diff options
Diffstat (limited to '75320-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 75320-0.txt | 15936 |
1 files changed, 15936 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/75320-0.txt b/75320-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26bfb10 --- /dev/null +++ b/75320-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,15936 @@ + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75320 *** + + + + + + TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE + + Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. + + Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been + placed at the end of the book text, in front of the Catalog. + + The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font. + + Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. + + + + + HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR + AND ITS ORIGIN. + + + + + HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR + + AND ITS ORIGIN. + + + BY + FRANCES E. COLENSO. + + + ASSISTED IN THOSE PORTIONS OF THE WORK WHICH TOUCH UPON + MILITARY MATTERS + + BY + LIEUT.-COLONEL EDWARD DURNFORD. + + + London: + CHAPMAN AND HALL, LIMITED, 193, PICCADILLY. + 1880. + + _All Rights reserved._ + + + + + CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS, + CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS. + + + + +PREFACE. + + +It is probable that the Bishop of Natal may be held responsible +for the contents of a volume written partly by his daughter, and +having for its subject the Zulu War; more especially if a general +coincidence can be traced between what are known to be his views +and those which are expressed in this history. My father’s opinions +have, naturally, considerable influence over those held or expressed +by his family, and I do not imagine that much will be found in these +pages from which he will dissent. Nevertheless, it is desirable that +my readers should understand from the first that he is in no sense +responsible for their contents. + +When I left Natal, in September last, the idea of writing upon the +subject of the Zulu War had hardly occurred to me; it has developed +since to an extent quite beyond my original intentions, and I find +that its fulfilment has rather taken my father by surprise. I had no +opportunity of consulting him upon the subject, nor has he yet seen a +word of what I have written, for on reaching England I found that, to +be of any use at all, the book should appear almost at once. + +I made, indeed, ample use of the pamphlets which the Bishop of Natal +has written on behalf of Langalibalele and Cetshwayo, which have +saved me many hours of weary search. Consequently, while the Bishop +is in no way responsible for such errors or omissions as may occur in +this volume, any merit or usefulness which my portion of the book +may contain is due chiefly to his labours. + +The general plan of my history was laid out, and the first +few chapters were written, during the voyage from Natal, and +upon reaching England I obtained the assistance of my friend +Lieut.-Colonel Edward Durnford in that portion of the work which +deals with the military conduct of the war. While it was desirable +that a record of military events should be made by one whose +professional knowledge qualified him for the duty, there was an +additional reason which made his help appropriate. It may easily +be understood from his name that the interest taken by him in his +task would be of no ordinary kind. Colonel Durnford has written +the military portions of the book, but is not responsible for any +expressions of opinion upon matters strictly political. + +I am far from feeling that I am the best person to undertake such a +work as this, which my father himself would look upon as a serious +one, and which he, or even my sister, who has worked with him +throughout, would do so much better than I; but they were not at +hand, and I have thought it my duty to do what I could, while I could +have had no better aid than that given me by Colonel Durnford. + +However insufficient the result may prove, we shall at least hope +that our work may give some slight assistance to that cause of +justice, truth, and mercy, the maintenance of which alone can ensure +the true honour of the British name. + + FRANCES ELLEN COLENSO. + + _January 22nd, 1880._ + + + + +CONTENTS. + + + CHAPTER I. + PAGE + FIRST CAUSES 1 + + + CHAPTER II. + + LANGALIBALELE 20 + + + CHAPTER III. + + TRIAL OF LANGALIBALELE 38 + + + CHAPTER IV. + + THE BISHOP’S DEFENCE 51 + + + CHAPTER V. + + THE PUTINI TRIBE 63 + + + CHAPTER VI. + + SIR GARNET WOLSELEY: WHAT HE CAME FOR, WHAT HE DID, + AND WHAT HE DID NOT DO 78 + + + CHAPTER VII. + + THE MATSHANA INQUIRY AND COLONEL COLLEY 89 + + + CHAPTER VIII. + + THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL 112 + + + CHAPTER IX. + + THE DISPUTED TERRITORY 138 + + + CHAPTER X. + + THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION 163 + + + CHAPTER XI. + + SIHAYO, UMBILINI, AND THE MISSIONARIES IN ZULULAND 192 + + + CHAPTER XII. + + THE ULTIMATUM, DECLARATION OF WAR, AND COMMENCEMENT OF + CAMPAIGN 235 + + + CHAPTER XIII. + + ISANDHLWANA 273 + + + CHAPTER XIV. + + RORKE’S DRIFT—HELPMAKAAR—COURT OF INQUIRY, ETC. 302 + + + CHAPTER XV. + + THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SIKUKUNI 325 + + + CHAPTER XVI. + + NO. 4 COLUMN—INTOMBI—INDHLOBANE—KAMBULA—KING’S + MESSENGERS 344 + + + CHAPTER XVII. + + THE LOWER TUGELA—INYEZANE—ETSHOWE 368 + + + CHAPTER XVIII. + + NGINGINDHLOVU—RELIEF OF ETSHOWE—BORDER RAIDING 380 + + + CHAPTER XIX. + + REINFORCEMENTS—ISANDHLWANA REVISITED 394 + + + CHAPTER XX. + + THE PRINCE IMPERIAL 418 + + + CHAPTER XXI. + + ULUNDI 433 + + + CHAPTER XXII. + + SIR GARNET WOLSELEY—CAPTURE OF CETSHWAYO 453 + + + CONCLUSION 475 + + + + +THE ZULU WAR. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +FIRST CAUSES. + + +England’s collisions with the savage races bordering upon her +colonies have in all probability usually been brought about by the +exigencies of the moment, by border-troubles, and acts of violence +and insolence on the part of the savages, and from the absolute +necessity of protecting a small and trembling white population from +their assaults. + +No such causes as these have led up to the war of 1879. For more +than twenty years the Zulus and the colonists of Natal have lived +side by side in perfect peace and quietness. The tranquillity of +our border had been a matter of pride as compared to the disturbed +and uncertain boundaries between Zululand and the Transvaal. The +mere fact of the utterly unprotected condition of the frontier +farmers on _our_ border, and the entire absence of anything like +precaution, evinced by the common practice of building houses of the +most combustible description, is a proof that the colonists felt +no real alarm concerning the Zulus until the idea was suggested to +them by those in authority over them.[1] The only interruption to +this tranquil condition of the public mind about the Zulus was in the +year 1861, when a scare took place in the colony, for which, as it +afterwards proved, there were no grounds whatsoever. A general but +unfounded belief was rife that Cetshwayo,[2] king, or rather at that +time prince, ruling Zululand, was about to invade Natal, in order to +obtain possession of his young brother Umkungo, a claimant of the +Zulu crown, and who had escaped over the border at the time of the +great civil war of which we shall presently treat. This young prince +had been placed—by the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone—at +Bishopstowe,[3] for his education in the Native Boys’ School there; +and it was not until he had been there for years that the fancy +arose, suggested and fostered by the border farmers and traders in +Zululand, that Cetshwayo intended to take him by force from amongst +us, or at all events to make the attempt. + +Under the influence of this belief the troops then stationed in +Natal were ordered to the frontier, the colonial volunteers were +called out, the defence of the principal towns became a matter for +consideration; while outlying farmers, and residents in the country, +hastened to remove their families to places of comparative safety. + +Bishopstowe was supposed to be the special object of the expected +attack; but the Bishop himself, having occasional opportunities of +learning the state of things in Zululand, through his missionary +there, could never be brought thoroughly to believe in the gravity +of the danger. It is true that, as a matter of precaution, and in +deference to the strongly-expressed opinion of the Lieut.-Governor +of the Colony and of Mr. Shepstone, he sent away the threatened boy +to some of his own people, in a more remote and safer part of the +colony. But he was extremely reluctant to take the further step, +strongly urged upon him, of removing his family and people to the +adjacent city of Pietermaritzburg, and only consented to do so +under protest. During the night following his consent, but before +the project had been carried out, he had reason for a few hours to +suppose that he had been mistaken in his own judgment. The family +at Bishopstowe was knocked up at one o’clock in the morning by a +messenger from a passing Dutch farmer, who, on his way into town with +his own family, had sent word to the Bishop that Cetshwayo’s army had +entered the colony, was already between him and Table Mountain—that +is to say within a distance of nine miles—and was burning, killing, +and destroying all upon the way to Bishopstowe. There seemed to be no +doubt of the fact; so, hastily collecting their native villagers,[4] +the Colensos left their homes and started for the town, which they +reached, most of them on foot, about daybreak. The consequence of +their being accompanied and followed by a considerable party of +natives (of both sexes and all ages!) was that the townspeople +immediately supposed that the “Zulus had come;” and some of them +actually left their houses, and took refuge in the various places of +safety—such as the fort, the principal churches, and so on—previously +decided upon by the authorities in case of necessity. In common South +African terms they “went into laager.” + +As the day passed, and still no further tidings arrived of the +approach of the Zulus or the destruction of Bishopstowe, the Bishop +began to have strong suspicions that, after all, he had been right in +his original opinion, and that “the killing, burning, and destroying” +had been conjured up by some excited imagination. This opinion was +confirmed, if not completely established, in the course of the day, +by the reception of a letter from the missionary in Zululand before +mentioned, in which he inquired, on the Zulu king’s behalf, what +fault the latter had committed towards the English, that they should +be preparing to invade his country. The missionary added that all +was perfectly quiet in Zululand, until the border tribes, seeing +the British troops approaching, fled inland in alarm, killing their +cattle to prevent their falling into the hands of the invaders, and +burying their other possessions where they could not carry them +away. In point of fact the “scare” had no foundation whatsoever, and +the Zulus were quite as much alarmed by the actual approach of the +British troops as the Natalians had been by the imaginary Zulu army. +The worst immediate consequence of the mistake was the want, almost +amounting to famine, produced amongst the border Zulus by the loss of +their cattle. A later and more serious result has been that general +impression, which has long obtained credence at home in England, +that the colonists of Natal have not only been in fear of their +lives on account of the Zulus for many years, but have also had good +and sufficient reason for their alarm. But for this fixed, though +groundless idea, England would hardly have been in such a hurry to +send out additional troops for the protection of the colony as she +was in the summer of 1878; to her own great loss and to the very +considerable injury of the colony itself, not to speak of its unhappy +neighbours and heretofore friends the Zulus. + +It is certainly true that during the year 1878 the inhabitants of +Natal did honestly feel great fear of the Zulus, and of a possible +invasion of the colony by them, the alarm in many cases amounting +to absolute panic. But this feeling was produced by no warlike +menaces from our neighbours, no sinister appearances on our borders. +The panic—or “scare,” as it would popularly be called in Natal—was +forced upon the people by the conduct and language of their rulers, +by the preparations made for war, troops being sent for from England +“for defensive purposes” (as was so repeatedly asserted by both Sir +Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford, then Lieut.-General the Hon. F. +A. Thesiger), and by the perpetual agitation of the local newspaper +editors. + +It is true indeed that a certain section of the colonists eagerly +desired war. To some the presence of the troops was a source of +actual fortune, to others the freedom and independence of so large +a body of black people, whom they could neither tax nor force to +work for them, was, and had long been, odious; the revenue to be +derived from a hut-tax levied upon the Zulus, and the cheap labour +to be obtained when their power and independence should be broken, +formed one of the chief subjects for speculation when the war was +first suggested. To others, again, the prospect of war was simply a +source of pleasurable excitement, a hunt on a large scale, martial +glory to be won, with just spice enough of danger to give zest to the +affair; as had been the case in the war just concluded in Kaffraria. +Naturally this feeling was commonest amongst the volunteers and +their friends. Some of them looked upon the matter in a light which +would meet with utter condemnation in any civilised society; but +many others, especially the young lads who filled up the ranks of +the volunteer corps, were simply dazzled by visions of military +distinction, excited by the popular phrases in perpetual use about +“fighting for their country, and doing their duty as soldiers,” to +the extent of losing sight altogether of the question as to whether +or no their country really required any defence at all. + +Natal cannot honestly claim to be guiltless in bringing about the +war with the Zulus, and will hardly deny that in 1878 the prospect +was a most popular one amongst her sons. Perhaps Sir Bartle Frere +could not so easily have produced a war out of the materials which +he had at hand but for the assistance given him by the popular cry +in the colony, and the general fear of the Zulus, which called forth +England’s ready sympathy and assistance. But it must be remembered +that the panic was not a genuine one, nor even one like that of 1861, +produced by the folly of the people themselves. It was distinctly +imposed upon them by those in authority, whose policy was to bring +about a collision with the Zulus, and who then made use of the very +fears which they had themselves aroused for the furtherance of their +own purpose. + +The subjugation of the Zulus and the annexation of their country, +formed part of a policy which has occupied the minds of certain +British statesmen for many years. The ambition of creating a South +African Empire, to be another jewel in Victoria’s crown, which, if +no rival, should at least be a worthy pendant to the great Indian +Empire, was a dazzling one, and towards that object all Government +action in South Africa has apparently tended since the year 1873. +When the idea was first conceived those only know who formed it, but +it took practical and visible form in 1873. In that year by crowning +the Zulu king we assumed a right to interfere in the internal +management of the country, thereby establishing a possible future +cause of offence, which, as the Zulus obstinately refused to put +themselves in the wrong by any sort of interference with us, was +necessary in order to bring about a state of things which should +eventually give us a sufficient excuse for taking possession of the +country altogether. + +The origin of this performance was as follows. In the year 1856 a +great revolution took place in Zululand, and a civil war broke out +between two claimants to the heirship of the throne (then filled +by Umpande), namely, the present king, Cetshwayo, and his brother +Umbulazi. Cetshwayo was quite young at the time, and appears to have +been put forward by some ambitious warriors, who intended to rule in +his name, and did not expect the remarkable power and talent which he +afterwards developed. + +Umbulazi’s party was beaten, he himself being killed in battle, great +carnage ensuing, and many fugitives escaping into Natal. + +Amidst all the bloodshed and horror which naturally attends such +a warfare as this between savages, there stands out the singular, +perhaps unprecedented, fact that Cetshwayo, although victorious to +the extent of carrying the nation with him, not only never made any +attempt upon the old king, his father’s, life, but did not even +depose him or seize his throne. The old man lived and—nominally, +at all events—reigned for many years, though, owing to his age and +obesity, which was so great as to prevent his walking, he seems to +have been willing enough to leave the real authority in the hands of +his son, while retaining the semblance of it himself. He was treated +with all due respect by Cetshwayo and his followers until he died a +natural death in the year 1872, when Cetshwayo ascended the throne +which had long been virtually his own, and was proclaimed king of +Zululand. This was looked upon as a fitting time for a little display +of authority by ourselves, hence the friendly expedition to Zululand +of 1873, when we gave Cetshwayo to understand that, however it might +appear to him, he held his power from us, and was no true king till +we made him such. It was also rightly thought to be an opportunity +for suggesting to the Zulu king such reforms in the government of +his country as would naturally commend themselves to English ideas. +We considered, and with some reason, that capital punishment was an +over-frequent occurrence in Zululand, and that, on the other hand, +judicial trials before sentence should be the universal rule. It was +also desirable, if possible, to decrease the belief in witchcraft, +by which so much power was left in the hands of the witch-doctors +or priests;[5] and finally it was thought necessary to provide for +the safety of the missionaries resident in the land.[6] How far this +was a desirable step depends entirely on whether the men themselves +were earnest, self-sacrificing, peace-loving teachers of the gospel +of Christ, or mere traders for their own benefit, under the cloak +of a divine mission, ready to hail a bloody war. “Only the utter +destruction of the Zulus can secure future peace in South Africa ... +we have the approbation of God, our Queen, and our own conscience.” +(See letter from a missionary clergyman to Sir Bartle Frere,[7] dated +December 17th, 1878. (P. P. [C. 2316] p. 3.)) + +It was frequently asserted at the time in Natal that this coronation +ceremony (1st September, 1873) was nothing better than a farce, +and the way in which it was carried out seems hardly to have been +understood by the king himself. The Natalians were puzzled as to what +could be the meaning or intention of what seemed to them a hollow +show, and were on the whole rather inclined to put it down to Mr. +Shepstone’s supposed habit of “petting the natives,” and to “Exeter +Hall influences,” resulting in a ridiculous fuss on their behalf. + +From Mr. Shepstone’s despatch on the subject of the coronation of +Cetshwayo (P. P. [C. 1137]), and from messages brought from the +latter to the Government of Natal after his father’s death, there +appears to have been a strong desire on the part, not only of the +people, but of the king himself, that his formal succession to the +throne should be unattended by bloodshed and disorder, such as had +ushered in the rule of his predecessors for several generations. +How greatly the character of the Zulu rule had improved in a +comparatively short period may be judged by a comparison of the fact +[p. 5, _ibid._] (mentioned by Mr. Shepstone), that during the reigns +of Chaka and Dingana (grandfather and great-uncle to Cetshwayo), all +the royal wives were put to death either before the birth of their +children, or with their infants afterwards, with the behaviour of +Cetshwayo, both to his father and to his father’s wives.[8] And Mr. +Shepstone himself speaks of Cetshwayo on the occasion of this visit +in the following manner:—“Cetywayo is a man of considerable ability, +much force of character, and has a dignified manner; in all my +conversations with him,” the Secretary for Native Affairs continues, +“he was remarkably frank and straightforward, and he ranks in every +respect far above any native chief I have ever had to do with.” +Throughout the despatch, indeed, Mr. Shepstone repeatedly speaks of +the king’s “frankness” and “sagacity,” in direct opposition to the +charges of craft and duplicity so recklessly brought against the +latter of late. + +King Umpande died in October, 1872, having reigned nearly +thirty-three years, and on the 26th February, 1873, messengers from +Cetshwayo brought the news of his father’s death to the Governor +of Natal, requesting at the same time that Mr. Shepstone might be +sent to instal Cetshwayo as his successor,[9] in order that the +Zulu nation should be “more one with the government of Natal,” +and be “covered by the same mantle.” The message ended with the +request which Cetshwayo never lost an opportunity of making, that we +would protect his country from Boer aggressions.[10] “We are also +commissioned,” say the messengers, “to urge, _what has already been +urged so frequently_, that the government of Natal be extended so as +to intervene between the Zulus and the territory of the Transvaal +Republic.” + +The mere fact that this proposition was frequently and earnestly +pressed upon the Natal Government by the Zulus, is in itself a proof +positive that the aggressions were not on their side. They desired +to place what they looked upon as an impassable barrier between the +two countries, and could therefore have had no wish themselves to +encroach. + +Further messages passed between Cetshwayo and the Natal Government +upon the subject, until it was finally arranged that the coronation +should be performed by Mr. Shepstone, in Zululand, and, with a party +of volunteers as escort, he crossed the Tugela on the 8th August, +1873, accompanied by Major Durnford, R.E., Captain Boyes, 75th +Regiment, and several other officers and gentlemen. + +Mr. Shepstone’s long despatch, already quoted from, and in which +he describes, with true native minuteness, the most trivial +circumstances of the journey, and subsequent proceedings, gives the +impression that he looked upon his mission as a service of danger to +all concerned. It was, however, carried out without any break in the +friendly relations between the Zulus and his party, who returned to +Pietermaritzburg “without unpleasant incident” on the 19th September. + +The coronation mission was carried out—how far _successfully_ +entirely depends upon the results expected or desired by those +in command. The king himself, while looking upon the fact of his +recognition as sovereign of Zululand by the English as important, +is quite keen enough to have detected certain elements of absurdity +in the proceedings by which they invested him with his dignity. +There was perhaps a little good-humoured scorn in his reception of +the somewhat oddly-chosen presents and marks of honour offered him. +Without losing that respect for and faith in the English which has +always characterised his dealings with them, he felt impatiently +that they were rather making a fool of him; especially when they +put upon his shoulders a little scarlet mantle—formerly a lady’s +opera-cloak—the curtailed dimensions of which made him ridiculous +in his own eyes; and upon his head a pasteboard, cloth, and tinsel +crown, whose worthlessness he was perfectly capable of comprehending. +Mr. Shepstone’s despatch represents him as greatly impressed by the +ceremony, etc.; but the impression on the minds of many observers +was that he put up with much which both seemed and was trifling and +ridiculous, for the sake of the solid benefits which he hoped he and +his people would derive from a closer connection with the English. + +The portion of Mr. Shepstone’s despatch, however, which it is +important that we should study with attention is that which refers to +the “coronation promises” (so called) of Cetshwayo, and treats of the +political subjects discussed between king and kingmaker. + +Sir Bartle Frere repeatedly speaks of the transaction as “a solemn +act by the king, undertaken as the price of British support and +recognition;” of Cetshwayo as having “openly violated his coronation +promises;” of his “undoubted promises;” while Sir Garnet Wolseley, +in his speech to the assembled chiefs and people of the Zulu nation, +speaks of the coronation promises as though the want of attention +to them had been the chief, if not the only, cause of the king’s +misfortunes; and the same tone is taken in all late despatches on the +subject. + +And now let us turn to Mr. Shepstone’s own report, prepared at the +time, and see whether we gather from it the impression that the +conditions of his treaty with Cetshwayo were thought of, or intended +by him, to stand as solemn and binding promises, of which the +infraction, or delay in carrying out, would render the king and his +people liable to punishment at our hands. After giving his reasons +for objecting to “formal or written” treaties with savages,[11] Mr. +Shepstone himself remarks, “Ours is an elastic arrangement.” This +is a singularly candid confession, of the truth of which there can +be little doubt. Whether such a term _should_ be applicable to the +treaties made by an English Government is quite another question, to +which we will leave the English public to find an answer. We have, +however, but to quote from Mr. Shepstone’s own despatch to prove the +convenient “elasticity” of his propositions, and how greatly they +have been magnified of late in seeking a quarrel against the Zulu +king. At p. 16 of the report, after enumerating the “arrangements +and laws” proposed by him, and heartily approved by the Zulus, Mr. +Shepstone remarks: “Although all this was fully, and even vehemently, +assented to, it cannot be expected that the amelioration described +will immediately take effect. To have got such principles admitted +and declared to be what a Zulu may plead when oppressed, was but +sowing the seed, which will still take many years to grow and +mature.” And at p. 17 he says: “I told the king that I well knew the +difficulties of his position, and that he could overcome them only +by moderation and prudence and justice, but without these they would +certainly overcome him.” And again (p. 18, par. 82) he explains that +when he left Natal he had looked upon the “charge” which he knew that +he would be expected to deliver to Cetshwayo on his installation, as +something in the nature of an ordination sermon, or bishop’s charge +to candidates for confirmation, likely to influence only in so far +as the consciences of those addressed might respond, etc.; but that, +on entering Zululand, he found that the people thought so much of +this part of the duty he had undertaken that he felt himself to have +“become clothed with the power of fundamental legislation,” and +thought it right to take advantage of the opportunity for introducing +improvements in the government of the people. “I have already +described my success,” he continues, “and I attribute it to the +sagacity of Cetywayo.” + +But in all this there is no mention of “solemn promises,” to break +which would be an insult to the majesty of England, and an excuse +for war; nor is there, from beginning to end of the despatch, any +token that Mr. Shepstone looked upon them in that light, or had any +immediate expectation of proving the usefulness of his “elastic” +arrangement. + +In describing his interviews and political discussions with the Zulu +king, Mr. Shepstone speaks repeatedly in high praise of the ability +and behaviour of the former. He says in one place: “Cetywayo received +us cordially as before.... Major Durnford and my son, with the Natal +Native Indunas, sat down with me to an interview with Cetywayo and +the councillors, that lasted for five hours without intermission. It +was of the most interesting and earnest kind, and was conducted with +great ability and frankness by Cetywayo. Theoretically, my business +was with the councillors who represented the nation; but, had it not +been for the straightforward manner in which Cetywayo insisted upon +their going direct to the point, it would have been impossible to +have got through the serious subjects we were bound to decide in the +time we did.” + +Of the points discussed in this way the most important was that +which, a little later, led directly up to the Zulu War—namely, the +aggressions of the Transvaal Boers and the disputed boundary between +them and the Zulus. “The whole of the afternoon,” says Mr. Shepstone, +“was occupied with this subject, about which he occasionally grew +very earnest, and declared that he and every Zulu would die rather +than submit to them—viz. the Boer encroachments. He reproached the +Government of Natal for not having taken up the Zulu cause, and +for not even having troubled themselves to examine whether their +statements were true or not, while they treated them as if without +foundation.” + +In fact, on this, as on every other occasion, the Zulu king lost no +opportunity of protesting against the encroachments of the Boers, +lest his peaceable conduct towards these latter, maintained in +deference to the wishes of the Natal Government, should be brought +up against him later as a proof of their rights. Whatever may have +been the intentions and opinions of Mr. Shepstone on the subject of +the “coronation promises,” he left Cetshwayo unfettered in his own +opinion, having merely received certain advice as to the government +of his people from his respected friends the English, to whose wishes +he should certainly give full attention, and whose counsel he would +carry out as far as was, in his opinion, wise or feasible. As already +stated, the principal item of the English advice related to capital +punishment, which we, with some justice, considered a too frequent +occurrence in Zululand, especially in cases of supposed witchcraft, +this superstition being undoubtedly the bane of the country. + +But in judging of the king’s acts in this respect, it should be +remembered that, to rule a nation without any assistance in the form +of gaols or fetters, capital punishment must needs be resorted to +rather more frequently than in our own country, where, indeed, it is +not so long since we hung a man for stealing a sheep, and for other +acts far short of murder. And as to the superstition concerning +witches, it can hardly have led to more cruelty and injustice in +Zululand than in civilised European countries, where at Trèves 7000 +victims were burned alive for witchcraft; 500 at Geneva in three +months; 1000 in the province of Como; 400, at _once_, at Toulouse; +with many other like cases on official record.[12] The practice of +smelling out a witch, as it is called, is one to be put a stop to as +soon as possible by gradual and gentle means, and Cetshwayo himself +had arrived at that conclusion without our assistance, as shown in +his conversation with the native printer Magema, whose account of a +visit paid to the Zulu king appeared in “Macmillan’s Magazine” for +March, 1878. + +But the custom of a people—the law of a land—is not to be done away +with or altered in an hour; nor could we English reasonably expect +such radical changes in the administration of a country to follow +our orders as immediately and naturally as we should expect a new +ordinance to be received by the natives of Natal living under our +own rule. Neither could we justly consider the non-fulfilment of +our wishes and commands a sufficient cause for attacking Zululand, +although such supposed non-fulfilment was the first, and for a long +time the only _casus belli_ which could be found against the Zulu +king. + +The first occasion on which the solemnity of these “coronation +promises” was made of importance was in 1875, when Bishop Schreuder +undertook to pay Cetshwayo a visit for the purpose of presenting +him with a printed and bound copy of Mr. Shepstone’s Report upon +the coronation in 1873, and impressing him fully with the wishes of +the English Government. Even then, judging from Bishop Schreuder’s +account of his interview, neither king nor councillors were +thoroughly satisfied with the result.[13] Cetshwayo, while admiring +the exact report given of what took place during Mr. Shepstone’s +visit, objected that he had reserved his own royal prerogatives and +the right of putting criminals to death for certain serious crimes, +and pointed out that Mr. Shepstone had neglected to inform the Queen +of this fact. + +Bishop Schreuder, from his own account, appears to have overruled all +objections with a very high hand, and almost forced the “book,” with +his own interpretation of it, upon the seemingly reluctant king, who, +he says, “evidently felt himself out of his depth.” + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +LANGALIBALELE. + + +Meanwhile in Natal mischief was brewing. A certain chief in the north +of the colony was supposed to be in a very rebellious frame of mind, +and it was rumoured that force of arms would prove necessary in order +to bring him to his senses. + +This chief was one Langalibalele, who, with his tribe, the +Ama-Hlubi, had been driven out of Zululand by Umpande in the year +1848, and had taken refuge in Natal. He was located by the English +Government in the country below the Draakensberg Mountains, with +the duty imposed upon him of defending Natal against the attacks +of the predatory hordes of Bushmen who, in the early days of the +colony, made perpetual and destructive raids over the mountains. +From this point of view it would seem reasonable that the Hlubi +tribe should be permitted the use of firearms, prohibited, except +under certain restrictions, to the natives of Natal; inattention to +which prohibition was the ground upon which the original suspicions +concerning Langalibalele’s loyalty were based. The law, however, +by which this prohibition and these restrictions were made was one +of those enactments which, even when theoretically wise, are often +practically impossible, and to which new communities are so prone. + +Theoretically no native can possess a gun in Natal which has not +been registered before a magistrate. Practically, in every kraal, in +every part of the colony, there were, and doubtless still are, many +unregistered guns, bought by natives, or given to them in lieu of +wages by their masters (a common practice at the Diamond Fields), +with very vague comprehension or total ignorance on the part of +the native that any unlawful act had been committed. This would be +more especially natural when the masters who thus furnished their +men with the forbidden weapon were themselves in some way connected +with the government of the country (Natal), whose sanction would +therefore be looked upon by the natives as an equivalent to the +permission of Government itself. But in point of fact the law had +always been enforced in such an extremely lax way, the evasions of +it were so easy and numerous, and so many white men of position and +respectability in the colony were party to the infraction of it, +that it is no wonder that its reality and importance was but lightly +engraved upon the native mind. + +The special accusation, however, brought against Langalibalele to +prove his rebellious tendencies was that young men of his tribe were +in possession of unregistered guns, which, in addition, had not +been brought in to the magistrate, when demanded, for registration. +The reason for this unwillingness (on the part of the young men) to +comply with the above demands, appeared afterwards in the fact that +other guns which had been properly produced for registration, had, +after considerable delay, been returned to their owners in an injured +condition, rendering them unfit for use. + +As these guns were the well-earned reward of hard labour, and +greatly valued by their possessors, it is little to be wondered at +that there should be considerable reluctance on the part of others +to risk the same loss. A little forbearance and consideration on +the part of those in authority might, however, easily have overcome +the difficulty. But in this case, as in others, the mistake was +committed of requiring prompt and unquestioning obedience, without +sufficient care being taken to protect the rights of those who +rendered it. As usual we would not stop to reason or deal justly +with the savage. Carelessness of the property of the natives, the +overbearing impatience of a magistrate, the want of tact and good +feeling on the part of a commonplace subordinate—all these led to an +indefinitely uneasy state of things, which soon produced considerable +anxiety in the colonial mind. This feeling prevailed during Mr. +Shepstone’s absence in Zululand, and it was generally understood that +the Secretary for Native Affairs’ next piece of work after crowning +Cetshwayo would be that of “settling Langalibalele.” + +But beyond the reluctance to produce their guns for registration, +there was nothing in the behaviour of the Hlubi tribe to give the +colonists cause for apprehension. No lawless acts were committed, no +cattle stolen, no farmhouse fired, and the vague fears which existed +amongst the white inhabitants as to what might happen were rather +the result of the way in which “Government” shook its head over the +matter as a serious one, than justified by any real cause for alarm. +It was in fact one of those “Government scares” which occasionally +were produced from causes or for reasons not apparent on the surface. + +On Mr. Shepstone’s return from the coronation of Cetshwayo, +Government native messengers were sent to Langalibalele, requiring +the latter to come down in person to Pietermaritzburg, the capital +of Natal, to answer for the conduct of his tribe concerning their +guns. The message produced a great—and to those who were ignorant of +the cause of it—a most unreasonable panic in the tribe, in which the +chief himself shared considerably. The Ama-Hlubi appeared exceedingly +suspicious, even of the designs of the Government messengers, +who were made to take off their great-coats, and were searched +for concealed weapons before being admitted into the presence of +Langalibalele. Such distrust of British good faith was held in itself +to be a crime, the insolence of which could not be overlooked. +Furthermore it was soon evident that the tribe would not trust their +chief, nor he his person, in the hands of the Government, now that +he was in disfavour. Without actually refusing to obey the orders +he had received and proceed to Pietermaritzburg, Langalibalele sent +excuses and apologies, chiefly turning upon his own ill-health, +which made travelling difficult to him. This answer was the signal +for the military expedition of 1873, which was entered upon without +any further attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the +affair, or to find out the real grounds for the evident fear and +distrust of the Hlubi tribe. In October, 1873, the force, partly +of regulars, partly colonial, a few Basuto horse, with an entirely +unorganised and useless addition of untrained Natal natives, started +from Pietermaritzburg, with all the pomp and circumstance of war; +and much to the delight of the young colonial blood on the look-out +for martial distinction. The tribe, however, far from having the +least wish to fight, or intention of opposing the British force, +deserted their location as soon as the news reached them that the +army had started, and fled with their chief over the Draakensberg +Mountains. Our force, commanded by Colonel Milles of the 75th +Regiment, and accompanied by the Lieut.-Governor Sir B. C. C. Pine +and Mr. Shepstone, reached a place called Meshlyn, situated on the +confines of the district to be subdued, on October 31st; but the +“enemy” had vanished, and were reported to be making the best of +their way out of the colony, without, however, committing ravages of +any description on their way, even to the extent of carrying off any +of their neighbours’ cattle. In fact they were frightened, and simply +ran away. Our object now was to arrest the tribe in its flight; and a +plan was formed for enclosing it in a network of troops, seizing all +the passes over the mountains, and thus reducing it to submission. + +Positions were assigned to the different officers in command, and +the scheme looked extremely well on paper, and to men who were +not acquainted with the district and the exceeding difficulty of +travelling through it. Unfortunately, with the same lamentable +failure in the Intelligence Department which has characterised +the more important proceedings of 1879, very little was known, by +those in command, of the country, or of what was going on in it. Mr. +Shepstone himself, whose supposed knowledge of the people, their +land, and all concerning them was so greatly and naturally relied +upon, proved totally ignorant of the distances which lay between one +point and another, or of the difficulties to be overcome in reaching +them. + +In consequence of this singular ignorance a little force was sent +out on the evening of November 2nd, under command of Major Durnford, +R.E., chief of the staff, with orders to seize and hold a certain +pass known as the Bushman’s River Pass, over which Langalibalele was +expected to escape; the distance having been miscalculated by about +two-thirds, and the difficulties of the way immensely underrated. + +Major Durnford was himself a new-comer in the colony at that time, +and had therefore no personal knowledge of the country; but he +was supplied with full, though, as it soon appeared, unreliable +information by those under whose command he served, and who were in +possession of a plan or diagram of the district which turned out to +be altogether incorrect. He did, indeed, reach his assigned post, +though four-and-twenty hours after the time by which he expected +to be there; while those sent out to take up other positions never +reached them at all, owing to the same incorrect information +concerning locality. + +Major Durnford was in command of a party composed of 2 officers, +6 non-commissioned officers, and 47 rank and file of the Natal +and Karkloof Carbineers, 24 mounted Basutos,[14] and a native +interpreter. His orders were[15] to seize and hold the Bushman’s +River Pass, “with a view to preventing the entrance in or out of the +colony of any natives until the expedition is ready to cross over.” +Special orders were also given to him that he was on no account to +fire the first shot. + +There was one excellent reason, not generally taken into +consideration, for this order, in the fact that the three days given +by Government to the tribe in which to surrender would not be over +until midday on the 3rd of November. + +Starting at 8.30 P.M. on the 2nd November, Major Durnford’s force +only reached its destination at 6.30 A.M. on the 4th, having +traversed a most difficult country, broken, pathless, and well-nigh +inaccessible. On the line of march many men fell out, utterly unable +to keep up; pack-horses with provisions and spare ammunition were +lost; and Major Durnford had his left shoulder dislocated, and other +severe injuries, by his horse falling with him over a precipice on +the 3rd. He pressed on for some hours, but became quite exhausted at +the foot of the Giant’s Castle Pass, where he lay some time; he was +then dragged up with the aid of a blanket, reaching the top of the +pass at 2 A.M. At 4 A.M. Major Durnford was lifted on his horse, and +with his force—reduced to 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 33 +troopers, and the Basutos—pushed on to the Bushman’s River Pass, and +occupied it at 6.30 A.M., finding Langalibalele’s men already in the +pass. + +Major Durnford posted his men, and went forward with the interpreter +to parley with the chiefs, and induce them to return to their +allegiance. This was a service of danger, for the young warriors +were very excited. Seeing that the enemy were getting behind rocks, +etc., commanding the mouth of the pass, he made every preparation +for hostilities, though restricted by the order not to fire the +first shot. Finding that, although the natives drew back when he +bade them, they pressed on again when his back was turned, and that +the volunteers were wavering, he at last reluctantly directed an +orderly retreat to higher ground, from whence he could still command +the pass. Upon a shot being fired by the natives, the retreat became +a stampede, and a heavy fire being opened, three of the Carbineers +and one Basuto fell. The horse of the interpreter was killed, and, +while Major Durnford was endeavouring to reach the man and lift him +on his own horse, the interpreter was killed by his side, and Major +Durnford was surrounded and left alone. Dropping the reins, he drew +his revolver, and shot his immediate assailants, who had seized his +horse’s bridle, and, after running the gauntlet of a numerous enemy +at close quarters, escaped with one serious wound, an assegai-stab in +the left arm, whereby it was permanently disabled. He received one +or two trifling cuts besides, and his patrol-jacket was pierced in +many places. Getting clear of the enemy, Major Durnford rallied a few +Carbineers and the Basutos, and covered the retreat. + +The head-quarters camp was reached about 1 A.M. on the 5th. At 11 +P.M. on that day, Major Durnford led out a volunteer party—artillery +with rockets, 50 men of the 75th Regiment, 7 Carbineers, and 30 +Basutos—to the rescue of Captain Boyes, 75th Regiment, who had been +sent out with a support on the 3rd, and was believed to be in great +danger. Major Durnford had received such serious injuries that the +doctor endeavoured to dissuade him from further exertion, but as +those sent to his support were in danger and he knew the country, +he determined to go. He was lifted on his horse, and left amid the +cheers of the troops in camp. Having marched all night—resting only +from 3 to 5 A.M.—they met Captain Boyes’ party about midday; they had +lost their way, and thus did not find the Giant’s Castle Pass. + +After this, Major Durnford, with a considerable force, occupied +Bushman’s River Pass, recovered and buried the bodies of his +comrades, and held the pass. He afterwards patrolled the disturbed +districts. The Lieut.-Governor, Sir B. C. C. Pine, in a despatch +dated 13th November, 1873, accepted the responsibility of the orders +not to fire the first shot, and said of Major Durnford: “He behaved, +by testimony of all present, in the most gallant manner, using his +utmost exertions to rally his little force, till, left _absolutely_ +alone, he was reluctantly compelled to follow them—wounded.” + +Colonel Milles, commanding the field force, published the following +order: + + “CAMP MESHLYN, 7th November, 1873. + + “The Commandant, with deep regret, announces to the field + force under his command the loss of three Carbineers, viz.: + Mr. Erskine, Mr. Potterill, and Mr. Bond, and of one native + interpreter, Elijah, who formed part of the small force sent up + with Major Durnford, R.E., to secure the passes, and who were + killed during the retreat of that party from the passes, which, + although they had gallantly seized, they were unable to hold, the + orders being for ‘the forces not to fire the first shot,’ and so + having to wait till they were placed at a great disadvantage. + The brave conduct of those killed is testified to by all their + comrades, and there is consolation alone in the thought that + they died nobly fighting for their country. The Commandant must, + however, publicly render his thanks to Major Durnford for the way + in which he commanded the party, for his courage and coolness, + and especially for the noble way in which, after his return from + the passes, being almost exhausted, he mustered a volunteer party + and marched to the relief of Captain Boyes, who was considered in + great danger. + “By command, + “A. E. ARENGO CROSS + “(For Chief of the Staff).” + +Although the main body of the fighting-men of the tribe had left +Natal, most of the women and children, the sick and infirm, with +a few able-bodied men to watch over them, had taken refuge in +holes and caves, of which there are a considerable number in that +mountainous part of the colony. The men of the tribe, indeed, were +in disgrace with the Government, and thought it best to be out of +the way when the British force paid their homes a visit, but it was +not for a moment imagined that the soldiers would make war upon +women and children. The latter, in any case, could not have taken +that tremendous and hurried journey across the great mountains; and, +with what soon proved a very mistaken confidence on the part of the +people, all who could neither fight nor travel were left in these +hiding-places, from which they expected to emerge in safety as soon +as the troops, finding no one to oppose them, should have left the +district. “The English soldiers will not touch the children,”[16] +was the expression used. So far, however, was this idea from being +realised, that the remainder of the expedition consisted of a series +of attempts, more or less successful, to hunt the unfortunate +“children” out of their hiding-places and take them prisoners. + +During these proceedings many acts were committed under Government +sanction which can only be characterised by the word “atrocities,” +and which were as useless and unnecessary as they were cruel.[17] + +Poor frightened creatures were smoked to death or killed by rockets +in caves which they dared not leave for fear of a worse fate at +the hands of their captors; women and children were killed, men +were tortured, and prisoners put to death. On one occasion a white +commander of native forces is said to have given the significant +information to his men that he _did not wish to see the faces of any +prisoners_; and it is reported that a prisoner was made over to the +native force to be put to death as the latter chose. The colonial +newspapers apologised at the time for some of these acts, on the +score that they were the result of the youthful enthusiasm of “Young +Natal” fleshing his maiden sword. + +These acts were chiefly committed by the irregular (white) troops +and native levies, and are a signal proof of how great a crime it +is to turn undisciplined or savage troops, over whom no responsible +person has any real control, loose upon a defenceless people. The +excuse made by those in authority in such cases is always “We did not +intend these things to take place, but horrors are always attendant +on savage warfare.” But such excuses are of small value when, in +campaign after campaign, it has been proved that the use of colonial +troops under their own officers, and of disorganised masses of armed +“friendly natives,” is invariably productive of scenes disgraceful to +the name of England, without any attempt being made to introduce a +better system. Certainly if “horrors” beyond the fair fortune of war +_are_ necessarily attendant upon savage warfare, they should not be +those inflicted by British troops and their allies upon unarmed or +solitary men, women, and children. + +So many women were injured in dislodging them from the caves that +Major Durnford, on his second return from the mountains, instituted a +hospital-tent where they might be attended to; but such humanity was +by no means the general rule. + +If acts of barbarity were for the most part committed by the +irregular troops, there is one instance to the contrary which can +never be forgotten in connection with this affair—so flagrant a case +that the friends of the officer in command, when the story first +appeared in the colonial papers, refused to believe in it until it +was authenticated beyond a doubt. + +A body of troops—infantry, irregular cavalry, and undisciplined +natives—upon one occasion during this expedition were engaged for +some hours in trying to dislodge a solitary native from a cave in +which he had taken refuge. The force had discovered the hiding-place +by the assistance of a little boy, whom they captured and induced to +betray his friends. + +The “rebel” (in this case there was but one) refused to surrender, +and for a long while defended himself gallantly against the attacks +of the whole force. Shots were fired through the apertures of the +cave, rockets (a new and horrible experience to the poor creature) +were discharged upon him. At last, after holding out for some hours, +the man gave up the struggle, and coming out from his insufficient +shelter, begged for mercy at the hands of his numerous foe. He had a +good many wounds upon him, but none sufficiently severe to prevent +his walking out amongst his captors, and asking them to spare his +life. After a short consultation amongst the officers, a decision was +arrived at as to the proper treatment of this man, who had proved +himself a brave soldier and was now a helpless captive. + +By order of the officer commanding, a trooper named Moodie put +his pistol to the prisoner’s head and blew out his brains. A +court-martial sat upon this officer in the course of the following +year, and he was acquitted of all blame. The defence was that the man +was so seriously injured that it was an act of humanity to put an +end to him, and that the officer dared not trust him in the hands of +the natives belonging to the English force, who were exasperated by +the long defence he had made. But the prisoner was not mortally nor +even dangerously wounded. He was able to walk and to speak, and had +no wound upon him which need necessarily have caused his death. And +as to the savage temper of the native force, there was no reason why +the prisoner should be left in their charge at all, as there was a +considerable white force present at the time.[18] + +The result of the expedition against the Hlubi tribe was so little +satisfactory that those in authority felt themselves obliged to look +about for something else to do before taking the troops back to +Pietermaritzburg. They found what they wanted ready to their hand. +Next to Langalibalele’s location lay that of the well-to-do and quiet +little tribe of Putini. “Government” had as yet found no fault with +these people, and, secure in their own innocence, they had made no +attempt to get out of the way of the force which had come to destroy +their neighbours, but remained at home, herded their cattle, and +planted their crops as usual. Unfortunately, however, some marriages +had taken place between members of the two tribes, and when that +of Langalibalele fled, the wives of several of his men took refuge +in their fathers’ kraals in the next location. No further proof +was required of the complicity of Putini with Langalibalele, or of +the rebellious condition of the smaller tribe. Consequently it was +at once, as the natives term it, “eaten up,” falling an easy prey +owing to its unsuspecting state. The whole tribe—men, women, and +children—were taken prisoners and carried down to Pietermaritzburg, +their cattle and goods were confiscated, and their homes destroyed. +Several of the Putini men were killed, but there was very little +resistance, as they were wholly taken by surprise. The colony was +charmed with this success, and the spoils of the Putini people were +generally looked to to pay some of the expenses of the campaign. +Whatever may have been the gain to the Government, by orders of +which the cattle (the chief wealth of the tribe) were sold, it +was not long shared by the individual colonists who purchased the +animals. The pasture in that part of the country from which they had +come is of a very different description from any to be found in the +environs of Pietermaritzburg, and, in consequence of the change, +the captured cattle died off rapidly almost as soon as they changed +hands. But this was not all, for they had time, before they died, to +spread amongst the original cattle of their new owners two terrible +scourges, in the shape of “lung-sickness” and “red-water,” from which +the midland districts had long been free. One practical result of the +expedition of 1873 seems to be that neither meat, milk, nor butter +have ever again been so cheap in the colony as they were before that +date, the two latter articles being often unobtainable to this day. + +The unhappy prisoners of both tribes were driven down like beasts to +Pietermaritzburg, many of the weaker dying from want and exposure +on the way. Although summer-time, it happened to be very wet, and +therefore cold; our native force had been allowed to strip the +unfortunates of all their possessions, even to their blankets and +the leather petticoats of the women. The sufferings of these poor +creatures—many of them with infants a few days old, or born on the +march down—were very great. A scheme was at first laid, by those in +authority, for “giving the women and children out” as servants for a +term of years—that is to say, for making temporary slaves of them to +the white colonists. This additional enormity was vetoed by the home +Government, but the fact remains that its perpetration was actually +contemplated by those entrusted with the government of the colony, +and especially of the natives, and was hailed by the colonists as +one of the advantages to accrue to them from the expedition of +1873. Several children were actually given out in the way referred +to before the order to the contrary arrived from England, and a +considerable time elapsed before they were all recovered by their +relatives. + +The unhappy women and children of the Langalibalele tribe were mere +emaciated skeletons when they reached the various places where they +were to live under surveillance. They seemed crushed with misery, +utterly ignorant of the cause of their misfortunes, but silent and +uncomplaining. Many of the women had lost children—few knew whether +their male relatives were yet alive. On being questioned, they +knew nothing of Mr. Shepstone, not even his name, which was always +supposed to command the love and fear of natives throughout the +length and breadth of the land. They did not know what the tribe had +done to get into such trouble; they only knew that the soldiers had +come, and that they had run away and hidden themselves; that some of +them were dead, and the rest were ready to die too and have it all +over. A considerable number of these poor creatures were permitted +by Government to remain upon the Bishop’s land, where most of them +gradually regained health and spirits, but retained always the +longing for their own homes and people and their lost chief which +characterises them still.[19] + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +TRIAL OF LANGALIBALELE. + + +Meanwhile the fugitive chief had at last been captured by the +treachery of a Basuto chief named Molappo, who enticed him into +his hands, and then delivered him up to Mr. Griffiths, resident +magistrate in that part of British Basutoland. When he and his party +were first captured they had with them a horse laden with all the +coin which the tribe had been able to get together during the last +few days before the expedition started from Pietermaritzburg, and +which they had collected to send down as a ransom for their chief. +Their purpose was arrested by the news that the soldiers had actually +started to attack them; when, feeling that all was lost, they fled, +carrying the chief and his ransom with them. What became of the +money, whether it became Molappo’s perquisite, or whether it formed +part of the English spoil, has never been publicly known. But it can +hardly be denied that the readiness of the people to pay away in +ransom for their chief the whole wealth of the tribe earned by years +of labour on the part of the working members, is in itself a proof +that their tendencies were by no means rebellious. + +Langalibalele, with seven of his sons and many indunas (captains) and +headmen, was brought down to Pietermaritzburg for trial, reaching the +town on the 21st December. + +So strong was the unreasoning hatred of the colonists against him +on account of the death of the three Carbineers which had resulted +from the expedition, that the unhappy man, a helpless captive, was +insulted and pelted by the populace as he was conveyed in irons to +the capital; and again, after sentence had been passed upon him, upon +his way to Durban. + +It was at this stage of affairs that the Bishop of Natal first +came upon the scene, and interfered on behalf of the oppressed. +Until 1873, while earnestly endeavouring to do his best as teacher +and pastor amongst the natives as well as amongst their white +fellow-colonists, he had not found it to be his duty to go deeply +into political matters concerning them. He had great confidence at +that time in the justice and humanity of their government as carried +on by Mr. Shepstone, for whom he had a warm personal regard, based +on the apparent uprightness of his conduct; and he had therefore +contented himself with accepting Mr. Shepstone’s word in all that +concerned them. + +That so many years should have passed without the Bishop’s having +discovered how greatly his views and those of his friend differed in +first principles as to the government of the people, is due partly to +the fact that the two met but seldom, and then at regular expected +intervals, and partly because no great crisis had previously taken +place to prove the principles of either in that respect. Their +regular interviews were upon Sundays, when the Bishop, going into +Pietermaritzburg for the cathedral service, invariably spent a +couple of hours with his friend. During these comparatively short +meetings doubtless Mr. Shepstone’s real personal regard for the +Bishop caused him temporarily to feel somewhat as he did, and, +where he could not do so, to refrain from entering upon political +discussion. The sympathy with Mr. Shepstone which existed in the +Bishop’s mind prevented the latter from looking more closely for +himself into matters which he believed to be in good hands, and which +did not naturally fall within the sphere of his duties; while the +comparatively trivial character of the cases with which the native +department had hitherto dealt, was not such as to force their details +before a mind otherwise and fully employed. + +The Langalibalele expedition, however, opened the Bishop’s eyes. +While it lasted, although deeply deploring the loss of life on either +side, and feeling great indignation at the atrocities perpetrated +on ours, he did not doubt that Mr. Shepstone had done all he could +to avert the necessity of bloodshed, and expected to find him, upon +his return to Pietermaritzburg, much grieved and indignant at the +needless amount of suffering inflicted upon his people, the greater +portion of whom must be entirely innocent, even although the charges +against their chief should be proved. + +The discovery that Mr. Shepstone entirely ratified what had been +done[20] was the first blow to his friend’s reliance on him. The +mockery of justice termed a trial, granted to Langalibalele, was the +next; and the discovery of how completely he had misconceived Mr. +Shepstone’s policy closed the intimacy of their friendship. + +It soon became apparent that the trial of the chief was indeed to +be a farce—a pretence, meant to satisfy inquiring minds at home +that justice had been done, but which could have but one result, +the condemnation of the prisoner, already prejudged by a Government +which, having declared him to be a rebel and having treated him as +such, was hardly likely to stultify itself by allowing him to be +proved innocent of the charges brought against him. + +That there might be no doubt at all upon the subject, the prisoner +was denied the help of counsel, white or black, in the hearing +of his case, even to watch the proceedings on his behalf, or to +cross-examine the witnesses; consequently the official record of the +trial can only be looked upon as an _ex parte_ statement of the case, +derived from witnesses selected by the Supreme Chief,[21] examined by +the Crown Prosecutor, and not cross-examined at all on the prisoner’s +behalf, although the assistance of counsel was recognised by the +Crown Prosecutor himself as being in accordance with Kafir law.[22] + +But the formation of the court and its whole proceedings were +palpably absurd, except for the purpose of securing a conviction; +and that this was the case was generally understood in Natal, Even +those colonists who were most violent against the so-called “rebel,” +and would have had him hanged without mercy, asserting that he had +been “taken red-handed,” saw that the authorities had put themselves +in the wrong by granting the prisoner a trial against the justice of +which so much could be alleged. + +In point of fact, the Lieut.-Governor had no power to form a court +such as that by which Langalibalele was tried, consisting of his +excellency himself as Supreme Chief, the Secretary for Native +Affairs, certain administrators of native law, and certain native +chiefs and indunas. Besides which the Lieut.-Governor was not only +debarred by an ordinance of the colony[23] from sitting as judge in +such a court, from which he would be the sole judge in a court of +appeal, but had already committed himself to a decision adverse to +the prisoner by having issued the proclamation of November 11th, +1873, declaring that the chief and his tribe had “set themselves +in open revolt and rebellion against Her Majesty’s Government in +this colony,” and “proclaiming and making known that they were in +rebellion, and were hereby declared to be outlaws,” and that “the +said tribe was broken up, and from that day forth had ceased to +exist,” and by further seizing and confiscating all the cattle and +property of the said tribe within reach, deposing Langalibalele from +his chieftainship, and otherwise treating him and his tribe as rebels. + +His Excellency, therefore, could not possibly be looked upon as an +unprejudiced judge of the first instance in the prisoner’s case; +nor could the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone, by whose +advice and with whose approval the expedition had been undertaken. +As to the minor members of the court, they could hardly be expected +to have an independent opinion in the matter, especially the “native +chiefs and indunas,” who knew very well that they would be liable to +the accusation of disaffection themselves if they ventured to show +any bearing towards the prisoner, or to do otherwise than blindly +follow the lead of their white “brother-judges” (!) and masters. + +The native names gave a satisfactory air of justice to the +proceedings of the court in English eyes, but in point of fact they +were but dummy judges after all. + +Not only, however, was the court wrongly constituted, but its +proceedings were irregular and illegal. It was called, and considered +to be, a _native_ court, but in point of fact it was a nondescript +assembly, such usages of either native or supreme court as could +possibly tell on the prisoner’s side (notably the use of counsel) +being omitted, and only those which would insure his conviction +admitted. + +It was not the practice of the colony for serious crimes to be tried +before a native court. But in this case they were obliged to run +counter to custom for the reason given in a previous note, that most +of the separate charges against the chief could not be recognised +as crimes at all in an English court of law. At the same time the +sentence finally given was one quite beyond the power of the court +to pronounce. Clause 4 of the ordinance limits the power of the +Supreme Chief to “appointing or removing the subordinate chiefs or +other authorities” among the natives, but gives him no power to +sentence to death, or to “banishment or transportation for life to +such place as the Supreme Chief or Lieut.-Governor may appoint.” +When Langalibalele had been “removed” from his chieftainship, and +himself and the bulk of his tribe “driven over the mountain out of +the colony” by the Government force, as announced in the bulletin of +November 13th, 1873, the cattle within the colony seized, and many of +the tribe killed in resisting the attempt to seize them, the Supreme +Chief, under native law, had expended his power; while banishment is +a punishment wholly unknown to Kafir law, as is plainly stated in +“Kafir Laws and Customs,” p. 39. + +Again, throughout the trial, the prisoner was assumed to have pleaded +guilty, although in point of fact he had merely admitted that he had +done certain acts, but desired witnesses to be called whose “evidence +would justify or extenuate what he had done,” a plea which in any +ordinary court would be recorded as a plea of “Not guilty.” + +The native members of the court, also, were made to sign a judgment, +the contents of which had been “interpreted” to them, and their +signatures “witnessed,” by which the prisoner is declared to have +been “convicted, on clear evidence, of several acts, for some of +which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every +civilised country in the world.” The absurdity of this is palpable, +since it was impossible that these men should know anything of the +law of any civilised land; it is plain, therefore, that in pretending +to agree with assertions, of the meaning of which they were totally +ignorant, they were under some strong influence, such as prejudice +against the prisoner, undue fear of the Supreme Chief, or desire to +please him—one of them being “Head Induna of the Natal Government,” +and another the “Induna to the Secretary for Native Affairs.” + +To turn to these crimes, “for some of which he would be liable to +forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the +world”—to which statement His Excellency the Supreme Chief, the +Secretary for Native Affairs, and the Administrators of Native Law +have also signed their names—we find that the charges run as follows: + +1. “Setting at naught the authority of the magistrate in a manner[24] +_not indeed sufficiently palpable to warrant the use of forcible +coercion to our_ (civilised) laws and customs.” Which charge we may +at once dismiss as absurd. + +2. “Permitting, or _probably_ encouraging, his tribe to possess +fire-arms, and retain them contrary to law.” + +3. “With reference to these fire-arms, defying the authority of the +magistrate, and once insulting the messenger.” + +4. “Refusing to appear before” the Supreme Chief when summoned, +“excusing his refusal by evasion and falsehood,” and “insulting his +messenger.” + +5. “Directing his cattle and other effects to be taken out of the +colony under an armed escort.” + +6. Causing the death of Her Majesty’s subjects at the Bushman’s River +Pass. + +It is plain to the most casual observation that none of the first +five accusations, even if fully proved, refer to crimes punishable by +death in any civilised land; and it is difficult to see how the Chief +could reasonably be considered responsible for the sixth and last, +seeing that the action took place in his absence, against his express +commands, and to his great regret. + +Returning to the five first-named offences, we find that the +statements contained in the second and third charges are the only +proofs alleged of the truth of the first—to which therefore we need +give no further attention—the magistrate himself stating that “this +was the first time the prisoner ever refused to appear before him +when ordered to do so;” and this was the first time for more than +twenty years that he had been reported for any fault whatever. + +Proceeding to charge No. 2, we find that the prisoner entirely denied +having encouraged his young men to possess themselves of guns; nor +could he justly be said to have even “permitted” them to do so merely +because he did not actively exert himself to prevent it. The men went +away from home, worked, were paid for their services in guns, or +purchased them with their earnings, without consulting him. He had +never considered it to be part of his duty to search the huts of his +people for unregistered guns, but had simply left them to suffer the +consequences of breaking the laws of the colony, if discovered. It +is also to be observed that amongst the seven sons captured with him +only one had a gun at a time when certainly, if ever, they would have +carried them; which does not look as though he had greatly encouraged +them to possess themselves of firearms. + +But if the second charge, in a very modified form, might be +considered a true one, yet Langalibalele had done no worse in that +respect than most of the other chiefs in the colony. In proof of +this assertion may be brought “Perrin’s Register” for the years +1871-2-3—the years during which a large number of natives received +payment for their services at the diamond-fields in guns. From this +register it appears that the total number of guns registered in eight +of the principal northern tribes of the colony—the two first-named +chiefs being _indunas_ to the very magistrate who complained of +Langalibalele—was as follows: + + +---------------------+--------------------+ + | | GUNS REGISTERED IN | + | HUTS. +--------------------+ + | | 1871.| 1872.| 1873.| + +---------------------+------+------+------+ + | Ndomba 1190 | — | — | — | + | Faku 2071 | — | 2 | — | + | Mganu 1277 | — | — | — | + | Pakade 2222 | 1 | — | 1 | + | Zikali 1651 | — | 1 | — | + | Nodada 3000 | — | 1 | 2 | + | Putini 1239 | — | 1 | — | + | Langalibalele 2244 | — | 9 | 4 | + +---------------------+------+------+------+ + +Furthermore, any fault with respect to the guns was not an offence +under Kafir Law, and could only have been tried in the Colonial +Court under the ordinary law of the colony. + +The third and fourth charges were those which, when first reported in +Natal, produced considerable alarm and indignation in the minds of +the colonists. A defiance of the authority, both of magistrate and +Supreme Chief, and insult offered to their messengers, looked indeed +like actual rebellion. The charges, however, dwindled down to very +little when properly examined. The “defiance” in question consisted +only in an answer made to the magistrate to the effect that he could +not send in as desired five young men—in possession of unregistered +guns—because they had run away, he knew not whither, being frightened +by the course pursued by the magistrate’s messenger; and that he +could not find eight others, said to have come into the colony with +guns, and to belong to his tribe, upon such insufficient data, +and unless their names were given to him. The sincerity of which +reasoning was shortly proved by the fact that, as soon as their names +were notified to him, he did send in three of those very lads, with +their guns, and two more belonging to other members of their party, +besides sending in with their guns those who had worked for Mr. W. E. +Shepstone, and who probably thought that the name of their master was +a sufficient guarantee for their right to possess firearms. + +The charge of insulting the native messengers from Government, of +which a great deal was made at first, proved to be of very little +consequence when investigated, but it is one to which special +attention should be given because, indirectly, it is connected with +the Zulu War. + +The facts are as follows: One of the chief witnesses for the +prosecution, Mawiza, a messenger of the Government, stated in his +evidence-in-chief on the second day of the trial, that on the +occasion of his carrying a message from Government, the prisoner’s +people had “taken all his things from him,” and had “stripped, and +taken him naked” into the Chiefs presence. But on the fourth day, +in answer to a question from His Excellency, he said “that they had +_intended_ to strip him but had allowed him to retain his trousers +and boots,” thereby contradicting himself flatly. Nevertheless the +court being asked by His Excellency whether it required further +evidence on this point, replied in the negative. They did not even +ask a question, on the subject, of Mawiza’s two companion messengers, +Mnyembe and Gayede, though both these were examined; Mnyembe’s +evidence-in-chief being cut short _before_ he came to that part of +the story, and Gayede’s taken up just _after_ it. + +The chief was kept in solitary confinement from the day when he was +brought down to Pietermaritzburg, December 31st, till the day when +his sons were sentenced, February 27th; not being allowed to converse +with any of his sons, or with any members of his tribe, or with any +friend or adviser, white or black. It was therefore quite out of his +power to find witnesses who would have shown, as Mnyembe and Gayede +would have done, that Mawiza’s statements about the “stripping” were +false; that he still wore his waistcoat, shirt, trousers, boots, and +gaiters, when he was taken to the chief; and that the “stripping” +in question only amounted to this, that he himself put off his two +coats, by the chiefs orders, “as a matter of precaution caused by +fear” and not for the purpose of insulting the messenger, or defying +the Supreme Chief. They would have satisfied the court also that +other acts charged against the prisoner arose from fear, and dread of +the Supreme Chief, and not from a spirit of defiance. + +This affair of the messenger, explained by fear and suspicion on the +part of Langalibalele, by which, also, he accounted for his refusal +to “appear before” the Supreme Chief (which is to say that, being +desired to give himself up into the hands of the Government, he was +afraid to do so, and ran away), was the turning-point of the whole +trial. What special reason he had for that fear and distrust will +be inquired into shortly. Meanwhile the court considered that such +expressed distrust of the good faith of the authorities was an added +offence on the part of the prisoner, who was formally condemned to +death, but his sentence commuted to banishment for life to Robben +Island, the abode of lunatics and lepers, in which other captive +native chiefs had languished and died before him.[25] + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE BISHOP’S DEFENCE. + + +The daily accounts of the trial which appeared in the local papers +were read with great interest and attention by the Bishop, who +quickly discerned the injustice of the proceedings. Mawiza’s manifest +contradiction of his own evidence first attracted his attention, and +led to his hearing from some of his own natives what was not allowed +to appear at the trial, that Mawiza’s story was entirely false. +Seeing how seriously this fact bore upon the prisoner’s case, he went +to Mr. Shepstone and told him what he had heard. + +The Secretary for Native Affairs was at first very indignant with +the Bishop’s informant, doubting the truth of his statement, and +declaring that the man must be severely punished if it were proved +that he had lied. The Bishop, confident in the integrity of his +native,[26] assented, saying, however, that the same argument should +apply to Mawiza. The matter was at once privately investigated by Mr. +Shepstone—the Bishop, Mawiza, Magema, and others being present—with +the result that Mr. Shepstone himself was obliged to acknowledge the +untrustworthiness of Mawiza, who was reproved in the severest terms +for his prevarications by the other native indunas.