+dangerous wound, but cheered on his men to the end of the engagement.
+
+The attack, checked here, rolled round to the left face; and, whilst
+this was being developed, a fresh force came up against the rear,
+probably anticipating that all the faces of the laager could not be
+defended at the same time. Here they obstinately held their ground,
+finding cover in the long grass and undulations.
+
+The mounted troops were now sent out, the mounted infantry and
+volunteers to clear the front face, and Captain Barrow to attack
+the enemy’s right flank. On their appearance the Zulus commenced
+to retreat. It was now 7.30 A.M.; and the Natal Native Contingent,
+clearing the ditch of the rear face, dashed out in pursuit, which,
+led by Captain Barrow’s horsemen, was carried on for several miles.
+
+The loss of the enemy in this engagement is estimated at 1000: 671
+bodies were actually counted. The attacking force is said to have
+numbered about 11,000 men.
+
+Colonel Pearson, who had watched the fight through a glass,
+telegraphed his congratulations to the General.
+
+The loss of the column was 2 officers and 9 men killed (including
+Lieut.-Colonel Northey, 60th Rifles), 5 officers and 57 men wounded.
+
+On the 3rd April, leaving a garrison in the laager, Lord Chelmsford
+pushed on to Etshowe with a convoy of fifty-eight carts with stores.
+The advance was unopposed, but the difficulties of the country were
+such that it was nearly midnight before the rear guard had traversed
+the fifteen miles and entered Etshowe.
+
+The garrison had suffered severely from sickness during the preceding
+month, losing by disease 4 officers and 20 non-commissioned officers
+and men; and when relieved there were sick in hospital, 8 officers
+and 44 non-commissioned officers and men, and attending hospital,
+1 officer and 78 non-commissioned officers and men—out of a total
+force of 53 officers, 1289 non-commissioned officers and men, and 121
+natives.
+
+The constant wet weather and close quarters in the fort, with little
+or no shelter, the want of medicines, and insufficient food, might
+well have caused even heavier loss.
+
+The General determined to evacuate Etshowe, as he found it so
+difficult of approach: future operations being planned to be carried
+on by the coast road. On the 4th Colonel Pearson evacuated the fort
+he had so tenaciously held, taking with him his waggons and all his
+stores that were of any use; unserviceable tools and metal-work were
+buried, but the fort was not destroyed.
+
+Colonel Pearson’s march to the Tugela was performed without any
+interruption from the enemy.
+
+On the 4th a kraal of Dabulamanzi’s on the Entumeni Hill was
+destroyed by a patrol from Etshowe, and on the 5th the relieving
+column left, and bivouacked near the Infuchini mission station. Early
+next morning an unfortunate alarm occurred, causing the death of
+three men. A sentry fired at what he thought was a body of the enemy,
+and the piquet on the opposite side of the entrenchment retired into
+shelter, together with native scouts who were out in front. Although
+it was a bright moonlight night, and no mistakes should have been
+made, fire was opened from the entrenchment, and five of the 60th
+were wounded and nine natives bayoneted as they attempted to gain the
+shelter of the laager.
+
+On reaching Ngingindhlovu a new laager was formed, about a mile from
+the old one; this was garrisoned on the 7th, the column moving on to
+the Tugela.
+
+The small mounted force under Captain Barrow, 19th Hussars, rendered
+excellent service, both during the engagement at Ngingindhlovu, and
+by the manner in which the scouting duties were carried out.
+
+A party of Mr. John Dunn’s people (natives), 150 in number, were also
+of the greatest utility in scouting and outpost duties. Mr. Dunn
+himself accompanied the General; his knowledge of the country and
+sound advice being of much use (_ibid._ p. 122).
+
+John Dunn was an Englishman, resident in Zululand, where he had
+lived for many years and adopted many Zulu customs. He amassed a
+considerable property, and had an extensive following. He invariably
+received the greatest kindness and consideration from the Zulu king,
+and was frequently employed by him in various communications with the
+English Government. When the danger of war between English and Zulus
+appeared imminent, John Dunn appealed to the English for protection
+for himself, his property, and people, who were ready, he said, to
+fight on the English side. At the same time Cetshwayo sent him a
+message to the effect that he saw the English were going to attack
+him, and therefore Dunn had better leave his country, with his people
+and cattle, and go to a place of safety. This John Dunn did, crossing
+the Tugela about the 3rd of January, and settling near Fort Pearson.
+
+At the time the General determined to move to the relief of Etshowe
+he “sent secret instructions to the different commanders along the
+border, from the Lower Tugela up to Kambula Hill, requesting them
+to make strong demonstrations all along the line, and, if possible,
+to raid into Zululand in order to make a diversion in favour of the
+relieving column,” thinking he “might possibly have to meet the full
+strength of the Zulu army.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 56).
+
+On the 2nd of April a small force of Native Contingent crossed the
+Tugela and burnt two large kraals, no resistance being made. On
+the next day a force crossed again and burnt an unoccupied kraal,
+exchanging a few shots with Zulus, of whom a considerable number
+were seen at a distance. On the following day the natives refused
+to cross, and the Border Agent, Mr. Fannin, remarks: “I think it
+is fortunate it was not attempted, as the Zulus had assembled a
+considerable body of men to resist.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 104).
+
+The reserve native force had co-operated in these movements by being
+assembled and placed in position along the Tugela, but the colonial
+commander declined to proceed over the border, or send any of his
+force into Zululand, without the sanction of the Lieut.-Governor.
+
+The Government of Natal had placed at Lord Chelmsford’s disposal a
+number of natives (over 8000) for service in the Zulu country. Some
+of these were intended for fighting purposes, and formed what we
+have already described as the Natal Native Contingent. The rest were
+supplied for transport, pioneer, and hospital-corps services, and all
+were expected to cross the border.
+
+But besides these men, native levies were called out, when the war
+began, for service _in the colony_—that is to say, for the defence
+of the border under colonial district commanders. These levies were
+to be used solely as a border-guard, and were not intended to cross
+into Zululand at all. Sir Henry Bulwer, in permitting them to be
+raised, had been careful to protect as far as possible the interests
+of both the white and the native population of Natal, and had made
+very proper stipulations as to the services for which he placed these
+levies at the disposal of the General. The latter, indeed, expressed
+it as his opinion that every available fighting native in the colony
+should be called out; but Sir Henry, with a greater comprehension
+of consequences, demurred to this rash proposal, and a personal
+interview between the two resulted in the above-mentioned arrangement.
+
+Consequently the Lieut.-Governor was not a little surprised to
+learn on the 8th April that the native levies had been ordered, in
+conjunction with the other troops, to make raids across the border
+into Zululand. To this he objected, writing to the High Commissioner
+on April 9th in the following terms: “I venture to suggest for your
+Excellency’s consideration the question of the policy of raids of
+this kind. The burning of empty kraals will neither inflict much
+damage upon the Zulus, nor be attended with much advantage to
+us; whilst acts of this nature are, so it seems to me, not only
+calculated to invite retaliation, but to alienate from us the whole
+of the Zulu nation, men, women, and children, including those who are
+well disposed to us. We started on this war on the ground that it was
+a war against the king and the Zulu Government, and not against the
+nation....”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 103).
+
+A correspondence ensued between the Lieut.-Governor and the
+Lieut.-General, in which the two differed in a very decided
+manner. Lord Chelmsford complained that the action taken by the
+Lieut.-Governor, “in refusing to allow the orders issued by” him to
+the native forces to be carried out, appeared to him “fraught with
+such dangerous consequences” that he considered it necessary to refer
+the question to the Home Government. (P. P. [C. 2318] p. 56.) He
+implied that this interference had (in conjunction with the state of
+the Tugela River) prevented a general raid being made, which might
+have proved an important diversion in favour of the column relieving
+Etshowe, and he declared, in behalf of the raiding system, that
+“it would be madness to refrain from inflicting as much damage as
+possible upon our enemy” (_ibid._ p. 56).
+
+It was a well-known fact that the fighting-men of the Zulu nation
+were with their army, and that the only occupants of the kraals
+to be raided were the women, children, and the infirm and other
+non-combatants; therefore the General’s following remark, “I am
+satisfied that the more the Zulu nation at large feels the strain
+brought upon them by the war, the more anxious will they be to see it
+brought to an end,” was of a highly Christian, wise, and soldierly
+nature, hardly to be matched by anything attributed to the Zulu
+monarch himself.
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer’s replies were temperate but decided. He pointed
+out that the statement contained in Lord Chelmsford’s despatch
+to the Secretary of State for War, implying that the Governor’s
+interference had (or might have) seriously interfered with the relief
+of Etshowe, was erroneous; Etshowe having been relieved on the 3rd
+of April, five days before Sir Henry even heard of the order for
+the Natal natives to make raids. To the General himself he observes
+that his interference had been limited to approval of the action of
+the district commander, who declined to employ his force in a manner
+contrary to the express stipulations under which they were raised,
+and concludes: “The views of this Government are very strongly
+against the employment, under the present circumstances, of the
+native levies or native population along the border in making raids
+into the Zulu country, as being, in the opinion of the Government,
+calculated to invite retaliation, and also as being demoralising to
+the natives engaged in raiding” (_ibid._ p. 55).
+
+The Lieut.-Governor’s views were that these native levies “were
+called out expressly and solely for service in the colony, and
+for the defence of the colony, and were placed under the colonial
+district commanders for that purpose only,” and that no authority had
+been given to employ these native levies “on any service in the Zulu
+country” (_ibid._ p. 54).
+
+And it seems that raids along the border had been ordered _after_ the
+relief of Etshowe was effected.
+
+Sir H. Bulwer writes, 16th April, that he had received, on the 7th,
+a copy of a military telegram written after the relief of Etshowe,
+showing that the General had “ordered raids to be made across the
+border wherever feasible,” and, on the following day, a copy of a
+memorandum, written from Etshowe by Colonel Crealock, the Assistant
+Military Secretary, and addressed to the officer commanding at the
+Lower Tugela, and, among other things, it contained the following
+instruction: “Send word up to the frontier to raid across the river
+wherever the river permits.” And the same evening he heard of the
+native levies having been required to cross (_ibid._ p. 53).
+
+The question of the employment of the native levies in making
+raids across the border was referred by the Lieut.-Governor to the
+Executive Council of Natal, which, on the 23rd April, expressed
+itself as “strongly opposed to the employment, in making raids into
+the Zulu country, of the native levies, who ... have been called
+out for the _defence_ of the colony only.” But, in view of the
+Lieut.-General’s strongly-expressed opinions, the Council felt there
+was no alternative but that the General “should have the power of
+so employing the native levies on the border. At the same time, the
+Council desires ... to record emphatically its objections to the
+course proposed, and to such employment of the levies.”—(P. P. [C.
+2367] p. 132).
+
+This decision of the Executive Council was communicated to the
+General on April 25th by the Lieut.-Governor, with the remark:
+“Your Excellency will therefore have the power to employ the native
+levies across the border in the way named by you, should you think
+it imperatively necessary for military reasons. Your Excellency will
+not fail to perceive, however, that such employment of the native
+levies is against the decided opinion of this colony as to its
+inexpediency” (_ibid._ p. 133).
+
+On the 20th May raids were again made into Zululand from three
+different points, under Major Twentyman’s command. One party crossed
+at the Elibomvu Drift, and burnt fifteen kraals and large quantities
+of grain; another burnt three kraals and captured a large herd of
+cattle; and the third burnt two kraals, and then, seeing the Zulus
+assembling in force, beat a hurried retreat across the Tugela.—(P. P.
+[C. 2374] p. 91).
+
+Sir Henry Bulwer, on the 24th May, writes to the High Commissioner:
+“Major-General the Hon. H. H. Clifford, commanding the base of
+operations ... was wholly unaware that any such raid was being
+organised by Major Twentyman, who, I believe, acted under general
+instructions received from head-quarters.... The views of the
+Government of Natal on the subject of these raids, your Excellency is
+already acquainted with. The material advantage to be gained by the
+work of destruction or of plunder of Zulu property can be at the best
+but trifling and insignificant, and on every other account I fear
+our action will prove positively injurious to us, to our interests,
+and to our cause. We are absolutely provoking retaliation. Already,
+I am informed, since the raid reported in these papers took place,
+some native huts on the Natal side of the Tugela have been burned by
+Zulus; and to what extent this work of revenge and retaliation may be
+carried, with what losses of property, and even of life, inflicted
+on our border natives, it is impossible to say.... What result we
+have gained to justify even the risk of such retaliation against us,
+and of such a sacrifice to our own native population, I know not”
+(_ibid._ pp. 89, 90).
+
+The fears of the Lieutenant-Governor were in some measure realised
+on the 25th June, when he writes: “A raid was made by two bodies
+of Zulus, numbering, it is estimated, about 1000, into the Tugela
+Valley, below the Krans Kop in this colony. The Zulus destroyed
+several kraals, and carried off a number of cattle. I regret to say
+also that several of our Natal natives, including women, were killed,
+and some women and children carried off.”
+
+“There can be little doubt that this raid has been made in
+retaliation for the one that was made into the Zulu country opposite
+the Krans Kop by a force under Major Twentyman, of Her Majesty’s
+4th Regiment, on the 20th May, and which was reported to you in my
+despatch of the 31st of that month.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 150).
+
+Thus the opinions expressed in Sir H. Bulwer’s despatch of 24th May
+were to some extent justified, with the probability of a blood-feud
+being set up between the two border populations, and widening the
+breach between ourselves and the Zulu people; and with it the
+increased difficulty of obtaining a satisfactory settlement for the
+future.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX.
+
+REINFORCEMENTS—ISANDHLWANA REVISITED.
+
+
+During the latter part of March and April reinforcements
+kept steadily pouring into Natal, and with them four general
+officers—Major-General the Hon. H. H. Clifford, V.C., C.B., who
+was stationed at Pietermaritzburg, to command at the base of
+operations; Major-General Crealock, C.B., to command No. 1 Division,
+concentrating on the Lower Tugela; Major-General Newdigate, to
+command No. 2 Division, head-quarters Dundee; and Major-General
+Marshall, to command the Cavalry Brigade attached to No. 2 Division;
+Brigadier-General Wood, V.C., C.B., retaining his previous command—to
+be styled the Flying Column.
+
+By the middle of March the available force consisted of an effective
+strength of non-commissioned officers and men—Imperial troops,
+7520; volunteer cavalry, etc., 1367; Europeans, attached to native
+contingents, 495; making a total of 9382 Europeans, with 5769
+natives.—(P. P. [C. 2316] p. 85).
+
+No operations of any consequence took place beyond concentrating
+troops and forwarding supplies. On the 20th April, Lord Chelmsford
+reported that Major-General Crealock had taken up his command
+and, if transport arrangements permitted, would shortly commence
+operations. Major-General Newdigate was on his way to his command.
+
+The reinforcements alone considerably exceeded the strength of the
+force with which the war was so rashly undertaken. They consisted of
+the 1st Dragoon Guards, 17th Lancers; 21st, 57th, 58th, 60th, 88th
+(one company), 91st, 94th Foot; two batteries Royal Artillery, and
+detachments from St. Helena and Mauritius; one company and half C
+troop Royal Engineers; drafts for various regiments; detachments of
+Army Service and Army Hospital Corps; etc. etc.;—a total (including
+the staff embarked in February from England) of 387 officers and 8901
+men.
+
+But even after the arrival of this enormous accession of strength,
+further reinforcements of three battalions were demanded “for reserve
+and garrison purposes.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 162).
+
+At the end of April the effective force was:
+
+  First Division, Major-General Crealock:
+    Imperial and irregular troops               6508
+    Native Contingent (151 mounted)             2707
+
+  Second Division, Major-General Newdigate:
+    Imperial and irregular troops               6867
+    Natives (243 mounted)                       3371
+
+  Flying Column, Brigadier-General Wood:
+    Imperial and irregular troops               2285
+    Natives (75 mounted)                         807
+
+  Making a total strength of 22,545 men available for the conquest
+  of Zululand.
+
+On the 14th May, Lord Chelmsford reported: “The troops are in
+position, and are only waiting for sufficient supplies and transport
+to advance.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 97).
+
+The transport difficulties naturally increased with the increasing
+force. The colony did not eagerly press forward to the rescue, and
+although transport for service in the colony could be obtained, that
+for trans-frontier work was not procurable in any quantity on any
+terms.
+
+The colonial view somewhat appeared to be, “No government has
+power, either legally or morally, to force any man to perform acts
+detrimental to his own interest.” No doubt the colony felt itself
+more secure whilst the troops remained within its borders, and
+naturally was not anxious to assist in their departure; and it may
+have thought the war “was an Imperial concern, brought about by an
+Imperial functionary;” and therefore the Empire should be left “to
+worry out the affair for itself;” as remarked by a colonial paper at
+the time.
+
+On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the necessities
+of the troops, during this campaign, taxed the resources of the
+colonists to the utmost. If some profited in a mercantile point of
+view, and were unpatriotic enough to try to make every penny they
+could out of the army intended for their protection, there were
+others who acted in a very different spirit. The sacrifice and loss
+of both life and property through the Zulu war has been as great, in
+proportion, to Natal as to the mother country; and if the former was
+weak and wicked—or perhaps only _thoughtless_—enough to wish for war,
+she has now received a lesson which will prevent her ever making
+so great a mistake again. While upon the one side we hear stories
+of transport riders and others who lost no opportunity of fleecing
+at every turn both Government and military in their necessity, on
+the other hand we have equally well-authenticated accounts of strict
+honesty, and even generosity, on the part of other Natalians. One
+story is told of a transport rider who had earned the sum of £1500,
+which was to be paid by instalments of £500 each: after he had
+received two of these the officer who paid him was removed, and his
+successor, unaware of previous payments, handed over to the transport
+rider’s messenger the whole £1500. The honest fellow at once returned
+the £1000 overpaid.
+
+It is also a well-known fact that many of the principal tradesmen
+permitted their shopmen to join the volunteer corps to which they
+belonged, still continuing to pay them their respective salaries
+during their absence.
+
+The colony was not revelling in a shower of gold, as some at home
+imagine: a few individuals, doubtless, thought to “make hay while the
+sun shines,” but to the population at large the war was certainly not
+advantageous. For some months fresh provisions were almost at famine
+prices, or even unattainable by private persons.
+
+Many farmers were with the army, either as volunteers or with the
+transport train; others again had sold their waggons and oxen, and
+thus had no means of bringing in their produce. The market supply
+was consequently very small, and generally at once bought up for the
+garrisons.
+
+Transport difficulties, we have said, increased with the increasing
+force. The 9000 Imperial troops sent as reinforcements had to be fed,
+and their food conveyed to where they were stationed. Three or four
+thousand horses and mules also had to be fed in a country from which
+grass was disappearing, and in which supplies of forage were small.
+The larger part of the troops and horses were sent up-country—some
+two hundred miles from the coast—where winter grass-fires might be
+expected, and nature’s stores were certain soon to be exhausted; and
+thus arose the terrible strain in the transport resources of the
+country.
+
+But much more was required than was necessary. In place of the
+ponderous train accompanying each column—a fruitful source of
+difficulty and danger on the march by day, if a protection when
+halted at night—the advance should have been made from entrenched
+depôts in the lightest possible order. A rapid advance on the king’s
+kraal in compact formation, and, wherever the enemy might stand, a
+decisive battle fought—the result of which, with the most ordinary
+care, could not be doubtful—and the war would be virtually over.
+There need have been no weary inactivity, with its following of
+disease and death, and the saving to the country would have been
+enormous.
+
+Supplies were pushed forward from the Lower Tugela to the Inyezane,
+where a fort was constructed (Fort Chelmsford); and from the base up
+to Conference Hill—the supplies required by Lord Chelmsford before an
+advance could be made being two months’ with the forces advancing,
+and one month’s at the advanced depôts.[169]
+
+But little further was done through this period of indecision and
+vacillation, in which plans were made only to be changed, and orders
+given one day to be countermanded the next. Sickness laid its heavy
+hand on many a man—exposure and inaction in the first place, then
+want of proper care and nursing, gradually swelling the death-roll.
+Before the war, and throughout its course, a body of ladies of Natal
+were most anxious to place themselves under the orders of the medical
+staff as nurses for the sick and wounded; but their offers, though
+repeatedly pressed upon the authorities, were declined.
+
+It was at this period that the following message was telegraphed by
+Lord Chelmsford to the High Commissioner:
+
+“May 16th, 1879.—General Crealock telegraphs: Messengers from king
+are at his advanced post. King sues for peace. John Dunn sent to
+see them. Message as follows: ‘White man has made me king, and I
+am their son. Do they kill the man in the afternoon whom they have
+made king in the morning? What have I done? I want peace; I ask for
+peace.’ King asks for a black man or white man to return with his
+messengers to say message delivered rightly. Undwana, one of the
+messengers, states that he has sent to Dabulamunzi to order him to
+go to the king. Message had been delivered to him by Undwana, and
+he ought to have reached king yesterday. All principal chiefs have
+been sent for to the king. He says army is dispersed. Chiefs have
+been urging peace on king. General C. has only informed Clifford
+and Lieutenant-Governor of the above. I have telegraphed back to
+Crealock: ‘Tell messengers I informed king’s messenger at Etshowe
+that any message must be sent to me at Colonel Wood’s camp. I am
+ready to receive any messenger under flag of truce. Tell them
+something more than words will be required. Supply them with flag
+of truce; relax no preparations or precautions.’” End of quotation.
+“I shall be glad to receive your Excellency’s early instructions. I
+consider the king should not be allowed to remain on the throne, and
+that the terms of peace should be signed at Ulundi in presence of
+British force. I shall not make any change in my arrangements in the
+meantime.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] pp. 100, 101).
+
+To Major-General Marshall belongs the credit of performing the
+long-neglected duty of revisiting the fatal battle-field of
+Isandhlwana, and burying as many as possible of those that fell
+there. With General Newdigate’s permission, the Cavalry Brigade
+under General Marshall made a reconnaissance of the Bashi Valley and
+Isandhlwana, having moved down to Rorke’s Drift for that purpose.
+
+The left column of the brigade proceeded up the Bashi Valley,
+and moving round the Ingqutu range, joined the right column at
+Isandhlwana.
+
+The reconnaissance was proposed to include burying the dead, bringing
+away the waggons, etc.; but an order was received prohibiting
+touching the 24th, who were to be interred by their own comrades.
+
+The battle-field was a fearful sight—though softened much by the
+kindly hand of nature. There plainly lay revealed the widely-spread
+camp (or rather line of camps), the hopeless position in which it was
+placed; the absolute impossibility, circumstanced as it was, of any
+result but the sad one we have already chronicled. And there, too,
+were the evidences of a gallant resistance, and a stand made by men
+“faithful unto death.”
+
+It was well said: “The field of Isandhlwana is beginning to give up
+its secrets; the mists of fiction are being dispersed by the dry
+light of fact. It has not been through mere idle curiosity that
+there has been a desire to know what passed during the final moments
+of that fatal struggle. There were difficulties to be explained,
+reputations to be cleared, allegations to be contradicted. There was
+the desire to know how those who were lost had died. To be sure that
+they died with their faces to the foe; to be satisfied that their
+death was not attended with any excess of cruelty or suffering. And
+there can be little doubt that it is the very anxiety to be assured
+of all this that stands responsible for the numerous fictions—as we
+must now hold them to be—which have been circulated with regard to
+what passed on that memorable day.”—_Natal Witness_, 29th May, 1879.
+
+A short description of the spot, taken from that written by Mr.
+Archibald Forbes, may be of interest: At the top of the ascent beyond
+the Bashi we saw, on our left front, rising above the surrounding
+country, the steep, isolated, and almost inaccessible hill, or rather
+crag, of Isandhlwana; the contour of its rugged crest strangely
+resembling a side view of a couchant lion. On the lower neck of
+the high ground on its right were clearly visible up against the
+sky-line the abandoned waggons of the destroyed column. Now we
+crossed the rocky bed of the little stream and were cantering up the
+slope leading to the crest on which were the waggons, and already
+tokens of the combat and bootless flight were apparent. The line of
+retreat towards Fugitives’ Drift, along which, through a gap in the
+Zulu environment, our unfortunate comrades who thus far survived
+tried to escape, lay athwart a rocky slope to our right front, with
+a precipitous ravine at its base. In this ravine dead men lay thick.
+All the way up the slope could be traced the fitful line of flight.
+Most of the dead here were 24th men; single bodies and groups where
+they seemed to have gathered to make a hopeless gallant stand and
+die. On the edge of a gully was a gun-limber jammed, its horses
+hanging in their harness down the steep face of the ravine; a little
+farther on a broken ambulance-waggon, with its team of mules dead
+in their harness, and around were the bodies of the poor fellows
+who had been dragged from the intercepted vehicle. Following the
+trail of bodies through long grass and scattered stores, the crest
+was reached. Here the dead lay thick, many in the uniform of the
+Natal Mounted Police. On the bare ground on the crest itself, among
+the waggons, the dead were less thick; but on the slope beyond, on
+which from the crest we looked down, the scene was the saddest and
+more full of weird desolation than any I had yet gazed upon. There
+was none of the horror of a recent battle-field; nothing of all that
+makes the scene of yesterday’s battle so rampantly ghastly shocked
+the senses. A strange dead calm reigned in this solitude; grain had
+grown luxuriantly round the waggons, sprouting from the seed that
+dropped from the loads, falling on soil fertilised by the life-blood
+of gallant men. So long in most places had grown the grass that it
+mercifully shrouded the dead, whom four long months to-morrow we
+have left unburied. In a patch of long grass, near the right flank
+of the camp, lay Colonel Durnford’s body, a central figure of a knot
+of brave men who had fought it out around their chief to the bitter
+end. A stalwart Zulu, covered by his shield, lay at the Colonel’s
+feet. Around him lay fourteen Natal Carbineers and their officer,
+Lieutenant Scott, with a few Mounted Police[170] (twenty). Clearly
+they had rallied round Colonel Durnford in a last despairing attempt
+to cover the flank of the camp, and had stood fast from choice, when
+they might have essayed to fly for their horses, who were close by
+their side at the piquet-line. With this group were about thirty
+gallant fellows of the 24th. In other places the 24th men were found
+as if fallen in rallying square, and there were bodies scattered all
+along the front of the camp.
+
+The fallen were roughly buried, except those of the men of the 24th
+Regiment. These were ordered to be left untouched. General Marshall
+had nourished a natural and seemly wish to give interment to all
+the dead who so long had lain at Isandhlwana, but it appeared that
+the 24th desired to perform the ceremony themselves in presence
+of both battalions. One has much sympathy with the regiment, but
+General Marshall offered to convey a burial-party with tools from
+Rorke’s Drift in waggons, and it seemed scarcely right to postpone
+longer than absolutely necessary what respect for our honoured dead
+required. Thus, the Zulus, who have carefully buried their own dead,
+will return to find we visited the place, not to bury our dead, but
+to remove a batch of waggons!
+
+In the desolate camp were many sad relics, and the ground was strewn
+with them and the spoil of the plundered waggons. Scarcely any
+arms were found, and no ammunition—a few stray rusted bayonets and
+assegais only were to be seen.
+
+Teams of horses were hitched on to the soundest of the waggons, till
+forty fit to travel were collected on the crest, and sent under
+escort to Rorke’s Drift, and meantime scouting-parties had fired the
+kraals around, but found no Zulus.
+
+“I shall offer few comments on the Isandhlwana position. Had the
+world been searched for a position offering the easiest facilities
+for being surprised, none could have been well found to surpass it.
+The position seems to offer a premium on disaster, and asks to be
+attacked. In the rear laagered waggons would have discounted its
+defects; but the camp was more defenceless than an English village.
+Systematic scouting could alone have justified such a position, and
+this too clearly cannot have been carried out.”—_Daily News_, 20th
+June, 1879.
+
+On the 20th, 23rd, and 26th June the burial of the remainder of those
+who fell at Isandhlwana was completed by a force under the command
+of Lieut.-Colonel Black, 24th Regiment. He carefully noted the signs
+of the fight, and reported that the bodies of the slain lay thickest
+in the 1-24th camp, in which 130 dead lay (in two distinct spots),
+with their officers, Captain Wardell, Lieutenant Dyer, and a captain
+and a subaltern not recognisable; close to the place where the bodies
+of Colonel Durnford, Lieutenant Scott, and other Carbineers, and men
+of the Natal Mounted Police were found. This is described as being a
+“centre of resistance,” as the bodies of men of all arms were found
+converging as it were to the spot. About sixty bodies, with those of
+Captain Younghusband and two other officers, lay in a group under the
+southern precipice of Isandhlwana, as if they had held the crags and
+fought till ammunition failed. The proofs of hand-to-hand fighting
+were frequent. The fugitives’ track, too, told its tale: “Here and
+there around a waggon, here and there around a tree, a group had
+formed and stood at bay; shoulder to shoulder they fired their last
+cartridge, and shoulder to shoulder they plied the steel; side by
+side their bones are lying and tell the tale.”
+
+Eight hundred yards from the road the guns had come upon ground no
+wheels could pass, and from here the bodies were more and more apart
+till, about two miles from camp, the last one lies and marks the
+limit reached by white men on foot.
+
+The fatal trail again began near the river’s bank, where Major Smith,
+R.A., and others rest, a river’s breadth from Natal; across the river
+it runs until the graves of Melville and Coghill nearly mark its end.
+
+_The Standard and Mail_ of September 16th says: “It is a noticeable
+fact that Cetywayo declares that his men were completely disheartened
+by Isandula, and that as a matter of fact he was never able to get
+them thoroughly together again after that event. He says that a large
+part of the forces engaged on that occasion were actually retreating
+when another part made the fatal rush.... Of course these statements
+are of interest as showing what Cetywayo said, but they must be
+accepted with reservation, as he has throughout taken up the theory
+that he and his men had no intention of inflicting so much injury
+upon us as they did.”
+
+Bishop Schreuder, on the 3rd March, says: “The Zulus’ version of the
+Isan’lwana story tells us some most remarkable things with respect
+to the battle and the effect of it on the Zulus. The Zulus, after
+having ransacked the camp, bolted off with the booty as fast as they
+could when the English army was seen returning to the camp, even at a
+great distance. The detachment of the Zulu army seen by Glyn’s column
+on its way, the 23rd January, back to Rorke’s Drift, was a part of
+the Undi corps and Utako (Udhloko) retreating from the unsuccessful
+attack on the Commissariat stores at Rorke’s Drift. Among the
+horsemen was Udabulamanzi, who says that they were so tired, and glad
+that Glyn’s column did not attack them, for if attacked they would
+have bolted every one. Comparatively few and inferior oxen were
+brought to the king, as the izinduna appropriated to themselves the
+best and most of the captured oxen; Udabulamanzi, for instance, took
+home twenty good oxen. The Zulus say that the affair at Isan’lwana
+commenced with a victory and ended with a flight, for, as it is the
+case after a defeat, the whole army did not return to the king, but
+the soldiers dispersed, making the best of their way with what booty
+they had got to their respective homes, and to this day they have not
+reassembled to the king, who is very much displeased with his two
+generals, Umnkingwayo (Tsingwayo) and Umavumengwane (Mavumengwana),
+and other izinduna.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 37).
+
+Some of the Zulu and native accounts of Isandhlwana are worth
+noticing. One says the engagement “lasted till late in the
+afternoon.” (P. P. [C. 2374] p. 24.) Another speaks of the fighting
+when the 24th retired on the tents, and of their ammunition failing.
+Another (Nugwende, a brother of Cetshwayo) says that the main, or
+front and the left flank attack of the Zulu army were beaten and fell
+back with great loss until the fire of the white troops slackened.
+The right flank entering the camp, the main body was ordered to renew
+the attack, which the English were unable to prevent from want of
+ammunition.
+
+The following “Statement of a Zulu Deserter regarding the Isan’lwana
+Battle” was taken by Mr. Drummond, head-quarter staff:
+
+  The Zulu army, consisting of the Ulundi corps, about 3000 strong;
+  the Nokenke Regiment, 2000 strong; the Ngobamakosi Regiment,
+  including the Uve, about 5000 strong; the Umcityu, about 4000
+  strong; the Nodwengu, 2000 strong; the Umbonambi, 3000 strong;
+  and the Udhloko, about 1000 strong, or a total of about 20,000
+  men in all, left the military kraal of Nodwengu on the afternoon
+  of the 17th of January. It was first addressed by the King, who
+  said:
+
+  “I am sending you out against the whites, who have invaded
+  Zululand and driven away our cattle. You are to go against the
+  column at Rorke’s Drift, and drive it back into Natal; and, if
+  the state of the river will allow, follow it up through Natal,
+  right up to the Draakensburg. You will attack by daylight, as
+  there are enough of you to ‘eat it up,’ and you will march
+  slowly, so as not to tire yourselves.”