[27] + +Singularly enough, however, _this discovery made no difference +whatever in the condemnation and sentence of the prisoner_, although +the charge thus, to a great extent, disposed of, was the most serious +of those brought against him. + +But this was not all. Another point struck the Bishop very forcibly, +namely, the perpetual recurrence of one phrase from various +witnesses. “He (Langalibalele) was afraid, remembering what was +done to Matshana,” and “he was afraid that he should be treated as +Matshana was, when he was summoned to appear by Government.” Such +expressions, used in excuse of the Chiefs conduct, would, of course, +have been inquired into had the prisoner been allowed counsel, or +had any one watched the case on his behalf. But although the court +judged the excuse of “fear” to be an added fault on the Chiefs part, +and although perpetual allusions were made by witnesses to a specific +cause for this fear, no question was asked, and no notice taken +by those present of the perpetually recurring phrase. The Bishop, +however, in the interests of justice and truth, made inquiries +amongst his own natives as to the meaning of these allusions. He +knew, of course, in common with the rest of the inhabitants of Natal, +that, in the year 1858, a native chief named Matshana had got into +some trouble with the Government of Natal. A commando had gone out +against him, and, after a skirmish with some native troops under Mr. +John Shepstone, in which Mr. Shepstone was wounded, and some men on +the other side killed, he had escaped with his people into Zululand, +where he had lived ever since. The Bishop had never heard the details +of the affair, and knew of nothing in connection with this incident +which could account for the “fear because of what was done to +Matshana.” + +“Can you tell me anything of the story of Matshana’s escape from +Natal?” was the question put by him at different times to different +natives; and everyone thus questioned gave substantially the +same account, of what was plainly among them a well-known, and +well-remembered incident in the history of the colony. + +Matshana, they said, was accused of some offence, and being summoned +before the authorities to answer for it, had refused to appear. Mr. +John Shepstone, with a native force, of whom this very Langalibalele, +then a young chief, with his followers formed a portion, was sent +out to endeavour to reduce him to obedience. Mr. Shepstone invited +him to a friendly interview, in which they might talk over matters, +but to which Matshana’s men were to bring no weapons. In consequence +of the reluctance of Matshana to fulfil this condition, the proposed +interview fell through several times before it was finally arranged. +Matshana’s people, even then, however, brought their weapons with +them, but they were induced to leave them at a certain spot a short +distance off. The meeting took place; Mr. Shepstone being seated in +a chair with his people behind him, Matshana and his men crouched +native fashion upon the ground, suspicious and alert, in a semicircle +before him. Suddenly Mr. Shepstone drew a gun from beneath the rug +at his feet, and fired it (he says, as a signal), whereupon his men, +some of whom had already ridden between Matshana’s party and their +arms, fell on, and the struggle became general, resulting in the +death of many of Matshana’s people. The chief himself, who seems to +have been on the look-out for a surprise, escaped unhurt. He was +resting upon one knee only when the first shot was fired, and sprang +over the man crouching behind him. Another man, named Deke, who was +sitting close to him, was wounded in the knee, but is alive to this +day. + +This story, which in varied form, but substantially as given above, +was generally known and believed by the natives, furnished a very +complete explanation of why Langalibalele ventured to distrust the +good faith and honour of the Government, having himself taken part +in, and been witness of, such a disgraceful transaction; which, when +it came to the knowledge of the Secretary of State, was emphatically +condemned by him. Remembering this circumstance, it is not wonderful +that Langalibalele should have taken the precaution of searching the +Government messengers for concealed weapons. + +It seemed strange that Mr. Shepstone, sitting as judge upon the +bench to try a man for his life, should silently allow so great a +justification of his chief offence to remain concealed. But it +seemed stranger still to suppose him ignorant of any part of an +affair carried out under his authority, and by his own brother. + +However, the Bishop took the matter privately to him in the first +instance, telling him what he had heard, and pointing out what an +important bearing it had upon the unfortunate prisoner’s case. He was +met by a total denial on Mr. Shepstone’s part that any such act of +treachery had ever taken place, or that there were any grounds for +the accusation. + +Nevertheless, after careful consideration, and on thoroughly sifting +the obtainable evidence, the Bishop could not avoid coming to the +painful conclusion that the story was substantially true, and was a +valid excuse for Langalibalele’s fear. Finding that further appeal +on behalf of the prisoner to those on the spot was in vain, he now +wrote and printed a pamphlet (giving the usual native version that +the first shot fired was _at_ Matshana) on the subject for private +circulation, and especially for Lord Carnarvon’s information.[28] + +One of the first results of the appearance of this pamphlet was +a demand on the part of Mr. J. Shepstone’s solicitor for “an +immediate, full, and unqualified retraction of the libel falsely and +maliciously published in the pamphlet, with a claim for £1000 damages +for the injury done to Mr. J. Shepstone by the same.” + +Such an action would have had but a small chance of a decision upon +the Bishop’s side at that time in Natal, so, to defend himself—and +not, as generally supposed, out of enmity to the Shepstones—he +appealed to Lord Carnarvon in the matter, on the grounds that his +action had been taken for the public good, and in the interests of +justice. + +Meanwhile the unfortunate chief and his eldest son Malambule +were sent to Robben Island, the former as a prisoner for life, +the latter for five years. They were secretly conveyed away from +Pietermaritzburg to the port, and every effort made to prevent the +Bishop from seeing them, or interfering on their behalf. Other sons, +two of them mere lads, who had as yet held no more important position +in the tribe than that of herdboys to their father’s cattle, and many +of the headmen and indunas, were condemned to imprisonment in the +gaol at Pietermaritzburg for terms varying in length from six months +to seven years. The two young sons, lads named Mazwi and Siyepu, were +kept prisoners for the shortest period named, six months; but it was +some little time after they left the gaol before they were really +set at liberty. The family at Bishopstowe, where their mothers and +many of their other relatives were located, were naturally anxious to +have the two boys also, and, as soon as their term of imprisonment +was up, applied for the charge of them. Somewhat to their surprise +all sorts of difficulties were raised on the point—one would have +thought a very simple one—and they were at last curtly informed +that the boys did not wish to go to Bishopstowe, and would remain +where they were, under surveillance in another district. The Bishop +himself was away at the time, but his eldest daughter, acting for +him, soon discovered through native sources that in point of fact the +boys were extremely anxious to go to Bishopstowe, but were in too +terrified a condition to express a wish. The question had been put to +them in this form: “So! you have been complaining! you say you want +to leave the place you have been sent to, and go to Bishopstowe?” +Whereupon the frightened lads, their spirits crushed by all that +had befallen them, naturally answered: “We never complained, nor +asked to go anywhere”—which, was perfectly true. By dint of a little +determination on the part of Miss Colenso, however, the desired +permission was at last obtained, and Mazwi and Siyepu entered the +Bishopstowe school, which had already been established for the boys +of the scattered tribe. Under the treatment which they there received +they soon began to recover from their distress, and to lose the +terrified expression in the eyes which characterised them painfully +at first. But the health of Mazwi, the elder, was broken by hardship +and confinement, and he died of consumption a few years after.[29] + +It soon became apparent that there must be something specially +injurious to the prisoners in their life in gaol beyond the mere +fact of confinement. Nearly all the men of the Hlubi tribe left it +labouring under a dreadful complaint of a complicated form (said to +be some species of elephantiasis), of which a considerable number +died; others, as in Mazwi’s case, falling victims to consumption. On +inquiry it appeared that the fault lay in the _excessive washing_ +to which every part of the building was habitually subjected—floors +and bed-boards being perpetually scrubbed, and therefore seldom +thoroughly dry. This state of things was naturally a trial to the +constitutions of people accustomed to life in the warm smoke-laden +atmosphere of a native hut. However beneficial it might be to the +natives to instruct them in habits of cleanliness,[30] this was +hardly the way to do it, and the results were disastrous. The +peculiar complaint resulting from confinement in the city gaol was +commonly known amongst the natives as the “gaol-disease,” but it +had not attracted the same attention while the victims to it were +occasional convicts, as it did when it attacked a large number of +innocent prisoners of war! + +After the chief had been sent to Robben Island, it was represented, +by those interested in his welfare, that to leave him there for the +rest of his life without any of his family or people near him—except +his son Malambule, who was to be released in five years’ time—would +be a great and unnecessary addition to the hardship of his position; +and it was finally decided that one of his wives and a servant of +his own should be sent to join him in captivity. A few days after +this decision a story was circulated in the colony, causing some +amusement, and a little triumph on the part of the special opponents +of the chief and his cause: it was to the effect that “out of all +Langalibalele’s wives not one was willing to go to him,” and many +were the sarcastic comments made upon the want of family affection +thus evinced by the natives. On due inquiry it turned out that the +manner in which the question had been put to them was one highly +calculated to produce a negative answer. Native policemen, who were +sent to the kraals where they were living, to inquire which of them +would be willing to go, accosted them with “Come along! come along +and be killed with your chief!” which proposition was not unnaturally +looked upon with considerable disfavour. When, however, the matter +was properly explained to them, they all expressed their willingness +to go, although a journey across the (to them) great unknown +element was by no means a trifling matter in their eyes. The woman +selected in the first instance was one Nokwetuka, then resident at +Bishopstowe, where she was fitted out for her journey, and provided +with suitable clothes.[31] She joined her husband upon the island +as proposed, as also did a lad of the tribe Fife, who happened to +be residing (free) at the Cape, and obtained permission to attend +upon his chief. It was not until some time after, when Langalibalele +had been removed to an adjoining portion of the mainland, bleak and +barren indeed, but an improvement upon Robben Island, that two other +women and a little son were added to the party.[32] + +For the son, Malambule, however, there was no possibility of making +any such arrangements during the five years of his captivity, as +he was a bachelor; although when he was captured he had a bride in +prospect, the separation from and probable loss of whom weighed +greatly upon his mind. He could not even learn whether she was yet +alive, as so many women had been killed, and others had died since +from the effects of the hardships they had undergone; while it was +more than probable, supposing her to be yet living, that she might be +given in marriage to some other more fortunate individual, either by +the authority of her relatives, or, as happened in another case, by +that of the Government of Natal.[33] + +Towards the end of his imprisonment, Malambule grew very restless and +morose; and, when he found himself detained some time after the term +of years had elapsed, he became extremely indignant and difficult +to manage, being in fact in a far more “rebellious” frame of mind +than he ever was before. On one occasion he showed so much temper +that it was thought necessary to put him under temporary restraint +in the gaol. Apparently he was very wise in giving so much trouble, +for it was shortly found expedient to let him go, though it remains +unexplained why he should not have been set free immediately upon +the expiration of his sentence. He was sent back to Natal, but still +treated as a prisoner until he reached Pietermaritzburg, where he was +finally set at liberty; putting in a sudden and unexpected appearance +at Bishopstowe, where he was joyfully welcomed by his own people. +He did not, however, spend much time amongst them, but hurried off +as soon as possible up-country to find his bride. It is pleasant +to be able to record that he found her just in time to prevent +another marriage being arranged for her, and that his return was as +satisfactory an event to her as to himself. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE PUTINI TRIBE. + + +To assist in paying the expenses of the expedition, “Government” +had “eaten up” the small tribe commonly known as the “Putini,” but +properly called the “Amangwe” tribe, “Putini” being, in reality, the +name of their late chief, who died shortly before the disturbances, +leaving the sole custody of their infant son and heir to his young +widow, who accordingly held the position and dignity of chieftainess +in the tribe. + +To say that the “eating up” of these people was an utter mistake is +to say no more than can honestly be said concerning Langalibalele’s +tribe, the Ama-Hlubi; but, in the case of the Putini people, the +mistake was a more flagrant one, and, when all was said and done, +there was no possibility of making out a charge against them at all. +Finally the fact stared the Government (both at home and in Natal) in +the face that a tribe had been attacked, members of it killed, the +people taken prisoners and stripped of all their possessions, without +even the shadow of a reason for such treatment being forthcoming. + +Major (by this time Lieutenant-Colonel) Durnford specially took up +the cause of this injured and innocent people. It was plain enough +that the Government at home would never ratify the action taken +against the Amangwe tribe by the Government in Natal; and that sooner +or later the latter would be forced, in this instance, to undo their +work as far as possible—to restore the people to their location, and +to disgorge at least part of their plunder:—and it was evident to +Colonel Durnford that the sooner this was done the better for all +parties. The Natal Government would put itself in a more dignified +position by voluntarily and speedily making full amends for the wrong +done, and doing of its own accord what eventually it would be obliged +to do at the command of the home Government. It was also of special +importance to the people themselves that they should be allowed to +return to their homes in time to plant their crops for the following +year. + +About May, 1874, it had been decided by the Government that +Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, in his capacity of Colonial Engineer, +should take a working-party to the Draakensberg Mountains, and blow +up, or otherwise destroy, all the passes by which ingress or egress +could be obtained. The chief object of this demolition was that of +giving confidence to the up-country districts, the inhabitants of +which were in perpetual fear of inroads from the scattered members +of the outlawed tribe. They had indeed certain grounds for such +apprehensions, as one or two attacks had been made upon farmhouses +since the expedition. Even these demonstrations were not evidence of +organised resistance, but mere individual acts of vengeance committed +by single men or small parties, in return for brutalities inflicted +upon the women and children belonging to them. They were, however, +sufficient to keep the country in perpetual alarm, which it was +highly advisable should be checked. + +The demolition of the passes being decided upon, Colonel Durnford +applied for the services of the male Putini prisoners, some eighty in +number, and induced the Government to promise the men their liberty, +with that of the rest of the tribe, if, on their return, when the +work should be finished, the Colonel could give them a good character. + +He left Pietermaritzburg with his party of pioneers and a company of +the 75th Regiment, under Captain Boyes and Lieutenant Trower, in May, +and spent some months in the complete destruction of the Draakensberg +passes, returning to the capital in September. The movement at first +raised violent though unavailing opposition amongst the colonists, +who persisted in looking upon the Putini men as bloodthirsty rebels, +who might at any moment break loose upon them and ravage the country. +But when the whole party returned from the mountains, without a +single case of misconduct or desertion amongst them—although they +had had hard work and undergone great hardships (shared to the full +by Colonel Durnford, who suffered to the end of his life from the +effects of intense cold upon his wounded arm)—the colonists ceased to +look upon them as desperate ruffians, and soon forgot their fears. +Meanwhile the Colonel found considerable difficulty in obtaining the +actual freedom of the tribe, for which he and his eighty pioneers had +worked so hard and suffered so much. Any less resolute spirit would +have been beaten in the contest, for “Government” was determined not +to give way an inch more than could possibly be helped. + +However, the matter was carried through at last, and the whole tribe +returned to their devastated homes—including the eighty pioneers, +to whom the Colonel had paid the full wages of free labourers for +the time during which they had worked—in good time to plant their +crops for the coming year. Eventually they also received some small +compensation for the property of which they had been robbed, though +nothing even approaching to an equivalent for all that had been taken +from them or destroyed by the Government force in 1873. + +The same party of mounted Basutos who were with Colonel Durnford at +the Bushman’s River Pass affair, accompanied him throughout this +second more peaceful expedition, and remained his devoted followers +for the rest of his life. + +The colony was tranquil again, and gradually the immediate +consequences of the expedition vanished below the surface of everyday +life, except in the minds of those who had suffered by it. But one +important result was obtained. England was once more convinced that +the time for withdrawing her troops from the colony and leaving it +to protect itself had not yet arrived. Some such project had been +entertained during the previous year, and its speedy accomplishment +was frequently foretold; but such a proceeding would have been fatal +to the plans of the empire-making politicians. The impossibility +of withdrawing the troops was clearly established by turning a +mole-hill into a mountain—by proving how critical the condition of +the native mind within the colony was considered to be by those who +should be the best judges—so that it was thought necessary to turn +out the whole available European force, regular and irregular, upon +the slightest sign of disturbance; and most of all by creating such a +panic in the colonial mind as had not existed since the early days of +Natal. + +It is doubtful how soon the Secretary of State for the Colonies +himself knew the extent to which the operations of 1873-4 could be +made subservient to his great confederation scheme; or rather, to +speak more correctly, how seriously the latter must be injured by +any attempt to set right the injustice done to the Hlubi tribe. When +the Bishop went to England[34] and pleaded in person the cause of +the injured people, there can be no doubt that Lord Carnarvon was +fully impressed by the facts then made known to him. None of the +despatches sent home could in the least justify the proceedings of +his subordinates in Natal. Lord Carnarvon’s own words, expressing +his disapproval of the action taken against the two tribes, and +requiring that all possible restitution should be made to them, show +plainly enough that at the period of the Bishop’s visit to him, with +all the facts of the case before him, his judgment in the matter +coincided with that of the Bishop himself. The latter returned to +Natal, satisfied that substantial justice would now be done, or at +all events that the suffering already inflicted upon the innocent +Hlubi and Amangwe tribes, by the rash and mistaken action of the +Government, would be alleviated to the utmost extent considered +possible without lowering that Government in the eyes of the people. + +Certain steps, indeed, were immediately taken. Orders were sent out +for the release of the Putini people, which order Colonel Durnford +had already induced the Natal Government to anticipate; and a further +order was notified that the tribe should be compensated for the +losses sustained by them during the late expedition. In the case of +Langalibalele and his tribe, although it was not thought advisable +to reinstate them in their old position, every effort was to be +made to mitigate the severity with which they had been treated. A +few extracts from the Earl of Carnarvon’s despatch on the subject +will best show the tone in which he wrote, and that the Bishop might +reasonably feel satisfied that mercy and consideration would be shown +to the oppressed people. + +The Earl of Carnarvon, after reviewing the whole proceeding, comments +somewhat severely upon the manner in which the trial had been +conducted. On this point he says: “I feel bound to express my opinion +that there are several points open to grave observation and regret.” +He speaks of the “peculiar and anomalous” constitution of the court, +the equally “peculiar” law by which the prisoner was tried, and of +“the confusion and unsatisfactory result to which such an anomalous +blending of civilised and savage terms and procedure must lead.” He +remarks that it was in his judgment “a grave mistake to treat the +plea of the prisoner as one of guilty;” and he says, “still more +serious, because it involved practical consequences of a very grave +nature to the prisoner, was the absence of counsel on his behalf.” +Entering into the various charges brought against the prisoner, and +the evidence produced to support them, he dismisses the magistrate’s +accusation of “general indications, of which, however, it is +difficult to give special instance, of impatience of control”; and +the Governor and Secretary for Native Affairs comments on the same +as unimportant, with the words, “I am bound to say that the evidence +does not appear to me fully to support these statements.”[35] + +Reviewing the circumstances and evidence concerning the unregistered +guns, he says: “I am brought to the conclusion that, though there +was probably negligence—it may be more or less culpable—in complying +with the law, there was no sufficient justification for the charge +in the indictment that Langalibalele did encourage and conspire +with the people under him to procure firearms and retain them, +as he and they well knew contrary to law, for the purpose and +with the intention of, by means of such firearms, resisting the +authority of the Supreme Chief.” Of the extent to which the chief’s +disobedience, in not appearing when summoned by Government, was due +to a “deliberately-planned scheme of resistance in concert with +others, or the mere effect of an unfounded panic,” the Earl remarks: +“Unfortunately this was not made clear.” And, finally, referring to +the charge of insulting the Government messengers, he says: “I am +obliged, with great regret, to conclude that this very important +portion of the evidence given against the prisoner at the trial was +so far untrustworthy as to leave it an open question whether the +indignities of which the witness complained may not have amounted to +no more than being obliged to take off his coat, which might be a +precaution dictated by fear, and nothing else.” + +Having thus censured the proceedings of his subordinates on every +point, he says: + +“That the Amahlubi tribe should be removed from its location may +have been a political necessity which, after all that had occurred, +was forced upon you, and I fear[36] it is out of the question +to reinstate them in the position, whether of land or property, +which they occupied previously. The relations of the colony with +the natives, both within and without its boundaries, render this +impossible. But every care should be taken to obviate the hardships +and to mitigate the severities which, assuming the offence of the +chief and his tribe to be _even greater than I have estimated it, +have far exceeded the limits of justice_.[37] Not only should the +terms of the amnesty of the 2nd May last be scrupulously observed, +but as far as possible means should be provided by which the members +of the tribe may be enabled to re-establish themselves in settled +occupations.”[38] Lord Carnarvon further says: “With respect to +the Putili tribe, I have in their case also expressed my opinion +that no sufficient cause has been shown for removing them from +their location. I can discover no indication of their conspiracy +or combination with Langalibalele, beyond the vague and wholly +uncorroborated apprehension of some movement on their part in +connection with the supposed tendencies of his tribe; and therefore I +can see no good reason for any punishment on this ground.” + +The proclamation to the native population enclosed in this despatch +contained the following sentences: + +“Langalibalele we release from imprisonment on the island in the sea, +but he shall not return to Natal. The Amahlubi may, if they choose, +when that is prepared which is to be prepared, go to him, but he will +not be allowed to go to the Amahlubi.” + +In all that Lord Carnarvon thought fit to say on this occasion he +does not express the slightest approval of any person concerned, +or action taken, except of the “conduct of Colonel Durnford, whose +forbearance and humanity towards the natives” (he says) “has +attracted my attention.” A despatch of the same date (3rd December, +1874) recalls Sir Benjamin Pine from the government of Natal. + +Anything more thoroughly condemnatory could hardly be imagined, +although it may be reasonably questioned how far justice was done to +Sir Benjamin Pine[39] by the whole weight of mismanagement being +placed upon his shoulders, while his coadjutor and adviser, Mr. +Shepstone, on whose opinion he had acted throughout, and whose word, +by his supposed knowledge of native ways and character, was law +throughout the affair, was promoted and rewarded. + +After perusing Lord Carnarvon’s remarks and directions, my readers +may imagine that some very good result would be produced on the +fortunes of both tribes, but in this supposition they would be +greatly mistaken. Nor, unless they had been in the habit of perusing +South African despatches with attention, would it occur to them how +easily the proclamation quoted from, drawn up by Mr. Shepstone, could +be evaded. The proclamation itself is almost childish in its foolish +way of informing the people that they had behaved very badly, and +deserved all they had got, but would be relieved of their punishment +by the mercy of the Queen, and must behave very well and gratefully +in future. Such exhortations to people who were perfectly aware that +they had been treated with the utmost injustice were rather likely +to raise secret contempt than respect in the minds of an intelligent +people, who would have far better understood an honest declaration +that “we have punished you, under the impression that you had done +what we find you did not do, and will therefore make it up to you as +much as possible.” + +The two important sentences of the proclamation (already quoted at +p. 71), however, were capable of being adapted to an extent of which +Lord Carnarvon probably did not dream. His lordship can hardly have +intended the first sentence by which Langalibalele was released +“from imprisonment on the island in the sea,” simply to mean that +he was to be conveyed to the nearest (most dreary) mainland, and +imprisoned there, within the limits of a small and barren farm, where +every irritating restriction and annoying regulation were still +imposed five years after. The words “he shall not return to Natal,” +certainly do not imply rigid confinement to a small extent of land, +where friends, white or black, are not allowed to visit him, or +send the most innocent presents without tedious delay and official +permission. The second sentence is an admirable specimen of South +African art. The people might go to their chief if they chose, “_when +that is prepared which is to be prepared_”—but which never has been +yet. + +We give Lord Carnarvon full credit for not having the slightest +notion that this clause would have no result whatever, as nothing +ever would be “prepared.” Year after year has dragged on—one or two +women[40] and a couple of boys being allowed, as a great favour, to +join the old chief during that time. But every difficulty has always +been raised about it, and not the slightest attempt has been made to +enable or permit the tribe or any part of it to follow. + +When the chief and his son were first removed from Robben Island to +Uitvlugt, a desolate and unfruitful piece of ground on the adjoining +mainland, at a considerable distance from the nearest dwelling-place +of any description, it was understood that the family would live in +comparative liberty, being merely “under surveillance;” that is to +say, that some suitable person or persons would be appointed by the +Cape Government to live within reach of them, and to be answerable +for their general good behaviour, for their gratification in every +reasonable wish or request, and for their making no attempt to escape +from the Cape Colony and return to their homes in Natal. + +Strict justice would have required that the chief and his +people—those that were left of them—should be restored to their +location, as was done in the case of the other tribe, and that +both should be repaid the full ascertainable value of the property +taken from them or destroyed; but politicians in these our days +place “expediency” so far above justice and truth, that men who are +fighting for the latter out-of-date objects may well be thankful for +the smallest concession to their side. + +The Bishop accordingly was satisfied that the new arrangement +proposed for the captive chief’s comfort was as good a one as he +could expect from Lord Carnarvon, although not what he might have +done himself had the power lain with him. But when he signified his +satisfaction in the matter, it was certainly on the assumption that +Langalibalele was to be made to feel his captivity as little as +possible upon the mainland—in fact that it was to consist _merely_ in +his inability to leave the colony, or, without permission, the land +assigned to him in it. But that such reasonable permission should be +easily obtainable—that as many of his family and tribe as desired to +do so should be allowed to join him there—that no galling restraints +(such as still exist) should be imposed upon him, were certainly +conditions proposed by Lord Carnarvon and accepted by the Bishop. + +When the Bishop returned to Natal, however, he left behind him in +England one who, closely following upon his steps, undid much of the +work which the other had done. Mr. Shepstone could have brought no +new light to bear upon the subject—he could have given Lord Carnarvon +no fresh facts which had not appeared already in the despatches, +through which the Natal Government had been in constant communication +with him. It was not likely that Mr. Shepstone should possess +information hitherto unknown to the rest of the world, including Lord +Carnarvon himself, which should have the power of entirely altering +the latter’s deliberately-formed judgment upon the subject under +consideration. But had this been so, Lord Carnarvon would assuredly +have communicated the fact to the Bishop, with whom he had parted in +complete unanimity of opinion, and to whom, and through whom to the +unhappy chief, promises had been made and hopes held out, destined, +apparently, never to be fulfilled. + +It is needless to conjecture what may have passed between Lord +Carnarvon and the man who reached England somewhat under a cloud, +with certain errors to answer for to a chief who was well up in facts +beforehand, but who, in 1876, appears as Sir Theophilus Shepstone, +K.C.M.G., with a commission as administrator of the Transvaal hidden +in the depths of his pocket. The facts speak for themselves. The +desire of the Secretary of State to achieve confederation in South +Africa (the South African Empire!), the peculiar capabilities of Mr. +Shepstone for dealing with the native and Dutch races of the country, +and the considerable check which “strict justice” to the injured +tribes would be to the great confederation scheme, are sufficient +grounds for believing that absolution for the past, and immunity +from the consequences of his acts were purchased by the engagement, +on Mr. Shepstone’s part, to carry out in quiet and successful manner +the first decided step towards the great project of confederation and +empire, namely, the annexation of the Transvaal. In the light cast by +succeeding events, it is plain that nothing would have been much more +inconvenient in the scheme of South African politics than any measure +which would be a censure upon Mr. Shepstone, or prevent his promotion +to a higher office in the State. + +That no such alteration in the opinion of the Secretary of State ever +took place may be gathered from his very decided though courteous +replies to the appeals made to him from the colony, to the addresses +from the Legislative Council and other colonists, containing +protests against Lord Carnarvon’s decisions, and professing to give +additional evidence against the tribes in question which would +completely justify the proceedings of the colonial Government, and +the severities of their punishment. + +To all that could be thus alleged Lord Carnarvon replies: “I did +not form my opinion until I had received and considered the fullest +explanation which the Government whose acts are questioned desired +to place before me, and in considering the case I had the advantage +of personal communication with an officer who was specially deputed +to represent the Government of Natal before me, and who, from his +knowledge, ability, and experience, was perhaps better qualified than +any other to discharge the duty which was confided to him. I fail to +find in the present documents the explanations which are promised in +the address to Her Majesty, or indeed any evidence so specific or +conclusive as to affect the opinion which, after the most anxious +consideration, Her Majesty’s Government formed upon this case.”—(P. +P. [C. 1342-1] p. 45.) + +In another despatch of the same date (July 27, 1875, [C. 1342-1] p. +46), addressed to the officer administering the Government, Natal, +he concludes: “As there is apparently no prospect of arriving at +an agreement of opinion on several points, there is, perhaps, no +advantage in continuing the discussion of them.” Nevertheless, +although holding so clear and decided a judgment, Lord Carnarvon +permitted his just and humane directions for the treatment of the +injured tribes to be practically set aside by those in authority +under him.[41] + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +SIR GARNET WOLSELEY. + +WHAT HE CAME FOR, WHAT HE DID, AND WHAT HE DID NOT DO. + + +England, however, was beginning to feel that her South African +possessions were in an unsettled condition, although in point of fact +they were quiet enough until she meddled with them in the blundering +well-meaning fashion in which she has handled them ever since. It was +patent, indeed, that some interference was required, when innocent +tribes were liable to such cruel injustice as that inflicted upon +the Ama-Hlubi and Amangwe in 1873, and, if her interference was +honestly intended on their behalf, she has at least the credit of the +“well-meaning” attributed to her above. Whatever her intentions may +have been, however, the result has been a progress from bad to worse, +culminating at last in the late unhappy Zulu War. + +It is believed by many that England possesses but one man upon whom +she can place any reliance in times of difficulty and danger, and +accordingly Natal shortly received notice that Sir Garnet Wolseley +was coming to “settle her affairs;” and the Natalians, with feelings +varying from humble and delighted respect to bitter and suspicious +contempt, prepared themselves to be set straight—or not—according to +their different sentiments. + +The great man and his “brilliant staff,” as it was soon popularly +called by the colonists—not without a touch of humour—arrived in +Natal upon the last day of March, 1875, and on the 1st of April he +took the oaths as Administrator of the Government at Pietermaritzburg. + +He immediately commenced a series of entertainments, calculated by +their unusual number and brilliancy to dazzle the eyes of young +Natalian damsels. These latter, accustomed as they were to very +occasional and comparatively quiet festivities, and balls at which +a few of the subalterns of the small garrison at Fort Napier were +their most valued partners, found themselves in a new world of a most +fascinating description, all ablaze with gold and scarlet, V.C.’s, +C.B.’s, titles, and clever authors. And, what was more, all these +striking personages paid them the most gracious attentions—attentions +which varied according to the importance of the young ladies’ +male relatives to the political scheme afoot. Meanwhile dinner +after dinner was given to the said relatives; Sir Garnet Wolseley +entertained the whole world, great and small, and the different +members of his staff had each his separate duty to perform—his list +of people to be “fascinated” in one way or another. For a short +time, perhaps, the popularity desired was achieved in consequence of +their united and persevering efforts, although from the very first +there were voices to be heard casting suspicion upon those who were +“drowning the conscience of the colony in sherry and champagne;” and +there were others, more far-sighted still, who grimly pointed out to +the gratified and flattered recipients of this “princely hospitality” +the very reasonable consideration: “You will have to pay for the +sherry and champagne yourselves in the end.” + +Undoubtedly the conviction that the colony would pay dear for its +unwonted gaiety—that it was being “humbugged” and befooled—soon stole +upon the people. While the daughters enjoyed their balls, their +fathers had to buy their ball-dresses; and while the legislative +councillors and all their families were perpetually and graciously +entertained at Government House, the question began to arise: “What +is the object of it all?” + +All unusual treatment calls forth special scrutiny, and it is to +be doubted whether Sir Garnet’s lavish hospitality and (almost) +universally dropped honey, with all the painful labours of his +brilliant staff combined, did more than awaken the suspicions which +a course of proceedings involving less effort would have failed to +evoke. Even the most ignorant of Dutch councillors would be wise +enough to know that when a magnate of the land treated him and his +family as bosom friends and equals of his own, the said magnate +must want to “get something out of him”—even the most untaught and +ingenuous of colonial maidens would soon rate at their true value the +pretty speeches of the “men of note,” who would have had them believe +that, after frequenting all the gayest and most fashionable scenes of +the great world, they had come to Natal and found their true ideal +upon its distant shores. + +A vast amount of trouble and of energy was thrown away by all +concerned, while the few whose eyes were open from the first stood +by and watched to see what would come of it. The question remains +unanswered to this day. That the annexation of the Transvaal by Sir +Garnet Wolseley did _not_ come of it, is to that discreet general’s +great credit. And had his decision—that the work which he was +specially sent out to do[42] was one for which the country was not +ripe, and would not be for many years—been accepted and acted upon by +England, the expense of his six months’ progress through Natal would +have been well worth incurring indeed, for in that case there would +have been no Zulu War. But this, unfortunately for all parties, was +not the case. + +The popular answer in Natal to the question, “What did Sir Garnet +Wolseley do for you?” is, “He got us up an hour earlier in the +morning;” an excellent thing truly, but a costly hour, the history +of which is as follows: For many years the city of Pietermaritzburg, +known as “Sleepy Hollow” to its rivals of another and, in its own +opinion, a busier town, had set all its clocks and watches, and +regulated all its business hours by the sound of a gun, fired daily +from Fort Napier at nine o’clock A.M., the signal for which came +from the town itself. The gun was frequently credited with being +too fast or slow by a few seconds or even minutes, and on one +occasion was known to have been wrong by half-an-hour; a mistake +which was remedied in the most original fashion, by setting the gun +back a minute and a half daily till it should have returned to the +proper time; to the utter confusion of all the chronometers in the +neighbourhood. But, right or wrong, the nine-o’clock gun was the +regulator of city time, including that of all country places within +reach of its report. The natives understood it, and “gun-fire” was +their universal hour of call; the shops were opened at its sound, and +but little business done before it. But during Sir Garnet Wolseley’s +reign in Natal it occurred, not without reason, to the member of +his staff whom he placed in temporary authority over the postal and +other arrangements of the colony, that nine o’clock was too late for +a struggling community to begin its day, and he therefore altered +the original hour of gun-fire to that of eight A.M. How far the +alteration really changed the habits of the people it is hard to +say, or how many of them may now let the eight-o’clock gun wake them +instead of sending them to work, but the change remains an actual +public proof of the fact that in 1875 Sir Garnet Wolseley visited +Natal. + +A more important measure was the bill which he carried through the +Legislative Assembly for the introduction of eight nominee members to +be chosen by the Government, thereby throwing the balance of power +into the hands of the executive, unless, indeed, nominee members +should be chosen independent enough to take their own course. Whether +this measure was looked upon as very important by those who proposed +it, or whether the energy displayed was for the purpose of convincing +the public mind that such really was Sir Garnet’s great object in +Natal, it is not so easy to decide. But looking back through the +events of the last few years one is strongly tempted to suspect that +the whole visit to Natal, and all the display made there, was nothing +but a pretence, a blind to hide our designs upon the Transvaal, for +which Sir Garnet wisely considered that the country was not ripe. + +But if in this instance we are bound to admire Sir Garnet Wolseley’s +good sense, we must, on the other hand, greatly deprecate his +behaviour towards the two unfortunate tribes whose sorrows have been +recorded, and towards those who took an interest in their welfare and +just treatment—more especially towards the Bishop of Natal.[43] + +From the very first Sir Garnet’s tone upon native matters, and +towards the Bishop, were entirely opposed to that used by Lord +Carnarvon. Every attempt made by the Bishop to place matters upon +a friendly footing, which would enable the new Governor to take +advantage of his thorough acquaintance with the natives, was +checked; nor through the whole of his governorship did he ever invite +the Bishop’s confidence or meet him in the spirit in which he was +himself prepared to act; a course of proceeding most unfortunately +imitated by some of his successors, especially Sir Bartle Frere, who +only “invited criticism of his policy”—and received it—when too late +to be of any avail except to expose its fallacies. + +It is impossible to rise from a perusal of the despatches written by +Sir Garnet after his arrival in Natal, in answer or with reference +to matters in which the Bishop was concerned, without coming to the +conclusion that from the very beginning his mind was prejudiced +against the Bishop’s course, and that he had no sympathy with him or +the people in whom he was interested. Far from attempting to carry +out Lord Carnarvon’s instructions in the spirit in which they were +undoubtedly given, he set aside some, and gave an interpretation of +his own to others, which considerably altered their effect; while his +two despatches, dated May 12th and 17th, show plainly enough the bias +of his mind. + +The first is on the subject of the return of Langalibalele, which the +Bishop had recommended, offering to receive him upon his own land +at Bishopstowe, and to make himself responsible, within reasonable +limits, for the chief’s good behaviour. Sir Garnet “would deprecate +in the strongest terms” such return. “Langalibalele,” he says, “as +I am informed by all classes here, official and non-official (a +very small knot of men of extreme views excepted), is regarded by +the native population at large as a chief who, having defied the +authorities, and in doing so occasioned the murder of some white +men, is now suffering for that conduct.” While thus avoiding the +direct responsibility of sitting “in judgment upon past events,” by +_quoting_ from “all classes here,” he practically confirms their +opinion by speaking of those who differ from them as “a very small +knot of men of extreme views;” and he further commits himself to the +very unsoldierlike expression of “murder” as applied to the death of +the five men at the Bushman’s River Pass, by speaking in the same +paragraph of the punishment of the chief as “a serious warning to +all other Kafir chiefs ... to avoid imitating his example.” Without +mentioning the Bishop by name, he makes repeated allusions to him in +a tone calculated to give an utterly false impression of his action +and character. “To secure these objects” (the future safety of the +colony and the true interests of white and black) “it is essential +that a good feeling should exist between the two races; and I am +bound to say that in my opinion those who, by the line of conduct +they adopt, keep alive the recollection of past events,”[44] etc. +etc. “I have no wish to attribute to those who adopt this policy any +interested motives. I am sure that they are actuated by feelings +of high philanthropy,” (? simple justice and honesty), “and nothing +is farther from my mind than a wish to cast any slur upon them. Yet +I must say that from the manner in which they refuse to believe all +evidence that does not coincide with their own peculiar views, and +from the fact of their regarding the condition of affairs in Natal +from one standpoint alone, I am forced to consider them impractical +(_sic_), and not to be relied on as advisers by those who are +responsible for the good government of all classes.” In the following +paragraphs he speaks of “sensational narratives oftentimes based +upon unsifted evidence,” “highly-coloured accounts,” and “one-sided, +highly-coloured, and, in some instances, incorrect statements that +have been made public in a sensational manner,” all which could +refer to the Bishop alone. If by regarding the condition of affairs +in Natal from one standpoint alone, Sir Garnet Wolseley means the +standpoint of British honour and justice, and looks upon those who +hold it as “impractical,” there is little more to say. But Sir +Garnet can never have given his attention to the Bishop’s printed +pamphlets, and could therefore have no right to an opinion as to his +reception or treatment of evidence, or he would not venture to use +the expressions just quoted of one who had never made an assertion +without the most careful and patient sifting of the grounds for it, +whose only object was to establish the truth, _whatever that might +be_, and who was only too glad whenever his investigations threw +discredit upon a tale of wrong or oppression. That principles of +strict honour and justice should in these our days be characterised +as “peculiar views,” is neither to the credit of the English nation +nor of its “only man.” + +In the second despatch mentioned Sir Garnet makes the following +singular remark: “In the meantime I take the liberty of informing +your lordship that the words ‘the Amahlubi may, if they choose, +when that is prepared which is to be prepared, go to him,’ are +interpreted, by those who have taken an active part in favour of +the tribe, as binding the Government to convey all members of the +Amahlubi tribe who may wish to join Langalibalele, to whatever place +may be finally selected for his location. I do not conceive that +any such meaning is intended, and should not recommend that such +an interpretation should be recognised. I think, however, it may +fairly be matter for consideration whether Langalibalele’s wives and +children, who have lost all their property,[45] might not be assisted +with passages by sea to join Langalibalele.”[46] + +It is difficult to imagine what other interpretation can be placed +on the words of the proclamation, or how, after it had once been +delivered, any narrower measures could be fairly considered, or +require further “instructions.” + +In subsequent letters Sir Garnet scouts altogether representations +made by the Bishop of the destitute condition of members of the +Hlubi tribe, replying to Lord Carnarvon on the subject by enclosing +letters from various magistrates in different parts of the country +denying that destitution existed; saying that the people were “in +sufficiently good circumstances;” and most of them suggesting that, +should anything like starvation ensue, the people have only to hire +themselves out as labourers to the white people. The Bishop would +certainly never have made representations unsupported by facts; but +in any case it is a question whether we had not some further duties +towards a large number of innocent people whom we had stripped of all +their possessions, and whose homes and crops we had destroyed, than +that of allowing them to labour for us at a low rate of wages; or +whether the mere fact of its being thus possible for all to keep body +and soul together relieved us of the responsibility of having robbed +and stripped them. + +These facts in themselves prove how different from Lord Carnarvon’s +feelings and intentions were those of his subordinate, and how real +Sir Garnet’s antagonism. It is not therefore surprising that the +commands of the former were not, and have never been, carried out. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +THE MATSHANA INQUIRY AND COLONEL COLLEY. + + +In consequence of the threatened action for libel against the +Bishop of Natal on account of statements made in his defence of +Langalibalele, which Mr. John Shepstone considered to be “of a most +libellous and malicious nature,” the Bishop had laid the matter +before the Lieut.-Governor, Sir B. Pine, requesting him to direct an +inquiry to be made into the truth of the said statements. This was +refused by His Excellency through the acting Colonial Secretary in +the following terms: “Your lordship has thought it right to make the +most serious charges against an important and long-tried officer of +this Government—charges, too, relating to a matter which occurred +sixteen years ago.[47] That officer has, in His Excellency’s opinion, +very properly called upon your lordship to retract those charges. +Instead of doing this, you have appealed to the Lieut.-Governor to +institute an inquiry as to the truth of the charges you have made. +This the Lieut.-Governor has no hesitation in declining to do.” +Thereby prejudging the case without inquiry. + +The Bishop’s next action was an appeal to the Secretary of State for +the Colonies, which he requested the Lieut.-Governor to forward with +a copy of the correspondence which had already taken place on the +subject, in order that His Excellency might be fully aware of what +steps he was taking. + +This appeal contained a short account of the facts which had led to +his making the statements complained of—the trial of Langalibalele, +and the “fear of treachery” perpetually pleaded by many witnesses +in excuse of the chiefs conduct, but treated with contempt both by +the court below and the council, each including the Secretary for +Native Affairs, and presided over by His Excellency. The statements +made by the Bishop—not mere “charges” unsupported by evidence, but +the deposition of four eye-witnesses who might be cross-examined +at will—would, if proved to be true, greatly tend to palliate the +offences imputed to the chief, and should therefore not have been +suppressed by the officer concerned, who had kept silence when a +word from his mouth would have cleared a prisoner on trial for his +life from a very serious part of the charge against him. The Bishop +therefore submitted that the fact of the events in question having +taken place sixteen years before was no reason why they should not be +brought to light when required for the prisoner’s defence. + +The correspondence which ensued—including a very curious circumstance +relating to a missing despatch, recorded in the despatch-book +at Pietermaritzburg, but apparently never received in Downing +Street—will be found by those interested in the subject in the +Bishop’s pamphlet, “The History of the Matshana Inquiry.” For our +present purpose it is sufficient to remark that on the 22nd of April, +1875, Lord Carnarvon directed Sir Garnet Wolseley to institute a +careful inquiry into the matter, and suggested that under all the +circumstances this inquiry might be best conducted by one or more +of the senior officers of Sir Garnet’s staff, who had accompanied +him on special service to Natal. The correspondence which followed +between the parties concerned, with arrangements for the summoning +of witnesses and for the management of the trial, are also all to be +found in the above-mentioned pamphlet. The inquiry was to be of a +private nature, no reporters to be admitted, nor counsel on either +side permitted.[48] The Bishop and Mr. Shepstone were each to be +allowed the presence of one friend during the inquiry, who, however, +was not to speak to the witnesses, or to address the officer holding +the inquiry. In addition the Bishop asked, and received, permission +to bring with him the native interpreter, through whom he was in the +habit of conducting important conversations with natives, as his +own Zulu, although sufficient for ordinary purposes, was not, in +his opinion, equal to the requirements of the case, while Mr. J. +Shepstone was familiar from childhood with colloquial Kafir. + +In the Bishop’s pamphlet he points out that the course which Lord +Carnarvon had thought proper to adopt in this case was wholly his +own, and proceeds as follows:—a passage which we will quote entire:— + +“And I apprehend that this inquiry, though of necessity directed +mainly to the question whether Mr. John Shepstone fired at Matshana +or not, is not chiefly concerned with the character of the act +imputed to him, described by the Secretary for Native Affairs as of +a treacherous murderous nature, but involves the far more serious +question whether that act, if really committed, was suppressed by +Mr. John Shepstone at the time in his official report, was further +suppressed by him when he appeared last year as Government prosecutor +against a prisoner on trial for his life—who pleaded it as a very +important part of his defence, but found his plea treated by the +court, through Mr. John Shepstone’s silence, as a mere impudent +‘pretext’—and has been finally denied by him to the Secretary of +State himself, and is still denied down to the present moment. Such +an act as that ascribed to him, if duly reported at the time, might, +I am well aware, have been justified by some, or at least excused, on +grounds of public policy under the circumstances; though I, for my +part, should utterly dissent from such a view. In that case, however, +it would have been unfair and unwarrantable to have reproached Mr. +Shepstone at the present time for an act which had been brought +properly under the cognizance of his superiors. But the present +inquiry, as I conceive, has chiefly in view the question whether +the facts really occurred as Mr. John Shepstone reported at first +officially, and has since reaffirmed officially, or not.” + +Colonel Colley, C.B., was the officer appointed to conduct the +inquiry, the commencement of which was fixed for August 2nd, 1875. + +The intervening period granted for the purpose was employed by the +Bishop in summoning witnesses from all parts of the land; from +Zululand, from the Free State, and distant parts of the colony. +Matshana himself was summoned as a witness under an offer of safe +conduct from the Government. He, however, did not find it convenient, +or was afraid, to trust himself in person; but Cetshwayo sent some +of his men in his place. The Bishop’s object was to summon as many +“indunas,” or messengers, or otherwise prominent persons in the +affair of 1858; men who were thoroughly trustworthy, and “had a +backbone,” and would not be afraid to speak the truth; his desire +being to get at that truth, whatever it might be. Thirty-one men +responded to his call, of whom, however, only twenty were examined +in court, the Bishop giving way to Colonel Colley’s wish in the +matter, and to save the court’s time. Four other witnesses summoned +by _both_ the Bishop and Mr. Shepstone were examined, and nine more +on Mr. Shepstone’s behalf, called by him. The Bishop had considerable +difficulty in procuring the attendance of the witnesses he required. +The simple order of Mr. John Shepstone would suffice, by the mere +lifting up of his finger, to bring down to Pietermaritzburg at +once any natives whom he desired as witnesses, invested as he was +in the native mind with all the weight and all the terrors of the +magisterial office; and with the additional influence derived from +the fact of his having only recently filled, during his brother’s +absence in England, the office of Secretary for Native Affairs, +with such great—almost despotic—authority over all the natives in +the colony. The Bishop, on the contrary, had no such influence. He +had no power at all to insist upon the attendance of witnesses. He +could only _ask_ them to come, and if they came at his request, they +would know that they were coming, as it were, with a rope around +their necks; and if they were proved to have borne false witness, +calumniating foully so high an official, they had every reason to +fear that their punishment would be severe, from which the Bishop +would have had no power—even if, in such a case, he had the will—to +save them. + +When, upon the 2nd August, the inquiry began, out of the many +witnesses called by the Bishop, upon whom lay the _onus probandi_, +only three were at hand; and two of these, as will be seen, were +present merely through the wise forethought of _the_ intelligent +Zulu, William Ngidi. But for this last, the inquiry would have +begun, and—as the Commissioner was pressed for time, having other +important duties on his hands in consequence of Sir Garnet Wolseley +and staff being about immediately to leave the colony—might even +(as it seemed) have ended, with only a single witness being heard +in support of the Bishop’s story. No others were seen or even heard +of for some days, and then by accident only. The Secretary for +Native Affairs, it is true, by direction of Sir Garnet Wolseley, +had desired Cetshwayo to send down Matshana, and the Bishop fully +expected that this intervention of the Government with a promise +of safe conduct for him, would have sufficed to bring him. But Mr. +John Dunn, “Immigration Agent” of the Government in Zululand, and +Cetshwayo’s confidential adviser, whom the Bishop met in Durban on +July 8th, told him at once that he did not think there was the least +chance of Matshana’s coming, as the Secretary for Native Affairs’ +words in 1873, when he went up to crown Cetshwayo (who asked very +earnestly that Matshana might be forgiven and allowed to return +to Natal) were so severe—“He had injured the Secretary for Native +Affairs’ own body;” that is, one of his men had wounded his brother +(Mr. John Shepstone) fifteen years previously, when thirty or forty +of Matshana’s men had been killed—that he would be afraid to come at +a mere summons like this, notwithstanding the promise of safety, the +value of which he would naturally appreciate by his own experience +in former days. Mr. Dunn promised to do his best to persuade him to +go down, but did not expect to succeed. And, in point of fact, he +never came, alleging the usual “pain in the leg;” and the discussion +in Zululand about his coming had only the result of delaying for +some days the starting of the other witnesses whom the Bishop had +asked Cetshwayo to send. On August 4th, however, Zulu messengers +arrived, reporting to the Secretary for Native Affairs the sickness +of Matshana, and to the Bishop the fact that six witnesses from +Zululand were on the way, and they themselves had pushed on ahead +to announce their coming, as they knew they were wanted for August +2nd. Accordingly five of them arrived on August 8th, and the sixth, +Maboyi, on August 5th, under somewhat singular circumstances, as +will presently appear. Meanwhile most important witnesses in support +of the Bishop’s story were expected by him from Matshana’s old +location—Kwa’ Jobe (at the place of “Jobe”)—partly in consequence of +a letter written by Magema to William Ngidi, partly in compliance +with the Bishop’s request sent through Cetshwayo to Matshana himself +in Zululand. William Ngidi replied to Magema, as follows: “Your +letter reached me all right, and just in the very nick of time, for +it came on Saturday, and the day before Mr. John arrived here (Kwa’ +Jobe), and called the men to come to him on Monday, that they might +talk together about Matshana’s affair. On Sunday my friend Mlingane +came, and we took counsel together; for by this time it was well +known that Mr. John had come to speak with the people about that +matter of Matshana. So we put our heads together, and I got up very +early on Monday morning and hurried off to Deke, and told him that +he was called by Sobantu (the Bishop) to go before the Governor. He +readily agreed to go, and went down at once, on the very day when +Matshana’s people came together to Mr. John, so that he never went to +him; but, when I arrived, there had just come already the messenger +to call him to go to Mr. John, and another came just as he was about +to set off for ’Maritzburg. I told him to call for Mpupama on his +way, and take him on with him. I see that you have done well and +wisely in sending that letter without delay to me.” + +Accordingly these two men, Deke and Mpupuma, reached Bishopstowe +safely in good time. Also Ntambama, Langalibalele’s brother, of whom +the Bishop had heard as having been present on the occasion, readily +came at his summons, though he was not asked to give his evidence, +nor did the Bishop know what it would be before he made his statement +in court. But for the prudent action of William Ngidi, Ntambama would +have been the only witness whose testimony would have sustained +the Bishop’s statements during the first days of the inquiry; and +his evidence, unsupported, might have been suspected, as that of +Langalibalele’s brother, of not being disinterested, and would have +been contradicted at once (see below) by Ncamane’s. + +On Saturday, July 31st, the inquiry being about to begin on the +Monday, Magema received a doleful letter from William Ngidi to the +effect that the ’Inkos Sobantu must take care what he was about, +for that all the people were afraid, and would not venture to come +forward and give evidence against a high government official. He +spoke, however, of one man “whom I trust most of all the people +here,” and who had the scar upon his neck of a wound received upon +the day of Matshana’s arrest. + +Discouraging, indeed, as it was to find on the very eve of the +inquiry that all his efforts through William Ngidi had failed to +procure witnesses, except the two sent down by him at the first, +the Bishop was utterly at a loss to understand how his message to +Cetshwayo had, to all appearance, also entirely failed with respect +to those men of Matshana still living Kwa’ Jobe, as well as (it +seemed) those living in Zululand. + +On August 5th the mystery with respect to the witnesses Kwa’ Jobe +was explained. Deke, Mpupuma, Ntambama, and Njuba, who had come +from Zululand, had all been examined, as well as Ncamane, who, +when called by the Bishop, had replied that he would only come if +called by the Government; and when summoned through the Secretary +for Native Affairs, at the Bishop’s request, withdrew or modified +important parts of his printed statement. The Bishop had actually +no other witness to call, and all his efforts to obtain a number +of well-informed and trustworthy eye-witnesses from Zululand, Kwa’ +Jobe, and Basutoland, seemed likely to end in a complete fiasco. But +on the evening of Thursday, August 5th, a native came to him in the +street and said that his name was Maboyi, son of Tole (Matshana’s +chief induna, who was killed on the occasion in question), and that +he had been sent by Matshana to Mr. Fynn, the superintendent, and +Lutshungu, son of Ngoza, the present chief, of the remnant of his +former tribe living Kwa’ Jobe, to ask to be allowed to take down to +’Maritzburg as witnesses those men of his who were present on the +day of the attempt to seize Matshana. Mr. Fynn said that “He did not +refuse the men, but wished to hear a word by a letter coming from the +Secretary for Native Affairs—it was not proper that he should hear +it from a man of Matshana coming from Zululand,” and sent him off +under charge of a policeman to ’Maritzburg, where he was taken to the +Secretary for Native Affairs, who said to him: “If Matshana himself +had come, this matter might have been properly settled; it won’t be +without him!” But the Secretary for Native Affairs said nothing to +Maboyi about his going to call the witnesses Kwa’ Jobe; he only asked +by whom he had been sent, and when informed, he told him to go home +to Zululand, as he had not been summoned and had nothing to do with +this affair. Maboyi had reached ’Maritzburg on Monday, August 2nd, +the day on which the inquiry began. He saw the Secretary for Native +Affairs on Tuesday, and on that day was dismissed as above. Not a +word was said to the Bishop about his being brought down in this way +under arrest, which fully explained the non-arrival of his witnesses +from the location; since, first, their fear of giving witness against +a government official, and now the arrest of Maboyi, had spread a +kind of panic among them all, and deterred them from coming to give +evidence against Mr. John Shepstone—himself a resident magistrate, +only lately acting as Secretary for Native Affairs, and the brother +of the Secretary for Native Affairs himself—merely in answer to the +Bishop’s unofficial summons. Hearing, however, on Thursday from +natives that the case was then going on at Government House, Maboyi +went up to speak with the Bishop, but arrived when the court had +adjourned. He found him out in town, however, just as he was on the +point of leaving for Bishopstowe, and was, of course, told to wait +and give his evidence. Accordingly, he went to Bishopstowe, and +Magema was charged to bring him in for examination on Saturday, the +next day of the inquiry. On the way into town for that purpose, Mr. +Fynn’s policeman most positively refused to let him stay, and went +off ultimately in great wrath, as Maboyi and Magema insisted that he +must give his evidence before leaving town to return to Zululand. + +On that day, Saturday, August 7th, the Bishop explained the whole +affair to the Commissioner, and, having obtained a list of names +from Maboyi, requested that a Government messenger might be sent for +the men at once, and the Secretary for Native Affairs was instructed +to summon them. On Monday, August 9th, the Secretary for Native +Affairs replied that he had summoned all these men, except seven, +who were already in town, having been called by Mr. John Shepstone, +and having been, in fact, under his hands—in charge of his induna +Nozitshina—from the very first day of the inquiry. It seemed as if +William Ngidi’s statement was really to be verified, and that these +men had all succumbed to their fears. On the other hand, among these +seven was Matendeyeka, whom William Ngidi “trusted most of all;” and +there might be amongst them some who would have the courage to speak +out and to describe the facts connected with the arrest of Matshana +to the best of their ability. At all events the Bishop resolved to +call them, and do his best to bring the truth out of them; and Magema +afterwards whispered that he had heard from one of Mr. John’s men, +who was present when he spoke with the people (Kwa’ Jobe), that the +men there had said: “It was of no use to discuss it beforehand; +they would say nothing about what they remembered now; but before +the Governor they would speak the plain truth as they knew it.” +Accordingly the Bishop called four of these men—Matendeyeka, Faku +(son of Tole), Magwaza, Gwazizulu—and they all confirmed the story as +told by his other witnesses. He left the other three to be called by +Mr. John Shepstone, but he never called them. That these witnesses +should have been called by Mr. John Shepstone, as well as by the +Bishop, was satisfactory, showing that they were witnesses to whom +no objection could be made on the score of character or position in +the tribe, or as having been in any way, directly or indirectly, +influenced by the Bishop. + +But the result was that, as these men were in the hands of the other +side from the time they reached until they left ’Maritzburg, the +Bishop had never even seen them, or had any communication with them, +until they appeared to give their evidence. He was wholly ignorant +beforehand of what they _would_ say or what they _could_ say; he knew +not whether they would confirm or contradict the story told by his +other witnesses; and he knew not on what particular points, if any, +they could give special evidence, and was therefore unable to ask the +questions which might have elicited such evidence. + +By this time (August 8th) the witnesses from Zululand had arrived, +from whom the Bishop learned the names of other important witnesses +living Kwa’ Jobe, and at his request these also were sent for by +Government messengers. Unfortunately, through Maboyi’s arrest, some +of the Bishop’s witnesses summoned by the Secretary for Native +Affairs arrived too late on the very day (August 21st) on which the +evidence was closed, and others a day or two afterwards—twelve +altogether—of whom only one could be heard, whom the Bishop had +expressly named as a man whose testimony he especially desired to +take. Upon the whole, Sir Garnet Wolseley, who began by “leaving +entirely in the Bishop’s hands” the difficult and not inexpensive +business of “obtaining his witnesses,” summoned ultimately twenty-two +of them, of whom, however, four only could be heard by the +Commissioner; two (Matshana and Ngijimi) did not come at all; and +three, including a most important witness, were called too late to be +able to arrive till all was over; while four more out of the seven +who had been called by Mr. John Shepstone gave their evidence in +support of the Bishop, as doubtless the three others would have done, +if Mr. John Shepstone had called them. + +In the despatch to the Earl of Carnarvon, already quoted from (note +to p. 91), Sir B. Pine remarks: “I think it further my duty to +point out to your lordship that much of the evidence adduced by the +Bishop in this case has been taken in this way (_ex parte_, without +the safety of publicity, and the opportunity of cross-examination); +evidence so taken is peculiarly untrustworthy, for everyone +moderately acquainted with the native character is aware that when a +question is put to a native, he will intuitively perceive what answer +is required, and answer accordingly.” The above is a common but +insufficiently supported accusation against the natives, denied by +many who are more than “moderately acquainted” with their character; +although of course it is the natural tendency of a subservient race +in its dealings with its masters, and possible tyrants. But granting +for the nonce its truth, it would, in the case of the Matshana +inquiry, tell heavily on the Bishop’s side. Sir B. Pine was not +present at the private investigation made by the Bishop, to which he +alludes in the above sentence, and therefore can be no judge of the +“cross-examination,” which the four original witnesses underwent; and +they, if they did “intuitively perceive” what answer was required, +and “answer accordingly,” must merely have spoken the truth; a truth +which, at that early period of his investigations, the Bishop was +_most reluctantly_ receiving, and would gladly have had disproved. + +The evidence before the court, however, was given under circumstances +which, if Sir B. Pine’s account of native witnesses be correct, adds +enormously to the value of the fact that out of these twenty-four +witnesses, summoned from various quarters, many of them without +opportunity of communicating either with the Bishop or with each +other, but one[49] failed when it came to the point; and he, a feeble +old man, just released from prison (one of the captured tribe), was +manifestly in a state of abject alarm at finding himself brought +up to witness against the Government whose tender mercies he had +so lately experienced, and contradicted before Colonel Colley the +greater part of the story which he had originally told the Bishop. +This poor creature had been intimidated and threatened by a certain +man named Adam, under whose surveillance he lived after being +released from gaol, and who actually turned him and his family +out at night as a punishment for his having obeyed a summons to +Bishopstowe. He was manifestly ready to say anything which would +relieve him from the fear of the gaol, which he pleaded to Mr. +Shepstone a day or two later; on which occasion he unsaid all he had +previously said, having, as he afterwards confessed, been warned by +Mr. Shepstone’s policeman Ratsha, who asked him for what purpose he +had been summoned by the Bishop, _not to speak a word about_ “Mr. +John’s” treatment of Matshana. But, with the best intentions, the man +did not succeed in making his story tally entirely with that of Mr. +Shepstone’s other witnesses, nor with Mr. Shepstone’s own. + +With this one exception the Bishop’s witnesses told the same story in +all essential respects. They were men arriving from many different +and distant parts of the colony, from Zululand, and from the Free +State, who could not possibly have combined to tell the same story +in all its details, which, if false, would have been torn to pieces +when so many men of different ages and characters were cross-examined +by one so thoroughly acquainted with all the real facts of the case +as Mr. Shepstone—men who had nothing to expect from the Bishop, but +had everything to dread from the Government if proved to have brought +a false and foul charge against an officer so highly placed and so +powerfully protected; _yet not the least impression was made upon the +strength of their united evidence_. + +The case, however, is very different when we turn to Mr. Shepstone’s +witnesses. Of these, nine in number (besides the four natives called +by both the Bishop and Mr. Shepstone), seven were natives; the other +two being the Secretary for Native Affairs and Mr. John Taylor—a +son of Mr. John Shepstone’s first wife by her former husband. Mr. +Taylor was a lad of nine at the time, but, having been present with +his mother and little sister on the occasion of the attack upon +Matshana, was summoned as a witness by Mr. Shepstone. His evidence +was chiefly important as helping to prove that Matshana’s party had +not the concealed weapons which Mr. Shepstone’s chief native witness +Nozitshina said were left by them in immense numbers upon the ground; +as he stated that he and his sister went over the ground, after the +affair was over, and picked up the assegais, “about eight or nine” in +number. + +But it is important to remark that the very fact of the presence +at this meeting of Mrs. Shepstone with her two children, goes +far to disprove the account given by Mr. Shepstone in his second +“statement,” prepared by him on the occasion of this trial, but +which is greatly at variance on some vital points with the narrative +written by him on the day after the event, dated March 17th, 1858, +for the information of His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor. It +seems almost incredible that Mr. John. Shepstone should have, as +he says in his second statement, “made up his mind to face almost +certain” death, not only for himself and all his men, but for _his +wife and her two young children_, on the grounds that it was “too +late to withdraw at this stage” (same report), when at any time +since the “day or two previous” (_ibid._), when the information in +question[50] reached him; according to his account he might have +put off the meeting, or at all events have sent his wife and her +children to a place of safety. The Secretary for Native Affairs’ +evidence could of course be of a merely official character, as he +was not present on the occasion. He stated that Mr. John Shepstone’s +letters of February 16th and 24th, 1858, asked for by the Bishop, on +the subject of the approaching interview with Matshana, could not be +found, although they “must have been recently mislaid,” as he himself +(the Secretary for Native Affairs) had quoted from one of them in his +minute for the Secretary of State in June, 1874. Of Mr. Shepstone’s +native witnesses it can only be said that, amongst the seven called +by him only, six contradicted themselves and each other to so great +an extent as to make their evidence of no value, while the evidence +of the seventh was unimportant, and the four witnesses called by both +Mr. Shepstone and the Bishop told the same story as did the witnesses +of the latter, most unexpectedly to him. + +Nevertheless Colonel Colley’s judgment, although convicting Mr. John +Shepstone of having enticed the chief Matshana to an interview with +the intention of seizing him, was received and acted upon in Natal +as an acquittal of that officer. So far was this the case, that, +although Lord Carnarvon directed that the Bishop’s costs should be +placed upon the colonial estimates, the Legislative Council of the +colony refused to pay them on the grounds that they were the costs of +the losing party. In his report Colonel Colley gives his opinions as +follows: + +“That Matyana was enticed to an interview, as stated by the Bishop, +and was induced to come unarmed, under the belief that it was a +friendly meeting, such as he had already had with Mr. Shepstone, +for the purpose of discussing the accusations against him and the +question of his return to his location. + +“That Matyana, though very suspicious and unwilling, came there in +good faith; and that the accusations against him—of meditating the +assassination of Mr. Shepstone and his party, of a prearranged plan +and signal for the purpose, and of carrying concealed arms to the +meeting—which are made in Mr. J. Shepstone’s statements, are entirely +without foundation. + +“That Mr. Shepstone at that time held no magisterial position, but +was simply the commander of a small armed force charged with the +execution of a warrant; and that the manner in which he proposed to +effect the seizure, viz. at a supposed friendly meeting, was known +to and sanctioned by, if not the Government, at least the immediate +representative of the Government and Mr. Shepstone’s superior, Dr. +Kelly, the resident magistrate of the district. + +“That Mr. Shepstone did not attempt to shoot Matyana, as described +by the Bishop, but fired into the air after the attempt to seize +Matyana had failed, and in consequence of the attempt made almost +simultaneously by some of Matyana’s men to reach the huts and seize +the arms of Mr. Shepstone’s men. + +“The concealment of the gun,” he continues, “and the fact that a +number of Matyana’s men were killed in the pursuit, is not disputed +by Mr. Shepstone. + +“I confess that I have had the greatest difficulty in forming my +opinion on this latter point, and especially as to whether Mr. +Shepstone fired into the air as he states. _The weight of direct +evidence adduced at the inquiry lay altogether on the other +side._”[51] + +Colonel Colley then proceeds to give the considerations by which he +has been influenced in coming to a conclusion directly opposed to the +side on which, as he himself says, lay the weight of direct evidence. +These considerations were threefold. The first is an opinion of +his own, considerably at variance with most people’s experience, +namely, that a story handed down by oral tradition “crystallises +into an accepted form,” by which he explains away the fact that so +many witnesses told the same story, and one which stood the test of +cross-examination, without any important variations. + +The second consideration was even more singular, namely, that +allowance must be made on Mr. John Shepstone’s side for the greater +ability with which the Bishop conducted his case; and the third lay +in the statement that “Mr. J. W. Shepstone is a man of known courage, +and a noted sportsman and shot,” and “was not likely to have missed” +Matyana if he had fired at him; “and, if driven to fire into the +crowd in self-defence, it is more probable that he would have shot +one of the men on the right.” The Bishop’s opponents from the very +first persistently put forward the notion that he had “brought a +charge against Mr. J. W. Shepstone,” and this was countenanced by the +Government when they threw upon him the serious task of prosecuting +before a Court of Enquiry, whereas in point of fact the real question +at issue was not whether or no a certain shot was actually fired, but +whether, on a certain occasion, a Government official had acted in +a treacherous manner towards a native chief, thereby giving reason +for the excuse of fear on the part of Langalibalele, treated as a +false pretence by the court, some members of which were fully aware +of the facts, and the prosecutor himself the official concerned. And, +further, whether the said facts had been concealed by high Government +officers, and denied by them repeatedly to their superiors in England. + +On the former questions Colonel Colley’s report leaves no doubt, +and Lord Carnarvon’s comments upon it are of a very decided nature. +After signifying his acceptance of the decision as a “sound and +just conclusion,” and complimenting Colonel Colley on the “able +and conscientious manner in which” he “has acquitted himself of an +arduous and delicate task,” he continues: “On the other hand, I must, +even after the lapse of so many years, record my disapprobation of +the artifices by which it is admitted Matyana was entrapped into the +meeting with a view to his forcible arrest. Such underhand manœuvres +are opposed to the morality of a civilised administration; they lower +English rule in the eyes of the natives; and they even defeat their +own object, as is abundantly illustrated by the present case.” + +Mr. J. W. Shepstone, however, was a subordinate officer, and if +his mode of executing the warrant was approved by the superior +authorities in the colony, the blame which may attach to the +transaction must be borne by them at least in equal proportion. + +The gist of Colonel Colley’s decision is altogether condemnatory of +Mr. J. Shepstone, some of whose statements, he says, “are entirely +without foundation,” and, by implication, also of his brother, the +Secretary for Native Affairs; yet virtually, and in the eyes of +the world, the decision was in their favour. To quote from _The +Natal Mercury_ of November 2nd, 1875: “It is still understood that +Mr. Shepstone, in the minds of impartial judges, stands more than +exonerated from the Bishop’s charges.” Mr. John Shepstone was +retained in his responsible position, and received further promotion; +and his brother was immediately appointed to the high office of +Administrator of Government, and sent out with power to annex the +Transvaal if he thought proper. + +We have dwelt at some length upon the inquiry into the Matshana +case; for, since the annexation of the Transvaal was one of the +direct and immediate causes of the Zulu War, and since it seems +improbable that any other man than Sir Theophilus Shepstone could at +the moment have been found equally able to undertake the task, it +becomes a serious question to what extent an inquiry which had no +practical effect whatsoever upon the position of men whose conduct +had been stigmatised by the Secretary of State himself as “underhand +manœuvres, opposed to the morality of a civilised administration,” +may not be considered chargeable with the disastrous results. And, +further, we must protest against the spirit of the last sentence of +Lord Carnarvon’s despatch on the subject, in which he expresses his +“earnest hope that his (Colonel Colley’s) report will be received +by all parties to this controversy in the spirit which is to be +desired, and be accepted as a final settlement of a dispute which +cannot be prolonged without serious prejudice to public interests, +and without a renewal of those resentments which, for the good of the +community—English as well as native—had best be put to rest.” + +A dislocated joint must be replaced, or the limb cannot otherwise be +pressed down into shape and “put to rest;” a thorn must be extracted, +not skinned over and left in the flesh; and as, with the dislocation +unreduced or the thorn unextracted, the human frame can never recover +its healthful condition, so it is with the state with an unrighted +wrong, an unexposed injustice. + +The act of treason towards Matshana, hidden for many years, looked +upon by its perpetrators as a matter past and gone, has tainted all +our native policy since—unknown to most English people in Natal or +at home—and has finally borne bitter fruit in the present unhappy +condition of native affairs. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL. + + +On the 5th of October, 1876, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G., was +appointed “to be a Special Commissioner to inquire respecting certain +disturbances which have taken place in the territories adjoining the +colony of Natal, and empowering him, in certain events, to exercise +the power and jurisdiction of Her Majesty over such territories, or +some of them.” (P. P. [C. 1776] p. 1.) + +The commission stated: “Whereas grievous disturbances have broken +out in the territories adjacent to our colonies in South Africa, +with war between the white inhabitants and the native races, to +the great peril of the peace and safety of our said colonies ... +and, if the emergency should seem to you to be such as to render +it necessary, in order to secure the peace and safety of our said +colonies and of our subjects elsewhere, that the said territories, +or any portion or portions of the same, should provisionally, and +pending the announcement of our pleasure, be administered in our +name and on our behalf; then, and in such case only, we do further +authorise you, the said Sir Theophilus Shepstone, by proclamation +under your hand, to declare that, from and after a day to be therein +named, so much of any such territories as aforesaid, as to you after +due consideration, shall seem fit, shall be annexed to and form part +of our dominions.... Provided, first, that no such proclamation +shall be issued by you with respect to any district, territory, or +state unless you shall be satisfied that the inhabitants thereof, or +a sufficient number of them, or the Legislature thereof, desire to +become our subjects, nor if any conditions unduly limiting our power +and authority therein are sought to be imposed.” + +Such was the tenor of the commission which, unknown to the world at +large, Sir Theophilus Shepstone brought with him when he returned to +Natal in November, 1876. The sudden annexation which followed was +a stroke which took all by surprise except the few already in the +secret; many declaring to the last that such an action on the part of +the English Government was impossible—because, they thought, unjust. +It is true that the Republic had for long been going from bad to +worse in the management of its own affairs; its Government had no +longer the power to enforce laws or to collect taxes; and the country +was generally believed to be fast approaching a condition of absolute +anarchy. Nevertheless it was thought by some that, except by the +request of those concerned, we had no right to intrude our authority +for the better control of Transvaal affairs so long as their bad +management did not affect us. + +On one point, however, we undoubtedly had a right to interfere, as +the stronger, the juster, and more merciful nation—namely, the +attitude of the Transvaal Boers towards, and their treatment of, the +native tribes who were their neighbours, or who came under their +control. On behalf of the latter unfortunates (Transvaal subjects), +we did not even profess to interfere; but one of the chief causes +alleged by us for our taking possession of the country was a long and +desultory war which was taking place between the Boers and Sikukuni, +the chief of the Bapedi tribe living upon their northern borders, and +in the course of which the Boers were behaving towards the unhappy +natives with a treachery, and, when they fell into their power, with +a brutality unsurpassed by any historical records. The sickening +accounts of cruelties inflicted upon helpless men, women, and +children by the Boers, which are to be found on official record in +the pages of the Blue-book (C. 1776), should be ample justification +in the eyes of a civilised world for English interference, and +forcible protection of the sufferers; and it is rather with the +manner in which the annexation was carried out, and the policy which +followed it, than with the intervention of English power in itself, +that an objection can be raised. + +The war between the Boers and the Bapedi arose out of similar +encroachments on the part of the former, which led, as we shall +presently show, to their border disputes with the Zulus. Boer farmers +had gradually deprived of their land the native possessors of the +soil by a simple process peculiarly their own. They first rented +land from the chiefs for grazing purposes, then built upon it, +still paying a tax or tribute to the chief; finally, having well +established themselves, they professed to have purchased the land +for the sum already paid as rent, announced themselves the owners of +it, and were shortly themselves levying taxes on the very men whom +they had dispossessed. In this manner Sikukuni was declared by the +Boers to have ceded to them the whole of his territory—that is to +say, hundreds of square miles, for the paltry price of a hundred head +of cattle. + +An officer of the English Government, indeed (His Excellency’s +Commissioner at Lydenburg, Captain Clarke, R.A.), was of opinion +[C. 2316, p. 29] that, “had only the Boer element in the Lydenburg +district been consulted, it is doubtful if there would have been war +with Sikukuni,” as the Boers, he said, might have continued to pay +taxes to the native chiefs. And the officer in question appears to +censure the people who were “willing to submit to such humiliating +conditions, and ambitious of the position of prime adviser to a +native chief.” It is difficult to understand why there should be +anything humiliating in paying rent for land, whether to white or +black owners, and the position of prime adviser to a powerful native +chief might be made a very honourable and useful one in the hands of +a wise and Christian man. + +Captain Clarke continues thus: “It was the foreign element under the +late President which forced matters to a crisis. Since the annexation +the farmers have, with few exceptions, ceased to pay tribute to the +Chiefs; their relations with the natives are otherwise unchanged. +Culture and contact with civilisation will doubtless have the effect +of re-establishing the self-respect of these people, and teaching +them the obligation and benefits imposed and conferred on them by +their new position.” That is to say, apparently, teaching them that +it is beneath their dignity to pay taxes to native landowners, but +an “obligation imposed” upon them to rob the latter altogether of +their land, the future possession of which is one of the “benefits +conferred on them by their new position” (_i.e._ as subjects of the +British Crown). + +“The Bapedi branch of the Basuto family,” says Captain Clarke, in the +same despatch, “essentially agricultural and peaceful in its habits +and tastes, even now irrigate the land, and would, if possible, +cultivate in excess of their food requirements. The friendly natives +assure me that their great wish is to live peacefully on their lands, +and provide themselves with ploughs, waggons, etc. The experience of +the Berlin missionaries confirms this view. Relieved of their present +anomalous position, into which they have been forced by the ambition +of their rulers,[52] and distrust of the Boers, encouraged to follow +their natural bent, the Basutos would become a peaceful agricultural +people, capable of a certain civilisation.” How well founded was this +“distrust of the Boers,” may be gathered from the accounts given in +the Blue-book already mentioned. + +The objects of the Boers in their attacks upon their native +neighbours appear to have been twofold—the acquisition of territory, +and that of children to be brought up as slaves. + +_The Cape Argus_ of December 12th, 1876, remarks: “Through the whole +course of this Republic’s existence, it has acted in contravention +of the Sand River Treaty;[53] and slavery has occurred not only +here and there in isolated cases, but as an unbroken practice has +been one of the peculiar institutions of the country, mixed up with +all its social and political life. It has been at the root of most +of its wars.... The Boers have not only fallen upon unsuspecting +kraals simply for the purpose of obtaining the women and children +and cattle, but they have carried on a traffic through natives, who +have kidnapped the children of their weaker neighbours, and sold them +to the white man. Again, the Boers have sold and exchanged their +victims amongst themselves. Waggon-loads of slaves have been conveyed +from one end of the country to the other for sale, and that with the +cognizance and for the direct advantage of the highest officials +of the land. The writer has himself seen in a town situated in the +south of the Republic the children who had been brought down from a +remote northern district.... The circumstances connected with some +of these kidnapping excursions are appalling, and the barbarities +practised by cruel masters upon some of these defenceless creatures +during the course of their servitude are scarcely less horrible than +those reported from Turkey, although they are spread over a course of +years instead of being compressed within a few weeks.” This passage +is taken from a letter to _The Argus_ (enclosed in a despatch from +Sir Henry Barkly to the Earl of Carnarvon, December 13th, 1876), +which, with other accompanying letters from the same source, gives an +account of Boer atrocities too horrible for repetition. [C. 1776]. +A single instance may be mentioned which, however shocking, is less +appalling than others, but perhaps shows more plainly than anything +else could do what the natives knew the life of a slave in the +Transvaal would be. The information is given by a Boer. “In 1864,” he +says, “the Swazies accompanied the Boers against Males.[54] The Boers +did nothing but stand by and witness the fearful massacre. The men +and women were also murdered. One poor woman sat clutching her baby +of eight days old. The Swazies stabbed her through the body; and when +she found that she could not live, she wrung her baby’s neck with +her own hands, to save it from future misery. On the return of that +commando the children who became too weary to continue the journey +were killed on the road. The survivors were sold as slaves to the +farmers.” + +Out of this state of things eventually proceeded the war between +the Boers and Sikukuni, the result of which was a very ambiguous +one indeed; for although Sikukuni was driven out of the low-lying +districts of the country, he took refuge in his stronghold, which +affords such an impregnable position in a thickly-populated range of +mountains as hitherto to have defied all attempts, whether made by +Boers or by English, to reduce it.[55] + +Another important reason alleged at the time for taking possession of +the Transvaal was that the border troubles between it and Zululand +were becoming more serious every day; that, sooner or later, unless +we interposed our authority, a war would break out between the Boers +and the Zulus, into which we should inevitably be drawn. The Zulus, +having continually entreated our protection, while at our desire they +refrained from defending themselves by force of arms, were naturally +rejoiced at an action on our part which looked like an answer to +their oft-repeated prayer, and eagerly expected the reward of their +long and patient waiting. + +But, however strongly we may feel that it was the duty of the more +powerful nation to put a stop to the doings of the Transvaal Boers, +even at considerable expense to ourselves, the manner in which we +have acted, and the consequences which followed, have been such as to +cause many sensible people to feel that we should have done better +to withdraw our prohibition from Cetshwayo, and allow him and the +Boers “to fight it out between them.”[56] + +We might have honestly and openly interfered and insisted upon +putting a stop to the atrocities of the Boers, annexing their country +if necessary to that end, but then we ourselves should have done +justice to the natives on whose behalf we professed to interfere, +instead of taking over with the country and carrying on those very +quarrels and aggressions which we alleged as a sufficient reason for +the annexation. + +When Sir Theophilus Shepstone went up to Pretoria it was, ostensibly, +merely to advise the President and Volksraad of the Transvaal +Republic as to the best means of extricating themselves and the +country from the difficulties into which they were plunged, and +with the expressed intention of endeavouring to produce a peaceful +settlement with Sikukuni, which should protect him and his people +for the future from the tyranny of the Boers. Up to the last the +notion that there was any intention of forcibly annexing the country +was indignantly repudiated by the members of the expedition, +although their chief meanwhile was in possession of his commission +as Administrator of the British Government in the Transvaal. There +were some who suspected that there was more in the movement than +was confessed to by those concerned. It was argued that, were Sir +Theophilus Shepstone’s visit of a purely friendly nature, no armed +force would have been sent to escort him, as he was going, not into +a savage country, but into one which, at all events, professed to +have a civilised government and an educated class. The unsettled +state of feeling amongst the Boers was pleaded in answer to this +argument, but was commonly met by the suggestion that if, under the +circumstances, the armed force of mounted police which accompanied +the important visitor might be looked upon as a justifiable +precaution, yet the possible danger to strangers from the violence +of a few lawless men in a country in which the government was not +strong enough to keep them in check, was not great enough to account +for the fact that a regiment of British infantry was hastily moved +up to Newcastle, from whence they could speedily be summoned into +the Transvaal. The presence of a Zulu army upon the other border, +where it lay quiet and inoffensive for weeks during Sir Theophilus +Shepstone’s proceedings in the Transvaal, was naturally looked upon +as a suspicious circumstance. There can be little doubt that—whether +or no Cetshwayo obeyed a hint from his old friend the Secretary for +Native Affairs, and sent his army to support him, and to overawe the +Boers by a warlike demonstration—the Zulus were present in a spirit, +however inimical to the Boers, entirely friendly to the English. The +mere fact that the army lay there so long in harmless repose, and +dispersed promptly and quietly _immediately_ upon receiving orders to +do so from Sir Theophilus Shepstone, proves that, at all events, they +and their king thought that they were carrying out his wishes. The +feeling expressed at the time by a British officer,[57] in speaking +of this Zulu army, and recommending that it should be dispersed, that +“it were better the little band of Englishmen (including, of course, +himself) should fall by the hand of the Boers than that aught should +be done by the former to bring about a war of races,” can hardly have +been shared by Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself, or the message to +the Zulu king to withdraw his army would have been despatched some +weeks earlier. + +In face of these facts it strikes one as strange that the temporary +presence of this Zulu army on the Transvaal borders, manifestly in +our support (whether by request or not), and which retired without +giving the least offence, or even committing such acts of theft or +violence as might be expected as necessary evils in the neighbourhood +of a large European garrison, should have been regarded, later, as a +sign of Cetshwayo’s inimical feeling towards _the English_.[58] + +Mr. Pretorius, member of the Dutch executive council, and other +influential Transvaalers, assert that Sir T. Shepstone threatened to +let loose the Zulus upon them, in order to reduce them to submission; +but the accusation is denied on behalf of the Administrator of the +Transvaal. And Mr. Fynney (in the report of his mission to Cetshwayo +from Sir T. Shepstone, upon the annexation of the Transvaal, dated +July 4, 1877) gives the king’s words to him, as follows: “I am +pleased that Somtseu (Sir Theophilus Shepstone) has sent you to let +me know that the land of the Transvaal Boers has now become part of +the lands of the Queen of England. I began to wonder why he did not +tell me something of what he was doing. I received one message from +him, sent by Unkabano, from Newcastle, and I heard the Boers were +not treating him properly, and that they intended to put him into a +corner. If they had done so, I should not have wanted for anything +more. Had one shot been fired, I should have said, ‘What more do I +wait for? they have touched my father.’” + +But all doubt upon the subject of Sir T. Shepstone’s intention +was quickly and suddenly set at rest—the silken glove of friendly +counsel and disinterested advice was thrown aside, and the mailed +hand beneath it seized the reins of government from the slackened +fingers of the President of the Transvaal. On the 22nd January, +1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone entered Pretoria, the capital of +the country, where he was received with all kindness and attention +by the president, Mr. Burgers, and other important men, to whom he +spoke of his mission in general terms, as one the object of which +was “to confer with the Government and people of the Transvaal, with +the object of initiating a new state of things which would guarantee +security for the future.”[59] + +On April 9th, 1879, Sir T. Shepstone informed President Burgers that +“the extension over the Transvaal of Her Majesty’s authority and +rule” was imminent. + +The following protest was officially read and handed in to Sir T. +Shepstone on the 11th April: + + “Whereas I, Thomas François Burgers, State President of the + South African Republic, have received a despatch, dated the + 9th instant, from Her British Majesty’s Special Commissioner, + Sir Theophilus Shepstone, informing me that his Excellency has + resolved, in the name of Her Majesty’s Government, to bring the + South African Republic, by annexation, under the authority of the + British Crown: + + “And whereas I have not the power to draw the sword with good + success for the defence of the independence of the State against + a superior power like that of England, and in consideration of + the welfare of the whole of South Africa, moreover, feel totally + disinclined to involve its white inhabitants in a disastrous war, + without having employed beforehand all means to secure the rights + of the people in a peaceable way: + + “So, I, in the name and by the authority of the Government and + the people of the South African Republic, do hereby solemnly + protest against the intended annexation. + + “Given under my hand and under the Seal of the State at the + Government Office at Pretoria, on this the 11th day of April, in + the year 1877. + (Signed) “THOMAS BURGERS, + “State President.” + +A strong protest was handed in on the same date by the Executive +Council, in which it was stated “the people, by memorials or +otherwise, have, by a large majority, plainly stated that they are +averse to it” (annexation). + +On April 17th, 1877, Sir T. Shepstone writes to Lord Carnarvon: +“On Thursday last, the 12th instant, I found myself in a position +to issue the proclamations necessary for annexing[60] the South +African Republic, commonly known as the Transvaal, to Her Majesty’s +dominions, and for assuming the administration thereof.” P. P. [C. +1776] pp. 152-56. + +His intentions had been so carefully concealed, the proclamation took +the people so completely by surprise; that it was received in what +might be called a dead silence, which silence was taken to be of that +nature which “gives consent.” + +It has been amply shown since that the real feeling of the country +was exceedingly averse to English interference with its liberties, +and that the congratulatory addresses presented, and demonstrations +made in favour of what had been done, were but expressions of feeling +from the foreign element in the Transvaal, and got up by a few +people personally interested on the side of English authority. But +at the time they were made to appear as genuine expressions of Boer +opinions favourable to the annexation, which was looked upon as a +master-stroke of policy and a singular success. + +It was some time before the Transvaalers recovered from the stunning +effects of the blow by which they had been deprived of their +liberties, and meanwhile the new Government made rapid advances, and +vigorous attempts at winning popularity amongst the people. Sir T. +Shepstone hastened to fill up every office under him with his own +men, although there were great flourishes of trumpets concerning +preserving the rights of the people to the greatest extent possible, +and keeping the original men in office wherever practicable. The +first stroke by which popularity was aimed at was that of remitting +the war taxes levied upon the white population (though unpaid) +to meet the expenses of the war with Sikukuni. It became apparent +at this point what an empty sham was our proposed protection of +Sikukuni, and how little the oppression under which he and his people +suffered had really called forth our interference. Sir T. Shepstone, +while remitting, as stated, the tax upon the Boers, insisted upon the +payment in full of the fine in cattle levied by them upon Sikukuni’s +people. So sternly did he carry out the very oppressions which he +came to put an end to, that a portion of the cattle paid towards +the fine (two thousand head, a large number, in the reduced and +impoverished state of the people) were sent back, by his orders, on +the grounds that they were too small and in poor condition, with the +accompanying message that better ones must be sent in their place. A +commission (composed of Captain Clarke, R.A., and Mr. Osborne) was +sent, before the annexation, by Sir T. Shepstone, to inquire into a +treaty pressed by the Boers upon Sikukuni, and rejected by him, as +it contained a condition by which he was to pay taxes, and thereby +come under the Transvaal Government.[61] To these gentlemen “Sikukuni +stated that the English were great and he was little [C. 1776, p. +147], that he wanted them to save him from the Boers, who hunted him +to and fro, and shot his people down like wild game. He had lost +two thousand men” (this included those who submitted to the Boers) +“by the war, ten brothers, and four sons.... He could not trust +the Boers as they were always deceiving him.” After saying that “he +wished to be like Moshesh” (a British subject), and be “happy and at +peace,” he “asked whether he ought to pay the two thousand head of +cattle, seeing that the war was not of his making.” + +“To this we replied,” say the Commissioners, “that it was the custom +of us English, when we made an engagement, to fulfil it, cost what it +might; that our word was our word.” + +Small wonder if the oppressed and persecuted people and their chief +at last resented such treatment, or that some of them should have +shown that resentment in a manner decided enough to call for military +proceedings on the part of the new Government of the Transvaal. +In point of fact, however, it was not Sikukuni, but his sister—a +chieftainess herself—whose people, by a quarrel with and raid upon +natives living under our protection, brought on the second or English +“Sikukuni war.” + +Turning to the other chief pretext for the annexation of the +Transvaal, the disturbed condition of the Zulu border, we find +precisely the same policy carried out. When it was first announced +that the English had taken possession of the country of their +enemies, the Zulus, figuratively speaking, threw up their caps, and +rejoiced greatly. They thought that now at last, after years of +patient waiting, and painful repression of angry feelings at the +desire of the Natal Government, they were to receive their reward in +a just acknowledgment of the claims which Sir T. Shepstone had so +long supported, and which he was now in a position to confirm. + +But the quiet submission of the Boers would not have lasted, even +upon the surface, had their new Governor shown the slightest sign +of leaning to the Zulu side on the bitter boundary question; and as +Sir T. Shepstone fancied that the power of his word was great enough +with the Zulus to make them submit, however unwillingly, there was +small chance of their receiving a rood of land at his hands. He had +lost sight of, or never comprehended the fact, that that power was +built upon the strong belief which existed in the minds of the Zulu +king and people with regard to the justice and honesty of the English +Government. This feeling is amply illustrated by the messages from +the Zulu king, quoted in our chapter upon the Disputed Territory, and +elsewhere in this volume, and need therefore only be alluded to here. + +But this belief, so far as Sir T. Shepstone is concerned, was +destroyed when the Zulus found that, far from acting according to his +often-repeated words, their quondam friend had turned against them, +and espoused the cause of their enemies, whom, at his desire, they +had refrained these many years from attacking, when they could have +done so without coming into collision with the English. + +The Zulus, indeed, still believed in the English, and in the Natal +Government; but they considered that Sir T. Shepstone, in undertaking +the government of the Boers, had become a Boer himself, or, as +Cetshwayo himself said, his old friend and father’s back, which +had carried him so long, had become too rough for him—if he could +carry him no longer he would get down, and go to a man his equal +in Pietermaritzburg (meaning Sir Henry Bulwer, Lieut.-Governor of +Natal), who would be willing and able to take him up. + +It is a curious fact, and one worthy of note, that Sir T. Shepstone, +who for so many years had held and expressed an opinion favourable +to the Zulus on this most important boundary question, should yet +have studied it so little that, when he had been for six months +Administrator of the Transvaal, with all evidence, written or oral, +official or otherwise, at his command, he could say, speaking of a +conversation which he held with some Dutch farmers at Utrecht—Parl. +p. (2079, p. 51-4): “I then learned for the first time, what +has since been proved by evidence the most incontrovertible, +overwhelming, and clear, that this boundary line[62] had been +formally and mutually agreed upon, and had been formally ratified by +the giving and receiving of tokens of thanks, and that the beacons +had been built up in the presence of the President and members of the +Executive Council of the Republic, in presence of Commissioners from +both Panda and Cetshwayo, and that the spot on which every beacon was +to stand was indicated by the Zulu Commissioners themselves placing +the first stones on it. + +“I shall shortly transmit to your Lordship” (the Secretary of State +for the Colonies) “the further evidence on the subject that has been +furnished to me.” This “further evidence,” if forwarded, does not +appear in the Blue-books. It is plain that the Border Commissioners +of 1878 found both the “evidence the most incontrovertible, +overwhelming, and clear,” and the “further evidence” promised, +utterly worthless for the purpose of proving the case of the Boers; +but, even had it been otherwise, Sir T. Shepstone’s confession +of ignorance up to so late a date on this most vital question is +singularly self-condemnatory. + +“When I approached the question,”[63] he says, “I did so supposing +that the rights of the Transvaal to land on the Zulu border had very +slender foundation. I believed, from the representations which had +been systematically made by the Zulus to the Natal Government on +the subject, of which I was fully aware from the position I held in +Natal, that the beacons along the boundary line had been erected by +the Republican Government, in opposition to the wishes, and in spite +of the protests, of the Zulu authorities.[64] + +“I, therefore, made no claims or demand whatever for land. I invited +Cetshwayo to give me his views regarding a boundary, when I informed +him from Pretoria that I should visit Utrecht on the tour I then +contemplated making. When I met the Zulu prime minister and the +indunas on the 18th October last” (six weeks before he discovered, +in conversation with some Boers, the “evidence incontrovertible, +overwhelming, and clear”), “on the Blood River, I was fully prepared, +if it should be insisted on by the Zulus, as I then thought it might +justly be, to give up a tract of country which had from thirteen +to sixteen years been occupied by Transvaal farmers, and to whose +farms title-deeds had been issued by the late Government; and I +contemplated making compensation to those farmers in some way or +another for their loss. I intended, however, first to offer to +purchase at a fair price from the Zulu king all his claims to land +which had for so many years been occupied and built upon by the +subjects of the Transvaal, to whom the Government of the country was +distinctly liable.”[65] + +Sir T. Shepstone, when he met the Zulu indunas at the Blood River, +was prepared to abandon the line of 1861 (claimed by the Boers), for +that of the Blood River and the Old Hunting Road (“if it should be +insisted on by the Zulus,” as he “then thought it might justly be”), +which, in point of fact, would have satisfied neither party; but +he does not say by what right he proposed to stop short of the old +line of 1856-7—viz. the Blood River—and insist upon the “Old Hunting +Road.” If the half-concession were just, so was the whole—or neither. + +To these half-measures, however, the Zulus would not submit, and the +conference failed of its object. + +“Fortunately, therefore, for the interests of the Transvaal,” +says Sir T. Shepstone, “I was prevented by the conduct of the +Zulus themselves from surrendering to them at that meeting what my +information on the subject then had led me to think was after all +due to them, and this I was prepared to do at any sacrifice to the +Transvaal, seeing, as it then appeared to me, that justice to the +Zulus demanded it.” + +In spite, however, of the concession to the Boers, made in Sir T. +Shepstone’s altered opinion on the border question, they were by +no means reconciled to the loss of their independence, although +Captain Clarke says (C. 2316, p. 28), in speaking of the Boers in +Lydenburg district, “they, in the majority of cases, would forget +fancied wrongs if they thought they had security for their lives +and property, education for their children, and good roads for the +transport of their produce.”[66] + +The following “agreement signed by a large number of farmers at +the meeting held at Wonderfontein,” and translated from a Dutch +newspaper, the _Zuid Afrikaan_, published at Capetown on the 15th +February (C. 2316, p. 1), gives a different impression of the state +of feeling amongst the Boers: + +“In the presence of Almighty God, the Searcher of all hearts, and +prayerfully waiting on His gracious help and pity, we, burghers of +the South African Republic, have solemnly agreed, and we do hereby +agree, to make a holy covenant for us, and for our children, which we +confirm with a solemn oath. + +“Fully forty years ago our fathers fled from the Cape Colony in order +to become a free and independent people. Those forty years were forty +years of pain and suffering. + +“We established Natal, the Orange Free State, and the South African +Republic, and three times the English Government has trampled our +liberty and dragged to the ground our flag, which our fathers had +baptised with their blood and tears. + +“As by a thief in the night has our Republic been stolen from us. We +may nor can endure this. It is God’s will, and is required of us by +the unity of our fathers, and by love to our children, that we should +hand over intact to our children the legacy of the fathers. For that +purpose it is that we here come together and give each other the +right hand as men and brethren, solemnly promising to remain faithful +to our country and our people, and with our eye fixed on God, to +co-operate until death for the restoration of the freedom of our +Republic. + +“So help us Almighty God.” + +These pious words, side by side with the horrible accounts of the +use made by the Boers of their liberty while they had it, strike one +as incredibly profane; yet they are hardly more so than part of the +speech made by Sir T. Shepstone to the burghers of the Transvaal on +the occasion of the annexation. + +“Do you know,” he asks them, “what has recently happened in Turkey? +Because no civilised government was carried on there, the Great +Powers interfered and said, ‘Thus far and no farther.’ And if +this is done to an Empire, will a little Republic be excused when +it misbehaves? Complain to other powers and seek justice there? +Yes, thank God! justice is still to be found even for the most +insignificant, but it is precisely this justice which will convict +us. If we want justice we must be in a position to ask it with +unsullied hands.”[67] + +Our first quotation was from the words of ignorant Boers, our second +from those of a man South African born and bred, South African in +character and education. But perhaps both are surpassed by words +lately written by an English statesman of rank. Let us turn to a +“minute” of Sir Bartle Frere’s, forwarded on November 16th, 1878 +(2222, p. 45), and see what he says in defence of Boer conquests and +encroachments. “The Boers had force of their own, and every right of +conquest; but they _had also what they seriously believed to be a +higher title, in the old commands they found in parts of their Bible +to exterminate the Gentiles, and take their land in possession_.[68] +We may freely admit that they misinterpreted the text, and were +utterly mistaken in its application. But _they had at least a sincere +belief in the Divine authority for what they did, and therefore a far +higher title than the Zulus could claim for all they acquired_.”[68] +(P. P. [C. 2222] p. 45). + +If the worship of the Boers for their sanguinary deity is to be +pleaded in their behalf, where shall we pause in finding excuses for +any action committed by insane humanity in the name of their many +gods? But the passage hardly needs our comments, and we leave it to +the consideration of the Christian world. + +A paragraph from _The Daily News_ of this day, November 8th, 1879, +will suitably close our chapter on the Transvaal. It is headed +“Serious Disturbance in the Transvaal,” and gives a picture of the +disposition of the Boers, and of the control we have obtained over +them. + + “PRETORIA, October 13th. + + “A somewhat serious disturbance has occurred at Middleberg. A + case came in due course before the local court, relating to a + matter which took place last July. A Boer, by name Jacobs, had + tied up one of his Kaffir servants by his wrists to a beam, so + that his feet could not touch the ground. The man was too ill + after it to move for some days. The case against the Boer came on + on October 8th. A large number of Boers attended _from sympathy + with the defendant_,[69] and anxious to _resist any interference + between themselves and their Kaffirs_. The Landrost took the + opportunity to read out Sir Garnet’s proclamation, declaring the + permanency of the annexation of the Transvaal. The attitude of + the Boers appeared to be so threatening that after a time the + Landrost _thought it better to adjourn the hearing for a couple + of hours_. + + “On the court’s reassembling, he was informed that + five-and-twenty Boers had visited two of the stores in the town, + and had seized gunpowder there, gunpowder being a forbidden + article of sale. The following day a much larger attendance of + Boers made their appearance at the court. Seventy of them held + a meeting, at which they bound themselves to protect those who + had seized the gunpowder, and their attitude was so threatening + that the Landrost, on the application of the public prosecutor, + _adjourned the case sine die_. A fresh case of powder seizing + was reported on the same day. Colonel Lanyon has already gone to + the scene of disturbance, which will be dealt with purely, _at + all events at present_, as a civil case of violence exercised + against the owners of the stores. At the same time a troop of + dragoons will be there about the day after to-morrow, and a + company of infantry in a few days more, while a considerable + number of the 90th Regiment will in a short time be, in regular + course, passing that way. The spark will therefore no doubt be + stamped out quickly where it has been lighted. The only danger is + in the tendency to explosion which it perhaps indicates in other + directions.” + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +THE DISPUTED TERRITORY. + + +We must now look back and gather up the threads—hitherto interwoven +with accounts of other matters—connected with what has been rightly +called the “burning question” of the disputed territory, which led +eventually to the Zulu War. + +The disputes between the Boers and Zulus concerning the boundary line +of their respective countries had existed for many years, its origin +and growth being entirely attributable to the well-known and usually +successful process by which the Dutch Boers, as we have already said, +have gradually possessed themselves of the land belonging to their +unlettered neighbours. This process is described by Mr. Osborn, +formerly resident magistrate of Newcastle, now Colonial Secretary of +the Transvaal Government, September 22nd, 1876 (1748, p. 196). + +“I would point out here that this war (with Sikukuni) arose solely +out of dispute about land. The Boers—as they have done in other +cases, and are still doing—encroached by degrees upon native +territory; commencing by obtaining permission to graze stock upon +portions of it at certain seasons of the year, followed by individual +graziers obtaining from native headmen a sort of license to squat +upon certain defined portions, ostensibly in order to keep other +Boer squatters away from the same land. These licenses, temporarily +extended, as friendly or neighbourly acts, by unauthorised, headmen, +after a few seasons of occupation by the Boer, are construed by him +as title, and his permanent occupation ensues. Damage for trespass is +levied by him upon the very men from whom he obtained right to squat, +to which the natives submit out of fear of the matter reaching the +ears of the paramount Chief, who would in all probability severely +punish them for opening the door of encroachment to the Boer. After +awhile, however, the matter comes to a crisis, in consequence of the +incessant disputes between the Boers and the natives; one or other +of the disputants lays the case before the paramount Chief, who, +upon hearing both parties, is literally frightened with violence +and threats by the Boer into granting him the land. Upon this, +the usual plan followed by the Boer is at once to collect a few +neighbouring Boers, including an Acting Field Cornet, or even an +Acting Provisional Field Cornet, appointed by the Field Cornet or +Provisional Cornet, the latter to represent the Government, although +without instructions authorising him to act in the matter. A few +cattle are collected among themselves, which the party takes to +the Chief, and his signature is obtained to a written instrument, +alienating to the Republican Boers a large slice of, or all, his +territory. The contents of this document are, so far as I can make +out, never clearly or intelligibly explained to the Chief, who signs +it and accepts of the cattle, under the impression that it is all in +settlement of hire for the grazing licenses granted by his headmen.” + +“This, I have no hesitation in saying, is the usual method by which +the Boers obtain what they call cessions of territories to them by +native Chiefs. In Sikukuni’s case, they say that his father, Sikwata, +ceded to them the whole of his territory (hundreds of square miles) +for one hundred head of cattle.” + +Also Sir H. Barkly, late Governor of the Cape, writes as follows, +October 2nd, 1876 (1748, p. 140): + +“The following graphic description of this process (of Boer +encroachment) is extracted from a letter in the Transvaal _Advocate_ +of a few weeks ago: ‘Frontiers are laid down, the claim to which +is very doubtful. These frontiers are not occupied, but farms are +inspected (“guessed at” would be nearer the mark), title-deeds for +the same are issued, and, when the unlucky purchaser wishes to take +possession, he finds his farm (if he can find it) occupied by tribes +of Kafirs, over whom the Government has never attempted to exercise +any jurisdiction.’ ‘Their Chief,’ it adds, ‘is rather bewildered +at first to find out that he has for years been a subject of the +Transvaal.’ ‘The Chief in question is one Lechune, living on the +north-west of the Republic. But the account is equally applicable +to the case of Sikukuni, or Umswazi, or half-a-dozen others, the +entire circuit of the Republic, from the Barolongs and Batlapins on +the west, to the Zulus on the east, being bordered by a _series of +encroachments disputed by the natives_.’” + +A memorandum from Captain Clarke, R.A., Special Commissioner at +Lydenburg, dated April 23rd, 1879 (C. 2367, p. 152), also gives +an account of the way in which the Boers took possession of the +Transvaal itself, highly illustrative of their usual practice, and +of which the greater part may be quoted here, with a key to the real +meaning of phrases which require some study to interpret. + +“On the entrance of the Fou Trekkers into the Transvaal, they +were compelled against their hereditary instincts to combine for +self-defence against a common foe.” (That is to say, that, having +forced themselves into a strange country, they necessarily combined +to oust those they found there.) “External pressure was removed by +success, and the diffusive instinct asserted itself”—which being +translated into ordinary English simply signifies that, having +conquered certain native tribes, they settled themselves upon their +lands, and returned to their natural disunited condition. “Isolated +families, whose ambition was to be out of sight of their neighbours’ +smoke, pushed forward into Kafir-land” (as yet unconquered). + +“Boundaries were laid down either arbitrarily or by unsatisfactorily +recorded treaty with savage neighbours. The natives, forced back, +acquired the powers of coalition lost by the Boers, and in their turn +brought pressure to bear on their invaders and whilom conquerors; +farm after farm had to be abandoned, and many of the Boers who +remained acknowledged by paying tribute that they retained their +lands by the permission of neighbouring chiefs. The full importance +of this retrograde movement was not at once felt, as a natural +safety-valve was found.” + +“A considerable portion of the east of the Transvaal is called +the High Veldt, and consists of tableland at a considerable +elevation, overlying coal-measures; this district appears bleak and +inhospitable, overrun by large herds of game and watered by a series +of apparently stagnant ponds which take the place of watercourses.... +From various sources, within the last six years, it has been +discovered that the High Veldt is most valuable for the grazing of +sheep, horses, and cattle; and farms which possess the advantage of +water are worth from £1,000 to £1,200, where formerly they could have +been bought for as many pence.” + +“This discovery has opened a door of escape for many of the +_native-pressed borderers_. _The pressure_ on those that remain +increases, and on the north-east and west of the Transvaal is a +fringe of farmers who live by the sufferance or in fear of the +interlacing natives.” + +The phrases which I have italicised seem to indicate that the +writer has lost sight of the fact that, if the border farmers are +“native-pressed,” it is because they have intruded themselves amongst +the natives, from which position a just and wise government would +seek to withdraw them, instead of endeavouring to establish and +maintain them in it by force. This latter course, however, is the +one which Captain Clarke recommends. The remainder of his memorandum +is a series of suggestions for this purpose, one of which runs as +follows: “To take away the immediate strain on the border farmer, and +the risk of collision which the present state of affairs involves, +I would suggest the establishment of Government Agents, who should +reside _on or beyond the border now occupied by the farmers_.[70] ... +Each Residency should be a fortress, built of stones and prepared for +defence against any native force.” + +Sir Bartle Frere’s version of Captain Clarke’s account, given to +the Secretary of State in a despatch enclosing the above, runs as +follows: “Most of the native chiefs now there have gradually crept +in, under pressure from the northward, and finding no representatives +of the Transvaal Government able to exercise authority on the spot, +have gradually set up some sort of government for themselves, before +which many of the Boers have retired, leaving only those who were +willing to pay a sort of tribute for protection, or to avoid being +robbed of their cattle.” + +With whatever oblique vision Sir Bartle Frere may have perused the +enclosure from which he gathers his facts, no unbiassed mind can +fail to detect the singular discrepancy between the account given by +Captain Clarke and that drawn from it by the High Commissioner in his +enclosing letter. + +He makes no mention of the _driving out_ of the natives which +preceded their _creeping in_, and which figures so largely in Captain +Clarke’s memorandum, of which he professes to give a sketch. And he +introduces, entirely on his own account, the accusation against the +natives implied in the phrase “or to avoid being robbed of their +cattle,” of which not a single word appears in the memorandum itself. + +Properly speaking, there were two disputed boundary lines up to +1879, the one being that between Zululand and the Transvaal, to +the south of the Pongolo River; the other that between the Zulus +and the Swazis, to the north of, and parallel to, that stream.[71] +The Swazis are the hereditary enemies of the Zulus, and there has +always been a bitter feeling between the two races, nevertheless the +acquisitiveness of the Transvaal Boers was at the bottom of both +disputes. They profess to have obtained, by cession from the Swazi +king in 1855, a strip of land to the north-east of the Pongolo River +and down to the Lebomba Mountains, in order that they might form a +barrier between them and the Zulus; but the Swazis deny having ever +made such cession. + +In addition to the doubt thrown upon the transaction by this denial, +and the well-known Boer encroachments already described, it remains +considerably open to question whether the Swazis had the power to +dispose of the land, which is claimed by the Zulus as their own. +The commission which sat upon the southern border question was not +permitted to enter upon that to the north of the Pongolo, which +therefore remains uncertain. The one fact generally known, however, +is undoubtedly favourable to the Zulu claim. The territory in +question was occupied until 1848 by two Zulu chiefs, Putini of the +Ama-Ngwe, and Langalibalele of the Ama-Hlubi tribe, under the rule +of the Zulu king Umpande. These chiefs, having fallen into disgrace +with the king, were attacked by him, and fled into Natal. They were +ultimately settled in their late locations under the Draakensberg, +leaving their former places in Zululand, north and south of the +Pongolo, the inNgcaka (Mountain), and inNgcuba (River) vacant. + +Sir Henry Bulwer remarks on this point—(P. P. 2220, pp. 400-2): + +“Sir T. Shepstone says indeed, that there is no dispute between the +Transvaal and the Ama-Swazi; but, as he adds that, should questions +arise between them, they may be settled on their own merits, it is +not impossible that questions may arise; and I am certainly informed +that the Ama-Swazi used formerly to deny that they had ever ceded +land to the _extent_ claimed by the Republic.” But that the western +portion, at all events, of the land in dispute was at that time under +Zulu rule, is apparent from an account given by members of the house +of Masobuza, principal wife of Langalibalele, and sister to the Swazi +king, who was sheltered at Bishopstowe after the destruction of the +Hlubi tribe, and died there in 1877. + +“In Chaka’s time, Mate, father of Madhlangampisi, who had lived from +of old on his land north of the Pongolo, as an _independent_ chief, +not under Swazi rule, gave, without fighting, his allegiance to +Chaka; and from that time to this the district in question has been +under Zulu rule, the Swazi king having never at any time exercised +any authority over it.” The same statement applies to several other +tribes living north, and on either side of the Pongolo, amongst them +those of Langalibalele and Putini. + +“Madhlangampisi’s land was transferred by the Boer Government as +late as January 17th, 1877, to the executors of the late Mr. +M’Corkindale, and now goes by the name of ‘Londina,’ in which is +the hamlet of ‘Derby.’... We are perfectly aware that the southern +portion of the block is held by command of the Zulu chief, and +the executor’s surveyors have been obstructed in prosecuting the +survey.”—_Natal Mercury_, July 23rd, 1878. + +In 1856 a number of Boers claimed _Natal_ territory _west_ of the +Buffalo, as far as the Biggarsberg range, now the south-west boundary +of the Newcastle County, and some of them were in occupation of +it; and, a commission being sent to trace the northern border of +the colony along the line of the Buffalo, these latter opposed +and protested against the mission of the Commissioners; but their +opposition spent itself in threats, and ended in the withdrawal from +Natal of the leaders of the party. + +Other Boers had settled _east_ of the Buffalo, in the location +vacated by the tribe of Langalibalele, as to whom the aforesaid +Commissioners write: + +“During our stay among the farmers it was brought to our notice by +them that they had obtained from Panda the cession of the tract of +country beyond the Buffalo (inNcome), towards the north-west; they +had subscribed among themselves one hundred head of cattle for this +land, which had been accepted by Panda.” + +And Sir T. Shepstone says: + +“Panda never denied this grant (N.B.—in respect of what lay _west_ +of the Draakensberg), but repudiated the idea that he had sold the +land. His account was that, when the farmers were defeated by Her +Majesty’s troops in Natal, some of them asked him for land to live +upon outside the jurisdiction of the British Government, and that he +gave them this tract ‘only to live in, as part of Zululand under Zulu +law’” (P. p. 1961, p. 28). “The cattle they say they paid for it, +Panda looked upon as a thank-offering, made in accordance with Zulu +custom” (1961, pp. 1-5). + +In reply to messages sent by the Zulu king to the Natal Government, +complaining of the encroachments of the Boers on the _north_, as +well as the west of Zululand, and begging the friendly intervention +and arbitration of the English, the advice of the Natal authorities +was always to “sit still,” and use no force, for England would see +justice done in the end.[72] + +From all this it would appear that the claim of Cetshwayo to land +north of the Pongolo was not an “aggressive act,” without any real +foundation in right, and merely a defiant challenge intended to +provoke war; but was a just claim, according to the tests applied +by Sir Bartle Frere—(P. p. 2222, p. 29)—viz. “actual occupation and +exercise of sovereign rights.” + +The subject is fully gone into, and further evidence produced, in the +Bishop of Natal’s pamphlet, “Extracts from the Blue-Books;” but the +main facts are as here stated. + +On turning to the subject of the better known border dispute, between +the Zulus and the Transvaal Boers on the east, we are confronted at +once by the fact that the decision of the Commissioners, chosen by +Sir H. Bulwer to investigate the matter, was decidedly favourable +to the Zulu claim; which, after careful consideration of all the +evidence on either side, they found to be a just and good one. This +decision should, in itself, have been sufficient to relieve the Zulu +king from the accusation of making insolent demands for territory +with aggressive and warlike intentions. But as, up to July, 1878, the +above charge was the sole one brought against him, and on account +of which troops were sent for and preparations made for war; and +as, also, Sir Bartle Frere has thought fit to cast a doubt upon +the judgment of the Commissioners by the various expressions of +dissatisfaction which appear in his correspondence with the Bishop of +Natal; it will be necessary for us to enter fully into the matter, in +order to understand the extent to which the question bore fruit in +the Zulu War. + +In 1861 Cetshwayo demanded from the Transvaal Government the persons +of four fugitives, who had escaped at the time of the Civil War of +1856, and had taken refuge amongst the Boers. One of these fugitives +was a younger son of Umpande, by name Umtonga, who took refuge +at first in Natal; from whence, however, he carried on political +intrigues in Zululand, with the assistance of his mother, which +resulted in the death of the latter and in a message from Cetshwayo +to the Natal Government, complaining of Umtonga’s conduct, and +requesting that he should be placed in his hands. This was refused, +but the Government undertook to place the young man under the +supervision of an old and trusted colonial chief, Zatshuke, living +in the centre of the colony. Umtonga professed to accept and to be +grateful for this arrangement; but, upon the first step being taken +to carry it out, he fired twice at the policeman who was sent to +conduct him to Zatshuke, but missed him, and then escaped to the +Transvaal territory. + +From thence he, with another brother, and two indunas (captains) +were given up to Cetshwayo by the Boers, who required, in return for +their surrender, the cession of land _east_ of the Blood River, and +a pledge that the young princes should not be killed. Cetshwayo is +said by the Boers to have agreed to both conditions, and he certainly +acted up to the latter, three of the four being still alive, and the +fourth having died a natural death.[73] It is this alleged bargain +with Cetshwayo (in 1861) on which the Boers found their claim to the +main portion of the disputed territory—a “bargain in itself base and +immoral; the selling of the persons of men for a grant of land, and +which no Christian government, like that of England, could recognise +for a moment as valid and binding,” even if it were ever made. _But +it is persistently denied by the Zulus_ that such a bargain was ever +consented to by them or _by their prince_. On this point Cetshwayo +himself says: “I have never given or sold any land to the Boers of +the Transvaal. They wished me to do so when I was as yet an umtwana +(child, prince). They tried to get me to sign a paper, but I threw +the pen down, and never would do so, telling them that it was out of +my power to either grant or sell land, as it belonged to the king, +my father, and the nation. I know the Boers say I signed a paper, +and that my brothers Hamu and Ziwedu did also. I never did, and if +they say I held the pen or made a mark, giving or selling land, it is +a lie!” The Prince Dabulamanzi, and chiefs sitting round, bore out +the king in this statement. (From Report of Mr. Fynney on July 4th, +1877—P. p. 1961, p. 45.) + +And so says Sir T. Shepstone (1961, p. 5): “Panda, who is still +living, repudiated the bargain, and Cetshwayo denied it. The +Emigrant Farmers, however, insisted on its validity, and proceeded +to occupy. The Zulus have never ceased to threaten and protest. And +the Government of Natal, to whom these protests and threats have been +continually made, has frequently, during a course of fifteen years, +found it very difficult to impress the Zulus with the hope and belief +that an amicable solution of the difficulty would some day be found, +provided that they refrained from reprisals or the use of force.” + +The first message from the Zulus on the subject of the disputed +territory was received on September 5th, 1861, in the very year +in which (according to the Boers) the cession in question was +made (1961, p. 7). The Bishop of Natal, in his “Extracts” already +mentioned, records eighteen messages on the same subject, commencing +with the above and concluding with one brought on April 20th, 1876 +(1748, p. 49), showing that for a period of fifteen years the Zulu +king (whether represented by Umpande or by Cetshwayo) had never +ceased to entreat “the friendly intervention and arbitration of this +Government between them and the Boer Government” (1961, p. 9). These +eighteen messages acknowledge the virtual supremacy of the English, +and the confidence which the Zulus feel in English justice and +honour, and they request their protection, or, failing that, their +permission to protect themselves by force of arms; they suggest that +a Commission sent from Natal should settle the boundary, and that a +Resident or Agent of the British Government should be stationed on +the border between them and the Boers, to see that justice was done +on both sides. They report the various aggressions and encroachments +by which the Zulus were suffering at the hands of their neighbours, +but to which they submitted because the question was in the hands of +the Government of Natal; and they repeatedly beg that the English +will themselves take possession of the disputed country, or some part +of it, rather than allow the unsettled state of things to continue. +“They (the Zulus) beg that the Governor will take a strip of country, +the length and breadth of which is to be agreed upon between the +Zulus and the Commissioners (for whom they are asking) sent from +Natal, the strip to abut on the Colony of Natal, and to run to the +northward and eastward in such a manner, in a line parallel to the +sea-coast, as to interpose in all its length between the Boers and +the Zulus, and to be governed by the Colony of Natal, and form a +portion of it if thought desirable. + +“The Zulu people earnestly pray that this arrangement may be carried +out immediately, because they have been neighbours of Natal for so +many years, separated only by a stream of water, and no question has +arisen between them and the Government of Natal; they know that where +the boundary is fixed by agreement with the English there it will +remain. + +“Panda, Cetshwayo, and all the heads of the Zulu people assembled, +directed us to urge in the most earnest manner upon the +Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the prayer we have stated.” + +This is the concluding portion of the fourth message, received +on June 5th, 1869 (1961, p. 9). The fifth, reporting fresh Boer +aggressions, was received on December 6th, 1869. + +In the course of the same year Lieutenant-Governor Keate addressed +the President of the South African Republic on the subject, and +suggested arbitration, which suggestion was accepted by the +President, provided that the expenses should be paid by the losing +party; and during the following two years repeated messages were +sent by Mr. Keate reminding the President that being “already in +possession of what the Zulu authorities put forward as justifying +their claims,” he only awaits the like information from the other +side before “visiting the locality and hearing the respective +parties.”—(P. p. 1961, p. 24). + +On August 16th, 1871, the Government Secretary of the South African +Republic replies that he has “been instructed to forward to the +Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the necessary documents bearing on the +Zulu question, together with a statement of the case, and hopes to do +so by next post; but that, as the session, of the Volksraad had been +postponed from May to September, it would be extremely difficult to +settle the matter in 1871,” he therefore proposed January, 1872, as a +convenient time for the purpose. + +Nearly eight weeks later (October 9th) Lieutenant-Governor Keate +informs the President that the documents promised, upon the Zulu +border question, have not yet reached him; but sees nothing, at +present, likely to prevent his “proceeding, in January next, to the +Zulu border for the purpose of settling the matter at issue.” + +But the promised papers appear never to have been sent. The +arbitration never took place. Lieutenant-Governor Keate was relieved +from the government of Natal in 1872; and the next stage of the +question is marked by the issue on May 25th, 1875, of a proclamation +by Acting-President Joubert, annexing to the dominion of the South +African Republic the territory, the right to which was to have been +decided by this arbitration. + +In this proclamation no reference is made to the (alleged) Treaty +of 1861 (see p. 176), by which “what is now and was then disputed +territory had been ceded to the South African Republic,” though +it certainly annexes to the Republic all the country included in +the Treaty, and seems to annex more. But no ground of claim is set +forth or alluded to upon which the right to annex is founded, “with +reservation of all further claims and rights of the said Republic,” +nor any reason assigned for the act, except to “prevent disagreement” +between the Boers and the Zulus. And Sir T. Shepstone goes on to say +(1961, p. 5): + +“The officers of the South African Republic proceeded to exercise +in this annexed territory the ordinary functions of government, and +among these, the levying taxes on natives. The Zulus, who had been +persistent in repudiating the cession, and who have continued to +occupy the territory as theirs, resisted the demand by Cetshwayo’s +directions, and a collision appeared imminent, when the difficulty +was avoided by the officers withdrawing the order they had issued.” + +Nevertheless, in spite of the repeated disappointments with which +they met, the Zulus continued to send complaints and entreaties +to the Government of Natal; which messages, although they never +varied in their respectful and friendly tone towards the English, +show plainly how deeply they felt the neglect with which they were +treated. The English “promises” are spoken of again and again, and +the thirteenth message contains a sentence worth recording, in its +simple dignity. “Cetshwayo desired us,” say the messengers, “to urge +upon the Governor of Natal to interfere, to save the destruction of +perhaps both countries—Zululand and the Transvaal. He requests us to +state that he cannot and will not submit to be turned out of his own +houses. It may be that he will be vanquished; but, as he is not the +aggressor, death will not be so hard to meet” (1748, p. 14). + +Sir Henry Bulwer’s answers to these messages contain passages which +sufficiently prove that up to this time the Government of Natal +had no complaints to make against the Zulu king. “This is the +first opportunity the Lieutenant-Governor has had,” he says, “of +communicating with Cetshwayo since his (Sir H. Bulwer’s) arrival +in the Colony. He therefore takes the opportunity of sending him a +friendly greeting, and of expressing the pleasure with which he had +heard of the satisfactory relations that have existed between this +Colony and the Zulus,” November 25th, 1875 (1748, p. 15). + +“This Government trusts that Cetshwayo will maintain that moderation +and forbearance which he has hitherto shown, and which the Government +has great pleasure in bringing to the notice of the councillors of +the great Queen, and that nothing will be done which will hinder the +peaceful solution of the Disputed Territory question,” July 25th, +1876 (1748, p. 97). + +Meanwhile repeated acts of violence and brutality on the part of +the Boers are reported, and in the Blue-books before us the Zulu +complaints are confirmed from various official sources, by Mr. Fynn, +Resident Magistrate of the Umsinga Division (1748, p. 10), by Sir +Henry Bulwer (1748, pp. 8, 11, 12, 25), by Sir T. Shepstone himself +(1748, pp. 10, 24, 29, 52, 56), by Mr. Osborn (1748, p. 82), and by +Sir Henry Barkly (1748, p. 25). No attempt at settlement, however, +had been made in answer to these appeals up to the time of the +annexation of the Transvaal, in 1877, by Sir T. Shepstone; after +which so great a change took place in the tone of the latter upon the +subject of the disputed territory. + +Upon this question we may quote again from Mr. Fynney’s report of +the king’s answer to him upon the announcement of the annexation of +the Transvaal. “I hear what you have said about past disputes with +the Boers, and about the settlement of them,” said the king; “the +land question is one of them, and a great one. I was in hopes, when I +heard it was you who visited me, that you had brought me some final +word about the land, as Somtseu had sent from Newcastle by Umgabana +to say that his son would come with the word respecting the land so +long in dispute, and I felt sure it had come to-day, for you are his +son. Now the Transvaal is English ground, I want Somtseu to send +the Boers away from the lower parts of the Transvaal, that near my +country. The Boers are a nation of liars; they are a bad people, bad +altogether; I do not want them near my people; they lie, and claim +what is not theirs, and ill-use my people. Where is Thomas (Mr. +Burgers)?” + +“I informed him,” says Mr. Fynney, “that Mr. Burgers had left the +Transvaal.” + +“Then let them pack up and follow Thomas,” said he, “let them go. The +Queen does not want such people as those about her land. What can +the Queen make of them or do with them? Their evil ways puzzled both +Thomas and Rudolph (Landdrost of Utrecht); they will not be quiet. +They have laid claim to my land, and even down to _N’Zabankulu_ (you +saw the line), burned it with fire, and my people have no rest.” + +“Umnyamana (Prime Minister) here remarked,” continues Mr. Fynney, “we +want to know what is going to be done about this land; it has stood +over as an open question for so many years. Somtseu took all the +papers to England with him to show the great men there, and we have +not heard since.” To which Mr. Fynney, of course, had no reply to +make. + +Within a fortnight of the annexation the Boers on the Zulu border +presented Sir T. Shepstone with an address, stating that during the +last ten or twelve years (_i.e._ from 1861, when this encroachment +was begun by the Boers) they had “suffered greatly in consequence of +the hostile behaviour of the Zulu nation, but more so for the last +two years” (_i.e._ from 1875, when the Boer Government proclaimed the +disputed territory to belong to the Transvaal, and proceeded to levy +taxes upon its Zulu inhabitants), so that, they said, their lives and +goods were in danger (1814, p. 14). + +Accordingly Sir T. Shepstone writes to Lord Carnarvon as follows: +“I shall be forced to take some action with regard to the Disputed +Territory, of which your lordship has heard so much, but I shall be +careful to avoid any direct issue.”[74] + +“It is of the utmost importance,” he continues, “that all questions +involving disturbance outside of this territory should be, if +possible, postponed until the Government of the Transvaal is +consolidated, and the numerous tribes within its boundaries have +begun to feel and recognise the hand of the new administration.” + +These remarks already show the change in sentiment, on Sir T. +Shepstone’s part, which was more markedly displayed at the Blood +River meeting between him and the Zulu indunas. The conference +proved an utter failure, as also did several other attempts on Sir +T. Shepstone’s part to persuade the Zulus to relinquish to him, on +behalf of the Transvaal, the claims upon which they had so long +insisted. + +On December 5th, 1877, two indunas came from Cetshwayo to the +Bishop of Natal with a request that he would put the Zulu claim in +writing, to be sent to Sir H. Bulwer and the Queen. The same indunas, +a few days later, with Umfunzi and ’Nkisimane—messengers from +Cetshwayo—appointed, before a notary public, Dr. Walter Smith and Mr. +F. E. Colenso to be “diplomatic agents” for Cetshwayo, “who should +communicate on his behalf in the English language, and, when needful, +in writing,” and especially to “treat with the British Government on +the boundary question” (2000, p. 58);[75] which appointment, however, +Sir H. Bulwer and Sir T. Shepstone refused to recognise; and the +former, having proposed the Border Commission before receiving notice +of this appointment—though the Commissioners had not yet started from +’Maritzburg—did not feel it advisable, as “no such appointment had +been made by the Zulu king,”[76] to communicate to Messrs. Smith and +Colenso Lord Carnarvon’s despatch (January 21st, 1878), which said: + +“I request that you will inform Mr. Smith and Mr. Colenso that +the desire of Her Majesty’s Government in this matter is that the +boundary question shall be fully and fairly discussed, and a just +arrangement arrived at, and that you will refer them to Sir T. +Shepstone, to whom has been committed the duty of negotiating on the +subject.”[77] + +Meanwhile, however, Sir T. Shepstone’s “negotiations” had proved +unsuccessful, and Sir Henry Bulwer writes to Sir Bartle Frere (2000, +p. 68): “It seems but too clear, from all that has now happened, that +the prospect of a settlement of the question by direct negotiations +between the Government of the Transvaal and the Zulu king is at an +end. The feeling against the Boers on the part of the Zulu king +and people is too bitter, and they are now scarcely less angry +against the new Government of the Transvaal than they were against +the old Government.” He then suggests arbitration as a way by which +the Zulu king “can escape the alternative of war, by which he can +obtain justice, and by which, at the same time, he can avoid direct +negotiations with the Government of a people whom he dislikes and +distrusts.” + +The diplomatic agents were never recognised by the colonial +authorities, or allowed to exercise their functions; but a visit +which Mr. Colenso paid to the Zulu king in connection with the +appointment is worth recording for the sake of the glimpse it gives +of Cetshwayo’s habits and daily life, as told by a disinterested +eye-witness. + +The king, it appears, whom so many have delighted to represent as +a corpulent unwieldy savage, to whom movement must be a painful +exertion, was in the habit of taking a daily constitutional of about +six miles out and back. Mr. Colenso observed that this was his +regular habit, and during his stay at the royal kraal he daily saw +Cetshwayo start, and could trace his course over the hills by the +great white shield carried before him as the emblem of kingship. + +On his return the king regularly underwent a process of ablution at +the hands of his attendants, who poured vessels of water over him, +and rubbed the royal person down with a species of soft stone. This +performance over, Cetshwayo ascended his throne or chair of state, +upon which he remained, hearing causes, and trying cases amongst his +people, until the shades of evening fell, before which time he did +not break his fast. + +This description, of the accuracy of which there can be no question, +gives a picture of a simple, moderate, and useful kingly existence, +very different from the idea commonly received of a savage monarch, +wallowing in sloth and coarse luxury, and using the power which he +holds over his fellow-creatures only for the gratification of every +evil or selfish human passion. Cetshwayo ruled his people well +according to his lights: let us hope that, now we have wrested his +kingdom from him, our government may prove a _more_ beneficent one. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION. + + +Sir Henry Bulwer’s message proposing arbitration was sent to +Cetshwayo on December 8th, 1877 (2000, p. 67). + +In this message he makes it plain to the king that “the Governments +of Natal and the Transvaal are now brothers, and what touches one +touches the other.” “Therefore,” he continues, “the Lieut.