+
+  We accordingly left Nodwengu late in the afternoon, and marched
+  in column to the west bank of the White Umfolosi, about six miles
+  distant, where we bivouacked for the night. Next day we marched
+  to the Isipezi military kraal, about nine miles off, where we
+  slept; and on the 19th we ascended to the tableland near the
+  Isihlungu hills, a march of about equal duration with that of
+  the day previous. On this day the army, which had hitherto been
+  marching in single column, divided into two, marching parallel to
+  and within sight of each other, that on the left consisting of
+  the Nokenke, Umcityu, and Nodwengu Regiments, under the command
+  of Tyingwayo, the other commanded by Mavumingwana. There were a
+  few mounted men belonging to the chief Usirayo, who were made
+  use of as scouts. On the 20th we moved across the open country
+  and slept by the Isipezi hill. We saw a body of mounted white
+  men on this day to our left (a strong reconnaissance was made on
+  the 20th, to the west of the Isipezi hill, which was probably
+  the force here indicated). On the 21st, keeping away to the
+  eastward, we occupied a valley running north and south under the
+  spurs of the Ngutu hill, which concealed the Isandlana hill,
+  distant from us about four miles, and nearly due west of our
+  encampment. We had been well fed during our whole march, our
+  scouts driving in cattle and goats, and on that evening we lit
+  our camp-fires as usual. Our scouts also reported to us that
+  they had seen the vedettes of the English force at sunset on
+  some hills west-south-west of us (Lord Chelmsford with some of
+  his staff rode up in this direction, and about this time, and
+  saw some of the mounted enemy). Our order of encampment on the
+  21st of January was as follows: On the extreme right were the
+  Nodwengu, Nokenke, and Umcityu; the centre was formed by the
+  Ngobamakosi and Mbonambi; and the left, of the Undi Corps and
+  the Udhloko Regiment. On the morning of the 22nd of January
+  there was no intention whatever of making any attack, on account
+  of a superstition regarding the state of the moon, and we were
+  sitting resting, when firing was heard on our right (the narrator
+  was in the Nokenke Regiment), which we at first imagined was
+  the Ngobamakosi engaged, and we armed and ran forward in the
+  direction of the sound. We were, however, soon told it was the
+  white troops fighting with Matyana’s people some ten miles away
+  to our left front, and returned to our original position. Just
+  after we had sat down again, a small herd of cattle came past our
+  line from our right, being driven down by some of our scouts,
+  and just when they were opposite to the Umcityu Regiment, a body
+  of mounted men, on the hill to the west, were seen galloping,
+  evidently trying to cut them off. When several hundred yards off,
+  they perceived the Umcityu, and, dismounting, fired one volley at
+  them and then retired. The Umcityu at once jumped up and charged,
+  an example which was taken up by the Nokenke and Nodwengu on
+  their right, and the Ngobamakosi and Mbonambi on the left, while
+  the Undi Corps and the Udhloko formed a circle (as is customary
+  in Zulu warfare when a force is about to be engaged) and remained
+  where they were. With the latter were the two commanding
+  officers, Mavumingwana and Tyingwayo, and several of the king’s
+  brothers, who with these two corps bore away to the north-west,
+  after a short pause, and keeping on the northern side of the
+  Isandlana, performed a turning movement on the right without any
+  opposition from the whites, who, from the nature of the ground,
+  could not see them. Thus the original Zulu left became their
+  extreme right, while their right became their centre, and the
+  centre the left. The two regiments which formed the latter, the
+  Ngobamakosi and Mbonambi, made a turning along the front of the
+  camp towards the English right, but became engaged long before
+  they could accomplish it; and the Uve Regiment, a battalion of
+  the Ngobamakosi, was repulsed and had to retire until reinforced
+  by the other battalion, while the Mbonambi suffered very severely
+  from the artillery fire. Meanwhile, the centre, consisting of the
+  Umcityu on the left centre, and the Nokenke and Nodwengu higher
+  up on the right, under the hill, were making a direct attack on
+  the left of the camp. The Umcityu suffered very severely, both
+  from artillery and musketry fire; the Nokenke from musketry fire
+  alone; while the Nodwengu lost least. When we at last carried
+  the camp, our regiments became mixed up; a portion pursued the
+  fugitives down to the Buffalo River, and the remainder plundered
+  the camp; while the Undi and Udhloko Regiments made the best
+  of their way to Rorke’s Drift to plunder the post there—in
+  which they failed, and lost very heavily, after fighting all
+  the afternoon and night. We stripped the dead of all their
+  clothes. To my knowledge no one was made prisoner, and I saw
+  no dead body carried away or mutilated. If the doctors carried
+  away any dead bodies for the purpose of afterwards doctoring the
+  army, it was done without my knowing of it; nor did I see any
+  prisoner taken and afterwards killed. I was, however, one of the
+  men who followed the refugees down to the Buffalo River, and
+  only returned to the English camp late in the afternoon. (This
+  portion of the prisoner’s statement was made very reluctantly.)
+  The portion of the army which had remained to plunder the camp
+  did so thoroughly, carrying off the maize, breadstuffs (_sic_),
+  and stores of all kinds, and drinking such spirits as were in
+  camp. Many were drunk, and all laden with their booty; and
+  towards sunset the whole force moved back to the encampment of
+  the previous night, hastened by having seen another English
+  force approaching from the south. Next morning the greater part
+  of the men dispersed to their homes with their plunder, a few
+  accompanying the principal officers to the king, and they have
+  not reassembled since.—_The Times_, March 22nd, 1879.
+
+Another account, taken by the interpreter of one of the column
+commanding officers (a version of which has appeared in the columns
+of _The Army and Navy Gazette_, of 11th October 1879, and is
+described as a “full and accurate account”), is selected as being
+corroborated in all main points by survivors of the British force,
+and by the battle-field itself. It is the story of Uguku, a Zulu
+belonging to the Kandampenvu (or Umcityu) Regiment, who says: “We
+arrived at Ingqutu eight regiments strong (20,000 to 25,000 men) and
+slept in the valley of a small stream which runs into the Nondweni
+river to the eastward of Sandhlwana. The regiments were Kandampenvu
+(or Umcityu), Ngobamakosi, Uve, Nokenke, Umbonambi, Udhloko, Nodwengu
+(name of military kraal of the Inkulutyane Regiment), and Undi (which
+comprises the Tulwana, Ndhlondhlo, and Indhluyengwe): The army was
+under the joint command of Mavumengwana, Tsingwayo, and Sihayo. It
+was intended that Matshana ka Mondisa was to be in chief command, but
+he having been a Natal Kafir, the other three were jealous of him,
+and did not like him to be put over them; they therefore devised a
+plan of getting him out of the way on the day of the battle. They
+accomplished this plan by getting him to go forward with Undwandwe
+to the Upindo to reconnoitre, and promised to follow. As soon as
+he had gone they took another road, viz. north of Babanango, while
+Matshana and Undwandwe went south of it, being accompanied by six
+mavigo (companies). It was our intention to have rested for a day in
+the valley where we arrived the night before the battle, but having
+on the morning of the battle heard firing of the English advance
+guard who had engaged Matshana’s men, and it being reported that the
+Ngobamakosi were engaged, we went up from the valley to the top of
+Ingqutu, which was between us and the camp; we then found that the
+Ngobamakosi were not engaged, but were quietly encamped lower down
+the valley. We saw a body of horse coming up the hill towards us from
+the Sandhlwana side. We opened fire on them, and then the whole of
+our army rose and came up the hill. The enemy returned our fire, but
+retired down the hill, leaving one dead man (a black) and a horse
+on the field. The Uve and Ngobamakosi then became engaged on our
+left with the enemy’s skirmishers, and soon afterwards we were all
+engaged with the skirmishers of the enemy. We were not checked by
+them” (_i.e._ stopped), “but continued our march on the camp until
+the artillery opened upon us. The first shell took effect in the
+ranks of my regiment, just above the kraal of Baza. The Nokenke then
+ran out in the shape of a horn towards the kraal of Nyenzani on the
+road between Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift (the continuation of the
+road, to the eastward of the camp). The engagement now became very
+hot between the Mangwane (mounted natives) and us, the Mangwane being
+supported by the infantry, who were some distance in their rear. We
+were now falling very fast. The Mangwane had put their horses in a
+donga, and were firing away at us on foot. We shouted ‘Izulu!’ (‘The
+heavens!’)[171] and made for the donga, driving out the Mangwane
+towards the camp. The infantry then opened fire on us, and their fire
+was so hot, that those of us who were not in the donga retired back
+over the hill. It was then that the Nokenke and Nodwengu regiments
+ran out towards Nyenzani’s kraal. We then shouted ‘Izulu!’ again,
+and got up out of the dongas. The soldiers opened fire on us again,
+and we laid down. We then got up again, and the whole of my regiment
+charged the infantry, who formed into two separate parties—one party
+standing four deep with their backs towards Sandhlwana, the other
+standing about fifty yards from the camp in like formation. We were
+checked by the fire of the soldiers standing near Sandhlwana, but
+charged on towards those standing in front of the camp, in spite of
+a very heavy fire on our right flank from those by Sandhlwana. As
+we got nearer we saw the soldiers were beginning to fall from the
+effects of our fire. On our left we were supported by the Umbonambi,
+half the Undi, Ngobamakosi, and Uve. Behind us were the other half
+of the Undi and Udhloko, who never came into action at Sandhlwana,
+but formed the reserve (which passed on and attacked Rorke’s Drift).
+As we rushed on the soldiers retired on the camp, fighting all the
+way, and as they got into the camp we were intermingled with them. It
+was a disputed point as to which of the following regiments was the
+first in the English camp, viz.: Undi, Kandampenvu, Ngobamakosi, and
+Umbonambi; but it was eventually decided that the Umbonambi was the
+first, followed by Undi.
+
+“One party of soldiers came out from among the tents and formed
+up a little above the ammunition-waggons. They held their ground
+there until their ammunition failed them, when they were nearly all
+assegaied. Those that were not killed at this place formed again
+in a solid square in the neck of Sandhlwana. They were completely
+surrounded on all sides, and stood back to back, and surrounding
+some men who were in the centre. Their ammunition was now done,
+except that they had some revolvers which they fired at us at close
+quarters. We were quite unable to break their square until we had
+killed a great many of them, by throwing our assegais at short
+distances. We eventually overcame them in this way.”[172]
+
+When all we have narrated was known in Natal, the question was asked
+in the public prints: “Who, in the light of these recently-discovered
+facts, were the real heroes of that day? Surely the two officers who
+commanded in that narrow pass at the rear of the camp.... Surely,
+too, no smaller heroism was that of the fourteen carbineers ... who,
+mere boys as they were, gave their lives away in order to afford
+their comrades-in-arms a chance of retreat.... Any one of these men
+might have had a chance for his life, had he chosen to follow the
+example set by so many. They remained, however, and they died, and
+only after four months of doubt, contradiction, and despatch-writing,
+is it made known to the world who they were who have most deserved
+the coveted decoration ‘For Valour.’”
+
+“‘The dead shall live, the living die!’ Never was this well-known
+line of Dryden’s more strikingly illustrated than by the events of
+the past fortnight,” writes _The Natal Witness_ of June 7th, 1879.
+“‘The dead shall live,’ the mists of doubt, overclouding many a
+reputation, have been cleared up by a visit to the now sacred field
+of Isandhlwana.
+
+“‘The living die:’ the hopes of a large party in an European nation
+have been extinguished by the assegais of a mere handful of savages.”
+(Alluding to the death of the Prince Imperial of France.) “The
+two events stand side by side in startling contrast, and suggest
+thoughts which even the wisest might with advantage ponder. Turn, for
+instance, to the story of the field of Isandhlwana, as now told in
+plain though interrupted and awful characters by the remains found
+resting near the ‘neck.’ Could it have been guessed that, while human
+recollection and human intelligence failed so utterly to convey to
+the world a history of the events of that too memorable day, Nature
+herself would have taken the matter in hand, and told us such a
+story as no one who hears it will ever forget? Four months, all but
+a day, had elapsed since the defenders of the field stood facing
+the Zulu myriads—four months of rain and sun, of the hovering of
+slow-sailing birds of prey, and of the predatory visits, as it might
+well be deemed, of unregarding enemies. Four months! and during all
+that time, while the world was ringing from one end to the other
+with the news of a terrible disaster, while reinforcements were
+crowding on to our shores, and special correspondents were flooding
+the telegraph-wires with the last new thing, all through those four
+months the dead slept quietly on, waiting almost consciously, as one
+might think, for the revelation which was to establish their fame,
+and, where necessary, relieve their unjustly sullied reputation.
+For four months was there a sleep of honour slept upon that bitter
+field—a sleep unbroken by any of the noise of the war that rolled
+both to southward and to northward. The defeat of Indlobane had been
+suffered; the victory of Kambula had been gained; the defenders of
+Rorke’s Drift had been rewarded, at least with a nation’s praise; the
+imprisoned column had been released from Etshowe; all the roads in
+Natal had rung to the tread of men and the rolling of waggon-wheels,
+as the force which was to “wipe out” the disaster of Isandhlwana
+moved up to the front. Yet still the honoured dead slept in silence.
+Only the grasses that waved round them in the autumn breeze murmured
+to them of their coming resurrection; only the stars that looked down
+on them, when the night wind even had ceased, and the hills loomed
+black and silent in the morning hours, bade them be patient and wait.
+There were many and varied fates entwined in that quiet group: there
+was the trained officer, there was the private soldier, there was the
+man who had come to find employment in a colonial service, there were
+the lads from the colony itself; all these were there, waiting till
+the moment should come when their heroism should be recognised, when
+the vague slanders of interest or of cowardice should be dispelled,
+and the wreath of undying fame hung round each name in the historic
+temple. And the moment, long waited for—long promised, as it might
+almost seem, by the beneficent hand of Nature herself, who held
+firmly to some unmistakable tokens of recognition—the moment at last
+arrived. There could be no mistake about it. Those lying here were
+those who had often been called by name by those who found them.
+If one means of recognition was absent, another took its place. If
+the features were past identification, there was the letter from a
+sister, the ornament so well known to companions, the marks of rank,
+the insignia of office. Ghastly tokens, it will be said, making up
+the foreground of a ghastly scene. Yes, ghastly tokens, but glorious
+tokens also—tokens enabling many a family to name those that died
+with a regret no longer mingled with doubt or with pain; tokens
+that will long be cherished, and which will be shown to children as
+preserving the memory of lives that are to be imitated. A black cloud
+has, by these revelations, been lifted from the rocks of Isandhlwana,
+and many whom we deemed dead are living again—living as examples,
+never to be defaced, of the honour which tradition has so fondly
+attached to a British soldier’s name.”
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XX.
+
+THE PRINCE IMPERIAL.
+
+
+Early in April the South African community was greatly impressed and
+interested by the arrival of the young Prince Imperial, who came
+out to Natal to take his share in the fortunes of war, and to see
+something of active service against the Zulus. The colonists were not
+a little gratified by the fact of this young hope of an illustrious
+house having come to fight for and with them against their dreaded
+foes; yet amongst them all there was hardly one, great or small,
+gentle or simple, whose second thought was not one of sincere regret
+that he, who, besides being of such importance in the future of
+Europe, was also his widowed mother’s only son and sole comfort,
+should be allowed to risk his life in a savage warfare. Many a
+thought of kindly sympathy was directed from Natal towards that royal
+mother for whom English men and women have always had so sincere a
+feeling, whether in prosperity or adversity; and many a warm-hearted
+woman’s eyes filled with tears at the sight of the gallant youth, and
+at the very thought of what his loss would be to her who remained
+to pray for him at home, the home which she had found amongst our
+countrymen in England. On every side anxious hopes were expressed
+that the Prince would be carefully guarded from danger, and not
+allowed needlessly to throw away his precious young life; all these
+hopes and anxieties were redoubled when he arrived, and, by his
+winning ways and gallant bearing, won the hearts of all who came
+in contact with him. Had Natal been asked, he would have been sent
+straight home again instead of across the borders, and yet it would
+have been hard to resist and thwart the eager wish to be of use, to
+work, and to see service which characterised him throughout his short
+campaign, and which, combined with gentleness and humanity as it was,
+proved him to be a true soldier to the heart’s core.
+
+Since he had come to Natal he could not, of course, be kept away
+from the front, and the day he left ’Maritzburg good wishes from all
+classes attended him along the road. It was thought, indeed, that
+in all human probability he was safe, except in the event of some
+such battle as would make the chances equal for all, from general
+to drummer-boy. “At all events,” it was said, “Lord Chelmsford will
+keep him by his side.” Others, again, opined that the General would
+find it no easy task to restrain the eager young spirit that scorned
+to be treated with more care than others of his age. But this doubt
+was answered by one who knew the Prince, and who said that he was too
+good a soldier ever to disobey an order. Throw himself in the way of
+difficulty and danger he might wherever possible, but any distinct
+_order_ would be promptly and fully obeyed.
+
+For some little time the Prince acted as extra aide-de-camp to Lord
+Chelmsford, and accompanied him in that capacity to Colonel Wood’s
+camp at Kambula, and back to Utrecht. Colonel Harrison, R.E., was
+also of the party, and during the journey very friendly relations
+were established between him and the Prince, which lasted to the end,
+and were drawn closer by the former’s careful attendance during an
+indisposition which befell the latter.
+
+Whilst at Kambula the General reconnoitred the Indhlobane Mountain
+on May 4th, and on return to camp was joined by the Prince Imperial,
+when, to show him the defence of a laager, the alarm was sounded. In
+three minutes every man was at his allotted post, and an inspection
+of the camp, with its double tier of rifles ready for work, was
+made by the General and staff. Next day the camp was broken up, and
+the column moved to about a mile from the White Umvolosi, near the
+Zinguin range—Lord Chelmsford and staff, with the Prince, proceeding
+to Utrecht.
+
+On May 8th, the General, having appointed Colonel Harrison, R.E.,
+Assistant-Quartermaster-General of the army, and Lieutenant Carey,
+98th Regiment, Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, requested the
+former “to give some work to the Prince Imperial, as he was anxious
+for it, and did not find enough to do in the duties of an extra
+aide-de-camp.” This request was a verbal one, and the words used
+may not be letter for letter, but of the purport there is no doubt;
+and such a request from the Commander-in-Chief was, of course, an
+order which was immediately carried out. The Prince was directed
+to collect and record information respecting the distribution of
+troops, location of depôts, and the like, and he worked hard at this
+for some days. Lord Chelmsford shortly afterwards left for Newcastle,
+but before his departure Colonel Harrison suggested that it would be
+advisable, during his lordship’s absence, to make a reconnaissance
+into Zululand, on the borders of which they had been hovering so
+long, so as to determine the exact line of route which the columns
+ought to take in the impending invasion.
+
+Lord Chelmsford accepted the suggestion, asking Colonel Harrison
+to take the Prince with him on the expedition, and appointing an
+intelligent officer to accompany them. The reconnoitring party
+started with a strong escort, and reached Conference Hill on May
+13th. Here they were joined by Colonel Buller and 200 horsemen, and
+were engaged on their reconnaissance till May 17th, bivouacking at
+night with horses saddled and bridled, and marching at dawn, scouring
+the country, and sweeping Zulu scouts before them. The Prince
+was delighted with the life, the simple fare of the officers—his
+comrades—cooked by themselves at their camp-fire, the strange
+country, the sight of the enemy, the exhilarating gallops over the
+grass up hill and down dale after fleet Zulu spies, the bivouac under
+the star-lit heavens. All this pleased him immensely; as he told
+Colonel Harrison: “Made him feel that he was really doing soldiers’
+work such as he had never done before.” Always anxious to be of use,
+he made most careful and copious notes and observations on all they
+saw or did.
+
+On the 17th the party returned to Conference Hill, Colonel Harrison
+and Colonel Buller having arranged for a combined and further
+reconnaissance of the country from that place and Brigadier-General
+Wood’s camp; but as the special duty to which the Prince and the
+intelligence officer had been assigned was over, Colonel Harrison
+would not allow them to accompany him farther, but directed them
+to return to Utrecht. They obeyed; but, on the 18th, after Colonel
+Harrison had started on his expedition and was already in Zululand,
+he was surprised by the appearance of the Prince Imperial, who had
+galloped all the way from Balte Spruit by himself to overtake him,
+bringing with him the permission, for which he had sent a messenger
+to Lord Chelmsford, to go on the new reconnaissance. The party now
+consisted of Colonel Harrison, the Prince, Lieutenant Carey, one
+officer and five men Bettington’s Horse, and one officer and twenty
+men Natal Native Horse (Basutu). The escort would have been stronger,
+but that the junction with Colonel Buller from Wood’s camp was looked
+for to add to it. The first day was occupied in searching the country
+as before, and in looking out for Buller; and the party bivouacked at
+night with vedettes and sentries posted all round, as Zulus had been
+seen on the hills, although they did not molest the reconnoitring
+party.
+
+On the following day (the 19th), whilst exploring a deep rough
+valley, the party was suddenly confronted by a number of Zulus, who
+came down the hill at one side of the donga, and spread out in the
+usual way in two wings or horns, in order to overlap or outflank it,
+firing as they advanced. The officer in command of the advance at
+once put spurs to his horse and rode straight up the hill at the weak
+centre of the Zulu detachment, followed by the rest of the party.
+They pushed right through the centre of the Zulus, and the horns at
+once broke away, and escaped among the rocks with some loss. Smaller
+bodies of Zulus were met with subsequently, but did not attempt to
+try conclusions with the horsemen, who were obliged to keep on the
+move the greater part of the night, as the enemy was all around them.
+
+Next morning they reached Conference Hill, without meeting Colonel
+Buller; Colonel Harrison and the Prince proceeding to Utrecht to
+report to Lord Chelmsford.
+
+Lord Chelmsford now informed Colonel Harrison that “He
+was to consider the Prince Imperial as attached to the
+Quartermaster-General’s staff for duty, but it was not put in orders,
+in consequence of the Prince not being in the army.” The Prince
+lived, as before, with the General’s personal staff, and Colonel
+Harrison, therefore, only saw him when he came for work or orders,
+which was very frequently.
+
+On May 25th—the head-quarters having been established at Landman’s
+Drift—the Prince, having called for work as usual, was directed to
+prepare a plan of a divisional camp. That evening Colonel Harrison
+was spoken to by Lord Chelmsford, because the Prince Imperial had
+gone outside the lines without an escort, but replied “That the work
+he had given the Prince to do referred to the camp inside the outpost
+lines.” The General then told Colonel Harrison “To take care that the
+Prince was not to go out without an escort when working for him, and
+in the matter of escort to treat him, not as a royal person, but the
+same as any other officer, taking all due precautions.”
+
+Colonel Harrison then said that “He would see the Prince, and tell
+him he was never to leave the camp without a suitable escort, and
+that he was to apply to him for one when it was wanted;” and Lord
+Chelmsford replied that “That would do.”
+
+The same day Colonel Harrison saw the Prince, and told him this,
+and to make the matter quite sure, he then and there gave him the
+instructions in writing.
+
+He next directed him to make a map of the country, from the
+reconnaissance sketches of Lieutenant Carey and others. This work the
+Prince executed very well, and so eager was he for employment, so
+desirous to be always up and doing, that he went, not once or twice,
+but often every day to Colonel Harrison’s tent asking for more.
+
+On the 28th of May, head-quarters were at Kopje Allein, and on that
+and the two following days reconnaissances were pushed far into the
+enemy’s country, but no enemy was seen. Small parties, even single
+officers, rode about unmolested all over the district round, and went
+beyond the spot where so sad a scene was shortly afterwards enacted.
+
+On the 31st of May the Prince went to Colonel Harrison’s tent with a
+report which he had written, and, as usual, asked for some more work.
+He was told that the army was to march next day, and that he might
+go out and report on the roads and camps for the day following; with
+which instructions the Prince was greatly pleased. Next day the 2nd
+Division (with which were Lord Chelmsford and the head-quarters’
+staff) were ordered to march towards Ulundi; Wood’s column being
+in advance some miles, on the other side of the Blood River, on a
+road which would take it out eventually on the line of march of
+the head-quarters’ column. Lieutenant Carey, whilst conversing on
+duty matters with Colonel Harrison, expressed a wish to go out with
+the Prince, as he desired to verify a sketch he had made on the
+previous day; and, although Colonel Harrison had intended to ask
+one of the General’s personal staff to accompany the Prince, he
+said, when Lieutenant Carey volunteered to go: “All right; you can
+look after the Prince!” At the same time he told Lieutenant Carey
+to let the Prince do the work for which he was going out, namely,
+a detailed report on the road and the selection of a site for the
+camp. Lieutenant Carey was known to Colonel Harrison as a cautious
+and experienced officer, who had been frequently out on patrol duties
+with Colonel Buller and others, who was acquainted with the nature of
+the work he had to do, the precautions to be taken, and the actual
+ground to be gone over; and there was every reason to believe that he
+thoroughly understood his position, and would make, as he had done
+before, the proper arrangements for an escort.
+
+On the morning of the 1st, Colonel Harrison, hearing that no escort
+had arrived at the hour fixed for the departure of the reconnoitring
+party, went over to General Marshall’s tent, and obtained from him
+the order for the number of men he thought sufficient—“six Europeans
+and six Basutos;” and, having informed Lieutenant Carey of this,
+he rode off to attend to his own duties—superintending the march of
+the army, inspecting the fords, and moving on in advance (in company
+with Major Grenfell) to select the site for watering-places and the
+next camp. On a ridge in front of the column Colonel Harrison and
+his companion presently found the Prince and Lieutenant Carey halted
+with the European troopers only, and heard from them that they were
+waiting for the Basutos, who had not joined them in camp; but some
+were now in sight on the hillside flanking the line of march, and
+moving in a direction which would bring them upon it a little in
+advance of the spot where the party was waiting.
+
+As Lieutenant Carey had been already over the country, he was asked
+by Colonel Harrison to point out the place where the water supply
+for the next camp was, and the whole party rode slowly along a donga
+towards the supposed stream or ponds. Colonel Harrison did not think
+the water sufficient for their purpose, and rode back to the high
+ground, where he was rejoined by Major Grenfell, who told him that
+the Prince’s party had just discovered a better supply a little
+farther on. There was a ridge in front of them which they considered
+marked the end of the day’s march, and the officers dispersed to
+attend to their own duties, not imagining for an instant that the
+reconnoitring party would go on without the Basutos, who, from their
+wonderful power of sight and hearing, and quickness at detecting the
+approach of danger, were always regarded as essential to an escort.
+
+Unhappily, however, such was the case. The party rode on until they
+came to a deserted kraal, situated some 200 yards from the river, and
+consisting of five huts, one with the usual small cattle enclosure.
+Between the kraal and the river stretched a luxuriant growth of
+tambookie grass, five or six feet in height, with mealies and Kafir
+corn interspersed. This dense covert, however, did not completely
+surround the kraal, for in front there was an open space, apparently
+used by the Zulus, judging from the ashes and broken earthenware
+strewn about, as a common cooking-ground.
+
+Here the party halted, and the Prince, having first sent a native
+guide to make sure that the huts were all uninhabited, gave the
+order that the horses should be off-saddled and turned out to
+graze. Some of them lit a fire and made coffee, while the Prince
+and Lieutenant Carey, after the latter had taken a look round with
+his glass, proceeded to make sketches of the surrounding country.
+It is said that the Prince’s talent with pen and pencil, combined
+with his remarkable proficiency in military surveying—that great
+gift of recognising at once the strategic capabilities of any spot
+which distinguished the First Napoleon—made his contributions to our
+knowledge of the country to be traversed of great value; and he never
+lost an opportunity of making himself of use in this and every other
+way.
+
+It was about 3 P.M. when the party halted at this deserted kraal, the
+Prince deciding that they should leave again in an hour’s time. That
+the Zulus had been upon the spot not long before was apparent from
+signs of freshly-chewed _imfi_ (native sugar-cane) upon the ground,
+while a few dogs lingering about might have suggested that their
+masters were not far off. Before the hour was over, however, the
+native guide came in to report that he had seen a Zulu coming over
+the hill, and it was now thought prudent to retire, the Prince giving
+directions to collect and up-saddle the horses, followed by the order
+to “Mount.”
+
+Some of the men were already in the saddle, others in the act of
+mounting, when a sudden volley fired upon them from amongst the
+tall stalks of the mealies (Indian corn) which grew on every side,
+betrayed the presence of a numerous armed foe, who had returned
+unseen to those who were in temporary occupation of their kraals.
+The distance was not twenty yards, and the long grass swayed to the
+sudden rush of the Zulus, as with a tremendous shout, they charged
+towards the Prince and his companions. The horses all swerved at the
+suddenness of the tumult, and one broke away, its rider being shot
+before he could recover it and mount. The young Prince was riding
+a fine gray charger, a gray of sixteen hands, always difficult to
+mount, and on this occasion, frightened by the firing, it became
+restive and could not be controlled. Lieutenant Carey, apparently,
+had at this moment been carried by his horse in a direction which
+brought one of the huts between him and the Prince, of whose
+difficulties he was therefore unaware. From the moment of the attack
+no man seems to have known much of what the rest were doing; to
+gallop away was the only chance for life, and all hurried off, the
+Prince in vain endeavouring to mount his restive steed unaided. He
+was passed by Trooper Letocq: “_Dépêchez vous, s’il vous plait,
+Monsieur!_” he cried, as he dashed past, himself only lying across
+his saddle, but the Prince made no answer; he was already doing his
+utmost, and in another minute he was alone. He was seen endeavouring
+to mount his rearing charger, as it followed the retreat, while he
+ran beside it, the enemy close at hand. He made one desperate attempt
+to leap into the saddle by the help of the holster-flap; _that_ gave
+way, and then he fell. The charger dashed riderless past some of the
+mounted men, who, looking back, saw the Prince running after them
+on foot, with the Zulus but a few paces behind him. Alas! not a man
+turned back, they galloped wildly on, and carried back to camp the
+news that the gallant young Prince, for or with whom each of them
+should have died that day, lay slain upon the hillside where he had
+made his last brave stand alone. Two troopers fell besides—one was
+struck down by a bullet as he rode away; the other was the man who
+had lost his horse, Trooper Rogers, and who was last seen in the
+act of levelling his carbine at the enemy. The native guide was
+killed as well, after a hard fight with the foe, witnessed to by the
+blood-stained and broken weapons found by his side next day. The
+fugitives rode on for some distance, when they met General Wood and
+Colonel Buller, to whom they made their report. From the brow of an
+adjacent hill these officers, looking through their glasses, could
+see the Zulus leading away the horses they had taken—the trophies of
+their successful attack.
+
+That evening Colonel Harrison was in his tent, engaged in writing
+orders for the next day’s march, when Lord Chelmsford came in to
+tell him “The Prince is killed!” and Lieutenant Carey soon after
+confirmed the dreadful, well-nigh incredible news. He said they were
+off-saddled at a kraal, when they were surrounded and fired into,
+and that the Prince must have been killed, for no one had seen him
+afterwards.
+
+Colonel Harrison asked the General to let him take a few men to the
+kraal, and see if, by any chance, the Prince were only wounded, or
+were hidden near at hand, but his request was not granted, and the
+testimony of the survivors extinguished all hope.
+
+Next day General Marshall, with a cavalry patrol, went out to search
+for the Prince, being assisted by scouts of the Flying Column. The
+bodies of the troopers were soon found, and shortly afterwards that
+of His Imperial Highness was found by Captain Cochrane, lying in a
+donga about 200 yards from the kraal where the party had halted. The
+body was stripped with the exception of a gold chain with medallions
+attached, which was still round his neck. Sword, revolver, helmet,
+and clothes were gone; but in the grass were found the Prince’s spurs
+and one sock.
+
+The body had eighteen assegai wounds, all in front, and the marks on
+the ground and on the spurs indicated a desperate resistance.
+
+The two white troopers were laid together beside a cairn of stones,
+which was erected to mark the exact spot where the Prince was found,
+and later in the day they were buried there, the chaplain on duty
+with the column performing the funeral service.
+
+But for the Prince himself a true soldiers’ bier was formed of lances
+lashed together and horse blankets, and, borne thus, the body of the
+noble lad was carried up the hill towards the camp which he had left
+the previous day so full of energy and life.
+
+The melancholy news was telegraphed throughout the colony, causing
+universal grief and consternation. Every heart was wrung with
+sympathy for _the mother_; and even those to whose homes and hearts
+the war had already brought desolation, felt their own grief hushed
+for awhile in the presence of a bereavement which seemed to surpass
+all others in bitterness and depth.
+
+What citizen of ’Maritzburg will ever forget the melancholy Sunday
+afternoon, cold and storm-laden, when, at the first distant sound of
+the sad approaching funeral music, all left their homes and lined the
+streets through which the violet-adorned coffin passed on its way to
+its temporary resting-place.
+
+In Durban, too, the solemn scene was repeated; the whole colony being
+deeply moved at the sad and untimely death of the gallant Prince.
+H.M.S. _Boadicea_, flag-ship of Commodore Richards, had the honour of
+conveying the body to Simon’s Bay, when it was transferred to H.M.S.
+_Orontes_ with every possible mark of respect for conveyance to
+England.
+
+A court of inquiry was at once assembled by Lord Chelmsford, and
+reported that Lieutenant Carey had not understood the position in
+which he stood towards the Prince, and, as a consequence, failed to
+estimate aright the responsibility which fell to his lot; also that
+he was much to blame for having proceeded on the duty in question
+with a portion only of the escort; and that the selection of the
+kraal where the halt was made, surrounded as it was by cover for the
+enemy, and adjacent to difficult ground, showed a lamentable want of
+military prudence. And, finally, the court deeply regretted that no
+effort was made after the attack to rally the escort and to show a
+front to the enemy, whereby the possibility of aiding those who had
+failed to make good their retreat might have been ascertained.