-Governor +of Natal sends these words to Cetshwayo that he may know what is in +his mind, and that Cetshwayo may do nothing that will interrupt the +peaceful and friendly relations that have existed for so many years +between the English and the Zulus.” He then proposes that he should +write to “the Ministers of the great Queen in England, and also to +the Queen’s High Commissioner who resides at Capetown, in order that +they may send fit and proper persons, who will come to the country +with fresh minds, and who will hear all that the Zulus have to say on +the question, and all that the Transvaal Government has to say, and +examine and consider all the rights of the question, and then give +their decision in such manner that all concerned may receive and +abide by that decision, and the question be finally set at rest. + +“Meanwhile,” he says, “no action should be taken to interfere with +the existing state of things or to disturb the peace. But the +disputed territory should be considered and treated as _neutral_ +between the two countries for the time being.” + +Before this communication reached him, Cetshwayo had already sent +messengers to the Bishop of Natal, asking advice how to act in his +present difficulties. And they had carried back “a word,” which would +reach the king about November 19th, to the effect that he must on +no account think of fighting the Transvaal Government, and that he +had better send down some great indunas to propose arbitration to +Sir Henry Bulwer, in whose hands he might leave himself with perfect +confidence, that the right and just thing would be done by him. The +Bishop knew nothing of Sir Henry’s intentions when he sent this +reply; and, in point of fact, the two had separately come to the same +conclusion as to what would be the wisest course to follow. + +Cetshwayo therefore was prepared to receive Sir Henry’s proposition, +which he did, not only with respect, but with delight and relief +(2000, p. 138). His answer to the message contained the following +passages: “Cetshwayo hears what the Governor of Natal says ... and +thanks him for these words, for they are all good words that have +been sent to Cetshwayo by the Governor of Natal; they show that the +Natal Government still wishes Cetshwayo to drink water and live.” +He suggests, however, that before sending for people from across the +sea to settle the boundary, he should be glad if the Governor would +send his own representatives to hear both sides of the dispute, and +if they cannot come to a decision, “a letter can be sent beyond the +sea” for others to come. The message continues: “Cetshwayo thanks the +Governor for the words which say the ground in dispute should not be +occupied while the matter is talked over.” + +“Cetshwayo says he hears it said that he intends to make war upon +the Transvaal. He wishes the Natal Government to watch well and see +when he will do such a thing. For, if he attended to the wish of the +English Government in Natal when it said he must not make war on the +Transvaal _Boers_, why should he wish to do so upon those who are now +of the same Great House as Natal, to whose voice he has listened?” + +“Cetshwayo is informed that he is to be attacked by the Transvaal +people. If so, and if he is not taken by surprise, he will, as soon +as he hears of the approach of such a force, send men who will report +it to the Natal Government before he takes any action.” + +“Cetshwayo says he cannot trust the Transvaal Boers any longer; they +have killed his people, they have robbed them of their cattle on the +slightest grounds. He had hoped Somtseu would have settled all these +matters. But he has not done so; he wishes to cast Cetshwayo off; +he is no more a father, but a firebrand. If he is tired of carrying +Cetshwayo now, as he did while he was with the Natal Government, then +why does he not put him down, and allow the Natal Government to look +after him, as it has always done?” + +Sir Henry Bulwer expressed his satisfaction at this reply, speaking +of it as a far more satisfactory one than they had been led to expect +(2000, p. 138), and he writes of it to Sir T. Shepstone thus: “You +will see by the king’s reply that he has met my representations in a +very proper spirit.... I have no reason to think that what the king +says is said otherwise than in good faith; and, if this be so, there +seems to me to be no reason why this dispute should not be settled in +a peaceable manner” (2097, p. 26), and he says to Cetshwayo himself, +“The Lieutenant-Governor has heard the words of Cetshwayo. He is glad +that the words which he lately sent to Cetshwayo were welcome. They +were words sent in a friendly spirit, and Cetshwayo received them in +a friendly spirit. This is as it should be,” and he agrees to the +king’s proposal concerning commissioners from Natal, provided that +the Transvaal Government agree also. + +The following is the account given by the Government messengers, who +carried Sir H. Bulwer’s message to Cetshwayo of the manner in which +it was received by the king and his indunas (2079, p. 25): + +“While we spoke to Cetshwayo, we saw that what we were saying lifted +a great weight from his heart, that they were words which he was glad +to hear; and what he said to us as we finished showed us we were +right in this belief.... + +“We could see, when we arrived at the great kraal, that the indunas, +and even the king, were not easy in their hearts, and from all we +could see and gather, the chief men under the king did not wish for +war. After the message was delivered, all of them appeared like men +who had been carrying a very heavy burden, and who had only then been +told that they could put it down and rest.” + +It is best known to himself how, in the face of these words, and with +nothing to support his statement, Sir Bartle Frere could venture to +assert in his fourth letter to the Bishop, “The offers to arbitrate +originated with the Natal Government, and were by no means willingly +accepted by Cetshwayo;” Cetshwayo having, in point of fact, earnestly +asked for arbitration again and again, as we have already shown, and +rejoicing greatly when at last it was offered him. Mr. J. Shepstone’s +observation also (2144, p. 184), that “To this suggestion Cetshwayo +replied ‘that he had no objection,’” hardly gives a fair view of the +state of the case. + +But, before this satisfactory agreement had been arrived at, Sir T. +Shepstone had managed still further to exasperate the feelings of the +Zulus against the new Government of the Transvaal, while the fact +that Natal and the Transvaal were one, and that to touch one was to +touch the other, and to touch England also, had not been brought home +to the king’s mind until he received Sir H. Bulwer’s message. + +Before the receipt of that message, Cetshwayo had every reason to +believe that the negotiations concerning the disputed territory were +broken off. Sir T. Shepstone’s tone on the subject had altered; he +had parted with the king’s indunas at the Blood River in anger, +and the messenger whom he had promised to send to the king himself +had never appeared. Meanwhile, the Boers had gone into laager, by +direction, they say, of Sir T. Shepstone himself, and with the full +expectation that he was about to make war upon the Zulus. No offer +of arbitration had yet been made. Cetshwayo had been played with +and baffled by the English Government for sixteen years, and to all +appearance nothing whatever was done, or would be done, to settle +in a friendly manner this troubled question, unless he took steps +himself to _assert_ his rights, and he seems to have taken the +mildest possible way of so doing under the circumstances. According +to the official reports at the time, he sent a large force of armed +men to build a military kraal near Luneburg, north of the Pongolo, +in land which was also disputed with the Transvaal Government, but +formed no part of the (so called) disputed territory to the south +of that river, or as Lord Carnarvon said to a deputation of South +African merchants (_Guardian_, January 9th, 1878): “He (the Zulu +king) had proceeded to construct, in opposition to Sir T. Shepstone’s +warnings, a fortified kraal in a disputed territory abutting upon +English soil.” + +But this was a very exaggerated way of describing a comparative +trifling circumstance. The erection of a kraal—not, as so frequently +asserted, a military one, but merely an ordinary Zulu kraal for the +residence of a headman, to keep order among the 15,000 Zulus who +lived in that district—had long been contemplated, and had once, +during Umpanda’s lifetime, been attempted, though the Boers had +driven away the Zulu officer sent for the purpose, and destroyed the +work he had commenced. + +Cetshwayo himself explains his reason for sending so large a force +for the purpose, on the grounds that he wished the kraal to be built +in one day, and his men not to be obliged to remain over a night, +while, as Colonel Durnford, R.E., says (2144, p. 237), “the fact that +the men at work are armed is of no significance, because every Zulu +is an armed man, and never moves without his weapon.” + +Sir T. Shepstone, however, was greatly alarmed when he first heard of +the building of this kraal, and writes concerning it—November 16th, +1877 (1961, p. 224): “I feel, therefore (because of the irritating +effect of it upon the Transvaal), that the building of this kraal +must be prevented at all hazards.” The “hazards” do not appear to +have proved very serious, as a simple representation on the part of +Captain Clarke, R.A., and Mr. Rudolph, sent to the spot by Sir T. +Shepstone, resulted in the Zulu force retiring, _having made only +a small cattle kraal and chopped and collected some poles_, which +they left on the ground, to be used for the building of the huts +hereafter, but which were very soon carried off and used as firewood +by the Luneburg farmers. + +But this did not satisfy Sir T. Shepstone, who sent messengers to +Cetshwayo, complaining of what had been done, and of “finding,” as +he says, “a Zulu force in the rear of where he was staying;”[78] +and saying that, in consequence, and in order to restore confidence +amongst those Boers living on the Blood River border, he (Sir +T. Shepstone) had decided to send a military force down to the +waggon-drift on the Blood River, to encamp there on our side of the +river. Cetshwayo replies that he did not send to have the kraal built +that trouble might arise, but because his people were already living +on the ground in dispute. He admits that of course the administrator +could do as he pleased about sending an armed force to encamp on his +own borders; but he urges him to think better of it, saying that +the Zulus would be frightened and run away, and, if he in his turn +should send an armed force to encamp just opposite Sir T. Shepstone’s +encampment, to put confidence into _his_ people’s hearts, he asks, +somewhat quaintly, “would it be possible for the two forces to be +looking at one another for two days without a row?” + +Many expressions are scattered through the Blue-books at this period +concerning “Zulu aggressions;” and Sir T. Shepstone makes frequent, +though vague and unproven, accusations concerning Cetshwayo’s +“mischievous humour,” and the terror of the Boer frontier farmers. + +But, so far as these remarks allude to the border squabbles +inseparable from the state of affairs, the score is so heavily +against the Boers that the counter-charges are hardly worth +considering. The only acts chargeable upon the king himself are, +first, the building of this kraal, which really amounted to no more +than a practical assertion of the Zulu claim to land north of the +Pongolo; and, secondly, the execution of a (supposed) Zulu criminal +there, which was an exercise of Cetshwayo’s authority over his own +people living in the district. + +For the acts of violence committed by the robber chief Umbilini, the +Zulu king could not justly be considered responsible; but of this +matter, and of the raid committed by the sons of Sihayo, we will +treat in a later chapter. + +Sir T. Shepstone himself allows that Cetshwayo’s frame of mind was a +better one after the reception of Sir Henry Bulwer’s message offering +arbitration (2079, pp. 51-54); and says that his (Sir T. Shepstone’s) +messengers “describe Cetshwayo as being in a very different temper to +that which he had on former occasions exhibited;” to use their own +expression, “it was Cetshwayo, but it was Cetshwayo born again.”... +“They gleaned from the Zulus ... that a message from the Governor of +Natal had been delivered, and they concluded that the change which +they had noticed as so marked in the king’s tone must have been +produced by that message.” + +The fact that Cetshwayo joyfully and thankfully accepted Sir Henry +Bulwer’s promise—not to give him the land he claimed, but to have the +matter investigated and justice done—is sufficiently established; but +from the Boers the proposal met with a very different reception. + +Sir T. Shepstone acknowledged the receipt of Sir H. Bulwer’s despatch +of December 11th, “transmitting copy of a message” which he “had +thought fit to send to the Zulu king,” and then summoned a few +leading men in the district, and laid the proposition before them. +He reports that after some pretty speeches about the “Christian, +humane, and admirable proposal,” which they should have “no excuse +for hesitating to accept, if Cetshwayo were a civilised king and the +Zulu Government a civilised government,” etc. etc., they proceeded to +state their objections. They had, they said, no misgiving regarding +the justice of the claim of the State; and they believed that the +more it was investigated, the more impartial the minds of the +investigators, the clearer and more rightful would that claim prove +itself to be. Nevertheless, they professed to fear the delay that +must necessarily be caused by such an investigation[79] (the dispute +having already lasted fifteen years!) and to doubt Cetshwayo’s +abiding by any promise he might make to observe a temporary boundary +line. + +To place the two parties to the dispute on equal terms, they said, +the land in question should be evacuated by both, or occupied by +both under the control of Sir Henry Bulwer, who, they proposed, as +an indispensable condition of the proposed arbitration, should take +possession of the land in dispute or of some part of it. And Sir T. +Shepstone remarks: + +“My view is that the considerations above set forth are both weighty +and serious. + +“I do not anticipate that, under the circumstances, Cetshwayo would +venture to make or to authorise any overt attack. I do fear, however, +the consequences of the lawless condition into which the population +all along the border is rapidly falling. Cetshwayo, I fear, rather +encourages than attempts to repress this tendency; and, although he +will not go to war, he may allow that to go on which he knows will +produce war.” + +The condition of the border seems, as we have already shown, to have +been “lawless” for many years, though the fault lay rather, with the +Boers—whose many acts of violence are recorded in the Blue-books—than +with the Zulus, and Sir T. Shepstone has apparently overlooked the +fact that he himself had just summarily put a stop to an attempt, on +Cetshwayo’s part to “repress” any lawless “tendency” amongst his own +people (of which the Administrator complains) by placing a headman, +or responsible person, amongst them to keep order. + +Under the above-mentioned conditions Sir T. Shepstone accepts +Sir Henry Bulwer’s proposal, and informs him that, under the +circumstances, he shall not carry out his expressed intention of +placing a military post in the neighbourhood of the Blood River. + +And again he writes—January 17th, 1878 (2079, p. 58): + +“It was, however, necessary to point out to Sir H. Bulwer the +difficulties and dangers, as well as the loss of property, which +the white people (Boers?) feel that they will be subjected to by the +acceptance of His Excellency’s proposal, unless he can devise some +means by which their safety and interests can be protected during the +pending of the investigation, _which under existing circumstances it +is Cetshwayo’s interest to prolong indefinitely_.” + +The words which I have italicised show that Sir T. Shepstone took for +granted beforehand that the decision of the Commissioners would be +unfavourable to the Zulus. + +Sir Henry Bulwer, however, did not see his way to falling in with the +conditions of the Boers, and replies as follows (2079, p. 128): + +“I do not see that I am in a position, or that, as the +Lieutenant-Governor of this colony, I should have the power to take +actual possession of the country in dispute. And if to take over the +country, and hold possession of it, is considered by your Government +an indispensable condition for the acceptance of the mediating +course I have proposed, I feel that my proposal falls short of the +requirements of the case.” + +On January 29th, Sir T. Shepstone writes to Sir Henry again, saying +that “It was felt that, in consequence of the step which you have +thought it right to take in your communication to the Zulu king of +the 8th December last, the Government of the Transvaal is placed at +a disadvantage, and that the longer action on your part is delayed, +the greater that disadvantage grows. It follows, therefore, that any +action in the direction of your proposition is better than no action +at all; and I was urged to beg your Excellency to take some step in +the matter without delay.” + +Accordingly Sir Henry at once sends a message to Cetshwayo, +suggesting the observance of a “neutral belt,” pending the settlement +of the boundary question (2079, p. 132), and mentioning the two +lines, from point to point, which he proposed for the purpose. + +The same suggestion was made, of course, to Sir T. Shepstone, who +replies as follows: “You have rightly assumed the concurrence of +this Government, and I trust that Cetshwayo will see in your message +the necessity that is laid upon him to prove that he was sincere in +asking you to undertake the inquiry.” + +This ready acquiescence is fully accounted for by the fact, shortly +apparent, that _both_ the lines mentioned by Sir Henry, between which +neutrality should be observed, were within what was claimed by the +Zulus as their own country, and Sir T. Shepstone says: “At present +the belt of country indicated is occupied solely by Zulus. The whole +of it has been apportioned in farms to Transvaal subjects, but has +not been occupied by them.” + +Small wonder that the Zulu king, in reply to this proposal, +“informs the Governor of Natal that the two roads mentioned in His +Excellency’s message are both in Zululand, and therefore the king +cannot see how the ground between the roads can belong to both +parties.” + +Nevertheless Sir Henry Bulwer hardly seems to fall in with Sir T. +Shepstone’s suggestion, that Cetshwayo’s consent on this point should +be looked upon as a test of his sincerity: “Either,” he says (2100, +p. 73), “he has misunderstood the real nature of the proposal, or he +is disinclined to accept anything which may in his opinion be taken +to signify a withdrawal of one iota of his claim.” And, in point of +fact, though no “neutral ground” was marked off, the Commission went +on just as well without it; all the apprehensions of disturbance and +disorder having been falsified by the event. + +Sir T. Shepstone repeatedly speaks of the border Boers having been +forced by Zulu acts and threats of aggression to abandon their farms +and go into laager, etc. etc.; but, on investigation, it is apparent +that this abandonment of farms, and trekking into laager, took place +in consequence of an intimation from the Landrost of Utrecht, under +instructions from Sir T. Shepstone himself; as appears from the +following passages of an address from seventy-nine Boers, protesting +against arbitration as “an absurdity and an impossibility,” which was +presented to Sir T. Shepstone on February 2nd, 1878 (2079, p. 140): + +“The undersigned burghers, etc. ... take the liberty to bring to your +Excellency’s notice that they, in consequence of intimation from the +Landrost of Utrecht, dated 14th December last, on your Excellency’s +instructions, partly trekked into laager, and partly deserted their +farms, in the firm expectation that now a beginning of a war would +soon be made.... That they have heard with anxiety and understand +that arbitration is spoken of, which would have to determine our +property and possessions; which we fear will decide in favour of +a crowned robber, murderer, and breaker of his word, who knows as +well as we that he is claiming a thing which does not belong to +him ... for which reason we are sure that such arbitration is an +absurdity and an impossibility. We therefore hereby protest against +all proposed or to be undertaken arbitration; and we will, with all +legal means at our disposal, etc., resist a decision, etc., over our +property which we know would be unlawful and unjust.” + +They give as a reason for presenting the address from which these +phrases are taken, “_because it is impossible for us to remain any +longer in laager without any object_,” which hardly looks as though +they thought themselves in daily danger from the Zulus, unless the +“beginning of a war” should “soon be made” by Sir T. Shepstone. +They request His Excellency “to commence without any further delay +defending” their “rights and property and lives;” and should His +Excellency “not be inclined or be without power” to do so, they +further signify their intention of requesting him to assist them +with ammunition, and not to hinder them seeking assistance, of +fellow-countrymen and friends, to maintain their “rights,” and to +check their “rapacious enemies and to punish them.” + +And they conclude: “We, the undersigned, bind ourselves on peril +of our honour to assist in subduing the Zulu nation, and making it +harmless.” + +Sir T. Shepstone encloses this in a sympathising despatch, but Sir +Henry Bulwer remarks upon it and upon a subsequent memorial[80] of +the same description—February 23rd (2100, p. 67): + +“Of course, if the object of the memorialists is war, if what they +desire is a war with the Zulu nation, it is not to be wondered at +that they should find fault with any steps that have been taken to +prevent the necessity for war. Nor, if they desire war, is it to be +expected that they should be favourable to arbitration, though I find +it difficult to reconcile the expression of the apprehensions of the +memorialists that arbitration would decide against them, with the +unanimous expression of opinion, previously given to your Excellency +by some of the leading men of the district, that the proposal made +by me was a Christian, humane, and admirable one; that they had no +misgivings regarding the justice of the claim of the State, and +that they believed the more it was investigated ... the clearer and +more rightful would that claim prove itself to be. Your Excellency +observes that the deep feeling of distrust shown by the memorialists +is scarcely to be wondered at, when it is remembered that they are +compelled to occupy with their families fortified camps, while their +farms in the neighbourhood are being occupied by Zulus, their crops +reaped, and their cultivated lands tilled by Zulus, and the timber of +their houses used as Zulu firewood. + +“I do not quite understand what farms and cultivated lands are +referred to; because in a previous despatch—your despatch, No. 7, of +February 5th—your Excellency, in referring to the disputed territory, +states, so I understand, that it ‘_is at present occupied solely by +Zulus_,’ and that, although the whole of it has been apportioned in +farms to Transvaal subjects, _it has not been occupied by them_.’” + +The matter was referred to the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, +and the appointment of a commission was approved by him. He plainly +took it for granted that, as Sir T. Shepstone had said, the Transvaal +claim was based on “evidence the most incontrovertible, overwhelming, +and clear,” and looked to the commission for the double advantage of +enabling Sir T. Shepstone “to clear up or put on record, in a form +calculated to satisfy Her Majesty’s Government, an answer to all +doubts as to the facts and equity of the question,” and of gaining +time for preparing a military force to silence and subjugate the +Zulus should they object (as he expected) to such an award. That +nothing short of military coercion of the Zulus would settle the +matter, was evidently Sir Bartle Frere’s fixed idea; in fact that was +the foregone conclusion with him from beginning to end. + +On February 12th, Sir Henry Bulwer sent a message to Cetshwayo (2079, +p. 140), to this effect: + +“The Lieut.-Governor now sends to let Cetshwayo know that he has +selected, for the purpose of holding this inquiry, the Queen’s +Attorney-General in Natal (Hon. M. H. Gallway, Esq.), the Secretary +for Native Affairs (Hon. J. W. Shepstone, Esq.), and Colonel +Durnford, an officer in the Queen’s army. + +“These gentlemen will proceed by-and-by to the place known as Rorke’s +Drift, which is on the Buffalo River, and in Natal territory, and +they will there open the inquiry on Thursday, March 7th. + +“The Lieut.-Governor proposes, as the most convenient course to be +taken, that the Zulu king should appoint two or three indunas to +represent the Zulu king and the Zulu case at the inquiry, and that +these should be at Rorke’s Drift on March 7th, and meet the Natal +Commissioners there. The same thing also the Governor proposes shall +be done by the Transvaal Government.” And the king’s reply to the +messengers was expressive: “I am very glad to hear what you say—I +shall now be able to sleep.” + +On March 7th the Commission met at Rorke’s Drift, and sat for +about five weeks, taking evidence day by day in presence of the +representatives deputed, three by the Transvaal Government, and three +by the Zulus. + +Of the three gentlemen who formed the Commission, one was Sir T. +Shepstone’s brother, already mentioned in this history, whose natural +bias would therefore certainly not be upon the Zulu side of the +question; another was a Government official and an acute lawyer; and +the third, Colonel Durnford, to the writer’s personal knowledge, +entered upon the subject with an entirely unbiassed mind, and with +but one intention or desire, that of discovering the actual truth, +whatever it might be. The only thing by which his expectations—rather +than his opinions—were in the least influenced beforehand, was the +natural supposition, shared by all, that Sir T. Shepstone, who had +the reputation of being in his public capacity one of the most +cautious of men, must have some strong grounds for his very positive +statement of the Transvaal claim. + +There was, plainly, some slight confusion in the minds of the +three Transvaal delegates, as to their position relative to the +Commissioners, with whom they apparently expected to be on equal +terms, and in a different position altogether from the Zulu +delegates on the other side. This, however, was a manifest mistake. +It was particularly desirable that the Zulus should be made to feel +that it was no case of white against black; but a matter in which +impartial judges treated either side with equal fairness, and without +respect of persons. One of the Commissioners was the brother of their +chief opponent, one of the Transvaal delegates his son; it would +naturally have seemed to the Zulus that the six white men (five out +of whom were either Englishmen, or claimed to be such) were combining +together to outwit them, had they seen them, evidently on terms +of friendship, seated together at the inquiry or talking amongst +themselves in their own language. + +The Commissioners, however, were careful to avoid this mistake. +Finding, on their arrival at Rorke’s Drift, that the spot intended +for their encampment was already occupied by the Transvaal delegates, +who had arrived before them, they caused their own tents to be +pitched at some little distance, in order to keep the two apart. +The same system was carried out during the sitting of the Court, at +which the Commissioners occupied a central position at a table by +themselves, the Transvaal delegates being placed at a smaller table +on one hand, mats being spread for the Zulu delegates, in a like +position, on the other.[81] + +Care was also necessary to prevent any possible altercations arising +between the Boer and Zulu attendants of either party of delegates, +who, in fact, formed the one real element of danger in the affair. +On one occasion, during the sitting of the Commission, Colonel +Durnford observed a Boer poking at a Zulu with his stick, in a +manner calculated to bring to the surface some of the feelings of +intense irritation common to both sides, and only kept under control +by the presence of the Commissioners. The Colonel at once put a +stop to this, and placing a sentry between the two parties, with +orders to insist on either keeping to its own side of the ground, no +further disturbance took place. Popular rumour, of course, greatly +exaggerated the danger of the situation, catching as usual at the +opportunity for fresh accusations against the Zulu king, who, it was +once reported from Durban, had sent an impi to Rorke’s Drift, and had +massacred the Commissioners and all upon the spot. Fortunately the +same day that brought this report to Pietermaritzburg, brought also +letters direct from the Commissioners themselves, of a later date +than the supposed massacre, and in which the Zulus were spoken of as +“perfectly quiet.” + +That the impartial conduct of the Commissioners had the desired +effect is manifest from Cetshwayo’s words, spoken after the +conclusion of the inquiry, but before its result had been made known +to him. His messengers, after thanking Sir Henry Bulwer in the name +of their king and people for appointing the commission, said that +“Cetshwayo and the Zulu people are perfectly satisfied with the way +in which the inquiry was conducted throughout, the way in which +everything went on from day to day in proper order, and without the +least misunderstanding; but that each party understood the subject +that was being talked about. + +“Cetshwayo says,” they continued, “he now sees that he is a child +of this Government, that the desire of this Government is to do him +justice.... + +“Cetshwayo and the Zulu people are awaiting with beating hearts what +the Lieut.-Governor will decide about the land that the Boers have +given the Zulus so much trouble about; for the Zulus wish very much +now to reoccupy the land they never parted with, as it is now the +proper season (of the year) for doing so.” + +Such was Cetshwayo’s frame of mind (even before he knew that +the decision was in his favour) at a time when he was popularly +represented as being in an aggressive, turbulent condition, preparing +to try his strength against us, and only waiting his opportunity to +let loose upon Natal the “war-cloud” which he was supposed to keep +“hovering on our borders.” + +The boundary question resolved itself into this: + +1. To whom did the land in dispute belong in the first instance? + +2. Was it ever ceded or sold by the original possessors? + +1. In answer to the first question, the Commissioners took the treaty +made in 1843, between the English and the Zulus, as a standpoint +fixing a period when the territory in dispute belonged entirely to +one or other. There was then no question but that the Zulu country +extended over the whole of it. + +2. The Zulus deny ever having relinquished any part of their country +to the Boers, who on the other hand assert that formal cessions had +been made to them of considerable districts. With the latter rested +the obligation of proving their assertions, which were simply denied +by the Zulus, who accordingly, as they said themselves, “had no +witnesses to call,” having received no authority from the king to do +more than point out the boundary claimed[82] (2242, p. 80). + +The Boer delegates brought various documents, from which they +professed to prove the truth of their assertions, but which were +decided by the Commissioners to be wholly worthless, from the glaring +discrepancies and palpable falsehoods which they contained. One of +these documents, dated March 16th, 1861, “purporting to give an +account of a meeting between Sir T. Shepstone, Panda, and Cetshwayo,” +they decided to be plainly a fabrication, as Sir T. Shepstone did +not arrive at Nodwengu,[83] from Natal, to meet Panda and Cetshwayo, +until May 9th, 1861. + +Other records of cessions of land professed to be signed by the king, +but were witnessed by neither Boer nor Zulu, or else by Boers alone. +A definition of boundaries was in one case ratified by one Zulu only, +a man of no rank or importance; and in other documents alterations +were made, and dates inserted, clearly at another time. + +Meanwhile it was apparent, from authentic Boer official papers, +that the Zulus were threatened by the Boer Government that, if they +dared to complain again to the British Government, the South African +Republic “would deal severely with them, and that they would also +endanger their lives;” while such expressions used by the Volksraad +of the South African Republic as the following, when they resolve “to +direct the Government to continue in the course it had adopted with +reference to the policy on the eastern frontier, with such caution +as the Volksraad expects from the Government with confidence; and +in this matter to give it the right to take such steps as will more +fully benefit the interests of the population than _the strict words +of the law of the country lay down_” (2220, p. 337), convicts them of +dishonesty out of their own mouths. + +Finally the Commissioners report that in their judgment, east of the +Buffalo, “there has been no cession of land at all by the Zulu kings, +past or present, or by the nation.” + +They consider, however, that—as the Utrecht district has long been +inhabited by Boers, who have laid out the site for a town, and built +upon it, and as the Zulu nation had virtually acquiesced in the +Boer authority over it by treating with them for the rendition of +fugitives who had taken refuge there—the Transvaal should be allowed +to retain that portion of the land in dispute, compensation being +given to the Zulus inhabiting that district if they surrendered the +lands occupied by them and returned to Zululand, or permission being +given them to become British subjects and to continue to occupy the +land. + +Sir Bartle Frere’s version of this is as follows: + +“The Commissioners propose to divide the area in dispute between the +Blood River and the Pongolo, giving to neither party the whole of its +claim.” He then quotes the recommendation of the Commissioners, that +compensation should be given to Zulus leaving the Utrecht district, +and wants to know what is to be done for the farmers who “in good +faith, and relying on the right and power of the Transvaal Government +to protect them, had settled for many years past on the tract which +the Commission proposes to assign to the Zulus.” He wishes to know +how they are to be placed on an equality with the Zulus from the +Utrecht district. To this Sir Henry Bulwer ably replies by pointing +out that compensation to the said farmers lies with their own +Government, by whose sanction or permission they had occupied land +over which that Government had no power by right. In fact, far from +“dividing the area in dispute,” and giving half to either party on +equal terms, the reservation of the Utrecht district was rather +an unavoidable concession to the Boers who had long had actual +possession of it—which, with due compensation, the Zulus would have +been ready enough to make, while receiving back so much of their own +land—than an acknowledgment that they could make good their original +claim to it. The Commissioners indeed say distinctly “_there has been +no cession of land at all by the Zulu king, past or present, or by +the nation_.” + +But indeed, after the decision in favour of the Zulus was given, Sir +Bartle Frere entirely changed the complacent tone in which he had +spoken of the Commission beforehand. To all appearance his careful +schemes for subjugating the Zulu nation were thrown away—the war and +the South African Empire were on the point of eluding his grasp. He +had sent to England for reinforcements—in direct opposition to the +home policy, which for some years had been gradually teaching the +colonies to depend upon themselves for protection, and therefore +to refrain from rushing headlong into needless and dangerous wars, +which might be avoided by a little exercise of tact and forbearance. +He and his friend General Thesiger had laid out their campaign and +had sent men-of-war to investigate the landing capabilities of the +Zulu coast, and he had recommended Sir Henry Bulwer to inform the +Zulu king—when the latter expressed his disquietude on the subject +of these men-of-war—that the ships he saw were “for the most part +English merchant vessels, but that the war-vessels of the English +Government are quite sufficient to protect his (Cetshwayo’s) coast +from any descent by any other power” (October 6th, 1878, 2220, p. +307). + +Sir Henry Bulwer was too honest to carry out this recommendation, +even had he not had the sense to know that Cetshwayo was accustomed +to the passing of merchantmen, and was not to be thus taken in +(supposing him to be likely to fear attacks from “foreign foes”). +But the fact remains that, an English official of Sir Bartle Frere’s +rank has put on record, in an official despatch under his own hand, a +deliberate proposal that the Zulu king should be tranquillised, and +his well-founded suspicions allayed by—a “figure of speech,” shall we +say? + +Every possible objection was made by Sir Bartle Frere to the +decision of the Commissioners, and it was with the utmost difficulty +that he was at last persuaded to ratify it, after a considerable +period employed in preparing for a campaign, the idea of which he +appears never for a minute to have relinquished. Sir T. Shepstone +protested against the decision, which, however, Sir Henry Bulwer +upheld; while Sir Bartle Frere finally decides that “Sir H. Bulwer +and I, approaching the question by somewhat different roads, agree +in the conclusion that we must accept the Commissioners’ verdict.” +Their report was made on June 20th, 1878, but it was not until +November 16th that Sir H. Bulwer sent to Cetshwayo to say that “the +Lieut.-Governor is now in a position to inform Cetshwayo that His +Excellency the High Commissioner has pronounced his award, etc.,” and +to fix twenty days from the date of the departure of the messengers +carrying this message from Pietermaritzburg, as a convenient time for +a meeting on the borders of the two countries at the Lower Tugela +Drift, at which the decision should be delivered to the king’s +indunas by officers of the Government appointed for the purpose. + +But before this conclusion was arrived at another attempt had been +made to bring accusations against Cetshwayo, who said himself at the +time (June 27th, 1878): “The name of Cetshwayo is always used amongst +the Boers as being the first to wish to quarrel.” Alarming accounts +reached the Natal Government of a fresh military kraal having been +built by the king, and notices to quit being served by him upon Boers +within the disputed territory, in spite of his engagement to await +the decision of the Commissioners. The farmers complained of being +obliged to fly, “leaving homes, homesteads, and improvements to be +destroyed by a savage, unbridled, revengeful nation.”[84] Sir T. +Shepstone re-echoed their complaint (2220, p. 27), and Sir Bartle +Frere comments severely upon the alleged Zulu aggressions. + +The matter, however, when sifted, sinks into insignificance. Some +squabbles had taken place between individual Boers and Zulus, such as +were only natural in the unsettled state of things; and Cetshwayo’s +explanation of the so-called “notices to quit” placed them in a very +different light. + +Sir Henry Bulwer writes to Sir Bartle Frere as follows on this point +(July 16th): “The Zulu king says that all the message he sent was a +request that the Boers should be warned not to return to the disputed +country, as he was informed they were doing since the meeting of the +Commission. We know that some of the Boers did return to the disputed +territory after the Commission broke up;[85] and this, no doubt, was +looked upon by the Zulus as an attempt on the part of the Boers to +anticipate the result of the inquiry, and led to the giving those +notices.... The fault has been, no doubt, on both sides.” + +The military kraal, also, turned out to be no more of the nature +ascribed to it than was its predecessor: “An ordinary private Zulu +kraal”—see report of Mr. Kudolph (2144, p. 186)—“built simply to +have a kraal in that locality, where many of Cetshwayo’s people are +residing without a head or kraal representing the king ... the king +having given instructions that neither the white nor the native +subjects of the Transvaal were in any way to be molested or disturbed +by the Zulus;” and having sent a small force to do the work, because +the large one he had sent on a previous occasion had frightened the +white people. + +Colonel Pearson, commanding the troops in Natal and the Transvaal, +writes, June 8th, 1878 (2144, p. 236): + +“The Landrost of Utrecht I know to be somewhat of an alarmist, and +the border farmers have all along been in a great fright, and much +given to false reports. I allude more particularly to the Boers. I +enclose Lieut.-Colonel Durnford’s views of the kraal question. He +is an officer who knows South Africa intimately, and his opinion I +consider always sound and intelligent.” + +And the following is the statement of Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E., +June 8th, 1878 (2144, p. 237): + +“I know the district referred to, in which are many Zulu kraals, +and believe that, if such a military kraal is in course of erection +on the farm of one Kohrs, believed to be a field-cornet in the +Wakkerstroom district, residing about fifteen miles from the mission +station of the Rev. Mr. Meyer, it is being constructed that order may +be kept amongst the Zulus here residing—who owe allegiance to the +Zulu king alone—and in the interests of peace.... I further believe +that, if the German or other residents at or near Luneburg have been +ordered to leave, it is not by orders of the King of Zululand, who is +far too wise a man to make a false move at present, when the boundary +between himself and the Transvaal is under consideration.” + +The excitement concerning the “notices to quit,” and the second +“military kraal,” appears to have been as unnecessary as any other +imaginary Zulu scare; and there are no proofs to be extracted +from the official papers at this period of the slightest signs of +aggressive temper on the part of the Zulu king. + +On the contrary; if we turn to the “Message from Cetywayo, King of +the Zulus, to His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of Natal,” dated +November 10th, 1878, we find the concluding paragraph runs: “Cetywayo +hereby swears, in presence of Oham, Mnyamana, Tshingwayo, and all his +other chiefs, that he has no intention or wish to quarrel with the +English.”—(P. P. [C. 2308] p. 16). + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +SIHAYO, UMBILINI, AND THE MISSIONARIES IN ZULULAND. + + +Much has been said of late years concerning the duty imposed by our +superior civilisation upon us English, in our dealings with the South +African races, of checking amongst the latter such cruel and savage +practices as are abhorrent to Christian ideas and practices. We will +proceed to show how this duty has been performed by the Government of +Natal. + +One of the commonest accusations brought against the Zulus, and +perhaps the most effectual in rousing English indignation and +disgust, is that of buying and selling women as wives, and the cruel +treatment of young girls who refuse to be thus purchased. + +Without entering into the subject upon its merits, or inquiring +how many French and English girls yearly are, to all intents and +purposes, sold in marriage, and what amount of moral pressure is +brought to bear upon the reluctant or rebellious amongst them; or +whether they suffer more or less under the infliction than their wild +sisters in Zululand do under physical correction;—we may observe that +the terrors of the Zulu system have been very much exaggerated. That +cruel and tyrannical things have occasionally been done under it no +one will deny, still less that every effort should have been made +by us to introduce a better one. Amongst the Zulus, both in their +own country and in Natal, marriages are commonly arranged by the +parents, and the young people are expected to submit, as they would +be in civilised France. But the instance which came most directly +under the present writer’s own observation, is one rather tending to +prove that the custom is one which, although occasionally bearing +hardly upon individuals, has been too long the practice of the +people, and to which they have always been brought up, to be looked +upon by them as a crying evil, calling for armed intervention on the +part of England. In the early days of missionary work at Bishopstowe +(between 1860-70), five girls took refuge at the station within a few +days of each other, in order to avoid marriages arranged for them by +their parents, and objected to by them. They dreaded pretty forcible +coercion, although of course, in Natal, they could not actually +be put to death. They were, of course, received and protected at +Bishopstowe, clothed, and put to school, and there they might have +remained in safety for any length of time, or until they could return +home on their own terms. But the restraint of the civilised habits +imposed on them, however gently, and the obligation of learning +to read, sew, and sweep, etc., was too much for these wild young +damsels, accustomed at home to a free and idle life.[86] Within a +few weeks they all elected to return home and marry the very men on +whose account they had fled; and the conclusion finally arrived at +concerning them was, that their escapade was rather for the sake of +attaching a little additional importance to the surrender of their +freedom, than from any real objection to the marriages proposed for +them. + +Now let us see what means had been taken by the English to institute +a better state of things and greater liberty for the women. In Natal +itself, of course, any serious act of violence committed to induce +a girl to marry would be punished by law, and girls in fear of such +violence could usually appeal for protection to the magistrates or +missionaries. Let us suppose that a girl, making such an appeal, +receives protection, and is married to the man of her own choice by +English law and with Christian rites. What is the consequence to her? +She has no rights as a wife, in fact she is not lawfully a wife at +all, nor have her children any legal claims upon their father; the +law of the colony protects the rights of native women married by +native custom, which it virtually encourages by giving no protection +at all to those who contract marriages by the English, or civilised +system.[87] + +So much for our dealings with the Zulus of Natal; and even less can +be said for us concerning those over the border. + +Until quite lately the practice existed in the colony of +surrendering to Zulu demands refugee _women_, as well as cattle, as +“property,” under an order from the Natal Government, which was in +force at the time of Sir H. Bulwer’s arrival, but was at some time +after rescinded.[88] + +It was well known that, by the laws of Zululand, the offence of a +woman’s escaping from her husband with another man was punishable by +death, therefore unhappy creatures thus situated were delivered up +by the Natal Government to certain death, and this practice had been +continued through a course of many years. + +The law being altered in this respect, and cattle only returned, Sir +H. Bulwer writes, on February 3rd, 1877: “Some few weeks ago I had +occasion to send a message to Cetywayo on account of the forcible +removal from Natal territory of a Zulu girl, who had lately taken +refuge in it from the Zulu country. A party of Zulus had crossed +the Tugela River in pursuit, and taken the girl by force back to +Zululand. I therefore sent to inform Cetywayo of this lawless act on +the part of some of his subjects” (1776, pp. 86, 87); and Cetshwayo +replies with thanks, saying that he knew nothing previously of what +had happened, and that “should anything of the same kind take place +to-morrow he (the Governor of Natal) must still open my ears with +what is done by my people.” + +This is apparently all. There is no attempt to make a serious +national matter of it; no demand for the surrender of the offenders, +nor for the payment of a fine. Nor is there even a warning that any +future occurrence of the same description will be viewed in a more +severe light. Sir Henry “informs” Cetshwayo of what has taken place, +and Cetshwayo politely acknowledges the information, and that the +action taken by his people deserves censure. “I do not send and take +by force,” he says; “why should my people do so? It is not right.” + +Eighteen months later, on July 28th, 1878, a similar case was +reported. A wife of the chief Sihayo had left him and escaped into +Natal. She was followed by a party of Zulus, under Mehlokazulu, the +chief son of Sihayo, and his brother, seized at the kraal where she +had taken refuge, and carried back to Zululand, where she was put to +death, in accordance with Zulu law. + +The Zulus who seized her did no harm to Natal people or property; +in fact their only fault towards England was that of following and +seizing her on Natal soil, an act which for many years, and until +quite lately, they would have been permitted to do, and assisted in +doing, by the border Government officials. A week later the same +young men, with two other brothers and an uncle, captured in like +manner another refugee wife of Sihayo, in the company of the young +man with whom she had fled. This woman was also carried back, and is +supposed to have been put to death likewise; the young man with her, +although guilty in Zulu eyes of a most heinous crime, punishable with +death, was safe from them on English soil—they did not touch him. But +by our own practice for years past, of surrendering _female_ refugees +as _property_, we had taught the Zulus that we regarded women as +cattle. + +While fully acknowledging the savagery of the young men’s actions, +and the necessity of putting a stop to such for the future, it must +be conceded that, having so long countenanced the like, we should +have given fair notice that, for the future, it would be an act of +aggression on us for a refugee of either sex to be followed into our +territory, before proceeding to stronger measures. + +Sir Henry Bulwer, indeed, though taking a decided view of the young +men’s offence, plainly understood that it was an individual fault, +and not a political action for the performance of which the king +was responsible. “There is no reason whatsoever as yet to believe +that these acts have been committed with the consent or knowledge of +the king,”[89] he says (2220, p. 125), and his message to Cetshwayo +merely _requests_ that he will send in the ringleaders of the party +to be tried by the law of the colony. + +On a previous occasion the king had, of his own accord, sent a Zulu +named Jolwana to the Natal Government to be punished by it for the +murder of a white man in the Zulu country. Jolwana was returned upon +his hands with the message that he could not be tried in Natal as he +was a Zulu subject. Under these circumstances it was not unnatural +that Cetshwayo should have taken the opportunity, apparently offered +him by the use of the word _request_, of substituting some other +method of apology for the offence committed than that of delivering +up the young men, who, as he afterwards said, he was afraid would be +“sjambokked” (flogged). + +Cetshwayo’s first answer is merely one acknowledging the message, and +regretting the truth of the accusation brought by it. He allows that +the young men deserve punishment, and he engages to send indunas of +his own to the Natal Government on the subject; but he deprecates the +matter being looked upon in a more serious light than as the “act of +rash boys,” who in their zeal for their father’s house (? honour) did +not think what they were doing. + +About this date, August, 1878, when all sorts of wild reports +were flying about, in and out of official documents, relative to +Cetshwayo’s supposed warlike preparations, he had ordered that _none +of his people should carry arms on pain of death_. + +This was in consequence of a circumstance which had occurred some +months before (January, 1878), when during the Umkosi, or feast of +first-fruits, a great Zulu gathering which annually takes place at +the king’s kraal, two of the regiments fell out and finally came +to blows, resulting in the death of some men on either side. Sir +B. Frere says, in his correspondence with the Bishop (p. 4), that +_many hundred men were killed_ on this occasion; but Mr. F. Colenso, +who happened to be there a few days after the fight, heard from a +white man, who had helped to remove the dead, that about fifty were +killed. In consequence of this, “an order had gone forth, forbidding +native Zulus, when travelling, to carry arms, nothing but switches +being allowed. A fire took place, which burned the grass over Panda’s +grave,[90] and the doctors declared that the spirits of Dingane and +Chaka had stated that they view with surprise and disgust the conduct +of the Zulus at the present day in fighting when called before +their king; that this was the reason Panda’s grave was burned; and +such things would continue until they learned to be peaceful among +themselves, and wait until they are attacked by other natives before +spilling blood.” + +Cetshwayo’s next message, September 9th (2260, p. 32), after he had +inquired into the matter of Sihayo’s sons, acknowledges again that +they had done wrong, but observes that he was glad to find that they +had hurt no one belonging to the English. What they had done was +done without his knowledge. The _request_ of the Natal Government +concerning the surrender of the offenders, he said, should be laid +before the great men of the Zulu people, to be decided upon by them; +_he could not do it alone_. + +He finally, with full and courteous apologies in the same tone, +begs that the Natal Government will accept, instead of the persons +of the young men, a fine of fifty pounds, which he sent down by his +messengers, but which was promptly refused. Sir Henry Bulwer appears +to have been inclined to allow of the substitution of a larger fine +for the surrender of the culprits (2222, p. 173); but Sir B. Frere +insists on severer measures, saying: “I think it quite necessary that +the delivery up to justice of the offenders in this case should have +been _demanded_,[91] and should now be peremptorily insisted on, +together with a fine for the delay in complying with the reiterated +_demand_.” + +John Dunn, who is supposed to have advised the king to send money as +an atonement, affirms that the invasion had been mutual, fugitives +from justice having been fetched out of Zululand by Natal officers; +and he (Dunn) asks whether outraged husbands, even amongst civilised +people, are prone to pay much respect to the rights of nations when +upon the track of their unfaithful spouses. Plainly, neither he nor +the king looked upon the matter in so serious a light as Sir Bartle +Frere chose to do when he said, September 30th, 1878 (2220, p. +280), “and, unless apologised and atoned for by compliance with the +Lieut.-Governor’s demands (?) that the leader of the murderous gangs +shall be given up to justice, it will be necessary to send to the +Zulu king _an ultimatum, which must put an end to pacific relations +with our neighbours_.”[92] + +Sir M. Hicks-Beach, in reply to Sir B. Frere’s last-quoted despatch, +writes, November 21st: “The abduction and murder of the Zulu woman +who had taken refuge in Natal is undoubtedly a serious matter, and +no sufficient reparation for it has yet been made. But I observe that +Cetshwayo has expressed his regret for this occurrence; and although +the compensation offered by him was inadequate, there would seem +to have been nothing in his conduct with regard to it which would +preclude the hope of a satisfactory arrangement.”—(P. P. [C. 2220], +p. 320). + +But the whole of Sir Bartle Frere’s statements at this period +concerning Cetshwayo are one-sided, exaggerated, or entirely +imaginary accusations, which come in the first instance with force +from a man of his importance, but for which not the slightest grounds +can be traced in any reliable or official source. He brings grave +charges against the king, which are absolutely contradicted by the +official reports from which he draws his information; he places +before the public as actual fact what, on investigation, is plainly +nothing more than his own opinion of what Cetshwayo thinks, wishes, +or intends, and what his thoughts, wishes, and intentions may be at +a future period. Every circumstance is twisted into a proof of his +inimical intentions towards Natal, the worst motives are taken for +granted in all he does. When the king’s messages were sent through +the ordinary native messengers between him and the Government of +Natal, they are termed mere “verbal” messages (as what else should +they be?), not “satisfactory or binding;” when they were sent +through Mr. John Dunn they were called “unofficial,” although Mr. +Dunn had been repeatedly recognised, and by Sir B. Frere himself, +as an official means of communication with Cetshwayo on matters of +grave importance; and, when Mr. Dunn writes, on his own account, his +opinion that the “boys” will not be given up, Sir B. Frere calls his +letter “a similar informal message (_i.e._ from the king), couched +in insolent and defiant terms.” In nothing that passed between the +king and the Government of Natal during this whole period is there +one single word, on Cetshwayo’s part, which could possibly be thus +described. There are, indeed, many apologies and entreaties to +the Government to be satisfied with some other atonement for the +fault committed than the surrender of the culprits, and there is +a great deal from various sources, official and otherwise, about +cattle collected, even beyond the demands of the Government, as a +propitiation; but of Sir B. Frere’s “semi-sarcastic, insolent, and +defiant” messages not one word. + +It would take many pages to point out how utterly misleading is +every word spoken by the High Commissioner on this subject, but to +those who are curious in the matter, and in proof of the truth of +our present statements, we can only recommend the South African +Blue-books of 1878-79. We cannot, however, better illustrate our +meaning than by a quotation from Lord Blachford (_Daily News_, March +26th, 1872): “What did Sir B. Frere say to all this? He was really +ashamed to answer that he did not know. He had studied the series +of despatches in which Sir B. Frere defended his conduct, and he +willingly acknowledged the exuberance of literary skill which they +exhibited. But when he tried to grapple with them he felt like a man +who was defending himself with a stick against a cloud of locusts. +He might knock down one, and knock down another, but ‘the cry is +still they come.’ His only consolation was, that they did not appear +to have convinced Her Majesty’s Government, whose replies were from +beginning to end a series of cautions, qualifications, and protests.” + +On turning to the subject of the robber chief, Umbilini, and his +raids, we are at once confronted by the fact that he was not a Zulu +at all, but a Swazi, and a claimant to the Swazi throne. His claim +had not been approved by the majority of the Swazi nation, and his +brother Umbandeni, the present king, was appointed instead. Umbilini, +however, was not a man to quietly sink into an inferior position, and +having taken possession, with his followers, of some rocky caves in +the borderland, forming an almost impregnable fortress, he lived for +many years, much in the fashion of the border freebooters of whose +doings we read in Scottish history, making raids upon his neighbours +on all sides, and carrying off cattle, women, and children. His +expeditions were most frequently directed towards the party against +him in his own country, but neither his Boer nor Zulu neighbours +escaped entirely. On first leaving Swaziland he went to offer homage +to the Zulu king, and was given land to settle upon in Zululand. No +doubt Cetshwayo looked upon a warrior of Umbilini’s known prowess as +rather an important vassal, especially in the event of a war between +him and his ancient enemies the Swazis, in which case Umbilini’s +adherence would probably divide the enemy amongst themselves. But +he appears to have been in perpetual trouble on account of his +turbulent vassal, and to have given him up altogether at one time. +After a raid committed by him upon the Dutch, the latter applied to +Cetshwayo to have him delivered up to them. “I could not do this,” +says Cetshwayo; “I should have got a bad name if I had done so, and +people would have said it was not good to _konza_ (pay homage) to +Cetshwayo. I therefore refused, but paid one hundred head of cattle +for the offence he had committed;”[93] and Cetshwayo’s own account to +Mr. Fynney is as follows (1961): + +“Umbilini came to me for refuge from his own people, the Ama-Swazis, +and I afforded him shelter; what would the world have said had I +denied it to him? But, while allowing him to settle in the land as my +subject, I have always been particularly careful to warn my people +not to afford him any assistance or become mixed up in any quarrel +between him and the Boers; and although I do not deny that he is my +subject, still I will not endorse his misdeeds. When Mr. Rudolph +complained to me of the trouble Umbilini was giving, I told Mr. +Rudolph to kill him—I should not shield him; this the Boers tried to +do, but, as usual, made a mess of it.” + +In fact, on a repetition of Umbilini’s offence against the Boers, +Cetshwayo refused to be longer responsible for his acts, and gave the +Dutch permission to kill him. They fought him, and were beaten by him +with his small band of only nineteen men. On a subsequent occasion, +after a raid committed by Umbilini upon the Swazis, Cetshwayo was so +incensed that he sent out a party to take and kill him; but he got +notice beforehand, and escaped. + +Sir Bartle Frere chooses to consider the king responsible for all +Umbilini’s doings, and even Sir H. Bulwer says: “The king disowned +Umbilini’s acts.... But there is nothing to show that he has in any +way punished him, and, on the contrary, it is quite certain (of +which ‘certainty,’ however, no proofs are forthcoming) that even if +Umbilini did not act with the express orders of Cetshwayo, he did so +with the knowledge that what he was doing would be agreeable to the +king” (2260, p. 46). + +This accusation was made in January, 1879, and refers to raids of the +previous year, by which time, as the Swazis were our allies and the +Boers our subjects, Umbilini’s raids in all directions except those +on the Zulu side had become offences to us for which Cetshwayo was +held responsible. In point of fact, it was no such simple matter to +“punish” Umbilini, whose natural fortress could be held by a couple +of men against anything short of the cannon which Cetshwayo did +not possess. Nor was it singular that, at a time when the king had +already strong suspicions that his country was about to be attacked, +he should not have wasted his strength in subduing one who, in the +event of war, would be most useful to himself. + +That, when the evil day came and his country was invaded, Cetshwayo +should have made common cause with all who would or could assist him +is a mere matter of course, and it was but natural that so bold and +skilful a leader as Umbilini has proved himself to be should then +have been promoted and favoured by the unfortunate king. + +We need scarcely say more upon this point, beyond calling our +readers’ attention to the fact that the expressions “_Zulu raids_,” +“_indiscriminate massacres_,” “_violation by the Zulus of Transvaal +territory_,” “_horrible cruelties_” (2308, p. 62, and elsewhere), +so freely scattered through the despatches written to prove the +criminality of the Zulu king, _all, without exception_, apply to acts +committed either by Umbilini and his (chiefly) _Swazi_ followers, or +by Manyonyoba, a small but independent native chief, living north of +the Pongolo.[94] + +The “case of Messrs. Smith and Deighton” is the only charge against +the Zulu king, in connection with Natal, which we have now to +consider, and it is one in which, as we shall see, a great deal was +made of a very small matter. + +Mr. Smith, a surveyor in the Colonial Engineer’s department, was on +duty inspecting the road down to the Tugela, near Fort Buckingham. +The Zulu mind being in a very excited state at the time—owing to +the obvious preparation for war, of which they heard reports from +Natal, troops stationed at Greytown, and war-ships seen close to +the Zulu shore, as though looking for a landing-place—Mr. Smith was +specially instructed to proceed upon his errand alone, and with great +discretion. By way of carrying out these directions he took with +him only a trader—Deighton by name—and their discretion was shown by +“taking no notice” when, having arrived at the drift into Zululand, +they were questioned by Zulus, who were on guard there in consequence +of rumours that our troops were about to cross.[95] + +Mr. Wheelwright (a Government official), to whom the matter was +reported a week after it occurred, not by Mr. Smith, the principal +person concerned, but by Mr. Deighton, says: “The fact that the two +white men took no notice of ‘lots of Zulus shouting out’ from their +own bank, ‘What do you want there?’ but ‘walked quietly along,’[96] +as if they had not heard, or as if they were deaf, very naturally +confirmed the suspicion that they were about no good.” + +The consequence was, that when the white men reached an islet in the +middle of the river (or rather one which is generally in the middle +of the stream when it is full—it was low at the time), they were +seized by the Zulus, and detained by them for about an hour and a +half, whilst all sorts of questions were asked: “What are you doing +there?” “What had the soldiers come to Greytown for?” “What did the +white men want coming down there? There were two down not long ago, +then other two only a few days since, and now there is other two; you +must come for some reason.” + +However, after a time, they were allowed to depart, an attempt made +to take their horses from them being prevented by the induna of the +Zulus. + +Sir Bartle Frere does not seem to have thought very much of the +matter at first, for Sir M. Hicks-Beach, when acknowledging his +despatch reporting it, says (2220, p. 320): “I concur with you in +attributing no special importance to the seizure and temporary arrest +of the surveyors, which was partly due to their own indiscretion, and +was evidently in no way sanctioned by the Zulu authorities.” + +But a little later—although with no fresh facts before him—Sir B. +Frere takes a very different tone (2222, p. 176). + +“I cannot at all agree with the lenient view taken by the +Lieut.-Governor of this case. Had it stood quite alone, a prompt +apology and punishment of the offenders might have been sufficient. +As the case stands, it was only one of many instances of insult and +threatening, such as cannot possibly be passed over without severe +notice being taken of them. What occurred,” he says, “whether done by +the king’s order, or only by his border-guards, and subsequently only +tacitly approved by his not punishing the offenders, seems to me a +most serious insult and outrage, and should be severely noticed.” + +There is no sign that it was ever brought to the king’s knowledge, +and when Sir B. Frere speaks of its being “only one of many +instances of insult and threatening,” he is drawing largely on his +imagination, as there is _no other recorded at all_, unless he means +to refer to the “notices to quit” in the disputed territory of which +we have already treated. + +We must now consider the points connected with the internal +management of the Zulu country, which have generally been looked upon +as a partial excuse for our invasion. Foremost amongst these is the +infraction of the so-called “coronation promises,” of which we have +spoken in a previous chapter. Frequent rumours were current in Natal +that the king, in defiance of the said promises, was in the habit of +shedding the blood of his people upon the smallest provocation, and +without any form of trial. Such stories of his inhuman atrocities +were circulated in the colony that many kind-hearted and gentle +people were ready to think that war would be a lesser evil. Yet, +whenever one of these stories was examined into or traced to its +source, it turned out either to be purely imaginary, or to have for +its foundation some small act of more or less arbitrary authority, +the justice of which we might possibly question, but to which no one +would apply the words “barbarities,” “savage murders,” etc. + +An instance of the manner in which the Zulu king has obtained +his character of “a treacherous and bloodthirsty sovereign,”[97] +came under the notice of the present writer about December of +last year (1878). Happening to be on a visit to some friends in +Pietermaritzburg, and hearing them mention Cetshwayo’s cruelties, +I observed that I did not much credit them, as I had never yet met +anyone who knew of them from any trustworthy source. I was met with +the assurance that their “kitchen-Kafir,” Tom, from whom they had +received their accounts, was a personal witness, having himself +escaped from a massacre, and they vouched for the truthfulness of +the man’s character. I asked and obtained permission to question +the man in his own language, being myself anxious to find any real +evidence on the subject, especially as, at that time—with military +preparations going on on every side—it was apparent to all that “we” +intended war, and one would have been glad to discover that there +was any justification for it on our side. The same evening I took an +opportunity of interrogating “Tom,” saying, “So I hear that you know +all about this wicked Zulu king. Tell me all about it.” Whereupon the +man launched out into a long account of the slaughter of his people, +from which not even infants were spared, and from which he was one of +the few who had escaped. He had plainly been accustomed to tell the +tale (doubtless a true one), and there were touches in it concerning +the killing of the children which showed that he had been in the +habit of recounting it to tender-hearted and horror-struck English +mothers. When he had finished his tale I asked him when all the +horrors which he had described had taken place. “Oh!” he replied, “it +was at the time of the fight between Cetshwayo and Umbulazi (1856); +that was when I left Zululand.” + +“And you have never been there since?” + +“No; I should be afraid to go, for Cetshwayo kills always.” + +“How do you know that?” I inquired, for he had started upon a fresh +account of horrors relating to the time at which he was speaking. + +“Oh! I know it is true,” was the ready and confident reply, “because +the white people here in ’Maritzburg tell me so out of the papers.” + +In point of fact the man, on whose word to my own knowledge rested +the belief of a considerable circle of the citizens, could only give +personal evidence concerning what happened at the time of the great +civil war, when Zululand was in such confusion that it would not be +easy to distribute responsibility, and when Cetshwayo himself was a +young man in the hands of his warriors. All he could tell of a later +date he had himself learnt from “white people” in the town, who, +again, had gathered their information from the newspapers; and Bishop +Schreuder, long resident in Zululand, says: “I had not with my own +eyes seen any corpse, and personally only knew of them said to have +been killed.... I myself had my information principally from the same +sources as people in Natal, and often from Natal newspapers.” + +The king’s own reply to these accusations may be taken entire from +Mr. Fynney’s report on July 4th, 1877 (1961), with the portions of +the message delivered by the latter to which it refers: + +“You have repeatedly acknowledged the house of England to be a great +and powerful house, and have expressed yourself as relying entirely +upon the good-will and power of that house for your own strength and +the strength of the country over which you are king; in fact you have +always looked towards the English Government. + +“Which way is your face turned to-day? Do you look, and still desire +to look, in the same direction? Do you rely on the good-will and +support of the British Government as much as you formerly did? + +“The Government of Natal has repeatedly heard that you have not +regarded the agreements you entered into with that Government, +through its representative, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, on the occasion +of your coronation. These agreements you entered into with the sun +shining around you, but since that time you have practised great +cruelties upon your people, putting great numbers of them to death. +What do you say?” + +In reply to the above, Cetshwayo said: “I have not changed; I still +look upon the English as my friends, as they have not yet done or +said anything to make me feel otherwise. They have not in any way +turned my heart, therefore I feel that we have still hold of each +other’s hands. But you must know that from the first the Zulu nation +grew up alone, separate and distinct from all others, and has never +been subject to any other nation; Tyaka (Chaka) was the first to +find out the English and make friends with them; he saved the lives +of seven Englishmen from shipwreck at the mouth of the Umfolosi, he +took care of them, and from that day even until now the English and +Zulu nations have held each other’s hands. The English nation is +a just one, and we are together” (we are at one with each other). +“I admit that people have been killed. There are three classes of +wrong-doers that I kill—(1) the abatakati—witches, poisoners, etc.; +(2) those who take the women of the great house, those belonging to +the royal household; and (3) those who kill, hide, or make away with +the king’s cattle. I mentioned these three classes of wrong-doers to +Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone), when he came to place me as king over the +Zulu nation, as those who had always been killed. I told him that it +was our law, and that three classes of wrong-doers I would kill, and +he replied: ‘Well, I cannot put aside a standing law of the land.’ +I always give a wrong-doer three chances, and kill him if he passes +the last. Evil-doers would go over my head if I did not punish them, +and that is our mode of punishing.... I do not see that I have in any +way departed from, or broken in anything, the compact I made with the +Natal Government through Somtseu.” + +The next subject to be considered is that of the treatment of the +missionaries and their converts in Zululand. + +Sir T. Shepstone, in his account of what passed at the installation +of Cetshwayo, writes as follows (C. 1137, p. 19): “The fourth point +was the position of Christian missionaries and their converts. +Cetywayo evidently regretted that they had ever been admitted at all, +and had made up his mind to reduce their numbers by some means or +other.... He said they had committed no actual wrong, but they did +no good, and that the tendency of their teaching was mischievous; he +added that he did not wish to harm them, that they might take all +their property with them and go in peace. + +“I suggested that they could not take their houses away. He replied +that the materials of which they were built—stone, earth, and +wood—were all Zulu property, but they might take them also if they +wished. He thought that four, however, were entitled to greater +consideration; these were Bishop Schreuder and Mr. Oftebro, of the +Norwegian Mission, because of their long residence—more than twenty +years—and their services in other ways than as missionaries; and +Bishop Wilkinson and Mr. Robertson, because they had brought an +introduction from the Governor of Natal; but that the teaching even +of these was mischievous, and could not be received by the Zulus +without injury.... The advantages of education, the value to a man +of being able to read and write, and the extreme inconvenience of +ignorance were discussed. Cetywayo heartily concurred in all that was +said on these subjects, and said it was education made the English +so great; and that, if he thought he could remember what he might +learn, he would be taught himself; and he expressed regret that the +missionaries did not confine themselves to that kind of teaching. + +“The result of our conversations on the subject of the missionaries +was an understanding that those who were already in the country +should not be interfered with, and that, if any of them committed +an offence for which the offender might be considered deserving of +expulsion, the case should be submitted to the Government of Natal, +and its assent be received before the sentence should be carried +out. It is necessary to explain that the Zulus have no idea of +inflicting any punishment upon a missionary except that of expulsion +from the country. _I did not consider it wise to attempt to make any +arrangements in favour of native converts._”[98] + +What was meant by the teaching of the missionaries being +_mischievous_ is fully explained by the remarks of the prime +ministers Mnyamana and Vumandaba, reported by Mr. Fynney in 1877 +(1961, p. 47) as follows: + +“We will not allow the Zulus to become so-called Christians. It is +not the king says so, but every man in Zululand. If a Zulu does +anything wrong, he at once goes to a mission station, and says he +wants to become a Christian; if he wants to run away with a girl, +he becomes a Christian; if he wishes to be exempt from serving +the king, he puts on clothes, and is a Christian; if a man is an +umtagati (evil-doer), he becomes a Christian. All these people are +the subjects of the king; and who will keep a cow for another to milk +it?... The missionaries desire to set up another power in the land, +and, as Zululand has only one king, that cannot be allowed.” + +Mr. Fynney continues: “Before I left Zululand (before July, 1877) +most of the missionaries had decided upon leaving; some had already +left, not from any fear of personal danger, but because in some cases +they have been deserted by the natives on their stations; in others +the native converts were uneasy, and wished to leave; and from the +attitude of both the king and chiefs, they could plainly see that all +chances of making fresh converts, or even retaining those around +them, were for the present at an end.... I find there were all sorts +of wild (?) rumours going about from station to station—one that +the British Government intended to annex Zululand at once. I am +afraid that this and the like rumours have done harm. Several of the +missionaries have been frequently to the king of late, and, as he +told me, have worried him to such an extent that he does not want to +see them any more.”[99] + +In August of the same year Lord Carnarvon requests Sir Henry Bulwer +to make a special point of causing “the missionaries to understand +distinctly that Her Majesty’s Government cannot undertake to compel +the king to permit the maintenance of the mission stations in +Zululand,” and to recommend them, if they cannot carry on their work +without armed support, to leave it for the present. + +Sir Henry Bulwer writes (2000, p. 33): + +“The action taken by some of the missionaries in leaving that country +has apparently proved not only unnecessary, but ill-advised for their +own interests. The king was not sorry that they should go, but he was +angry with them for going.”[100] and on January 26th, 1878, a message +arrived from Cetshwayo, concerning those that remained, to this +effect (2100, p. 61): + +“Cetshwayo states that he wishes His Excellency to know that he is +not pleased with the missionaries in the Zulu country, as he finds +out that they are the cause of much harm, and are always spreading +false reports about the Zulu country, and (he) would wish His +Excellency to advise them to remove, as they do no good.” + +Shortly after the Rev. Mr. Oftebro and Dr. Oftebro, Norwegian +missionaries from Zululand, were granted an interview by the +Lieut.-Governor of Natal for the purpose of laying their case before +His Excellency. The king, they said, had informed them that he was +now quite persuaded that they had communicated to the governors of +Natal and the Transvaal, and to the editors of the public papers in +Natal, all important matters that occurred in the Zulu country—that +the accounts they sent were not even truthful—and that he had +believed these missionaries were “men,” but that he now found them to +be his enemies. + +They believed that amongst the “white men,” from whom he had obtained +his information, were Mr. John Mullins, a trader, and Mr. F. E. +Colenso, a son of the Bishop of Natal, who had been at the king’s +kraal for some six days and who, they said, “_had translated, for the +king’s information, accounts of doings in the Zulu country_, from +several newspapers of the colony.” This last, as it happens, was pure +fiction. Sir Henry Bulwer, indeed, believed it at the time, and wrote +upon it as follows (2100, p. 89): + +“I notice in Messrs. Smith and Colenso’s letter to the Earl of +Carnarvon, a statement to the effect that the disposition and +dealings of Cetshwayo had been sedulously misrepresented by the +missionaries and by the Press. And this statement tends, I am afraid, +to confirm the belief that Mr. F. E. Colenso, when he lately visited +the Zulu country, ... made certain representations regarding the +missionaries in Zululand, which were greatly calculated to prejudice +the king’s mind against them, or against some of them.” + +But Mr. Colenso, on seeing for the first time the above statements in +the Blue-book, wrote to Sir M. Hicks-Beach as follows (2220, p. 318): + +“The suspicions expressed by the missionaries as to my proceedings +are entirely without foundation in fact. So far from attempting to +prejudice the king’s mind against them, I confined myself, in the +little I did say to Cetshwayo on the subject, to supporting their +cause with him. The king had received, through some of his various +channels of information, an account of the numerous contributions +made by missionaries and others living under his protection in +Zululand, to the colonial newspapers, and in particular, of an +exaggerated and sensational report, written by the Zululand +correspondent of _The Natal Mercury_, of the catastrophe which +occurred at the annual Feast of Firstfruits some ten days before +my last conversation with the king, which report he attributed to +the Rev. Mr. Robertson, from the fact that his waggon-driver was +the only white man present on the occasion, except Dr. Oftebro, Mr. +Mullins, and Mr. Dunn. Cetshwayo expressed himself as indignant at +the conduct of Mr. Robertson, who, he said, had never, during his +long residence in Zululand, received anything but good treatment at +the hands of his (Cetshwayo’s) father and himself, and, he added, +‘I have borne with him too long.’ To this I replied that, if he had +any distinct ground of complaint against Mr. Robertson, he (the king) +should get it set down in writing, and send it to His Excellency the +Lieut.-Governor of Natal; and I wished him to understand that any +different course would be productive of no good effect. I then told +Cetshwayo, omitting further reference to Mr. Robertson, that in my +opinion the presence of the missionaries as a body in his country +was a great advantage to him, and that they merited his protection. +He disclaimed having ever treated them with anything but great +consideration.” + +The particular statement of the two missionaries Oftebro, concerning +the translation of newspapers, also Mr. Colenso specially and +distinctly contradicts, saying that he had no newspapers with him nor +extracts of newspapers, nor were any such read to Cetshwayo in his +presence. + +Sir H. Bulwer states, at the request of the Messrs. Oftebro (2100, +p. 61), that no member of the Norwegian mission had supplied this +Government with information as above. But it does not follow that +no such communications had been made to Sir B. Frere and Lord +Carnarvon. Missionaries had written anonymously to the colonial +papers, and the account in _The Natal Mercury_ of the fight at the +Umkosi was attributed by Cetshwayo, not without reason, to the Rev. +E. Robertson. The tone of this letter, and its _accuracy_, may be +gathered from the following extract, referring to the land which, +in the opinion of the Commissioners, “was by right belonging to the +Zulus.” + +“Never was a more preposterous demand made upon any Government than +that which Cetshwayo is now making upon the English Government of +the Transvaal.... For be it remembered that, until very lately, the +Zulus have never occupied any portion of it, (!) and even now very +partially. It is most earnestly to be hoped that Sir T. Shepstone, +while doing all in his power to keep the peace, _will be equally firm +in resisting the unjust pretensions of the Zulus_.”