+
+Lieutenant Carey was then tried by court-martial and found guilty.
+The home authorities decided, however, that the conviction and
+sentence could not be maintained, and consequently ordered this
+officer to be released from arrest and to return to his duty.
+
+In justice to Lieutenant Carey it must be said that the Prince
+appears to have been actually in command of the party; Lieutenant
+Carey accompanied it, by permission, for the purpose of completing
+some of his own work, taking advantage of the protection of the
+escort to enable him to do so; he received no order about the command
+of the escort, or other instructions beyond the words, “You can look
+after the Prince,” which were evidently interpreted as _advise him_,
+but could scarcely warrant controlling his movements.
+
+The Prince’s written instructions from Colonel Harrison were lost
+with him.
+
+On dangerous duties pertaining to the Quartermaster-General’s
+Department in an enemy’s country the Prince Imperial should _never_
+have been employed; as long as he remained with the British forces
+he should have been retained on the personal staff of the General
+commanding.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXI.
+
+ULUNDI.
+
+
+Before entering on the history of the advance of the main column on
+Ulundi, we will glance at the doings of No. 1 Division, which was to
+operate against Ulundi from the eastward.
+
+During May entrenched posts had been established—Fort Crealock,
+on the left bank of the Amatikulu River and close to John Dunn’s
+Road, about fourteen miles from Fort Pearson, on the Tugela; Fort
+Chelmsford, on the right bank of the Inyezane, also on John Dunn’s
+Road, and eight miles from Fort Crealock; and, in June, Fort
+Napoleon, on the left bank of the Umlalazi River, between Fort
+Chelmsford and Port Durnford, where a landing-place was established—a
+brief account of which may be interesting. The spot is described as
+a straight sandy coast near the mouth of the Umlalazi River, always
+having a boiling surf rolling in on the beach. The landing operations
+were carried out by means of large decked surf-boats of about forty
+tons burden each.
+
+The mode of working them was as follows: One end of a long hawser
+was made fast to an anchor dropped some distance outside the surf,
+and the other end taken on shore by a small line, hauled taut, and
+secured to shore moorings.
+
+By means of this “warp” the surf-boat travels to and from the beach.
+Having picked up the warp by the buoy-rope, it is placed in grooves
+in the bow and stern of the boat, and there retained by pins. The
+roll of the surf takes the boat in, large rope-stoppers being used to
+check her should she be going too fast.
+
+In this way some 3000 tons of stores were landed, at a very great
+saving of expense over land transport. The landing operations were
+at all times difficult, sometimes impossible; they were conducted
+by Commander Caffin, R.N., and to him and the Naval Brigade there
+stationed is due the entire credit of the excellent work done.
+
+Forwarding supplies and bridging the Tugela was the work of the
+1st Division through May and well into June; everything military,
+except convoy duty, appeared at a standstill. There was a great
+deal of sickness amongst the troops, but General Crealock did much
+in providing proper hospital accommodation and improving sanitary
+arrangements.
+
+Fort Pearson was converted into an extensive hospital, where there
+were as many as 400 patients at times, and whose garrison, after
+the advance of the division, was composed of the convalescents. At
+this hospital some wily patients managed to appropriate £5000 of the
+public moneys; but this fortunately was all recovered, except about
+£33.
+
+Telegraphic communication was established by the Royal Engineers
+between Fort Chelmsford and the Lower Tugela; and Colonel Walker,
+C.B., Scots Guards, was appointed to the command of this portion of
+the base, and stationed at Fort Pearson.
+
+On the 18th June the long-expected move was made by No. 1 Division,
+and General Crealock, with the advanced portion of the force, left
+Fort Pearson and the Lower Tugela. Moving by Fort Chelmsford, he
+reached the Umlalazi River on the 22nd. The river was bridged by the
+train under Captain Blood, R.E., and a work commenced on the left
+bank called “Fort Napoleon.”
+
+The General was engaged reconnoitring on the 23rd and following days,
+capturing a few cattle, one of which appeared to resent its capture,
+charging the General, and severely injuring his horse. On the 28th
+the force encamped near Port Durnford.
+
+But little interest attaches to this division, which had great
+opportunities before it. An earlier advance and a little dash
+would have given the laurels of the second campaign to the 1st
+Division, which at the beginning of May consisted of upwards of 9000
+men—6500 being Europeans—a sufficient force to have accomplished the
+destruction of Ulundi with ease; but it was not to be.
+
+Many absurd stories are told as to causes of delays, one being the
+want of so many rations of _pepper_; and the whole ending in the
+well-known telegram, “Where is Crealock?”
+
+We may here devote a few remarks to the Naval Brigade, which rendered
+such good service throughout the campaign; and, had opportunity
+offered, would have largely added to the laurels it won.
+
+After the relief of Etshowe, the Naval Brigade was divided between
+Lower Tugela and Fort Chelmsford, Commander Brackenbury in command at
+the latter post, Captain Campbell in chief command. The main force
+advanced with General Crealock—545 officers and men of _Active_,
+_Boadicea_, and _Shah_, with 3 9-pounder guns, 6 rocket-troughs, and
+5 Gatling guns. At Port Durnford they remained disembarking stores
+till July 21st, when, after being reviewed by Sir Garnet Wolseley,
+the _Active’s_ and _Shah’s_ men embarked, leaving the _Boadicea’s_ to
+continue temporarily the duties of the landing station.
+
+Captain Bradshaw of the _Shah_, and Captain Adeane of the _Tenedos_,
+rendered good service at Durban and Simon’s Bay respectively.
+
+The Royal Marines of the squadron served with the Naval Brigade.
+Lieutenant Dowding, R.M.L.I., was at first the senior officer, and
+advanced with Colonel Pearson’s column to Etshowe, remaining there
+until its relief. Captain Phillips, R.M.L.I., and Captain Burrowes,
+R.M.A., were landed from H.M.S. _Shah_, the former senior officer,
+and in command of the Marines at the battle of Ngingindhlovu.
+
+We must now return to the 2nd Division and Flying Column, which
+at last began to move in the right direction. Zululand had been
+carefully reconnoitred to the Babanango Mountain by Colonel Buller,
+and the advance of the 2nd Division, with the head-quarters, in this
+direction was covered by the Flying Column, which was always within
+striking distance.
+
+The troops now were carefully protected at night by laagers; the
+ordinary form being a rectangle in three compartments, with a
+shelter trench two yards outside the waggons, so that there might be
+a second line of fire from the top of the waggons, without risk to
+the defenders of the shelter trench.
+
+The Flying Column bore the brunt of work in the advances, scouting
+the country in every direction, the most reliable “eyes and ears”
+of the force the “Natal Native Horse,” then commanded by Captain
+Cochrane. These men (Edendale men and Basutu) in small numbers
+crowned the summit of every hill right and left of the route, and
+miles in front they were pushed to feel the way. On the 4th June the
+scouts reported a considerable number of the enemy, these, after the
+exchange of a few shots, Colonel Buller tried to draw towards the
+camp, but in vain, and the patrol, not being strong enough to risk an
+engagement, returned to camp. There three messengers from Cetshwayo
+were being received by Lord Chelmsford.
+
+They were sent back on June 6th with the following message: “He must
+at once give proof of being earnest in desiring peace, proof to
+be—1st. Two 7-pounder guns, and the oxen now with him taken from us
+to be sent in with the ambassadors. 2nd. A promise from Ketchwayo
+that all the arms taken during war, etc., when collected shall be
+given up. 3rd. One regiment to come to my camp and lay down its arms
+as a sign of submission. Pending Cetywayo’s answer, there will be no
+military operations on our part; when he has complied with them, I
+will order cessation of hostilities pending discussion of final terms
+of peace.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 107).
+
+On the previous day (5th June), Colonel Buller took a force of about
+300 men to reconnoitre the proposed route. The Zulus seen the day
+before came out from their kraals, and formed as if for an attack.
+The ground in their rear was broken and covered with thorny bush,
+the kraals large, apparently belonging to a chief; and beside one of
+them were four waggons, evidently taken from Isandhlwana. Colonel
+Buller determined to burn the kraals, but as he approached the enemy
+broke and retired into the cover, opening a heavy fire. A portion
+of the force engaged the Zulus from the edge of the bush whilst the
+remainder set fire to the kraals, which was accomplished with the
+loss of two men wounded.
+
+Major-General Marshall came up with a portion of the Cavalry Brigade,
+and, with a view to ensuring the safety of Colonel Buller’s retreat,
+advanced three troops of the 17th Lancers under Colonel Drury-Lowe to
+hold the enemy in check.
+
+The enemy was found to be very strongly posted in the thorns, and
+the ground being impracticable for cavalry, the Lancers were ordered
+to retire. Their Adjutant, Lieutenant Frith, was in this fruitless
+skirmish shot through the heart.
+
+During this affair an incident occurred (told by an officer present
+at the time), showing the individual bravery of the Zulus: A single
+warrior, chased by several Lancers, found himself run down and escape
+impossible. He turned and faced his enemies; spreading his arms
+abroad he presented his bare breast unflinchingly to the steel, and
+fell, face to the foe, as a brave soldier should.
+
+On the 6th a post called Fort Newdigate was established, and on this
+evening the warmth of the double line of fire from the laager of the
+2nd Division was unpleasantly experienced by the 5th Company Royal
+Engineers. This company had marched up that afternoon in advance
+of the Flying Column (which was going down-country for supplies),
+and had camped close to one of the unfinished redoubts outside the
+laager; an alarm was given in the laager, and a heavy fire opened
+therefrom. The Engineers coolly lay down flat on the ground, and
+waited till the excitement was over. It was due entirely to their
+own steadiness that the casualties were not greater; as it was, one
+sergeant was wounded and two horses killed.
+
+On the 7th, the division advanced, clearing the country of Zulus and
+burning their kraals, and encamped at the Upoko River; remaining
+there till the arrival of Brigadier-General Wood’s Column with a
+large convoy of supplies for which it had been sent. The time was
+usefully employed in reconnoitring, examining the road in advance,
+making drifts practicable, etc.
+
+A line of telegraph was laid by the half Telegraph Troop (C) Royal
+Engineers, from Quagga’s kraal (on the road between Newcastle
+and Ladysmith), where it joined the colonial line to Doornberg
+_viâ_ Dundee and Landtmann’s Drift, thus placing head-quarters in
+communication with Pietermaritzburg, etc.; flag-signalling being
+employed to communicate with Doornberg.
+
+On the 16th June the correspondent of _The Times_ wrote: “We are
+wandering towards Ulundi much as the Children of Israel wandered
+towards Canaan, without plans, or even definite notions for
+the future. It would seem not impossible to form some plan of
+campaign—something, at any rate, more definite than the hand-to-mouth
+manner in which we are now proceeding. Deep science and tactical
+skill are not necessary to contend with savages; a simple method
+and plain common-sense suffice, if backed by energy, decision, and
+determination.”
+
+The intelligence now telegraphed that Sir Garnet Wolseley was on
+his way to Natal to unravel the various tangled skeins of civil and
+military policy, doubtless acted as the “spur in the head” which
+expedited Lord Chelmsford’s movements.
+
+On the 17th, Brigadier-General Wood arrived with the supplies, and
+next day the force advanced to the Upoko River, where the road from
+Rorke’s Drift to Ulundi crosses it. Here there was a halt for a day,
+and a depôt formed, called Fort Marshall. Colonel Collingwood was
+left in charge of the two posts, Forts Newdigate and Marshall; and
+the whole line of communication in the enemy’s country, and such
+of the garrison as were left in frontier-posts for the purpose of
+patrolling, were placed under the command of Major-General Marshall.
+
+Fort Marshall was about twenty-five miles from Rorke’s Drift, and
+sixteen from Fort Newdigate; from this post to Koppie Allein (on the
+Blood River) the distance was twenty-one miles.
+
+Having struck down into this road, which runs into Zululand in an
+easterly direction, a glance at the map will show how needless
+was the waste of time and money spent in concentrating stores at
+Conference Hill—so far removed from the line of communications with
+Pietermaritzburg.
+
+The combined column reached the Umhlatusi River on the 21st, having
+traversed difficult and mountainous ground, where in many places the
+train was obliged to pass by single waggons.
+
+The Zulus took no advantage of the many opportunities for attack
+that presented themselves, and the march to Ulundi was practically
+unopposed. At this halting-place Fort Evelyn was built; and on the
+24th the march was resumed.
+
+Cetshwayo’s messengers, ’Mfunzi and ’Nkisimane, came up from
+Pietermaritzburg on the 24th, and next morning were sent to the king
+with Lord Chelmsford’s reply to his message.
+
+A very awkward drift on the Uvulu River was passed by the column,
+after crossing which a day’s halt was made, when a cavalry patrol was
+sent out to destroy some military kraals. Two more indunas came in to
+ask for peace, and were sent back to Ulundi in the evening. On the
+27th the force arrived at Entonjaneni, where the arrangements for the
+final advance on Ulundi were made, tents and all unnecessary baggage
+left behind, and a strong post formed with the aid of waggons. Four
+hundred waggons, 6000 oxen, and 800 mules were left entrenched here;
+the remaining 200 waggons, with ten days’ provisions, accompanying
+the advancing force. This evening two more messengers came in from
+the king with elephant tusks, some hundred head of oxen, and two
+trunks, the property of Lord Chelmsford. The messengers were sent
+back next day.
+
+_The Natal Colonist_ of June 28th says: “Again we hear that Ketshwayo
+has sent to Government, asking why Lord Chelmsford continues to
+advance. He (the king) hopes the General will not persist in
+advancing, as in that case he will be forced to fight, and what he
+wants is peace. This, we believe, makes the eleventh message he has
+sent in to the same effect. The General affects to doubt his _bonâ
+fides_. How is this to be established? Can his lordship think of
+no better guarantee than one which the most vigorous supporters of
+the war cannot term anything but childish?” This latter question is
+explained in another issue of the same paper, in which the editor
+remarks: “It is argued that the Zulus or the Zulu king cannot be
+sincere in desiring peace, because when the chance offers our troops
+are fired upon. If people would but consider for a moment, that until
+there is a truce or armistice agreed on we are living in a state of
+war; that our troops are in the Zulu country, making war upon its
+inhabitants, missing no opportunity of inflicting damage and injury
+upon them, burning their kraals, destroying their grain, ravaging
+their gardens, and firing on the natives themselves at every chance,
+what right, they would ask themselves, have we to expect that the
+Zulus should refrain from retaliation, however desirous they may be
+of seeing peace restored, and an end put to all the devastation and
+horror of prolonged warfare? _We_ do not profess to be otherwise than
+desirous of peace—peace with honour and security for the future—and
+yet are we not invading their country, and almost vaunting that we
+shall dictate its terms only when our invading columns have met at
+Ulundi, and planted the English flag there?”
+
+On the 30th the descent into the valley of the White Umvolosi was
+commenced, through a country covered with scattered bush and aloes.
+Two indunas were escorted in during the day, one bearing a letter
+from Cetshwayo to Lord Chelmsford,[173] and the other the sword of
+the Prince Imperial, which the king sent in immediately on learning
+the value attached to it.[174]
+
+Sir Garnet Wolseley—having been ordered out to Natal as Governor of
+Natal and the Transvaal, and Her Majesty’s High Commissioner for the
+eastern portion of South Africa—landed at Durban on the 28th June. On
+the 30th Lord Chelmsford sent him the following message: “Five miles
+from Entonganini; ten miles from Umvolosi River. King’s messengers
+have just left with message from me. I must advance to position on
+left bank of river. This I do to-morrow, but will stop hostilities,
+pending negotiations, if communicated demands are complied with by
+3rd July, noon. There are indunas come with cattle and guns. I have
+consented to receive 1000 captured rifles instead of a regiment
+laying down its arms. As my supplies will only permit of my remaining
+here until the 10th July, it is desirable I should be informed by
+you of the conditions of peace to be demanded. White man with king
+states he has 20,000 men. King anxious to fight; Princes not so.
+Where is Crealock’s column? Signal.”
+
+On the 1st July the Flying Column and General Newdigate’s division
+reached, without opposition, the southern bank of the White Umvolosi,
+within five or six miles of the royal kraals of Ulundi. Defensible
+laagers were at once formed, and the position made secure before
+night. Large bodies of Zulus were seen in motion at Ulundi. Next day
+the 2nd Division closed up their laager to that of the Flying Column,
+and a stone redoubt was erected on knoll in rear; so that a small
+garrison might hold the post, leaving the main force unencumbered to
+operate as desired. The Zulu army was not seen, and no messengers
+arrived from the king; but a large herd of white (royal) cattle was
+observed being driven from the king’s kraal towards the camp, and
+shortly afterwards driven back again.
+
+On the 3rd, as the Zulus were firing on watering-parties at the
+river, and no message had come in, a reconnaissance on the farther
+side was ordered. At noon, the cattle, sent in with the last
+messengers from the king, were driven back across the river, and
+about the same time Colonel Buller crossed lower down with the
+mounted men of the Flying Column to reconnoitre towards Ulundi.
+Detaching parties to cover his flank, he advanced rapidly to within
+about 200 yards of the Ulundi river, and about three-quarters of a
+mile from Ulundi, when he came upon about 5000 Zulus concealed in the
+river-bed, who at once opened fire, while large bodies of the enemy,
+moving down on each flank, endeavoured to cut off his retreat.
+
+Colonel Buller, having effected the purpose for which he had gone
+forward—feeling the enemy and reconnoitring the ground—retired
+with a loss of three men killed and four wounded. Many officers
+distinguished themselves in endeavouring to save the men who were
+lost, as well as in bringing in dismounted men: Commandant D’Arcy,
+Lieut.-Colonel Buller, Captain Prior, Lord William Beresford,
+Lieutenant Hayward, and also Sergeant Kerr are mentioned.
+
+On the 4th, at 6.45 A.M., the force crossed the river, leaving the
+camp garrisoned by the 1-24th Regiment, a company of Engineers, and
+casualties (about 900 Europeans, 250 natives, with one Gatling gun).
+
+Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with the light cavalry of the Flying Column,
+crossed in advance, and occupied the high ground in front without
+opposition; the main body following, marched up the broken ground
+out of the valley, and formed a hollow square, the ammunition-carts,
+etc., in the centre, and the guns in position ready to come into
+action without delay. The Flying Column formed the front half, and
+the 2nd Division the rear half of the square; front, flanks, and
+rear covered by the cavalry. In this formation the troops advanced
+to the spot selected by Colonel Buller, which was about 700 yards
+beyond the Nodwengo kraal, and about the same distance from a stream
+that crossed the road halfway to Ulundi; high ground, commanding the
+adjacent country, and with little cover beyond long grass, near it.
+
+The guns were posted in the angles and in the centre of each face of
+the square, and each face had a company of infantry in reserve.
+
+Large numbers of Zulus were now seen coming from the hills on the
+left and left front, and other masses on the right, partly concealed
+by the mist from the river, passed the Nodwengo kraal to surround the
+square.
+
+The cavalry on the right and left became engaged at 8.45 A.M., and,
+slowly retiring as the enemy advanced, passed into the square, which
+immediately opened fire.
+
+The Zulu advance was made with great determination, but their
+movements appeared to be without order. Some individuals managed to
+reach within thirty or forty yards of the rear face, where there
+was some cover, but the main advance on all sides was checked at
+some distance by the heavy artillery fire and steady volleys of the
+infantry. These were so effective that within half an hour the enemy
+wavered and gave way, when the cavalry dashed out to complete their
+discomfiture. Passing out by the rear face of the square, Colonel
+Drury-Lowe (who had been already wounded) led the 17th Lancers in the
+direction of the Nodwengo kraal, dispersing the enemy and killing
+those that could not reach the shelter of the kraal or the bush
+below; then wheeling to the right, he charged through the enemy, who
+were endeavouring to reach the mountains beyond.
+
+In this manner the whole of the level ground was cleared.
+Lieut.-Colonel Buller’s command also took up the pursuit, doing much
+execution until the enemy mounted the slopes of the hills and were
+beyond their reach. But even then a place of safety was not gained,
+for some guns were moved out from the square, and got the range of
+the enemy retreating over the hills. The brunt of this day’s work
+fell on the cavalry. Even in the pursuit the greater part of the
+Zulus turned and fought for their lives. Overtaken by a Lancer, a
+Zulu would stop just before the fatal thrust was delivered, and,
+dodging like lightning, evade the lance, sometimes seizing it and
+holding on till the Lancer was relieved by a comrade.
+
+The Irregular Horse, Mounted Infantry, and Native Horse (Captain
+T. Shepstone’s Basutu and the Natal Native Horse under Captain
+Cochrane), thoroughly searched the ground, disposing of the enemy who
+had taken refuge in dongas, bush, and long grass. 600 Zulus are said
+to have fallen before the cavalry alone—150 of them being credited to
+the Lancers.
+
+Thus was fought the battle of Ulundi.
+
+It was impossible for the ill-armed enemy to pass the belt of fire
+that encircled the square, even had they not been shaken by the
+accurate artillery fire whilst yet at a distance.
+
+The ease with which the attack was repelled may be gathered from the
+fact that the average number of rounds fired by the infantry actually
+in the ranks was less than six-and-a-half rounds per man (6·4 rounds).
+
+The troops certainly were very steady, and the firing—generally
+volley-firing by sections—was as a rule under perfect command.
+
+We have heard of an officer calmly smoking his pipe whilst in command
+of his company during the engagement.
+
+As soon as the wounded had been attended to, the force advanced to
+the banks of the stream near Ulundi, whilst the cavalry swept the
+country beyond. Ulundi was fired at 11.40 A.M., and the adjacent
+kraals shortly afterwards. At 2 P.M., the return march to the camp
+commenced. Every military kraal in the valley that had not previously
+been destroyed was in flames; and not a sign of the Zulu army was to
+be perceived.
+
+The British force engaged consisted of 4062 Europeans and 1103
+natives, with 12 guns and 2 Gatlings. The loss: killed, 2 officers
+(Captain Wyatt-Edgell, 17th Lancers, and the Hon. W. Drummond, in
+charge of the Intelligence Department), 13 non-commissioned officers
+and men, and 3 natives; wounded, 19 officers, 59 non-commissioned
+officers and men, and 7 natives.
+
+The Zulu force is estimated variously; some put it at 12,000, some at
+20,000. Being scattered over a large extent of country, and some of
+the regiments engaged having already suffered heavily, it is not easy
+to arrive at a reliable conclusion. It is probable that the correct
+number lay between 15,000 and 20,000.
+
+As regards the Zulu loss, Lord Chelmsford says: “It is impossible to
+estimate with any correctness the loss of the enemy, owing to the
+extent of country over which they attacked and retreated; but it
+could not have been less, I consider, than 1000 killed.”—(Despatch,
+4th July).
+
+Using the same reasoning on the 6th, Lord Chelmsford says: “But
+judging by the reports of those engaged, it cannot be placed at a
+less number than 1500 killed.”
+
+From the statements of prisoners it would seem that the attacking
+force was about 15,000 strong, 5000 being in reserve. At a meeting
+of the Zulu Council on the 2nd July, it appears that it was resolved
+by the King to send in the royal coronation white cattle as a
+peace-offering; but as they were being driven towards the English
+camp on the 2nd, they were turned back at Nodwengo by the Umcityu
+Regiment, who refused to let them pass, saying, as they could not
+fulfil all the demands, it was useless to give up the cattle, and
+therefore they would fight. The king was then at Ulundi; he said that
+“as the Inkandampemvu (Umcityu) Regiment would not let the cattle go
+in as a peace-offering, and as we wished to fight, the white army
+being now at his home, we could fight, but we were to fight the white
+men in the open, and attack before the Nodwengo and Ulundi kraals,
+where we were on the day of the fight.... The army is now thoroughly
+beaten, and as it was beaten in the open, it will not reassemble and
+fight again. No force is watching the lower column, and none has been
+sent there. How could there be, when all were ordered to be here
+to-day? We mustered here by the king’s orders at the beginning of
+this moon, about ten days ago. We have not been called out before.”
+
+The natives belonging to the British force were exceedingly struck at
+the idea of their being brought into the square, whilst the soldiers
+formed “a laager” of their bodies round them.
+
+The special correspondent of _The Daily News_, Mr. Archibald Forbes,
+performed a very gallant act after the battle of Ulundi. Finding
+that no despatch was being sent off by the General to announce the
+victory, he determined to take the news himself, and, “taking his
+life in his hand,” set out alone to ride right through the Zulu
+country. This he did, riding the whole night, having frequently to
+dismount and actually _feel_ his way—the tracks of the waggons on the
+upward route.
+
+Next day, after a ride of nearly a hundred miles, he reached
+Landtmann’s Drift (in fifteen hours), and was enabled to telegraph to
+Sir Garnet Wolseley the news of the victory of the 4th.
+
+A few brief remarks on the return march are all that are necessary.
+The day after the battle of Ulundi (5th July) the whole force retired
+to Entonjaneni, and remained there till the 9th, when the Flying
+Column moved on the road towards the coast to Kwamagwasa, _en route_
+to meet Sir Garnet Wolseley.
+
+On the 10th the 2nd Division marched from Entonjaneni, and arrived at
+the Upoko River on the 15th.
+
+Lord Chelmsford accompanied the Flying Column. We cannot leave
+Brigadier-General Wood’s command without a word of notice. From
+the beginning to the end of the campaign its work was done in
+a thoroughly soldierlike manner, leaving little or nothing to
+be desired. There was a thorough reciprocal confidence between
+commander and men, and a total absence of those “scares” which were
+occasionally heard of during the campaign.
+
+Where all did well, it may seem a little invidious to single
+one out for mention, but we will quote the concluding words
+of Brigadier-General Wood’s despatch of 5th July, referring to
+Lieut.-Colonel Redvers Buller, not only on account of this officer’s
+merit, but “to point the moral” as to where was the neglect which led
+primarily to the disaster to the Head-quarter Column in January:
+
+“He has never failed to cover the column with his mounted men, for
+from ten to twelve miles in front, and on the flanks.
+
+“Constitutionally fearless, he is prudent in counsel, and though
+resolute, is very careful of the lives of his troops in action. He
+possesses, in my opinion, all the attributes of a perfect leader of
+light cavalry.”
+
+It is stated (_Standard_, August 22nd, 1879) that, on reaching
+the White Umvolosi, despatches arrived from Sir Garnet Wolseley,
+requesting Lord Chelmsford to fall back and meet him at Kwamagwasa—a
+mission station, where it had at one time been proposed that the 1st
+and 2nd Divisions should effect a junction.
+
+On the 4th, Lord Chelmsford sent a despatch to Sir Garnet Wolseley,
+in which he said: “As I have fully accomplished the object for which
+I advanced, I consider I shall now be best carrying out Sir Garnet
+Wolseley’s instructions by moving at once to Entonjanini, and thence
+to Kwamagwaza.”
+
+Why the blow struck at Ulundi was not followed up it is difficult to
+say. If Lord Chelmsford’s instructions permitted him to advance and
+engage the enemy, they would be sufficiently elastic to enable him
+to follow up the victory. The king was known to have a new kraal in
+a strong position at the junction of the White and Black Umvolosi
+Rivers, within a day’s march of Ulundi; the Zulu army was thoroughly
+beaten and dispersed, and there was absolutely nothing to prevent an
+advance for the destruction of this stronghold, the moral effect of
+which on the native mind would have been very great. There was an
+ample force, willing hearts, and no lack of supplies. The solution of
+the problem must be sought in Lord Chelmsford’s words: “I have fully
+accomplished the object for which I advanced.” He withdrew at once
+from the scene of his victory, and—resigned his command.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXII.
+
+SIR GARNET WOLSELEY—CAPTURE OF CETSHWAYO.
+
+
+Sir Bartle Frere, whose continued popularity spoke somewhat of
+colonial approval of the war, had returned to the Cape in June, and
+his reception at Cape Town “capped the climax of an uninterrupted
+triumph,” according to _The Natal Mercury_. That he thought himself
+deserving of the honours due to a conqueror returning home in triumph
+we may gather from the fact that he sent no instructions to suppress
+any demonstrations of delight at his return, although at that very
+time the latest and perhaps the saddest tragedy of all the sad
+results of his policy had just been enacted, and Natal, as with one
+voice, was lamenting the Prince Imperial’s death.
+
+“So be it,” says _The Natal Witness_ of June 12th, 1879, commenting
+upon this text; “Sir Bartle Frere’s reception capped the climax of an
+uninterrupted triumph. We are quite ready to believe this, and, as
+we have said, we are glad at last to have so decided an intimation
+of what Sir Bartle Frere has intended to do. There are triumphs of
+various kinds. There is the triumph which surrounds the statesman,
+who, by gentle persuasion, by cautious reforms, by a personal
+example of uprightness and unselfishness, has reduced threatening
+elements of danger, and evolved peace and security out of storm and
+terror. There is the triumph which is his who, impressed with a deep
+sense of the value of human life, lays his head upon his pillow every
+night in the happy confidence that never through his means, either
+directly or indirectly, has a human life been needlessly sacrificed.
+There is the triumph of the philanthropist, who, feeling deep in
+his heart the claims of an aboriginal people to the consideration
+of a civilised power, has, in his dealings with that people, been
+careful rather to strain doubtful points in their favour, than to
+take advantage of their presumed simplicity. There is the triumph
+of the Christian legislator, who regards the authority entrusted
+to him as entrusted with a solemn injunction to use that authority
+in the name of his divine Master, for the purpose of spreading and
+confirming the kingdom of peace and good will. There is the triumph
+of the diplomatist, who, in respect of his dealings with state
+questions, can lay his hand upon his heart, and affirm that he never
+misled his superiors, ... never wrote a line which he did not believe
+to be true. All these triumphs we doubt not will be yet achieved by
+Sir Bartle Frere, if only the fatigue caused by his ‘troubles and
+journeying’ does not suggest an early return to Europe.”
+
+Would Sir Bartle Frere be supported by the Home Government? and would
+Lord Chelmsford be upheld by his military superiors in England?
+Such were the questions perpetually asked in the colony, to which
+there seemed no full and sufficient answer. True, both had received
+messages of sympathy and confidence; but these were sent palpably on
+the spur of the moment, and long before all the facts of the case had
+been brought to light; and, on the other hand, Sir Bartle Frere had
+received a very severe rebuke in the despatches mentioned in Chapter
+XII. Still the tide of events was permitted to flow on, and many
+doubted the reality of the condemnation.
+
+From the time of the disaster at Isandhlwana, prophecies were current
+that Lord Chelmsford would be recalled, and as misfortune pursued our
+arms the prophecies were renewed. Many were the conjectures as to who
+would be sent to replace Lord Chelmsford should he be recalled, and a
+general idea was prevalent that the sprightly Sir Garnet Wolseley and
+his “brilliant staff” would once more grace the shores of Natal. The
+despatch announcing his approach reached the colony in the middle of
+June, and the telegram to Lord Chelmsford announcing his appointment
+ran as follows: “Her Majesty’s Government have determined to send out
+Sir Garnet Wolseley as Administrator in that part of South-Eastern
+Africa in the neighbourhood of the seat of war, with plenary powers,
+both civil and military. Sir Bartle Frere, instructed accordingly by
+Colonial Office. The appointment of a senior officer is not intended
+as a censure on yourself, but you will, as in ordinary course of
+service, submit and subordinate your plans to his control. He leaves
+this country by next mail” (sent _viâ_ St. Vincent, 29th May, 1879).
+
+Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Durban on the 28th June, and proceeded
+direct to Pietermaritzburg, where he was the same day sworn in as
+Governor of Natal. Certainly Sir Garnet did not let the grass grow
+under his feet. On Sunday, the 29th, he telegraphed to Colonel Walker
+at Fort Pearson: “Send back Zulu messengers immediately to the king
+with following message from me: ‘If the king wants peace he must
+send Umnyamana, Umfanawendhela, and Vumandaba to General Crealock’s
+column, where I will depute an officer of rank to hear what the king
+has to say. I alone have power to make peace. All the other Generals
+are under my orders.’ Explain to the messengers who I am. They are to
+tell the king, and remind him that I was here as Governor before, and
+had many communications with him then.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 149).
+
+The message from Cetshwayo was delivered by two Zulu messengers at
+the Lower Tugela, on June 25th, to Mr. Fynney, Administrator and
+Border Agent.
+
+“We are sent by the king straight to you. We were ordered not to go
+to the troop at the Umlatazi, as other messengers (Sintwangu) will
+go there.... The king asks you to speak to the great white Chief
+with the Upper Column, and ask to stay the advance of the troops
+till he (the king) can hear plainly what he has done, what great sin
+he has committed. If he ever killed a white man or white woman, or
+ever took cattle from a white man before the war? Did he ever walk
+over the words spoken at the Umlambongwenya Kraal by Somtseu? (Sir
+T. Shepstone). The king wished us to say if he is to be destroyed
+he could die happy if he knew first really what wrong he had done.
+The king begs you will speak to the great white Chief with the Upper
+Column to stay a further advance till chosen representatives from
+both sides can meet and hear really the cause of the war, and what
+wrong he has done. The king does not ask for favour if it is proved
+he has been wrong. He wants to hear, and he wishes the troops not to
+advance till he can hear; for if they do he cannot help fighting,
+as there will be nothing left but to try and push aside a tree if
+falling upon him.”
+
+“This is our message from the king to you, and he ordered us to tell
+you that it is from himself; even the indunas do not know he has sent
+it” (_ibid._ p. 154).
+
+On the same day (29th) Sir Garnet sent the following order to Captain
+McLeod: “Make arrangements at once, with Swazis, for massing north
+of Pongolo River, with view to invading Zululand. Spread abroad news
+that the invasion will take place immediately, but do not let them
+cross river without my orders. When they are ready to cross let me
+know, and I will send you further instructions. Impress urgently upon
+them that women and children must not be murdered, but promise them
+all cattle they take. This promise to be made as public as possible.
+I am now High Commissioner, with full powers to decide all terms of
+peace. All reports must be sent to me, care of General Clifford,
+’Maritzburg” (_ibid._ p. 150).
+
+The object of this message was “to establish a standing menace, and
+to bring formidable pressure to bear in that quarter upon the Zulus.”
+
+The barbarity of the Swazis in warfare, and the keen delight
+with which they would have found themselves let loose upon their
+hereditary enemies the Zulus, whose army was either scattered or
+destroyed, was a well-known fact, and many wondered that such a
+course should be proposed.
+
+Captain McLeod, a hardy soldier and brave man, had been for many
+months in about as unenviable a position as can well be imagined—in
+an unsettled border district in war time, threatened both by Boers
+and Zulus. He had been posted at Derby, to guide and control the
+movements of our ally the Swazi king, who, it was imagined, would be
+stanch to us or not, according to the fortunes of the Zulu war.
+
+Captain McLeod knew the Swazis well, and how little chance there
+would be of keeping them under control if once let loose upon the
+helpless Zulu people; he therefore begged that they might be used
+only as a last resource.
+
+With the view of still further spreading alarm through the Zulu
+country, Sir Garnet sent a message to the Amatongas that he might
+“possibly ascend the Maputa River with a force and use their
+territory as a base of operations against the Zulus from the north”
+(_ibid._ p. 149).
+
+On the 30th, after a long conference with General Clifford and
+Commissary-General Strickland, Sir Garnet Wolseley had an interview
+with about seventy Natal native chiefs, who had been assembled at
+his request, and addressed them, through an interpreter, to the
+effect that the great English Queen had sent him to carry on the
+war against Cetshwayo, and to thank them for what they had already
+done. That the chiefs need have no fear but that the Queen would
+send as many armies as are necessary, if the troops sent were not
+sufficient. “They may depend upon it, and the past history of our
+nation is a guarantee thereof, that when we give a promise we will
+perform it. Our war is not against the Zulu people, but against
+Ketshwayo, who has broken all his promises. We have no wish to rob
+the Zulu people of their property or their land; but tell the chiefs
+this, that I say this war is going to be finished by us, and finished
+in a satisfactory manner. The Queen is most anxious that the war in
+Natal should be finished.” Then (as there was a scarcity of grass for
+draught-oxen) Sir Garnet requested the chiefs to furnish a certain
+number (2000) of their young men to carry provisions for the troops;
+the men to carry their arms whilst so employed, and to be paid and
+fed by him.
+
+Once more, then, we hear the words: “_Our war is not against the Zulu
+people!_”
+
+These “carriers” were taken from the Tugela Valley, which had lately
+suffered from the Zulu raid, and where many of the men had belonged
+to the native levies raised for the defence of the border; they
+naturally did not appreciate an employment which removed them from
+the protection of their families, and which was at variance with
+their customs[175] and prejudices.
+
+There was not much work for these “carriers” after all; they were
+assembled at the Lower Tugela, and marched up to Fort Chelmsford,
+each man with a fifty-pound mealie-bag on his head.[176] Their
+commander, Major Schwabe, left the loads there, and took the men on
+to Port Durnford, where they were employed as required. Having, after
+some time, received their pay, the “carriers” quietly walked off to
+their homes.
+
+The Commander-in-Chief remained but two days in Pietermaritzburg,
+returning to Durban on the 1st of July. The same evening he embarked
+on board H.M.S. _Shah_, intending to land at Port Durnford, and
+thus reach the scene of action. For once in his life Sir Garnet’s
+good fortune deserted him; the heavy surf on the beach prevented
+his landing, and the _Shah_ brought him back to Durban. Here he
+received the news of the battle of Ulundi, telegraphed to him by Mr.
+Archibald Forbes.
+
+No one quite knew what Lord Chelmsford was about, but everyone
+understood that he would try and end the war before he was
+superseded; and the general feeling in the colony was certainly one
+of hope that “poor Lord Chelmsford” might get a chance, win a battle,
+and have his bonfire in the enemy’s city of straw. Some few, indeed,
+argued that as Lord Chelmsford could not possibly, in the time left
+him, settle the Zulu question by the sword, it might occur to him
+at last to pay some attention to the hard-pressed Zulu monarch’s
+repeated messages imploring peace, and propose some conditions
+possible for Cetshwayo to accept and fulfil. Without further
+bloodshed an honourable peace might thus have been concluded before
+Sir Garnet Wolseley could step upon the scene.
+
+We left the 1st Division at the Umlalazi River, close to the
+landing-place, Port Durnford. There the force remained, General
+Crealock occupied in receiving the submission of the neighbouring
+Zulus, who were flocking in from every direction.
+
+But whilst Lord Chelmsford, on his approach to Ulundi, was inquiring,
+“Where is Crealock?” Crealock was quietly established near the coast,
+his military activity being displayed in the burning of Empangeni
+and other kraals north of the Umlatuzi River. As the Zulus all round
+were coming in, and no “impi” was even heard of, the object of this
+exhibition of force seems a little doubtful. As was remarked by
+_The Cape Times_: “Why the British soldier was ordered to destroy
+the shelter, and, with the shelter, the store of grain food of some
+thousands of poor women and children whose husbands and fathers
+were making their submission, we can no more understand than we can
+comprehend the strategy by which a large British force was held back
+for months at the edge of the enemy’s country, while commissariat
+supplies were accumulating sufficient to support a long campaign,
+the whole work before them being to march a hundred miles, and with
+one fight close up the war. If they were beaten they could fall back
+on the base; but with caution and generalship defeat was out of the
+question.” However, Major-General Crealock must have the credit of
+quieting the eastern portion of Zululand before the termination of
+the war. From his despatches of the 5th July we gather that the
+“district people are all wanting to come in,” that he was “sending
+back the people to their districts; difficulty of feeding them would
+be great.” His division paraded under arms to receive the “official
+submission” of “Mabilwana, Manyingo, and other chiefs,” who, with
+some 250 men, double that number of women and children, and their
+cattle, etc., had come in—these people belonging to the coast
+district, but were not strictly speaking warriors, or necessarily
+belonging to the Zulu army; nor could their submission be looked upon
+as any desertion of their king by the fighting-men of the nation.
+They were told that the General accepted their submission, and should
+look to them in future to keep peace in that district. If any Zulus
+were found in arms, their chief or headman would suffer; but, if they
+behaved themselves well, he would give them back their cattle and
+his protection. The men then received passes (or tickets) and were
+permitted to return to their districts.[177]
+
+Sir Garnet Wolseley crossed the Tugela with his staff and escort on
+July 6th, and proceeded to the head-quarters of the 1st Division,
+near Port Durnford, which he reached on the 7th. He at once set
+to work “to reduce the excessive rate of expenditure which has so
+far been maintained in connection with this war,” and “arranged
+with the Commodore to embark the Naval Brigade at the earliest
+opportunity,” and also “dispensed with the services of some of the
+colonial troops.” Reinforcements of all kinds were stopped, including
+a fine battalion of Marine Infantry and strong detachment of Marine
+Artillery, just arrived at the Cape in H.M.S. _Jumna_.
+
+On July 10th, Sir Garnet also put on one side “the plan of a Swazi
+invasion.” (P. P. [C. 2454] p. 163.) All the chiefs up to St. Lucia
+Bay tendered their submission, and sent in their arms.
+
+Sir Garnet Wolseley and Lord Chelmsford met at St. Paul’s on the
+15th July, the latter arriving with Brigadier-General Wood’s Flying
+Column. This Sir Garnet inspected on the following day, taking the
+opportunity of decorating Major Chard, R.E., with the Victoria Cross,
+awarded him for his gallantry at Rorke’s Drift.
+
+Lord Chelmsford left St. Paul’s on the 17th, on his way home. His
+“brilliant victory” had turned the tide of popular favour somewhat in
+his direction, and he found that (as he said) “nothing succeeds like
+success.”
+
+In Durban he was accorded a reception which must have been highly
+gratifying to his feelings. One of his last remarks in Natal,
+in reply to a speech made as he was about to embark, was to the
+following effect: “I think I may say confidently that we have now
+seen the beginning of the end of this campaign, and any success which
+has attended my efforts, I feel, is due to the prayers of the people,
+and the kindly ordinations of Divine Providence; for I am one of
+those who believe firmly and implicitly in the efficacy of prayer and
+in the intervention of Providence.”
+
+In this comfortable frame of mind Lord Chelmsford passes from the
+scene.
+
+Sir Garnet Wolseley completed the chain of forts across Zululand,
+commencing with St. Paul’s, an English mission station on the coast
+road a little north of where it crosses the Umlatusi. Fifteen miles
+west of this is Kwamagwasa. Twenty miles a little south of west lies
+Fort Evelyn, on the road from Rorke’s Drift to Ulundi. Fort Marshall
+about twenty miles west-south-west of Fort Evelyn, Fort Newdigate,
+twelve miles north-west of Fort Evelyn, and a fort on Itelezi Hill
+completes the chain to the Blood River. Some of these forts were
+constructed on the upward march of the 2nd Division and Flying
+Column, to keep open their communications. In addition to these,
+Fort Cambridge was built near where the road from Conference Hill
+crosses the White Umvolosi; and a little later an entrenched post
+(Fort George) was thrown up near Enhlongana mission station, thus
+thoroughly, by these detached posts, commanding the country.
+
+Patrols were pushed out in various directions, by one of which
+the two guns lost at Isandhlwana were found between Ulundi and
+Maizekanye. They had not been spiked, but the Zulus had screwed
+rifle-nipples into the vents, and had also apparently tried to load
+the guns by ramming home shells, but without cartridges.
+
+The Cavalry Brigade was broken up, and a fresh disposition of the
+troops made. Sir Garnet visited various posts, interviewing the Zulu
+chiefs who had surrendered themselves. Some of the most important,
+however, of those who came in, and were supposed to have submitted
+and deserted their king, had, in point of fact, no such intention,
+appearing merely to make their often and vainly repeated attempt at
+procuring “terms” for Cetshwayo and themselves. It had always been
+prophesied that the Zulu nation would desert their king. Before the
+war began, some of those who professed to understand the people best,
+declared that they would be thankful to throw off the yoke of one
+whom, it was alleged, they regarded with fear and hatred, and would
+side with the English as soon as the latter crossed their border.
+
+The fallacy of this idea was discovered to our cost.
+
+It was then asserted that the Zulu army had given a temporary
+strength to the authority of their king, which would last until we
+had beaten his troops and proved our superiority, and this assertion
+was used by those who insisted that no peace must be made, however
+earnestly desired by the Zulus, until we had beaten them and shown
+them that we were their masters.
+
+After Ulundi, it was argued that the people would be glad to procure
+peace by giving up their king, whose unconditional submission, or
+capture, was announced by us to be the only possible conclusion to
+the war.
+
+The Zulus had ceased to struggle with their powerful conquerors, and
+it now only remained to find Cetshwayo, who was said to be north
+of the Black Umvolosi River, with a very small following. A flying
+column, under Lieut.-Colonel Baker Russell, was sent out from Fort
+Newdigate early in August, but his patrols were not successful.
+
+On August 14th, a cavalry force under Major Barrow, with Lord
+Gifford, started from Ulundi to try and find Cetshwayo, who had
+hitherto eluded all attempts to capture him. Day after day it was
+reported that the pursuers were close upon the fugitive: they had
+come to a kraal where he had slept the previous night, they reached
+another where he had been that very morning, and then they lost “the
+scent,” and for some time could trace him no farther. They tried in
+vain to persuade his people to betray him, but this “hated tyrant,”
+although beaten and powerless, flying through the land now in the
+possession of his conquerors, had still such a hold over the loyalty
+and affection of his people, that they were true to him in his
+adversity, and refused to give him up or to set his enemies on his
+track.
+
+Severe measures were taken to procure by force the information which
+could not otherwise be obtained. Orders were given to one party of
+the pursuers that at each kraal they reached, if the inhabitants
+refused to speak, so many huts should be burnt, so many principal men
+and women taken prisoners, and all cattle confiscated. Many kraals
+were thus treated, and so many prisoners collected in this manner,
+that the number to be taken at each kraal had to be reduced from
+eight to four, then to two, and at last to one of each sex; thus
+proving how steadfast were the people generally in their loyalty to
+their king. On approaching some of these kraals, the headmen came out
+and offered the passes or papers promising protection, given them
+on surrendering their arms; but the unhappy people received another
+lesson on the text, “When we give a promise we will perform it,”
+and were told that their papers were worthless now; they must tell
+where the king was, or suffer like the rest. One of the officers
+concerned in carrying out these orders, exclaimed at the time with
+natural indignation: “I don’t care what may be said of the necessity
+of catching Cetshwayo; necessary or not, we are committing a crime in
+what we are doing now!”
+
+These measures proving useless, five prisoners were flogged to make
+them speak—yet they held their peace. An interpreter, who accompanied
+Major Barrow’s party, writes: “I had been a long time in Zululand. I
+knew the people and their habits, and although I believed they would
+be true to their king, I never expected such devotion. Nothing would
+move them. Neither the loss of their cattle, the fear of death, or
+the offering of large bribes, would make them false to their king.”
+
+For many days this work of trying to persuade or force the people
+to betray their king was continued, and, at last a woman was
+frightened into giving a clue, which resulted in taking prisoners
+three brothers, at whose kraal the king had slept the night before.
+“They were questioned,” says the interpreter, “but denied in the most
+solemn way that they knew anything about the king. We threatened to
+shoot them, but they said: ‘If you kill us we shall die innocently.’
+This was about nine o’clock at night, a beautiful moonlight night,
+and the picture was rather an effective one. There were all our men
+sitting round at their fireplaces, our select tribunal facing the
+three men, who were calm and collected, whilst we, as a sort of
+inquisition, were trying to force them to divulge their secret. As
+a last resource we took one man and led him away blindfolded behind
+a bush, and then a rifle was fired off to make believe that he was
+shot. We then separated and blindfolded the remaining two, and said
+to one of them: ‘You saw your brother blindfolded and led away;
+we have shot him. Now we shall shoot you. You had better tell the
+truth.’ After a good deal of coaxing (?) one told us where the king
+had slept the night before, and which was about fifteen miles away,
+and also where he had seen him that very morning ... it was now
+eleven o’clock. Lord Gifford gave orders for our party to saddle up,
+which was smartly done, and we started off with the two brothers as
+guides. We left the one brother behind so as to keep on the screw, to
+make the two believe he had been shot. They took us over as ugly a
+piece of country as ever horse crossed, and at daybreak we surrounded
+the kraal. But disappointment was again in store for us, for our bird
+had flown about twelve hours previously.”
+
+The direction he had taken being pointed out, the party followed
+until they got within four or five miles of a kraal, where the king
+had halted for the day. Lord Gifford sent off a note addressed to
+Captain Maurice, saying he was on the track and hoped for speedy
+capture; and, finding the kraal could not be approached without his
+being seen, seems to have made up his mind to wait till nightfall. It
+is perhaps fortunate that this arrangement was not carried out, as,
+in the darkness and hurry of a night attack, it is possible that we
+might have had the additional wrong laid upon us of having shot the
+Zulu king.
+
+Amongst other patrols sent out to look for Cetshwayo was one under
+Major Marter, King’s Dragoon Guards, consisting of one squadron
+Dragoons, ten men Mounted Infantry and Lonsdale’s Horse, and one
+company Natal Native Contingent, their orders being to get on the
+king’s track and capture him, if possible, and to reconnoitre the
+Ngome Forest, and report if it could be traversed.
+
+This force started on the 27th August, Major Marter sending two
+natives on in the direction of the Ngome to impress upon the people
+that until the king was captured they could not have rest, as troops
+would be constantly on the move amongst them, and require supplies,
+etc., and to suggest it would be to their advantage to give him some
+hint or sign about the king. He had found the natives friendly,
+but they said frankly that if they knew the king to be close by
+they would not tell him; he, therefore, remembering the language of
+symbols was pleasant to the native mind, endeavoured, by indirect
+means, to obtain the information he sought. Having got over about
+twenty-four miles of rough country, the little column halted on
+the summit of the Inenge Mountain, and, starting at daylight next
+morning, had crossed the Ibuluwane River about ten o’clock, when
+a Zulu came from the hill in front, sent by a headman to whom
+the scouts had been, and began to talk on indifferent subjects,
+not appearing to wish to speak about the king. After some time
+he casually remarked: “I have heard the wind blow from this side
+to-day,” pointing to the Ngome Forest, “but you should take that road
+until you come to Nisaka’s kraal,” showing a track leading upwards
+and along the side of the range.
+
+About half an hour afterwards a native brought a note addressed to
+Captain Maurice. As this officer was out in another direction on
+the same service, Major Marter opened and read it. It was from Lord
+Gifford, who said he was on the track again and hoped for a speedy
+capture of the king, but gave no information as to where either the
+king or Lord Gifford were. Sending the man on in Captain Maurice’s
+direction, Major Marter proceeded to Nisaka’s kraal, some distance
+up the mountain. After some talk a suggestion of guides was made to
+Nisaka, who said they had better go to his brother’s kraal on top of
+the mountain, and called two men to go as guides. On reaching this
+kraal the guides made signs for the party to halt where trees hid
+them from being seen from below, and then took Major Marter on to the
+edge of the precipice, crawling along on hands and knees; they then
+stopped, and told him to go to a bush a little farther on and look
+down. He did so, and saw a kraal in an open space about 2000 feet
+below, in a basin, three sides of which were precipitous and covered
+with dense forest. He considered it would be useless to approach the
+kraal from the open side, as one minute’s warning would enable the
+king to escape to the nearest point of the forest; and therefore
+decided to venture down the side of the mountain under cover of the
+forest, feeling that the importance of the capture would warrant the
+risk.
+
+Having rejoined his men, Major Marter ordered the natives to take off
+their uniform, and, with their arms and ammunition only, pass down
+the precipitous mountain to the lower edge of the forest nearest to
+the kraal, and remain concealed till the cavalry were seen coming
+from the forest on the other side; they were then to rush out towards
+the open side of the kraal and surround it. The cavalry left led
+horses, pack-animals, and every article which could make a noise
+or impede their progress, and followed Major Marter, leading their
+horses down the descent in single file. They left the upper part
+of the mountain at 1.45 P.M., and, after a scramble over rocks and
+watercourses, floundering in bogs, and hampered everywhere by trees
+and gigantic creepers, reached the foot about three o’clock, having
+lost two horses killed in the descent, and one man having his arm
+badly hurt. In a little dell they mounted, and at a gallop dashed
+out—one troop to the right, one to the left, the irregulars straight
+to the front—over boulders, through high grass and every impediment,
+up to the kraal; the natives reaching it at the same moment.
+
+Seeing that the men in the kraal were armed with guns as well as
+assegais, Major Marter desired his interpreter to call out that if
+any resistance were offered he would shoot down every one and burn
+the kraal; and then dismounting, with a few of his men, he entered
+the enclosure, which was strongly stockaded. A chief—Umkosana—met
+him, and was asked where the king was; after some delay, seeing it
+was a hopeless case, he pointed out a hut on the farther side of
+the enclosure. Major Marter called on the king to come out, but he
+insisted the officer should go in to him. A threat of setting fire to
+the hut was then made, when the king asked the rank of the officer,
+and, after some further parley, came out and stood erect and quite
+the king, looking at Major Marter, saying: “You would not have taken
+me, but I never thought troops could come down the mountain through
+the forest.”
+
+Besides the Chief Umkosana, there were with Cetshwayo seven men and a
+lad, five women and a girl, of his personal attendants.
+
+There were twenty guns in the kraal, four of them rifles that had
+belonged to the 24th Regiment, much ammunition, some belts of the
+24th, and many assegais, one of which—the king’s—was sent by Sir
+Garnet Wolseley to the Queen.
+
+Taking the most open line of country, the party set out for Ulundi,
+Major Marter taking personal charge of the king, who was in good
+health, and showing no signs of over-fatigue.
+
+On the evening of the second day three men and a woman sprang
+suddenly into the thick bush through which they were passing and
+tried to escape; but two of the men were shot. They had been
+repeatedly warned that anyone trying to escape would be shot.
+
+On the morning of the 31st August, Major Marter safely reached the
+camp at Ulundi with Cetshwayo; who is described by his captor as “a
+noble specimen of a man, without any bad expression, and the king all
+over in appearance and manner.”
+
+Sir Garnet Wolseley did not receive the fallen king himself, or
+accord him any of the signs of respect to which he was entitled, and
+which at least generosity demanded. That this was deeply felt is
+apparent from the words of an eye-witness, the interpreter attached
+to Major Barrow’s force. “Cetywayo,” he says, “who appreciates nicely
+the courtesies due to rank—as those who knew him tell me—felt this
+keenly. Sir Garnet Wolseley did not see him at all, and Mr. John
+Shepstone only had an interview with him to tell him that he would
+leave under the charge of Major Poole, R.A., for—no one knew where.
+The instructions to the Major were, on leaving Ulundi, to proceed to
+Pietermaritzburg _viâ_ Rorke’s Drift, but the camp had not been left
+many miles behind before a messenger to the Major from the General
+gave Port Durnford as the port of embarkation.
+
+“Cetshwayo spent less than three hours amidst the ruins of Ulundi,
+and when he left them he was not aware of his destination. His hope
+was that he was going to Pietermaritzburg.... This he believed was
+where he was going until he came to Kwamagwasa, and he said, ‘This
+is not the way to the Tugela.’ He grew moody after this, and used to
+moan, ‘It was better to be killed than sent over the sea.’”
+
+The party reached Port Durnford on the 4th September, and was
+immediately embarked for Cape Town. There the king met with a fitting
+reception, and was conveyed to the castle, where he remained under
+strict surveillance in the custody of Colonel Hassard, C.B., R.E.,
+Commandant at Cape Town.
+
+One peculiarity regarding the treatment of Cetshwayo may be
+illustrated by the following personal anecdote:
+
+A son and daughter of the Bishop of Natal, on their way to England,
+called at Cape Town on board a steamer at the time of the king’s
+arrival. They asked permission to see him, feeling that if anything
+could be a solace to the captive it would be an interview with
+members of a family which he knew had kindly feelings towards
+him.[178] This request was refused by Sir Bertie Frere, who regretted
+that he could not “at present give anyone permission to visit
+Cetewayo,” and said that “all intercourse with him must be regulated
+by the orders of the General Commanding H. M. Forces in the Field,
+to whom all applications to communicate with the prisoner should be
+referred.” After this communication, it was rather surprising to find
+that several of the passengers on board the mail-steamer, leaving
+the Cape the next day, had not only seen the king, but had found no
+difficulty in so doing.[179]
+
+
+
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+
+The fall of Ulundi was looked upon by some as the finishing touch
+to the Zulu power and the end of the war, while others considered
+peace ensured only and completely by the capture of the king. Much,
+however, remained to be done before Natal could be thought of as at
+peace with her neighbours and herself, and what has been commonly
+called the “Settlement of Zululand,” was a task which required the
+gravest consideration and the most careful handling.
+
+Sir Garnet Wolseley’s first act in this direction was to call
+together as many of the principal Zulu chiefs and officials as could
+be found, and to address them upon the situation. This meeting took
+place at Ulundi on the 1st of September, the day after the captive
+king’s departure for Port Durnford. About 200 Zulus, including two of
+Cetshwayo’s brothers, and his prime minister Mnyamana, had responded
+to the summons; and seating themselves in rows four deep, with the
+principal chiefs in front, a few paces from the flagstaff at Sir G.
+Wolseley’s tent, waited in perfect silence. When Sir Garnet, with his
+staff, at last appeared, he addressed the assembled chiefs through
+Mr. John Shepstone, who accompanied him as interpreter. He informed
+them that it was six years that very day since Cetshwayo was crowned
+king of the Zulus, and that he was now carried away never to return.
+This, he told them, was in consequence of his having broken his
+coronation promises, and having failed to make and keep such laws
+amongst his people as the Queen of England could approve, therefore
+his kingdom was taken from him; and would now be divided amongst a
+number of chiefs, who would be expected to rule with justice. In
+future no life was to be taken without trial, and trivial offences
+were to be punished by fines; no standing army would be allowed, nor
+the possession of guns and ammunition by any Zulu; nor would any
+stores be permitted to be landed on the Zulu coast, in case, under
+the guise of merchandise, arms should be brought into the country.
+The young men would be allowed to marry when and whom they pleased,
+provided they had sufficient for the support of a wife, and could
+obtain the consent of the girl’s parents, and “smelling out” for
+witchcraft was to be put down. Nevertheless, the Queen had no wish to
+force our laws and customs upon them. By their own rules of war and
+conquest, Zululand now belonged to her; but she had already enough
+land in Africa, and had therefore no intention of depriving the Zulus
+of theirs. Finally, the missionaries were not to be forced upon them,
+and the Zulus were even forbidden to encourage their settling amongst
+them.
+
+To secure the fulfilment of all these commands, Sir G. Wolseley told
+the chiefs that he intended to leave an English officer as resident,
+to be the eyes and ears of England, to watch over the people, and
+to see the laws observed and that the chiefs ruled with justice and
+equity. With what machinery the officer in question was to perform
+so wide a task does not appear. Whether his position is to be a real
+one, requiring several British regiments to support it, or whether it
+is to be a mere farce, a fine-sounding pretence, remains yet to be
+proved.
+
+At the conclusion of the General’s discourse he produced a document,
+the purport of which, he said, he had now told them, and which was to
+be signed by all the chiefs whom he had chosen as rulers of the land,
+to each of whom a duplicate copy would be given, while he retained a
+similar one himself.
+
+The first to sign his name was Mr. John Dunn, whose chieftainship
+was by far the largest; and after him the Zulu chiefs touched the
+pen while Mr. Shepstone made their crosses for them, in place of the
+signature which they could not form.
+
+For once in the history of Natal, all classes, from whatever widely
+differing motives, were united in condemning the arrangement.
+
+“The so-called settlement of Zululand,” says _The Cape Times_, on
+September 16th, “is regarded with anything but satisfaction in Natal,
+if we may accept the press of that colony as representative of public
+opinion. Sir Garnet Wolseley was probably acting under instructions
+in making peace on a barbarian basis; such a peace, however, has no
+guarantee for continuance, but on the contrary an inherent weakness,
+forbidding any hope of permanence. A savage nation is now divided
+into a number of savage nations, each leaning to the other with all
+the force of common blood and common traditions, while to check
+the impulses of that force there is absolutely nothing beyond the
+influence of two or three British residents, unsupported by any armed
+retinue, and clothed with no more than a shadow of authority. And
+as the embodiment of British civilisation, and as Her Majesty the
+Queen’s own representative in Zululand, is placed Mr. John Dunn....
+But whatever John Dunn’s merits may be, his appointment as Chief
+Resident in Zululand is a shock to civilisation. His ways are Zulu
+ways; his associations, Zulu associations; his very habits of thought
+imbued with the Zulu character. A white man who for twenty years or
+more has lived the Zulu life, wedded Zulu wives, and chosen their
+society in preference to that of such women as a white man should
+love and honour, is not the man to represent the Queen of England
+in a nation of savages. The settlement of Zululand means simply
+the appointment of a dozen Cetywayos, with a white man to look
+after them, who is a Cetywayo in all but colour. And now Sir Garnet
+Wolseley skips off in his light and airy fashion to the Transvaal,
+flattering himself that he has made things pleasant in Zululand. It
+is a miserable delusion....”
+
+The “engagements” into which the Zulu chiefs entered are:
+
+“1. I will observe and respect whatever boundaries shall be assigned
+to my territory by the British Government through the Resident of the
+division in which my territory is situated.
+
+“2. I will not permit the existence of the Zulu military system, or
+the existence of any military system of organisation whatever, in my
+territory, and I will proclaim and make it a rule that all men shall
+be allowed to marry when they choose and as they choose, according
+to the good ancient customs of my people, known and followed in the
+days preceding the establishment by Chaka of the system known as the
+military system; and I will allow and encourage all men living within
+my territory to go and come freely for peaceful purposes, and to work
+in Natal and the Transvaal and elsewhere for themselves or for hire.
+
+“3. I will not import or allow to be imported into my territory by
+any person, upon any pretext or for any object whatever, any arms
+or ammunition from any part whatsoever, or any goods or merchandise
+by the sea-coast of Zululand, without the express sanction of the
+Resident of the division in which my territory is situated; and I
+will not encourage or promote, or take part in, or countenance in any
+way whatever, the importation in any other part of Zululand of arms
+or ammunition from any part whatever, or goods or merchandise by the
+sea-coast of Zululand, without such sanction, and I will confiscate
+and hand over to the Natal Government all arms and ammunition, and
+goods and merchandise, so imported into my territory, and I will
+punish by fine or by other sufficient punishment any person guilty
+of or concerned in any such unsanctioned importation, and any person
+found possessing arms or ammunition, or goods or merchandise,
+knowingly obtained thereby.
+
+“4. I will not allow the life of any of my people to be taken for
+any cause, except after sentence passed in a council of the chief men
+of my territory, and after fair and impartial trial in my presence
+and after the hearing of witnesses; and I will not tolerate the
+employment of witch-doctors, or the practice known as smelling-out,
+or any practices of witchcraft.
+
+“5. The surrender of persons fugitive in my territory from justice,
+when demanded by the government of any British colony, territory, or
+province, in the interests of justice, shall be readily and promptly
+made to such government; and the escape into my territory of persons
+accused or convicted of offences against British laws shall be
+prevented by all possible means, and every exertion shall be made to
+seize and deliver up such persons to British authority.
+
+“6. I will not make war upon any chief or chiefs, or people, without
+the sanction of the British Government, through the Resident of the
+division in which my territory is situated.
+
+“7. The succession to the chieftainship of my territory shall be
+according to the ancient laws and customs of my people, and the
+nomination of each successor shall be subject to the approval of the
+British Government.
+
+“8. I will not sell, or in any way alienate, or permit, or
+countenance any sale or alienation of any part of the land in my
+territory.
+
+“9. I will permit all people residing in my territory to there
+remain, upon the condition that they recognise my authority as chief,
+and any persons not wishing to recognise my authority and desiring
+to quit my territory I will permit to quit and to pass unmolested
+elsewhere.
+
+“10. In all cases of dispute in which British subjects are involved
+I will appeal to and abide by the decision of the British Resident
+of the division in which my territory is situated. In all cases when
+accusations of offence or crime committed in my territory are brought
+against British subjects, or against my people in relation to British
+subjects, I will hold no trial and pass no sentence except with the
+approval of such British Resident.
+
+“11. In all matters not included within these terms, conditions, and
+limitations, and in all cases provided for herein, and in all cases
+when there may be doubt or uncertainty as to the laws, rules, or
+stipulations applicable to matters to be dealt with, I will govern,
+order, or decide in accordance with the ancient laws and usage of my
+people.”
+
+The following letter, addressed to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone,
+and published in _The Guardian_ of December 10th, 1879, by the Dean
+of ’Maritzburg, contains such valuable and important matter that we
+quote it verbatim:
+
+                           THE DEANERY, ’MARITZBURG, NATAL,
+                                             _September 27th, 1879_.
+
+  SIR,—Though I have not the honour of being known to you, yet,
+  as the affairs of South Africa must necessarily engage the
+  attention of Parliament when it next meets, I venture to hope
+  you will not consider it an intrusion if I lay before you
+  some of the conclusions I have arrived at after thirty years’
+  residence as a clergyman in Natal. I do so as I know from
+  experience how extremely difficult it is for those who have
+  passed their lives in the midst of a highly organised society,
+  to realise the conditions of a colony, and especially of one
+  which is brought into contact with the undeveloped races of South
+  Africa. The first question that presents itself is, What is
+  the meaning of the apparent antagonism of the native races, at
+  the present time, to the white man? I attribute it immediately
+  to the natives suddenly and unexpectedly finding themselves in
+  the possession of firearms. When the Diamond Fields were first
+  opened out, no restrictions were placed on the gun-trade by the
+  Cape Government, and so soon as this became known the natives
+  flocked there in thousands from all parts of South Africa,
+  hiring themselves out to work, and stipulating to be paid in
+  rifles. Young men everywhere will arm themselves if they can,
+  and especially in a country in which there is abundant room for
+  hunting, and still more so when the young men are savages, and
+  know of no distinction except that which comes from exhibiting
+  prowess in war. I do not myself think they were influenced by
+  any feelings of hatred to the white man, or that there existed
+  any deep-seated conspiracy amongst the chiefs or old men. But
+  the young men suddenly discovered they could obtain firearms, so
+  got them; and having got them, they then desired to use them.