[101] + +How far the Zulu king was justified in his opinion that the +missionaries were not his friends may be gathered from the above, and +from the replies to Sir B. Frere’s appeal to the “missionaries of all +denominations” for their opinions on native politics, as published in +the Blue-books (2316), of which the following examples may be given: + +From letter of the Rev. P. D. Hepburn, December 17th, 1878: “All +in these parts are quiet, and are likely to remain quiet, if His +Excellency overthrows the Zulu chief, and disarms the remaining +Zulus. The Zulus are very warlike; will attack in front, flank, and +rear. They are, and have been, the terror of the neighbouring tribes +since the days of Chaka.[102] Only the utter destruction of the Zulus +can secure future peace in South Africa. May His Excellency not allow +himself to be deceived by the Zulu chief Cetywayo.” + +“On full inquiry it will be found that our late war, (Kaffraria) +here was to a great extent attributable to Zulu influence.[103] If +our forces suffer defeat at Natal, all native tribes in South Africa +will rise against us. I am a man of peace; I hate war; but if war, +let there be no dawdling and sentimental nonsense. + +“True and faithful to God, our Queen, and the interests of the +empire, we have the approbation of God, our Queen, and our own +conscience. I would have much liked had there been a regiment of +British cavalry at Natal. Sword in hand, the British are irresistible +over all natives. The battle at the Gwanga in 1846, under Sir Henry +Darrell, lasted only about fifteen minutes; about four hundred Kafirs +were cut down.... + +“God, our God, put it into the minds of our rulers that all tribes in +south-east and east Africa must submit to British power, and that it +is the interest of all Africans to do so. Heathenism must perish; God +wills it so.”[104] + +These remarks are from a missionary in Kaffraria, but the tone of +these in Zululand is the same, or even worse. Compare the following +statement made to the Natal Government by two native converts from +the Etshowe mission station—Mr. Oftebro’s (1883, p. 2): “We know that +as many a hundred (Zulus) in one day see the sun rise, but don’t see +it go down.... The people, great and small, are tired of the rule +of Cetshwayo, by which he is finishing his people. The Zulu army is +not what it was, there are only six full regiments. Cetshwayo had +by his rule made himself so disliked, that they knew of no one, and +especially of the headmen, who would raise a hand to save him from +ruin, no matter from what cause.” + +Mr. John Shepstone adds, April 27th, 1877 (p. 4): “The above was +confirmed only yesterday by reliable authority, who added that a +power such as the English, stepping in now, would be most welcome to +the Zulus generally, through the unpopularity of the king, by his +cruel and reckless treatment of his subjects.” And Mr. Fynney, in the +report already quoted from, says: + +“The king appeared to have a very exaggerated idea both of his +power, the number of his warriors, and their ability as such.... +While speaking of the king as having exaggerated ideas as to the +number of his fighting-men, I would not wish to be understood as +underrating the power of the Zulu nation.... I am of opinion that +King Cetywayo could bring six thousand men into the field at a short +notice, great numbers armed with guns; but the question is, would +they fight?... I am of opinion that it would greatly depend against +whom they were called to fight.... While the Zulu nation, to a man, +would have willingly turned out to fight either the Boers or the +Ama-Swazi, the case would be very different, I believe, in the event +of a misunderstanding arising between the British Government and the +Zulu nation.... I further believe, from what I heard, that a quarrel +with the British Government would be the signal for a general split +up amongst the Zulus, and the king would find himself deserted by the +majority of those upon whom he would at present appear to rely.” + +While Sir T. Shepstone says, November 30th, 1878 (2222, p. 175): “I +will, however, add my belief that the Zulu power is likely to fall to +pieces when touched.” + +Such were the opinions given by men supposed to be intimately +acquainted with Zulu character and feeling, one of them being _the_ +great authority on all native matters; and on such statements did +Sir Bartle Frere rely when he laid his scheme for the Zulu War. +How absolutely ignorant, how foolishly mistaken, were these “blind +leaders of the blind” has been amply proved by the events of 1879. + +We need not enter very fully into the accusations brought by the +missionaries against the Zulu king of indiscriminate slaughter of +native converts for their religion’s sake. They were thoroughly +believed in Natal at the time; but, upon investigation, they dwindled +down to three separate cases of the execution of men (one in each +case) who happened to be converts, but of whom two were put to death +for causes which had nothing whatsoever to do with their faith (one +of them being indeed a relapsed convert); and the third, an old +man, Maqamsela, whose name certainly deserves to be handed down to +fame in the list of martyrs for religion’s sake, was killed without +the sanction or even knowledge of the king, by the order of his +prime minister Gaozi.[105] That the latter received no punishment, +although the king disapproved of this action, is not a fact of any +importance. It is not always convenient to punish prime ministers and +high commissioners, or powerful indunas. + +Sir Bartle Frere of course takes the strongest possible view of +the matter against the king, and speaks of his having killed Zulu +converts (2220, p. 270), “at first rarely, as if with reluctance, +and a desire to conceal what he had ordered, and to shift the +responsibility to other shoulders, latterly more frequently, openly, +and as an avowed part of a general policy for re-establishing the +system of Chaka and Dingane.” This little phrase is of a slightly +imaginative nature, resting on no (produced) evidence. It is, in +fact, a “statement.”[106] + +Sir Henry Bulwer’s reply—November 18th, 1878 (2222, p. 171)—which +forms an able refutation of various statements of Sir B. Frere, +contains the following sentence: “I took some pains to find out how +the case really stood, and ascertained that the number of natives, +either converts or living on mission stations, who had been killed, +was _three_. I have never heard since that time of any other mission +natives being killed.... I was, therefore, surprised, on reading +your Excellency’s despatch, to see what Messrs. Oftebro and Staven +had said. I have since made particular inquiries on that point, but +have failed to obtain any information showing that more than _three_ +mission natives have been killed. Among others to whom I have spoken +is the Rev. Mr. Robertson, of Zululand, who was in ’Maritzburg a few +weeks ago. He told me that he had not heard of any other than the +_three_ cases.” + +Sir Bartle Frere replies, December 6th, 1878 (2222, p. 175):[107] +“I have since made further inquiry (he does not say what), and have +_no doubt_ that though His Excellency _may possibly_ be right as +to the number regarding which there is _judicial evidence_ (Sir H. +Bulwer plainly decides that there was _no evidence at all_); the +missionaries had _every reason to believe_ that the number slain +_on account of their inclination to Christianity_ was considerably +greater than three. One gentleman, who had better means of obtaining +the truth than anyone else, told me _he had no doubt_ the number of +converts killed was considerable.” + +This gentleman, Sir Bartle Frere assures us, “knows the Zulus +probably better than _any living European_; he is himself an old +resident in Zululand, and a man _above all suspicion of exaggeration +or misrepresentation_(!). He gave me this information, under +stipulation that his name should not be mentioned, otherwise it +would, I am sure, at once be accepted as a guarantee for the accuracy +of his statements.” + +With such phrases, “I have no doubt,” “every reason to believe,” “I +feel sure,” etc. etc., has Sir Bartle Frere continually maligned the +character of the Zulu king, called since the war by Mr. John Dunn, +“the most injured man in South Africa.” + +One is rather puzzled who the man may be to whom Sir Bartle Frere +gives so high a character, his opinion of which he evidently expects +will quite satisfy his readers. We should much like to have the +gentleman’s name. The number of gentlemen “long resident in Zululand” +are not so many as to leave a wide field for conjecture. Besides the +missionaries, the only names that occur to us to which the phrase +can apply are those of Mr. John Shepstone, Mr. John Dunn, and Mr. +Robertson. + +The only point in the indictment against Cetshwayo which we have +now to consider, is that of the killing of girls under the Zulu +marriage law, and the reply to Sir Henry Bulwer’s remonstrance on +the point, which Sir Bartle Frere speaks of in his final memorandum +as expressed “in terms of unprecedented insolence and defiance;” +while _The Times of Natal_ (generally recognised as the Government +organ) went still further, and has twice charged the Zulu king with +sending _repeatedly_, insolent messages to the Natal Government. As +to the _repetition_ of the offence, it need only be said that there +is no foundation in the Blue-books for the assertion. And as to +this particular offence it is enough to say that no notice had been +taken of it to Cetshwayo himself, till two years afterwards it was +unearthed, and charged upon him, as above, by the High Commissioner, +notwithstanding that, whatever it may have been, it had been +subsequently condoned by friendly messages from this Government. + +The marriage law of Zululand is thus described by Sir T. Shepstone +(1137, p. 21): “The Zulu country is but sparsely inhabited when +compared with Natal, and the increase of its population is checked +more by its peculiar marriage regulations than by the exodus of +refugees to surrounding governments. Both boys and girls are formed +into regiments, and are not allowed to marry without special leave +from the king, or until the regiments to which they belong are +fortunate enough to receive his dispensation. Caprice or state +reasons occasionally delay this permission, and it sometimes +happens that years pass before it is given. Contravention of these +regulations is visited by the severest penalties.”[108] + +The history of the case which we are now considering may be given in +the following extracts: + +On September 22nd, 1876, Mr. Osborn, resident magistrate of +Newcastle, writes: “The Zulu king lately granted permission to two +regiments of middle-aged men to marry. These were, however, rejected +by the girls, on the ground that the men were too old; upon which +the king ordered that those girls who refused to marry the soldiers +were to be put to death. Several girls were killed in consequence, +some fled into the colony, others into the Transvaal Republic, and on +October 9th, Government messengers report (1748, p. 198): + +“We heard that the king was causing some of the Zulus to be killed on +account of disobeying his orders respecting the marriage of girls, +and we saw large numbers of cattle which had been taken as fines. +Otherwise the land was quiet.” + +As far as the most careful investigations could discover, the number +killed was not more than four or five, while the two Zulus already +quoted said that, although they had _heard_ of the matter, they did +not _know_ of a single instance; and as these young men themselves +belonged to one of the regiments, it can hardly be supposed that any +great slaughter could have taken place unknown to them. + +At the time, however, report as usual greatly exaggerated the +circumstances, and Sir Henry Bulwer speaks (1748, p. 198) of +“_numbers of girls and young men_,” and “_large numbers of girls and +others connected with them_,” as having been killed. + +He sent a message to Cetshwayo on the subject, which in itself was +a temperate and very proper one for an English governor to send, in +the hope of checking such cruelty in future, and was not unnaturally +somewhat surprised at receiving an answer from the usually courteous +and respectful king, which showed plainly enough that he was highly +irritated and resented the interference with his management of +his people. Sir Henry had reminded him of what had passed at his +coronation, and Cetshwayo replies that if Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone) +had told the white people that he (the king) had promised never to +kill, Somtseu had deceived them. “I have yet to kill,” he says. He +objects to being dictated to about his laws, and says that while +wishing to be friends with the English, he does not intend to govern +his people by laws sent to him by them. He remarks, in a somewhat +threatening way, that in future he shall act on his own account, and +that if the English interfere with him, he will go away and become a +wanderer, but not without first showing what he can do if he chooses. +Finally he points out that he and the Governor of Natal are in like +positions,[109] one being governor of Natal, the other of Zululand. + +It is plain that this reply, as reported by the Government +messengers, produced a strong effect on Sir H. Bulwer’s mind, and +considerably affected his feeling towards the king, though, as +already stated, he never brought it, at the time or afterwards, +to the notice of Cetshwayo, and has since exchanged friendly +messages with him. And no doubt the reply was petulant and wanting +in due respect, though a dash of arrogance was added to it by the +interpreter’s use of the expression “we are equal,” instead of “we +are in like positions”—each towards our own people. But that the +formidable words “I have yet to kill,” “I shall now act on my own +account,” meant nothing more than the mere irritation of the moment +is plain from the fact that he never made the slightest attempt to +carry them out, though recent events have taught us what he might +have done had he chosen to “act on his own account.” + +The _tone_ of the reply would probably have been very different had +it been brought by Cetshwayo’s own messengers. By an unfortunate +mistake on the part of the Natal Government, one of the messengers +sent was a _Zulu refugee_ of the party of Umbulazi and Umkungo, +between whom and the king there was deadly hostility, which had +lately been intensified by the insulting manner in which Umkungo’s +people had received Cetshwayo’s messengers, sent in a friendly spirit +to inform them of King Umpande’s death. The very presence of this +man, bringing a reproof from the Government of Natal, would naturally +be resented by the Zulu king, who had already declined communications +from the Transvaal sent through refugee subjects of his own (Sir +Henry Bulwer—1748, p. 10); and was now obliged to receive with +courtesy, and listen to words of remonstrance from, one of these very +refugees who had fled to Natal, and, under Zulu law, was liable to be +put to death as a traitor, when he made his appearance in Zululand. +The king’s words, exhibiting the irritation of the moment, whatever +they may have been, would lose nothing of their fierceness and +bitterness by being conveyed through such a medium. + +We do not wish to defend such practices as those of forcing girls +into distasteful marriages, or putting them to death for disobedience +in that respect. But we must remember that, after all, the king, in +ordering these executions, was enforcing, not a new law laid down by +himself, but “an old custom” (1748, p. 198). From his point of view +the exercise of such severity was as necessary to maintaining his +authority as the decimation of a regiment for mutiny might appear to +a commander, or the slaughter of hundreds of Langalibalele’s people, +hiding in caves or running away, which we have already described, +appeared to Sir B. Pine and Sir T. Shepstone in 1873-74. + +The king himself gave an illustration of his difficulties in a +message sent to Sir H. Bulwer early in 1878 (2079, p. 96). He +reported to His Excellency that two of his regiments had had a +fight, and many of his men had been killed, at which he was much +annoyed. He reports this to show His Excellency that, although he +warned them that he would severely punish any regiment that caused +any disturbance at the Umkosi, he cannot rule them without sometimes +killing them, especially as they know they can run to Natal. + +We have now considered in turn every accusation brought against the +Zulu king up to the end of 1878, when Sir Bartle Frere delivered +his ultimatum, which he had said beforehand would put an end to our +peaceful relations with our neighbours. We venture to assert that, +with the exception of the last, every one of these accusations is +distinctly refuted on evidence gathered from official sources. Of +that last, we would observe, that, although it cannot be entirely +denied, the fault has been greatly exaggerated; while that part +of it which referred to the sole instance of a hasty reply to the +Natal Government, has been condoned by two years’ friendly relations +since the offence, before it was raked up by Sir Bartle Frere as an +additional pretext for the war. And, at all events, had Cetshwayo’s +severity to his people been a hundred times greater than it ever was, +he could not in a lifetime have produced the misery which this one +year’s campaign has wrought. + +Yet these accusations were the sole pretexts for the war, except +that fear of the proximity of a nation strong enough and warlike +enough to injure us, _if it wished to do so_, which Sir Bartle Frere +declared made it impossible for peaceful subjects of Her Majesty +to feel security for life or property within fifty miles of the +border, and made the existence of a peaceful English community in +the neighbourhood impossible.[110] He speaks in the same despatch +(2269, pp. 1, 2) of the king as “an irresponsible, bloodthirsty, and +treacherous despot,” which terms, and others like them, do duty again +and again for solid facts, but of the justice of which he gives no +proof whatever. We cannot do better than give, in conclusion, and +as a comment upon the above fear, a quotation from Lord Blachford’s +speech in the House of Lords, March 26th, 1879, which runs: + +“Some people assumed that the growth of the Zulu power in the +neighbourhood of a British colony constituted such a danger that, +in a common phrase, it had to be got rid of, and that, when a thing +had to be done, it was idle and inconvenient to examine too closely +into the pretexts which were set up. And this was summed up in +a phrase which is used more than once by the High Commissioner, +and had obtained currency in what he might call the light +literature of politics. We might be told to obey our ‘instincts of +self-preservation.’ No doubt the instinct of self-preservation was +one of the most necessary of our instincts. But it was one of those +which we had in common with the lowest brute—one of those which we +are most frequently called on to keep in order. It was in obedience +to the ‘instinct of self-preservation’ that a coward ran away in +battle, that a burglar murdered a policeman, or, what was more to our +present purpose, that a nervous woman jumped out of a carriage lest +she should be upset; or that one man in a fright fired at another +who, he thought, meant to do him an injury, though he had not yet +shown any sign of an intention of doing so. The soldiers who went +down in the _Birkenhead_—what should we have thought of them if, +instead of standing in their ranks to be drowned, they had pushed the +women and children into the hold and saved themselves? A reasonable +determination to do that which our safety requires, so far as it +is consistent with our duty to others, is the duty and interest of +every man. To evade an appeal to the claims of reason and justice, +by a clamorous allegation of our animal instinct, is to abdicate our +privileges as men, and to revert to brutality.” + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + +THE ULTIMATUM, DECLARATION OF WAR, AND COMMENCEMENT OF CAMPAIGN. + + +On December 11th the boundary award was delivered to the Zulus +by four gentlemen selected for the purpose, who, by previous +arrangement, met the king’s envoys at the Lower Tugela Drift. The +award itself, as we already know, was in favour of the Zulus; +nevertheless it is impossible to read the terms in which it was given +without feeling that it was reluctantly done. It is fenced in with +warnings to the Zulus against transgressing the limits assigned to +them, without a word assuring them that _their_ rights also shall +in future be respected; and, while touching on _Zulu_ aggressions +on _Boers_ in the late disputed territory, it says nothing of those +committed _by_ Boers. + +But perhaps the most remarkable phrase in the whole award is that in +which Sir Bartle Frere gives the Zulus to understand that _they_ will +have to pay the compensation due to the ejected Transvaal farmers, +while he entirely ignores all that can be said on the other side of +injuries to property and person inflicted on Zulus in the disputed +territory (of which the Blue-books contain ample proof), not to speak +of the rights and advantages so long withheld from them, and now +decided to be their due. + +Sir Henry Bulwer plainly took a very different view on this point +when he summed up the judgment of the Commissioners (2220, p. 388), +and added as follows: “I would venture to suggest that it is a fair +matter for consideration if those Transvaal subjects, who have been +induced ... under the sanction, expressed or tacit, of the Government +of the Republic, to settle and remain in that portion of the country, +have not a claim for compensation from their Government for the +individual losses they may sustain.” + +Sir Bartle Frere, starting with phrases which might be supposed +to agree with the above, gradually and ingeniously shifts his +ground through propositions for compensation to be paid to farmers +“_required_ or _obliged_ to leave” (omitting the detail of _who is to +pay_), and then for compensation to be paid to farmers _wishing_ to +remove, until he finally arrives, by a process peculiarly his own, +at a measure intended to “secure private rights of property,” which +eventually blossomed out into a scheme for maintaining, in spite of +the award, the Boer farmers on the land claimed by them, which we +shall presently relate in full. Although nothing appeared in the +award itself on this point, the whole tone of it was calculated to +take the edge off the pleasure which the justice done them at last +would naturally give the Zulus, and it was promptly followed up by an +“ultimatum” from the High Commissioner calculated to absorb their +whole attention. + +This “ultimatum” contained the following thirteen demands, and was +delivered on the same day with the award, an hour later: + + 1. Surrender of Sihayo’s three sons and brother to be tried by + the Natal courts. + + 2. Payment of a fine of five hundred head of cattle for the + outrages committed by the above, and for Ketshwayo’s delay in + complying with the request (N.B., not _demand_) of the Natal + Government for the surrender of the offenders. + + 3. Payment of a hundred head of cattle for the offence committed + against Messrs. Smith and Deighton (N.B., twenty days were + allowed for compliance with the above demands, _i.e._ until + December 31st, inclusive). + + 4. Surrender of the Swazi chief Umbilini, and others to be named + hereafter, to be tried by the Transvaal courts (N.B., no time was + fixed for compliance with this demand). + + 5. Observance of the coronation “promises.” + + 6. That the Zulu army be disbanded, and the men allowed to go + home. + + 7. That the Zulu military system be discontinued, and other + military regulations adopted, to be decided upon after + consultation with the Great Council and British Representatives. + + 8. That every man, when he comes to man’s estate, shall be free + to marry. + + 9. All missionaries and their converts, who until 1877 lived in + Zululand, shall be allowed to return and reoccupy their stations. + + 10. All such missionaries shall be allowed to teach, and + any Zulu, if he chooses, shall be free to listen to their + teaching.[111] + + 11. A British Agent shall be allowed to reside in Zululand, who + will see that the above provisions are carried out. + + 12. All disputes in which a missionary or European (_e.g._ trader + or traveller) is concerned, shall be heard by the king in + public, and in presence of the Resident. + + 13. No sentence of expulsion from Zululand shall be carried out + until it has been approved by the Resident. + + N.B.—Ten days more were allowed for compliance with the above + demands (4-13). + +_The Natal Colonist_, August 21st, 1879, condenses the opinions of +Sir B. Pine upon the ultimatum—from his article in “The Contemporary +Review,” June, 1879—thus: + +“He thinks the depriving Messrs. Smith and Deighton of their +handkerchiefs and pipes hardly a matter deserving of a place in such +a document; that the Sihayo and Umbilini affairs were more serious, +but that ‘full reparation ... might have been obtained by friendly +negotiations.’ He does not attach to the promises alleged to have +been made by Cetshwayo ‘the force of a treaty which we were bound to +see executed.’ And while approving of a British Resident being placed +in the Zulu country, he frankly recalls the fact that ‘Cetshwayo has +himself, on more than one occasion, requested such an arrangement.’ +‘At the same time,’ he adds, ‘I think that the powers proposed to be +invested in this officer are more than are necessary or expedient, +and I would especially refer to those relating to the protection of +missionaries. Christianity ought not to be enforced at the point of +the sword.’ In reference to Cetshwayo’s alleged coronation promises, +we may note in passing that Sir B. Pine is careful to point out that +one chief reason for his sanctioning that expedition was ‘out of +deference to Mr. Shepstone’s judgment;’ and that it was expressly +stipulated by the High Commissioner that no British troops should +accompany Mr. Shepstone, ‘so that Her Majesty’s Government might +not be compromised in the matter.’ With such a stipulation it is +amazing that anyone should still contend that Cetshwayo entered into +engagements so solemn as to call for invasion of his country to +punish the breach of them.” + +And the Special Correspondent of _The Cape Argus_ writes: “As regards +the alleged coronation engagements, Dunn affirms that no undertaking +was made by, or even asked from, Cetshwayo. In the act of coronation, +Mr. (now Sir T.) Shepstone gave to the king a piece of paternal +counsel, and the conditions were in reality nothing more than +recommendations urged upon his acceptance by the Special Commissioner. + +“Lord Kimberley, who was Secretary of State for the Colonies at the +time of Sir T. Shepstone’s installation of Cetshwayo, spoke upon this +subject in the House of Lords;” which _The Daily News_, March 26th, +1879, reports as follows: + +“With respect to the so-called coronation promises, nothing had more +astonished him in these papers than to learn that these promises were +supposed to constitute an engagement between us and the Zulu nation. +He happened to have had some concern in that matter; and if he had +supposed that Sir T. Shepstone, in asking for these promises from +Cetshwayo, had rendered us responsible to the Zulu nation to see that +they were enforced, he would not have lost a mail in disavowing any +such responsibility. He was supported in the view which he took by +the late Colonial Secretary (Lord Carnarvon). The fact was that these +were friendly assurances, given in response to friendly advice, and +constituted no engagement. But Sir B. Frere put these ‘coronation +promises’ in the foreground.” Sir M. Hicks-Beach, also, says (2144, +p. 1): “It is obvious that the position of Sir T. Shepstone in this +matter was that of a friendly counsellor, giving advice to the king +as to the good government of the country.” + +The demands which we have recorded were delivered to the Zulu envoys, +who were not allowed to discuss or comment upon them, on the ground +that the Commission had no authority for that purpose. The envoys, +indeed, appeared seriously concerned by their import. They denied +that the coronation stipulations had ever been disregarded, and said +that they could not understand why the Zulu army should be disbanded; +the army was a national custom with them as with the English. They +also asked for an extension of time, and considered that on such +important matters no specified time should have been fixed; the reply +to which request was that the time was considered ample. + +Sir B. Frere, in his covering despatch to the Secretary of State, +remarks that the “enclosed extracts from demi-official letters,” from +the Hon. Mr. Brownlee and the Hon. Mr. Littleton, “give an outline +of the proceedings, and show that the messages were _carefully +delivered_, _well explained_, and _thoroughly understood_, copies +of the English text with Zulu translations being given to the Zulu +envoys.” On turning to “the enclosed extracts,” however, we do not +find in them a single word of the sort from either gentleman, while +the extract from Mr. Littleton’s letter consists of not a dozen lines +describing the spot where the meeting took place, and in which the +writer’s opinions are limited to these: “they (the Zulus) seemed to +take the award very quietly,” but “were evidently disturbed” by the +ultimatum, and “Mr. Shepstone seemed to me to manage very well.” The +young gentleman could not well say any more, as he did not know a +word of Zulu; but one is puzzled to know how Sir B. Frere draws his +deductions from either extract. How far the opinions of the other +honourable gentleman are to be depended upon, may be gathered from +the following assertion made by him some months after the Boundary +Commissioners had deliberately decided that the Boers had no claim +whatever to the disputed territory, but that it would be expedient to +allow them to retain the Utrecht district. + +“The falsehood of the Zulu king with regard to the Utrecht land +question,” says Mr. Brownlee, “is quite on a par with his other +actions. After misleading the Natal Government upon the merits of the +case, it is now discovered on the clearest and most incontrovertible +proof[112] that a formal cession was made of this disputed land to +the Transvaal Republic.” + +The special correspondent of _The Cape Argus_, however, writes about +this time as follows: “Dunn states that Cetshwayo does not, even +now, know fully the contents of the ultimatum, and still less of the +subsequent memorandum.[113] The document was read over once, and its +length was such (2222, pp. 203-9)—six pages of the Blue-book—that the +messengers could not possibly fix the whole of it in their memory.” +True, a copy was given to Dunn himself; but, for sufficient reasons +of his own, he did not make known the contents of the document in +person, but sent word to the king by his own messengers, between whom +and the indunas there was a considerable discrepancy. According to +Dunn, Cetshwayo was in a great fury upon hearing the word of the High +Commissioner (? as to the maintenance of Boer “private rights” over +his land). He reproached his adviser with having thwarted his purpose +to exact satisfaction at the hands of the Dutch, and doubly blamed +him for having represented the English as just in their intercourse +and friendly in their intentions. Until this time he had thought, as +Dunn himself had, that the congregation of troops upon his borders +represented nothing but an idle scare. But he saw at length that the +English had thrown the bullock’s skin over his head, while they had +been devouring the tid-bits of the carcass. + +The three causes alleged in the ultimatum for war—the raid of +Sihayo’s sons, the assault on Messrs. Smith and Deighton, and the +proceedings of Umbilini—occurred long after Sir B. Frere had been +preparing for war, in the full expectation that the Border Commission +would decide against the Zulu claims, and that Cetshwayo would not +acquiesce peacefully in such a decision. It would seem, indeed, from +his remarks on the subject (Correspondence, Letters II. and IV.), +that he would have even set aside the decision of the Commissioners, +if he had found it possible to do so. Although he failed in doing +this, he sought to attain practically the same end by means of a +remarkable “memorandum,” prepared and signed by himself—not submitted +to Sir Henry Bulwer, but “_prematurely_” published in the Natal +newspapers. + +The memorandum in question was on the appointment of a Resident in +Zululand, and, as Sir Bartle Frere himself says, “it was intended to +explain for Cetshwayo’s benefit what was the nature of the cession +to him of the ceded territory,” and it contained the following +clause: “It is intended that in that district (the late disputed +territory) individual rights of property, which were obtained under +the Transvaal Government, shall be respected and maintained, so +that any Transvaal farmers, who obtained rights from the Government +of the Republic, and who may now elect to remain on the territory, +may possess under British guarantee the same rights they would have +possessed had they been grantees holding from the Zulu king under the +guarantee of the great Zulu council.” + +The _whole_ of the disputed territory had been apportioned in farms +to Transvaal subjects, and without doubt every one of these farms +would immediately be claimed, since their value would be immensely +raised by the fact that in future they would be held “under British +guarantee.” Therefore, to thus maintain the farmers upon them without +regard to the wishes of the Zulu king and nation was simply to take +away piecemeal with one hand what had just been given as a whole with +the other. + +This “memorandum” was hailed with triumph by some of the colonial +papers, and the news that, after all, the Zulus were to get no solid +satisfaction from the award, soon circulated amongst all classes, not +excluding the Zulus themselves. + +It was upon this subject that the “Correspondence” between Sir Bartle +Frere and the Bishop of Natal, already referred to, commenced. In +December, 1878, the High Commissioner was good enough to invite +the Bishop, both by message and personally, to “criticise” his +policy towards the Zulus. The invitation, indeed, came far too +late for any arguments or information, which the Bishop might be +able to afford, to be of the very slightest use. However, the High +Commissioner desired criticism, and received it in a series of +letters, which—except the last two, withheld for some reason best +known to himself—were published, with Sir B. Frere’s replies, in the +Blue-books. + +The Bishop pointed out that, under the interpretation of this +memorandum, “the award gives back the land in name only to the Zulus, +whereas in reality Ketshwayo will have no control over it; he will +not be able to exercise authority over his own people living on it, +without coming into collision immediately with their Boer masters, +who would fiercely resent any intrusion on his part on their farms; +he will not be able to send any of his people to live on it, or any +of his cattle to graze on it, or even to assign places in it to such +of his people as may elect to move from the Boer to the Zulu side +of the new boundary.”[114] To which Sir Bartle replies, that he had +“a strong impression[115] that, if Cetshwayo were simply told the +disputed land was assigned to him, he would at once conclude that it +was his in full Zulu sovereignty;” which he assumed to be impossible +with regard to any land which had once been under the British flag, +while to eject a settler who had bought the land from the Transvaal +Government, in the belief that it could maintain him upon it, he +regarded as an “unjust and immoral act.” In point of fact, the land +in question could only have been looked upon as “under the British +flag,” in trust for the rightful possessors, and the farmers had +settled upon it in the full knowledge that the title to it was in +dispute; while, even had it been otherwise as to the latter point, +the only just claim that could be raised would be against the Boer +Government, or its representative, and certainly not against the +right of the Zulu people to be restored to actual occupation of the +land. + +But that from the first, and long before he left Capetown for Natal, +the High Commissioner was preparing for war with the Zulus, is +evident from his despatch and telegram of January 26th, 1878 (quoted +from at page 179), in the former of which he speaks of the delay +caused by the border inquiry being no disadvantage, as, besides other +reasons, it “will increase our means of defending whatever we may +find to be our unquestionable rights;” and in the latter he says +again: “I hope the delay caused will not be great, and whatever there +is will have compensating advantages, for I have some hopes of being +able to strengthen your hands.” + +These phrases, indeed, might merely refer to Sir Bartle Frere’s +desire to be “ready to defend ourselves against further +aggressions;” but certain statements made by Commodore Sullivan show +that he had already in view the invasion of Zululand. + +Extracts from these statements run as follows: + +“I am informed by the Governor (Sir B. Frere) that there is every +chance of hostility in the debateable land between the Transvaal, +Zululand, and Natal.”—December 16th, 1877 (2000, p. 45). + +“His Excellency (Sir B. Frere) pointed out to me that, as it appeared +almost certain that serious complications must shortly arise with the +Zulu tribe of Kafirs on the borders of Natal and the Transvaal, which +will necessitate active operations, he considered it better that the +_Active_ should remain here, in order to render such assistance by +sea and land as may be practicable.”—April 12th, 1878 (2144, p. 32). + +“The object of my visit here was ... to make myself acquainted +with such points on the (Zulu) coast as might be available for +co-operating with Her Majesty’s land forces by landing troops or +stores.[116] + +“It had been my intention (abandoned by Sir H. Bulwer’s desire) to +have examined the north of the Tugela River both by land and sea, +also a reported landing-place situated almost thirty miles eastward +of the Tugela by sea.” + +The High Commissioner was plainly determined not to allow the Zulus +the slightest _law_, which, indeed, was wise in the interests of war, +as there was considerable fear that, in spite of all grievances and +vexations, Cetshwayo, knowing full well, as he certainly did, that +collision with the English must eventually result in his destruction, +might prefer half a loaf to no bread, and submit to our exactions +with what grace he could. And so probably he would; for, from all +accounts, every effort was made by the king to collect the fines of +cattle, to propitiate the Government. + +Sir Bartle Frere, accordingly, was very particular in requesting Sir +Henry Bulwer to give Cetshwayo notice (C. 2222, p. 222) that “_rigid +punctuality with regard to time will be insisted on, and, unless +observed, such steps as may appear necessary will be immediately +taken to ensure compliance_,” which Sir H. Bulwer notifies to the +Zulu king upon the same day, December 16th (C. 2308, p. 31). + +Two days later Mr. John Dunn wrote to say that he had received a +message from the king (2222, p. 227), requesting him “to write and +say that he agrees to the demands of giving up Sihayo’s sons and +brother, and the fines of cattle; but begs that, should the number +of days (twenty) have expired before the arrival of the cattle, His +Excellency will take no immediate action, as, owing to the many +heavy rains[117] we have had since the meeting of His Excellency’s +Commissioners and his indunas, they have not been able to reach him +yet; and Sihayo’s sons being at their kraals, which are some way from +him, it will take some days to send for them.” + +“On the other demands he will give his answer on consulting his +indunas.” + +Yet Sir Bartle Frere declares (P. P. [C. 2454] p. 136) that Cetshwayo +“was resolved on war rather than on compliance with any demand of +ours.” + +Bishop Schreuder’s opinion, reported through Mr. Fannin on December +22nd (2308, p. 31), was that all the demands would be agreed to +except that of the disbandment of the army and the abolition of the +military system. “The king and nation will consider it a humiliation, +and a descent from their proud position as independent Zulus to +the lower and degrading position of Natal Kafirs, to agree to this +demand. I asked,” says Mr. Fannin, “if the announcement that the +restriction on marriage would be removed would not reconcile the +young men to the change. He (Bishop Schreuder) thinks not; they will +stand by their king, and fight for the old institutions of their +country.” + +The king’s request for some indulgence as to time was peremptorily +refused, and was looked upon as “a pitiful evasion,” on the grounds +that he had already had four months to consider the question of +Sihayo’s sons. In point of fact, however, the first “demand” had only +been made a week before, and, until then, the word “request” having +been used, the king was at liberty to offer atonement for the offence +other than the surrender of the offenders, as Sir Henry Bulwer +himself suggested (2222, p. 173), by paying a fine of five thousand +head of cattle from the Zulu nation. + +Sir B. Frere’s answer to Cetshwayo through Mr. Dunn (2222, p. 227) +was, “That the word of Government as already given, cannot now be +altered. + +“Unless the prisoners and cattle are given up within the term +specified, Her Majesty’s troops will advance. But in consideration +of the disposition expressed in Mr. Dunn’s letter to comply with the +demands of Government, the troops will be halted at convenient posts +within the Zulu border, and will there await the expiration of the +term of thirty days without, in the meantime, taking any hostile +action unless it is provoked by the Zulus.” + +And John Dunn adds on his own account (2308, p. 34), that the +king evidently does not attach sufficient importance to the time +stipulated. The cattle, he said, “are still being collected, and it +will be impossible now for them to be up in time.” John Dunn in the +same letter put in a petition on behalf of his own cattle and people, +saying that the latter would be willing to join in with any force +should they be required. + +Meanwhile, from accounts given by Mr. Fannin (2308, pp. 35 and 37), +by Mr. Robson (2242, pp. 11, 12) (2308, p. 35), by Mr. Fynney (2308, +p. 36), and from other sources, it is plain that Cetshwayo was doing +his utmost to collect the required cattle in time, though hampered +in doing so by the extreme difficulty of complying in a hurry with +the other demands implying such radical changes in the administration +of the country, and exceedingly distressed at the turn affairs were +taking. Every report shows plainly enough that, far from desiring +war, and looking out for an opportunity to try their strength with +the English, the Zulu king and people, or the major part of it, were +thrown into utmost consternation by the menacing appearance of their +hitherto friendly neighbours. But all explanations were disregarded, +all requests for time treated as impudent pretexts, preparations on +our part for an invasion of Zululand were hurried on, while every +sign of agitation (the natural consequences of our own attitude) on +the other side of the border was construed into an intention on the +part of the Zulu king to attack Natal, and urged as an added reason +for our beginning hostilities. There were, at that time, no grounds +whatsoever for this supposition. It is plain enough that, when it +became apparent that war would be forced upon him by us, the Zulu +king contemplated nothing but self-defence, and that, during these +preliminaries to the unhappy campaign of 1879, there were numerous +occasions on which, by the exercise of a little patience, justice, +and moderation, any ruler less bent on conquering Zululand than was +Sir Bartle Frere could have brought matters to a peaceful issue, +without the loss of honour, men, and money which England has since +sustained. + +Lord Chelmsford (then Lieut.-General the Hon. F. Thesiger) arrived +in Natal in August, 1878, and at once began his preparations for +the expected campaign. One of the measures upon which great stress +was laid was that of forming a native contingent to act with the +British troops. The original scheme for the organisation of this +contingent in case of necessity had been prepared and carefully +worked out by Colonel Durnford, R.E., and was based on his thorough +knowledge of the natives. During the eight years of his life in South +Africa he had had ample opportunity of learning, by experience, how +utterly and mischievously useless was the plan, hitherto invariably +followed, of employing disorganised, untrained bodies of natives as +troops under their own leaders, without any proper discipline or +control. The bravest men in the world would be apt to fail under such +circumstances; while mere bands of untaught savages, unaccustomed to +fighting and half-armed, had repeatedly proved themselves in former +campaigns excellent for running away, but otherwise useless except as +messengers, servants, and camp-followers. Added to which there was +no possibility of preventing such “troops” as these committing every +sort of lawless violence upon the wounded or captured enemy. + +Colonel Durnford’s scheme was intended to meet both difficulties, +and, when laid before the General on his arrival in Natal, met with +his unqualified approval. So much was he struck with it that he was +at first disposed to entrust the organisation and chief command of +the entire contingent to one who, by the ability and completeness +with which he had worked out the scheme, proved himself the fittest +person to carry it out, and take command of the whole force. But the +General changed his mind, and decided to divide the native contingent +amongst the various columns, the details of its distribution being as +follows: + +The 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent of three battalions +(Commandant Montgomery, Major Bengough, and Captain Cherry), and +five troops mounted natives formed No. 2 Column, commanded by +Lieut.-Colonel Durnford. + +The 2nd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (two battalions, under +Major Graves) was attached to No. 1 Column, commanded by Colonel +Pearson. + +The 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (two battalions, under +Commandant Lonsdale) was attached to No. 3 Column, commanded by +Colonel Glyn, and about two hundred Natal Native Contingent were +attached to No. 4 Column, commanded by Colonel Wood. + +Each battalion of Native Contingent was to consist of 5 staff and +90 officers and non-commissioned officers (white), and 110 officers +and non-commissioned officers and 900 privates (natives); the +native non-commissioned officer being armed with a gun, and being a +section-leader of 9 men armed with assegai and shield. + +Lord Chelmsford speaks in various despatches (C. 2234) of this Native +Contingent in the following terms: + +“The Lieut.-Governor, I am happy to say, has acceded to the request +I made some little time ago for the services of six thousand Natal +natives. I hope to be in a position to equip and officer them very +shortly” (p. 25). + +“At the time of my arrival in the colony, three months ago, these +natives possessed no military organisation, nor had any arms provided +for them by Government.” + +“The Natal Government have within the last fourteen days allowed me +to raise and organise seven thousand natives for service within or +without the border” (p. 26). + +“The arrival of these officers (special service officers from +England) has also enabled me to place Imperial officers in command of +some of the battalions of native levies.”... + +“The Natal Contingent consists of three regiments, two of two +battalions and one of three” (p. 39). + +“There are in addition five troops of mounted natives and three +companies of pioneers.”... + +“The pioneers have been raised, officered, and equipped under the +orders of the Natal Government, and are now placed at my disposal. +The remainder of the Contingent have been raised at the cost and +under the orders of the Imperial authorities” (p. 40). + +In none of his despatches is there mention of any special officer +in connection with this native force, but the following officers +were responsible for the organisation of the various regiments: No. +1 Regiment and mounted contingent, Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E.; +No. 2 Regiment, Major Graves; No. 3 Regiment, Commandant Lonsdale. +Great difficulties appear to have been thrown in the way of the +proper equipment, etc. of the native levies; but by untiring effort +and personal determination, better arrangements for pay, clothing, +and discipline were made for (at all events, a portion of) the levy +than had been known amongst South African troops. The indiscriminate +appointment of officers caused considerable trouble, illustrative +of which we may mention an anecdote. Men were repeatedly sent to +Lieut.-Colonel Durnford with orders from the military secretary +that they were to receive commissions, some of these unfitted by +disposition and education for the duties required of them. A friend +has lately furnished an instance very much to the point. “A young +fellow came one day to Colonel Durnford from Colonel Crealock, who +said he had served in the old colony, and boasted that _he_ knew how +to make Kafirs fight. ‘How is that?’ was the inquiry made. ‘Oh!’ +replied the youth, ‘just to get behind them with a sjambok (_i.e._ +whip)—that’s the way to do it!’ ‘All right,’ replied the Colonel +quietly; ‘I have just one piece of advice to give you though—_make +your will_ before you start! If you’re not stabbed by your own men, +you will deserve it.’” + +How successful was the training of the men of the 2nd Column may +be judged by the behaviour of the “Natal Native Horse,” a body of +mounted men (Basuto, Edendale, and Zikali natives) who fought at +Isandhlwana; and did right good service throughout the campaign.[118] +He also raised, equipped, and trained the three companies of Native +Pioneers, organising two field-parks, and providing complete bridge +equipment for crossing the Tugela; besides preparing, mainly from +his own personal observations (having been at Ulundi in 1873, and in +Zululand on many occasions), the map of Zululand in universal use +during the campaign, and mentioned in despatches as “Durnford’s map.” + +In reply to Sir Bartle Frere’s inquiries as to proposed movements of +troops up to Natal, Sir H. Bulwer writes, July 18th, 1878, that in +his opinion “it is desirable under the present circumstances, and +pending the final decision in the matter of the boundary dispute, to +avoid as much as possible any military demonstration, as liable to +be misunderstood and to be interpreted as showing our intention to +settle the question by force. The delay, too, that has occurred since +the sitting of the Commission might be attributed by the Zulu king to +our desire to make preparations, and it might be thought that we were +playing false.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] p. 395). + +And here we may appropriately refer to the opinion expressed by the +Home Government at a later date. + +Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes to Sir B. Frere, 21st November, 1878: +“I trust that ... Cetywayo may have been informed that a decision +regarding the disputed boundary would speedily be communicated to +him. His complaint that the Lieut.-Governor of Natal ‘is hiding from +him the answer that has come from across the sea, about the land +boundary question, and is only making an excuse for taking time, so +as to surprise him,’ is not altogether an unnatural one for a native +chief situated in his circumstances, who is necessarily ignorant of +much that has passed on this subject, and of many of the causes to +which the delay is attributable. But it is a misunderstanding which +it should be the earnest endeavour of the Government to remove, and I +am confident that there is no need to impress upon you the importance +of losing no time in dealing with this question or the beneficial +effect which its satisfactory settlement may be expected to have upon +the strained relations which you describe as now existing between +the colony of Natal and the Zulu nation.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] p. 322). + +We must now briefly run through the principal points in despatches +bearing on the question of increasing the military strength in Natal. + +Sir B. Frere, writing from Cape Town on September 10th, says: “I +have consulted General Thesiger on the subject. He is very unwilling +to ask for reinforcements on the Natal border without the full +concurrence of the Government of that colony, and I understand that +His Excellency Sir H. Bulwer is specially anxious that nothing should +be done in Natal which could possibly justify to the Zulu chief +the belief that we were preparing for active hostilities against +him. I confess that, as at present informed, I very imperfectly +comprehend the grounds on which the objections of His Excellency the +Lieut.-Governor, as I understand them, to strengthening the Natal +frontier are based.[119] They will doubtless be more fully explained +when I have the advantage of personal communication with him. In +the meantime I feel quite certain that the preservation or speedy +restoration of peace will be rendered much more certain if General +Thesiger had two more battalions of Her Majesty’s Army within his +reach.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] pp. 282, 283). + +On September 14th, referring to the above despatch, Sir B. Frere +says he has “since received a telegraphic communication from +General Thesiger, in which he expresses his views in regard to his +military requirements in the event of hostilities breaking out with +the Zulus.” The General asks for six more special duty officers, +and fifteen captains or subalterns for transport duties. “General +Thesiger considers that an addition of two regiments would be +essential, and that the presence of a cavalry regiment would be of +enormous advantage” (_ibid._ p. 254). + +From Durban, Sir B. Frere telegraphs on September 23rd to Sir +M. Hicks-Beach: “I find that the urgency of supporting General +Thesiger’s request is much greater even than I supposed. I trust +there will be no delay in complying with his request to its fullest +extent” (_ibid._ p. 255). + +There had been serious and disturbing reports of a Zulu force being +assembled on the Tugela River, for the ostensible purpose of hunting, +with reference to which Sir H. Bulwer writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, +14th September, “on the subject of the gathering of a Zulu force +within a short distance of our border across the Tugela. You will +learn from these papers that the gathering has broken up, and the +Zulus returned home” (_ibid._ p. 270). + +Sir M. Hicks-Beach, on October 17th, replies to Sir B. Frere’s +despatches of 14th and 23rd September, that “arrangements will be +made for the early despatch of some additional officers for special +duty. Her Majesty’s Government are, however, not prepared to comply +with the request for a reinforcement of troops. All the information +that has hitherto reached them with respect to the position of +affairs in Zululand appears to them to justify a confident hope that, +by the exercise of prudence, and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of +forbearance and reasonable compromise, it will be possible to avert +the very serious evil of a war with Cetywayo; and they cannot but +think that the forces now at your disposal in South Africa, together +with the additional officers about to be sent, should suffice to meet +any other emergency that may arise, without a further increase to the +Imperial troops” (_ibid._ p. 273). + +On September 30th, Sir B. Frere writes from Pietermaritzburg: “I +regret that I find the position of affairs in this colony far more +critical even than I expected;” and, after a very exaggerated +description of the state of affairs, he says: “An attempt of native +tribes to combine to resist the white man and drive him back has +been long foreseen. There can be no doubt that this design is now in +process of attempted execution” (_ibid._ pp. 278-82). + +Of the truth of this startling assertion, let Sir H. Bulwer’s +despatches, as well as after-events, speak. + +Enclosed in this despatch of Sir B. Frere is General Thesiger’s +memorandum on the military requirements, and his sketch for a +defensive scheme for Natal, for which he requires “6000 natives, 600 +mounted men, 6 guns, and 3 battalions of British infantry;” but he +remarks: “I cannot, however, conceal from myself that security from +invasion depends almost entirely upon the forbearance of Cetywayo;” +and says, “for defensive purposes alone, therefore, Natal and +Transvaal colonies require 3 battalions of infantry in addition to +what they have already got” (_ibid._ pp. 285, 286). + +In reply, Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes, 21st November: “The several +circumstances which you have reported as tending to cause an open +rupture do not appear, in themselves, to present any difficulties +which are not capable of a peaceful solution.... On a full review, +therefore, of all the circumstances reported by you, and influenced +by the strong representations made by Lord Chelmsford as to the +insufficiency of his present force to ensure the safety of the +European residents in Natal and the Transvaal, Her Majesty’s +Government have felt themselves justified in directing that further +reinforcements of troops, as well as the additional officers recently +placed under orders for special service, should be sent out to Natal, +and the necessary steps will at once be taken for this purpose. But +in conveying to you the decision at which, in compliance with your +urgent representations, Her Majesty’s Government have arrived, it is +my duty to impress upon you that in supplying these reinforcements it +is the desire of Her Majesty’s Government not to furnish means for a +campaign of invasion and conquest, but to afford such protection as +may be necessary at this juncture to the lives and property of the +colonists. Though the present aspect of affairs is menacing in a high +degree, I can by no means arrive at the conclusion that war with the +Zulus should be unavoidable, and I am confident that you, in concert +with Sir H. Bulwer, will use every effort to overcome the existing +difficulties by judgment and forbearance, and to avoid an evil so +much to be deprecated as a Zulu war” (_ibid._ pp. 320, 321). + +On November 11th, the Lieut.-General says that he has just been +permitted by the Natal Government to raise and organise 7000 +natives, and ventures “to express an opinion that the demand for +two extra battalions cannot be considered unreasonable even for +purely defensive purposes;” but he goes on to say: “a defensive plan, +however, cannot be considered as satisfactory unless there is the +possibility of taking the offensive at the right moment. This I am +doing my best to prepare for; and, so soon as my native contingent is +mobilised, I shall be ready, so far as my limited means will allow, +to enter Zululand, should such a measure become necessary.”—(P. P. +[C. 2222] p. 19). + +On December 18th, Sir M. Hicks-Beach says: “I take this occasion, +however, of reminding you that it is the desire of Her Majesty’s +Government, in sending these reinforcements, to assist the local +Government as far as possible in providing for the protection of the +settlers in the present emergency, and not to furnish the means for +any aggressive operations not directly connected with the defence of +Her Majesty’s possessions and subjects” (_ibid._ p. 21). + +On December 2nd, Sir B. Frere forwards copies of memoranda by Sir T. +Shepstone and Mr. Brownlee, in which the former proposes measures +which “involve the extinction of the Zulu power as it now is, and +the attempt to adopt them must, if decided upon, be made with the +knowledge that the Zulu chief will oppose them, whatever course the +headmen and common people may adopt” (_ibid._ p. 134). + +Mr. Brownlee says plainly: “The time has arrived for decisive action; +we will never again have so favourable an opportunity as the present; +if it is lost, sooner or later we will be taken at a disadvantage” +(_ibid._ p. 138). + +On December 10th, Sir B. Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach: “The +chance of avoiding war under such circumstances by any exercise of +prudence, or by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance or +reasonable compromise, may depend upon ourselves or upon the Zulus, +or upon the nature of the issues pending between us.... Can we then +rest on an armed truce?... After the most anxious consideration, I +can arrive at no other conclusion than that it is impossible to evade +the necessity for now settling this Zulu question thoroughly and +finally ... there is clearly no possibility of now evading bringing +matters to an issue with the Zulus” (_ibid._ pp. 183-85). + +On the 23rd January, 1879, Sir M. Hicks-Beach acknowledges the +receipt of Sir B. Frere’s despatches containing “the demands with +which Cetywayo has been called upon to comply, together with your +own descriptions of the situation with which you have to deal, as +well as other very important memoranda by Sir H. Bulwer, Sir T. +Shepstone, and Mr. Brownlee,” and says, “I may observe that the +communications which had previously been received from you had not +entirely prepared them” (Her Majesty’s Government) “for the course +which you have deemed it necessary to take. The representations +made by Lord Chelmsford and yourself last autumn as to the urgent +need of strengthening Her Majesty’s forces in South Africa were +based upon the imminent danger of an invasion of Natal by the Zulus, +and the inadequate means at that time at your disposal for meeting +it. In order to afford protection to the lives and property of the +colonists, the reinforcements asked for were supplied, and, in +informing you of the decision of Her Majesty’s Government, I took +the opportunity of impressing upon you the importance of using every +effort to avoid war. But the terms which you have dictated to the +Zulu king, however necessary to relieve the colony in future from +an impending and increasing danger, are evidently such as he may +not improbably refuse, even at the risk of war; and I regret that +the necessity for immediate action should have appeared to you so +imperative as to preclude you from incurring the delay which would +have been involved in consulting Her Majesty’s Government upon a +subject of so much importance as the terms which Cetywayo should be +required to accept before those terms were actually presented to the +Zulu king” (_ibid._ pp. 187, 188). + +The preliminary arrangements for the campaign were the formation of +four columns, with sufficient transport, etc. to enter Zululand at +different points, and concentrate on Ulundi. + +No. 1 Column, Colonel Pearson, to assemble on the Lower Tugela, +garrison Fort Pearson, and cross and encamp on the Zulu side, under +the protection of the guns of the fort. + +This Column at first was composed of 2 guns Royal Artillery, 1 +company Royal Engineers, 2nd Battalion “The Buffs,” 99th Regiment, +Naval Brigade (2 guns and 1 Gatling), 1 squadron Mounted Infantry, +about 200 Natal Volunteers, 2nd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (2 +battalions), and 1 company Natal Native Pioneers. + +No. 2 Column, Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E., to cover the Tugela, and +co-operate with Colonel Pearson, was almost entirely composed of +natives. Its strength, a rocket battery, 1st Regiment (3 battalions) +Natal Native Contingent, 315 “Natal Native Horse,” and 1 company +Natal Native Pioneers. + +No. 3 Column, Colonel Glyn, C.B., to cross at Rorke’s Drift, when +the time granted the Zulu king had expired. “On the advance being +ordered,” it would “require two days for this column to reach a good +military position;” and it was to keep up communications “with the +columns on the left and right.” Strength of column, 6 guns Royal +Artillery, 1 squadron Mounted Infantry, 1-24th Regiment, 2-24th +Regiment, about 200 Natal Volunteers, 150 Mounted Police, and 3rd +Regiment (2nd Battalion) Natal Native Contingent, also one company +Natal Native Pioneers. A company of Royal Engineers was ordered to +join this column. + +No. 4 Column, Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B., to advance to the Blood +River. Strength, 6 guns Royal Artillery, 1-13th Regiment, 90th +Regiment, Frontier Light Horse, some 200 Native Contingent; and a +small Dutch force was expected to join this column. + +A 5th Column (which had been operating against Sekukuni) was under +the command of Colonel Rowlands, V.C., C.B., composed of the 80th +Regiment, three guns, and mounted irregulars. + +The strength of the columns is given as: + + Imperial Native Conductors + and Contingent. and Waggons and Carts. + Colonial Troops. Drivers. + + No. 1 Column 1872 2256 238 266 (144 hired) + ” 2 ” 5 3488 84 30 + ” 3 ” 1747 2566 293 233 (82 ” ) + ” 4 ” 1843 387 162 102 (21 ” ) + ” 5 ” 1202 338 25 62 (50 ” ) + +Forming a grand total of + + Imperial Native Conductors, Waggons, etc. + and Contingent. etc. + Colonial Troops. + + 6669 9035 802 693 + (of which 297 were hired) + +with about 1200 horses belonging to cavalry, etc., and 691 horses, +361 mules, and 5231 oxen. In addition, there were the conductors, +drivers, etc., and 4572 oxen of the hired waggons. + +The columns to operate on the following bases and lines: + + No. 1. Durban—Lower Tugela. + ” 2. Pietermaritzburg, Greytown—Middle Drift (Tugela). + ” 3. Ladysmith—Rorke’s Drift (Buffalo River). + ” 4. Newcastle—Utrecht—Blood River. + ” 5. Middleburg—Derby—Pongolo River. + +Ulundi being the objective point of the force. + +In place of any urgent necessity for commencing the war, putting +political questions on one side, there were strong military reasons +for postponing it. + +Sir Bartle Frere, in his despatch of 30th June, 1879 (P. P. [C. 2454] +p. 137), seeks to prove that the time of moving across the border +was “well chosen,” and accorded with information received, yet the +fact remains that advice _was_ given that the most favourable time +for military operations in Zululand was between the periods of summer +rains and winter grass-fires—_i.e._ the months of March, April, +and May. In spite of Sir Bartle Frere’s pleas, we must hold that +no competent “military critic” would recommend invading an enemy’s +country during the rainy season, when rivers are in flood, plains in +many cases marshes, and roads almost impassable; especially if the +invading forces were required to move with a ponderous waggon-train. + +Lord Chelmsford himself proves the case: he writes (January 12th) +on the day after crossing the border: “The country is in a terrible +state from the rain, and I do not know how we shall manage to get our +waggons across the valley near Sirayo’s kraals.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. +43). + +And again on January 14th, from the head-quarter camp, Zululand, near +Rorke’s Drift, he writes: “Between this camp and Greytown alone, a +distance of some seventy miles, three rivers are now impassable, and +waggons have to cross by ferries, a laborious operation requiring +more skilled labour than we at present have available. + +“The road at various points requires the most constant supervision, +and in some parts the heavy rain frequently dislodges huge boulders +from the hill-sides overhanging the roadway, and in many places +watercourses become torrents after an hour’s rain. + +“Beyond this camp towards the Izipezi Hill (my first objective point) +the road will require great labour to make it passable; but strong +working-parties have already been at work. The transport difficulties +are augmented by the great mortality in oxen; this is inevitable, but +it will probably decrease in a few weeks’ time” (_ibid._ p. 47). + +It is believed that the first project of operations was to advance +in three lines on Ulundi—from the Lower Tugela, Rorke’s Drift, and +Blood River—the columns to move forward by short marches, entrenching +strongly at each halting-place, doing no injury to the Zulu people, +and thus inducing them to submit quietly. This wise and consistent +idea was unfortunately never even attempted. + +On the 8th January, 1879, Lord Chelmsford writes: “All the reports +which reach me tend to show that the Zulus intend, if possible, to +make raids into Natal[120] when the several columns move forward.... +The strength of the three columns, Nos. 1, 3, and 4, is only just +sufficient to enable them to advance.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 26). + +The directions for the various columns were, briefly—No. 1. To cross +the Tugela at Fort Pearson and encamp on the Zulu side; when ordered +to advance, to move on Etshowe, and there, or in its neighbourhood, +to form a depôt, well entrenched. + +No. 2. To form a portion of No. 1 Column, but act separately, +reporting to Colonel Pearson; to remain on the Middle Tugela frontier +till an advance is ordered, and Colonel Pearson has reached Etshowe. + +The defence of the frontier was to rest with the Colonial Government; +but on the 8th January the General altered the instructions for No. 2 +Column, and directed two-thirds of it to move up to the Sand Spruit +Valley for the protection of the Umsinga border, and to operate in +conjunction with No. 3 Column. The third battalion to remain at +Middle Drift. + +No. 3 Column to cross at Rorke’s Drift when the thirty days expired; +to move forward and form an advanced depôt, strongly entrenched, +as found advisable from the nature of the country, etc. To assist +in clearing the border south-east of Rorke’s Drift, and to keep up +communication with the columns on left and right. + +No. 4 Column to advance to the Blood River. “The civil authorities +on the border will take every care to warn the Zulus that our first +advance need not be deemed hostile, but that no collection of armed +natives in the vicinity of our forces can be permitted; no act on our +part to unnecessarily bring on hostilities should be permitted.”—(P. +P. [C. 2222] p. 223). + +In the event of a further advance, the advanced depôt of this column +to be near the intersection of the roads from Utrecht to Ulundi, +and Rorke’s Drift to Swaziland; but “to delay its advance toward +the Umvolosi River until the border is cleared, and to move in a +southerly direction towards Colonel Glyn’s column to assist it +against Sirayo.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] pp. 27, 28). + +On January 11th, the General met Colonel Wood, and arranged with +him that he should “occupy himself with the tribes in his front and +left flank,” till the General was “ready to advance to Izipezi Hill” +(_ibid._ p. 42). + +By this unfortunate change of plan, the left of No. 3 Column was +exposed, of which the Zulus took fatal advantage. + +We must now return to Sir Bartle Frere, who, considering that +he had “exhausted all peaceable means for obtaining redress for +the past, and security for the future,” “by a notification dated +the 4th of January, 1879, placed in the hands of Lieut.-General +Lord Chelmsford, K.C.B., commanding Her Majesty’s forces in South +Africa, the further enforcement of all demands;” and remarks, “it +only remains for us to await the issue with perfect confidence in +the justice of our cause. The contest has not been provoked by the +British Government. That Government has done its best to avoid war +by every means consistent with honour.” An absolute truth as regards +the Home Government. “_That_” Government, as Sir B. Frere cleverly +remarks, “_had_ done its best to avoid war,” and did not see the +necessity, or, at all events, the immediate necessity, of that war +into which its servant, contrary to its instructions, plunged it. + +The period allowed to Cetshwayo having expired, on the 11th January, +1879, the following notification was published in both English and +Zulu: + + NOTIFICATION. + + _January 11th, 1879._ + + The British forces are crossing into Zululand to exact from + Cetywayo reparation for violations of British territory committed + by the sons of Sirayo and others; and to enforce compliance with + the promises, made by Cetywayo at his coronation, for the better + government of his people. + + The British Government has no quarrel with the Zulu people. All + Zulus who come in unarmed, or who lay down their arms, will be + provided for till the troubles of their country are over; and + will then, if they please, be allowed to return to their own + land; but all who do not so submit will be dealt with as enemies. + + When the war is finished, the British Government will make the + best arrangements in its power for the future good government of + the Zulus in their own country, in peace and quietness, and will + not permit the killing and oppression they have suffered from + Cetywayo to continue. + + H. B. E. FRERE, + _High Commissioner_. + +(This is followed by a translation in the Zulu language.) + +“This,” Sir B. Frere says, is “a message to the Zulu population which +the General will make as widely known as possible.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] +p. 24). + +On December 29th, Mr. Fynney, Border Agent, writes at the request +of the Lieut.-General Commanding to the Lieut.-Governor of Natal +that the General “has taken the opportunity offered by the return of +Sintwangu and Umpepa to send the following message to the Zulu king: + +“‘That, in the event of the cattle demanded as a fine, together with +Sirayo’s sons and brother, not being delivered before the expiration +of the time allowed, Her Majesty’s troops will occupy Zulu territory +without delay. + +“‘2. That no forward movement into Zululand will be made till the +expiration of the thirty days; but at the end of that time, if all +the demands are not complied with, the troops will advance. + +“‘3. That such advance will not be directed against the Zulu nation, +but against the king, who has broken the promises he made at his +coronation. So that in the event of hostilities, all Zulu subjects +willing to lay down their arms, and wishing to take refuge in British +territory, will be fed and protected till such time as peace is +restored, when they will be at liberty to return to their homes; but +that all who remain in Zululand will be considered as enemies. + +“‘5. That these are His Excellency’s instructions, which he intends +to carry out to the best of his ability.’” (P. P. [C. 2308] p. 39). + +On the 11th January, Lord Chelmsford, with No. 3 Column, crossed +the Buffalo River at Rorke’s Drift, the infantry crossing on a +barrel-raft, a punt, and a small boat; the cavalry and natives by a +ford lower down the river. The force encamped in the Zulu country +where it crossed. + +The General, with the cavalry, rode to the left to meet Colonel +Wood—commanding No. 4 Column, which was at Bemba’s Kop—about +thirty-five miles off. They met about halfway. Colonel Wood, on his +return, commenced operations against the Zulus by seizing some 2000 +cattle belonging to Inkomi and Sihayo, the Zulus only making “a show +of resistance.” In addition to this, Colonel Wood reports, on the +13th January, that he had also captured 2000 or 3000 head of cattle +from the Sondolosi tribe, and on the same day an attack was made on a +petty chief, Mbuna, whose men refused to disarm, and seven Zulus were +killed.—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 45). + +Colonel Wood crossed the Blood River on the 6th January, and here we +must leave No. 4 Column for the present. + +No. 1 Column had some difficulty in effecting the passage of the +Tugela, the river being in flood. The fortunes of this column will be +followed in a future chapter. + +Colonel Durnford, No. 2 Column, reported to the General (on his +return to camp on the 11th) that the country in his front was quite +quiet. He then returned to his command with further instructions as +to its disposition, when “he and the mounted men and rocket battery +were to join me with No. 3 Column,” writes the General on January +14th.—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 47). + +On the 11th, the General writes: “Both Colonel Wood and Major Russell +took a good number of Sirayo’s cattle this morning, which we found +quietly grazing along our line of advance.” And again: “Several +hundred head of cattle, etc. were taken by Nos. 3 and 4 Columns +on the 11th. This I considered desirable on political grounds, as +they all belonged to Usirayo, as well as from military necessities” +(_ibid._ pp. 43-46). It is rather difficult to reconcile this +commencement of operations with the words “The British Government +has no quarrel with the Zulu people;” or with the General’s message +to the Zulu king (through Mr. Fynney, Border Agent, and the Zulu +messengers Sintwangu and Umpepa, December 29th, 1878) ... “if all +the demands are not complied with the troops will advance. That such +advance will not be directed against the Zulu nation, but against the +King....”—(P. P. [C. 2308] p. 39). + +On the 12th January, No. 3 Column first came into contact with the +Zulus. The General made a reconnaissance in the Bashi Valley and +towards Izipezi Hill. Sihayo’s people were seen driving the cattle +to the shelter of the hills, “as, however,” the General says, “it is +well known that we had made a distinct demand for the punishment of +the sons of this chief, and that his clan was one of the bravest and +most warlike of the Zulu nation, I considered it very desirable to +punish them at once by capturing their cattle.” + +The Ingqutu Mountain was occupied by infantry, when “a fire was +opened upon them by the Zulus, who were occupying very strong +positions in the caves and rocks above.” An officer present states +that the actual first shot was from the side of the British, but +this is not of great importance, as it is impossible to imagine the +Zulus could have been expected to look calmly on, whilst their cattle +were being captured. After about half-an-hour’s fight the cattle and +horses were taken. The mounted force was likewise engaged higher up +the mountain. Our loss, 2 Native Contingent killed and 12 wounded. +The loss inflicted on the enemy, 30 killed, 4 wounded, and 10 +prisoners; the cattle, etc. taken, 13 horses, 413 cattle, 332 goats, +and 235 sheep.—(P. P. [C. 2242] pp. 47, 48). + +These first steps in Zululand have been given in considerable detail, +as they afford much food for reflection on the contrast between +“words” and “deeds.” + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + +ISANDHLWANA. + + +Having crossed into Zululand, the “difficulties ... in the way of +those who are endeavouring to move forward into an enemy’s country, +over tracts which have never been traversed, except by a very few +traders’ waggons,”[121] began to declare themselves; and Lord +Chelmsford remarks, January 16th: “No. 3 Column at Rorke’s Drift +cannot possibly move forward even eight miles until two swamps, into +which our waggons sank up to the body, have been made passable. This +work will occupy us for at least four days, and we shall find similar +obstacles in front of us in every march we are anxious to make.” + +We find Lord Chelmsford, on January 27th, stating: “The country is +far more difficult than I had been led to expect, and the labour of +advancing with a long train of waggons is enormous. It took seven +days hard work, by one half of No. 3 Column, to make the ten miles +of road between Rorke’s Drift and Insalwana Hill practicable, and +even then had it rained hard I feel sure that the convoy could not +have gone on. The line of communication is very much exposed, and +would require a party of mounted men always patrolling, and fixed +intrenched posts of infantry at intervals of about ten miles.”—(P. +P.—C. 2252). + +Under these circumstances we can only wonder that the advance with +cumbersome trains of waggons was undertaken, and the apparent want of +knowledge of the invaded country is almost equally surprising. All +previous experience goes to prove that a general moving in an enemy’s +country _with_ his “impedimenta” should form a defensible camp at +every halt; and this Lord Chelmsford apparently recognised when he +promulgated the “Regulations for Field Forces in South Africa;” but +we shall find how fatally he neglected the most ordinary precautions. + +A hint for the advance might well have been taken from Sir Garnet +Wolseley’s campaign in Ashantee, and the various columns moved on +Ulundi—about eighty miles—in the lightest possible order, and without +a ponderous waggon-train. Rapid movement was the more imperatively +necessary, the enemy being in force, and able to make most rapid +concentrations. Guns (7-pounders) could have been moved over very +difficult ground with comparative ease, and even carried along +piecemeal if necessary. + +The strangeness of the situation is shown plainly in Lord +Chelmsford’s despatch of the 16th January, written at Rorke’s +Drift—on the very borders of Zululand—at the very outset of the +war. Having spoken of “difficulties” (as already quoted), he says: +“Accepting the situation, therefore, it remains for me to determine +what modification of the plan of campaign at first laid down will +be necessary.” His idea still is to drive, “as far as possible, all +the Zulus forward towards the north-east part of their country,” and +“with Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Columns, to thoroughly clear or subjugate +the country ... by means of expeditions made by those columns from +certain fixed positions,” and this, he hopes, will “have the effect +of removing any dangerously large body from the Natal borders.” +Colonel Wood, with No. 4 Column, to act independently. “By these +movements,” he continues, “I hope to be able to clear that portion +of Zululand which is situated south of the Umhlatoosi River;” and +remarks that Cetshwayo will be obliged “to keep his army mobilised, +and it is certain that his troops will have difficulty in finding +sufficient food. If kept inactive, they will become dangerous to +himself; if ordered to attack us, they will be playing our game.” + +How these plans answered, one week sufficed to show. + +The first step in advance from Rorke’s Drift was to push forward +four companies of the 2-24th Regiment, a battalion of Natal Native +Contingent, and a detachment of Natal Native Pioneers into the Bashi +Valley on the 14th January, for the purpose of repairing the road. +This detachment remained encamped there until the 20th, five miles +from the remainder of the column at Rorke’s Drift, and with no +attempt at “laager” or other defence, Lord Chelmsford did not see the +need of precaution, and his instructions to the officer in command +were, “Use the bayonet” if a night attack took place. + +On the 17th the General made a reconnaissance as far as Isandhlwana; +and on January 20th No. 3 Column moved from Rorke’s Drift and Bashi +Valley, to the spot selected for the camp to the east of Isandhlwana +Hill. The post at Rorke’s Drift (where the Buffalo was crossed)—of +vital importance to the safety of the column—was left with a +garrison of one company of 1-24th Regiment, but without any attempt +whatever at entrenchment: nor were any defensive precautions taken +at Helpmakaar, the store depôt in Natal, twelve miles from Rorke’s +Drift. The march to Isandhlwana was accomplished “without much +difficulty,” but “half a battalion 2-24th was obliged to halt short +of this camp owing to the oxen being fatigued.” They bivouacked for +the night in the open. + +The position of the camp is thus described: “At the spot where our +road crossed ... we had a small kopje on the right, and then about +fifty yards to our left rises abruptly the Isandhlwana Mountain ... +entirely unapproachable from the three sides nearest us, but on the +farther, viz. that to the north, it slopes more gradually down, and +it is there connected with the large range of hills on our left with +another broad neck of land. We just crossed over the bend, then +turned sharp to the left, and placed our camp facing the valley, with +the eastern precipitous side of the mountain behind us, leaving about +a mile of open country between our left flank and the hills on our +left, the right of the camp extending across the neck of land we had +just come over, and resting on the base of the small kopje described +beforehand.” + +The camp was formed in the following order from left to right: 2-3rd +Natal Native Contingent, 1-3rd Natal Native Contingent, 2-24th +Regiment, Royal Artillery, mounted troops, and 1-24th Regiment. “The +waggons were all placed between the camp and the hill at the back, +and behind them, immediately against its base, the head-quarters’ +tents were pitched with their waggons beside them.”... “Not a single +step was taken in any way to defend our new position in case of a +night or day attack from the enemy.”[122] + +On the same day (20th) the General reconnoitred on the “waggon-track, +which skirts Inhlazatye Mountain, as far as a place called Matyana’s +Stronghold,” at a distance of about twelve miles, but saw nothing of +the enemy. “Not having time to properly examine the country round +this peculiar stronghold,” the General ordered that next day two +separate parties should move out from the camp at an early hour; one +of mounted men under Major Dartnell to reconnoitre on the road he had +taken, whilst two battalions of Native Contingent under Commandant +Lonsdale worked round the Malakata Mountain: the orders being that +these officers were to effect a communication on the Inhlazatye +range, and then return to camp.—(P. P. [C. 2252] pp. 74, 75). + +At about ten o’clock the Zulus were found in force by the mounted +men; the contingent being on a range of hills distant about five +miles. The enemy appeared anxious to fight, but Major Dartnell did +not think it prudent to engage without supports. The Zulus occupied +a large kloof, and whenever the mounted men approached they came out +in large numbers. A small body were sent up close, under Mr. Mansel, +to try and make the Zulus show their force, when they advanced +throwing out the “horns,” and tried to surround the party, following +them down into the open, where Major Dartnell and the remainder +of the mounted troops were. The whole then retired and joined the +contingent, about three miles from the kloof. + +In the evening, says Major Clery, “a message arrived from +Major Dartnell that the enemy was in considerable force in his +neighbourhood, and that he and Commandant Lonsdale would bivouac out +the night,” which they were permitted to do.[123] + +The wisdom of this may be doubted, as the Native Contingent seemed +particularly liable to alarm; twice they “were seized with panic, +rushing about everywhere, the night being very dark. They knocked +us down,” writes an officer, “and stampeded our horses, causing the +greatest confusion. If the Zulus had come on we should all have been +cut to pieces.” + +“That night Major Dartnell sent off messengers to Lord Chelmsford +that he had marked the Zulus down in a kloof, and asked for two +companies of infantry to be sent out as a support, and that he would +attack the Zulus in the morning.” + +Major Clery says:[124] “About 1.30 A.M. on the 22nd, a messenger +brought me a note from Major Dartnell to say that the enemy was +in greater numbers than when he last reported, and that he did +not think it prudent to attack unless reinforced by two or three +companies of the 24th Regiment. The General ordered the 2nd +Battalion 24th Regiment, the Mounted Infantry, and four guns, to +be under arms at once to march.” The Natal Native Pioneers, about +50 strong, accompanied the force, which “marched out from the camp +as soon as there was light enough to see the road.” Lieut.-Colonel +Pulleine, 1-24th Regiment, was instructed to take “command of the +camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn”—the force left with him +consisting of 5 companies 1-24th and 1 company 2-24th Regiment; 2 +guns Royal Artillery; about 20 Mounted Infantry and Volunteers; 30 +Natal Carbineers, 31 Mounted Police, and 4 companies Natal Native +Contingent. An order was also despatched to Colonel Durnford (at +Rorke’s Drift) to move up to Isandhlwana. Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine’s +instructions for the defence of the camp were, briefly, to draw +in his “line of defence” and “infantry outposts,” but to keep his +cavalry vedettes “still far advanced.”[125] We may here note that +the only country searched was that direct to the front and right +front—the direction of the waggon-track—although it is stated “the +Lieut.-General had himself noticed mounted men in one direction (our +left front) on the 21st, and in this direction he had _intended_ to +make a reconnaissance.” (P. P. [C. 2260] p. 99). + +After the departure of the advance column nothing unusual occurred in +camp until between seven and eight o’clock, when it was reported from +the advanced picquet (on the Ingqutu range of hills, about 1500 yards +to the north) that a body of the enemy could be seen approaching +from the north-east: and various small bodies were afterwards seen. +Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine got his men under arms, and sent a written +message off to head-quarters that a Zulu force had appeared on the +hills on his left front. This was received “between 9.30 and 10 A.M.” + +Colonel Durnford received the General’s order when on an expedition +into Natal to obtain waggons, but at once returned to Rorke’s Drift, +and marched for Isandhlwana. Lieutenant Chard, R.E., who had ridden +to camp for orders, “met Colonel Durnford about a quarter of a mile +from the camp at the head of his mounted men” about 10.30 A.M., +and told him the troops were in column outside the camp, and Zulus +showing “on the crest of the distant hills,” “several parties” +working round so far to the left that he “was afraid they might be +going to make a dash at the Drift.” He took orders to Major Russell +to hurry up with the rocket battery, to detach a company of Sikali +men to protect the baggage, and for all to “look out to the left.” + +Colonel Durnford reached the camp, and received all the information +Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine could afford, finding the situation to +be:—Lonsdale’s natives on outpost duty on the hills to the left, the +guns in position on the left of the camp, and the infantry under +arms. The oxen were driven into camp and—Mr. Brickhill says—tied to +the yokes, but not inspanned. Constant reports were coming in from +the hills to the left—“The enemy are in force behind the hills.” +“The enemy are in three columns.” “One column is moving to the left +rear, and one towards the General.” “The enemy are retiring in every +direction.” The enemy’s force was given at 400 to 600. + +On hearing these reports, Colonel Durnford sent one troop Natal +Native Horse to reinforce his baggage guard; two troops to the hills +to the left (under Captains G. Shepstone and Barton)—one to move +along the crest of the range, one to search the valley beyond—and +determined himself to go out to the front “and prevent the one column +joining the ‘impi,’ which was supposed at that time to be engaged +with the troops under the General;” he asked Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine +for two companies of the 24th, to which Colonel Pulleine replied, +“that two companies could ill be spared, but that if Colonel Durnford +ordered them, of course they should go.” On consideration, Colonel +Durnford decided only to take his own men,[126] and moved out with +his remaining two troops Natal Native Horse, followed by Major +Russell’s rocket battery, with its escort of a company of Native +Contingent, under Captain Nourse. + +A company 1-24th, under Lieutenant Cavaye, was sent out as a picquet +to the hills about 1200 yards north of the camp, and the remainder of +the troops dismissed to their private parades, where the men were to +lie down in readiness to turn out if required. At this time there +was no expectation of an attack during the day, and no idea had been +formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy.[127] + +The two troops sent on the hills to the left “to ascertain the +enemy’s movements,” had proceeded “about five miles from the camp,” +when “the Zulu army came forward, advancing straight on towards the +camp.” Captain Shepstone ordered a retreat on the camp, and himself +rode in with the warning that the “whole Zulu army was advancing to +attack it.”[128] Captain Shepstone met Captain Gardner on reaching +the camp, and both officers then went to Colonel Pulleine, but, says +Captain Gardner, the enemy were “already on the hill on our left in +large numbers.” + +Colonel Durnford, having despatched his two troops to the left, had +moved out to the front at a canter, followed at a foot’s pace by +the rocket battery, etc. About five miles out, a trooper rode down +from the hills on the left, and reported an immense “impi” behind +the hills, and almost immediately the Zulus appeared in force in +front and on the left, in skirmishing order, ten or twelve deep, +with supports close behind. They opened fire at about 800 yards, and +advanced very rapidly. Colonel Durnford retired a little way—to a +donga—and extended his men, then fell back, keeping up a steady fire, +for about two miles,[129] when he came upon the remains of the rocket +battery, which (it appeared) had turned to the left on hearing firing +on the hills, been cut off, and broken up. Fighting was still going +on here, but the Zulus were speedily driven back. + +Colonel Durnford retired slowly on the camp, disputing every yard +of ground, until he reached a donga about 800 yards in front of the +right of the camp; there, prolonging the line of the camp troops, and +the right being reinforced by between thirty and forty mounted men, +under Captain Bradstreet, a stand was made. + +“This gully,” Mr. Brickhill, interpreter to No. 3 Column, says, “the +mounted force held most tenaciously, every shot appearing to take +effect,” and with the havoc caused by the guns, “a thousand Zulu dead +must have laid between the conical hill and the gully. They lay just +like peppercorns upon the plain.” + +The two troops of native horse sent to reconnoitre the Ingqutu Hills, +retired fighting before the enemy in good order “to a crest in the +neck which joins Sandhlwana to Ingqutu. Leaving their horses well +sheltered here, they held this crest splendidly, keeping up a steady +galling fire.”[130] They were eventually compelled to retire, with +the loss of Captain G. Shepstone.[131] + +We must now consider what had taken place at the camp. All was quiet +till about twelve o’clock, when firing was heard on the hill where +the company on picquet was stationed; the troops were immediately +turned out and formed on the left front of the camp. About this +time Captain Gardner, 14th Hussars, arrived with an order from +the General, addressed to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, “to send on +the camp equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to +remain himself at his present camp and entrench it.”[132] Captain +G. Shepstone reached the camp with his warning about the same time. +Colonel Pulleine decided it was impossible to carry out the General’s +order, as the enemy were already in great force on the hills to the +left. Captain Gardner sent off a message to head-quarters, saying +that “our left was attacked by about ten thousand of the enemy. A +message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine.” + +One company (Captain Mostyn’s) was moved up to support the picquet; +the enemy distant about 800 yards, moving “towards our left.” Orders +to retire were received almost immediately, and the whole retired to +the foot of the slope, the enemy rushing forward to the crest of the +hill as our men disappeared. Captain Younghusband’s company was at +this time in echelon on the left.[133] + +The guns came into action about 400 yards on the left front of the +camp, “where they were able to throw shells into a large mass of the +enemy that remained almost stationary about 3400 yards off.”[134] + +The three advanced companies of the 24th retired on the main body, +when the situation was this: The two guns and the whole of the +24th in line, about 300 yards from the left front of the camp; the +natives took post on the right of the 24th; then came Durnford’s +Basutos; and the extreme right was formed by about forty mounted +Europeans[135]—the force holding the only position that afforded +any shelter, viz. broken ground and a “donga” in front of the camp; +the infantry “in good position among the stones and boulders to the +left and left centre of the camp, and who stood their ground most +gallantly.”[136] The enemy approached to within about 400 yards, the +two guns firing case. The heavy fire from the line told so upon the +Zulus that they wavered and lay down; they are said to have covered +the valley in detached groups to the depth of about three-quarters of +a mile.[137] + +The enemy now began to work round the rear (which they could do with +impunity owing to the formation of the ground), and Captain Essex +says: “I rode up to Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, who was near the right, +and pointed this out to him. He requested me to take men to that part +of the field, and endeavour to hold the enemy in check;” but at this +moment, he says, “those of the Native Contingent who had remained in +action, rushed past us in the utmost disorder, thus laying open the +right and rear of the 24th, the enemy dashing forward in the most +rapid manner.” The ammunition of the mounted troops failing (supplies +had been repeatedly sent for, but none came), Colonel Durnford +retired them towards the right of the camp (where the waggons and +ammunition of the Native Horse were), and himself galloped off to +the 24th, having previously told Captain Gardner that the position +was too extended, and he desired to concentrate the force. Colonel +Durnford’s intention undoubtedly was to withdraw all the troops to +the rising ground on the right of the camp, to which point he had +retired his Native Horse. + +The Zulus rushed on the left in overwhelming numbers, completely +surrounding the 24th. The guns limbered up, and made for the Rorke’s +Drift Road, but found it blocked by the enemy; they therefore +“followed a crowd of natives and camp-followers, who were running +down a ravine; the Zulus were all among them, stabbing men as they +ran.” Down this ravine the fugitives hastened, the enemy round and +among them, the assegai doing its deadly work. + +Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine was said by Lieutenant Coghill to have been +killed,[138] and during the flight Major Stuart Smith, R.A. (who had +been wounded), Surgeon-Major Shepherd, and many a man, mounted and +on foot, were killed. The Buffalo was gained at a point about five +miles below Rorke’s Drift, and numbers of the fugitives were either +shot, or carried away by the stream and drowned. Lieutenants Melville +and Coghill rode from the camp, on its being carried by the Zulus, +the former with the Queen’s colours of his regiment. These he bore +into the river, but lost his horse, and was left struggling in the +swift current; Lieutenant Coghill, who had safely crossed, rode in to +his assistance, when his horse was shot. These brave young officers +succeeded in gaining the Natal shore, but were soon overtaken by the +enemy, and died fighting to the last. The Natal Native Horse escaped +with little loss; they assisted many in the retreat, which they +covered as well as they could, especially under Captain Barton on the +banks of the Buffalo. Captain Essex puts the time of the retreat +from the camp at “about 1.30 P.M.” + +After this period no one living escaped from Isandhlwana, and it was +supposed that the troops had broken, and, falling into confusion, +that all had perished after a brief struggle. + +Nothing was known of the after-events of that fatal day for months, +till, on the 21st May, the scene of the disaster was revisited, and +the truth of the gallant stand made was established. This will be +treated of in another chapter. + +We must now turn to the movements of the column under Colonel +Glyn, with the General; and it will be most convenient to take the +occurrences of the day as described by Lord Chelmsford and his +military secretary (Lieut.-Colonel Crealock). + +Leaving camp at daybreak,[139] the General “reached Major Dartnell +about 6.30 A.M., and at once ordered him to send out his mounted men +to gain intelligence of the enemy, whose whereabouts did not appear +to be very certain.” (P. P. [C. 2252] p. 75.) The enemy shortly +after showed in considerable strength at some distance, but retired +without firing as the troops advanced. Lieut.-Colonel Crealock says: +“Between 9.30 and 10 A.M. we were off-saddled some twelve miles from +camp. During the three previous hours we had been advancing with +Colonel Glyn’s column against a Zulu force that fell back from hill +to hill as we advanced, giving up, without a shot, most commanding +positions.” (P. P. [C. 2260] p. 99.) It was at this time (“about +9 A.M.,” the General says) that the message was received from +Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills +on his left front. The General says he at once sent his aide-de-camp, +Lieutenant Milne, R.N., to the top of a high hill, from which the +camp could be seen. He had “a very powerful telescope, but could +detect nothing unusual.”[140] Lieut.-Colonel Crealock says that all +the news he gave “was that the cattle had been driven into camp,” and +he acknowledges “our own attention was chiefly bent on the enemy’s +force retiring from the hills in our front, and a party being pursued +by Lieut.-Colonel Russell three miles off.” + +The kloof where the enemy had been was found deserted, but a large +body of Zulus were seen beyond it, and a portion of the mounted +force sent after them, Major Dartnell and the rest of his men moving +off to the right in the direction of another body of Zulus. These +turned out to be Matshana’s people, with the chief himself present: +they were engaged, their retreat cut off, and then driven back on +the Native Contingent. Of this party Matshana and one or two of his +people alone escaped. + +“Having no cause, therefore, to feel any anxiety about the safety of +the camp,” the General ordered the mounted infantry to sweep round +“to the main waggon-track, whilst a portion of the infantry went over +the hilltop to the same point, and the guns, with an escort, retraced +their steps,” with instructions to join Colonel Glyn near the Mangane +Valley, where the General proceeded with Colonel Glyn to fix upon a +site for a new camp. Captain Gardner, 14th Hussars, was sent back to +camp “with the order to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine to send on the camp +equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to remain at his +present camp, and entrench it.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 101). + +The 1st Battalion Native Contingent was ordered to march back to camp +across country, and examine dongas, etc. _en route_. + +“Not a sign of the enemy was now seen near us,” says Colonel +Crealock. “Not a suspicion had crossed my mind that the camp was in +any danger, neither did anything occur to make me think of such a +thing until about 1.15,” when it was fancied firing was heard (the +natives were certain of it). “We were then moving back to choose a +camp for the night about twelve miles from Isandula.” About 1.45 +P.M., a native reported “heavy firing had been going on round the +camp. We galloped up to a high spot, whence we could see the camp, +perhaps 10 or 11 miles distant. None of us could detect anything +amiss; all looked quiet. This must have been 2 P.M. The General, +however, probably thought it would be well to ascertain what had +happened himself, but not thinking anything was wrong, ordered +Colonel Glyn to bivouac for the night where we stood; and taking +with him some 40 mounted volunteers, proceeded to ride into camp. +Lieut.-Colonel Cecil Russell, 12th Lancers, now joined us, and +informed me that an officer of the Natal Native Contingent had come +to him (about 12 noon, I think) when he was off-saddled, and asked +where the General was, as he had instructions to tell him that heavy +firing had been going on close to the camp.... This officer, however, +did not come to us. + +“This information from Colonel Russell was immediately followed +by a message from Commandant Brown, commanding the 1st Battalion +Natal Native Contingent, which had been ordered back to camp at +9.30 A.M.—(the battalion was halted a mile from us, and probably +eight miles from camp)—to the effect that large bodies of Zulus were +between him and the camp, and that his men could not advance without +support. The General ordered an immediate advance of the battalion, +the mounted volunteers and mounted infantry supporting it. + +“I am not aware what messages had been sent from[141] the camp and +received by Colonel Glyn or his staff; but I know that neither the +General nor myself had up to this time received any information but +that I have mentioned. + +“At 3.15 the General appeared to think that he would be able to brush +through any parties of Zulus that might be in his road to the camp +without any force further than that referred to, viz. 1st Battalion +Native Contingent and some eighty mounted white men. + +“At 4 P.M.,[142] however, the native battalion again halted,” when +within about six miles of the camp, “and shortly after—the General +says—Commandant Lonsdale rode up to report that he had ridden into +camp and found it in possession of the Zulus.” The General at +once sent word to Colonel Glyn to bring back all the troops, and +advanced about two miles, sending Lieut.-Colonel Russell forward to +reconnoitre;—he fully confirmed Commandant Lonsdale’s report. Colonel +Glyn rejoined the General about 6 P.M., when the troops were formed +in “fighting order,” and advanced across the plain; “but could not +reach the neighbourhood of our camp until after dark.” + +It may properly be here remarked that from the outskirts of the force +firing had been seen at the camp as late as nearly four o’clock; and +about six, large bodies of the enemy were seen retiring from the +camp, through openings in the Ingqutu range. + +When a move was first made by the General in the direction of the +camp, an officer who was in advance narrates what he saw when he +came to a rising ground from which the camp was first seen: + +“There certainly were some tents standing then, but seemed very few, +and away to the left front of the camp there was some smoke, though +not much, and it was high up, just as if there had been musketry fire +and the smoke had floated away; but there was certainly no musketry +fire going on then. A few seconds afterwards a sergeant ... said: +‘There go the guns, sir.’ I could see the smoke, but we could hear +nothing. In a few seconds we distinctly saw the guns fired again, +one after the other, sharp. This was done several times—a pause, and +then a flash—flash! The sun was shining on the camp at the time, +and then the camp looked dark, just as if a shadow was passing over +it. The guns did not fire after that, and in a few minutes all the +tents had disappeared. The sergeant said, ‘It’s all over now, sir.’ I +said, ‘Yes, and I hope it is the right way.’ We could see there was +fighting going on, but of course did not know which way it had gone. +The men all thought the Zulus had retired, but I felt doubtful in my +own mind, but had no idea really of the catastrophe that had taken +place.... This must have been about 3 P.M.” + +“Within two miles of camp,” Lieutenant Milne says, “four men were +seen slowly advancing in front of us; a few mounted men were sent +out; the men in front previously seen then took cover behind some +rocks, but were fired upon by our men; one fell, the remainder ran +out in the open, throwing up their hands to show they were unarmed. +On being taken prisoners, they were found to be Native Contingent, +escaped from the massacre.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 185). + +On nearing the camp it was nearly dark, but it was observed that +waggons were drawn up across the neck; the guns were therefore +brought into action and shelled them. Then, no sound being heard, +Major Black, with a wing of his regiment, moved forward to occupy the +small hill close to Isandhlwana. No enemy was seen, and the camp was +found tenanted by those who were taking their last long sleep. + +A halt was made for the night amidst the _débris_ of (the proper +right of) the camp, on the “neck;” the infantry covering the west, +and the mounted troops and guns the east side. During the night there +were one or two false alarms, and the whole force, at early dawn, +moved off towards Rorke’s Drift, as the General was anxious about +the safety of that important post; also the troops had no spare +ammunition,[143] but little food, and “it was certain that daylight +would reveal a sight which could not but have a demoralising effect +upon the whole force.”—(P. P. [C. 2252] p. 76). + +In Lord Chelmsford’s despatch of 27th January, he gives a narrative +of the attack on the camp, but remarks “the absolute accuracy of +which, however, I cannot vouch for” (pp. 76, 77). On comparing his +“narrative” with the _facts_, it will be found to be _absolutely +inaccurate_. But Lord Chelmsford makes some remarks which cannot be +passed, over in silence. He says: “Had the force in question but +taken up a defensive position in the camp itself, and utilised +there the materials for a hasty entrenchment;” but he does not point +out how the “force in question” was to know of the near approach of +the Zulu army, he himself having neglected to search the country +where that army lay. He had prepared no “defensive position;” but he +had selected a fatal spot for his camp, which, covering a front of +about half a mile, was utterly indefensible as it stood; and he had +“pooh-poohed” the suggestion of taking defensive precautions when +made by Colonel Glyn; and, further, it does not appear that there +was _any time whatever_ for the “force in question” to do anything +but fight. Lord Chelmsford then says: “It appears that the oxen were +yoked to the waggons three hours before the attack took place, so +that there was ample time to construct that waggon-laager which the +Dutch in former days understood so well.” This remark comes with +peculiar ill-grace from Lord Chelmsford, who not only had not taken +any precautions, but had not permitted any laager or other defence to +be made; and whose reply to a suggestion of a laager at Isandhlwana +was, “It would take a week to make.” Also it must not be forgotten +that the attack on Isandhlwana was _without warning_. + +He next says: “Had, however, the tents been struck, and the British +troops placed with their backs to the precipitous Isalwana Hill, I +feel sure that they could have made a successful resistance.” Here +again he would blame the dead to cover the faults of the living! +But even had the troops been thus placed (as some eventually appear +to have been), how long could they keep at bay, when ammunition +failed,[144] an enemy armed with weapons they could use with fatal +effect out of reach of the bayonet? + +And lastly, Lord Chelmsford speaks of rumours “that the troops were +deceived by a simulated retreat,” and thus “drawn away from the line +of defence.” The _facts_ prove the exact contrary. The only person +deceived by a “simulated retreat” was Lord Chelmsford himself, whose +troops _during three hours_ had advanced “against a Zulu force +that fell back from hill to hill ... giving up without a shot most +commanding positions.” And where was _their_ “_line of defence_?” +We do not find one word of Lord Chelmsford’s own want of the most +ordinary precautions—his want of “intelligence,” and neglect to +obtain it—of his seeing the enemy’s mounted scouts on the left front, +and intending (but not making) a reconnaissance in that direction—his +fixed belief that the enemy _could_ only be in force in his front—the +transparent way in which he was drawn off farther from the camp—the +absence of any attention to the signs that something _was_ wrong at +the camp—the prevention of assistance reaching the beleaguered camp +when one of his officers _had_ recognised the emergency, etc.; to +which must be added that we do not find one word of regret for the +untimely fate of the gallant men who fell doing _their_ duty. In +justice to Colonel Glyn, commanding No. 3 Column, it must be remarked +that the General himself gave the orders for the various movements, +etc. And in justice to Lord Chelmsford also, we note it is asserted +that the shock he experienced told severely upon him at the time; and +he may not have very carefully studied the despatch, which was the +work of his military secretary. + +Before finally leaving the events of the 22nd January, we must fully +notice an important episode that occurred, and which had a serious +bearing on the disaster we have to lament. + +We have seen that “the guns with an escort” were ordered to retrace +their steps ... to join Colonel Glyn at the rendezvous near the +Mangane Valley. We will now follow their movements. + +When Lord Chelmsford discovered that the enemy he had come in +search of had disappeared, 4 guns Royal Artillery, 2 companies +2-24th Regiment (Captains Church and Harvey), and about 50 Natal +Native Pioneers, the whole under the command of Lieut.-Colonel +Harness, R.A., were ordered to march to a rendezvous in advance by +a different route to that taken by the remainder of the column; +this was necessary, as the guns could not go over the ground taken +by the latter. To carry out the order, they had to retrace for over +two miles the route by which they had come in the morning, and then +bear to the left. This was done (a short halt having first been +made, to let men and horses have a rest), and about twelve o’clock +they reached some rising ground, when they again halted, not being +certain of the direction of the rendezvous, to await Major Black, +2-24th, Assistant Quartermaster-General, who had gone on to find it. +Almost immediately after this halt the firing of cannon was heard, +and looking towards the camp, about eight miles off, they saw shells +bursting against the hills to the left of it. Soon afterwards a body +of about 1000 natives suddenly appeared in the plain below, between +them and the camp; the Native Pioneers thought they were Zulus. +Captain Church told Colonel Harness if he would let him have a horse +he would go and find out. Colonel Harness at once gave him one, +and sent a mounted sergeant with him. As they galloped towards the +natives, a European officer rode out, and when they met said: “The +troops behind me are Commandant Browne’s contingent, and I am sent to +give you this message: ‘_Come in every man, for God’s sake! The camp +is surrounded, and will be taken unless helped at once._’” Captain +Church rode back as fast as he could, and found Colonel Harness in +conversation with Major Gosset (aide-de-camp) and Major Black, both +of whom had come up during his absence. Colonel Harness promptly +said: “We will march back;” but Major Gosset ridiculed the idea, +and advised him to carry out his orders. Colonel Harness then asked +Major Black and Captain Church their opinions. They both agreed with +him without hesitation. Colonel Harness gave the order to return, +and started without a moment’s delay; Major Gosset riding off in the +direction of the General. About 1.30 P.M. Lieut.-Colonel Harness was +on his way to the camp, and had got over about two miles of ground +when he was overtaken by Major Gosset with orders from the General to +march back to the rendezvous. The order was obeyed. + +Now the startling reflection comes home that to this most important +fact, bearing on the events of the day (for even if too late to +save life, Colonel Harness would have saved the camp), there is not +a hint even in the despatches of Lord Chelmsford, or the official +statement of his military secretary.[145] The latter goes so far +as to say, in paragraph 17 of his statement (P. P. [C. 2260] p. +100): “I am not aware what messages had been sent from the camp and +received by Colonel Glyn or his staff; but I know that neither the +General nor myself had up to this time received any information but +that I have mentioned.” This statement refers to a time _after_ the +General had arrived at a spot about a mile from where Commandant +Browne’s battalion of natives were halted, _after_ he had received +the message, “Come in, every man, for God’s sake,” etc., and _after_ +he had met Colonel Harness on his return march to the rendezvous; +and not only that, but apparently _after_ the receipt of a most +important message from Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, described as follows +by the special correspondent of _The Times_ of Natal (Captain +Norris-Newman): “We did halt there, and found the staff there as +well, looking on through the field-glasses at some large bodies of +Kafirs [Zulus], who were in close proximity to our camp about ten +miles off. The Mounted Police were ordered to halt and off-saddle; +but Captain [T.] Shepstone and his volunteers had orders to proceed +back to camp to see what was up. I joined them, and we had not gone +far on the road when a mounted messenger came up with a note from +Colonel Pulleine to the General, saying that the camp was attacked +by large numbers of Kafirs, and asked him to return with all the +help at his command. With this we halted, and awaited the up-coming +of the General, who came along at once, and proceeded up the valley +to reconnoitre. About three miles had been got over, during which we +passed the four guns under Colonel Harness, and some of the 24th ... +on their way to encamp at the new ground. A mounted man was then seen +approaching, and was recognised as Commandant Lonsdale. He brought +the dreadful news that, having chased a Zulu on horseback, he got +separated from his men, and had ridden quietly back to camp; but on +arrival there, within about three hundred yards of it (at about 2 +P.M.), he found large bodies of the enemy surrounding it and fighting +with our men. He had just time to discover his mistake, turn, and fly +for his life, when several bullets were fired at him, and many Zulus +started in chase.”—_Natal Colonist_, January 30th, 1879. + +The above message is undoubtedly that mentioned by Captain Gardner +as having been despatched from the camp at or soon after twelve +o’clock. (P. P. [C. 2260] p. 81.) And there still remains the fact +that, not only as regards Colonel Harness, does there appear to be an +unaccountable omission in the “statement”[146] alluded to, but also +we find mention of only _one_ message from the camp; whereas other +messages are _known_ to have been received, and to have been in the +possession of the Assistant Military Secretary. + +Here also we must allude to Sir Bartle Frere’s despatches of January +27th, and February 3rd and 12th. In the first he says: “In disregard +of Lord Chelmsford’s instructions, the troops left to protect the +camp were taken away from the defensive position they were in at +the camp, with the shelter which the waggons, parked, would have +afforded....” We know that the troops did the best they could, left +as they were by their general in an open camp—we know they had +no “defensive position”—and we know that the waggons were _not_ +“parked,” but drawn up in rear of their own camps. + +Sir Bartle says, February 3rd: “It is only justice to the General to +note that his orders were clearly not obeyed on that terrible day at +Isandhlwana camp.” + +And on February 12th, he says: “It is impossible to shut one’s eyes +to the fact that it was, in all human probability, mainly due to +disregard of the General’s orders that so great a disaster occurred” +(a little qualifying his sweeping assertion of February 3rd). + +But yet again Sir Bartle returns to the charge, and says, June 30th: +“It is difficult to over-estimate the effect of such a disaster as +that at Isandhlwana on both armies, but it was clearly due to breach +of the General’s order, and to disregard of well-known maxims of +military science.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 138). + +On what grounds Sir Bartle Frere bases those assertions we know +not—no known orders were disobeyed—and, in spite of the special +pleading in these despatches, we must come to the conclusion that +Sir Bartle Frere’s remarks were penned in utter ignorance of facts, +and that the accusations concerning “disregard of well-known maxims +of military science” should have been applied, _not_ to the soldiers +who fell at Isandhlwana, but to those who placed them in that fatal +position. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +RORKE’S DRIFT—HELPMAKAAR—COURT OF INQUIRY, ETC. + + +The garrison of the Rorke’s Drift post consisted of B Company 2-24th +Regiment (Lieutenant Bromhead), and (with officers and casuals) was +of a total strength of 139. It was encamped on the Natal side of the +Buffalo, where there was a mission station, one building of which +was used as a hospital and one as a commissariat store. The crossing +of the river was effected by what are called “ponts”—boats used as +a kind of “flying bridge”—and there were drifts, or fords, in the +vicinity. Major Spalding, Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, and +Lieutenant Chard, R.E., were stationed here. The former rode off to +Helpmakaar at 2 P.M., 22nd January, “to bring up Captain Rainforth’s +company, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, to protect the pont,” leaving +Lieutenant Chard in command of the post. + +About 3.15 P.M., Lieutenant Chard was at the ponts, when two men came +riding from Zululand at a gallop, and shouted to be taken across the +river. They were Lieutenant Adendorff, Natal Native Contingent, and +a carbineer, who brought tidings of the disaster at Isandhlwana and +the advance of the Zulus towards Rorke’s Drift. Lieutenant Adendorff +remained to assist in the defence of the post, and the carbineer rode +on to take the news to Helpmakaar. + +Lieutenant Chard at once gave orders to secure the stores at the +ponts, and rode up to the commissariat store, when he found a +note had been received from the 3rd Column, saying the enemy were +advancing, and directing them to strengthen and hold the post at +all cost. Lieutenant Bromhead was actively at work preparing for +defence, ably assisted by Mr. Dalton, of the Commissariat Department, +loopholing the buildings and connecting them by walls of mealie-bags +and two waggons that were there. Lieutenant Chard then rode down to +the pont, and brought up the guard and stores. + +An officer, with about a hundred of “Durnford’s Horse,” now arrived, +and asked for orders. He was instructed to throw out men to watch +the drifts and ponts, to check the enemy’s advance, and fall back +on the post when forced to retire. These men had, however, been in +the saddle since daylight, and had gone through a heavy engagement: +they were quite exhausted (besides being dispirited by the loss of +their beloved leader), and, after remaining a short time, retired to +Helpmakaar. A detachment of Natal Native Contingent also left the +post. + +Lieutenant Chard now commenced an inner work—“a retrenchment of +biscuit-boxes.” This was two boxes high when, about 4.30 P.M., 500 +or 600 of the enemy came in sight, and advanced at a run against +the south wall. They were met with a well-sustained fire, but, in +spite of their loss, approached to within about fifty yards. Here +they were checked by the cross-fire from the attacked front and the +store-house. Some got under cover and kept up a heavy fire, but +the greater number, without stopping, moved to the left, round the +hospital, and made a rush at the wall of mealie-bags. After a short +but desperate struggle the enemy were driven back with heavy loss +into the bush around the post. The main body of the enemy coming up, +lined the ledge of rock, caves, etc., overlooking the work, at a +distance of about 400 yards to the south, and from whence a constant +fire was kept up, and they also occupied in great force the garden, +hollow road, and bush. + +The bush not having been cleared away enabled the enemy to advance +under cover close to the wall, and a series of desperate assaults +were made, extending from the hospital along the wall as far as the +bush reached; each assault was brilliantly met and repulsed with the +bayonet, Corporal Scheiss, Natal Native Contingent, distinguishing +himself greatly. The fire from the rocks took the work completely in +reverse, and was so heavy that about 6 P.M., the garrison was obliged +to retire behind the entrenchment of biscuit-boxes. + +During this period the enemy had been storming the hospital, and at +last succeeded in setting fire to the roof. The garrison defended +it most gallantly, bringing out all the sick that could be moved; +Privates Williams, Hook, R. Jones, and W. Jones, 2-24th Regiment, +being the last men to leave, and holding the doorway with the bayonet +when their ammunition was expended. The want of communication and the +burning of the house rendered it impossible to save all the sick. + +It was now found necessary to make another entrenchment, which was +done with two heaps of mealie-bags, Assistant-Commissary Dunne +working hard at this, though much exposed. As darkness came on the +little garrison was completely surrounded, but gallantly repulsed +several serious assaults; it was, however, eventually forced to +retire to the inner entrenchment, which it held throughout the night. +The attack continued vigorously till midnight, the men firing on the +assailants with the greatest coolness, aided by the light afforded +by the burning hospital. A desultory fire was kept up by the enemy +throughout the night, but this ceased about 4 A.M. on the 23rd, and +at daybreak the enemy was out of sight. Lieutenant Chard at once +set about patrolling round the post, collecting the Zulu arms, and +strengthening the defences. + +About 7 A.M., a large body of the enemy appeared on the hills to +the south-west, and Lieutenant Chard sent off a note to Helpmakaar +asking for assistance. About 8 A.M., No. 3 Column appeared in sight, +the enemy falling back on its approach. Thus ended a most gallant +defence, reflecting the utmost credit on all concerned. + +The loss of the garrison was 15 non-commissioned officers and men +killed, and 12 wounded (of whom two died almost immediately). The +attacking force was estimated at 3000 men, of whom upwards of 350 +were killed. + +Lord Chelmsford, with the remains of No. 3 Column, had moved off from +Isandhlwana, as we have already described, at daybreak that morning. +It had been thought necessary to insist upon absolute inaction +through the night; no attempt was allowed at identifying the dead, +or even at making sure that no life remained in the camp; and men +lay down to rest, ignorant whether a careless hand might not fall +on the lifeless form of a dead comrade or, mayhap, a brother. The +remainder of the Natal Carbineers, as they afterwards discovered, +bivouacked that night on the right of the camp, upon the very “neck” +of land where so gallant a stand was made; their captain recognising +the body of Lieutenant Scott, and therefore being able afterwards to +identify the spot. That life might exist without its being known to +the returning column is proved by the fact that a native groom lay +for dead, although unwounded, in the camp throughout the night. The +man had feigned death when the camp was taken, and did not dare to +move on the return of the General’s party, lest he should be taken by +them for a Zulu, and should share the fate of the few actual Zulus +found intoxicated beneath the waggons, and bayoneted by our soldiers. +He crept out in the morning, and followed the retreating column to +Rorke’s Drift at a distance, meeting on the way with narrow escapes +of losing his life from both friend and foe. + +On coming within sight of Rorke’s Drift, heavy smoke was seen rising +from it, and Zulus retiring; this caused the liveliest apprehensions +for the safety of the post. However, to the intense relief of all, +on nearing the Buffalo River the waving of hats was seen from a +hastily-erected entrenchment, and the safety of the little garrison +was known. + +Lieut.-Colonel Russell was sent with a mounted escort to Helpmakaar, +to see if the road was open and all safe there; but some officers +of Major Bengough’s battalion Natal Native Contingent rode in and +reported the road open, Helpmakaar laagered, and no attack made on +it. Some men of the Buffalo Border Guard also rode in from Fort Pine +and reported all well there. + +The General and staff hurried down to Pietermaritzburg _viâ_ +Helpmakaar, while the garrison at Rorke’s Drift was left in utter +confusion,[147] as testified by many of those present at the time. +No one appeared responsible for anything that might happen, and the +result was one disgraceful to our English name, and to all concerned. +A few Zulu prisoners had been taken by our troops—some the day +before, others previous to the disaster at Isandhlwana, and these +prisoners were put to death in cold blood at Rorke’s Drift. It was +intended to set them free, and they were told to run for their lives, +but they were shot down and killed, within sight and sound of the +whole force. An eye-witness—an officer—described the affair to the +present writer, saying that the men whom _he_ saw killed numbered +“not more than seven, nor less than five.” He said that he was +standing with others in the camp, and hearing shots close behind him, +he turned, and saw the prisoners in question in the act of falling +beneath the shots and stabs of a party of our men.[148] The latter, +indeed, were men belonging to the Native Contingent, but they were +supposed to be under white control, and should not have been able to +obtain possession of the prisoners under any circumstances. Scenes +like these were not likely to impress the savages with whom we were +dealing with our merciful and Christian qualities, nor to improve the +chances of European prisoners who might fall into their hands during +the campaign. + +As soon as order was a little restored, the cover round the post of +Rorke’s Drift was cleared away, barricades built, the thatched roof +taken off the house, and the four guns placed in position within the +enclosure. + +The General and staff reached Pietermaritzburg early on January 26th. +There, as everywhere else, panic reigned, and gloom spread over all. +From the city especially many a son and brother had gone out to fall +upon that fatal day, and grief was mingled there with terror for what +might come next. It was long before any accurate information could +be gained as to what had happened, and who had fallen; and, owing to +the hurried retreat of No. 3 Column from Isandhlwana before daybreak +on the 23rd, the great burden of uncertainty was laid upon many heavy +hearts both upon the spot and at home in England. + +At first all who had had friends at the camp hoped they might be +amongst the saved, since it was known that some had escaped by “The +Fugitives’ Drift,” a spot some five miles from Rorke’s Drift, where +those flying from Isandhlwana crossed the river; and day by day the +lists of killed and missing appeared with the names gradually removed +from the latter to the former. Well had an hour’s daylight been spent +that morning to spare the uncertainty that hung over many an English +and South African home for days and weeks, and even months. + +No time was now lost in making such preparations for defence as +the principal towns afforded. An invasion of the colony by the +victorious Zulu army was hourly expected, and with some reason, since +retaliation for our invasion might naturally be feared. Sir Bartle +Frere himself remarks, on February 12th (C. 2269): “It has become +painfully evident that the Zulu king has an army at his command which +could almost any day unexpectedly invade Natal; and owing to the +great extent of frontier, and utter helplessness of the undisciplined +hordes of Natal natives to offer effectual resistance, the Zulus +might march at will through the country, devastating and murdering, +without a chance of being checked, as long as they abstained from +attacking the entrenched posts of Her Majesty’s troops, which are +from 50 to 100 miles apart. The capital and all the principal towns +are at this moment in ‘laager,’ prepared for attack, which even if +successfully resisted, would leave two-thirds of them in ashes, and +the country around utterly desolated.”[149] + +Whatever reasonable fears of retaliation were entertained by the +people of Natal, they soon rose to panic-height in consequence of the +great alarm displayed by the chief authorities, both military and +civil. By their orders, the central part of ’Maritzburg, including +the Court House, was barricaded with loopholed boarding, as a refuge +for the citizens in case of attack, wells were dug inside the Court +House, and notice given that the usual guns, announcing the arrival +of the English mails, would be discontinued for the present, but that +three guns would be fired as a signal for the citizens to go into +the laager within three hours, while four guns would signify that +the danger was urgent, and they must fly into it at once, taking +stores of food, which they were to have ready beforehand, beside what +the borough council had provided, and they must then comply with an +elaborate series of rules, which was published in the Government +_Gazette_. So great, indeed, was the scare that some of the citizens +of ’Maritzburg did actually take refuge one night in the laager, and +others hurriedly left the colony, while many natives, living near the +city, slept out, with their wives and children, some nights in the +open field. On that night, when terror was at its height, it is said +that the bedding of the Governors and their staff, together with the +official records of Government House, was removed to the neighbouring +gaol, a strong stone building, just under the guns of Fort Napier, +which was chosen as a place of refuge for their Excellencies. It is +also said that Lord Chelmsford’s horse was kept saddled and bridled +all night; and a stretcher was placed, by express order, outside the +window of a lady in delicate health, without her knowledge, so as to +be ready in case of emergency—as if a Zulu impi could drop suddenly, +at a moment’s notice, into the middle of the city, the frontier, at +the nearest point, being sixty miles off. + +Whether or no the High Commissioner was really in such a state of +alarm as he appeared to be, the existence of such a scare in Natal +would, no doubt, help to support his policy in the eyes of those at +home, as an actual inroad of Zulus at that time would have still more +effectually justified the charges he had made against Cetshwayo, +and the strong measures he had taken in invading Zululand, for the +good of the Zulus themselves and the safety of the colony. After +the disaster at Isandhlwana, Sir B. Frere of course reiterates his +charges against the king of intending to invade the colony (C. 2269). +But these charges are sufficiently answered by the mere fact that +although, as Sir B. Frere himself points out, Natal lay at his mercy +for some months after the disaster, he made no attack whatever either +upon Swazis, Boers, or English. After Isandhlwana, if ever, such +invasion was to be dreaded, yet not only was none attempted, but even +the Zulus who, in the flush of victory crossed into Natal at Rorke’s +Drift on the 22nd, were called back by their officers with the words, +“Against the orders of your king!” + +In startling contrast to the panic which reigned after the 22nd +January was the ignorance and carelessness shown by the authorities +beforehand. At the very time of the disaster to No. 3 Column there +was a train of fifteen waggons, with sixty-five boxes of ammunition +each, moving unguarded up to Helpmakaar, upon a road eight miles from +and parallel to the Zulu border! + +With the exception of Rorke’s Drift, no military station was at +this time more open to attack than Helpmakaar, distant from it about +twelve miles. The fugitives from Isandhlwana, Captains Essex and +Gardner, Lieutenants Cochrane, Curling, and Smith-Dorrien, with +about thirty others, reached this place between 5 and 6 P.M., and +at once set about forming a waggon-laager round the stores. The +garrison of two companies of the 1-24th Regiment had marched towards +Rorke’s Drift during the day; but Major Spalding says: “On reaching +the summit of a hill from which the mission-house is visible it +was observed to be in flames; this confirmed the statement of the +fugitives that the post had been captured. This being the case, +it was determined to save, if possible, Helpmakaar and its depôt +of stores” ... and the column reached Helpmakaar by 9 P.M. (P. P. +[C. 2260] p. 88.) Captain Gardner, soon after reaching Helpmakaar, +left for Utrecht, it having occurred to him to carry the news of +the disaster himself to Colonel Wood. Our loss at Isandhlwana is +given as 689 officers and men Imperial troops, and 133 officers +and men of Colonial Volunteers, Mounted Police, and Natal Native +Contingents—Europeans (P. P. [C. 2260] pp. 93-98); but the actual +loss was slightly in excess of those numbers. + +The Zulu army appears to have consisted of the following regiments: +’Kandampemvu (or Umcityu), ’Ngobamakosi, Uve, Nokenke, Umbonambi, +Udhloko, Nodwengu, and Undi (which comprises the Tulwana, +’Ndhlondhlo, and Indhluyengwe), whose full nominal strength reaches +a total of 30,900 men; but the actual numbers are estimated at from +20,000 to 25,000. + +The Zulus acknowledge to having suffered heavily, and their loss is +estimated at 3000. + +Cetshwayo’s youngest brother, Nugwende, who surrendered on 27th +April, said he was present at Isandhlwana. That the front and left +flank attack was beaten, and fell back with great loss until the fire +of the white troops slackened; the right flank entering the camp, the +attack was renewed, the English being unable to prevent their onset +from want of ammunition. The Zulu army, he says, numbered 20,000 of +the king’s best troops. + +A court of inquiry, composed of Colonel Hassard, C.B., R.E., +Lieut.-Colonel Law, R.A., and Lieut.-Colonel Harness, R.A., assembled +at Helpmakaar on the 27th January, when the following officers gave +evidence: Major Clery; Colonel Glyn, C.B.; Captain Gardner, 14th +Hussars; Captain Essex, 75th Regiment; Lieutenant Cochrane, 32nd +Regiment; Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien, 95th Regiment; Captain Nourse, +Natal Native Contingent; and Lieutenant Curling, R.A. + +The evidence taken consisted of statements made by the above +officers, not one of whom appears to have been questioned. The +(so-called) inquiry seems to have been strictly limited to the +occurrences at the camp, as we find Major Clery’s evidence finish +abruptly, “I saw the column out of camp and accompanied it.” Colonel +Glyn merely corroborated Major Clery’s statement; and the other +officers gave their respective versions of the occurrences at the +camp; Captain Essex giving a very clear and detailed account of the +movements of the 24th Regiment. + +The proceedings were forwarded on the 29th, with these remarks: “The +court has examined and recorded the statements of the chief witnesses. + +“The copy of proceedings forwarded was made by a confidential clerk +of the Royal Engineers. + +“The court has refrained from giving an opinion, as instructions on +this point were not given to it.” + +The proceedings were forwarded from Durban to the Secretary of State +for War on February 8th by Lord Chelmsford, who said: “The court has +very properly abstained from giving an opinion, and I myself refrain +also from making any observations, or from drawing any conclusions +from the evidence therein recorded.” + +He regrets that more evidence has not been taken, and has directed +his military secretary “to append a statement of the facts which came +under his cognizance on the day in question.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 80). + +On this officer’s “statement” some remarks have been made in the +previous chapter; and we must now quote one or two passages from the +public prints, which appeared when Colonel Harness’s share in the +proceedings of the 22nd January first came to light. + +_The Daily News_ of April 8th, referring to this episode and the +court of inquiry, says: “Lord Chelmsford seems to have been as +unfortunate in the selection of his staff-officers as he was in +everything else.” + +Lieut.-Colonel Crealock’s “statement” is stigmatised as “palpably +written to establish a preconceived theory;” and _The Daily News_ +says most justly that “Colonel Harness should not have sat as member +of the court of inquiry. How it could have been supposed that an +officer who had taken so prominent a part in the doings of the 22nd +January was a fit and suitable member of a court assembled even to +take evidence merely, is more than we can understand. Besides, the +very fact of his being a member, we are told, precluded Colonel +Harness from giving his own valuable evidence.” + +_The Natal Witness_ of May 29th, 1879, makes some reflections on +the same subject, which are very pertinent. We need not repeat +its criticisms on the court of inquiry, etc. but it says: “It is +notorious that certain members of Lord Chelmsford’s staff—there is +no need to mention any name or names—came down to ’Maritzburg after +the disaster, prepared to make Colonel Durnford bear the whole +responsibility, and that it was upon their representations that the +High Commissioner’s telegram about ‘poor Durnford’s misfortune’ was +sent.” + +How a court of inquiry, assembled without the power, apparently, of +asking a single question, was to throw much light on the causes of +the disaster, does not appear. Its scope was limited to the doings at +the camp; and under any circumstances it could not well criticise the +faults of the General. The proceedings of this court of inquiry can +therefore only be considered as eminently unsatisfactory. + +We might here leave this painful subject, were it not for the +undisguised attempts that have been made to throw the blame on the +dead. + +In considering the question of blame, we must first put before us the +circumstances in which the camp defenders found themselves when they +were required “to defend the camp.” + +Now the orders given to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine are stated by Major +Clery, senior staff-officer of No. 3 Column, thus:— + +“Before leaving the camp I sent written instructions to Colonel +Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect: ‘You will be in +command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I +speak from memory) your camp, or your line of defence’—I am not +certain which—‘while the force is out; also draw in the line of +your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry vedettes +still far advanced.’ I told him to have a waggon ready loaded with +ammunition ready to follow the force going out at a moment’s notice, +if required. I went to Colonel Pulleine’s tent just before leaving +camp to ascertain that he had got these instructions, and again +repeated them verbally to him.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 81). + +As regards the force left to defend the camp, there were no +instructions to form a defensive post; the General did not think it +necessary, though to him was the almost prescient remark made: “We +should be all right if we only had a laager.” He saw no danger; he +was about to move his camp on, and a laager would be useless work, so +he put the suggestion on one side with the remark: “It would take a +week to make.” Thus Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine was left, and he had no +reason to anticipate danger, till, almost without a moment’s warning, +he found the camp threatened by an overwhelming force; he then, after +trying in vain to check the enemy’s right, endeavoured to hold the +donga and broken ground close in front of the camp, where his men +found some cover; the camp itself being absolutely indefensible.[150] +Colonel Durnford, as we have seen, reached the camp about 10.30 A.M., +before which time Major Chard says: “The troops were in column ... +out of camp,” and he saw Zulus “on the crest of the distant hills,” +and several parties moving to the left towards Rorke’s Drift. Colonel +Durnford takes out his mounted men to (as he thinks) assist his +General, and to see what the enemy is about.[B] + +Again, some assert that the action was brought about by Colonel +Durnford’s Native Horse in the Ingqutu Hills. Even had it been so, +yet this officer’s duty distinctly was to feel and reconnoitre the +enemy.[151] When the Zulu army moved forward to the attack, he, with +his handful of men, fell slowly back, gaining all the time possible +for the camp defenders. + +Taking the whole of the circumstances of the day, we may conclude +that, had the enemy remained hidden on the 22nd, we should probably +have lost the entire column instead of part; but the account given by +an English Officer with one of the troops that first saw the enemy, +and other accounts from Zulus, seem to make it clear that the Zulus +were moving on the camp when they came in contact with the horsemen. +That they had no intention of remaining hidden is shown by their +unconcealed movements on the hills throughout the morning.[152] + +Now, whether these defenders did or did not take the best measures +“to defend the camp” when it was attacked, the primary causes of the +disaster were undoubtedly these: + +1. The fatal position selected for the camp, and the total absence of +any defensive precautions. + +2. The absence of systematic scouting, whereby an army of upwards of +20,000 Zulus was enabled to approach Isandhlwana on the 21st, and +remained unobserved till the 22nd, although their mounted scouts were +actually seen by the General and staff on the 21st, watching _them_. + +3. The subdivision of the force, and the absence of proper +communications by signalling or otherwise. + +4. The neglect of warnings given by the events of the day, and +messages from the camp; also the withdrawal of a force actually on +the march to the relief of the camp. + +For these principal causes of the disaster, none of those who fell +were responsible. + +That Lord Chelmsford was shaken by the tragic events of January is +evident from his letter to the Secretary of State for War, dated +“Durban, Natal, February 9th, 1879,” and which ran as follows: “I +consider it my duty to lay before you my opinion that it is very +desirable, in view of future contingencies, that an officer of the +rank of major-general shall be sent out to South Africa without +delay. In June last I mentioned privately to His Royal Highness +the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief that the strain of prolonged +anxiety and exertion, physical and mental, was even then telling +on me. What I felt then, I feel still more now. His Excellency Sir +Bartle Frere concurs in this representation, and pointed out to me +that the officer selected should be fitted to succeed him in his +position of High Commissioner. In making this representation, I +need not assure you that it will be my earnest desire to carry on +my duties for Her Majesty’s service up to the fullest extent of my +powers.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 79). + +The exact meaning of this letter has never been made clear. No +doubt Lord Chelmsford was feeling “the strain of prolonged anxiety +and exertion, physical and mental,” but His Royal Highness the +Commander-in-Chief said that he had no previous knowledge of it. +Students of Greek history will note the striking parallelism of this +case with that of Nicias, who, when commanding before Syracuse in +the year 414 B.C., applied to be superseded. “Such was the esteem +which the Athenians felt for this union of good qualities, purely +personal and negative, with eminent station, that they presumed the +higher aptitudes of command,” and “the general vote was one not +simply imputing no blame, but even pronouncing continued and unabated +confidence.”—Grote’s “History of Greece.” + +But of all the strange and incomprehensible circumstances connected +with that sad time, the one which struck Natal as the strangest was +the utter desertion of the battle-field and the long neglect of the +dead who lay there. On the 4th February Major Black, 2-24th Regiment, +with a small party, found the bodies of Lieutenants Melville and +Coghill about 300 yards from the river on the Natal side, near the +Fugitives’ Drift, and they were buried on the spot, the colours which +they had striven to save being found in the river, and returned next +day to the Regiment at Helpmakaar. + +The fatal field of Isandhlwana was not again seen till the 14th +March, when Major Black, 2-24th, with a small mounted party, paid a +flying visit to the spot, a few shots only being fired at them from +a distance. No attempt was made to bury the dead, and until the 21st +of May that ghastly field remained as it was left on the 23rd of +January, although there does not appear to have been any period since +the disaster when a moderate force might not with perfect safety +have done all that was necessary. + +On the morning after the return of Colonel Glyn’s Column to Rorke’s +Drift, “Commandant Lonsdale mustered the Contingent and called out +the indunas, and told them in the hearing of all that he wanted +to find out the men who were courageous and would stand by their +officers and die with them if necessary, and that those who were +willing to do this were to come forward. At this time the mounted +infantry and volunteers were moving off to Helpmakaar. The general +reply of the Contingent was that they were willing to go over to +fight along with the white people, their shield against Cetywayo; but +that now that they saw their shield going away they would not go over +by themselves, and that no one could say he was not afraid.”[153] + +“They were then dismissed, but in the afternoon they were all +disarmed (of their guns), and their belts and puggaries and blankets +taken from them by their officers. Each company had a flag, which +they asked to take home with them; some were allowed to do so, but +others were not. They were then all told to go home, and to keep +together till they reached the Umsinga, and then to divide each for +his own home.” + +On January 24th, Colonel Glyn wrote to Lord Chelmsford: “The whole +of the Native Contingent walked off this morning. Their rifles were +taken from them; all the hospital-bearers then went, and now the +Native Pioneers are going. I am now left without any natives.” The +General immediately forwarded Colonel Glyn’s letter to Sir Henry +Bulwer, with the remark: “Unless these men are at once ordered back +to their regiments, or punished for refusing to go, the most serious +consequences will ensue” (_ibid._ p. 3). + +Sir Henry Bulwer very properly abstained from taking any strong +measures as to punishing the men until he had inquired into the +causes which led to their desertion. Eventually, indeed, he +discovered that most of them had not deserted at all, but had been +disbanded by their leader, Commandant Lonsdale. But meanwhile there +was a great deal to be said, and on January 29th Sir Henry writes, +pointing out that “the great disaster which happened to our force at +Isandhlwana Camp on the 22nd inst., the circumstances under which +these men passed the night of the 22nd, and the retirement of the +remainder of the column on Rorke’s Drift and back into Natal, were +all calculated to have their effect on the natives who belonged to +this column;” and proceeds: “I am told, too, that whilst the European +force at Rorke’s Drift on the night of the 23rd were entrenched, +the Native Contingent was not entrenched; and further I am told +that, on an alarm being given that night, the European officers and +non-commissioned officers who were with the Native Contingent left +their men and took refuge within the entrenchments. On the following +morning, the 24th, the General and his staff left the camp; and +this circumstance, those acquainted with the native character tell +me, may very probably have had a further depressing effect upon the +natives.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 4). + +On February 7th, Sir Henry Bulwer writes again that he has received +answers from the magistrates whom he had directed to make inquiries +into the causes of the dispersion of the men. These reports speak +of the cheerful spirit and loyal tone of the chiefs, and of very +many of the men having reported themselves to their magistrates on +their return from the front. The accounts given by the different +magistrates are unanimous as to the causes of the dispersion. Some of +the men declared that officers of the Contingent told them to return +home and await further orders, as provisions were short; others, to +use their own words, said: “We saw that the Government was driven +out of Zululand, and the wind blew us back also.” They thought also +that the Commander-in-Chiefs hasty departure from Rorke’s Drift was a +flight from the enemy. Another reason for their retreat, and to them +a very strong one, was the necessity of going home and performing the +rights of purifying after shedding blood.[154] It was also stated +that some of them were led by their officers in their retreat. Others +saw their officers killed, were left without control, and fled. Their +friends were now laughing at them, and they were eager to return to +the front under proper guidance. + +These, indeed, were ample explanations for the fact of the dispersion +of the 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent, but they were followed +by many and serious complaints, made by the men and reported by the +magistrates, of the manner in which the former had been treated +since the campaign began. These complaints comprised insufficiency +of food, floggings for disobedience to orders which they had either +never heard, or had not understood, and bad officers.[155] These were +the most important items, the rest referring to their preference for +their own methods of fighting, to which, as we have already shown, +there were the strongest objections. + +These reports referred solely to the contingent attached to Colonel +Glyn’s column, with the exception of one, which was concerning the +remnant of the Zikali men, escaped from Isandhlwana. + +It was finally decided that the men of the contingents belonging to +No. 1 Column might “be allowed to leave in batches, but they must be +made to understand that they are required for the defence of Natal.” +(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 22.) The contingent forming No. 2 Column remained +steadily serving throughout the war. Major Bengough’s battalion had a +narrow escape of sharing in the disaster of Isandhlwana, and the men +were somewhat shaken and disheartened at seeing the contingent of No. +3 Column dispersing; but this ill-effect soon passed away. + +Colonel Pearson’s remarks on the company of Native Pioneers belonging +to his column are concise and valuable. He says: “The men worked +cheerfully. They had eyes like hawks, and they did all their scouting +to perfection. It convinced me that the Natal Zulus, under proper +management, would make excellent troops.” + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SIKUKUNI. + + +We have already, in a previous chapter, explained the circumstances +which led to the war between the Transvaal Boers and Sikukuni, +independent chief of a mixed race of natives commonly called the +_Makatisi_, more properly the _Bapedi_, tribe. The immediate cause +of the war was a border dispute between some of the gradually +encroaching Boer farmers and the natives whom they had displaced, +which ended in the latter taking possession of some cattle belonging +to the former. + +This affair took place during a temporary absence of Mr. Burgers +(then President of the Republic), who, on his return, demanded the +cattle at the hands of Sikukuni, and the restraint of his people +within the limits assigned to them by their Boer neighbours. Sikukuni +expressed his willingness to make the required restitution, but took +the opportunity of reminding the President that he laid claim to a +considerable piece of territory already occupied by Boers, to whom +he denied having ever willingly relinquished it. This reply was the +signal for a declaration of war against Sikukuni on the part of the +President and Volksraad, and a large “commando,” or volunteer force, +was called out to attack him early in July, 1876. + +This force, consisting of some 3000 Boers and over 4000 of their +Swazi allies, made its way through the country, ravaging and +destroying as it went, until it reached the famous stronghold known +as “Sikukuni’s Town,” upon which it made an unsuccessful night +attack, on August 2nd. + +A single reverse was sufficient to dishearten the gallant Boers, who +immediately discovered various reasons which made their return to +their homes absolutely necessary. The commando dispersed, leaving +a force of volunteers composed of stray Englishmen, Germans, and +half-bred natives to occupy a couple of posts (Fort Burgers and +Fort Weber), which they built for the purpose. From these posts +they carried on a system of raiding expeditions upon Sikukuni’s +people, which effectually prevented the cultivation of their land, +and finally produced a scarcity of food amongst them. This state of +things was too harassing to last, and Sikukuni sued for peace, which +was granted him early in 1877, conditionally upon his paying a heavy +fine in cattle. + +A month later, and before the fine had been paid, Sir T. Shepstone +had annexed the Transvaal, and, as we have already described, took +over, with the country, its quarrels and demands. He tried to enforce +the fine imposed by the late Boer Government upon Sikukuni, while +remitting the war-tax levied upon the whites. After having been +subjected to so long a course of marauding on the part of the Dutch, +it is not impossible that the chief really had some difficulty in +procuring, at a moment’s notice, the 2000 head of cattle demanded +by Sir T. Shepstone.[156] At all events, the fine was not paid so +promptly as the administrator expected; and the whole country being +in an unsettled condition, perpetual disturbances still took place +between Sikukuni’s people and the border farmers, and also between +the former and petty chiefs who had placed themselves under British +protection. + +The most restless of the independent native rulers seems to have been +a woman, Legolwana, a sister of Sikukuni’s, who had her own clan, and +whose head-quarters was a mountain stronghold, called Masellaroon. In +February, 1878, her people had a quarrel (nor was it for the first +time) with a neighbouring native chief under our rule, from whom +they took some cattle. Whether or no there were two sides to the +question, the despoiled chief was our subject, and it so happened +that Legolwana’s people were met in the act of driving off the cattle +by a patrol of Transvaal volunteers, who promptly interfered. This +occurrence led to a general outbreak of hostilities. Legolwana’s men +attacked the two forts simultaneously, and the officers in command, +Captain Clarke and Lieutenant Eckersley, with their men, escaped +from them, and retired to Lydenburg. From thence Captain Clarke sent +embassies to the Swazi king and another independent chief, asking for +assistance against Sikukuni. His invitations, however, were politely +declined, the chiefs in question not caring to interfere, although +wishing to remain upon friendly terms with the English. + +Having obtained reinforcements from the gold-fields and Pretoria, +Captain Clarke marched back to Fort Weber, and re-occupied it with a +force consisting of 40 mounted volunteers under Captains Van Deventer +and Ferreira, 150 Natal Zulus under Lieutenants Lloyd and Dacomb, and +300 Bechuanas under Mr. Tainton. + +Captain Clarke’s first intentions were to attack Legolwana and +reduce her to submission. Captain Lacon Hervey, 71st Regiment, gives +the following description of her stronghold in his account of “The +Secocœni War”: + +“The town, or kraal, of Legolani consisted of a number of straw and +wattle-and-daub huts, beehive-shaped, situated at the base and on +the terraces of a mountain of rocks and huge boulders 700 feet high, +covered over with thick clumps of bush. The huts at the base of the +mountain were surrounded by an impenetrable hedge of prickly pear; +a single entrance, barricaded with timber, led through an avenue +of prickly pear and cactus into the group of huts surrounded by +palisading, wattle screens, and stone walls. Each group of huts was +commanded by the rocks above; from behind these a direct, flanking, +and enfilade fire could be poured on the attacking party, which, on +account of the intricacy of the ground, would be compelled to advance +in single file along the tortuous goat-paths leading up to the +mountain. In addition to the cover afforded by the caves and fissures +in the rocks, schanzes, or low stone walls, were built up wherever +favourable positions with safe means of retreat presented themselves. +The paths leading from one rock entrenchment, or terrace, to the +one above it, were so concealed by rock and bush as to be difficult +to find. Finally, the Kafirs’ most valued treasure, the cattle, was +placed on the summit of the mountain, on a level plot of ground, +surrounded by a stone wall.” + +This stronghold was attacked by Captain Clarke’s orders on the 5th +April, and, “after about two hours’ sharp work, the north of the +hill was carried.”[157] The fighting force, not being sufficient to +complete its work, was ordered to withdraw, after having swept all +the cattle from that side of the hill (277 head of cattle and 211 +sheep and goats). A considerable number of Legolwana’s people are +supposed to have fallen in this assault, the loss on our side being +10 killed and 12 wounded, amongst the latter Captain Van Deventer +slightly, and Lieutenant Lloyd severely. These two officers are +reported as having led the attack with great gallantry. + +The partial success gained by the storming of Masellaroon (with the +loss of life on our side—considerable under the circumstances) was +not such as to encourage Captain Clarke in the tactics with which +he had commenced his operations. He therefore abandoned all idea of +seizing the native strongholds, and “established a cordon of forts, +about twelve miles from each other ... with a view of harassing the +Kafirs by preventing them from cultivating the Indian corn.” + +“Legolwana had sued for peace, but Captain Clarke would not listen to +anything except unconditional surrender, with the guarantee that all +life should be spared.”