+  Everywhere they were armed, and so everywhere they began to
+  talk of fighting; the leaven had been put in and the whole lump
+  worked. The war which arose is now over, and the Cape Government
+  is engaged in steadily disarming the natives under its rule;
+  its loyal subjects, the Fingoes and the Basutos, as well as the
+  recently conquered tribes. Sir Garnet Wolseley told the Zulus
+  also to bring in their guns; but they have treated his order with
+  contempt, and he has made no attempt to enforce it; the Zulus
+  themselves, I am afraid, will soon adduce this as evidence that
+  they were not beaten. I may say, also, the Natal Governor always
+  placed restrictions on the natives possessing firearms, and, so
+  far as he could, enforced those restrictions on his own natives
+  returning from the Diamond Fields, and they have proved perfectly
+  loyal. Whilst at the time I deprecated the reckless trade allowed
+  by the Cape Government, still it seems to me rather hard, after
+  having allowed the natives to purchase guns, to set to work to
+  disarm them. The wisest course I consider would be to impose a
+  tax on the possession of firearms generally, granting privileges
+  to members of volunteer corps, etc. In that way, without drawing
+  invidious distinctions between white and coloured, our own young
+  men would be exempted from paying by serving as volunteers; and
+  if the tax were a heavy one the natives would be deterred from
+  keeping guns, and, further, the Government would know exactly to
+  what extent they were armed.
+
+  To leave, however, the native races in general, and to confine
+  ourselves to the Zulus. They never went to war with us, but
+  we with them; they have always been excellent neighbours; for
+  thirty years they have never been accused of stealing a sheep,
+  or an ox, or a horse from the Natal side. Natal had no quarrel
+  with them nor Cetywayo with us; it has been our misfortune that
+  it has been found convenient to carry on the war from Natal;
+  but Sir H. Bulwer, our Governor, has been true to the colony
+  in insisting that it was no war of ours. If there was any
+  justification of the war, it must be sought in the interests of
+  Transvaal, and then it can only be accepted as a judgment. The
+  Crown had not a shadow of right to annex the Transvaal. True,
+  they were not governing themselves very well in that State;
+  neither, perhaps, is Germany, but we do not annex Germany. We
+  did take over the Transvaal, however, in direct violation of
+  engagements which had been entered into with the Dutch Boers.
+  Shepstone, in his proclamation, was obliged to say that we must
+  read between the lines of that engagement—_i.e._ the promises
+  of the British Government were worth nothing. The simple fact
+  was that the Cape and Transvaal merchants had been overtrading
+  in that republic; it was bankrupt, so many of them were on the
+  brink of insolvency. I cannot say more without mentioning names,
+  but there was no difficulty in seeing what influences were
+  brought to bear on Lord Carnarvon. The Republic was annexed;
+  farms were accepted at a nominal price in payment of debts, and
+  resold again in London, say at sixpence per acre, which amply
+  repaid the merchant, who thus saved himself, whilst the Boers
+  were left without their independence, and poorer than ever. Had
+  we stayed our hand, finding themselves hopelessly bankrupt, in
+  a few months they might probably have sought our assistance,
+  and then we could have annexed them without their having a
+  grievance; as it is they cannot forget it. I am sorry for them,
+  for they are a simple people. Shepstone went up as Governor, and
+  Cetywayo at once asked to have his old disputes with the Boers
+  arranged—in former days both he and his father, whenever they had
+  had any difference with the Transvaal, always sent messengers
+  in to the Natal Government to advise with it—and Shepstone,
+  the Secretary for Natal Affairs, according to his wont, always
+  temporised, admitting in a half-and-half way that they were
+  right, but advising patience. When, however, he found himself
+  at the Transvaal he suddenly sided with the Dutch, and Cetywayo
+  became greatly incensed and declared himself betrayed. I believe
+  he would at once have invaded the Transvaal, but from fear of us
+  in Natal. He hesitated, however, and according to the old maxim,
+  he who hesitates does not fight; but before he had quieted down
+  Sir B. Frere interfered with his _ultimatum_, and Cetywayo stood
+  grandly on the defensive. He is a savage, and his ambition was
+  to be a great savage; I do not mean a cruel one, but a powerful,
+  influential savage. He was ambitious, but disliked progress,
+  and such men must fail; so he has fallen, but with dignity. He
+  has never attacked a neighbour, white or black; he has defended
+  his country bravely, and has been guilty of no excesses. It has
+  been our war, not his. Sir B. Frere says most truly that almost
+  everyone he spoke to encouraged him to go to war; but I am afraid
+  he avoided those who, he was told, were against war—and when
+  will not Englishmen advise war? No argument was used, except
+  the one that Cetywayo might overrun Natal at any moment; but he
+  had never shown a disposition to do so, and we were stronger
+  than men would allow. Men who do not trust in the arm of God do
+  not see the defences which surround them. The Tugela, the river
+  which separates Natal from Zululand, was a great protection,
+  as in summer-time, even if fordable, the Zulus would not cross
+  it, lest it should rise in their rear; and in the winter, our
+  dry season, they cannot keep the field, as their naked bodies
+  are quite unable to bear exposure to the cold nights. Moreover,
+  though our own army will never acknowledge it, Cetywayo’s force
+  did not exceed 30,000 naked savages. Of course we are told they
+  were 60,000 or 80,000 strong; but if you casually inquire of any
+  officer who has been in Zululand whether the kraals were thickly
+  dotted over the country, he will tell you artlessly, “No, quite
+  the contrary.” I have again and again inquired of traders as to
+  the density of the population relative to Natal. I have inquired
+  of those who have lived at Ulundi, and have seen Cetywayo’s
+  regiments mustered, and I am confident that 30,000 is the very
+  outside at which the Zulu force could be put. I may return to
+  this. I mention it now to show why I do not agree with Sir Bartle
+  in his view of our position; and certainly I cannot admit,
+  because a neighbour is powerful, that therefore we are justified
+  in going to war with him.
+
+  But, now that we have been at war, on what terms is peace to
+  be arranged? In the Cape Colony the natives—as the Basutos,
+  the Fingoes, and others—live in districts to themselves, not
+  intermingled with the white man. The young men leave their homes,
+  and go into the colony, and work for a time in the towns or on
+  the farms; but their home is in Basutoland, Fingoland, etc. The
+  same holds good in the Transvaal. The natives there are on the
+  border; but Natal is the one exception to this rule; in this
+  colony we live intermingled; and a few years ago we were regarded
+  as living in the crater of a volcano. It was thought that the
+  Natal natives, who outnumber the European settlers eighteenfold,
+  might at any moment overwhelm us, so that Cape politicians and
+  others refused to be connected with this colony. In 1876,
+  however, before the rising of the natives on the frontier, I was
+  bold enough to point out to my fellow-colonists that our supposed
+  weakness was in reality our strength. And so it has proved.
+  During the last two years Natal has been the oasis of South
+  Africa; everywhere else the natives have either been in arms,
+  or shown themselves disaffected, if we except the Fingoes; but
+  the position in which they stand to the Kafir tribes around them
+  compels them to be loyal, so they are scarcely to be taken into
+  account.
+
+  Whilst, then, throughout South Africa the natives have been a
+  source of uneasiness, the overwhelming native population of
+  Natal (360,000, against 22,000 whites) has been perfectly true
+  to the Government, and the grounds of their loyalty are now, I
+  think, recognised in Natal. They are these: 1. The natives are
+  not, like Englishmen, self-reliant, but naturally dependent;
+  consequently, they use the machinery of Government much more
+  than we do. An Englishman dislikes appealing to a magistrate, as
+  it implies a want of power to take care of himself or to govern
+  his dependents. Not so the native; he habitually leans upon the
+  magistrate. Thirty years ago in Natal the native leant upon his
+  chief; now he has become familiar with the magistrate, who has
+  become a necessity to him. I argue, therefore, that a people will
+  not plot or even desire to throw off an authority which enters
+  into their daily life. 2. Natives who have resided amongst white
+  men feel the need of their presence. The native races cannot
+  develop themselves—nor, when in some degree developed, can they
+  stand by themselves—as their wills are weak, and intellectually
+  they are lawyers, fond of argument, but without imagination; so
+  they can neither plan nor construct. In their independent state
+  they have no criminal law, no commercial code, no municipal one,
+  no law of tenure of landed property; they possess only a few
+  customs regulating marriage and the division of their cattle
+  amongst the family; but, scattered amongst white men, they are
+  able to expand. The effect is seen in many ways—amongst others,
+  in the increase of their families. 3. They are naturally fond of
+  trading. In many ways they may be compared to the Celtic race, as
+  they cannot rise above the tribal organisation; but, unlike the
+  Celt, they are not intellectual; and, unlike him, their natural
+  bent is towards trading. They are good soldiers, but they prefer
+  trading to everything; consequently, on this account, they are
+  unwilling to separate from the white man. 4. The natives never
+  go to war unless they can first send their cattle to the rear;
+  but this they cannot do when distributed amongst the Europeans,
+  and this operates alone as a great check. During the thirty years
+  I have been in Natal we have only had three chiefs give the
+  slightest trouble, and these three have all been on the borders,
+  and so have been able to send their cattle away. I am convinced,
+  therefore, that, if the Government wishes to maintain peace and
+  to develop the native races, it should intermingle them with the
+  Europeans. The Aborigines Society at home will probably object.
+  It is easy to say the white man seeks only to dispossess the
+  native, but whatever the individual motive, the white man is the
+  benefactor by his presence. He may have hunted down the North
+  American Indian and the Aborigines of Australia, but not so in
+  South Africa. Here not only does the magistrate protect him,
+  but the Kafir is a worker, which the North American Indian and
+  the native of Australia is not. The white man wants the Kafir’s
+  labour, and to secure it has to be just and kind. A farm-servant
+  in England is by no means so independent as a Kafir out here. Mix
+  up the races therefore, and to some extent at least the problem
+  of governing and improving the native race is solved. After the
+  defeat at Isandhlwana, new-comers like the military thought our
+  natives might rise; but their wives, children, waggons, cattle,
+  etc., were in the colony, so they made common cause with us, and
+  showed themselves zealously loyal. I consider it, therefore,
+  to be most foolish to try and keep the races apart; we must
+  intermingle them. It was Alexander’s principle and the Roman
+  rule; the present European families have been founded on this
+  method—so we must go on mingling, not separating.
+
+  I send you a copy of Sir Garnet Wolseley’s conditions of peace,
+  as published in _The Natal Witness_. They are universally
+  condemned here. 1. The chiefs are to be under British Residents,
+  and they must be supported by a force. But who is to pay? It
+  is said the Zulus are not to be taxed, as that would amount to
+  annexation; or, rather, it would test Sir Garnet’s arrangements.
+  If he is afraid to tax the Zulus the Residents will be afraid
+  to control them. The test of defeat with Kafirs is the loss of
+  cattle—they do not estimate the loss of life; but we have not
+  taken cattle. Indeed, the balance is on their side: they have
+  carried off more than we have.[180] The test of submission is
+  obedience, and they have with one accord disobeyed the order to
+  give up their guns. The test of the Queen’s authority in South
+  Africa is the payment of taxes. Even Cetywayo offered to pay a
+  hut-tax; and if Sir Garnet does not impose one, all the young men
+  in Zululand, before a year is over, will point to their cattle,
+  their guns, and their immunity from taxes, and boast that they
+  were not beaten. If the Zulus are to be controlled by British
+  Residents they should pay a hut-tax. Our natives pay a hut-tax
+  of 14s. per hut. I have understood that the Cape Government wish
+  it to be uniform throughout South Africa, and to be fixed at £1.
+  We estimate the population at three-and-a-half persons to a hut,
+  and at 14s. it amounts to 4s. per head. Besides that the natives
+  on farms pay rent to the farmer, and the more they adopt our
+  habits the more do they pay through the Customs. The Zulus could
+  readily pay £1 per hut, or, say £36,000 per annum. Cetywayo’s
+  Government was an expensive one. His commissariat alone was a
+  heavy drain upon the resources of the people. Savages, as well
+  as civilised persons, understand that they must support their
+  Government; the Zulus, therefore, would recognise the justice
+  of being taxed; and not to tax them is, I consider, to abandon
+  one of the duties of Government. Moreover, it is said we are to
+  be taxed to pay our quota of the recent expenditure. But our
+  natives will hardly understand first fighting the Zulus, and then
+  having to pay for it. It will seem to them as if they were the
+  offending party, if they, and not the Zulus, are taxed. 2. The
+  conditions discourage trade. It ought to be encouraged to the
+  utmost. Instead of forbidding importation by sea, a Custom-house
+  should be established at the one port or landing-place, 3. The
+  alienation of land is forbidden, in order to keep out the white
+  man; but he should be encouraged to enter, and so long as the
+  land is held in common by the whole tribe there will be no
+  improvement in agriculture. Or, to take the conditions in order—2
+  is impossible; the young men will be quarrelling with one another
+  at weddings and other gatherings, tribal fights will ensue, and
+  the chiefs must have a force at their command. 3 I have touched
+  upon. 4 is nugatory; if a chief wishes to put to death he can
+  give a man a mock trial and have done with it. 6 overlooks that
+  wars often do not begin with the chiefs; the young men bring
+  them about. 8 I have touched upon. The whole implies the active
+  and constant superintendence of the Resident, and that will be
+  resisted: some kraal or kraals will be disobedient to orders,
+  the chief will be unable or unwilling to enforce obedience, and
+  the Resident must call in other assistance at great expense; and
+  at whose? There is nothing enduring, nothing practical in this
+  settlement, if it deserves to be called such. It is not likely
+  to last, and everyone expects, after a short interval, more
+  bloodshed and more reckless expenditure. The burden cannot be
+  thrown on the Colony, as the Government has not been consulted on
+  the terms of peace. The whole thing is a cruelty to the Zulus,
+  to the colonists, and to the suffering home population, for
+  there will be another £3,000,000 or more to be voted yet; but
+  during the whole time meat was 8d. and bread 4d. per pound. 1s.
+  6d. per diem was consequently ample allowance for the keep of a
+  soldier; of course I am aware there were numerous other sources
+  of expenditure, but it is extreme folly to send an army out to
+  a distant place, with power to draw upon the Treasury at will;
+  it is too great a trial for human nature. As a blind, all sorts
+  of things are said about the colonists; a great deal or even all
+  may be true, but it does not explain half. That, however, is by
+  the way; but I must mention, before concluding, that one of the
+  newly-appointed chiefs is a white man named John Dunn. He left
+  home when about fifteen or sixteen, and has since lived with the
+  Zulus, taking to himself a number of wives. This appointment is
+  looked upon as an outrage to public morals and as an insult to
+  the colonists. I say nothing about the missionaries, as I do
+  not wish that they should lean upon the civil power; the Church
+  must do her proper work in her proper way. I simply write as an
+  Englishman, to one who largely guides the counsels of the nation,
+  to lift up my voice against what has been done, and is being
+  done, in this part of the empire. Trusting you will excuse my
+  thus trespassing upon your time, believe me to remain yours most
+  respectfully,
+                                        JAMES GREEN,
+                                              _Dean of ’Maritzburg_.
+
+But at all events we had gained one definite result by all the blood
+and money spent in the Zulu war. The most important and earnestly
+insisted on immediate cause of our attack upon Zululand was the
+invasion of our soil, and the violation of our sanctuary, committed
+by Mehlokazulu and his brother, sons of Sihayo, when they seized and
+carried off two women who had taken refuge in Natal. We “requested”
+the Zulu king to deliver up the young men to us for judgment and for
+punishment, and he begged us to accept a fine in lieu of the persons
+of the offenders. We declined this proposal and repeated our request,
+which suddenly became a “demand” when it appeared in the ultimatum,
+and as such remained.
+
+It was said at the time that, had the young men been given up even
+after the troops had crossed the border, hostilities would have been
+suspended until the rest of the demands could be complied with. But
+they were not, so we went to war.
+
+And now, at last, the war was over, one of Sihayo’s sons had fallen
+in battle, and Mehlokazulu, the other, was in our hands. Here was
+what we had fought for, and obtained! What would be done with him?
+By the military authorities he could only be treated like any
+other prisoner of war, and released unharmed amongst the other
+Zulus. He was therefore handed over to the civil authorities at
+Pietermaritzburg to be tried by them, although he was denied the
+same advantages of counsel which are accorded by law to other civil
+prisoners.
+
+This denial was commented upon unfavourably by those who desired
+justice to be done, but, apparently, Mehlokazulu required no counsel,
+for he was not tried. He had committed no offence on British soil
+punishable in a Zulu subject by British law. His own king could have
+punished him by our request, but we had deposed and transported
+that king, and there was no law by which we could have inflicted
+anything beyond a trifling fine for trespass upon the man whom we had
+compassed heaven and earth, and shed so much of England’s noblest
+blood, to seize. The magistrate declined to commit him for trial,
+and Mehlokazulu was permitted to return to his home. “Doubtless,”
+remarks _The Natal Colonist_ of October 27th, “the legal adviser of
+the Crown was concerned in the case, and framed the charge which
+there was the best chance of being substantiated. And this is the
+result—‘there was no evidence to maintain the charge.’... It is a
+miserable conclusion to a most miserable affair.... The charge which,
+as we have seen, is almost made the chief occasion of the war which
+has desolated so many homes, and cost millions of money, completely
+breaks down when brought to the test of legal trial, and the prisoner
+is, of necessity, set at liberty. We never believed much in the
+other pretexts for the war put forward by Sir Bartle Frere, but we
+confess that we always thought the outrage by Sihayo’s sons was one
+to be visited with condign punishment, whether it was one which would
+justify war or not; and even though we knew it was only a pretext,
+seeing that it only took place long after war had been determined on,
+and preparations for it had been begun to be made.”
+
+“But the ultimatum and its demands are things of the past. Rivers of
+blood have flowed to enforce these demands, and now they are put on
+one side as utterly valueless, both by the settlement of Zululand and
+the release of Sirayo’s son.”[181]
+
+With this humiliating fact we must close our record of the Zulu War.
+In doing so, we feel that too many of the circumstances which we have
+thus recorded reflect no credit on the name of England—that name
+which as English men and women we most desire should be honoured by
+the world at large; and we realise with pain that, so far as our work
+may be perused by dwellers upon other shores, so far have we lessened
+the glory of our motherland in their eyes. But, however much we may
+regret the necessity, we do not therefore think it a less imperative
+duty to bring to the light as much as possible whatever wrong and
+injustice has been committed and concealed by those to whom England
+has entrusted her power and her fame. That the light of publicity
+should be thrown upon them is the first step towards their cure,
+or at least towards the prevention of any further wrong, and it is
+with the truest loyalty to our Sovereign, and the deepest love and
+reverence for our country, that we have undertaken the task now
+completed.
+
+
+THE END.
+
+
+CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS, CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] “Few things struck me more than the evident haste and temporary
+character of the defensive measures undertaken by the English part of
+the population”—in the border districts of Natal. (See letter from
+Sir Bartle Frere to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, dated March 28th, 1879.
+P. P. [C. 2318] p. 32.)
+
+[2] Spelt thus to give the nearest proper pronunciation of “Cetywayo.”
+
+[3] Residence of the Bishop of Natal.
+
+[4] These people had refused to leave their homes, or desert their
+Bishop, as long as he and his family remained at Bishopstowe,
+although both black and white, for miles around, had sought shelter
+elsewhere.
+
+[5] A system not unlike the Inquisition in its evil results.
+
+[6] Who, it may be remarked, have always been well treated in
+Zululand.
+
+[7] Portions of this letter are omitted from the Blue-book. It would
+be interesting to see the letter as originally received.
+
+[8] One put to death in 1861 was condemned on a charge of high
+treason.
+
+[9] As he had previously, in the year 1861, visited Zululand for the
+purpose of fixing the succession upon the house of Cetshwayo.
+
+[10] Since by our desire he refrained from protecting it by force of
+arms.
+
+[11] He gives as reasons for his objections: first, that such
+treaties “involve an admission of equality between the contracting
+parties,” and therefore “encourage presumption” on the part of the
+inferior, etc.; secondly, that “men who cannot read are apt to forget
+or distort the words of a treaty.” A third reason, which does not
+seem to have occurred to Mr. Shepstone, lies in the ease with which
+a savage may be deceived as to the contents of a written document,
+which facility we shall soon largely illustrate in the matter of Boer
+treaties with the natives.
+
+[12] See Lecky’s “Rationalism in Europe”:—7000 at Trèves; 600 by a
+single Bishop of Bamberg; 800 in _one_ year, in the bishopric of
+Wurtzburg; 1000 in the province of Como; 400 at _once_, at Toulouse;
+500 in three months, at Geneva; 48 at Constance; 80 at the little
+town of Valary in Saxony; 70 in Sweden; and one _Christian_ judge
+boasted that he himself had been the means of putting to death, in
+sixteen years, 800 witches!
+
+In Scotland, two centuries ago, but after many centuries of
+Christianity and civilisation, John Brown, the Ayrshire carrier, was
+shot, and, within a fortnight, an aged widow and a young maid were
+tied to stakes in the Solway and drowned by the rising tide, for the
+crime of neglecting episcopal worship, and going aside into the moor
+to spend the Sabbath day in prayer and praise.
+
+[13] P. P. [C. 1401] p. 30.
+
+[14] Natives of Basutoland, resident for many years in Natal.
+
+[15] See Field Force Order, 1873.
+
+[16] In the Zulu language the word _abantwana_ (children) is a
+general one, including both women and children.
+
+[17] It is only fair to Major Durnford to state that during the whole
+of these proceedings he was away over the mountains, in vain pursuit
+of an enemy to be fought.
+
+[18] 1. The following account of the above transaction was given by
+one of those concerned, in a letter to _The Natal Times_ of that
+date: “Twenty of us volunteered yesterday to go up and into a cave
+about eight miles from here. We found only one native, whom we shot,
+took a lot of goats (eighty-seven), and any amount of assegais and
+other weapons. We also searched about the country and killed a few
+niggers, taking fourteen prisoners. One fellow in a cave loaded his
+rifle with stones, and slightly wounded Wheelwright and Lieutenant
+Clarke, R.A. We, however, got him out, and Moodie shot him through
+the brains. Fifteen of ours have just volunteered to go to a cave
+supposed to contain niggers. We are gradually wiping out the three
+poor fellows who were shot, and all our men are determined to have
+some more.”
+
+2. _The Natal Government Gazette_, December 9th, 1873, contains the
+following enactment: “All officers and other persons who have acted
+under the authority of Sir Benjamin Chillay Campbell Pine, K.C.M.G.,
+as Lieut.-Governor of the colony of Natal, or as Supreme Chief over
+the native population, or have acted _bonâ fide_ for the purposes
+and during the time aforesaid, whether such acts were done in any
+district, county, or division of the colony in which martial law was
+proclaimed or not, are hereby indemnified in respect of all acts,
+matters, and things done, in order to suppress the rebellion and
+prevent the spread thereof; and such acts so done are hereby made and
+declared to be lawful, and are confirmed.”
+
+[19] It is hard to understand why these people should yet be detained
+and their harmless old chief still kept prisoner at Capetown. The
+common saying that they are all content and the chief better off than
+he ever was before in his life, is an entirely and cruelly false one.
+Langalibalele is wearying for his freedom and his own people; the few
+women with him are tired of their loneliness, and longing to be with
+their children in Natal. The present writer paid the chief a visit in
+September of this year (1879), and found him very sad. “I am weary;
+when will they let me go?” was his continual question.
+
+[20] Not including those individual acts of cruelty which no one
+could defend, although many speak of them as unavoidable.
+
+[21] The Lieut.-Governor of the colony.
+
+[22] Kafir law, under which Langalibalele was tried, because most
+of the offences with which he was charged were not recognisable by
+English law.
+
+[23] Ordinance No. 3, 1849.
+
+[24] The italics are the Author’s own in this and following charge.
+
+[25] The other rebel chiefs of the Cape Colony here alluded to,
+however, were not “banished,” but merely imprisoned in a portion of
+their own Supreme Chiefs territory, where, at proper times, they
+could be visited by members of their families and tribes; moreover,
+they were duly tried and convicted before the ordinary courts of
+serious crimes committed by themselves individually, and they had
+actually resisted by force their Supreme Chief within his territory;
+whereas Langalibalele had made no resistance—he was a runaway, but
+no rebel; he had not been tried and condemned for any crime in the
+Colonial Court, and banishment for life to Robben Island, away from
+all his people, was a fate worse than death in his and their eyes.
+
+[26] The same Magema, the Bishop’s printer, before mentioned.
+
+[27] Although Mawiza’s lies were plainly exposed, he was never
+punished, but remains to this day in charge of a large tribe, over
+which he has been placed by the Government.
+
+[28] On June 24th, 1874, the Bishop presented this “Appeal on behalf
+of Langalibalele” to His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of Natal
+and the executive committee of the Colony. The appeal was made in
+the first instance to Sir B. C. C. Pine, who altogether refused to
+listen to it. On this the Bishop forwarded a letter through the
+Lieut.-Governor to the Earl of Carnarvon, enclosing a copy of his
+correspondence with Sir B. C. C. Pine, and stating his reasons for
+acting as he had done in the matter. This letter was dated August
+6th, 1874, and on August 16th the Bishop left home _en route_ to
+England.
+
+[29] He was a bright intelligent lad, keenly anxious for
+self-improvement, and with a great desire, unusual amongst his kind,
+to go to England, and see a civilised country.
+
+[30] The Zulus and Zulu-Kafirs bathe their persons frequently, but
+they have not our ideas of cleanliness in respect to dress and
+habitations, although they are very particular about their food,
+utensils, and other matters.
+
+[31] This was done at the expense of Government, which likewise
+allowed certain supplies of meal, salt, and a little meat to the
+captives.
+
+[32] The boy was one of those who in the meanwhile had learnt at
+Bishopstowe to read and write, and who therefore could be of some
+use to his father as scribe, although his usefulness in that respect
+is much curtailed by the exceeding caution of the Government, which
+in its absurd and causeless fear of “treasonable correspondence,”
+will not allow written words of any description to reach or leave
+the poor old chief without official inspection. This precaution
+goes so far that in one instance some mats made by the women for
+Miss Colenso, and sent from Uitvlugt (the place of Langalibalele’s
+confinement after he was removed from the island), never reached
+their destination, owing to the paper attached, signifying for whom
+they were intended, being removed, as coming under the head of
+prohibited liberties. Another case is that of a lady who visited the
+family in September, 1879, and asked them to tell her what trifles
+they would like her to send them from Cape Town, but found that she
+had no power to send some babies’ socks which the women had chosen,
+and a comforter for the old man’s neck, except through an official
+individual and by formal permission.
+
+[33] A woman, wife of one of the fugitives, being taken prisoner
+during the expedition, found favour, much against her will, in the
+eyes of one Adam (a follower of the Secretary for Native Affairs),
+who asked to be allowed to take her as his wife. Permission was
+granted, but the woman refused, saying that she had a husband
+already, to whom she was attached. Her wishes were disregarded, and
+she was conveyed home by Adam, from whom she shortly escaped. Adam
+applied to the nearest magistrate for an order to take forcible
+possession of the fugitive, and the woman was thrown into gaol by
+the magistrate, until she should consent to be Adam’s wife. The man
+took her home a second time, and she again escaped from him; in fact
+her determination was so great that the matter was finally given up
+altogether. Eventually she rejoined her own husband, who received her
+and her child with the kindness which her constancy deserved.
+
+[34] Reaching home early in October, 1874.
+
+[35] Acts of “defiance” and “resistance,” too vague for any special
+instance to be given, probably striking his lordship as being of a
+slightly imaginary character.
+
+[36] Implying plainly that strict justice would demand it.
+
+[37] Author’s italics.
+
+[38] No notice was ever taken of the recommendation.
+
+[39] It is reported that Sir B. Pine has felt the injustice to
+himself so keenly that he refuses longer to acknowledge his title of
+K.C.M.G., and styles himself simply Mr. Pine. There can be little
+doubt that in point of fact Mr. Shepstone was mainly responsible for
+all that happened; but “the right man to annex the Transvaal” could
+not well be spared, and a scapegoat was found for him in Sir Benjamin
+Pine.
+
+[40] Three at last.
+
+[41] It would be an injustice to an association, called into
+existence and maintained by a true spirit of Christian charity, to
+pass over in silence the active, if seemingly ineffectual, efforts
+of the Aborigines Protection Society to obtain justice for the
+unfortunate people of the Putini tribe.
+
+[42] The annexation of the Transvaal:—so stated by one of his own
+staff.
+
+[43] It is neither customary nor convenient to speak publicly of a
+parent, and I desire to let facts speak for themselves as much as
+possible. I feel, however, bound to remark that of all the mistakes
+made by a succession of rulers in Natal, perhaps the most foolish
+and unnecessary has been that jealousy of episcopal “or unofficial”
+interference, which has blinded them to the fact that the Bishop has
+always been ready to give any assistance in his power to the local
+Government in carrying out all just and expedient measures towards
+the natives, without claiming any credit or taking any apparently
+prominent position beyond his own; and, so long as justice is done,
+would greatly prefer its being done by those in office. He has never
+interfered, except when his duty as a man, and as the servant of a
+just and merciful Master, has made it imperatively necessary that he
+should do so; nor does he covet any political power or influence. To
+a government which intends to carry out a certain line of policy in
+defiance of justice and honour, he would ever be an opponent; but
+one which honestly aims at the truth would assuredly meet with his
+earnest support.
+
+[44] “The recollection of past events”—that is to say, of the
+slaughter of many men, women, and children, the destruction of homes,
+and the sufferings of the living;—this can hardly with reason be said
+to be _kept alive_ by attempts to ameliorate the condition of those
+that remained, and to show them some small kindness and pity. How
+“a good feeling” was to be restored between the victims and their
+conquerors by other means, Sir Garnet does not suggest.
+
+[45] In common only with the rest of the tribe.
+
+[46] Three women and two children only have been allowed to join him.
+
+[47] Which did not prevent their being of the utmost importance
+in considering the case of the chief under trial at the time the
+statements were made.
+
+[48] Sir B. Pine complains in his despatch, December 31st, 1874, of
+the “intolerable injustice” of charges being made against Mr. J.
+Shepstone, upon evidence taken by the Bishop _ex parte_, without
+the _safety of publicity_ and the opportunity of cross-examination.
+Yet Sir Garnet Wolseley refused to allow publicity or searching
+cross-examination by experienced advocates.
+
+[49] One of the original four.
+
+[50] Mr. Shepstone says in his second report that a day or two
+previous to the meeting with Matshana, he had received information to
+the effect that the chief’s intentions were to put him and his people
+to death at the expected interview, and all the efforts made by Mr.
+Shepstone and his witnesses were to prove, first, the murderous
+intentions of Matshana; and, secondly, that _nevertheless_ Mr.
+Shepstone had no counter-plans for violence, and did not fire upon
+the people.
+
+[51] Author’s italics.
+
+[52] Rather by the determination of their rulers to preserve their
+land from Boer encroachments.
+
+[53] SAND RIVER TREATY.—“Evidence was adduced that the Transvaal
+Boers, who, by the Sand River Convention, and in consideration of
+the independence which that convention assured to them, had solemnly
+pledged themselves to this country (England) not to reintroduce
+slavery into their Republic, had been in the habit of capturing,
+buying, selling, and holding in forced servitude, African children,
+called by the cant name of ‘black ivory,’ murdering the fathers,
+and driving off the mothers; that this slave trade was carried on
+with the sanction of the subordinate Transvaal authorities, and that
+the President did actually imprison and threaten to ruin by State
+prosecution a fellow-countryman who brought it to the notice of
+the English authority—an authority which, if it had not the power
+to prevent, had at any rate a treaty right to denounce it. This
+and more was done, sometimes in a barbarous way, under an assumed
+divine authority to exterminate those who resisted them. So much was
+established by Dutch and German evidence. But it was supplemented
+and carried farther by the evidence of natives as to their own
+sufferings, and of English officers as to that general notoriety
+which used to be called _publica fama_.”—_From an article by Lord
+Blachford in The Nineteenth Century Review, August 1879_, p. 265.
+
+[54] A native chief.
+
+[55] Written in October, 1879.
+
+[56] Lord Blachford says in the article already quoted from: “The
+citizens of these Republics have gone out from among us into a
+hostile wilderness, because they could not endure a humanitarianism
+which not only runs counter to their habits and interest, but
+blasphemes that combination of gain with godliness which is part of
+their religion. While that humanitarianism forms a leading principle
+of our government they will not submit to it. Why should we bribe
+or force them to do so? It is no doubt right and wise to remain, if
+possible, on good terms with them. It is wise and generous to save
+them, if possible, in their day of calamity—as, with our own opposite
+policy, we have been able to save them—by a wave of the hand—twice
+from the Basutos, and once from the Zulus. (Once for all rather,
+through the course of many years, during which we have restrained
+the Zulus from asserting their own rights to the disputed territory,
+by promises that we would see justice done.—_Author._) But it is
+neither wise nor necessary to embroil ourselves in their quarrels
+until they call for help, until they have had occasion to feel the
+evil effects of their own methods, and the measure of their weakness,
+and are ready, not in whispers or innuendos and confidential corners,
+but outspokenly in public meetings, or through their constituted
+authorities, to accept with gratitude our intervention on our own
+terms, until they are, if they ever can be, thus taught by adversity.