[158] + +Thus, with the usual notion that “no terms can be made with savages,” +which has again and again produced such disastrous consequences for +them and for us, a system of petty warfare was kept up, tedious, +unnecessary, and by which no good could be done nor honour gained. To +the volunteers, many of whom, says Captain Harvey, were “gentlemen +by birth and education,” there may have been some amusement in what +that officer speaks of as “actions of daring individual enterprise,” +and which he describes as follows: “Volunteers went out and lay +ambuscades at night, to surprise and cut off Kafirs proceeding from +kraal to kraal, or to cultivate their fields, and ‘cattle-lifting’ +expeditions were planned and boldly carried out;” but the life must +have become monotonous in the extreme before July, when the native +auxiliaries became so discontented with it that some of them were +allowed to return to their homes, while a troop of mounted infantry +was summoned from Pretoria to keep order amongst those who remained. + +It was about this time that Colonel Rowlands, V.C., came upon the +scene. This excellent officer, of whose services in 1878-79 so little +mention has been made, was sent out on “special service,” and was +for a short time attached to the staff of Lord Chelmsford (then +General Thesiger) during the Kaffrarian war. He was subsequently +sent by the High Commissioner to Pretoria, which he reached on May +6th. He employed the two following months in an inspection of the +northern and eastern frontiers of the Transvaal,[159] and by dint +of considerable personal exertion was enabled to supply valuable +information to head-quarters. Towards the end of July, Colonel +Rowlands was appointed Commandant of the Transvaal. At this time the +regular forces in the Transvaal consisted only of the 13th Light +Infantry, a few engineers, and departmental staff—quite inadequate +for the work required of them; but the Commander-in-Chief, in +signifying his approval of the manner in which Colonel Rowlands +proposed to distribute the troops already under his command, informed +him that he was about to reinforce the Transvaal with the 80th +Regiment and Frontier Light Horse, with a view to active operations +against Sikukuni. + +The promised reinforcements arrived by degrees from Natal, and +meanwhile there were Pretoria, Middleburg, Lydenburg, and Standerton, +where considerable stores of ammunition, etc. were collected, to +be garrisoned, as well as the cordon of forts, already mentioned, +along the Leolu Mountains, which left no large proportion of the +troops—about 800 of the 13th, and under 300 volunteers and Zulu +police—for service in the field. + +However, by the 29th August Colonel Rowlands found himself in a +position to leave Pretoria for the confines of the Transvaal, and +reached Fort Weber on the 13th September. From thence to Fort Burgers +was a long and tedious march through a difficult and trackless +country. The column was forced to make its own road as it went, and +had several skirmishes with Sikukuni’s people _en route_. Reinforced +by the Frontier Light Horse under Major Buller, and a party under +Major Russell from Pretoria, Colonel Rowlands at last reached Fort +Burgers, and, after a few days’ halt for repairs, patrolling, and +scouting the country, recommenced his march towards “Sikukuni’s +Town,” distant about twenty-five miles. + +On the 3rd October he advanced with 338 mounted men (Mounted +Infantry, Frontier Light Horse, and Transvaal Volunteers), 130 +infantry, and 2 7-pounder mountain guns; his intention being to +establish himself before Sikukuni’s town, thoroughly reconnoitre it, +and, should he find that there was a chance of success, and that the +position could be afterwards held, to attack it when he had brought +up reinforcements. + +The position was one of extreme difficulty, greatly increased by +the singular drought which was experienced at the time, both in the +Transvaal and Natal. + +From Fort Burgers to Sikukuni’s Town, the approach lay chiefly +through a defile commanded by “kopjes” (piles of rock and boulders, +often some hundred feet in height), of which the enemy did not fail +to take advantage. The weather was intensely hot, the thermometer +standing daily at over 100 in the shade, and the unusual drought had +dried up the springs and small watercourses to an extent previously +unknown. + +The camp was fired into on the night before the force sighted +Sikukuni’s Town, but from a considerable distance, causing no damage +beyond one horse wounded, and a general stampede of the slaughter +cattle; a determined advance of the piquets, reinforced by their +supports, quickly driving back the enemy, who did not advance again. + +The stronghold was sighted upon the following day, but it soon became +apparent to Colonel Rowlands that, while to attempt its capture with +the small force at his disposal would be a mere reckless sacrifice +of the troops under his command, it was equally impossible to carry +out his original intention of establishing himself before it, under +the existing circumstances of absolute want of water and forage. +Deeply disappointing as was this discovery, Colonel Rowlands was +convinced that his only course under the circumstances was to retire, +and, his opinion being confirmed by the senior officers present, he +reluctantly commenced his return march on the 6th October. + +Encouraged by the retreat of the force, the enemy, now in large +numbers, followed and harassed it, almost until it reached the +bivouac, eight miles from Fort Burgers. Thirteen thousand rounds of +ammunition were expended in keeping off the foe during the march, +and both man and beast suffered severely from want of water and the +intense heat of the sun. The force reached Fort Burgers the following +day, with the loss of 1 man wounded; 5 horses were killed, 10 died +of horse sickness, and 4 horses and 1 mule were wounded. Here they +remained for several weeks, in hopes that the summer rains, which it +was natural to expect should fall at this time of year, would enable +them to make a second advance upon Sikukuni’s Town. Meanwhile mounted +patrols, under Major Buller, Major Russell, Captain Clarke, and +Lieutenant Eckersley (in command of Swazi levies), swept the country +in every direction, harrying the natives and capturing their cattle, +but without meeting with any armed opposition. Horse sickness now +set in—that South African scourge, from which the force had hitherto +suffered but slightly, and in single cases, but which at this time +became an epidemic, deaths occurring daily, sometimes but a few +hours after the animal was attacked by the disease. This unfortunate +circumstance added greatly to the difficulties of the situation. + +After the retreat of the force from before Sikukuni’s Town, the +enemy made several determined attacks upon the forts in the Mamalubi +Valley, especially upon Fort Faugh-a-Ballagh; and although these +attacks were in every case successfully resisted, they necessitated +the strengthening of the garrisons of the forts along this line. + +Lord Chelmsford (then General Thesiger) had previously given notice +to Colonel Rowlands that a column from the Transvaal, under the +command of the latter, would be required to co-operate with the +Ama-Swazi in the invasion of Zululand. The 13th Regiment, Frontier +Light Horse, and Lieutenant Nicholson’s guns, were all to be +available for that purpose as soon as the Sikukuni affair (which was +then lightly considered) should be settled. By this arrangement, the +80th Regiment and volunteers alone were reserved for the defence of +the Transvaal. As the season was now far advanced, Colonel Rowlands +was obliged to make the best arrangements he could for the defence +of the border with the force—an absurdly small one, considering +the disturbed state of the country—which would be left after the +withdrawal of those intended by the General for the Zulu invasion. +His chief adviser, Captain Clarke, was of opinion that a precipitate +retirement from the valleys of the Steelport and Speckboom rivers +would be unadvisable. These valleys contained large numbers of Kafir +gardens, and, by holding them a little later, the natives would be +prevented from sowing their crops for another season, and starvation +would ensue. With this object in view, Fort Burgers was garrisoned +with 100 of the 13th Regiment, and some 50 mounted volunteers, +while Colonel Rowlands himself retired to Speckboom Drift, about +thirteen miles from Fort Burgers, where he constructed another +fort in such a position as to cover the junction of four important +roadways. Having completed this work, he determined to attack some +native strongholds in the Steelport Valley, into which he marched, +with 3 guns, 140 mounted men, 340 infantry, and 250 natives, on +the 26th October. Moving before daybreak the following morning, he +commenced the attack, at 7 A.M., upon a large kraal, built upon a +mountain spur. Here there was some sharp work, difficult positions +seized, and the valley finally cleared. Several kraals were burnt, +about 12,000 lb. of grain destroyed, and 100 head of cattle taken. +Sixteen of the enemy were “accounted for,” the loss on the side of +the attacking party being 1 killed and 10 wounded. At 10 o’clock the +same morning the Commandant returned to his camp on the Steelport, +and, a few days later, to the new fort at Speckboom Drift. Despatches +from head-quarters awaited him here, instructing him to withdraw +altogether, and as speedily as possible, from the enemy’s country. + +Arrangements were immediately made for the evacuation of Fort +Burgers, which was the advanced post on the direct road to Sikukuni’s +Town, the withdrawal of troops and stores being masked by a strong +patrol under Captain Carrington, composed of mounted volunteers and +native foot levies, who were sent, _viâ_ Fort Burgers and Origstaadt +Valley, to the Oliphant River. The head-quarters of the 13th Regiment +(340), Russell’s Mounted Infantry (63), and Lieutenant Nicholson’s +two mountain guns, left camp for Lydenburg—the whole under the +command of Lieut.-Colonel Gilbert, 13th Light Infantry—immediately; +and in a few days’ time Fort Burgers was emptied and demolished. +Captain Carrington’s patrol having returned, after capturing 345 +head of cattle, and meeting no enemy except a small guard and the +cattle-herds, Colonel Rowlands marched from Speckboom about the +7th November, leaving at that fort a sufficient force to guard the +ammunition and stores which remained there. About thirteen miles +from Lydenburg he halted and constructed a small fort, to cover +the principal road leading to that town, and which he purposed to +garrison with a detachment of volunteers. + +Considerable difficulty was now experienced by Colonel Rowlands +in arranging the small force to be left at his disposal, so as to +efficiently protect the great length of frontier, extending from +Fort Mamalubi (under the west side of the Leolu range, and about +twenty-five miles from Oliphant’s River) to Kruger’s Post on the +east, besides garrisoning Pretoria, Middleburg, and Lydenburg, in +which were large quantities of supplies and war _matériel_. His plans +were laid with due consideration for the nature of the country and +the enemy, and after careful consultation with those officers who +were supposed to be most fully acquainted with both. Nevertheless +they did not meet with full approval from head-quarters, from whence +Colonel Rowlands finally received orders to remain where he was, +and be responsible for the arrangements he had made, instead of +proceeding at the head of No. 5 Column to the eastern border for the +invasion of Zululand, as originally intended. Shortly afterwards +Lieut.-Colonel Gilbert was directed to proceed with the 13th Light +Infantry and Lieutenant Nicholson’s guns to Derby, Lieut.-Colonel +Buller having preceded him to that place, which was now removed from +under Colonel Rowlands’s command and placed under that of Colonel +Wood. + +The attention of the former officer was now turned to the disposition +of the force that remained to him, and to the raising of new corps +of volunteers and strengthening those already formed, which he +deemed necessary for the security of the Transvaal. To this work he +set himself with great energy and considerable success, stifling +thereby the disappointment which it was but natural that he should +feel at being excluded from the Zulu campaign. Towards the close of +the month, however, he received a letter from the General, asking +him to spare two companies of the 80th Regiment to take the place of +the force under Colonel Gilbert, which had been moved to Luneburg, +and which shortly after joined Colonel Wood’s column. Somewhat +to his surprise, he was reminded that Derby was _in his command_, +and was told that the General commanding would be glad if he would +proceed there in person to _reassure the Swazis_. That same day the +two companies of the 80th, under Major Creagh, were put in orders +to march as directed, and Colonel Rowlands followed a week later, +leaving the forces defending the northern border under the able +command of Major Carrington, who, however, took such instructions +from Captain Clarke as he considered necessary to give as +Commissioner of that district under His Excellency the Administrator +of the Transvaal. + +At Derby there was, not unnaturally, some slight confusion owing +to this double appointment of officers in command; but having +overcome this difficulty, Colonel Rowlands set himself seriously +to consider the situation, which was by no means a promising one. +A force composed of two companies of Europeans and 250 natives, +collected from the neighbouring country, was clearly useless for any +aggressive purposes, while the Swazis, though ready and willing to +co-operate with an English force large enough to support them, were +evidently far from satisfied with the number collected at Derby. +That town, or hamlet rather, consisting of but two houses in point +of fact, is situated from twenty to five-and-twenty miles from the +Zulu border of a part of Zululand peopled by some of the most warlike +tribes of that nation, and so small a garrison as the above did +but invite attack and disaster. Upon these considerations Colonel +Rowlands determined to reinforce himself from Pretoria and Lydenburg. +He sent instructions to Major Tyler, 80th Regiment, to send him +three companies of the 80th, two Armstrong guns, and a troop of +Weatherley’s Border Horse, but directing him to consult the colonial +authorities as to whether the troops could be safely spared, before +complying with the order. + +At this time, about the middle of January, the Zulus throughout this +northern and thickly-populated part of the country were perfectly +quiet and even friendly. There was still a possibility that the +difficulty between their king and the English might be settled +without bloodshed, and the people were evidently anxious to avoid +giving cause of offence. Colonel Rowlands, who employed his time +while waiting for his reinforcements (which would take some weeks to +arrive) in reconnoitring the country, found the roads open and the +inhabitants inoffensive. At this period he also attempted to organise +a frontier force of farmers—Englishmen, Boers, and Germans—whom he +summoned to a meeting for consideration of the question. From fifty +to sixty attended, and, after hearing his address, their spokesman +responded to the effect that they were willing to take service +for the defensive object proposed, but that it was to be clearly +understood that by uniting themselves to a common protective cause +(course?), they did not thereby acknowledge allegiance to the British +crown. But a committee, subsequently formed to consider details +connected with the proposed force, fell out amongst themselves, and +the scheme was abandoned. + +On the 26th January, Colonel Rowlands received from Sir T. Shepstone +the news of the disaster at Isandhlwana; and from this time nothing +but contradictory orders and impossible commands seem to have reached +him at his distant post. He heard of the troops he had intended +for special purposes being ordered elsewhere; he was directed by +Lord Chelmsford to take orders from his junior, Colonel Wood; he +received different instructions, entirely opposed to each other, +concerning the calling out of the Swazi allies; nevertheless, in +spite of the confusion which reigned at that unhappy epoch, he kept +his head, and went steadily on with the plans he had formed. By the +second week in February he had, with some difficulty, collected +a force of something under a thousand Europeans and natives, and +was prepared to operate. It seemed, however, impossible to get any +distinct orders or definite instructions from those in command, +either military or civil; and representations having been made to him +by the border Boers that a Zulu impi was about to attack them from +the Tolaka Mountains, he marched out with a portion of his force in +that direction, leaving Major Tucker (80th) in command of the rest. +While halted at the Assegai River upon this expedition, he received +a despatch from Colonel Wood, requesting him to march his force from +Derby to Luneburg to his support. Sending a note to Major Tucker, +directing him to start for Luneburg next morning, he continued his +march, attacked and took the Tolaka Mountain, and then proceeded +towards Luneburg with his own force. He was now about eighteen miles +from where his head-quarters camp under Major Tucker would be, with +a broken and hilly country to pass through, over which he had great +difficulty in conveying his wounded (fortunately but few), and the +captured women and children. These captives were, on this account, +offered their freedom, but refused to accept it, which, perhaps, was +not unnatural, seeing that their homes and crops were destroyed, and +they had no longer any means of livelihood. + +The force passed through the Intombi Valley, laying the country waste +for miles on either side of the road as it went, and met on its way +messengers from Colonel Wood, requesting the immediate presence of +the mounted corps. But upon the 23rd February, Colonel Rowlands +received a memorandum to the effect that the Lieut.-General, by +desire of the High Commissioner, wished him to proceed at once back +to Pretoria, to prepare some defence against the Boers, who had +assumed a threatening attitude. Upon the receipt of this order he +quitted the Luneburg district, and arrived on the 6th of March at +the capital of the Transvaal. Here there were but 200 infantry and +some few mounted volunteers; but by Colonel Rowlands’s exertions the +number was soon swelled to 600 or 700, by the addition of city corps +and other volunteers. + +A considerable number of Boers who had never willingly accepted +the annexation of their country by the English, had taken the +opportunity, offered by the general confusion which reigned after +the disaster of the 22nd January, of endeavouring to regain the +independence of their state. Mass meetings were held to discuss the +subject, and finally a large body of armed men formed a camp at no +great distance from Pretoria. The situation appeared a very serious +one; and the High Commissioner himself travelled to Pretoria to +endeavour by his honeyed words to calm an agitation which might prove +so singularly inconvenient should the angry feelings of the indignant +Boers find vent in blows. On the 12th of April, just two years from +the day of the annexation, Sir B. Frere met a deputation of the +Transvaal farmers at Erasmus Spruit, about six miles from Pretoria, +and held a long discussion with them upon the subject of their +rights and wrongs. They repeatedly and plainly asserted that Sir +T. Shepstone had coerced the people into submission by threatening +them with the Zulus, and declared unanimously that nothing would +satisfy them but the recovery of their liberties. Sir Bartle Frere +gave them to understand in return that this was the only thing for +which they might not hope. He assured them that he looked upon the +_voortrekkers_ as an honour to their race, and that he felt proud to +belong to the same stock. The Queen, he told them, felt for them “as +for her own children;”[160] and he hoped to tell her that she had “no +better subjects in her empire,” than amongst them. The committee, +however, retired in complete dissatisfaction, and addressed a +petition to Her Majesty, in which they remark, “unwilling subjects +but faithful neighbours we will be;” and more than hint that they are +prepared to “draw the sword” to prove how much they are in earnest. +The excitement, however, calmed down for the time being, and Sir +Bartle Frere departed. + +During his stay in Pretoria, he desired Colonel Rowlands to +make preparations to resume hostilities against Sikukuni, and +accordingly, by the end of May, that officer had increased the +number of his mounted volunteers by 450. He then made a vain attempt +to induce Lord Chelmsford to spare him another regiment of regular +troops; but finding that this was decidedly refused, and that no +operations were likely to take place in the Transvaal for some time, +he accepted the General’s offer of a brigade in the lower column. + +On the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley at Port Durnford, he applied to +that general for the command in case operations should be resumed in +the Transvaal. To this he had a strong claim, both on account of his +experience and of his laborious services there; but the request was +refused. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. + +NO. 4 COLUMN—INTOMBI—INDHLOBANE—KAMBULA—KING’S MESSENGERS. + + +On January 6th, No. 4 Column, under Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B.—strength +previously detailed—crossed the Blood River (the Zulu boundary +according to the award of the Commission) and advanced to Bemba’s Kop. + +On the 11th, Colonel Wood met the General halfway to Rorke’s Drift, +and received instructions “to occupy himself with the tribes on his +front and left flank, notably Seketwayo,” until No. 3 Column was +ready to advance to Isipezi Hill, when he was to proceed to Ingwe, +both columns to establish advanced depôts, bring up supplies, and +then move forward. Colonel Wood induced the Zulu chief Bemba to give +up his arms and come in, which he did on the 10th, bringing with him +about eighty of his people and 1000 head of cattle, sheep, and goats; +they were sent to Utrecht. + +On the 11th, Colonel Wood, who had advanced with a portion of the +force from Bemba’s Kop towards Rorke’s Drift to meet the General on +his return march, seized about 2000 head of cattle, the owners of +which were quietly tending them as usual (these were supposed to +be Sihayo’s), and next day attacked a petty chief, who was said to +have “given considerable trouble to the Transvaal farmers”, with +the result of seven Zulus killed and upwards of 500 head of cattle +captured. + +Some 2000 to 3000 head of cattle were also taken from the Sondolosi +tribe,[161] a slight resistance being offered by the Zulus, of whom +one was killed. Colonel Wood _thus_ endeavoured to induce Seketwayo’s +people to be pacified, and was “therefore most anxious to refrain +from taking any steps which might discourage these men from coming +in!” + +The General, on entering Zululand, finding the difficulties greater +than he had anticipated, instructed Colonel Wood “to act altogether +independently, about the head waters of the White Umveloosi River” +(16th January, 1879), and when Seketwayo had either surrendered +or been defeated, to “take up a position covering Utrecht and the +adjacent Transvaal border, wherever he considers his force can be +most usefully employed,” and not to “attempt to advance towards the +Inhlazatye Mountain until an advance by the other three columns +across the Umhlatoozi River has become possible.” (P. P. [C. 2252] +p. 63.) Colonel Wood, from Bemba’s Kop, communicated with Uhamo—a +brother of Cetshwayo—who had asked for a way to be pointed out by +which he might escape. + +No. 4 Column now moved towards Intemgeni River, and encamped there on +18th January, Colonel Wood reporting “many of the natives are giving +themselves up to me; I have captured about 4000 head of cattle.” +On the previous day a party of Wood’s “irregulars” attacked some +Zulus, killing 9, wounding about 20, and taking 5 prisoners and 100 +sheep; with a loss to themselves of 2 wounded (_ibid._ p. 66). On the +19th and 20th there were skirmishes with some of Tinta’s people, of +whom about 12 were killed. A prisoner was brought in by the Native +Contingent on the 19th, whom they gravely asked permission to kill +in the evening, “thinking they had done their whole duty in obeying +orders and bringing the man in.” + +The column encamped at Tinta’s kraal, on the left bank of the +Umvolosi River, and a stone fort was commenced. A reconnaissance +across the Umvolosi to Zinguni Mountain met the Zulus in force, +and was compelled to retire with a loss of two wounded, the enemy +not being checked until the river was recrossed. January 22nd, the +Zinguni Mountain was patrolled by a strong force, the enemy retiring +hastily, and leaving about 600 head of cattle. In the distance a +large force, estimated at 4000, was seen, and it apparently ascended +the Indhlobane Mountain. The column had a smart engagement with the +enemy on the 24th, and drove them off with a loss of about fifty +killed; but on receiving intelligence of the disaster to No. 3 +Column, retired to Fort Tinta. + +At Luneburg a laager was formed by the Dutch farmers, under +Commandant Schermbrucker, and Colonel Wood moved his force to Kambula +Hill, to cover Utrecht and the neighbouring border, and there +firmly entrenched himself. The situation chosen was a commanding +and central position between the Umvolosi and Pevana rivers on the +Jagt-pad (Hunter’s path), covering the country northward to Luneburg, +eastward to the Amaqulusi, southward to the Umvolosi, and westward to +Balte’s Spruit and Utrecht. + +The Zulus abandoned the open, and remained in the mountains and +broken country, where rocks and caves afforded them secure positions. + +On February 1st, Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with 140 irregular cavalry, +made a dash at the Amaqulisini (or Amaqulusi) kraal, thirty miles +distant. This was a military stronghold, deemed by the Boers to be +impregnable. It was situated in a basin at a distance of nearly +two miles from the summit of the rugged heights by which it was +surrounded, and almost hidden from view, although about 300 yards in +diameter and containing at least 250 huts. + +Leaving thirty men as a covering party, Colonel Buller moved with the +remainder down the almost precipitous slopes, the horsemen frequently +obliged to dismount and lead their horses. However, the kraal was +not occupied in force, and, after a few shots, the inmates fled. Six +Zulus were killed, 270 head of cattle taken, and the kraal burnt, the +force returning from this daring exploit without casualty, after a +hard day’s work of twenty hours. + +A small fort was finished and armed on February 3rd, and, on the +10th, Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with 400 irregular cavalry, reconnoitred +the Indhlobane Mountain, and, after a slight skirmish, captured 490 +head of cattle. + +A new fort was commenced at Kambula, about two miles higher up the +spur, and the camp moved to this spot on the 13th, the fort being +garrisoned by two companies of infantry and two guns. + +It was reported that Manyonyoba (an independent native chief) had +been killing and plundering in the Intombi Valley, so Colonel Buller +was sent with a force to the spot. The Swazi chief Umbilini was also +reported by Commandant Schermbrucker to have raided, in combination +with Manyonyoba, and done much mischief to life and property; +however, a force sent from Luneburg had a successful skirmish with +them. + +The king’s brother, Uhamo, came in to Captain McLeod from the Swazi +border with 300 of his people and 1000 cattle, and reached Derby on +February 4th, his following increased to about 600, and was moved +down to Luneburg, where he arrived on March 7th. + +A sad disaster occurred on the Intombi River to a detachment of the +80th Regiment on the 12th March. Captain Moriarty, with 104 men of +the 80th, was escorting a convoy from Derby to Luneburg. On reaching +the Intombi Drift (about four miles from Luneburg) the river was +found to be rising, and by the time the advanced guard (thirty-five +men, under Lieutenant Harward) had crossed, it was impossible to take +the waggons over. They were therefore laagered on the river-bank in +the shape of a triangle; and there they remained next day. About +4 A.M. on the 12th a shot was fired, and the troops turned out, +remaining under arms for half an hour, when, all being quiet, they +returned to their tents (it transpired afterwards that the outlying +sentries had been surprised and killed by the enemy). Suddenly the +fog lifted, and a large body of Zulus without any warning rushed on +and took the laager, driving the troops into the river. The party +under Lieutenant Harward, which was encamped on the opposite bank, +opened a brisk fire, but were soon broken, and obliged to fly towards +Luneburg; Lieutenant Harward, galloping in, gave the alarm. Only +forty-four men of this detachment survived. + +Major Tucker sallied out from Luneburg, when the enemy slowly +retreated. The waggons were saved, and the bodies of Captain Moriarty +and his unfortunate men buried. + +The comparatively quiet time at Kambula was passed thus: Colonel +Wood was up with the first in the early morning, and often out with +the patrols who daily scouted the country round for miles; his force +securely entrenched; himself a very strict but kind commander, who +had the full confidence and good-will of his troops. Sports were +got up for the amusement and occupation of the men. A band played +in the evening, and the singing and laughter in camp showed that +all were in excellent spirits. The daily business was cutting wood +from the mountain-side some three miles distant, escorts, patrols, +and piquet-duty. One of the night piquets (eight men) posted at +some distance from camp was termed “the forlorn hope;” its special +duty was to give early warning of an enemy’s approach. But the most +unpleasant feature in this camp-life was the absence of comfort at +night. The troops necessarily “turned in” dressed, armed, and ready +for instant work, with the _personal_ discomfort illustrated by this +soldier’s joke—that it was “Cetshwayo outside and Catch-away-o! +inside.” + +Lieut.-Colonel Buller, having returned to Kambula, patrolled Uhamo’s +district, and in the direction of the Indhlobane range; and on the +16th brought into camp 958 of Uhamo’s people. + +On March 28th, a reconnaissance by the whole cavalry force was made +towards Indhlobane. The Zulus were in possession of the mountain, +which was ascended in skirmishing order as rapidly as possible, +the enemy keeping up a heavy fire from caves and from behind huge +rocks. The summit was reached with the loss of one officer—Lieutenant +Williams—and serious fighting was kept up for some time in the +endeavour to dislodge the Zulus from their secure positions. Captain +the Hon. R. Campbell was killed, also Lieutenant von Sticenstron, and +Colonel Wood himself had a very narrow escape. + +Whilst engaged in this struggle a Zulu army was moving up to seize +the approaches to the mountain, and cut off the force from the camp. +Immediately on this being observed a retreat was made in rapid but +good order, until a very steep and stony krantz was reached, where +the men could only move in single file; here the enemy got in amongst +the troopers, causing utter confusion. The officers did their best to +steady their men, but it became a case of _sauve qui peut_. + +Captain Barton’s troop was sent down the mountain to recover the +body of Lieutenant Williams, and returned, having been joined by Mr. +Uys. On the flats they came up with Colonel Weatherley’s troop, and +found the enemy in front and on the right and left. Retreating a +short distance they were surrounded, so, opening out, they charged +through the enemy and over the neck, which was lined with Zulus. But +few were enabled to win their way through this perilous pass, and of +those who did many were overtaken and killed on the plain. Of Captain +Barton’s troop but eight men returned to camp that night. + +The broken force fought its way to the camp, followed by the enemy +for several miles. Many a man’s life was saved by a comrade halting +and taking him up on his own horse, a personal instance of which +Captain D’Arcy gives. His horse had been killed under him in the +descent of the mountain, and he ran for his life for some 300 yards, +when a man named Francis caught a horse for him, which, however, +he shortly relinquished to a wounded comrade, running on himself +on foot. Colonel Buller picked him up when nearly exhausted, but +when he recovered his breath he dismounted; he was a second time +in difficulties, and assisted by Lieutenant Blaine, and again, a +third time, by Major Tremlett, R.A. Indeed, most of the men got into +camp with comrades mounted behind them. The loss was 12 officers +and 84 non-commissioned officers and men killed, and also Colonel +Wood’s staff-officer, Captain the Hon. R. Campbell; Captain Barton, +Coldstream Guards; and Mr. Lloyd, Political Assistant. Colonel Wood’s +horse was shot under him. + +Mr. Piet Uys, the leader of the Burgher force, was likewise amongst +those killed in action this day. + +Small patrols were sent out next morning to endeavour to find any men +who might have escaped. + +Warning of an intended attack on Kambula was brought in by a +native—one of Uhamo’s men—and, about 11 A.M., dense masses of the +enemy were seen in the distance, when all the force was assembled +and the cattle driven into their laager. At 1.30 P.M. the action +commenced by mounted troops, under Colonels Buller and Russell, +engaging the enemy on the north of the camp. They were speedily +forced to return into the laager, followed by the Zulus until they +were within 300 yards, when a heavy fire from the 90th Regiment +checked their advance, and they opened out round the camp. + +At 2.15 the right front and rear of the camp were attacked by heavy +masses of the enemy, who, apparently well supplied with Martini-Henry +rifles, occupied a hill commanding the laager, enfilading it so that +the company of the 13th posted at the right rear of the enclosure had +to be withdrawn. The front of the cattle-laager was, however, stoutly +held by a company of the 13th; but the Zulus coming boldly on, Major +Hackett, with two companies of the 90th, was directed to clear the +slope. They sallied out into the open, driving the Zulus back in a +gallant manner under a heavy fire, until ordered to retire by Colonel +Wood. + +While bringing his men in, Major Hackett was dangerously wounded. + +The two guns in the redoubt were admirably worked by Lieutenant +Nicholson, R.A., until he was mortally wounded; when Major Vaughan, +R.A., replaced him. + +Major Tremlett, R.A., with four guns, remained in the open during the +engagement. + +The attack began to slacken about 5.30 P.M., enabling Colonel Wood +to assume the offensive; the Zulus were driven from the cattle kraal +into which they penetrated, and from the immediate vicinity of the +camp, the infantry doing great execution among the retreating masses. + +The pursuit was taken up by the mounted men under Colonel Buller, and +continued for seven miles, “killing great numbers, the enemy being +too exhausted to fire in their own defence” (_vide_ Colonel Wood’s +despatch of March 30th). All agreed in admiring the pluck of the +Zulus, who, “under tremendous fire, never wavered, but came straight +at us.” + +The loss of No. 4 Column was 2 officers killed, 5 wounded, and 80 +men killed and wounded. The strength of the enemy was thought to be +about 20,000, of whom 1000 are supposed to have been killed. Colonel +Wood’s operations at Indhlobane were for the purpose of “making +demonstrations against the enemy,” as directed by the General, who +had reason to believe at that time, that he should find the whole +Zulu army between his force and Etshowe. (P. P. [C. 2367] p. 35.) One +trooper, a Frenchman named Grandier, had a very remarkable escape +from Indhlobane, of which the following is his account: On coming +down the mountain we were met by a large Zulu force, and fell back +across the neck assailed on all sides. I was about the last, having +put a comrade on my horse whilst I ran alongside, when a Kafir caught +me by the legs, and I was made prisoner. I was taken to Umbilini’s +kraal and questioned; after which, I passed the night tied to a +tree. Next day I was taken into the middle of a large “impi,” where +I was threatened with death, but the leader said he would send me to +Cetywayo. Next day I started for Ulundi, in charge of four men, who +were riding, but I had all my clothes taken from me, and had to walk, +carrying their food. On the evening of the fourth day we reached +Ulundi, and I was kept tied in the open till about noon next day, +when Cetywayo sent for me, and questioned me about what the English +wanted, where Shepstone was, etc. A Dutchman acted as interpreter, +and I saw a Portuguese, and an English-speaking Zulu, who could +read.[162] Cetywayo had a personal guard of about one hundred men, +but I did not see any large numbers of men at his kraal, but there +were two small cannons there. During my stay I was fed on mealies, +and frequently beaten. At last messengers arrived reporting the death +of Umbilini, and Cetywayo said he would send me to his Kafirs to +kill. On 13th April I started in charge of two Kafirs, one armed with +a gun and both with assegais. About midday we were lying down, the +Kafirs being sleepy, when I seized an assegai and killed the man with +the gun, the other running away. I walked all night guided by the +stars; next day I saw an impi driving cattle towards Ulundi, so had +to lie still. After this I saw no Kafirs, and walked on at night. On +the morning of the 16th I met some of our own people and was brought +into camp. Trooper Grandier, when brought in, was dressed in an old +corduroy coat, cut with assegai stabs, and a pair of regimental +trousers cut off at the knee; these he had picked up on the Veldt. He +had strips of cloth round his feet. + +The independent chief Umbilini, who was such a thorn in the side of +the Transvaal, was killed early in April. Small parties had raided +into the Pongolo Valley from Indhlobane, opposite Luneburg, until +they were said to number some hundreds, when they came upon two +companies of the 2-24th on the march; these at once laagered, and the +enemy moved on; Umbilini, Assegai’s son, and four horsemen, going +back with twenty horses. They were pursued by Captain Prior, 80th +Regiment, with seven mounted men (80th), and another European, when +Assegai’s son was killed, and Umbilini mortally wounded. + +The raiders were attacked by some parties of natives, but went off to +the Assegai River with several beasts and sheep.—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. +51). + +Meanwhile, many attempts were made by the Zulu king to arrest the +tide of invasion, and to bring about a more peaceable solution of the +difficulties between him and the English Government. + +When Lord Chelmsford first crossed into Zululand, messengers were +sent by the king to the column on the Lower Tugela asking for an +explanation of the invasion, suggesting that hostilities should be +suspended, that the British troops should re-cross the Tugela, and +that talking should commence.[163] These men did not return to the +king, but remained at the Lower Tugela, Sir Bartle Frere says by +their own desire, since they dared not return with an unsatisfactory +answer. + +And Bishop Schreuder narrates on March 3rd that—“Two Zulus arrived +here yesterday with a message from the king.... The king says: ‘Look +here, I have taken care of the deserted mission stations, and not +allowed them to be destroyed, thinking that the missionaries in +time would return to them, such as Mr. Robertson’s at Kwamagwaza, +and Oftibro’s at Ekhowe, but we now see what use the missionaries +make of the station-houses; Robertson has come with an impi (army) +to the Ekhowe mission station, and there has made a fort of it, the +houses being turned to advantage for our enemies. Seeing this, my +people have of their own accord destroyed the other mission stations; +and although I have not ordered this destruction, still I cannot +complain of it, seeing that the houses on the stations will serve as +a shelter for our present invading enemy. I am in a fix what to do +with your station Entumeni, for it is reported ... that the column at +Miltongambill is to ... march to Entumeni, turn the station into a +fort, like Robertson has had the Ekhowe turned into a fort. In that +case I will, much against my wish, be obliged to destroy the house +at Entumeni, as a matter of self-protection, the last thing I ever +thought of doing, as I have no grudge against you or your station.’ +This is the substance of the king’s message to me with respect to +my station, Entumeni; it, therefore, now will entirely depend on +the decision of the General Lord Chelmsford, whether the Entumeni +station-houses are to be destroyed or _not_.” Bishop Schreuder says: +“The messengers also report that the king has sent, through a certain +Ikolwa Klass (not known to me), that copy of Sir T. Shepstone’s +report which I, on behalf of the Natal Government, handed over to him +from Her Majesty Queen Victoria, August, 1875. + +“Already Umavumendaba had requested the king to send that book with +the deputation that met at Tugela, 11th December, 1878, in order +that there might be proved from that book wherein the king had +sinned, since the English had put forth such warlike demonstrations; +but Umavumendaba’s request was not then acceded to. The king now +sends this book that from the contents of it may be proved wherein he +has broken the compact made at his installation, 1st September, 1875” +[1873].—(P.P. [C. 2318] pp. 35-37). + +Bishop Schreuder requested Mr. Fannin, the border agent, “to receive +the message from the messenger’s own lips, and communicate it to +His Excellency.” He reported that Cetshwayo wished to explain to +the Government that he had never desired war. He had not, he said, +refused the terms proposed at the Lower Tugela; he had collected 1000 +head of cattle to pay the demand made on him, and would even have +delivered up Sihayo’s sons to the General, but “any Zulu that showed +himself was immediately fired upon.” The attack upon Sandhlwana, +he protested, was not made by his orders, and his induna was in +disgrace for having made it. As regards Inyezane, the king contended +that Colonel Pearson provoked the attack made on him by burning +kraals, and committing other acts of hostility. He asked that both +sides should put aside their arms, and resume negotiations with a +view to a permanent settlement of all questions between himself and +the Government. He would, he said, have sent in a message some time +since, but was afraid, because the last time, when he sent eight +messengers to the Lower Tugela, they were detained, whom he now +begged might be sent back to him (_ibid._ pp. 40, 41). + +Mr. Fannin, on the 22nd March, reports the arrival of the messengers +with the book, and says: “Cetywayo sends by the messengers the book +containing the laws promulgated at the time of his coronation, and +presented to him by Her Majesty the Queen. + +“It will be remembered that this book was handed to the Zulu king by +Bishop Schreuder at the request of the Natal Government some time +after the coronation took place. The king now returns it, and asks +him to cast his eye over its contents, and say in what way he has +transgressed its provisions” (_ibid._ p. 47). + +On March 28th Mr. Fannin reports that “three messengers have arrived +with a message from Cetywayo. Their names are Johannes (a native +of Entumeni), ’Nkisimana, and Umfunzi. On approaching the ferry +they were fired on by the Native Contingent.... The message is +very short; it is simply to say, Cetywayo sees no reason for the +war which is being waged against him, and he asks the Government +to appoint a place at which a conference could be held with a view +to the conclusion of peace.” They further brought a message from +Dabulamanzi, that “a few days ago he sent a white flag with two +messengers to Ekhowe, to ask for a suspension of hostilities, until +the result of this mission was known, but the men have not returned. +He asks that the men may be released.” Mr. Fannin says: “Four other +Entumeni men have arrived with these messengers,” and he suggests, +“that the Entumeni men should not be allowed to return to Zululand” +(_ibid._ pp. 44, 45). + +“Owing,” says Sir B. Frere, on June 17th, “to some misunderstanding +between the various civil and military authorities, these messengers +also were detained for several weeks, and have only lately been sent +back.” + +“I do not for a moment suppose,” he continues, “that either the civil +or military authorities were aware of this, or could have prevented +it by bringing their detention to notice at an earlier period, but +it shows the difficulties of intercourse on such subjects with the +Zulus, where such things could occur without the slightest ground for +suspicion of bad faith on the part of either the civil or military +authorities.”[164] + +It is not easy to discover what unusual and mysterious difficulties +the civil and military authorities can have found in communicating +with the Zulu messengers (men who had been employed for many years +in carrying the “words” of Government and the Zulu king to each +other), and it is still more inexplicable to whose notice the said +authorities could have brought their detention. The whole matter +is about as comprehensible as the statement which appeared at the +time in the Natal papers, that when these same messengers—a small +party—approached our camp, bearing a white flag, “_we fired upon it_ +(_i.e._ the flag) _to test its sincerity_.” + +The detention of these messengers as prisoners at Kranz Kop came +to the knowledge of the Bishop of Natal about the middle of April, +and he at once brought the fact to the notice of the civil and +military authorities. On the 20th April he saw Lord Chelmsford +in Pietermaritzburg, and spoke to him on the subject. The General +informed him that he had already ordered them to go back to +Cetshwayo, and to say that he must send indunas to meet him (Lord +Chelmsford) at General Wood’s camp, to which he was then bound. +Nevertheless the General’s message, which would take but two days on +the road, had not reached Kranz Kop on the 29th, nor were the men +actually released until the 9th of May. When finally set at liberty +they carried with them a message calculated to discourage any further +attempts on the Zulu king’s part at bringing about a peaceful issue +to the war, being merely that if “Cetywayo sends any more messengers +he must send them to the Upper Column (Dundee).” + +Nevertheless on the 12th of June the same two old men appeared again, +brought down, bearing a white flag, to ’Maritzburg by policemen from +Mr. Fynn, resident magistrate at the Umsinga. Apparently they had +been afraid to cross at Kranz Kop, where the “sincerity” of their +white flag had been “tested” before, and were sent, not to the +military authorities, but to the civil magistrate, who sent them +down to Sir Henry Bulwer. He would have nothing to say to them, and +transferred them to General Clifford, who examined them on the 13th, +and sent them off on the following day to Lord Chelmsford. They had +already walked one hundred and fifty miles from Ulundi to ’Maritzburg +with their message of peace, and had then still further to go in +order to reach the General, before they could get any kind of answer. +Meanwhile the campaign was prosecuted without a pause. + +General Clifford’s account of this is as follows: + +“I began by informing them that I was only going to ask them such +questions as would enable me to judge whether I should be justified +in sending them on to my Chief, Lord Chelmsford, now in Zululand +carrying on the war. The headman, Umfundi, then made the following +statement: ‘We are Umfundi and Umkismana, Zulu messengers from +Cetywayo. I am sent here by Cetywayo to ask for time to arrange a +meeting of Chiefs with a view to arranging peace. We did not go to +the head white Chief, because Fynn at Rorke’s Drift, whom I knew, +told me the Great White Chief was in Zululand, and we had better see +Shepstone and the second White Chief, who were at Pietermaritzburg, +so we came on here advised by Fynn. I have been here about twice a +year for the last six years as King’s messenger, but not as Chief. +I am nothing but a messenger, and I have no authority from the King +to treat for peace, or to do anything besides delivering my message, +asking if time will be given to assemble a meeting of Chiefs. I know +Mr. Shepstone, Mr. Gallway, and Bishop Colenso, and I have seen +Bishop Colenso in this town, and also at his place in the country, +but I do not wish to see him now, and I have not asked to see him.’ +(This, according to their custom, merely implied that they had no +message for him.) ‘I want to see the Great Chief, as the King ordered +me to do. I only came here to deliver my message and because Fynn +told me. This is the seventeenth day since I left the King’s kraal. +Am an old man and cannot go so fast as I could when I was young, +and heavy rain detained me three days. The King told me to hurry on +and return quickly. It will take us seven days to get from here to +Ibabamango Mountain if we go by Rorke’s Drift. We only know of two +other messengers sent by the King; one is Sintwango, the name of the +other we do not know. They have been sent to the lower column because +Cetywayo thinks there are two Chiefs of equal power, one with the +upper column and the other with the lower column. They are sent like +us to ask for time to get out by the door. The King does not know +the name of your big Chief, and we do not either. We are the same +messengers the King sent to Fort Buckingham with the same message +we have now. Only then our orders were not to go to your Chief as +now, but to go to Fort Buckingham and wait for the answer there. We +delivered our message to the military Chief there, and he sent the +message on. The Chief was at Etshowe fighting, and the answer did +not come for two months; when it came it was that the great Chief +was surprised we were still there. He thought we had gone back to +the King long ago. The officer at Fort Buckingham advised us to go +to the great white Chief, but we said: “No, those are not the King’s +orders; our orders are to come here, and now we will return and tell +the King;” and it was half of the third month when we got back to +him. We told him what had taken place. He consulted his great Chiefs, +and then sent us with the orders we now have to go and see the great +white Chief, and that is now what we are trying to do. I have no +power given me but to ask for time. The King sends his messengers +first, because it is the custom of the country to do so, and not +to send a great Chief till arrangements have been made where the +Chiefs are to assemble to talk about peace. We have no power to talk +about terms of peace. None but messengers have yet been sent. The +messengers sent to the lower column went before the fighting began; +they were detained and did not return to the King’s kraal till we +did.’ I said I was satisfied they ought to be sent on at once to Lord +Chelmsford. + +“I would give a letter, written by me to Lord Chelmsford, to Umfunzi, +to be given by him with his own hand to Lord Chelmsford, and outside +the letter I would say that no one but Lord Chelmsford was to open +it. This appeared to please them much. I said I would write to the +commanding officers along the road they were going to look after +them, and to the officer at Rorke’s Drift to see them safe to +Ibabamango.’ ‘Would a white man be safe going with them?’ ‘Yes,’ +they said, ‘quite,’ and they wished one could be sent with them; but +still more, the King would be pleased if a white man was sent to him. +I said I would not send a white man alone into Zululand with them, +because my Chief did not approve, still less could I send one to the +King, because I was only under the big Chief. Anything they wished to +say about peace or anything else they must say to the big Chief when +they saw him.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 111). + +At no time during the war, indeed, did we encourage the Zulu king +in his persistent efforts to get peace; but more of this hereafter. +Here we will only add one further instance, namely, that of two +messengers sent to Colonel Pearson at Etshowe, who, although brought +blindfold into the camp, were kept as prisoners in irons until the +garrison was relieved. The pretext for this detention was that they +were _supposed_ to be spies; but officers present were satisfied that +there were no grounds for the supposition, or for the treatment which +they received. + +Sir Bartle Frere of course inclines to the opinion that _all_ +Cetshwayo’s messengers were spies, his entreaties for peace but +treacherous pretexts to cover his evil intentions. Some of the men +sent were old accredited messengers to the Government, whose names +are frequently mentioned in earlier Blue-books, yet Sir Bartle Frere +says of them: “In no case could they give any satisfactory proof that +they really came from the king.”[165] + +But the High Commissioner’s habit of finding evil motives for every +act of the Zulu king, made the case of the latter hopeless from the +first. + +Meanwhile the despatches received from Sir Michael Hicks-Beach +contained comments amounting to censure upon the High Commissioner’s +proceedings in forcing on a war with the Zulus. He is plainly told +that he should have waited to consult Her Majesty’s Government upon +the terms that Cetshwayo should be called upon to accept, and that +“they have been unable to find in the documents you have placed +before them that evidence of urgent necessity for immediate action +which alone could justify you in taking, without their full knowledge +and sanction, a course almost certain to result in a war, which, as I +had previously impressed upon you, every effort should have been used +to avoid.” + +“The communication which had passed between us,” continues the +Secretary of State, “as to the objects for which the reinforcements +were requested and sent, and as to the nature of the questions in +dispute with the Zulu king, were such as to render it especially +needful that Her Majesty’s Government should understand and approve +any important step, not already suggested to them, before you +were committed to it; and if that step was likely to increase the +probability of war, an opportunity should certainly have been +afforded to them of considering as well the time as the manner of +coming to issue—should it be necessary to come to issue—with the +Zulu king. And though the further correspondence necessary for this +purpose might have involved the loss of a favourable season for +the operations of the British troops, and might have afforded to +Cetywayo the means of further arming and provisioning his forces, the +circumstances rendered it imperative that, even at the risk of this +disadvantage, full explanations should be exchanged.” + +The despatch from which the above is quoted was written on the +19th March, and another, dated the following day, expresses the +writer’s “general approval of the principles on which the boundary +award was based,” as intimated in a previous despatch, but gives +a very qualified assent to Sir B. Frere’s emendations by which he +seeks to secure the “private rights” of settlers on the wrongfully +appropriated land, and remarks that he is disposed to think that the +recognition of these said private rights of European settlers in the +district declared to be Zulu territory should have been restricted +as far as possible to those cases in which _bonâ fide_ purchasers +had improved their farms by building, planting, or otherwise, which +restriction would have limited them to a very small number indeed. +Sir M. Hicks-Beach also reminds Sir B. Frere that Her Majesty’s +Government had distinctly said beforehand that “they could not +undertake the obligation of protecting” the missionaries in Zululand. +His comments upon the terms of the ultimatum, he says, are intended +for Sir B. Frere’s guidance when the time for once more proposing +terms should arrive, and he concludes: “It is my wish that, as far +as possible, you should avoid taking any decided step, or committing +yourself to any positive conclusion respecting any of them until you +have received instructions from Her Majesty’s Government.”—(P. P. [C. +2260] pp. 108-111). + +Again, upon April 10th, after receiving Sir Bartle Frere’s +explanations, Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes as follows: + +“Since I addressed to you my despatches of the 19th and 20th March, +I have received your two despatches of February 12th and March 1st, +further explaining the considerations which induced you to decide +that the demands made upon Ketshwayo must be communicated to him +without delay. The definite expression of the views and policy of +Her Majesty’s Government contained in my despatches already referred +to, which will have reached you before you receive this, makes it +unnecessary that I should enter into any examination of the arguments +or opinions expressed in your present despatches. It is sufficient to +say that Her Majesty’s Government do not find in the reasons now put +forward by you any grounds to modify the tenor of the instructions +already addressed to you on the subject of affairs in South Africa, +and it is their desire that you should regulate your future action +according to these instructions. + +“But there is one point alluded to in your despatch of March 1st +which I feel it necessary at once to notice, in order to prevent +any misunderstanding. You refer, in the thirty-second paragraph of +that despatch, to ‘much that will remain to be done on the northern +Swazi border and in Sekukuni’s country,’ and to the probability +that ‘the Transvaal, the Diamond Fields, Basutoland, and other +parts now threatened with disturbance, will not settle down without +at least an exhibition of force.’ I entertain much hope that in +each of these cases, including that of Sekukuni, the troubles now +existing or anticipated may disappear, either independently of or +as a consequence of that complete settlement of the Zulu difficulty +which I join with you in trusting to see speedily effected. But, if +this expectation should unfortunately not be fulfilled, you will +be careful to bear in mind that Her Majesty’s Government are not +prepared to sanction any further extension, without their specific +authority, of our responsibilities in South Africa; that their desire +is that the military operations now proceeding should be directed to +the termination, at the earliest moment consistent with the safety +of our colonies and the honour of our arms, of the Zulu question; +and that any wider or larger action of the kind apparently suggested +in your despatch, should be submitted to them for consideration and +approval, before any steps are taken to carry it into effect.”—(P. P. +[C. 2316] p. 36). + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. + +THE LOWER TUGELA—INYEZANE—ETSHOWE. + + +The first step taken towards preparing for the campaign and advance +of a column on Ulundi by the coast road was the landing of a “Naval +Brigade” from H.M.S. _Active_, in November, 1878, under the command +of Commander Campbell, R.N. The “Actives” at once marched up to +Lower Tugela Drift, and commenced preparations for the crossing of +the river. A “pont” was established, and boats collected preparatory +to the passage of the troops. Fifty men from the _Tenedos_, under +Lieutenant Kingscote, R.N., joined the Naval Brigade on January 7th, +1879, but remained at Fort Pearson and took charge of the pont, etc., +when the “Actives” moved up with No. 1 Column. + +The passage of the Tugela was a difficult and rather hazardous +undertaking, the river being nearly 300 yards wide, with a strong +current flowing. The preparations, including taking across a wire +hawser for the working of the pont, were conducted in a very +business-like and satisfactory manner by Commander Campbell and the +Naval Brigade. + +The Navy had received early notice of impending hostilities, and, +as early as April, 1878, Sir Bartle Frere had requested Commodore +Sullivan, C.B. (the naval chief), to remain in Natal, “in order +to render such assistance by sea and land as may be practicable,” +“as it appeared almost certain that serious complications must +shortly arise with the Zulu tribe ... which will necessitate active +operations.”—(P. P. 2144, p. 32). + +The coast was explored by the Commodore as far as St. Lucia Bay, +and every possible assistance willingly rendered by him and the +force under his command before and throughout the campaign. Valuable +assistance was also given by Captain Baynton, commodore of the Union +Steamship Company’s fleet. The force detailed for Colonel Pearson’s +command—styled No. 1 Column—concentrated on Fort Pearson, on the +Lower Tugela; its detail has been previously given. + +It was directed that this column should cross the river and encamp +on the Zulu bank, under the guns of the fort, there to await further +orders; but, from the flooded state of the river and other causes, +the passage was not effected till the 12th January, when the +principal part of the force crossed and encamped in Zululand. + +The 2nd (Captain Wynne’s) Company Royal Engineers arrived at Fort +Pearson on the 12th, and crossed on the 13th. It immediately set +about the construction of Fort Tenedos on the left bank, about 600 +yards from the river, to cover the crossing, protect stores, etc. + +The Naval Brigade were constantly at work, day and night, working the +boats and pontoon across the river, with the exception of the night +of the 14th, when a heavy flood swept away the wharves. Twice the +pontoon was upset, and one of the _Active’s_ men was drowned. + +Reconnaissances were made in the Zulu country, and a few prisoners +taken, but there were no signs of any large body of the enemy. One +of John Dunn’s men reported on the 17th that “the whole of his +neighbourhood” was “now deserted and the cattle driven into the +interior.” + +Everything being carefully prepared, the advance was made on the +18th, a strong advanced guard and the Natal Native Pioneers[166] +preceding the column. Every precaution was taken to prevent a +surprise, extra vigilance being necessary on account of the long +waggon-train carrying tents, rations for fifteen days, and a large +quantity of food and ammunition destined for an advanced depôt to be +formed at or near Etshowe. + +We may here say a few words on the extreme difficulties of South +African transport—difficulties so serious and full of danger that +they should have been eliminated from the plan of the campaign. + +The waggons used were, as a rule, the ordinary South African +ox-waggons, clumsy and heavy to move, each drawn by a team of +fourteen to eighteen oxen. The Zulu oxen are much superior to the +up-country oxen, as they stand more work, and will swim rivers; they +even swam the Tugela, whilst the remainder had to be ferried over. + +The pace of the ox-waggon is about a mile and a half an hour, and +drifts and hills cause frequent delays. Take for instance the train +of No. 1 Column: it accomplished the march to Etshowe, a distance +of thirty-seven miles, in between five and six days—from daylight +on the 18th to 10 A.M. 23rd—having only been detained by the enemy +at Inyezane for about two hours: the train was necessarily some six +miles in length, an element of the utmost danger had the swift-footed +Zulus been a little more enterprising. Two or three thousand Zulus +might easily have prevented Colonel Pearson reaching Etshowe _with_ +his train, in spite of all the precautions he might and did take. +The commanding officers of the various columns had no option in +the matter of waggon-train, and as far as they were concerned the +transport under their control worked well. + +The difficulty of moving with a long train of waggons during the +summer, or rainy season, can scarcely be exaggerated. Double spanning +over drifts and soft places, making bad places good with brushwood, +oxen getting tired owing to the length of time they were yoked, +rather than from the distance travelled, all gave endless trouble +and anxiety, and entirely upset all calculations as to distances to +be traversed. The transport duties of No. 1 Column were admirably +carried out by Captain Pelly Clarke and Assistant-Commissary Kevill +Davis.[167] + +The force advanced from the Tugela in two columns—the first crossed +the Inyoni and encamped—weather very wet and trying. The second +column started on the following day (19th) and joined its leader +at Umsundusi. At this camp the troops remained during the 20th. The +reconnoitring parties had reported the Amatikulu impassable, and +Colonel Pearson pushed forward engineers (native pioneers), with a +strong working-party and guard, to render the drift practicable, +which, after a day’s hard work, was done. On the 21st the column +again advanced, and, crossing the Amatikulu, encamped in the +evening at Kwasamabela, four miles from Inyezane; during the day a +reconnoitring party burnt a military kraal near Ngingindhlovu. Up to +this time only a few of the enemy’s scouts had been seen, and nothing +had occurred beyond an occasional nocturnal alarm. + +On the 22nd the column marched at 5 A.M., crossed the Inyezane River, +and halted for breakfast, and to outspan the oxen for a couple of +hours, in a fairly open spot, though the country round was a good +deal covered with bush. The halt here was unavoidable, as there +was no water for some distance beyond, but the country had been +previously carefully scouted by the mounted troops under Major Barrow. + +At eight o’clock piquets were being placed, and the waggons parked, +when a company of the Native Contingent—who were scouting in front, +under the direction of Captain Hart, staff-officer attached to the +regiment—discovered the enemy advancing rapidly over the ridges, and +making for the adjacent clumps of bush. The Zulus now opened a heavy +fire upon this company, and almost immediately inflicted a loss upon +it of 1 officer, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 3 men killed. + +The Naval Brigade (with rockets), under Captain Campbell, the guns +of the Royal Artillery, two companies of “The Buffs,” and the Native +Pioneers were at once posted on a knoll close by the road, from +whence the whole of the Zulu advance was commanded. From this knoll +the bush near was well searched with shell, rockets, and musketry. + +The waggons continuing to close up and park, two companies of +“The Buffs,” who moved up with them, were ordered to clear +the enemy out of the bush, guided by Captain Macgregor, +Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General. This they did in excellent +style, driving the Zulus into the open, which again exposed them to a +heavy fire from the knoll. + +The engineers and mounted troops were now enabled to move up from +the drift, and, supported by a half company of “Buffs” and a half +company of the 99th, sent on by Lieut.-Colonel Welman (99th) from the +rear of the column, cleared the Zulus out of the bush on the right +flank, where they were seriously threatening the convoy. The Gatling +gun also moved up from the rear, and came into action on the knoll. +The enemy now endeavoured to outflank the left, and got possession +of a kraal about 400 yards from the knoll, which assisted their +turning movement. This kraal was carried by Captain Campbell with his +Naval Brigade, supported by a party of officers and non-commissioned +officers of the Native Contingent under Captain Hart, who were posted +on high ground on the left of the road. Lieut.-Colonel Parnell with a +company of “Buffs,” and Captain Campbell with the Naval Brigade, now +attacked some heights beyond the kraal, upon which a considerable +body of the enemy was still posted. This action was completely +successful, and the Zulus fled in all directions. About half-past +nine the last shot was fired, and the column was re-formed, and +resumed its march at noon. + +The loss sustained in this action was 2 privates (“The Buffs”) +killed, 2 officers, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 4 natives +killed, and 1 officer and 15 men wounded. Colonels Pearson and +Parnell had their horses shot under them. + +The enemy’s force was estimated at 4000—the Umxapu, Udhlambedhlu, and +Ingulubi Regiments, and some 650 men of the district—and their loss +upwards of 300 killed. The wounded appear to have been either carried +away or hidden. + +Four miles beyond the scene of this engagement the column bivouacked +for the night; and, moving off at 5 A.M. next day, reached Etshowe at +10 A.M.; the rear guard not getting in till the afternoon. + +Etshowe was a mission station, abandoned some months before, but +now selected for an entrenched post, in preference to more open and +commanding ground to the north, in consequence of the necessity +of utilising the buildings for the storage of supplies. The +station consisted of a dwelling-house, school, and workshop, with +store-rooms—three buildings of sun-dried brick, thatched; there +was also a small church, made of the same materials, but with a +corrugated iron roof; and a stream of good water ran close by the +station. Here the column encamped, and preparations for clearing the +ground and establishing a fortified post for a garrison of 400 men +were made. + +Two companies of “Buffs,” two companies Native Contingent, and some +mounted men, were sent back to reinforce Lieut.-Colonel Ely, 99th +Regiment, who, with three companies of his regiment, was on the march +to Etshowe with a convoy of sixty waggons. + +On the 25th, Major Coates was sent down to the Tugela with a strong +escort and forty-eight empty waggons, for a further supply of stores; +and next day a “runner” arrived with news that a disaster had +occurred on the 22nd. On the 28th a telegram was received from Lord +Chelmsford, hinting at disaster—that he had been compelled to retire +to the frontier—that former instructions were cancelled, and Colonel +Pearson was to hold Etshowe or withdraw to the Tugela, also that he +must be prepared to bear the brunt of an attack from the whole Zulu +army. + +Colonel Pearson at once assembled his staff and commanding officers, +when it was finally decided to hold the post, sending back to the +Tugela the mounted troops and Native Contingent. These marched, +unencumbered with baggage, and reached the Tugela in ten hours—a +contrast with the upward march! The various buildings were loopholed, +and the church prepared for use as a hospital, all tents struck, and +the entrenchments supplemented by an inner line of waggons. In the +evening Colonel Ely’s convoy arrived safely. + +The mounted men were sent back from Etshowe, because a large +proportion of the horse forage consisted of mealies, which it was +thought might be required for the use of the garrison, as eventually +was the case. + +To replace the mounted men, a small vedette corps was formed under +Lieutenant Rowden, 99th Regiment, and Captain Sherrington, of the +Native Contingent, and did excellent service. + +These vedettes were constantly under fire. One was killed at his +post. Another was attacked by some dozen Zulus, who crept upon him +through the long grass; he lost two fingers of his right hand, had +a bullet through each leg and one in his right arm; his horse was +assegaied; yet he managed to get back to the fort, retaining his +rifle. + +The vedettes being much annoyed in the early morning by the fire +of some Zulus from a high hill, Captain Sherrington and six of the +men went out one night and lay in wait for them, behind some rocks +near the top of the hill, wounding three and putting an end to the +annoyance. + +Colonel Pearson felt it to be necessary to reduce the bread and +grocery rations of the troops, but was enabled to increase the meat +ration by a quarter of a pound, as a large number of cattle had been +brought up with Colonel Ely’s convoy. The waggons of the troops +sent back to the Tugela were officially searched, and a quantity of +food, medicines, and medical comforts thus added to the stock, the +two latter subsequently proving of the utmost value. All articles of +luxury were eventually sold by auction, and fetched almost fabulous +prices: matches were sold for 4s. a box, bottles of pickles 15s. +each, and tobacco 30s. a pound! + +The water supply was excellent, both in quality and quantity; and in +the lower part of the stream bathing-places for both officers and +men were constructed; and all sanitary arrangements most carefully +attended to. + +A waggon-laager was formed for the cattle, and every effort made to +provide for the security of the fort, as we may now call it—deepening +ditches, strengthening parapets, erecting stockades—all most +energetically carried on under the direction of Captain Wynne, R.E. + +So things went on, till, on February 9th, Zulus were observed to be +collecting; but nothing occurred beyond an occasional alarm. + +On the 11th two “runners” arrived from the Lower Tugela with a +despatch[168] from the General, almost requiring Colonel Pearson to +retire with half his force to the Tugela, leaving the remainder to +garrison the fort. This, after a council of war, was decided not to +be practicable, the country being occupied by the Zulus in force. A +flying column, however, was organised, in case it became necessary to +carry out what the General seemed to desire. + +Having questioned the messengers, and ascertained that they were +willing to return on the following Saturday, Colonel Pearson sent a +despatch, asking for further instructions, and saying he would be +prepared to start on Sunday night at twelve o’clock if necessary. + +This message was twice repeated on different days, but no reply +received. + +Alterations and improvements in the defences, to enable the fort +to be held by a smaller garrison, went steadily on in spite of bad +weather; ranges from 600 to 700 yards were marked round the fort, and +_trous-de-loups_ and wire entanglements formed on the north, south, +and east faces. + +On March 1st an expedition was led out by Colonel Pearson to attack a +military kraal (Dabulamanzi’s) six miles distant; this was done and +the kraal burnt, a smart skirmish being kept up with the Zulus during +the homeward march. + +On the 2nd it was noticed that heliograph signals were being flashed +from the Lower Tugela, but no message was made out. + +Next day further signalling, though vague, was taken to mean +that a convoy was to be expected on the 13th instant with 1000 +men, and that on its approach Colonel Pearson was to sally out +and meet it. A heliograph was improvised by Captain Macgregor, +Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, by means of a small +looking-glass, and efforts made to flash back signals, but bad +weather ensued, preventing further communication till the 10th. + +A new road to Inyezane, shortening the distance by about three +miles, and avoiding much of the bush, was commenced, and reported +fit for use on the 13th, though the work had been hindered by very +bad weather, and by the working-parties being constantly under fire. +Fortunately no one was hit, except Lieutenant Lewis, of “The Buffs.” + +On March 23rd two Zulus came up with a white flag, and were brought +in to the fort each with a mealie-bag over his head; they are said +to have come with a message from the king to the effect that if our +force would return to Natal he would order the officers commanding +his large armies not to touch it. These men were detained as +prisoners in irons, and interviewed by Lord Chelmsford on his arrival +at Etshowe; but of their subsequent disposal nothing appears known. + +At first the health of the troops was extremely good, but before +the end of February the percentage of sick had largely increased, +there being 9 officers and upwards of 100 men on the sick-list when +it was relieved. The principal disorders were diarrhœa, dysentery, +and fevers, aggravated by the want of proper medicines and medical +comforts, which had been soon exhausted. The church was used as the +hospital, and both officers and men lived under the waggons, over +which the waggon-sails were spread, propped up with tent-poles; thus +the troops actually lived at their alarm-posts. + +The relief took place none too soon, there being then but six days’ +further supply of reduced rations available for the garrison. + +“From first to last, the men showed an excellent spirit, the highest +discipline was maintained, and the reduction of the food was never +grumbled at or regarded in any other light than a necessity and +a privation to be borne, and which they were determined to bear +cheerfully.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 39). + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII. + +NGINGINDHLOVU—RELIEF OF ETSHOWE—BORDER RAIDING. + + +Lord Chelmsford, having moved down to Durban, reports (February +8th) that No. 1 Column is secure at Etshowe; that he is about to +forward troops to the Lower Tugela; and that Durban, Stanger, +Pietermaritzburg, and Greytown are prepared for defence, “with +garrisons which should prevent panic among those living around;” the +frontier quiet, and the road from Greytown quite open. + +The first reinforcement for Natal was brought by H.M.S. _Shah_, which +chanced to be at St. Helena (on her voyage home from the Pacific), +when the news of the disaster in Zululand arrived. Captain Bradshaw, +R.N., immediately decided to proceed to Natal with his ship; the +Governor, after consultation with the officer commanding the troops, +Colonel Philips, R.E., arranging to send in her all the available +force that could be spared from the island. Accordingly she sailed on +February 12th, with 3 officers and 52 men of the Royal Artillery, and +2 officers and 109 men of the 88th Regiment. + +H.M.S. _Boadicea_ also arrived on the station, bringing Commodore +Richards, who relieved Rear-Admiral Sullivan, C.B. + +Communications had been established with Etshowe by means of flashing +signals, which were conducted by Lieutenant Haynes, R.E., who, after +some failure and discouragement at first, persevered until complete +success was attained. + +Previous to this there had been no communications with Colonel +Pearson for a considerable time, but on March 11th a cypher message +from him (dated 9th) said that the flashing signals had been +understood, and that as officers and men were generally sickly, it +would be desirable to relieve the whole of the garrison, and that any +relieving force should bring a convoy and be prepared to fight.—(P. +P. [C. 2316] p. 81). + +On March 16th the signals from Etshowe were first made out, and +one of the messages received was: “Short rations until 3rd April. +Breadstuffs until 4th April. Plenty of trek oxen. Captain Williams, +‘The Buffs,’ died at Ekowe on 13th March” (_ibid._ p. 83). + +Reinforcements arriving from England, Lord Chelmsford determined to +effect the relief of Etshowe, and assembled a strong force on the +Lower Tugela for that purpose. The column to be in two divisions: the +first, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Law, R.A., composed of the +Naval Brigade of _Shah_ and _Tenedos_, 57th Regiment, 2 companies +“Buffs,” 5 companies 99th Regiment, mounted infantry, volunteers, +and natives, and 5th Battalion Natal Native Contingent; artillery—2 +9-pounders, 2 24-pounder rocket-tubes, and 1 Gatling gun; also 150 +of John Dunn’s people as scouts. The second division—Lieut.-Colonel +Pemberton, 60th Rifles, commanding—Naval Brigade of H.M.S. +_Boadicea_, Royal Marines of _Shah_ and _Boadicea_, 60th Rifles, 91st +Highlanders, and 4th Battalion Natal Native Contingent; artillery, 2 +24-pounder rocket-tubes and 1 Gatling gun; making a total fighting +strength of 3390 white troops and 2280 natives. The Lieut.-General +decided to take command of the column himself, and directed that it +should advance by the coast road, so as to avoid the bush country; to +advance without tents, and with only a blanket and waterproof-sheet +for each man. The convoy, taking one month’s provisions for the +garrison and ten days’ supplies for the column, consisted of about +100 waggons and 44 carts.