+I do not myself believe that we could enter into any political union
+with them except at the sacrifice of that character for justice to
+which, I persist in saying, we owe so much of our power and security
+in South Africa. Nor so long as we observe the rules of justice to
+them shall we do any good by disguising our substantial differences,
+or refraining from indignant remonstrances against proceedings which
+are not only repugnant to humanity, but violate their engagements
+with us and endanger our security.”
+
+[57] Colonel Durnford, R.E., who paid a flying visit to Pretoria at
+the time.
+
+[58] Mr. John Dunn is said to have stated to the Special
+Correspondent of _The Cape Argus_, and to have since reaffirmed his
+statement, that Sir T. Shepstone “sent word to Cetshwayo that he was
+being hemmed in, and the king was to hold himself in readiness to
+come to his assistance.” This assertion has also been denied by Sir
+T. Shepstone’s supporters.
+
+[59] P. P. [C. 1776] p. 88.
+
+[60] It may be interesting to compare the above with the wording of
+Sir T. Shepstone’s “Commission”—P. P. [C. 1776] p. 111.
+
+[61] The chief repeatedly refused to sign any paper presented to
+him by the Boers, on the grounds that he could not tell what it
+might contain, beyond the points explained to him, to which he might
+afterwards be said to have agreed; showing plainly to what the
+natives were accustomed in their dealings with the Transvaal.
+
+[62] That claimed by the Boers.
+
+[63] P. P. (2079, pp. 51-54).
+
+[64] The conclusion arrived at, after a careful consideration of all
+producible evidence, by the Rorke’s Drift Commission, in 1878.
+
+[65] A liability transferred to the Zulu king by Sir Bartle Frere in
+his correspondence with the Bishop of Natal.
+
+[66] That is to say, that they may be bribed by substantial benefits
+to acquiesce in the loss of their liberties.
+
+[67] Was it by inadvertence that Sir T. Shepstone speaks of “us” and
+“we,” thus producing a sentence so strangely and unhappily applicable?
+
+[68] Italics not Sir B. Frere’s.
+
+[69] Author’s italics throughout.
+
+[70] Author’s italics.
+
+[71] “_Ama_-Swazi” for the plural correctly, as also “Ama-Zulu.”
+
+[72] Sir Henry Bulwer, speaking of the disputed territory generally,
+writes as follows: “The Zulu king had always, in deference very
+much to the wishes and advice of this Government (Natal), forborne
+from doing anything in respect of the question that might produce
+a collision, trusting to the good offices of this Government to
+arrange the difficulty by other means. But no such arrangement had
+ever been made; and thus the question had drifted on until the
+formal annexation of the disputed territory by the Government of the
+Republic last year, and their subsequent attempt to give a practical
+effect to their proclamation of annexation by levying taxes upon the
+Zulus residing in the territory, provoked a resistance and a feeling
+of resentment which threatened to precipitate a general collision at
+any moment.”—SIR H. BULWER, _June 29th, 1876_ (C. 1961, p. 1).
+
+[73] Umtonga escaped again, and is now living in the Transvaal. His
+brother was still living in Zululand, as head of Umtonga’s kraal, at
+the beginning of the war, and no injury appears to have been done to
+any of the four.
+
+[74] Thereby pointing the truth of his own remark at a previous
+date—March 30th, 1876 (1748, p. 24): “But messages from the Zulu king
+are becoming more frequent and urgent, and _the replies he receives
+seem to him to be both temporising and evasive_.” (Author’s italics).
+
+[75] Immediately after they had signed the instrument of appointment
+the two Zulu messengers were sent in to the Government by Messrs.
+Smith and Colenso, and took with them a letter (C. 2000) which
+mentioned them as its bearers, and announced what they had done.
+
+[76] ’Mfunzi and ’Nkisimane were sent down again to ’Maritzburg by
+Cetshwayo, at the request of Sir H. Bulwer, and denied the whole
+transaction, though it was attested by the signatures of the notary
+and two white witnesses. It was afterwards discovered that they had
+been frightened into this denial by a Natal Government messenger,
+who told them that they had made the Governor very angry with them
+and their king by making this appointment; and John Dunn also, after
+receiving letters from ’Maritzburg, told them that they had committed
+a great fault, and that he saw that they would never _all_ come home
+again.
+
+[77] Messrs. Smith and Colenso’s explanatory letter to Sir M.
+Hicks-Beach, dated June 9th, 1878, concludes as follows:
+
+“This business, as far as we are concerned, is, therefore, ended. We
+had hoped to be instrumental in embodying in a contract a proposal
+which we knew was advantageous to both parties. To do so only
+required the intervention of European lawyers trusted by Cetewayo.
+We knew that he trusted us, and would trust no others. The task of
+acting for the king was, therefore, imposed on us as lawyers and as
+gentlemen. Of pecuniary reward, or its equivalent, our labours have
+brought us nothing. We do not require it. Honour we did not desire,
+nor had a savage prince any means of conferring it. The duty thus
+undertaken we give up only in despair, and we have nothing to regret.
+
+“Such information, however, as we have gleaned in the course of our
+agency you are entitled to hear from us, as we are British subjects.
+
+“The Zulus are hostile to the Boers of the Transvaal, and would
+fight with them but for fear of being involved in a quarrel with the
+English. But neither Cetewayo himself, who is wise and peaceful, nor
+the most hot-blooded of his young warriors have any desire to fight
+with England, _i.e._ Natal.
+
+“If they wished to do so there is nothing to prevent them, and never
+has been. As they march, they could march from their border to this
+city or to Durban in a little more than twenty-four hours. Their only
+fear is, that the English will come with an army ‘to make them pay
+taxes.’ They say they will rather die than do so. The king says the
+same. Almost every man has a gun. Guns and ammunition are cheaper at
+any military kraal in Zululand than at Port Natal. These goods are
+imported by Tonga men, who come in large gangs from Delagoa Bay, for
+white merchants. An Enfield rifle may be had for a sheep of a Tonga
+man; many have breech-loaders. The missionaries, whose principal
+occupation was trading, deal in ammunition. The missionaries have
+recently lost most of their converts, who have gone trading on their
+own account. Without these converts the missionaries cannot do
+business, and they have left the country, except Bishop Schreuder,
+who has gone back, that it may not be said that a white man is not
+safe there. Cetewayo says that he has asked the missionaries to stop.
+They have certainly not been turned out or threatened. Their going
+makes the Zulus think that we are about to invade the country.
+
+“Nothing but gross mismanagement will bring about a quarrel between
+England and the Zulus.”—(P. P. [C. 2144] pp. 215, 216).
+
+[78] This is apparently a figure of speech, since Luneburg, near
+which the kraal was being built, would seem by the map _not_ to
+lie “to the rear”—as seen from Zululand—of Utrecht, where Sir T.
+Shepstone was staying.
+
+[79] Compare the account of the delay on the part of the Boer
+Government when Mr. Keate proposed to arbitrate. See last chapter, p.
+182.
+
+[80] 2144, p. 191.
+
+[81] The Zulus, of course, would not have appreciated the convenience
+of a table and chairs; they had no “documents” to lay upon the
+former; and their opinion of the comfort of the latter is best
+expressed by the well-known Zulu saying that, “_Only Englishmen
+and chickens sit upon perches._” The mats provided for them were,
+therefore, a proper equivalent to the tables and seats placed for the
+other delegates.
+
+[82] Sir Bartle Frere gives a very unfair account of this
+matter-of-course fact when he transmits to the Secretary of State
+the above despatch, “informing me of the incomplete result, in
+consequence of the attitude of Cetshwayo’s representatives at the
+Commission of Inquiry.”
+
+[83] The king’s kraal at that time.
+
+[84] The homestead specially spoken of in this case does not appear
+to have been destroyed or injured till March, 1879, in the midst of
+the war, nor was any human being, white or black, belonging to these
+farms, killed by this “savage, unbridled, revengeful nation,” before
+the war began.
+
+[85] Apparently by Sir T. Shepstone’s orders, as the following phrase
+appears in one of the Boer protests against arbitration, April 25th,
+1873: “The majority of the people have, by order of your Excellency,
+trekked into laager on December 14th last, and after having remained
+in laager for nearly five months, _we are to go and live on our farms
+again_.”
+
+[86] The married women work in the mealie-gardens, etc., and the
+_little_ girls carry the babies; but the marriageable young women
+seem to have an interval of happy freedom from all labour and care.
+
+[87] This was comprehensible during the attempt, which proved so
+signal a failure, on the part of Sir T. Shepstone, to impose a
+_marriage tax_ upon the natives. The tax was so extremely unpopular
+that it was thought advisable to relinquish it, and to make the
+desired increase in the revenue of the colony by doubling the hut-tax.
+
+[88] Sir T. Shepstone, when he says (1137, p. 18) “Natal gives up the
+_cattle_ of Zulu refugees.... The refugees themselves are not given
+up,” plainly includes women amongst the cattle or “property” of the
+Zulus.
+
+[89] And later, Nov. 18, 1878 (2222, p. 173), he says: “I do not
+hold the King responsible for the commission of the act, because
+there is nothing to show that it had his previous concurrence or
+even cognizance. But he becomes responsible for the act after its
+commission, and for such reparation as we may consider is due for it.”
+
+[90] Since rifled by our troops, and the bones of the old king
+brought over to England.
+
+[91] No “demand” was made until it appeared in Sir B. Frere’s
+ultimatum.
+
+[92] On perusing the above italicised words, one learns for the first
+time that the ultimatum, which Sir Bartle Frere sent to the Zulu king
+a few months later, was actually sent for the express purpose of
+putting “an end to pacific relations with our neighbours.” This is
+hardly the light in which the British public has been taught to look
+upon the matter.
+
+[93] Mr. H. Shepstone (Secretary for Native Affairs in the Transvaal)
+acknowledges that this fine was paid (2222, p. 99).
+
+[94] Manyonyoba owed allegiance to Cetshwayo (as did Umbilini). He
+lived north of the Pongolo, in a part of the country over which
+Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Henry Bulwer altogether deny Cetshwayo’s
+supremacy, and was claimed as a subject of the Transvaal Government.
+
+[95] Sir H. Bulwer says “they have suspected, quite wrongly, that
+we had some design against them in making it” (the new road to the
+drift). It is to be questioned how far their suspicion was a wrongful
+one, seeing that it was understood from the first that the drift
+was intended especially for military purposes, and was undoubtedly
+inspected by Mr. Smith for the same.
+
+[96] Quotations from Mr. Deighton’s report to Mr. Wheelwright.
+
+[97] Words applied to him by Mr. Brownlee, late Secretary for Native
+Affairs of the Cape Government.
+
+[98] Author’s italics.
+
+[99] On one of these visits a missionary is reported to have said to
+the king coarsely in Zulu, “You are a liar!” (unamanga!) upon which
+Cetshwayo turned his back to him, and spoke with him no more.
+
+[100] Or rather he was angry with them for the rudeness which they
+committed in going _without taking leave_. He said they had never
+received anything but kindness from him, and might as well have paid
+him the compliment of a farewell salutation.
+
+[101] Author’s italics.
+
+[102] “Our Correspondent” of _The Daily News_ speaks, in to-day’s
+issue (November 17th, 1879), of the “tranquillising fear” of
+Cetshwayo having been removed from “our own native population.”
+
+[103] A mere assertion, often made, but never supported by the
+slightest proof.
+
+[104] And so the Rev. Mr. Glockner, speaking of the late war, says
+that they (the missionaries) had often warned the native chiefs of
+what would befall them, if they refused to become Christians.—_Vide
+The Scotsman, February 5th, 1880._
+
+[105] Story of Maqamsela, from _The Natal Colonist_ of May 4th, 1877:
+“Another case referred to in our previous article was that of a man
+named Maqamsela, particulars of which, derived from eye-witnesses,
+we have received from different sources. On Friday, March 9th, he
+attended morning service at Etshowe mission station as usual, went
+home to his kraal, and at noon started to go over to the kraal of
+Minyegana, but was seized on the road and killed because he was a
+Christian!
+
+“For many years he had wished to become a Christian, and this at his
+own desire was reported to Gaozi, his immediate chief, who _scolded
+him, saying, ‘it would occasion him_ (Gaozi) _trouble_.’ The earnest
+and repeated solicitation of Maqamsela was that the missionary
+(Mr. Oftebro) would take him to the king to obtain his permission
+to profess Christianity. Last winter the missionary consented to
+mention it to the king; but, _failing to see Gaozi first, deemed
+it imprudent to do so at that time_. Maqamsela was greatly grieved
+at this, saying, ‘I am not afraid of death; it will be well if I
+am killed for being a Christian.’ When an opportunity occurred of
+speaking to Gaozi about Maqamsela’s wish to be baptized, _he would
+give no direct answer, but complained of his bad conduct_. Maqamsela,
+however, persisted in his entreaties that his case should be reported
+to the king. ‘If they kill me because I believe, they may do so; the
+Lord will receive me. Has not Christ died for me? Why should I fear?’
+A favourable opportunity of naming the matter to the king presented
+itself some time after. Cetshwayo appeared very friendly, and
+proposed that the Christians should pay a tax, but said that their
+service should be building houses for him when called; otherwise
+they might remain in peace. Maqamsela was then mentioned as being
+desirous to become a Christian. He was an old man, who could not
+leave his kraal, and could not come up to serve. He had therefore
+been eaten up, and had not now a single head of cattle. On his name
+being mentioned, the king replied that _he would say nothing, Gaozi,
+Minyegana, and Xubane not being there_. Maqamsela was glad when he
+heard what had been done, and said, ‘If they kill me now, it is all
+right.’
+
+“A week later his time came. An induna, named Jubane, sent for him,
+and on his return from Jubane’s, an impi came to him, saying they
+had orders to kill him. He asked for what reason, and being told it
+was because he was a Christian and for nothing else, he said again,
+‘Well, I rejoice to die for the word of the Lord.’ He begged leave to
+kneel down and pray, which he was allowed to do. After praying, he
+said, ‘Kill me now.’ They had never seen any man act in this manner
+before, when about to be killed, and seemed afraid to touch him.
+After a long pause, however, a young lad took a gun and shot him, and
+they all ran away.”
+
+[106] This indiscriminate killing is disproved and denied by
+Cetshwayo himself and his principal chiefs (_vide_ “A Visit to King
+Ketshwayo,” “Macmillan’s Magazine,” March, 1878).
+
+[107] Author’s italics throughout.
+
+[108] Two Zulu prisoners, captured while on a peaceful errand, just
+before the commencement of hostilities, and who were permitted to
+reside at Bishopstowe when released from gaol, until they could
+safely return home, were questioned concerning these regulations,
+and said that they applied only to those who voluntarily joined the
+regiments, concerning which there was no compulsion at all, beyond
+the moral effect produced by the fact that it was looked upon, by
+the young people themselves, as rather a poor thing to do to decline
+joining. Once joined, however, they were obliged to obey orders
+unhesitatingly. These young men said that in the coast, and outlying
+districts, there were large numbers of people who had retained
+their liberty and married as they pleased, but that strict loyalty
+was the _fashion_ nearer the _court_. It was in these very coast
+districts that the Zulus surrendered during the late war, the _loyal_
+inhabitants proving their loyalty to _the bitter end_.
+
+[109] “We are equal,” said the interpreter; but the expression used
+is more correctly translated as above.
+
+[110] The natives of Natal, “peaceful subjects of Her Majesty,” were
+living in perfect security on one side of the border, and the Zulus
+on the other, the two populations intermarrying and mingling in the
+most friendly manner, without the smallest apprehension of injury to
+life or property, when Sir B. Frere landed at Durban.
+
+[111] Compare with 9 and 10 the distinct instructions on this point
+given by Lord Carnarvon during the previous year (1961, p. 60):
+“I request, therefore, that you will cause the missionaries to
+understand distinctly that Her Majesty’s Government cannot undertake
+to compel the king to permit the maintenance of the mission stations
+in Zululand.” Yet here the clause is made one of the conditions of an
+ultimatum, the alternative of which is war.
+
+[112] Sir T. Shepstone’s incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear
+evidence, sifted and proved worthless by the Commissioners.
+
+[113] Sir Bartle Frere declares (Correspondence, p. 57) that
+Cetshwayo “could have known nothing of the memorandum,” although
+(_ibid._ p. 6) he himself asserts that “it was intended to explain
+for Cetshwayo’s benefit what was the nature of the cession to him,”
+and it was plainly very generally known, and therefore naturally by
+the king.
+
+[114] Correspondence, p. 3.
+
+[115] Ibid. p. 6.
+
+[116] Compare with Sir Bartle Frere’s suggestion to Sir Henry Bulwer
+that the latter should persuade the Zulu king that the _Active_
+and her fellows were mostly merchant vessels, but that the English
+war-vessels would be sufficient to _protect his coast_!
+
+[117] Our own troops’ experience showed that this was no idle excuse.
+
+[118] One of Colonel Durnford’s officers writes, January 26th,
+“that he (the Colonel) had worked so hard at equipping this Native
+Contingent, against much opposition, and took special pride in his
+mounted men, three hundred men, that he called ‘The Natal Native
+Horse.’”
+
+[119] These words deserve special remark.
+
+[120] After-events proved the fallacy of these “reports.” Even when
+the Zulus could have swept Natal with fatal effect, they refrained.
+
+[121] Lord Chelmsford, January 16th, 1879. (P. P. [C. 2252] p. 63.)
+
+[122] Captain N. Newman.
+
+[123] Some Zulus (a chief named Gandama, and others) came into the
+camp on the 21st, saw the General, and were allowed to depart.—(P. P.
+[C. 2454] p. 182).
+
+[124] P. P. (C. 2260) p. 81.
+
+[125] Major Clery.
+
+[126] “There were no high words,” Lieutenant Cochrane says, of
+any kind between the colonels, as some would lead the public to
+suppose. The above remarks are taken from Lieutenant Cochrane’s
+account of what passed; and he says: “I think no one lives who was
+present during the conversation but myself; so that anything said
+contradictory to my statement is _invented_.”
+
+[127] Captain Essex, 75th Regiment.
+
+[128] Lieutenant Raw, Natal Native Horse.
+
+[129] Lieutenant Cochrane, 32nd Regiment.
+
+[130] Mr. Brickhill.
+
+[131] Having disengaged his men, Captain G. Shepstone said: “I must
+go and see where my Chief is,” and rode in again. His devotion cost
+him his life.
+
+[132] Captain Gardner.
+
+[133] Captain Essex.
+
+[134] Lieutenant Curling, R.A.
+
+[135] Captain Essex.
+
+[136] Lieutenant Cochrane.
+
+[137] Mr. Brickhill.
+
+[138] Lieutenant Curling.
+
+[139] Three mounted Zulu scouts were seen on the hills on the right
+from the rear guard, by an officer, who pointed them out to one of
+the staff.
+
+[140] Some remarks made by Lieutenant Milne, R.N. (aide-de-camp),
+are worthy of notice: “_January 21st._—We then rode up to the high
+land to the left of our camp, the ascent very steep, but possible
+for horses. On reaching the summit of the highest hill, I counted
+fourteen Zulu horsemen watching us at the distance of about four
+miles; they ultimately disappeared over a slight rise. Two vedettes
+were stationed at the spot from where I saw these horsemen; they
+said they had seen these men several times during the day, and had
+reported the fact.... We then returned to camp, the General having
+determined to send out a patrol in this direction the next day.”—(P.
+P. [C. 2454] p. 183).
+
+_January 22nd._—Lieutenant Milne was sent to the top of a hill to see
+what was doing in camp, and says: “On reaching the summit I could see
+the camp; all the cattle had been driven in close around the tents. I
+could see nothing of the enemy on the left” (_ibid._ p. 184).
+
+“We are not quite certain about the time. But it is just possible
+that what I took to be the cattle having been driven into camp may
+possibly have been the Zulu ‘impi’” (_ibid._ p. 187).
+
+[141] One message only is mentioned by the General or his military
+secretary as having been received from the camp. But an officer
+(of rank) _who had seen them_, says that five or six messages were
+received from the camp during the day by the General or his staff;
+and he says distinctly that the messages were in the possession of
+Lieut.-Colonel Crealock.
+
+[142] About this hour the tents in camp suddenly disappeared.
+
+[143] No spare ammunition was taken by the force with the General.
+
+[144] The reserve ammunition is said to have been packed in waggons,
+which were then filled up with stores.
+
+[145] The _first_ official mention of this appears in a Blue-book of
+August, 1879, where Lieutenant Milne, R.N. (aide-de-camp), says: “In
+the meantime, news came that Colonel Harness had heard the firing,
+and was proceeding with his guns and companies of infantry escorting
+them to camp. Orders were immediately sent to him to return and
+rejoin Colonel Glyn.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 184).
+
+[146] By the General’s directions this statement was to be “of the
+facts which came under his cognizance on the day in question.”—(P. P.
+[C. 2260] p. 80).
+
+[147] “The panic and confusion were fearful,” says one of themselves.
+
+[148] The number of prisoners thus killed is said to have been about
+twenty.
+
+[149] Yet Sir B. Frere, on the 30th June, writes: “The position of
+Wood’s and Pearson’s columns effectually checked the execution of
+an attempt at invasion.” These two columns, being some ninety miles
+apart and secure in their own positions _only_, would have been of
+little avail _had_ the Zulu king desired to make “an attempt at
+invasion.” It needed no better strategists than Cetshwayo and his
+chiefs to have masked each of the posts at Kambula and Etshowe with
+some 5000 men, and then “the Zulus might march at will through the
+country.”
+
+[150] Some officers who were with the advance column, and who
+afterwards visited Isandhlwana, say that they appear to have “tried
+to get the waggons together to form a laager,” but there was not time.
+
+[151] With respect to this, Lord Chelmsford lays down a principle
+(relative to the border raids, but even more strongly applicable
+here) that if a force remains “on the passive defensive, without
+endeavouring by means of scouting in small bodies or by raiding in
+large ones, to discover what the enemy is doing in its immediate
+front, it deserves to be surprised and overpowered.”—(P. P. [C. 2318]
+p. 80).
+
+[152] It is stated that on the previous evening there was no
+intention on the part of the Zulus to attack the camp upon the
+22nd, which was not thought by them a propitious day, being that of
+the new moon. It is also said that the Zulu army came with pacific
+intentions, in order to give up Sihayo’s sons, and the cattle for the
+fine. In all probability they _left the king_ with such orders—that
+is to say, to make terms if possible, but to fight if forced to it,
+and if the English intentions were plainly hostile. This hostility
+was thoroughly proved before the morning of the 22nd, when the
+departure of Lord Chelmsford’s force from the camp must have been a
+strong temptation to the Zulus to attack the latter.
+
+Warning of the Zulu army moving against Nos. 1 and 3 Columns was
+received on the border, and communicated to Mr. Fannin, Border Agent,
+on January 20th. The warning stated that the whole Zulu army, over
+35,000 strong (except about 4000 who remained with the king), was
+marched in two columns, the strongest against Colonel Glyn’s column,
+the other against Colonel Pearson; this was to take up its position
+on the 20th or 21st January at the royal kraal near Inyezane, and
+the first to approach Rorke’s Drift. The writer complains of the
+little and inadequate use made of the information, which might have
+been communicated from Fort Pearson to Rorke’s Drift in time to have
+averted the fearful disaster of the 22nd January.—(P. P. [C. 2308]
+pp. 69, 70).
+
+[153] P. P. (C. 2318) p. 12.
+
+[154] Had Lord Chelmsford been acquainted with this peculiarity of
+the Zulus, he might not have thought it necessary to hurry away
+from Isandhlwana on the 23rd. There was no fear of the same force
+attacking again for some days to come.
+
+[155] P. P. (C. 2318) pp. 11-17.
+
+[156] Who, it is said, insisted upon the animals being fine and in
+good condition, returning some which were sent in below the required
+mark.
+
+[157] Captain Clarke’s report (C. 2144), p. 37.
+
+[158] Sir T. Shepstone to Sir H. Bulwer, April 16th, 1878 (C. 2144).
+
+[159] Upon the Zulu border.
+
+[160] C. 2367, p. 90.
+
+[161] Sondolosi, deceased brother of Seketwayo.
+
+[162] Trooper Grandier’s story of ill-treatment has since been
+contradicted by this Dutchman.
+
+[163] C. 2374, p. 109.
+
+[164] Nevertheless, during the end of March and beginning of April
+communications took place between the Lieut.-Governor and the General
+commanding, on this subject (C. 2318, p. 45); therefore _both_ the
+military and civil authorities _were_ aware of it.
+
+[165] John Dunn is understood to have come back from his interview
+with the last peace messengers, and to have reported that the message
+was _bonâ fide_, and that Cetshwayo “means to have peace if possible.”
+
+[166] This company of Native Pioneers (one of those organised
+by Colonel Durnford, R.E., before the war) was raised from the
+_employés_ of the Colonial Engineer Department, and commanded by
+Captain Beddoes of the same department; this officer being highly
+commended by his chief. The company worked under the supervision
+of Lieutenant Main, R.E., and rendered excellent service. Colonel
+Pearson remarked: “The men worked cheerfully. They had eyes like
+hawks, and they did their scouting to perfection.”
+
+[167] One of the hardest workers in this department was Commissary J.
+W. Elmes, who distinguished himself by his untiring zeal and energy.
+
+[168] P. P. (C. 2260) p. 104.
+
+[169] P. P. (C. 2374) p. 115.
+
+[170] Mr. Mansel, the officer commanding this troop of Natal Mounted
+Police, says: “When we went out the morning before the fight we left
+thirty-one men behind, men whose horses had sore backs, etc. These
+men were in charge of only a corporal. Seven men escaped, and we
+buried all of the twenty-four that were killed. Twenty were killed
+just around Colonel Durnford. Three about two hundred yards away, and
+one at the Fugitives’ Drift.”
+
+[171] Properly Uzulu—the Zulu nation.
+
+[172] The above is corroborated on all main points by Mehlokazulu,
+son of Sihayo, who states that he was sent with three other indunas
+(mounted), on the morning of the 22nd, to see what the English were
+doing. On reporting to Tshingwayo, he said, “All right, we will
+see what they are going to do.” “Presently,” says Mehlokazulu, “I
+heard Tshingwayo give orders for the Tulwana and Ngyaza regiments to
+assemble. When they had done so, he gave orders for the others to
+assemble and advance in the direction of the English camp. We were
+fired on first by the mounted men, who checked our advance for some
+little time.” He says the soldiers were at first “in loose order,”
+but afterwards he saw them “massing together,” when “they fired at a
+fearful rate.” When the Zulus broke the infantry and closed in, they
+“came on to a mixed party of mounted men and infantry men,” about one
+hundred, who “made a desperate resistance, some firing with pistols
+and others using swords, and I repeatedly heard the word ‘Fire!’
+given by someone. But we proved too many for them, and killed them
+all where they stood. When all was over I had a look at these men,
+and saw a dead officer, with his arm in a sling and a big moustache
+(Colonel Durnford, R.E.), surrounded by dead carbineers, soldiers,
+and other men whom I did not know.”—_Vide R. E. Journal, Feb. 1880._
+
+[173] Written for him by a Dutch trader, residing with him.
+
+[174] This information he obtained through his messengers ’Mfunzi and
+’Nkisimane, who were in Pietermaritzburg in June. The message (sent
+by Mr. Colenso) being, that the young officer killed at the Styotyozi
+river was a Prince; that his sword would be desired by his family,
+and that if Cetshwayo wanted to make peace he had better return it.
+The result was that, as soon as the king received the message, he
+sent the sword on to Lord Chelmsford.
+
+[175] Amongst the wild natives of South Africa it is thought that the
+carrying of burdens is not a manly task. In a family of travelling
+Zulus the women and lads perform the duties of carriers, while the
+man of the party marches ahead, unencumbered except by his weapons,
+ready if necessary to defend his flock against the attack of man or
+beast. An officer, travelling in the eastern province some years
+ago, met and questioned a party proceeding in this fashion. “Why,”
+he asked the leader of the little band, “do you allow these women
+and girls to carry heavy loads, while you, a strong able-bodied man,
+have nothing but your assegais and knob-kerries in your hand?” Such
+questions are not seldom resented when they touch on native customs,
+and are asked in an overbearing manner. This officer was uniformly
+kind and courteous to the natives, and the man smilingly replied, “It
+is our custom, and the women prefer it;” referring his questioner to
+the women themselves for their opinion. The chief of these latter
+thereupon replied, with much grace and dignity: “Does the white chief
+think we would let _our man_ do woman’s work? It is our work to
+carry, and we should not like to see him do it.”
+
+[176] The appearance of the native carrier on the march was very
+ludicrous. Picture a stalwart Kafir carrying his sleeping mats,
+provisions, cooking-pot, drinking-gourd, shield, bundle of assegais
+and knob-kerries, and perched on top of all, on his head, a
+fifty-pound mealie-bag; the result was likened to a Christmas-tree.
+
+[177] A splendid elephant’s tusk (the Zulu emblem of international
+good-will and sincerity) had been sent by Cetshwayo, with one of his
+messages, to General Crealock; this Sir Garnet Wolseley sent home to
+the Queen, who thus has received a valuable present from her dusky
+antagonist.
+
+[178] Mr. Colenso was acquainted with him, having, as already
+related, paid him a visit in 1877.
+
+[179] At the same time many residents in Cape Town obtained, from
+mere motives of curiosity, that interview which, to those who had
+desired it for humanity’s sake, had been refused, while all who know
+his language, or are likely to sympathise, are rigidly excluded.
+Orders were given afterwards that the name of the Bishop of Natal
+should not be mentioned to Cetshwayo, “because it excited the
+prisoner.”
+
+[180] We think this statement is hardly correct.
+
+[181] _The Daily News_, 30th October, 1879.
+
+
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+                                                _February 16, 1880._
+
+                                BOOKS
+
+                            PUBLISHED BY
+
+                       CHAPMAN & HALL LIMITED,
+
+                          193, PICCADILLY.
+
+             (A Selection from their general Catalogue.)
+
+
+                   THE LETTERS OF CHARLES DICKENS.
+                (_NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PUBLISHED._)
+           Edited by his SISTER-IN-LAW and ELDEST DAUGHTER.
+               2 vols. demy 8vo, 30_s._ Second Edition.
+
+
+_BEESLY (EDWARD SPENCER)—Professor of History in University College,
+London_—
+
+  CATILINE, CLODIUS, AND TIBERIUS. Large crown 8vo, 6_s._
+
+
+_BLAKE (MRS.)_
+
+  THE REALITIES OF FREEMASONRY. Author of “Twelve Months in
+  Southern Europe.” Demy 8vo, 9_s._
+
+  “A singularly interesting and entertaining volume, clearly,
+  concisely, and systematically arranged in a series of chapters,
+  each of which contributes, in its proper place and order, to
+  the elucidation of the common purpose of them all, that is, the
+  _rationale_ of Freemasonry as it exists and is practised in
+  the present day. Mrs. Blake is never desultory or discursive;
+  possessing her subject thoroughly, and writing with all the
+  calmness of dispassionate investigation.”—_Daily News._
+
+
+_BOYLE (F.)—Author of “Camp Notes.”_
+
+  CHRONICLES OF NO MAN’S LAND. Large crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._
+
+  “It would be difficult to single one essay out above another in
+  Mr. Boyle’s series of remarkably equal sketches.”—_Standard._
+
+
+_BRADLEY (THOMAS)—of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich_—
+
+  ELEMENTS OF GEOMETRICAL DRAWING. In Two Parts, with Sixty Plates.
+  Oblong folio, half-bound, each Part, 16_s._
+
+
+_BUCKLAND (FRANK)_—
+
+  LOG-BOOK OF A FISHERMAN AND ZOOLOGIST. Second Edition. With
+  numerous Illustrations. Large crown 8vo 12_s._
+
+  “We welcome once more the freshest and most genial of the many
+  writers who aim at popularising among us habits of observation,
+  and the intelligent lover of natural history.”—_Graphic._
+
+
+_BURCHETT (R.)_—
+
+  DEFINITIONS OF GEOMETRY. New Edition. 24mo, cloth, 5_d._
+
+  LINEAR PERSPECTIVE, for the Use of Schools of Art. Twenty-first
+  Thousand. With Illustrations. Post 8vo, cloth, 7_s._
+
+  PRACTICAL GEOMETRY: The Course of Construction of Plane
+  Geometrical Figures. With 137 Diagrams. Eighteenth Edition. Post
+  8vo, cloth, 5_s._
+
+
+_BURNAND (F. C.), B.A., Trin. Coll. Camb._
+
+  THE “A. D. C.”; being Personal Reminiscences of the University
+  Amateur Dramatic Club, Cambridge. Demy 8vo, 12_s._ Second Edition.
+
+  “An eminently readable and pleasant book.”—_Examiner._
+
+  “A singularly amusing and interesting book.”—_Saturday Review._
+
+
+_CAMPION (J. S.) late Major, Staff, 1st Br. C.N.G., U.S.A._—
+
+  ON THE FRONTIER. Reminiscences of Wild Sport, Personal
+  Adventures, and Strange Scenes. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo,
+  16_s._ Second Edition.
+
+  “Every chapter is a finished picture.... The book will not only
+  delight the sportsman, but will prove irresistibly attractive
+  to all who like good stories thoroughly well told. To those in
+  search of fresh information about the aborigines or animals or
+  physical geography of Western America, Major Campion’s work will
+  yield many new facts. We hope to meet him again.”—_Times._
+
+  ON FOOT IN SPAIN. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 16_s._ Second
+  Edition.
+
+  “No one will look for word-painting, elaborate description, or
+  profound observation in a book of this kind; and, moreover, the
+  author seems to have a positive dread of what he calls ‘Coming
+  Barlow over the reader’—referring, we presume, to the terrible
+  mentor of Sandford and Merton. But in an unpretending way it
+  gives a much more graphic picture of the scenery, people, and
+  ways of North Spain than many a more ambitious work. Few readers,
+  we imagine, will lay it down without feeling they have a clearer
+  idea of the country, and without feeling also a kind of liking
+  for the author.”—_Pall Mall Gazette._
+
+
+_CARLYLE (DR.)_—
+
+  DANTE’S DIVINE COMEDY.—Literal Prose Translation of THE INFERNO,
+  with text and Notes. Second Edition. Post 8vo, 14_s._
+
+  CARLYLE BIRTHDAY BOOK. Prepared by permission of Mr. Thomas
+  Carlyle. Small crown 8vo, 3_s._
+
+  “An elegant little volume of the usual kind, with all its
+  quotations selected from Mr. Carlyle’s writings. Apart from its
+  primary use, this is really a book worth having, as it forms a
+  very good anthology of his wise and witty sayings.”—_Whitehall
+  Review._
+
+
+_CLINTON (R. H.)_—
+
+  A COMPENDIUM OF ENGLISH HISTORY, from the Earliest Times to A.D.
+  1872. With Copious Quotations on the Leading Events and the
+  Constitutional History, together with Appendices. Post 8vo, 7_s._
+  6_d._
+
+  “This is an invaluable book. In 280 pages it gives the whole
+  course of the history from the earliest ages, judiciously
+  interspersed with quotations from the best historians down to our
+  own time....”—_Examiner._
+
+
+_CRAIK (GEORGE LILLIE)_—
+
+  ENGLISH OF SHAKESPEARE. Illustrated in a Philological Commentary
+  on his Julius Cæsar. Fifth Edition. Post 8vo, cloth, 5_s._
+
+  OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. Ninth Edition.
+  Post 8vo, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+_DAVIDSON (ELLIS A.)_—
+
+  PRETTY ARTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF LEISURE HOURS. A Book for
+  Ladies. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 6_s._
+
+  THE AMATEUR HOUSE CARPENTER: a Guide in Building, Making, and
+  Repairing. With numerous Illustrations, drawn on Wood by the
+  Author. Royal 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+_DAVISON (THE MISSES)_—
+
+  TRIQUETI MARBLES IN THE ALBERT MEMORIAL CHAPEL, WINDSOR. A Series
+  of Photographs. Dedicated by express permission to Her Majesty
+  the Queen. The Work consists of 117 Photographs, with descriptive
+  Letterpress, mounted on 49 sheets of cardboard, half-imperial.
+  Price £10 10_s._
+
+
+_DE POMAR (THE DUKE)_—
+
+  FASHION AND PASSION; or, Life in Mayfair. New Edition. Crown 8vo,
+  6_s._
+
+
+_DIXON (W. HEPWORTH)_—
+
+  BRITISH CYPRUS. Demy 8vo, with Frontispiece, 15_s._
+
+  “‘British Cyprus’ is in essential points an able and piquant
+  work, and full of fresh and valuable information.”—_Graphic._
+
+  THE HOLY LAND. Fourth Edition. With 2 Steel and 12 Wood
+  Engravings, Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+_DRAYSON (LIEUT.-COL. A. W.)_—
+
+  PRACTICAL MILITARY SURVEYING AND SKETCHING. Fifth Edition. Post
+  8vo, cloth, 4_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+_DYCE (WILLIAM), R.A._—
+
+  DRAWING-BOOK OF THE GOVERNMENT SCHOOL OF DESIGN; OR, ELEMENTARY
+  OUTLINES OF ORNAMENT. Fifty selected Plates. Folio, sewed, 5_s._;
+  mounted, 18_s._
+
+  Text to ditto. Sewed, 6_d._
+
+
+_ESCOTT (T. H. S.)_—
+
+  PILLARS OF THE EMPIRE: Short Biographical Sketches. Demy 8vo,
+  10_s._ 6_d._
+
+  “The editor of the present volume deserves praise for the skill
+  displayed both in arranging the gallery and in painting some
+  of the more striking portraits which adorn it. From first to
+  last these sketches are full of fresh and lively interest; and
+  it would be no easy matter to select any one chapter which at
+  all falls short of the high standard reached by the volume
+  as a whole. The story of the lives and achievements of the
+  distinguished men whose career is here so brightly and freshly
+  recorded presents many varied contributions to the history of
+  the Empire, which appear as different illustrations of Imperial
+  service and aspects of the Imperial idea.... With bright touches,
+  happy illustrations, and pithy epigrams the whole book abounds,
+  and is readable from first to last.”—_Standard._
+
+
+_EWALD (ALEX. CHARLES), F.S.A._—
+
+  REPRESENTATIVE STATESMEN: Political Studies. Two Vols. Large
+  crown 8vo, 24_s._
+
+  “Contains much interesting matter well put together.... Mr. Ewald
+  has a happy knack of seizing the most salient points of the story
+  which he has to tell.”—_John Bull._
+
+
+_FANE (VIOLET)_—
+
+  DENZIL PLACE: a Story in Verse. Crown 8vo, cloth, 8_s._
+
+  QUEEN OF THE FAIRIES (A Village Story) and other Poems. By the
+  Author of “Denzil Place.” Crown 8vo, 6_s._
+
+  ANTHONY BABINGTON: a Drama. By the Author of “Denzil Place,” “The
+  Queen of the Fairies,” &c. Crown 8vo, 6_s._
+
+
+_FEARNLEY (W.), late Principal of the Edinburgh Veterinary College;
+Author of “Lectures on the Examination of Horses as to Soundness”_—
+
+  LESSONS IN HORSE JUDGING, AND THE SUMMERING OF HUNTERS. With
+  Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 4_s._
+
+  “An excellent description (with diagrams) of the points of a
+  horse one by one, followed by an equally excellent appendix on
+  the ‘Summering of Hunters.’”—_Graphic._
+
+
+_FITZ-PATRICK (W. J.)_—
+
+  LIFE OF CHARLES LEVER. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, 30_s._
+
+  “Mr. Fitzpatrick’s book is one of the most interesting of the
+  season; and we are glad that the task of writing about a writer
+  of whom all will be anxious to know all that can be known,
+  should have fallen into such conscientious and pains-taking
+  hands.”—_John Bull._
+
+
+_FLEMING (GEORGE), F.R.C.S._—
+
+  ANIMAL PLAGUES: THEIR HISTORY, NATURE, AND PREVENTION. 8vo,
+  cloth, 15_s._
+
+  HORSES AND HORSE-SHOEING: their Origin, History, Uses, and
+  Abuses. 210 Engravings. 8vo, cloth, £1 1_s._
+
+  PRACTICAL HORSE-SHOEING: With 37 Illustrations. Second Edition,
+  enlarged. 8vo, sewed, 2_s._
+
+  RABIES AND HYDROPHOBIA: THEIR HISTORY, NATURE, CAUSES, SYMPTOMS,
+  AND PREVENTION. With 8 Illustrations. 8vo, cloth, 15_s._
+
+  “Such a work as that now before us has long been a desideratum.
+  There have been useful treatises, more or less elaborated, upon
+  dog-madness, but there has not hitherto been any one which could
+  pretend to such a degree of completeness as the subject deserved.
+  It is not too much to say that Mr. Fleming has brought to its
+  consideration a remarkable amount of varied research and of
+  practical knowledge and judgment, and it must be acknowledged
+  that he has fulfilled the task he had assigned to himself in the
+  most ample and satisfactory manner.”—_Athenæum._
+
+  A MANUAL OF VETERINARY SANITARY SCIENCE AND POLICE. With 33
+  Illustrations. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, 36_s._
+
+  “His book is quite an encyclopædia of veterinary science, and
+  cannot fail to be of great value to all who have animals about
+  them. Mr. Fleming has resorted to the best authorities both in
+  this country and on the Continent, and has been able to add to
+  what he has obtained from them the results of a wide and varied
+  practical experience. His works on ‘Animal Plagues,’ and ‘Rabies
+  and Hydrophobia,’ have already secured his reputation as a writer
+  on veterinary science, and a material addition will be made
+  to it by the present extremely valuable and fairly exhaustive
+  treatise.”—_Pall Mall Gazette._
+
+
+_FORSTER (JOHN)_—
+
+  THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. With Portraits and other
+  Illustrations. 15th Thousand. 3 vols. 8vo, cloth, £2 2_s._
+
+  “Mr. Forster’s life of Dickens will always be eagerly read
+  as long as Dickens himself is eagerly read; and that will
+  be as long as Englishmen retain their delight in English
+  literature.”—_Spectator._
+
+  THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. Uniform with the Illustrated Edition
+  of Dickens’s Works. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, £1 8_s._
+
+  THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. Uniform with the Library Edition.
+  Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._
+
+  THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. Uniform with the “C. D.” Edition of
+  his Works. With Numerous Illustrations. 2 vols. 7_s._
+
+  THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. Uniform with the Household Edition.
+  With Illustrations by F. BARNARD. Crown 4to, cloth, 4_s._ 6_d._;
+  paper, 3_s._ 6_d._
+
+  WALTER SAVAGE LANDOR: a Biography, 1775-1864. With Portraits and
+  Vignettes. A New and Revised Edition, in 1 vol. Demy 8vo, 12_s._
+
+
+_FRANCATELLI (C. E.)_—
+
+  ROYAL CONFECTIONER: English and Foreign. A Practical Treatise.
+  With Coloured Illustrations. 3rd Edition. Post 8vo, cloth, 7_s._
+  6_d._
+
+  “Under the above abbreviated designation we are announcing a
+  work, the mere title-page of which is a catalogue of culinary
+  mysteries, and the programme of an exhibition of subtle and
+  ambrosial art. ‘The Royal English and Foreign Confectioner,’
+  as this title-page avers, is a practical treatise on the art
+  of confectionery in all its branches, comprising ornamental
+  confectionery artistically developed; different methods of
+  preserving fruit, fruit pulps, and juices in bottles, the
+  preparation of jams and jellies, fruit and other syrups,
+  summer beverages, and a great variety of national drinks; with
+  directions for making dessert cakes, plain and fancy bread,
+  candies, bonbons, comfits, spirituous essences, and cordials;
+  also, the art of ice-making, and the arrangement and general
+  economy of fashionable desserts. By Charles Elmé Francatelli,
+  pupil to the celebrated Carême, and late maître d’hotel to Her
+  Majesty the Queen, author of ‘The Modern Cook,’ ‘The Cook’s
+  Guide,’ and ‘Cookery for the Working Classes.’ With numerous
+  illustrations in chromo-lithography. We shall not affect to pass
+  judgment on the vast variety of recipes which carry out the
+  abundant promise of Francatelli’s title-page. It is enough to
+  absolve us from such endless labour to mention that the contents
+  of the chapters occupy 15 pages, and that the index in which the
+  references are printed very closely, comprises upwards of 20
+  pages, and includes all imaginable products of the confectionery
+  art.... WE SALUTE FRANCATELLI RESPECTFULLY IN DISMISSING HIS
+  BOOK; ONLY ADDING THAT HIS RECIPE FOR BEIGNETS OF PINK-APPLES, ON
+  PAGE 252, IS WORTH ALL THE MONEY WHICH THE PURCHASER WILL PAY FOR
+  THIS VERY OPPORTUNE VOLUME.”—_Times._
+
+
+_HANCOCK (E. CAMPBELL)_—
+
+  THE AMATEUR POTTERY AND GLASS PAINTER. With Directions for
+  Gilding, Chasing, Burnishing, Bronzing, and Ground Laying.
+  Illustrated. Including Fac-similes from the Sketch-Book of N. H.
+  J. WESTLAKE, F.S.A. With an Appendix. Demy 8vo, 5_s._
+
+  “A most useful handbook to the now fashionable art of painting
+  on china and glass, containing minute instructions which only
+  have to be thoroughly mastered to render the student capable of
+  turning out reasonably artistic work. The illustrations will also
+  be found very useful by the beginner, as they show the sort of
+  designs best adapted for the purpose in hand. For the general
+  reader, who does not aspire to become a crockery painter, some
+  interesting chapters on pottery and porcelain are provided,
+  in which they will find descriptions of many of the chief
+  manufactories, with particulars of the special productions that
+  have rendered them famous. Any person bitten with the china mania
+  cannot fail to be pleased with the information given in this part
+  of the book.”—_Globe._
+
+
+_HALL (SIDNEY)_—
+
+  A TRAVELLING ATLAS OF THE ENGLISH COUNTIES. Fifty Maps, Coloured.
+  New Edition, including the Railways, corrected up to the present
+  date. Demy 8vo, in roan tuck, 10_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+_HILL (MISS G.)_—
+
+  THE PLEASURES AND PROFITS OF OUR LITTLE POULTRY FARM. Small crown
+  8vo, 3_s._
+
+
+_HITCHMAN (FRANCIS)_—
+
+  THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD. 2 vols. Demy 8vo,
+  32_s._
+
+
+_HOLBEIN_—
+
+  TWELVE HEADS AFTER HOLBEIN. Selected from Drawings in Her
+  Majesty’s Collection at Windsor. Reproduced in Autotype, in
+  portfolio. 36_s._
+
+
+_HOVELACQUE (ABEL)_—
+
+  THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE: LINGUISTICS, PHILOLOGY, AND ETYMOLOGY.
+  With Maps. Large crown 8vo, cloth, 5_s._ Being the first volume
+  of “The Library of Contemporary Science.”
+
+  “This is a translation of the first work of a new French series
+  of Popular Scientific Works. The high character of the series,
+  and also its bias, may be inferred from the names of some of its
+  writers, _e.g._ P. Broca, Ch. Martins, C. Vogt, &c. The English
+  publishers announce that the present volume will be followed
+  immediately by others on Anthropology and Biology. If they are
+  like their precursor, they will be clear and well written,
+  somewhat polemical, and nobly contemptuous of opponents....
+  The translator has done his work throughout with care and
+  success.”—_Athenæum._
+
+
+_JARRY (GENERAL)_—
+
+  NAPIER (MAJ.-GEN. W. C. E.)—OUTPOST DUTY. Translated, with
+  TREATISES ON MILITARY RECONNAISSANCE AND ON ROAD-MAKING. Third
+  Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._
+
+
+_KEMPIS (THOMAS À)_—
+
+  ON THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. Four Books, Beautifully Illustrated
+  Edition. Demy 8vo, 16_s._
+
+  “It is illustrated with great ability—even the head and tail
+  pieces are themselves complete pictures, suggestive, quaint,
+  beautiful. The paper is of the best, and the printing very
+  careful. On the whole, for a gift or for presentation, we hardly
+  know where else to look for a book to match it. Clearly neither
+  care nor expense has been spared in producing this tasteful but
+  sumptuous volume.”—_Nonconformist._
+
+
+_KLACZKO (M. JULIAN)_—
+
+  TWO CHANCELLORS: PRINCE GORTCHAKOF and PRINCE BISMARCK.
+  Translated by Mrs. Tait. New and cheaper edition, 6_s._
+
+  “This is a most interesting and valuable book.... The object
+  is to trace out the working and the results of a ten years’
+  partnership between the two famous Chancellors of Russia and
+  Germany, Prince Gortchakoff and Prince Bismarck and these are
+  delineated with considerable artistic power, and in a manner
+  which betokens considerable political insight, and an intimate
+  acquaintance with the diplomatic world.”—_Blackwood’s Magazine._
+
+
+_LEFÈVRE (ANDRÉ)_—
+
+  PHILOSOPHY, Historical and Critical. Translated, with an
+  introduction, by A. W. KEANE, B.A. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+_LETOURNEAU (DR. CHARLES)_—
+
+  BIOLOGY. Translated by William MacCall. With Illustrations. Large
+  crown 8vo, 6_s._
+
+
+_LUCAS (CAPTAIN)_—
+
+  THE ZULUS AND THE BRITISH FRONTIER. Demy 8vo, 16_s._
+
+  “Even if South Africa did not so much engage public attention
+  at this moment, Mr. Lucas’s book would be well worth reading.
+  It is not a catchpenny publication, but a well written and
+  well arranged study of our relations with the Zulus. Mr. Lucas
+  expresses himself in a vigorous and manly style, without waste
+  of words; and, though he makes use occasionally of the figure
+  of irony, he never declaims, and never tries to be humorous out
+  of place. He himself has had some military experience near the
+  scene of the present disturbances, and he writes with a military
+  clearness and directness which command attention.”—_Saturday
+  Review._
+
+  CAMP LIFE AND SPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA. With Episodes in Kaffir
+  Warfare. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 12_s._
+
+  “Mr. Lucas has admirably executed the task which he set himself
+  to perform, and that was to touch upon some of the salient points
+  of life and character in South Africa, at the same time weaving
+  into them some of the everyday incidents of garrison life whilst
+  serving with his old regiment, the Cape Mounted Rifles. The book
+  is full of interest from the first page to the last, containing
+  as it does descriptions of the chief places in South Africa, its
+  various inhabitants, the peculiarities of Kaffir warfare, and the
+  sport to be met with.”—_Naval and Military Gazette._
+
+
+_LYTTON (ROBERT, LORD)_—
+
+  POETICAL WORKS—COLLECTED EDITION. Complete in 5 vols.
+
+  FABLES IN SONG. 2 vols. Fcap. 8vo, 12_s._ LUCILE. Fcap. 8vo,
+  6_s._ THE WANDERER. Fcap. 8vo, 6_s._ POEMS, HISTORICAL AND
+  CHARACTERISTIC. Fcap. 6_s._
+
+
+_MAXSE (FITZH.)_—
+
+  PRINCE BISMARCK’S LETTERS. Translated from the German. Second
+  Edition. Small crown 8vo, cloth, 6_s._
+
+
+_MAZADE (CHARLES DE)_—
+
+  THE LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. Translated from the French. Demy 8vo,
+  16_s._
+
+  “The arrangement of incidents, the juxtaposition of historical
+  contrasts, and the entire elaboration of M. de Mazade’s material,
+  are very artistic and very effective.... There is also much in
+  M. de Mazade’s work, which, by-the-bye, is well translated,
+  that may gratify English pride as well as instruct English
+  politicians.”—_World._
+
+
+_McCOAN (J. CARLILE)_—
+
+  OUR NEW PROTECTORATE. TURKEY IN ASIA: ITS GEOGRAPHY, RACES,
+  RESOURCES, AND GOVERNMENT. With a Map, showing the Existing and
+  Projected Public Works. 2 vols. large crown 8vo, 24_s._
+
+  “If a good book was to be made about Asiatic Turkey, it is
+  difficult to see how it could have been made with greater success
+  than has attended the efforts of Mr. McCoan. He has told us all
+  that we could wish to know; he has put his information into a
+  compact and readable shape; and he has supplied just as much
+  detail as gives body to his work without overloading it. He has,
+  too, a personal knowledge of many parts of the vast district he
+  describes; and has been for years familiar with the Turks, their
+  ways and work.”—_Saturday Review._
+
+
+_MOLESWORTH (W. NASSAU)_—
+
+  HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE YEAR 1830 TO THE RESIGNATION OF THE
+  GLADSTONE MINISTRY.
+
+  A Cheap Edition, carefully revised, and carried up to March,
+  1874. 3 vols. crown 8vo, 18_s._
+
+  A School Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._
+
+  “It is a great misfortune that the history of our country that
+  is nearest our own times young men are least acquainted with. It
+  is not written in histories that were read at school, and they
+  are not old enough, as I am old enough, to remember almost every
+  political fact since the great Reform Bill of 1832. I wish young
+  men would read some history of this period. A neighbour and a
+  friend of mine, a most intelligent and accomplished clergyman—Mr.
+  Molesworth—has published a work, being a political history
+  of England from the year 1830—that is, from the first Reform
+  Bill—until within the last two or three years; a book honestly
+  written, in which facts are plainly—and I believe truly—stated,
+  and a work which would give great information to all the young
+  men of the country, if they could be prevailed upon to read
+  it.”—_From the Right Hon. John Bright’s Speech at Birmingham._
+
+
+_MORLEY (HENRY)_—
+
+  ENGLISH WRITERS. Vol. I. Part I. THE CELTS AND ANGLO-SAXONS. With
+  an Introductory Sketch of the Four Periods of English Literature.
+  Part II. FROM THE CONQUEST TO CHAUCER. (Making 2 vols.) 8vo,
+  cloth, £1 2_s._
+
+  ⁂ Each Part is indexed separately. The Two Parts complete the
+  account of English Literature during the Period of the Formation
+  of the Language, or of THE WRITERS BEFORE CHAUCER.
+
+  “Mr. Morley’s volume, looks, at first sight, a formidable
+  addition to the existing mass of English writings after Chaucer;
+  but it is well worth reading. It comprises the foundation and
+  ground story, so to speak, of a work upon the whole sequence of
+  English literature. If carried out with the same spirit and on
+  the same scale as the volume already published, the complete work
+  will undoubtedly form a valuable contribution towards the story
+  of the growth of the literary mind of England, told as a national
+  biography of continuous interest.”—_Saturday Review._
+
+  Vol. II. Part I. FROM CHAUCER TO DUNBAR. 8vo, cloth, 12_s._
+
+  TABLES OF ENGLISH LITERATURE. Containing 20 Charts. Second
+  Edition, with Index. Royal 4to, cloth, 12_s._
+
+  In Three Parts. Parts I. and II., containing Three Charts, each
+  1_s._ 6_d._
+
+  Part III., containing 14 Charts, 7_s._ Part III., also kept in
+  Sections, 1, 2, and 1_s._ 6_d._ each; 3 and 4 together, 3_s._ ⁂
+  The Charts sold separately.
+
+
+_MORLEY (JOHN)_—
+
+  DIDEROT AND THE ENCYCLOPÆDISTS. 2 vols. demy 8vo, 26_s._
+
+  “We have here the story of a life, full in itself of human
+  interest, vividly and dramatically told; we have also glimpses
+  of the lives of others whose interest is scarcely inferior; have
+  a perfect treasure-house of social and political knowledge,
+  literary and artistic criticism; and we have another of those
+  singularly valuable contributions to the history of the
+  ‘modern spirit,’ which Mr. Morley is perhaps better qualified
+  than any living English writer to furnish, and which are
+  achieving for him a reputation that is more than English in its
+  comprehensiveness.”—_World._
+
+  CRITICAL MISCELLANIES. Second Series. France in the Eighteenth
+  Century—Robespierre—Turgot—Death of Mr. Mill—Mr. Mill on
+  Religion—On Popular Culture—Macaulay. Demy 8vo, cloth, 14_s._
+
+  VOLTAIRE. Large crown 8vo, 6_s._
+
+  “It is impossible to read his volume without being struck by
+  its independence of thought, its sincerity and candour of
+  expression, as well as by its ability and literary power. We have
+  freely expressed our dissent from the views which it presents
+  of the value and wholesomeness of the Voltairean philosophy,
+  if that name can fairly be applied to anything so essentially
+  unphilosophical; but at the same time it is well that such views
+  should be fairly argued out, and that, whatever inconvenience it
+  may occasion to people who, having once made up their minds on
+  a subject, dislike to have them disturbed, accepted conclusions
+  should be occasionally tested over again. Mr. Morley has given us
+  a valuable and highly suggestive study of the great man of a very
+  critical age.”—_Saturday Review._
+
+  ROUSSEAU. Large crown 8vo, 9_s._
+
+  CRITICAL MISCELLANIES. First Series. Large crown 8vo, 6_s._
+
+  CRITICAL MISCELLANIES. Second Series. [_In the Press._
+
+  “The papers one and all will bear reading not once but
+  twice—papers full of suggestive thought on subjects of undying
+  interest.”—_Graphic._
+
+  DIDEROT AND THE ENCYCLOPÆDISTS. Large crown 8vo, 12_s._
+
+  ON COMPROMISE. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._
+
+  STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL EDUCATION. Third Edition. 8vo, cloth, 3_s._
+
+
+_MORRIS (M. O’CONNOR)_—
+
+  HIBERNIA VENATICA. With Portraits of the Marchioness of
+  Waterford, the Marchioness of Ormonde, Lady Randolph Churchill,
+  Hon. Mrs. Malone, Miss Persse (of Moyode Castle), Mrs. Stewart
+  Duckett, and Miss Myra Watson. Large crown 8vo, 18_s._
+
+  TRIVIATA; or, Cross Road Chronicles of Passages in Irish Hunting
+  History during the season of 1875-76. With illustrations. Large
+  crown 8vo, 16_s._
+
+  “The highest compliment paid to the merits of ‘Triviator’s’
+  volume will be found to proceed from outsiders beyond the circle
+  of ‘hunting men,’ who have found interest and amusement in its
+  pages. The illustrations do not pretend to high line in art, but
+  are not lacking in humour and fidelity, and altogether we can
+  without scruple commend a perusal of ‘Triviata’ to all lovers
+  of hunting, on whose shelves it should find a place among the
+  standard works of that enthusiastic body.”—_Illustrated Sporting
+  and Dramatic News._
+
+
+_MURPHY (J. M.)_—
+
+  RAMBLES IN NORTH-WEST AMERICA. With Frontispiece and Map. 16_s._
+
+  “Mr. Murphy has not only written a very readable volume,
+  but must have employed infinite pains in collecting his
+  materials.”—_Saturday Review._
+
+
+_OLIVER (PROFESSOR), F.R.S., &c._—
+
+  ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL NATURAL ORDERS OF THE VEGETABLE
+  KINGDOM, PREPARED FOR THE SCIENCE AND ART DEPARTMENT, SOUTH
+  KENSINGTON. Oblong 8vo, with 109 Plates. Price, plain, 16_s._;
+  coloured, £1 6_s._
+
+
+_PIERCE (GILBERT A.)_—
+
+  THE DICKENS DICTIONARY: a Key to the Characters and Principal
+  Incidents in the Tales of Charles Dickens. With additions by
+  WILLIAM A. WHEELER. Large crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._
+
+  “The description of the external and internal peculiarities of
+  the characters is, as far as possible, given in Dickens’s own
+  words, a sign of laudable discretion on the editor’s part. The
+  volume forms a useful, we may say necessary, supplement to the
+  library edition of Dickens’s works.”—_Mayfair._
+
+
+_POLLOK (LIEUT.-COLONEL)_—
+
+  SPORT IN BRITISH BURMAH, ASSAM, AND THE CASSYAH AND JYNTIAH
+  HILLS. With Notes of Sport in the Hilly Districts of the Northern
+  Division, Madras Presidency. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, with Illustrations
+  and 2 Maps. 24_s._
+
+  “Colonel Pollok’s ‘Sport in British Burmah’ must be ranked among
+  the best books of its class.”—_Graphic._
+
+
+_POYNTER (E. J.), R.A._—
+
+  TEN LECTURES ON ART. Second Edition. Large crown 8vo, 9_s._
+
+  “This is a fine book, probably one of the books on art for a good
+  many years, full of clearly and deftly wrought-out explanations
+  upon subjects of much intricacy.... The remaining contents of
+  this remarkable book we must not even indicate. Its chief lessons
+  will, perhaps, centre upon the skilful teaching of thoroughness,
+  nobility, and patience that appears in almost every page, and
+  upon the remarkable illustrations and exposure of false taste in
+  decorative art.”—_Spectator._
+
+
+_PRINSEP (VAL), A.R.A._—
+
+  IMPERIAL INDIA. Containing numerous Illustrations and Maps made
+  during a Tour to the Courts of the Principal Rajahs and Princes
+  of India. Second Edition. Demy, 8vo, 21_s._
+
+  “It is to be hoped that the author of this work may be as
+  successful in his delineation of the Great Durbar on canvas as
+  he has been in the wood pictures we have noticed. His book is
+  one of the most readable that has lately appeared on the subject
+  of India, full of interest and of touches of humour which make
+  it a pleasant companion from the first chapter to the last....
+  It may be added that the illustrations are superlatively
+  good.”—_Athenæum._
+
+
+_REDGRAVE (SAMUEL)_—
+
+  A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF THE HISTORICAL COLLECTION OF
+  WATER-COLOUR PAINTINGS IN THE SOUTH KENSINGTON MUSEUM. With
+  an Introductory Notice by SAMUEL REDGRAVE. With numerous
+  Chromo-lithographs and other Illustrations. Published for the
+  Science and Art Department of the Committee of Council on
+  Education. Royal 8vo, £1 1_s._
+
+  “A book which is a real contribution to British art.”—_Graphic._
+
+
+_ROBSON (REV. J. H., M.A., LL.M.)—late Foundation Scholar of Downing
+College, Cambridge_—
+
+  AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON ALGEBRA. Post 8vo. 6_s._
+
+
+_ROLAND (ARTHUR)_—
+
+  FARMING FOR PLEASURE AND PROFIT.
+
+  VOL. I.—DAIRY FARMING, MANAGEMENT OF COWS, &c. Edited by WILLIAM
+  ABLETT. Large crown 8vo, 6_s._
+
+  “We cannot follow our author in detail, but we may confidently
+  recommend his book, not only to the attention of amateurs, but
+  also to that of experts, who will find a good many hints of
+  advantage to them.”—_Gardeners’ Chronicle._
+
+  “The book contains much information that will be useful to people
+  who may wish to keep their own cows and utilize their produce,
+  but are at present ignorant as to the best methods of going to
+  work.”—_Queen._
+
+  VOL. II.—POULTRY-KEEPING. Edited by WILLIAM ABLETT. Large crown
+  8vo, 5_s._
+
+  “Mr. Roland’s book gives much useful and instructive information
+  on the keeping and management of fowls; but we particularly
+  recommend his directions for the construction of a proper
+  fowl-house, which, though of the utmost importance and
+  absolutely necessary to success, is, as often as not, hopelessly
+  neglected.”—_Graphic._
+
+  VOL. III.—TREE-PLANTING, for Ornamentation or Profit, suitable to
+  every Soil and Situation. Edited by WILLIAM ABLETT. Large crown
+  8vo, 5_s._
+
+  “The book comprises much useful and practical information as
+  to the nature, uses, and growth of various kinds of trees; it
+  possesses the additional merit of being very readable, and
+  interesting to all admirers of sylvan beauty.”—_Queen._
+
+  VOL. IV.—STOCK-KEEPING AND CATTLE-REARING. [_In the Press._
+
+  VOL. V.—DRAINAGE OF LAND, MANURES, &c. [_In the Press._
+
+  VOL. VI.—ROOT-GROWING, HOPS, &c. [_In the Press._
+
+
+_SCOTT-STEVENSON (MRS.)_—
+
+  OUR HOME IN CYPRUS. With a Map and Illustrations. Demy 8vo,
+  14_s._ Second Edition.
+
+  “Mrs. Scott-Stevenson tells her story with delightful _naïveté_
+  and womanly simplicity; she gives us many amusing pictures of
+  life in Cyprus, and her sketches of her interesting female
+  friends at Kyrenia are particularly graphic. Her book is
+  altogether really attractive reading, gives one a fair idea of
+  several aspects of the island, and would prove useful to any
+  one contemplating a stay, especially for the sake of health.
+  It is accompanied by an excellent new map, containing many
+  important corrections on existing maps and a number of attractive
+  illustrations.”—_Times._
+
+
+_STORY (W. W.)_—
+
+  ROBA DI ROMA. Seventh Edition, with Additions and Portrait. Post
+  8vo, cloth, 10_s._ 6_d._
+
+  THE PROPORTIONS OF THE HUMAN FRAME, ACCORDING TO A NEW CANON.
+  With Plates. Royal 8vo, cloth, 10_s._
+
+  CASTLE ST. ANGELO. Uniform with “Roba di Roma.” With
+  Illustrations. Large crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+_STREETER (E. W.)_—
+
+  GOLD; OR, LEGAL REGULATIONS FOR THIS METAL IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
+  OF THE WORLD. Crown 8vo cloth, 3_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+_TANNER (PROFESSOR HENRY), F.C.S._—
+
+  JACK’S EDUCATION; OR, HOW HE LEARNT FARMING. Large crown 8vo,
+  4_s._
+
+  “Few people now fail to appreciate the value of popular
+  lectures on science and education, and the result of studies
+  in agricultural science is put into a taking narrative form by
+  Professor H. Tanner in ‘Jack’s Education,’ wherein he traces the
+  spread of agricultural knowledge in a certain district from a
+  stray remark dropped by a student at some provincial lectures.
+  Even the most unenlightened in farming matters could not fail to
+  understand and be interested in Professor Tanner’s volume.”
+
+
+_TOPINARD (DR. PAUL)_—
+
+  ANTHROPOLOGY. With a Preface by Professor PAUL BROCA, Secretary
+  of the Société d’Anthropologie, and Translated by ROBERT J. H.
+  BARTLETT, M.D. With numerous Illustrations. Large crown 8vo,
+  7_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+_TREVELYAN (L. R.)_—
+
+  A YEAR IN PESHAWUR AND A LADY’S RIDE INTO THE KHYBER PASS. Crown
+  8vo, 9_s._
+
+  “Mrs. Trevelyan has made the best of her opportunities for
+  observing what was worth noting while she was stationed at
+  Peshawur. The incidents of frontier life are well described,
+  as also are all the doings that go to make up life at that
+  important station, the whole being told in a pleasantly written
+  story.”—_Naval and Military Gazette._
+
+
+_TROLLOPE (ANTHONY)_—
+
+  THE CHRONICLES OF BARSETSHIRE. A Uniform Edition, consisting of 8
+  vols., large crown 8vo, 6_s._ each, handsomely printed, each vol.
+  containing Frontispiece.
+
+  THE WARDEN.
+  BARCHESTER TOWERS.
+  DR. THORNE.
+  FRAMLEY PARSONAGE.
+  THE SMALL HOUSE AT ALLINGTON. 2 vols.
+  LAST CHRONICLE OF BARSET. 2 vols.
+
+  AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. A Cheap Edition with Maps. 2 vols.
+  Small 8vo, cloth, 7_s._ 6_d._
+
+  SOUTH AFRICA. 2 vols. Large crown 8vo, with Maps. Fourth Edition,
+  £1 10_s._
+
+  SOUTH AFRICA, 1 vol. Crown 8vo, 6_s._
+
+
+_VÉRON (EUGÈNE)_—
+
+  ÆSTHETICS. Translated by W. H. ARMSTRONG. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._
+  6_d._
+
+  “It is utterly impossible, within our limits, to go far into so
+  vast a subject as æsthetics, which M. Véron himself can only
+  treat briefly and summarily in a volume of 473 pages. We can only
+  say that it is, on the whole, by far the best book on the subject
+  we ever met with. M. Véron is at the same time a master of his
+  subject and singularly free from those traditional prejudices
+  which usually hamper the judgment of a Frenchman in art matters.
+  He is quite independent of the stupid and tiresome official
+  teaching, and in perfect sympathy with true artistic genius in
+  its various manifestations.”—_Saturday Review._
+
+
+_WHITE (WALTER)_—
+
+  HOLIDAYS IN TYROL: Kufstein, Klobenstein, and Paneveggio. Large
+  crown 8vo, 14_s._
+
+  “A delightful holiday volume, full of pleasant chat and valuable
+  hints. Mr. Walter White has an eye that sees everything, a memory
+  which forgets nothing, a judgment to discriminate between what
+  is and is not worth repeating, and a fluent and cheery style,
+  neither striving artificially at epigram, nor relapsing through
+  feebleness into platitude.”—_World._
+
+  LONDONER’S WALK TO THE LAND’S END, AND A TRIP TO THE SCILLY
+  ISLES. Post 8vo. With 4 Maps. Third Edition. 4_s._
+
+  MONTH IN YORKSHIRE. Post 8vo. With a Map. Fifth Edition. 4_s._
+
+  “These volumes are written with intelligence, and are full of
+  information which should be welcome to every reader. There
+  are few parts of England which will not yield delight to
+  the pedestrian: but the counties visited by Mr. White are
+  inexhaustible in wealth of association and beauty of scenery, and
+  if his pleasantly written books excite a desire for home travel
+  they will not have been published in vain.”—_Pall Mall Gazette._
+
+
+_WORNUM (R. N.)_—
+
+  ANALYSIS OF ORNAMENT: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF STYLES. An
+  Introduction to the Study of the History of Ornamental Art. With
+  many Illustrations. Sixth Edition. Royal 8vo, cloth, 8_s._
+
+
+_WYLDE (ATHERTON)_—
+
+  MY CHIEF AND I; or, Six Months in Natal after the Langalibalele
+  Outbreak. With Portrait of Colonel Durnford. Demy 8vo, 14_s._
+
+  “We may add that the book is extremely interesting. Written
+  simply, but in good, plain English, without any attempt at
+  ‘word-painting,’ the very first pages gain the reader’s sympathy,
+  and when the last is reached, he parts from Mr. Wylde with
+  regret.”—_Examiner._
+
+
+_YOUNGE (C. D.)_—
+
+  PARALLEL LIVES OF ANCIENT AND MODERN HEROES. New Edition. 12mo,
+  cloth, 4_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+OFFICIAL HANDBOOK FOR THE NATIONAL TRAINING SCHOOL FOR COOKERY.
+Containing Lessons on Cookery; forming the Course of Instruction in
+the School. With List of Utensils Necessary, and Lessons on Cleaning
+Utensils. Compiled by “R. O. C.” Large crown 8vo. Fifth Edition, 8_s._
+
+“The good point about the book is that it presupposes complete
+ignorance on the part of the pupil; nothing is left to haphazard;
+every quantity is given in its exact and due proportion, and the
+price of each ingredient carefully set down. All these lessons,
+moreover, have been practically tested in the National Training
+School, and may therefore be accepted in good faith. It is not,
+however, to be supposed that any cunning recipes or rare and costly
+dishes are to be found in this book; the ‘first principles’ of good
+cookery is the lesson it professes to teach, and certainly the method
+of tuition is direct and easy to follow.”—_Times._
+
+
+FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW.—First Series, May, 1865, to Dec. 1866. 6 vols.
+Cloth, 13_s._ each.
+
+New Series, 1867 to 1872. In Half-yearly Volumes. Cloth, 13_s._ each.
+
+From January, 1873, to June 30, 1879, in Half-yearly Volumes. Cloth,
+16_s._ each.
+
+
+
+
+WHYTE-MELVILLE’S WORKS.
+
+
+CHEAP EDITION.
+
+_Crown 8vo, fancy boards, 2s. each, or 2s. 6d. in cloth._
+
+  UNCLE JOHN.
+  THE WHITE ROSE.
+  CERISE.
+  BROOKES OF BRIDLEMERE.
+  “BONES AND I.”
+  “M., OR N.”
+  CONTRABAND.
+  MARKET HARBOROUGH.
+  SARCHEDON.
+  SONGS AND VERSES.
+  SATANELLA.
+  THE TRUE CROSS.
+  KATERFELTO.
+  SISTER LOUISE.
+  ROSINE.
+  ROY’S WIFE.
+  BLACK BUT COMELY.
+
+
+
+
+CARLYLE’S (THOMAS) WORKS.
+
+
+LIBRARY EDITION COMPLETE.
+
+Handsomely printed in 34 vols. Demy 8vo, cloth, £15.
+
+  SARTOR RESARTUS. The Life and Opinions of Herr Teufelsdrockh.
+  With a Portrait, 7_s._ 6_d._
+
+  THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. A History. 3 vols., each 9_s._
+
+  LIFE OF FREDERICK SCHILLER AND EXAMINATION OF HIS WORKS. With
+  Supplement of 1872. Portrait and Plates, 9_s._ The Supplement
+  _separately_, 2_s._
+
+  CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS. With Portrait. 6 vols., each
+  9_s._
+
+  ON HEROES, HERO WORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY. 7_s._ 6_d._
+
+  PAST AND PRESENT. 9_s._
+
+  OLIVER CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES. With Portraits. 5 vols.,
+  each 9_s._
+
+  LATTER-DAY PAMPHLETS. 9_s._
+
+  LIFE OF JOHN STERLING. With Portrait, 9_s._
+
+  HISTORY OF FREDERICK THE SECOND. 10 vols., each 9_s._
+
+  TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GERMAN. 3 vols., each 9_s._
+
+  GENERAL INDEX TO THE LIBRARY EDITION. 8vo, cloth, 6_s._
+
+  EARLY KINGS OF NORWAY; also AN ESSAY ON THE PORTRAITS OF JOHN
+  KNOX. Crown 8vo, with Portrait Illustrations, 7_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+CHEAP AND UNIFORM EDITION.
+
+_In 23 vols., Crown 8vo, cloth, £7 5s._
+
+  THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A History. 2 vols., 12_s._
+
+  OLIVER CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES, with Elucidations, &c. 3
+  vols., 18_s._
+
+  LIVES OF SCHILLER AND JOHN STERLING, 1 vol., 6_s._
+
+  CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS. 2 vols., £1 4_s._
+
+  SARTOR RESARTUS AND LECTURES ON HEROES, 1 vol., 6_s._
+
+  LATTER-DAY PAMPHLETS. 1 vol., 6_s._
+
+  CHARTISM AND PAST AND PRESENT. 1 vol., 6_s._
+
+  TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GERMAN OF MUSÆUS, TIECK, AND RICHTER. 1
+  vol., 6_s._
+
+  WILHELM MEISTER, by Göthe. A Translation. 2 vols., 12_s._
+
+  HISTORY OF FRIEDRICH THE SECOND, called Frederick the Great.
+  Vols. I. and II., containing Part I.—“Friedrich till his
+  Accession.” 14_s._ Vols. III. and IV., containing Part II.—“The
+  First Two Silesian Wars.” 14_s._ Vols. V. VI., VII., completing
+  the Work, £1 1_s._
+
+
+PEOPLE’S EDITION.
+
+_In 37 vols., small Crown 8vo. Price 2s. each vol. bound in cloth; or
+in sets of 37 vols. in 18, cloth gilt, for £3 14s._
+
+  SARTOR RESARTUS.
+
+  FRENCH REVOLUTION. 3 vols.
+
+  LIFE OF JOHN STERLING.
+
+  OLIVER CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES. 5 vols.
+
+  ON HEROES AND HERO WORSHIP.
+
+  PAST AND PRESENT.
+
+  CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS. 7 vols.
+
+  LATTER-DAY PAMPHLETS.
+
+  LIFE OF SCHILLER.
+
+  FREDERICK THE GREAT. 10 vols.
+
+  WILHELM MEISTER. 3 vols.
+
+  TRANSLATIONS FROM MUSÆUS, TIECK, AND RICHTER. 2 vols.
+
+  THE EARLY KINGS OF NORWAY; also an Essay on the Portraits of John
+  Knox, with Illustrations. Small crown 8vo. Bound up with the
+  Index and uniform with the “People’s Edition.”
+
+
+
+
+DICKENS’S (CHARLES) WORKS.
+
+
+ORIGINAL EDITIONS.
+
+_In Demy 8vo._
+
+  THE MYSTERY OF EDWIN DROOD. With Illustrations by S. L. Fildes,
+  and a Portrait engraved by Baker. Cloth, 7_s._ 6_d._
+
+  OUR MUTUAL FRIEND. With Forty Illustrations by Marcus Stone.
+  Cloth, £1 1_s._
+
+  THE PICKWICK PAPERS. With Forty-three Illustrations by Seymour
+  and Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._
+
+  NICHOLAS NICKLEBY. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1
+  1_s._
+
+  SKETCHES BY “BOZ.” With Forty Illustrations by George Cruikshank.
+  Cloth, £1 1_s._
+
+  MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1
+  1_s._
+
+  DOMBEY AND SON. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._
+
+  DAVID COPPERFIELD. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1
+  1_s._
+
+  BLEAK HOUSE. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._
+
+  LITTLE DORRIT. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._
+
+  THE OLD CURIOSITY SHOP. With Seventy-five Illustrations by George
+  Cattermole and H. K. Browne. A New Edition. Uniform with the
+  other volumes, £1 1_s._
+
+  BARNABY RUDGE: a Tale of the Riots of ’Eighty. With Seventy-eight
+  Illustrations by G. Cattermole and H. K. Browne. Uniform with the
+  other volumes, £1 1_s._
+
+  CHRISTMAS BOOKS: Containing—The Christmas Carol; The Cricket on
+  the Hearth; The Chimes; The Battle of Life; The Haunted House.
+  With all the original Illustrations. Cloth, 12_s._
+
+  OLIVER TWIST and TALE OF TWO CITIES. In one volume. Cloth, £1
+  1_s._
+
+  OLIVER TWIST. Separately. With Twenty-four Illustrations by
+  George Cruikshank.
+
+  A TALE OF TWO CITIES. Separately. With Sixteen Illustrations by
+  Phiz. Cloth, 9_s._
+
+⁂ _The remainder of Dickens’s Works were not originally printed in
+Demy 8vo._
+
+
+LIBRARY EDITION.
+
+_In Post 8vo. With the Original Illustrations, 30 vols., cloth, £12._
+
+                                                                _s. d._
+  PICKWICK PAPERS                     43 Illustrations, 2 vols.  16  0
+  NICHOLAS NICKLEBY                   39       ”        2 vols.  16  0
+  MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT                   40       ”        2 vols.  16  0
+  OLD CURIOSITY SHOP and REPRINTED
+      PIECES                          36       ”        2 vols.  16  0
+  BARNABY RUDGE and HARD TIMES        36       ”        2 vols.  16  0
+  BLEAK HOUSE                         40       ”        2 vols.  16  0
+  LITTLE DORRIT                       40       ”        2 vols.  16  0
+  DOMBEY AND SON                      38       ”        2 vols.  16  0
+  DAVID COPPERFIELD                   38       ”        2 vols.  16  0
+  OUR MUTUAL FRIEND                   40       ”        2 vols.  16  0
+  SKETCHES BY “BOZ”                   39       ”        1 vol.    8  0
+  OLIVER TWIST                        24       ”        1 vol.    8  0
+  CHRISTMAS BOOKS                     17       ”        1 vol.    8  0
+  A TALE OF TWO CITIES                16       ”        1 vol.    8  0
+  GREAT EXPECTATIONS                   8       ”        1 vol.    8  0
+  PICTURES FROM ITALY and AMERICAN
+      NOTES                            8       ”        1 vol.    8  0
+  UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER               8       ”        1 vol.    8  0
+  CHILD’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND           8       ”        1 vol.    8  0
+  EDWIN DROOD and MISCELLANIES        12       ”        1 vol.    8  0
+  CHRISTMAS STORIES from “Household
+      Words,” &c.                     14       ”        1 vol.    8  0
+
+THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. By JOHN FORSTER. A New Edition. With
+Illustrations. Uniform with the Library Edition, post 8vo, of his
+Works. 10_s._ 6_d._
+
+
+THE “CHARLES DICKENS” EDITION.
+
+_In Crown 8vo. In 21 vols., cloth, with Illustrations, £3 9s. 6d._
+
+                                                               _s.  d._
+  PICKWICK PAPERS                               8 Illustrations  3   6
+  MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT                             8       ”        3   6
+  DOMBEY AND SON                                8       ”        3   6
+  NICHOLAS NICKLEBY                             8       ”        3   6
+  DAVID COPPERFIELD                             8       ”        3   6
+  BLEAK HOUSE                                   8       ”        3   6
+  LITTLE DORRIT                                 8       ”        3   6
+  OUR MUTUAL FRIEND                             8       ”        3   6
+  BARNABY RUDGE                                 8       ”        3   6
+  OLD CURIOSITY SHOP                            8       ”        3   6
+  A CHILD’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND                  4       ”        3   6
+  EDWIN DROOD and OTHER STORIES                 8       ”        3   6
+  CHRISTMAS STORIES, from “Household Words”     8       ”        3   6
+  TALE OF TWO CITIES                            8       ”        3   0
+  SKETCHES BY “BOZ”                             8       ”        3   0
+  AMERICAN NOTES and REPRINTED PIECES           8       ”        3   0
+  CHRISTMAS BOOKS                               8       ”        3   0
+  OLIVER TWIST                                  8       ”        3   0
+  GREAT EXPECTATIONS                            8       ”        3   0
+  HARD TIMES and PICTURES FROM ITALY            8       ”        3   0
+  UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER                        4       ”        3   0
+
+THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. Uniform with this Edition, with numerous
+Illustrations. 2 vols. 7_s._
+
+
+THE ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY EDITION.
+
+_Complete in 30 Volumes. Demy 8vo, 10s. each; or set, £15._
+
+This Edition is printed on a finer paper and in a larger type
+than has been employed in any previous edition. The type has been
+cast especially for it, and the page is of a size to admit of the
+introduction of all the original illustrations.
+
+No such attractive issue has been made of the writings of Mr.
+Dickens, which, various as have been the forms of publication adapted
+to the demands of an ever widely-increasing popularity, have never
+yet been worthily presented in a really handsome library form.
+
+The collection comprises all the minor writings it was Mr. Dickens’s
+wish to preserve.
+
+  SKETCHES BY “BOZ.” With 40 Illustrations by George Cruikshank.
+
+  PICKWICK PAPERS. 2 vols. With 42 Illustrations by Phiz.
+
+  OLIVER TWIST. With 24 Illustrations by Cruikshank.
+
+  NICHOLAS NICKLEBY. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.
+
+  OLD CURIOSITY SHOP and REPRINTED PIECES. 2 vols. With
+  Illustrations by Cattermole, &c.
+
+  BARNABY RUDGE and HARD TIMES. 2 vols. With Illustrations by
+  Cattermole, &c.
+
+  MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.
+
+  AMERICAN NOTES and PICTURES FROM ITALY. 1 vol. With 8
+  Illustrations.
+
+  DOMBEY AND SON. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.
+
+  DAVID COPPERFIELD. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.
+
+  BLEAK HOUSE. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.
+
+  LITTLE DORRIT. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz.
+
+  A TALE OF TWO CITIES. With 16 Illustrations by Phiz.
+
+  THE UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER. With 8 Illustrations by Marcus Stone.
+
+  GREAT EXPECTATIONS. With 8 Illustrations by Marcus Stone.
+
+  OUR MUTUAL FRIEND. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Marcus Stone.
+
+  CHRISTMAS BOOKS. With 17 Illustrations by Sir Edwin Landseer,
+  R.A., Maclise, R.A., &c. &c.
+
+  HISTORY OF ENGLAND. With 8 Illustrations by Marcus Stone.
+
+  CHRISTMAS STORIES. (From “Household Words” and “All the Year
+  Round.”) With 14 Illustrations.
+
+  EDWIN DROOD AND OTHER STORIES. With 12 Illustrations by S. L.
+  Fildes.
+
+
+HOUSEHOLD EDITION.
+
+This Edition consists of 22 Volumes, containing nearly 900
+Illustrations by F. Barnard, J. Mahony, F. A. Fraser, C. Green, &c.
+Price £3 14_s._ 6_d._ in cloth; and £2 15_s._ in paper binding.
+
+  OLIVER TWIST, with 28 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._; paper,
+  1_s._ 9_d._
+
+  MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT, with 59 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper,
+  3_s._
+
+  DAVID COPPERFIELD, with 60 Illustrations and a Portrait, cloth,
+  4_s._; paper, 3_s._
+
+  BLEAK HOUSE, with 61 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._
+
+  LITTLE DORRIT, with 58 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._
+
+  PICKWICK PAPERS, with 56 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._
+
+  BARNABY RUDGE, with 46 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._
+
+  A TALE OF TWO CITIES, with 25 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._;
+  paper, 1_s._ 9_d._
+
+  OUR MUTUAL FRIEND, with 58 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper,
+  3_s._
+
+  NICHOLAS NICKLEBY, with 59 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper,
+  3_s._
+
+  GREAT EXPECTATIONS, with 26 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._;
+  paper, 1_s._ 9_d._
+
+  OLD CURIOSITY SHOP, with 39 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper,
+  3_s._
+
+  SKETCHES BY “BOZ,” with 36 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._;
+  paper, 1_s._ 9_d._
+
+  HARD TIMES, with 20 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._; paper, 1_s._
+  6_d._
+
+  DOMBEY AND SON, with 61 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._
+
+  UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER, with 26 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._
+  6_d._; paper, 1_s._ 9_d._
+
+  CHRISTMAS BOOKS, with 28 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._;
+  sewed, 1_s._ 9_d._
+
+  THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, with 15 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._
+  6_d._; paper, 1_s._ 9_d._
+
+  AMERICAN NOTES and PICTURES FROM ITALY, with 18 New
+  Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._; paper, 1_s._ 9_d._
+
+  EDWIN DROOD; REPRINTED PIECES; and other STORIES, with 30
+  Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._
+
+  CHRISTMAS STORIES, with 23 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper,
+  3_s._
+
+  THE LIFE OF DICKENS. By JOHN FORSTER. With 40 Illustrations.
+  Cloth, 4_s._ 6_d._; paper, 3_s._ 6_d._
+
+Messrs. CHAPMAN & HALL trust that by this Edition they will be
+enabled to place the works of the most popular British Author of the
+present day in the hands of all English readers.
+
+
+_THE CHEAPEST AND HANDIEST EDITION OF_
+
+THE WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS.
+
+THE POCKET VOLUME EDITION.
+
+_30 vols., small fcap. 8vo, £2 5s._
+
+
+MR. DICKENS’S READINGS.
+
+_Fcap. 8vo. sewed._
+
+  CHRISTMAS CAROL IN PROSE.                          1_s._
+  CRICKET ON THE HEARTH.                             1_s._
+  CHIMES: A GOBLIN STORY.                            1_s._
+  STORY OF LITTLE DOMBEY.                            1_s._
+  POOR TRAVELLER, BOOTS AT THE HOLLY-TREE INN,
+      and MRS. GAMP.                                 1_s._
+
+  A CHRISTMAS CAROL, with the Original Coloured Plates; being a
+  reprint of the Original Edition. Small 8vo, red cloth, gilt
+  edges, 5_s._
+
+
+
+
+LEVER’S (CHARLES) WORKS.
+
+THE ORIGINAL EDITION WITH THE ILLUSTRATIONS.
+
+_In 17 vols. Demy 8vo. Cloth, 6s. each._
+
+
+CHEAP EDITION.
+
+_Fancy boards, 2s. 6d._
+
+  CHARLES O’MALLEY.
+  TOM BURKE.
+  THE KNIGHT OF GWYNNE.
+  MARTINS OF CROMARTIN.
+  THE DALTONS.
+  ROLAND CASHEL.
+  DAVENPORT DUNN.
+  DODD FAMILY.
+
+_Fancy boards, 2s._
+
+  THE O’DONOGHUE.
+  FORTUNES OF GLENCORE.
+  HARRY LORREQUER.
+  ONE OF THEM.
+  A DAY’S RIDE.
+  JACK HINTON.
+  BARRINGTON.
+  TONY BUTLER.
+  MAURICE TIERNAY.
+  SIR BROOKE FOSBROOKE.
+  BRAMLEIGHS OF BISHOP’S FOLLY.
+  LORD KILGOBBI.
+  LUTTRELL OF ARRAN.
+  RENT IN THE CLOUD and ST. PATRICK’S EVE.
+  CON CREGAN.
+  ARTHUR O’LEARY.
+  THAT BOY OF NORCOTTS.
+  CORNELIUS O’DOWD.
+  SIR JASPER CAREW.
+  NUTS AND NUT-CRACKERS.
+
+_Also in sets, 27 vols., cloth, for £4 4s._
+
+
+
+
+TROLLOPE’S (ANTHONY) WORKS.
+
+
+CHEAP EDITION.
+
+_Boards, 2s. 6d.; cloth, 3s. 6d._
+
+  THE PRIME MINISTER.
+  PHINEAS FINN.
+  ORLEY FARM.
+  CAN YOU FORGIVE HER?
+  PHINEAS REDUX.
+  HE KNEW HE WAS RIGHT.
+  EUSTACE DIAMONDS.
+
+_Boards, 2s.; cloth, 3s._
+
+  VICAR OF BULLHAMPTON.
+  RALPH THE HEIR.
+  THE BERTRAMS.
+  KELLYS AND O’KELLYS.
+  McDERMOT OF BALLYCLORAN.
+  CASTLE RICHMOND.
+  BELTON ESTATE.
+  MISS MACKENSIE.
+  AN EYE FOR AN EYE.
+  LADY ANNA.
+  HARRY HOTSPUR.
+  RACHEL RAY.
+  TALES OF ALL COUNTRIES.
+  MARY GRESLEY.
+  LOTTA SCHMIDT.
+  LA VENDÉE.
+  DOCTOR THORNE.
+  IS HE POPENJOY?
+
+
+
+
+SOUTH KENSINGTON MUSEUM SCIENCE AND ART HANDBOOKS.
+
+_Published for the Committee of Council on Education._
+
+  THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS IN SPAIN. By JUAN F. RIANO. Illustrated.
+  Large crown 8vo, 4_s._
+
+  GLASS. By ALEXANDER NESBITT. Illustrated. Large Crown 8vo, 2_s._
+  6_d._
+
+  GOLD AND SILVER SMITHS’ WORK. By JOHN HUNGERFORD POLLEN. With
+  numerous Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
+
+  TAPESTRY. By ALFRED CHAMPEAUX. With Woodcuts. 2_s._ 6_d._
+
+  BRONZES. By C. DRURY E. FORTNUM, F.S.A. With numerous Woodcuts.
+  Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
+
+  PLAIN WORDS ABOUT WATER. By A. H. CHURCH, M.A., Oxon. Large crown
+  8vo, sewed, 6_d._
+
+  ANIMAL PRODUCTS: their Preparation, Commercial Uses and Value. By
+  T. L. SIMMONDS. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._
+
+  FOOD: A Short Account of the Sources, Constituents, and Uses of
+  Food; intended chiefly as a Guide to the Food Collection in the
+  Bethnal Green Museum. By A. H. CHURCH, M.A., Oxon. Large crown
+  8vo, 3_s._
+
+  SCIENCE CONFERENCES. Delivered at the South Kensington Museum.
+  Crown 8vo, 2 vols., 6_s._ each.
+
+  VOL. I.—Physics and Mechanics.
+
+  VOL. II.—Chemistry, Biology, Physical Geography, Geology,
+  Mineralogy, and Meteorology.
+
+  ECONOMIC ENTOMOLOGY. By ANDREW MURRAY, F.L.S. APTERA. With
+  numerous Illustrations. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._
+
+  HANDBOOK TO THE SPECIAL LOAN COLLECTION of Scientific Apparatus.
+  Large crown 8vo, 3_s._
+
+  THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS: Historical Sketches. With 242 Illustrations.
+  Demy 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._
+
+  TEXTILE FABRICS. By the Very Rev. DANIEL ROCK, D.D. With numerous
+  Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
+
+  IVORIES: ANCIENT AND MEDIÆVAL. By WILLIAM MASKELL. With numerous
+  Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
+
+  ANCIENT & MODERN FURNITURE & WOODWORK. By JOHN HUNGERFORD POLLEN.
+  With numerous Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
+
+  MAIOLICA. By C. DRURY E. FORTNUM, F.S.A. With numerous Woodcuts.
+  Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
+
+  MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS. By CARL ENGEL. With numerous Woodcuts. Large
+  crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
+
+  MANUAL OF DESIGN, compiled from the Writings and Addresses of
+  RICHARD REDGRAVE, R.A. By GILBERT R. REDGRAVE. With Woodcuts.
+  Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
+
+  PERSIAN ART. By MAJOR R. MURDOCK SMITH, R.E. Second Edition. With
+  Additional Illustrations. [_In the Press._
+
+  FREE EVENING LECTURES. Delivered in connection with the Special
+  Loan Collection of Scientific Apparatus, 1876. Large crown 8vo,
+  8_s._
+
+
+
+
+CHAPMAN AND HALL’S
+
+LIST OF DIAGRAMS.
+
+_Issued under the Authority of the Science and Art Department, South
+Kensington_,
+
+For the use of Schools and Art and Science Classes.
+
+
+LARGE DIAGRAMS.
+
+ASTRONOMICAL:
+
+  TWELVE SHEETS. By JOHN DREW, Ph. Dr., F.R.S.A. Prepared for the
+  Committee of Council on Education. Sheets, £2 8_s._; on rollers
+  and varnished, £4 4_s._
+
+BOTANICAL:
+
+  NINE SHEETS. Illustrating a Practical Method of Teaching Botany.
+  By Professor HENSLOW, F.L.S. £2; on rollers, and varnished, £3
+  3_s._
+
+     CLASS.           DIVISION.        SECTION.     DIAGRAM.
+                  {                { Thalamifloral     1
+                  {                { Calycifloral    2 & 3
+  Dicotyledon     { Angiospermous  { Corollifloral     4
+                  {                { Incomplete        5
+                  { Gymnospermous                      6
+
+                  { Petaloid       { Superior          7
+  Monocotyledons  {                { Inferior          8
+                  { Glumaceous                         9
+
+BUILDING CONSTRUCTION:
+
+  TEN SHEETS. By WILLIAM J. GLENNY, Professor of Drawing, King’s
+  College. In sets, £1 1_s._
+
+GEOLOGICAL:
+
+  DIAGRAM OF BRITISH STRATA. By H. W. BRISTOW, F.R.S., F.G.S. A
+  Sheet, 4_s._; on roller and varnished, 7_s._ 6_d._
+
+MECHANICAL:
+
+  DIAGRAMS OF THE MECHANICAL POWERS, AND THEIR APPLICATIONS IN
+  MACHINERY AND THE ARTS GENERALLY. By DR. JOHN ANDERSON.
+
+  8 Diagrams, highly coloured on stout paper, 3 feet 6 inches by 2
+  feet 6 inches. Sheets £1 per set; mounted on rollers, £2.
+
+  DIAGRAMS OF THE STEAM-ENGINE. By Professor GOODEVE and Professor
+  SHELLEY. Stout paper, 40 inches by 27 inches, highly coloured.
+
+  Sets of 41 Diagrams (52½ Sheets), £6 6_s._; varnished and mounted
+  on rollers, £11 11_s._
+
+  MACHINE DETAILS. By Professor UNWIN. 16 Coloured Diagrams.
+  Sheets, £2 2_s._; mounted on rollers and varnished, £3 14_s._
+
+ZOOLOGICAL:
+
+  TEN SHEETS. Illustrating the Classification of Animals. By ROBERT
+  PATTERSON, £2; on canvas and rollers, varnished, £3 10_s._
+
+  The same, reduced in size on Royal paper, in 9 sheets uncoloured,
+  12_s._
+
+
+
+
+THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW.
+
+Edited by JOHN MORLEY.
+
+THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW is published on the 1st of every month (the
+issue on the 15th being suspended), and a Volume is completed every
+Six Months.
+
+
+_The following are among the Contributors_:—
+
+  SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.
+  PROFESSOR BAIN.
+  PROFESSOR BEESLY.
+  DR. BRIDGES.
+  HON. GEORGE C. BRODRICK.
+  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL, M.P.
+  J. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P.
+  PROFESSOR SYDNEY COLVIN.
+  MONTAGUE COOKSON, Q.C.
+  L. H. COURTNEY, M.P.
+  G. H. DARWIN.
+  F. W. FARRAR.
+  PROFESSOR FAWCETT, M.P.
+  EDWARD A. FREEMAN.
+  MRS. GARRET-ANDERSON.
+  M. E. GRANT DUFF, M.P.
+  THOMAS HARE.
+  F. HARRISON.
+  LORD HOUGHTON.
+  PROFESSOR HUXLEY.
+  PROFESSOR JEVONS.
+  ÉMILE DE LAVELEYE.
+  T. E. CLIFFE LESLIE.
+  RIGHT HON. R. LOWE, M.P.
+  SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, M.P.
+  LORD LYTTON.
+  SIR H. S. MAINE.
+  DR. MAUDSLEY.
+  PROFESSOR MAX MÜLLER.
+  PROFESSOR HENRY MORLEY.
+  G. OSBORNE MORGAN, Q.C., M.P.
+  WILLIAM MORRIS.
+  F. W. NEWMAN.
+  W. G. PALGRAVE.
+  WALTER H. PATER.
+  RT. HON. LYON PLAYFAIR, M.P.
+  DANTE GABRIEL ROSSETTI.
+  HERBERT SPENCER.
+  HON. E. L. STANLEY.
+  SIR J. FITZJAMES STEPHEN, Q.C.
+  LESLIE STEPHEN.
+  J. HUTCHISON STIRLING.
+  A. C. SWINBURNE.
+  DR. VON SYBEL.
+  J. A. SYMONDS.
+  W. T. THORNTON.
+  HON. LIONEL A. TOLLEMACHE.
+  ANTHONY TROLLOPE.
+  PROFESSOR TYNDALL.
+  THE EDITOR.
+
+&c. &c. &c.
+
+
+          THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW _is published at 2s. 6d._
+
+
+              CHAPMAN & HALL LIMITED, 193, PICCADILLY.
+
+  BRADBURY, AGNEW, & CO.,]                     [PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS.
+
+
+
+
+  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
+
+  Footnote [68] is referenced twice from page 135.
+
+  Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
+  corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
+  the text and consultation of external sources.
+
+  Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
+  when a predominant preference was found in the original book.
+
+  Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings of names
+  and words in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have
+  been left unchanged.
+
+  Pg viii: page number ‘23’ replaced by ‘273’.
+  Pg 56: ‘retractation of the’ replaced by ‘retraction of the’.
+  Pg 124: ‘African Rupublic’ replaced by ‘African Republic’.
+  Pg 295: ‘the beleagured camp’ replaced by ‘the beleaguered camp’.
+  Pg 348: ‘Schumbrucker’ replaced by ‘Schermbrucker’.
+  Pg 398: ‘where-ever the enemy’ replaced by ‘wherever the enemy’.
+  Pg 439: ‘casualities were’ replaced by ‘casualties were’.
+  Pg 457: ‘will send yon’ replaced by ‘will send you’.
+
+  Catalog
+  Pg c6: ‘trace ou the’ replaced by ‘trace out the’.
+  Pg c9: ‘knowledge,  terary’ replaced by ‘knowledge, literary’.
+  Pg c23: ‘Sheets, £2 2.’ replaced by ‘Sheets, £2 2_s._.
+
+
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75320 ***