—(P. P. [C. 2318] pp. 74, 75). + +The assembling of this column and preparation for an advance +occupied some weeks, and on the 23rd March Lord Chelmsford assumed +the personal command, the force being assembled on the left bank of +the Tugela and organised in two brigades, as already detailed, by +the 28th. Next day, at 6 A.M., the column marched from the Tugela +and encamped at Inyone, reaching next day the Amatakulu River. +_Now_, profiting by bitter experience, every precaution was taken, +and an entrenched waggon-laager formed before nightfall at each +halting-place. + +The crossing of the Amatakulu River took nine hours, and the column +encamped a mile and a half beyond it. Nothing had been seen of the +enemy until the 31st, when the scouts noticed small bodies of Zulus +near the Amatakulu bush. Captain Barrow, with a mounted force, +reconnoitred towards the Engoya Forest, and burnt the kraal of one of +the king’s brothers. + +On April 1st, the column marched to Ngingindhlovu, and about a mile +from the Inyezane River a laager was formed in a favourable position. +From this point to Etshowe, the track, after crossing swampy ground, +winds through a bushy and difficult country for about fifteen miles, +the country covered with high grass, and thus affording easy cover. + +Etshowe could be plainly seen from the laager, and flash signalling +was at once established. + +As this laager was destined to be the scene of an important +engagement, we will describe the disposition of the troops: Front +face (north), 60th Rifles; right flank, 57th Regiment; left flank, +99th Regiment and “Buffs;” rear face, 91st Regiment; the angles +manned by blue-jackets and marines, and armed with the guns, +Gatlings, and rocket-tubes. The night passed without alarm, and +the troops stood to arms at 4 A.M., the mounted men being sent out +scouting as usual at earliest dawn. From scouts and piquets came +reports, at 5.45 A.M., that the enemy was advancing, and at six +the attack commenced on the north front. The Zulus advanced with +great rapidity and courage, taking advantage of every bit of cover; +they even pushed forward to within twenty or thirty yards of the +entrenchments, but were checked by the steady fire of the 60th and +the Gatling gun. Lieut.-Colonel Northey, 3-60th Rifles, received a +dangerous wound, but cheered on his men to the end of the engagement. + +The attack, checked here, rolled round to the left face; and, whilst +this was being developed, a fresh force came up against the rear, +probably anticipating that all the faces of the laager could not be +defended at the same time. Here they obstinately held their ground, +finding cover in the long grass and undulations. + +The mounted troops were now sent out, the mounted infantry and +volunteers to clear the front face, and Captain Barrow to attack +the enemy’s right flank. On their appearance the Zulus commenced +to retreat. It was now 7.30 A.M.; and the Natal Native Contingent, +clearing the ditch of the rear face, dashed out in pursuit, which, +led by Captain Barrow’s horsemen, was carried on for several miles. + +The loss of the enemy in this engagement is estimated at 1000: 671 +bodies were actually counted. The attacking force is said to have +numbered about 11,000 men. + +Colonel Pearson, who had watched the fight through a glass, +telegraphed his congratulations to the General. + +The loss of the column was 2 officers and 9 men killed (including +Lieut.-Colonel Northey, 60th Rifles), 5 officers and 57 men wounded. + +On the 3rd April, leaving a garrison in the laager, Lord Chelmsford +pushed on to Etshowe with a convoy of fifty-eight carts with stores. +The advance was unopposed, but the difficulties of the country were +such that it was nearly midnight before the rear guard had traversed +the fifteen miles and entered Etshowe. + +The garrison had suffered severely from sickness during the preceding +month, losing by disease 4 officers and 20 non-commissioned officers +and men; and when relieved there were sick in hospital, 8 officers +and 44 non-commissioned officers and men, and attending hospital, +1 officer and 78 non-commissioned officers and men—out of a total +force of 53 officers, 1289 non-commissioned officers and men, and 121 +natives. + +The constant wet weather and close quarters in the fort, with little +or no shelter, the want of medicines, and insufficient food, might +well have caused even heavier loss. + +The General determined to evacuate Etshowe, as he found it so +difficult of approach: future operations being planned to be carried +on by the coast road. On the 4th Colonel Pearson evacuated the fort +he had so tenaciously held, taking with him his waggons and all his +stores that were of any use; unserviceable tools and metal-work were +buried, but the fort was not destroyed. + +Colonel Pearson’s march to the Tugela was performed without any +interruption from the enemy. + +On the 4th a kraal of Dabulamanzi’s on the Entumeni Hill was +destroyed by a patrol from Etshowe, and on the 5th the relieving +column left, and bivouacked near the Infuchini mission station. Early +next morning an unfortunate alarm occurred, causing the death of +three men. A sentry fired at what he thought was a body of the enemy, +and the piquet on the opposite side of the entrenchment retired into +shelter, together with native scouts who were out in front. Although +it was a bright moonlight night, and no mistakes should have been +made, fire was opened from the entrenchment, and five of the 60th +were wounded and nine natives bayoneted as they attempted to gain the +shelter of the laager. + +On reaching Ngingindhlovu a new laager was formed, about a mile from +the old one; this was garrisoned on the 7th, the column moving on to +the Tugela. + +The small mounted force under Captain Barrow, 19th Hussars, rendered +excellent service, both during the engagement at Ngingindhlovu, and +by the manner in which the scouting duties were carried out. + +A party of Mr. John Dunn’s people (natives), 150 in number, were also +of the greatest utility in scouting and outpost duties. Mr. Dunn +himself accompanied the General; his knowledge of the country and +sound advice being of much use (_ibid._ p. 122). + +John Dunn was an Englishman, resident in Zululand, where he had +lived for many years and adopted many Zulu customs. He amassed a +considerable property, and had an extensive following. He invariably +received the greatest kindness and consideration from the Zulu king, +and was frequently employed by him in various communications with the +English Government. When the danger of war between English and Zulus +appeared imminent, John Dunn appealed to the English for protection +for himself, his property, and people, who were ready, he said, to +fight on the English side. At the same time Cetshwayo sent him a +message to the effect that he saw the English were going to attack +him, and therefore Dunn had better leave his country, with his people +and cattle, and go to a place of safety. This John Dunn did, crossing +the Tugela about the 3rd of January, and settling near Fort Pearson. + +At the time the General determined to move to the relief of Etshowe +he “sent secret instructions to the different commanders along the +border, from the Lower Tugela up to Kambula Hill, requesting them +to make strong demonstrations all along the line, and, if possible, +to raid into Zululand in order to make a diversion in favour of the +relieving column,” thinking he “might possibly have to meet the full +strength of the Zulu army.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 56). + +On the 2nd of April a small force of Native Contingent crossed the +Tugela and burnt two large kraals, no resistance being made. On +the next day a force crossed again and burnt an unoccupied kraal, +exchanging a few shots with Zulus, of whom a considerable number +were seen at a distance. On the following day the natives refused +to cross, and the Border Agent, Mr. Fannin, remarks: “I think it +is fortunate it was not attempted, as the Zulus had assembled a +considerable body of men to resist.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 104). + +The reserve native force had co-operated in these movements by being +assembled and placed in position along the Tugela, but the colonial +commander declined to proceed over the border, or send any of his +force into Zululand, without the sanction of the Lieut.-Governor. + +The Government of Natal had placed at Lord Chelmsford’s disposal a +number of natives (over 8000) for service in the Zulu country. Some +of these were intended for fighting purposes, and formed what we +have already described as the Natal Native Contingent. The rest were +supplied for transport, pioneer, and hospital-corps services, and all +were expected to cross the border. + +But besides these men, native levies were called out, when the war +began, for service _in the colony_—that is to say, for the defence +of the border under colonial district commanders. These levies were +to be used solely as a border-guard, and were not intended to cross +into Zululand at all. Sir Henry Bulwer, in permitting them to be +raised, had been careful to protect as far as possible the interests +of both the white and the native population of Natal, and had made +very proper stipulations as to the services for which he placed these +levies at the disposal of the General. The latter, indeed, expressed +it as his opinion that every available fighting native in the colony +should be called out; but Sir Henry, with a greater comprehension +of consequences, demurred to this rash proposal, and a personal +interview between the two resulted in the above-mentioned arrangement. + +Consequently the Lieut.-Governor was not a little surprised to +learn on the 8th April that the native levies had been ordered, in +conjunction with the other troops, to make raids across the border +into Zululand. To this he objected, writing to the High Commissioner +on April 9th in the following terms: “I venture to suggest for your +Excellency’s consideration the question of the policy of raids of +this kind. The burning of empty kraals will neither inflict much +damage upon the Zulus, nor be attended with much advantage to +us; whilst acts of this nature are, so it seems to me, not only +calculated to invite retaliation, but to alienate from us the whole +of the Zulu nation, men, women, and children, including those who are +well disposed to us. We started on this war on the ground that it was +a war against the king and the Zulu Government, and not against the +nation....”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 103). + +A correspondence ensued between the Lieut.-Governor and the +Lieut.-General, in which the two differed in a very decided +manner. Lord Chelmsford complained that the action taken by the +Lieut.-Governor, “in refusing to allow the orders issued by” him to +the native forces to be carried out, appeared to him “fraught with +such dangerous consequences” that he considered it necessary to refer +the question to the Home Government. (P. P. [C. 2318] p. 56.) He +implied that this interference had (in conjunction with the state of +the Tugela River) prevented a general raid being made, which might +have proved an important diversion in favour of the column relieving +Etshowe, and he declared, in behalf of the raiding system, that +“it would be madness to refrain from inflicting as much damage as +possible upon our enemy” (_ibid._ p. 56). + +It was a well-known fact that the fighting-men of the Zulu nation +were with their army, and that the only occupants of the kraals +to be raided were the women, children, and the infirm and other +non-combatants; therefore the General’s following remark, “I am +satisfied that the more the Zulu nation at large feels the strain +brought upon them by the war, the more anxious will they be to see it +brought to an end,” was of a highly Christian, wise, and soldierly +nature, hardly to be matched by anything attributed to the Zulu +monarch himself. + +Sir Henry Bulwer’s replies were temperate but decided. He pointed +out that the statement contained in Lord Chelmsford’s despatch +to the Secretary of State for War, implying that the Governor’s +interference had (or might have) seriously interfered with the relief +of Etshowe, was erroneous; Etshowe having been relieved on the 3rd +of April, five days before Sir Henry even heard of the order for +the Natal natives to make raids. To the General himself he observes +that his interference had been limited to approval of the action of +the district commander, who declined to employ his force in a manner +contrary to the express stipulations under which they were raised, +and concludes: “The views of this Government are very strongly +against the employment, under the present circumstances, of the +native levies or native population along the border in making raids +into the Zulu country, as being, in the opinion of the Government, +calculated to invite retaliation, and also as being demoralising to +the natives engaged in raiding” (_ibid._ p. 55). + +The Lieut.-Governor’s views were that these native levies “were +called out expressly and solely for service in the colony, and +for the defence of the colony, and were placed under the colonial +district commanders for that purpose only,” and that no authority had +been given to employ these native levies “on any service in the Zulu +country” (_ibid._ p. 54). + +And it seems that raids along the border had been ordered _after_ the +relief of Etshowe was effected. + +Sir H. Bulwer writes, 16th April, that he had received, on the 7th, +a copy of a military telegram written after the relief of Etshowe, +showing that the General had “ordered raids to be made across the +border wherever feasible,” and, on the following day, a copy of a +memorandum, written from Etshowe by Colonel Crealock, the Assistant +Military Secretary, and addressed to the officer commanding at the +Lower Tugela, and, among other things, it contained the following +instruction: “Send word up to the frontier to raid across the river +wherever the river permits.” And the same evening he heard of the +native levies having been required to cross (_ibid._ p. 53). + +The question of the employment of the native levies in making +raids across the border was referred by the Lieut.-Governor to the +Executive Council of Natal, which, on the 23rd April, expressed +itself as “strongly opposed to the employment, in making raids into +the Zulu country, of the native levies, who ... have been called +out for the _defence_ of the colony only.” But, in view of the +Lieut.-General’s strongly-expressed opinions, the Council felt there +was no alternative but that the General “should have the power of +so employing the native levies on the border. At the same time, the +Council desires ... to record emphatically its objections to the +course proposed, and to such employment of the levies.”—(P. P. [C. +2367] p. 132). + +This decision of the Executive Council was communicated to the +General on April 25th by the Lieut.-Governor, with the remark: +“Your Excellency will therefore have the power to employ the native +levies across the border in the way named by you, should you think +it imperatively necessary for military reasons. Your Excellency will +not fail to perceive, however, that such employment of the native +levies is against the decided opinion of this colony as to its +inexpediency” (_ibid._ p. 133). + +On the 20th May raids were again made into Zululand from three +different points, under Major Twentyman’s command. One party crossed +at the Elibomvu Drift, and burnt fifteen kraals and large quantities +of grain; another burnt three kraals and captured a large herd of +cattle; and the third burnt two kraals, and then, seeing the Zulus +assembling in force, beat a hurried retreat across the Tugela.—(P. P. +[C. 2374] p. 91). + +Sir Henry Bulwer, on the 24th May, writes to the High Commissioner: +“Major-General the Hon. H. H. Clifford, commanding the base of +operations ... was wholly unaware that any such raid was being +organised by Major Twentyman, who, I believe, acted under general +instructions received from head-quarters.... The views of the +Government of Natal on the subject of these raids, your Excellency is +already acquainted with. The material advantage to be gained by the +work of destruction or of plunder of Zulu property can be at the best +but trifling and insignificant, and on every other account I fear +our action will prove positively injurious to us, to our interests, +and to our cause. We are absolutely provoking retaliation. Already, +I am informed, since the raid reported in these papers took place, +some native huts on the Natal side of the Tugela have been burned by +Zulus; and to what extent this work of revenge and retaliation may be +carried, with what losses of property, and even of life, inflicted +on our border natives, it is impossible to say.... What result we +have gained to justify even the risk of such retaliation against us, +and of such a sacrifice to our own native population, I know not” +(_ibid._ pp. 89, 90). + +The fears of the Lieutenant-Governor were in some measure realised +on the 25th June, when he writes: “A raid was made by two bodies +of Zulus, numbering, it is estimated, about 1000, into the Tugela +Valley, below the Krans Kop in this colony. The Zulus destroyed +several kraals, and carried off a number of cattle. I regret to say +also that several of our Natal natives, including women, were killed, +and some women and children carried off.” + +“There can be little doubt that this raid has been made in +retaliation for the one that was made into the Zulu country opposite +the Krans Kop by a force under Major Twentyman, of Her Majesty’s +4th Regiment, on the 20th May, and which was reported to you in my +despatch of the 31st of that month.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 150). + +Thus the opinions expressed in Sir H. Bulwer’s despatch of 24th May +were to some extent justified, with the probability of a blood-feud +being set up between the two border populations, and widening the +breach between ourselves and the Zulu people; and with it the +increased difficulty of obtaining a satisfactory settlement for the +future. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX. + +REINFORCEMENTS—ISANDHLWANA REVISITED. + + +During the latter part of March and April reinforcements +kept steadily pouring into Natal, and with them four general +officers—Major-General the Hon. H. H. Clifford, V.C., C.B., who +was stationed at Pietermaritzburg, to command at the base of +operations; Major-General Crealock, C.B., to command No. 1 Division, +concentrating on the Lower Tugela; Major-General Newdigate, to +command No. 2 Division, head-quarters Dundee; and Major-General +Marshall, to command the Cavalry Brigade attached to No. 2 Division; +Brigadier-General Wood, V.C., C.B., retaining his previous command—to +be styled the Flying Column. + +By the middle of March the available force consisted of an effective +strength of non-commissioned officers and men—Imperial troops, +7520; volunteer cavalry, etc., 1367; Europeans, attached to native +contingents, 495; making a total of 9382 Europeans, with 5769 +natives.—(P. P. [C. 2316] p. 85). + +No operations of any consequence took place beyond concentrating +troops and forwarding supplies. On the 20th April, Lord Chelmsford +reported that Major-General Crealock had taken up his command +and, if transport arrangements permitted, would shortly commence +operations. Major-General Newdigate was on his way to his command. + +The reinforcements alone considerably exceeded the strength of the +force with which the war was so rashly undertaken. They consisted of +the 1st Dragoon Guards, 17th Lancers; 21st, 57th, 58th, 60th, 88th +(one company), 91st, 94th Foot; two batteries Royal Artillery, and +detachments from St. Helena and Mauritius; one company and half C +troop Royal Engineers; drafts for various regiments; detachments of +Army Service and Army Hospital Corps; etc. etc.;—a total (including +the staff embarked in February from England) of 387 officers and 8901 +men. + +But even after the arrival of this enormous accession of strength, +further reinforcements of three battalions were demanded “for reserve +and garrison purposes.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 162). + +At the end of April the effective force was: + + First Division, Major-General Crealock: + Imperial and irregular troops 6508 + Native Contingent (151 mounted) 2707 + + Second Division, Major-General Newdigate: + Imperial and irregular troops 6867 + Natives (243 mounted) 3371 + + Flying Column, Brigadier-General Wood: + Imperial and irregular troops 2285 + Natives (75 mounted) 807 + + Making a total strength of 22,545 men available for the conquest + of Zululand. + +On the 14th May, Lord Chelmsford reported: “The troops are in +position, and are only waiting for sufficient supplies and transport +to advance.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 97). + +The transport difficulties naturally increased with the increasing +force. The colony did not eagerly press forward to the rescue, and +although transport for service in the colony could be obtained, that +for trans-frontier work was not procurable in any quantity on any +terms. + +The colonial view somewhat appeared to be, “No government has +power, either legally or morally, to force any man to perform acts +detrimental to his own interest.” No doubt the colony felt itself +more secure whilst the troops remained within its borders, and +naturally was not anxious to assist in their departure; and it may +have thought the war “was an Imperial concern, brought about by an +Imperial functionary;” and therefore the Empire should be left “to +worry out the affair for itself;” as remarked by a colonial paper at +the time. + +On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the necessities +of the troops, during this campaign, taxed the resources of the +colonists to the utmost. If some profited in a mercantile point of +view, and were unpatriotic enough to try to make every penny they +could out of the army intended for their protection, there were +others who acted in a very different spirit. The sacrifice and loss +of both life and property through the Zulu war has been as great, in +proportion, to Natal as to the mother country; and if the former was +weak and wicked—or perhaps only _thoughtless_—enough to wish for war, +she has now received a lesson which will prevent her ever making +so great a mistake again. While upon the one side we hear stories +of transport riders and others who lost no opportunity of fleecing +at every turn both Government and military in their necessity, on +the other hand we have equally well-authenticated accounts of strict +honesty, and even generosity, on the part of other Natalians. One +story is told of a transport rider who had earned the sum of £1500, +which was to be paid by instalments of £500 each: after he had +received two of these the officer who paid him was removed, and his +successor, unaware of previous payments, handed over to the transport +rider’s messenger the whole £1500. The honest fellow at once returned +the £1000 overpaid. + +It is also a well-known fact that many of the principal tradesmen +permitted their shopmen to join the volunteer corps to which they +belonged, still continuing to pay them their respective salaries +during their absence. + +The colony was not revelling in a shower of gold, as some at home +imagine: a few individuals, doubtless, thought to “make hay while the +sun shines,” but to the population at large the war was certainly not +advantageous. For some months fresh provisions were almost at famine +prices, or even unattainable by private persons. + +Many farmers were with the army, either as volunteers or with the +transport train; others again had sold their waggons and oxen, and +thus had no means of bringing in their produce. The market supply +was consequently very small, and generally at once bought up for the +garrisons. + +Transport difficulties, we have said, increased with the increasing +force. The 9000 Imperial troops sent as reinforcements had to be fed, +and their food conveyed to where they were stationed. Three or four +thousand horses and mules also had to be fed in a country from which +grass was disappearing, and in which supplies of forage were small. +The larger part of the troops and horses were sent up-country—some +two hundred miles from the coast—where winter grass-fires might be +expected, and nature’s stores were certain soon to be exhausted; and +thus arose the terrible strain in the transport resources of the +country. + +But much more was required than was necessary. In place of the +ponderous train accompanying each column—a fruitful source of +difficulty and danger on the march by day, if a protection when +halted at night—the advance should have been made from entrenched +depôts in the lightest possible order. A rapid advance on the king’s +kraal in compact formation, and, wherever the enemy might stand, a +decisive battle fought—the result of which, with the most ordinary +care, could not be doubtful—and the war would be virtually over. +There need have been no weary inactivity, with its following of +disease and death, and the saving to the country would have been +enormous. + +Supplies were pushed forward from the Lower Tugela to the Inyezane, +where a fort was constructed (Fort Chelmsford); and from the base up +to Conference Hill—the supplies required by Lord Chelmsford before an +advance could be made being two months’ with the forces advancing, +and one month’s at the advanced depôts.[169] + +But little further was done through this period of indecision and +vacillation, in which plans were made only to be changed, and orders +given one day to be countermanded the next. Sickness laid its heavy +hand on many a man—exposure and inaction in the first place, then +want of proper care and nursing, gradually swelling the death-roll. +Before the war, and throughout its course, a body of ladies of Natal +were most anxious to place themselves under the orders of the medical +staff as nurses for the sick and wounded; but their offers, though +repeatedly pressed upon the authorities, were declined. + +It was at this period that the following message was telegraphed by +Lord Chelmsford to the High Commissioner: + +“May 16th, 1879.—General Crealock telegraphs: Messengers from king +are at his advanced post. King sues for peace. John Dunn sent to +see them. Message as follows: ‘White man has made me king, and I +am their son. Do they kill the man in the afternoon whom they have +made king in the morning? What have I done? I want peace; I ask for +peace.’ King asks for a black man or white man to return with his +messengers to say message delivered rightly. Undwana, one of the +messengers, states that he has sent to Dabulamunzi to order him to +go to the king. Message had been delivered to him by Undwana, and +he ought to have reached king yesterday. All principal chiefs have +been sent for to the king. He says army is dispersed. Chiefs have +been urging peace on king. General C. has only informed Clifford +and Lieutenant-Governor of the above. I have telegraphed back to +Crealock: ‘Tell messengers I informed king’s messenger at Etshowe +that any message must be sent to me at Colonel Wood’s camp. I am +ready to receive any messenger under flag of truce. Tell them +something more than words will be required. Supply them with flag +of truce; relax no preparations or precautions.’” End of quotation. +“I shall be glad to receive your Excellency’s early instructions. I +consider the king should not be allowed to remain on the throne, and +that the terms of peace should be signed at Ulundi in presence of +British force. I shall not make any change in my arrangements in the +meantime.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] pp. 100, 101). + +To Major-General Marshall belongs the credit of performing the +long-neglected duty of revisiting the fatal battle-field of +Isandhlwana, and burying as many as possible of those that fell +there. With General Newdigate’s permission, the Cavalry Brigade +under General Marshall made a reconnaissance of the Bashi Valley and +Isandhlwana, having moved down to Rorke’s Drift for that purpose. + +The left column of the brigade proceeded up the Bashi Valley, +and moving round the Ingqutu range, joined the right column at +Isandhlwana. + +The reconnaissance was proposed to include burying the dead, bringing +away the waggons, etc.; but an order was received prohibiting +touching the 24th, who were to be interred by their own comrades. + +The battle-field was a fearful sight—though softened much by the +kindly hand of nature. There plainly lay revealed the widely-spread +camp (or rather line of camps), the hopeless position in which it was +placed; the absolute impossibility, circumstanced as it was, of any +result but the sad one we have already chronicled. And there, too, +were the evidences of a gallant resistance, and a stand made by men +“faithful unto death.” + +It was well said: “The field of Isandhlwana is beginning to give up +its secrets; the mists of fiction are being dispersed by the dry +light of fact. It has not been through mere idle curiosity that +there has been a desire to know what passed during the final moments +of that fatal struggle. There were difficulties to be explained, +reputations to be cleared, allegations to be contradicted. There was +the desire to know how those who were lost had died. To be sure that +they died with their faces to the foe; to be satisfied that their +death was not attended with any excess of cruelty or suffering. And +there can be little doubt that it is the very anxiety to be assured +of all this that stands responsible for the numerous fictions—as we +must now hold them to be—which have been circulated with regard to +what passed on that memorable day.”—_Natal Witness_, 29th May, 1879. + +A short description of the spot, taken from that written by Mr. +Archibald Forbes, may be of interest: At the top of the ascent beyond +the Bashi we saw, on our left front, rising above the surrounding +country, the steep, isolated, and almost inaccessible hill, or rather +crag, of Isandhlwana; the contour of its rugged crest strangely +resembling a side view of a couchant lion. On the lower neck of +the high ground on its right were clearly visible up against the +sky-line the abandoned waggons of the destroyed column. Now we +crossed the rocky bed of the little stream and were cantering up the +slope leading to the crest on which were the waggons, and already +tokens of the combat and bootless flight were apparent. The line of +retreat towards Fugitives’ Drift, along which, through a gap in the +Zulu environment, our unfortunate comrades who thus far survived +tried to escape, lay athwart a rocky slope to our right front, with +a precipitous ravine at its base. In this ravine dead men lay thick. +All the way up the slope could be traced the fitful line of flight. +Most of the dead here were 24th men; single bodies and groups where +they seemed to have gathered to make a hopeless gallant stand and +die. On the edge of a gully was a gun-limber jammed, its horses +hanging in their harness down the steep face of the ravine; a little +farther on a broken ambulance-waggon, with its team of mules dead +in their harness, and around were the bodies of the poor fellows +who had been dragged from the intercepted vehicle. Following the +trail of bodies through long grass and scattered stores, the crest +was reached. Here the dead lay thick, many in the uniform of the +Natal Mounted Police. On the bare ground on the crest itself, among +the waggons, the dead were less thick; but on the slope beyond, on +which from the crest we looked down, the scene was the saddest and +more full of weird desolation than any I had yet gazed upon. There +was none of the horror of a recent battle-field; nothing of all that +makes the scene of yesterday’s battle so rampantly ghastly shocked +the senses. A strange dead calm reigned in this solitude; grain had +grown luxuriantly round the waggons, sprouting from the seed that +dropped from the loads, falling on soil fertilised by the life-blood +of gallant men. So long in most places had grown the grass that it +mercifully shrouded the dead, whom four long months to-morrow we +have left unburied. In a patch of long grass, near the right flank +of the camp, lay Colonel Durnford’s body, a central figure of a knot +of brave men who had fought it out around their chief to the bitter +end. A stalwart Zulu, covered by his shield, lay at the Colonel’s +feet. Around him lay fourteen Natal Carbineers and their officer, +Lieutenant Scott, with a few Mounted Police[170] (twenty). Clearly +they had rallied round Colonel Durnford in a last despairing attempt +to cover the flank of the camp, and had stood fast from choice, when +they might have essayed to fly for their horses, who were close by +their side at the piquet-line. With this group were about thirty +gallant fellows of the 24th. In other places the 24th men were found +as if fallen in rallying square, and there were bodies scattered all +along the front of the camp. + +The fallen were roughly buried, except those of the men of the 24th +Regiment. These were ordered to be left untouched. General Marshall +had nourished a natural and seemly wish to give interment to all +the dead who so long had lain at Isandhlwana, but it appeared that +the 24th desired to perform the ceremony themselves in presence +of both battalions. One has much sympathy with the regiment, but +General Marshall offered to convey a burial-party with tools from +Rorke’s Drift in waggons, and it seemed scarcely right to postpone +longer than absolutely necessary what respect for our honoured dead +required. Thus, the Zulus, who have carefully buried their own dead, +will return to find we visited the place, not to bury our dead, but +to remove a batch of waggons! + +In the desolate camp were many sad relics, and the ground was strewn +with them and the spoil of the plundered waggons. Scarcely any +arms were found, and no ammunition—a few stray rusted bayonets and +assegais only were to be seen. + +Teams of horses were hitched on to the soundest of the waggons, till +forty fit to travel were collected on the crest, and sent under +escort to Rorke’s Drift, and meantime scouting-parties had fired the +kraals around, but found no Zulus. + +“I shall offer few comments on the Isandhlwana position. Had the +world been searched for a position offering the easiest facilities +for being surprised, none could have been well found to surpass it. +The position seems to offer a premium on disaster, and asks to be +attacked. In the rear laagered waggons would have discounted its +defects; but the camp was more defenceless than an English village. +Systematic scouting could alone have justified such a position, and +this too clearly cannot have been carried out.”—_Daily News_, 20th +June, 1879. + +On the 20th, 23rd, and 26th June the burial of the remainder of those +who fell at Isandhlwana was completed by a force under the command +of Lieut.-Colonel Black, 24th Regiment. He carefully noted the signs +of the fight, and reported that the bodies of the slain lay thickest +in the 1-24th camp, in which 130 dead lay (in two distinct spots), +with their officers, Captain Wardell, Lieutenant Dyer, and a captain +and a subaltern not recognisable; close to the place where the bodies +of Colonel Durnford, Lieutenant Scott, and other Carbineers, and men +of the Natal Mounted Police were found. This is described as being a +“centre of resistance,” as the bodies of men of all arms were found +converging as it were to the spot. About sixty bodies, with those of +Captain Younghusband and two other officers, lay in a group under the +southern precipice of Isandhlwana, as if they had held the crags and +fought till ammunition failed. The proofs of hand-to-hand fighting +were frequent. The fugitives’ track, too, told its tale: “Here and +there around a waggon, here and there around a tree, a group had +formed and stood at bay; shoulder to shoulder they fired their last +cartridge, and shoulder to shoulder they plied the steel; side by +side their bones are lying and tell the tale.” + +Eight hundred yards from the road the guns had come upon ground no +wheels could pass, and from here the bodies were more and more apart +till, about two miles from camp, the last one lies and marks the +limit reached by white men on foot. + +The fatal trail again began near the river’s bank, where Major Smith, +R.A., and others rest, a river’s breadth from Natal; across the river +it runs until the graves of Melville and Coghill nearly mark its end. + +_The Standard and Mail_ of September 16th says: “It is a noticeable +fact that Cetywayo declares that his men were completely disheartened +by Isandula, and that as a matter of fact he was never able to get +them thoroughly together again after that event. He says that a large +part of the forces engaged on that occasion were actually retreating +when another part made the fatal rush.... Of course these statements +are of interest as showing what Cetywayo said, but they must be +accepted with reservation, as he has throughout taken up the theory +that he and his men had no intention of inflicting so much injury +upon us as they did.” + +Bishop Schreuder, on the 3rd March, says: “The Zulus’ version of the +Isan’lwana story tells us some most remarkable things with respect +to the battle and the effect of it on the Zulus. The Zulus, after +having ransacked the camp, bolted off with the booty as fast as they +could when the English army was seen returning to the camp, even at a +great distance. The detachment of the Zulu army seen by Glyn’s column +on its way, the 23rd January, back to Rorke’s Drift, was a part of +the Undi corps and Utako (Udhloko) retreating from the unsuccessful +attack on the Commissariat stores at Rorke’s Drift. Among the +horsemen was Udabulamanzi, who says that they were so tired, and glad +that Glyn’s column did not attack them, for if attacked they would +have bolted every one. Comparatively few and inferior oxen were +brought to the king, as the izinduna appropriated to themselves the +best and most of the captured oxen; Udabulamanzi, for instance, took +home twenty good oxen. The Zulus say that the affair at Isan’lwana +commenced with a victory and ended with a flight, for, as it is the +case after a defeat, the whole army did not return to the king, but +the soldiers dispersed, making the best of their way with what booty +they had got to their respective homes, and to this day they have not +reassembled to the king, who is very much displeased with his two +generals, Umnkingwayo (Tsingwayo) and Umavumengwane (Mavumengwana), +and other izinduna.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 37). + +Some of the Zulu and native accounts of Isandhlwana are worth +noticing. One says the engagement “lasted till late in the +afternoon.” (P. P. [C. 2374] p. 24.) Another speaks of the fighting +when the 24th retired on the tents, and of their ammunition failing. +Another (Nugwende, a brother of Cetshwayo) says that the main, or +front and the left flank attack of the Zulu army were beaten and fell +back with great loss until the fire of the white troops slackened. +The right flank entering the camp, the main body was ordered to renew +the attack, which the English were unable to prevent from want of +ammunition. + +The following “Statement of a Zulu Deserter regarding the Isan’lwana +Battle” was taken by Mr. Drummond, head-quarter staff: + + The Zulu army, consisting of the Ulundi corps, about 3000 strong; + the Nokenke Regiment, 2000 strong; the Ngobamakosi Regiment, + including the Uve, about 5000 strong; the Umcityu, about 4000 + strong; the Nodwengu, 2000 strong; the Umbonambi, 3000 strong; + and the Udhloko, about 1000 strong, or a total of about 20,000 + men in all, left the military kraal of Nodwengu on the afternoon + of the 17th of January. It was first addressed by the King, who + said: + + “I am sending you out against the whites, who have invaded + Zululand and driven away our cattle. You are to go against the + column at Rorke’s Drift, and drive it back into Natal; and, if + the state of the river will allow, follow it up through Natal, + right up to the Draakensburg. You will attack by daylight, as + there are enough of you to ‘eat it up,’ and you will march + slowly, so as not to tire yourselves.” + + We accordingly left Nodwengu late in the afternoon, and marched + in column to the west bank of the White Umfolosi, about six miles + distant, where we bivouacked for the night. Next day we marched + to the Isipezi military kraal, about nine miles off, where we + slept; and on the 19th we ascended to the tableland near the + Isihlungu hills, a march of about equal duration with that of + the day previous. On this day the army, which had hitherto been + marching in single column, divided into two, marching parallel to + and within sight of each other, that on the left consisting of + the Nokenke, Umcityu, and Nodwengu Regiments, under the command + of Tyingwayo, the other commanded by Mavumingwana. There were a + few mounted men belonging to the chief Usirayo, who were made + use of as scouts. On the 20th we moved across the open country + and slept by the Isipezi hill. We saw a body of mounted white + men on this day to our left (a strong reconnaissance was made on + the 20th, to the west of the Isipezi hill, which was probably + the force here indicated). On the 21st, keeping away to the + eastward, we occupied a valley running north and south under the + spurs of the Ngutu hill, which concealed the Isandlana hill, + distant from us about four miles, and nearly due west of our + encampment. We had been well fed during our whole march, our + scouts driving in cattle and goats, and on that evening we lit + our camp-fires as usual. Our scouts also reported to us that + they had seen the vedettes of the English force at sunset on + some hills west-south-west of us (Lord Chelmsford with some of + his staff rode up in this direction, and about this time, and + saw some of the mounted enemy). Our order of encampment on the + 21st of January was as follows: On the extreme right were the + Nodwengu, Nokenke, and Umcityu; the centre was formed by the + Ngobamakosi and Mbonambi; and the left, of the Undi Corps and + the Udhloko Regiment. On the morning of the 22nd of January + there was no intention whatever of making any attack, on account + of a superstition regarding the state of the moon, and we were + sitting resting, when firing was heard on our right (the narrator + was in the Nokenke Regiment), which we at first imagined was + the Ngobamakosi engaged, and we armed and ran forward in the + direction of the sound. We were, however, soon told it was the + white troops fighting with Matyana’s people some ten miles away + to our left front, and returned to our original position. Just + after we had sat down again, a small herd of cattle came past our + line from our right, being driven down by some of our scouts, + and just when they were opposite to the Umcityu Regiment, a body + of mounted men, on the hill to the west, were seen galloping, + evidently trying to cut them off. When several hundred yards off, + they perceived the Umcityu, and, dismounting, fired one volley at + them and then retired. The Umcityu at once jumped up and charged, + an example which was taken up by the Nokenke and Nodwengu on + their right, and the Ngobamakosi and Mbonambi on the left, while + the Undi Corps and the Udhloko formed a circle (as is customary + in Zulu warfare when a force is about to be engaged) and remained + where they were. With the latter were the two commanding + officers, Mavumingwana and Tyingwayo, and several of the king’s + brothers, who with these two corps bore away to the north-west, + after a short pause, and keeping on the northern side of the + Isandlana, performed a turning movement on the right without any + opposition from the whites, who, from the nature of the ground, + could not see them. Thus the original Zulu left became their + extreme right, while their right became their centre, and the + centre the left. The two regiments which formed the latter, the + Ngobamakosi and Mbonambi, made a turning along the front of the + camp towards the English right, but became engaged long before + they could accomplish it; and the Uve Regiment, a battalion of + the Ngobamakosi, was repulsed and had to retire until reinforced + by the other battalion, while the Mbonambi suffered very severely + from the artillery fire. Meanwhile, the centre, consisting of the + Umcityu on the left centre, and the Nokenke and Nodwengu higher + up on the right, under the hill, were making a direct attack on + the left of the camp. The Umcityu suffered very severely, both + from artillery and musketry fire; the Nokenke from musketry fire + alone; while the Nodwengu lost least. When we at last carried + the camp, our regiments became mixed up; a portion pursued the + fugitives down to the Buffalo River, and the remainder plundered + the camp; while the Undi and Udhloko Regiments made the best + of their way to Rorke’s Drift to plunder the post there—in + which they failed, and lost very heavily, after fighting all + the afternoon and night. We stripped the dead of all their + clothes. To my knowledge no one was made prisoner, and I saw + no dead body carried away or mutilated. If the doctors carried + away any dead bodies for the purpose of afterwards doctoring the + army, it was done without my knowing of it; nor did I see any + prisoner taken and afterwards killed. I was, however, one of the + men who followed the refugees down to the Buffalo River, and + only returned to the English camp late in the afternoon. (This + portion of the prisoner’s statement was made very reluctantly.) + The portion of the army which had remained to plunder the camp + did so thoroughly, carrying off the maize, breadstuffs (_sic_), + and stores of all kinds, and drinking such spirits as were in + camp. Many were drunk, and all laden with their booty; and + towards sunset the whole force moved back to the encampment of + the previous night, hastened by having seen another English + force approaching from the south. Next morning the greater part + of the men dispersed to their homes with their plunder, a few + accompanying the principal officers to the king, and they have + not reassembled since.—_The Times_, March 22nd, 1879. + +Another account, taken by the interpreter of one of the column +commanding officers (a version of which has appeared in the columns +of _The Army and Navy Gazette_, of 11th October 1879, and is +described as a “full and accurate account”), is selected as being +corroborated in all main points by survivors of the British force, +and by the battle-field itself. It is the story of Uguku, a Zulu +belonging to the Kandampenvu (or Umcityu) Regiment, who says: “We +arrived at Ingqutu eight regiments strong (20,000 to 25,000 men) and +slept in the valley of a small stream which runs into the Nondweni +river to the eastward of Sandhlwana. The regiments were Kandampenvu +(or Umcityu), Ngobamakosi, Uve, Nokenke, Umbonambi, Udhloko, Nodwengu +(name of military kraal of the Inkulutyane Regiment), and Undi (which +comprises the Tulwana, Ndhlondhlo, and Indhluyengwe): The army was +under the joint command of Mavumengwana, Tsingwayo, and Sihayo. It +was intended that Matshana ka Mondisa was to be in chief command, but +he having been a Natal Kafir, the other three were jealous of him, +and did not like him to be put over them; they therefore devised a +plan of getting him out of the way on the day of the battle. They +accomplished this plan by getting him to go forward with Undwandwe +to the Upindo to reconnoitre, and promised to follow. As soon as +he had gone they took another road, viz. north of Babanango, while +Matshana and Undwandwe went south of it, being accompanied by six +mavigo (companies). It was our intention to have rested for a day in +the valley where we arrived the night before the battle, but having +on the morning of the battle heard firing of the English advance +guard who had engaged Matshana’s men, and it being reported that the +Ngobamakosi were engaged, we went up from the valley to the top of +Ingqutu, which was between us and the camp; we then found that the +Ngobamakosi were not engaged, but were quietly encamped lower down +the valley. We saw a body of horse coming up the hill towards us from +the Sandhlwana side. We opened fire on them, and then the whole of +our army rose and came up the hill. The enemy returned our fire, but +retired down the hill, leaving one dead man (a black) and a horse +on the field. The Uve and Ngobamakosi then became engaged on our +left with the enemy’s skirmishers, and soon afterwards we were all +engaged with the skirmishers of the enemy. We were not checked by +them” (_i.e._ stopped), “but continued our march on the camp until +the artillery opened upon us. The first shell took effect in the +ranks of my regiment, just above the kraal of Baza. The Nokenke then +ran out in the shape of a horn towards the kraal of Nyenzani on the +road between Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift (the continuation of the +road, to the eastward of the camp). The engagement now became very +hot between the Mangwane (mounted natives) and us, the Mangwane being +supported by the infantry, who were some distance in their rear. We +were now falling very fast. The Mangwane had put their horses in a +donga, and were firing away at us on foot. We shouted ‘Izulu!’ (‘The +heavens!’)[171] and made for the donga, driving out the Mangwane +towards the camp. The infantry then opened fire on us, and their fire +was so hot, that those of us who were not in the donga retired back +over the hill. It was then that the Nokenke and Nodwengu regiments +ran out towards Nyenzani’s kraal. We then shouted ‘Izulu!’ again, +and got up out of the dongas. The soldiers opened fire on us again, +and we laid down. We then got up again, and the whole of my regiment +charged the infantry, who formed into two separate parties—one party +standing four deep with their backs towards Sandhlwana, the other +standing about fifty yards from the camp in like formation. We were +checked by the fire of the soldiers standing near Sandhlwana, but +charged on towards those standing in front of the camp, in spite of +a very heavy fire on our right flank from those by Sandhlwana. As +we got nearer we saw the soldiers were beginning to fall from the +effects of our fire. On our left we were supported by the Umbonambi, +half the Undi, Ngobamakosi, and Uve. Behind us were the other half +of the Undi and Udhloko, who never came into action at Sandhlwana, +but formed the reserve (which passed on and attacked Rorke’s Drift). +As we rushed on the soldiers retired on the camp, fighting all the +way, and as they got into the camp we were intermingled with them. It +was a disputed point as to which of the following regiments was the +first in the English camp, viz.: Undi, Kandampenvu, Ngobamakosi, and +Umbonambi; but it was eventually decided that the Umbonambi was the +first, followed by Undi. + +“One party of soldiers came out from among the tents and formed +up a little above the ammunition-waggons. They held their ground +there until their ammunition failed them, when they were nearly all +assegaied. Those that were not killed at this place formed again +in a solid square in the neck of Sandhlwana. They were completely +surrounded on all sides, and stood back to back, and surrounding +some men who were in the centre. Their ammunition was now done, +except that they had some revolvers which they fired at us at close +quarters. We were quite unable to break their square until we had +killed a great many of them, by throwing our assegais at short +distances. We eventually overcame them in this way.”[172] + +When all we have narrated was known in Natal, the question was asked +in the public prints: “Who, in the light of these recently-discovered +facts, were the real heroes of that day? Surely the two officers who +commanded in that narrow pass at the rear of the camp.... Surely, +too, no smaller heroism was that of the fourteen carbineers ... who, +mere boys as they were, gave their lives away in order to afford +their comrades-in-arms a chance of retreat.... Any one of these men +might have had a chance for his life, had he chosen to follow the +example set by so many. They remained, however, and they died, and +only after four months of doubt, contradiction, and despatch-writing, +is it made known to the world who they were who have most deserved +the coveted decoration ‘For Valour.’” + +“‘The dead shall live, the living die!’ Never was this well-known +line of Dryden’s more strikingly illustrated than by the events of +the past fortnight,” writes _The Natal Witness_ of June 7th, 1879. +“‘The dead shall live,’ the mists of doubt, overclouding many a +reputation, have been cleared up by a visit to the now sacred field +of Isandhlwana. + +“‘The living die:’ the hopes of a large party in an European nation +have been extinguished by the assegais of a mere handful of savages.” +(Alluding to the death of the Prince Imperial of France.) “The +two events stand side by side in startling contrast, and suggest +thoughts which even the wisest might with advantage ponder. Turn, for +instance, to the story of the field of Isandhlwana, as now told in +plain though interrupted and awful characters by the remains found +resting near the ‘neck.’ Could it have been guessed that, while human +recollection and human intelligence failed so utterly to convey to +the world a history of the events of that too memorable day, Nature +herself would have taken the matter in hand, and told us such a +story as no one who hears it will ever forget? Four months, all but +a day, had elapsed since the defenders of the field stood facing +the Zulu myriads—four months of rain and sun, of the hovering of +slow-sailing birds of prey, and of the predatory visits, as it might +well be deemed, of unregarding enemies. Four months! and during all +that time, while the world was ringing from one end to the other +with the news of a terrible disaster, while reinforcements were +crowding on to our shores, and special correspondents were flooding +the telegraph-wires with the last new thing, all through those four +months the dead slept quietly on, waiting almost consciously, as one +might think, for the revelation which was to establish their fame, +and, where necessary, relieve their unjustly sullied reputation. +For four months was there a sleep of honour slept upon that bitter +field—a sleep unbroken by any of the noise of the war that rolled +both to southward and to northward. The defeat of Indlobane had been +suffered; the victory of Kambula had been gained; the defenders of +Rorke’s Drift had been rewarded, at least with a nation’s praise; the +imprisoned column had been released from Etshowe; all the roads in +Natal had rung to the tread of men and the rolling of waggon-wheels, +as the force which was to “wipe out” the disaster of Isandhlwana +moved up to the front. Yet still the honoured dead slept in silence. +Only the grasses that waved round them in the autumn breeze murmured +to them of their coming resurrection; only the stars that looked down +on them, when the night wind even had ceased, and the hills loomed +black and silent in the morning hours, bade them be patient and wait. +There were many and varied fates entwined in that quiet group: there +was the trained officer, there was the private soldier, there was the +man who had come to find employment in a colonial service, there were +the lads from the colony itself; all these were there, waiting till +the moment should come when their heroism should be recognised, when +the vague slanders of interest or of cowardice should be dispelled, +and the wreath of undying fame hung round each name in the historic +temple. And the moment, long waited for—long promised, as it might +almost seem, by the beneficent hand of Nature herself, who held +firmly to some unmistakable tokens of recognition—the moment at last +arrived. There could be no mistake about it. Those lying here were +those who had often been called by name by those who found them. +If one means of recognition was absent, another took its place. If +the features were past identification, there was the letter from a +sister, the ornament so well known to companions, the marks of rank, +the insignia of office. Ghastly tokens, it will be said, making up +the foreground of a ghastly scene. Yes, ghastly tokens, but glorious +tokens also—tokens enabling many a family to name those that died +with a regret no longer mingled with doubt or with pain; tokens +that will long be cherished, and which will be shown to children as +preserving the memory of lives that are to be imitated. A black cloud +has, by these revelations, been lifted from the rocks of Isandhlwana, +and many whom we deemed dead are living again—living as examples, +never to be defaced, of the honour which tradition has so fondly +attached to a British soldier’s name.” + + + + +CHAPTER XX. + +THE PRINCE IMPERIAL. + + +Early in April the South African community was greatly impressed and +interested by the arrival of the young Prince Imperial, who came +out to Natal to take his share in the fortunes of war, and to see +something of active service against the Zulus. The colonists were not +a little gratified by the fact of this young hope of an illustrious +house having come to fight for and with them against their dreaded +foes; yet amongst them all there was hardly one, great or small, +gentle or simple, whose second thought was not one of sincere regret +that he, who, besides being of such importance in the future of +Europe, was also his widowed mother’s only son and sole comfort, +should be allowed to risk his life in a savage warfare. Many a +thought of kindly sympathy was directed from Natal towards that royal +mother for whom English men and women have always had so sincere a +feeling, whether in prosperity or adversity; and many a warm-hearted +woman’s eyes filled with tears at the sight of the gallant youth, and +at the very thought of what his loss would be to her who remained +to pray for him at home, the home which she had found amongst our +countrymen in England. On every side anxious hopes were expressed +that the Prince would be carefully guarded from danger, and not +allowed needlessly to throw away his precious young life; all these +hopes and anxieties were redoubled when he arrived, and, by his +winning ways and gallant bearing, won the hearts of all who came +in contact with him. Had Natal been asked, he would have been sent +straight home again instead of across the borders, and yet it would +have been hard to resist and thwart the eager wish to be of use, to +work, and to see service which characterised him throughout his short +campaign, and which, combined with gentleness and humanity as it was, +proved him to be a true soldier to the heart’s core. + +Since he had come to Natal he could not, of course, be kept away +from the front, and the day he left ’Maritzburg good wishes from all +classes attended him along the road. It was thought, indeed, that +in all human probability he was safe, except in the event of some +such battle as would make the chances equal for all, from general +to drummer-boy. “At all events,” it was said, “Lord Chelmsford will +keep him by his side.” Others, again, opined that the General would +find it no easy task to restrain the eager young spirit that scorned +to be treated with more care than others of his age. But this doubt +was answered by one who knew the Prince, and who said that he was too +good a soldier ever to disobey an order. Throw himself in the way of +difficulty and danger he might wherever possible, but any distinct +_order_ would be promptly and fully obeyed. + +For some little time the Prince acted as extra aide-de-camp to Lord +Chelmsford, and accompanied him in that capacity to Colonel Wood’s +camp at Kambula, and back to Utrecht. Colonel Harrison, R.E., was +also of the party, and during the journey very friendly relations +were established between him and the Prince, which lasted to the end, +and were drawn closer by the former’s careful attendance during an +indisposition which befell the latter. + +Whilst at Kambula the General reconnoitred the Indhlobane Mountain +on May 4th, and on return to camp was joined by the Prince Imperial, +when, to show him the defence of a laager, the alarm was sounded. In +three minutes every man was at his allotted post, and an inspection +of the camp, with its double tier of rifles ready for work, was +made by the General and staff. Next day the camp was broken up, and +the column moved to about a mile from the White Umvolosi, near the +Zinguin range—Lord Chelmsford and staff, with the Prince, proceeding +to Utrecht. + +On May 8th, the General, having appointed Colonel Harrison, R.E., +Assistant-Quartermaster-General of the army, and Lieutenant Carey, +98th Regiment, Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, requested the +former “to give some work to the Prince Imperial, as he was anxious +for it, and did not find enough to do in the duties of an extra +aide-de-camp.” This request was a verbal one, and the words used +may not be letter for letter, but of the purport there is no doubt; +and such a request from the Commander-in-Chief was, of course, an +order which was immediately carried out. The Prince was directed +to collect and record information respecting the distribution of +troops, location of depôts, and the like, and he worked hard at this +for some days. Lord Chelmsford shortly afterwards left for Newcastle, +but before his departure Colonel Harrison suggested that it would be +advisable, during his lordship’s absence, to make a reconnaissance +into Zululand, on the borders of which they had been hovering so +long, so as to determine the exact line of route which the columns +ought to take in the impending invasion. + +Lord Chelmsford accepted the suggestion, asking Colonel Harrison +to take the Prince with him on the expedition, and appointing an +intelligent officer to accompany them. The reconnoitring party +started with a strong escort, and reached Conference Hill on May +13th. Here they were joined by Colonel Buller and 200 horsemen, and +were engaged on their reconnaissance till May 17th, bivouacking at +night with horses saddled and bridled, and marching at dawn, scouring +the country, and sweeping Zulu scouts before them. The Prince +was delighted with the life, the simple fare of the officers—his +comrades—cooked by themselves at their camp-fire, the strange +country, the sight of the enemy, the exhilarating gallops over the +grass up hill and down dale after fleet Zulu spies, the bivouac under +the star-lit heavens. All this pleased him immensely; as he told +Colonel Harrison: “Made him feel that he was really doing soldiers’ +work such as he had never done before.” Always anxious to be of use, +he made most careful and copious notes and observations on all they +saw or did. + +On the 17th the party returned to Conference Hill, Colonel Harrison +and Colonel Buller having arranged for a combined and further +reconnaissance of the country from that place and Brigadier-General +Wood’s camp; but as the special duty to which the Prince and the +intelligence officer had been assigned was over, Colonel Harrison +would not allow them to accompany him farther, but directed them +to return to Utrecht. They obeyed; but, on the 18th, after Colonel +Harrison had started on his expedition and was already in Zululand, +he was surprised by the appearance of the Prince Imperial, who had +galloped all the way from Balte Spruit by himself to overtake him, +bringing with him the permission, for which he had sent a messenger +to Lord Chelmsford, to go on the new reconnaissance. The party now +consisted of Colonel Harrison, the Prince, Lieutenant Carey, one +officer and five men Bettington’s Horse, and one officer and twenty +men Natal Native Horse (Basutu). The escort would have been stronger, +but that the junction with Colonel Buller from Wood’s camp was looked +for to add to it. The first day was occupied in searching the country +as before, and in looking out for Buller; and the party bivouacked at +night with vedettes and sentries posted all round, as Zulus had been +seen on the hills, although they did not molest the reconnoitring +party. + +On the following day (the 19th), whilst exploring a deep rough +valley, the party was suddenly confronted by a number of Zulus, who +came down the hill at one side of the donga, and spread out in the +usual way in two wings or horns, in order to overlap or outflank it, +firing as they advanced. The officer in command of the advance at +once put spurs to his horse and rode straight up the hill at the weak +centre of the Zulu detachment, followed by the rest of the party. +They pushed right through the centre of the Zulus, and the horns at +once broke away, and escaped among the rocks with some loss. Smaller +bodies of Zulus were met with subsequently, but did not attempt to +try conclusions with the horsemen, who were obliged to keep on the +move the greater part of the night, as the enemy was all around them. + +Next morning they reached Conference Hill, without meeting Colonel +Buller; Colonel Harrison and the Prince proceeding to Utrecht to +report to Lord Chelmsford. + +Lord Chelmsford now informed Colonel Harrison that “He +was to consider the Prince Imperial as attached to the +Quartermaster-General’s staff for duty, but it was not put in orders, +in consequence of the Prince not being in the army.” The Prince +lived, as before, with the General’s personal staff, and Colonel +Harrison, therefore, only saw him when he came for work or orders, +which was very frequently. + +On May 25th—the head-quarters having been established at Landman’s +Drift—the Prince, having called for work as usual, was directed to +prepare a plan of a divisional camp. That evening Colonel Harrison +was spoken to by Lord Chelmsford, because the Prince Imperial had +gone outside the lines without an escort, but replied “That the work +he had given the Prince to do referred to the camp inside the outpost +lines.” The General then told Colonel Harrison “To take care that the +Prince was not to go out without an escort when working for him, and +in the matter of escort to treat him, not as a royal person, but the +same as any other officer, taking all due precautions.” + +Colonel Harrison then said that “He would see the Prince, and tell +him he was never to leave the camp without a suitable escort, and +that he was to apply to him for one when it was wanted;” and Lord +Chelmsford replied that “That would do.” + +The same day Colonel Harrison saw the Prince, and told him this, +and to make the matter quite sure, he then and there gave him the +instructions in writing. + +He next directed him to make a map of the country, from the +reconnaissance sketches of Lieutenant Carey and others. This work the +Prince executed very well, and so eager was he for employment, so +desirous to be always up and doing, that he went, not once or twice, +but often every day to Colonel Harrison’s tent asking for more. + +On the 28th of May, head-quarters were at Kopje Allein, and on that +and the two following days reconnaissances were pushed far into the +enemy’s country, but no enemy was seen. Small parties, even single +officers, rode about unmolested all over the district round, and went +beyond the spot where so sad a scene was shortly afterwards enacted. + +On the 31st of May the Prince went to Colonel Harrison’s tent with a +report which he had written, and, as usual, asked for some more work. +He was told that the army was to march next day, and that he might +go out and report on the roads and camps for the day following; with +which instructions the Prince was greatly pleased. Next day the 2nd +Division (with which were Lord Chelmsford and the head-quarters’ +staff) were ordered to march towards Ulundi; Wood’s column being +in advance some miles, on the other side of the Blood River, on a +road which would take it out eventually on the line of march of +the head-quarters’ column. Lieutenant Carey, whilst conversing on +duty matters with Colonel Harrison, expressed a wish to go out with +the Prince, as he desired to verify a sketch he had made on the +previous day; and, although Colonel Harrison had intended to ask +one of the General’s personal staff to accompany the Prince, he +said, when Lieutenant Carey volunteered to go: “All right; you can +look after the Prince!” At the same time he told Lieutenant Carey +to let the Prince do the work for which he was going out, namely, +a detailed report on the road and the selection of a site for the +camp. Lieutenant Carey was known to Colonel Harrison as a cautious +and experienced officer, who had been frequently out on patrol duties +with Colonel Buller and others, who was acquainted with the nature of +the work he had to do, the precautions to be taken, and the actual +ground to be gone over; and there was every reason to believe that he +thoroughly understood his position, and would make, as he had done +before, the proper arrangements for an escort. + +On the morning of the 1st, Colonel Harrison, hearing that no escort +had arrived at the hour fixed for the departure of the reconnoitring +party, went over to General Marshall’s tent, and obtained from him +the order for the number of men he thought sufficient—“six Europeans +and six Basutos;” and, having informed Lieutenant Carey of this, +he rode off to attend to his own duties—superintending the march of +the army, inspecting the fords, and moving on in advance (in company +with Major Grenfell) to select the site for watering-places and the +next camp. On a ridge in front of the column Colonel Harrison and +his companion presently found the Prince and Lieutenant Carey halted +with the European troopers only, and heard from them that they were +waiting for the Basutos, who had not joined them in camp; but some +were now in sight on the hillside flanking the line of march, and +moving in a direction which would bring them upon it a little in +advance of the spot where the party was waiting. + +As Lieutenant Carey had been already over the country, he was asked +by Colonel Harrison to point out the place where the water supply +for the next camp was, and the whole party rode slowly along a donga +towards the supposed stream or ponds. Colonel Harrison did not think +the water sufficient for their purpose, and rode back to the high +ground, where he was rejoined by Major Grenfell, who told him that +the Prince’s party had just discovered a better supply a little +farther on. There was a ridge in front of them which they considered +marked the end of the day’s march, and the officers dispersed to +attend to their own duties, not imagining for an instant that the +reconnoitring party would go on without the Basutos, who, from their +wonderful power of sight and hearing, and quickness at detecting the +approach of danger, were always regarded as essential to an escort. + +Unhappily, however, such was the case. The party rode on until they +came to a deserted kraal, situated some 200 yards from the river, and +consisting of five huts, one with the usual small cattle enclosure. +Between the kraal and the river stretched a luxuriant growth of +tambookie grass, five or six feet in height, with mealies and Kafir +corn interspersed. This dense covert, however, did not completely +surround the kraal, for in front there was an open space, apparently +used by the Zulus, judging from the ashes and broken earthenware +strewn about, as a common cooking-ground. + +Here the party halted, and the Prince, having first sent a native +guide to make sure that the huts were all uninhabited, gave the +order that the horses should be off-saddled and turned out to +graze. Some of them lit a fire and made coffee, while the Prince +and Lieutenant Carey, after the latter had taken a look round with +his glass, proceeded to make sketches of the surrounding country. +It is said that the Prince’s talent with pen and pencil, combined +with his remarkable proficiency in military surveying—that great +gift of recognising at once the strategic capabilities of any spot +which distinguished the First Napoleon—made his contributions to our +knowledge of the country to be traversed of great value; and he never +lost an opportunity of making himself of use in this and every other +way. + +It was about 3 P.M. when the party halted at this deserted kraal, the +Prince deciding that they should leave again in an hour’s time. That +the Zulus had been upon the spot not long before was apparent from +signs of freshly-chewed _imfi_ (native sugar-cane) upon the ground, +while a few dogs lingering about might have suggested that their +masters were not far off. Before the hour was over, however, the +native guide came in to report that he had seen a Zulu coming over +the hill, and it was now thought prudent to retire, the Prince giving +directions to collect and up-saddle the horses, followed by the order +to “Mount.” + +Some of the men were already in the saddle, others in the act of +mounting, when a sudden volley fired upon them from amongst the +tall stalks of the mealies (Indian corn) which grew on every side, +betrayed the presence of a numerous armed foe, who had returned +unseen to those who were in temporary occupation of their kraals. +The distance was not twenty yards, and the long grass swayed to the +sudden rush of the Zulus, as with a tremendous shout, they charged +towards the Prince and his companions. The horses all swerved at the +suddenness of the tumult, and one broke away, its rider being shot +before he could recover it and mount. The young Prince was riding +a fine gray charger, a gray of sixteen hands, always difficult to +mount, and on this occasion, frightened by the firing, it became +restive and could not be controlled. Lieutenant Carey, apparently, +had at this moment been carried by his horse in a direction which +brought one of the huts between him and the Prince, of whose +difficulties he was therefore unaware. From the moment of the attack +no man seems to have known much of what the rest were doing; to +gallop away was the only chance for life, and all hurried off, the +Prince in vain endeavouring to mount his restive steed unaided. He +was passed by Trooper Letocq: “_Dépêchez vous, s’il vous plait, +Monsieur!_” he cried, as he dashed past, himself only lying across +his saddle, but the Prince made no answer; he was already doing his +utmost, and in another minute he was alone. He was seen endeavouring +to mount his rearing charger, as it followed the retreat, while he +ran beside it, the enemy close at hand. He made one desperate attempt +to leap into the saddle by the help of the holster-flap; _that_ gave +way, and then he fell. The charger dashed riderless past some of the +mounted men, who, looking back, saw the Prince running after them +on foot, with the Zulus but a few paces behind him. Alas! not a man +turned back, they galloped wildly on, and carried back to camp the +news that the gallant young Prince, for or with whom each of them +should have died that day, lay slain upon the hillside where he had +made his last brave stand alone. Two troopers fell besides—one was +struck down by a bullet as he rode away; the other was the man who +had lost his horse, Trooper Rogers, and who was last seen in the +act of levelling his carbine at the enemy. The native guide was +killed as well, after a hard fight with the foe, witnessed to by the +blood-stained and broken weapons found by his side next day. The +fugitives rode on for some distance, when they met General Wood and +Colonel Buller, to whom they made their report. From the brow of an +adjacent hill these officers, looking through their glasses, could +see the Zulus leading away the horses they had taken—the trophies of +their successful attack. + +That evening Colonel Harrison was in his tent, engaged in writing +orders for the next day’s march, when Lord Chelmsford came in to +tell him “The Prince is killed!” and Lieutenant Carey soon after +confirmed the dreadful, well-nigh incredible news. He said they were +off-saddled at a kraal, when they were surrounded and fired into, +and that the Prince must have been killed, for no one had seen him +afterwards. + +Colonel Harrison asked the General to let him take a few men to the +kraal, and see if, by any chance, the Prince were only wounded, or +were hidden near at hand, but his request was not granted, and the +testimony of the survivors extinguished all hope. + +Next day General Marshall, with a cavalry patrol, went out to search +for the Prince, being assisted by scouts of the Flying Column. The +bodies of the troopers were soon found, and shortly afterwards that +of His Imperial Highness was found by Captain Cochrane, lying in a +donga about 200 yards from the kraal where the party had halted. The +body was stripped with the exception of a gold chain with medallions +attached, which was still round his neck. Sword, revolver, helmet, +and clothes were gone; but in the grass were found the Prince’s spurs +and one sock. + +The body had eighteen assegai wounds, all in front, and the marks on +the ground and on the spurs indicated a desperate resistance. + +The two white troopers were laid together beside a cairn of stones, +which was erected to mark the exact spot where the Prince was found, +and later in the day they were buried there, the chaplain on duty +with the column performing the funeral service. + +But for the Prince himself a true soldiers’ bier was formed of lances +lashed together and horse blankets, and, borne thus, the body of the +noble lad was carried up the hill towards the camp which he had left +the previous day so full of energy and life. + +The melancholy news was telegraphed throughout the colony, causing +universal grief and consternation. Every heart was wrung with +sympathy for _the mother_; and even those to whose homes and hearts +the war had already brought desolation, felt their own grief hushed +for awhile in the presence of a bereavement which seemed to surpass +all others in bitterness and depth. + +What citizen of ’Maritzburg will ever forget the melancholy Sunday +afternoon, cold and storm-laden, when, at the first distant sound of +the sad approaching funeral music, all left their homes and lined the +streets through which the violet-adorned coffin passed on its way to +its temporary resting-place. + +In Durban, too, the solemn scene was repeated; the whole colony being +deeply moved at the sad and untimely death of the gallant Prince. +H.M.S. _Boadicea_, flag-ship of Commodore Richards, had the honour of +conveying the body to Simon’s Bay, when it was transferred to H.M.S. +_Orontes_ with every possible mark of respect for conveyance to +England. + +A court of inquiry was at once assembled by Lord Chelmsford, and +reported that Lieutenant Carey had not understood the position in +which he stood towards the Prince, and, as a consequence, failed to +estimate aright the responsibility which fell to his lot; also that +he was much to blame for having proceeded on the duty in question +with a portion only of the escort; and that the selection of the +kraal where the halt was made, surrounded as it was by cover for the +enemy, and adjacent to difficult ground, showed a lamentable want of +military prudence. And, finally, the court deeply regretted that no +effort was made after the attack to rally the escort and to show a +front to the enemy, whereby the possibility of aiding those who had +failed to make good their retreat might have been ascertained. + +Lieutenant Carey was then tried by court-martial and found guilty. +The home authorities decided, however, that the conviction and +sentence could not be maintained, and consequently ordered this +officer to be released from arrest and to return to his duty. + +In justice to Lieutenant Carey it must be said that the Prince +appears to have been actually in command of the party; Lieutenant +Carey accompanied it, by permission, for the purpose of completing +some of his own work, taking advantage of the protection of the +escort to enable him to do so; he received no order about the command +of the escort, or other instructions beyond the words, “You can look +after the Prince,” which were evidently interpreted as _advise him_, +but could scarcely warrant controlling his movements. + +The Prince’s written instructions from Colonel Harrison were lost +with him. + +On dangerous duties pertaining to the Quartermaster-General’s +Department in an enemy’s country the Prince Imperial should _never_ +have been employed; as long as he remained with the British forces +he should have been retained on the personal staff of the General +commanding. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI. + +ULUNDI. + + +Before entering on the history of the advance of the main column on +Ulundi, we will glance at the doings of No. 1 Division, which was to +operate against Ulundi from the eastward. + +During May entrenched posts had been established—Fort Crealock, +on the left bank of the Amatikulu River and close to John Dunn’s +Road, about fourteen miles from Fort Pearson, on the Tugela; Fort +Chelmsford, on the right bank of the Inyezane, also on John Dunn’s +Road, and eight miles from Fort Crealock; and, in June, Fort +Napoleon, on the left bank of the Umlalazi River, between Fort +Chelmsford and Port Durnford, where a landing-place was established—a +brief account of which may be interesting. The spot is described as +a straight sandy coast near the mouth of the Umlalazi River, always +having a boiling surf rolling in on the beach. The landing operations +were carried out by means of large decked surf-boats of about forty +tons burden each. + +The mode of working them was as follows: One end of a long hawser +was made fast to an anchor dropped some distance outside the surf, +and the other end taken on shore by a small line, hauled taut, and +secured to shore moorings. + +By means of this “warp” the surf-boat travels to and from the beach. +Having picked up the warp by the buoy-rope, it is placed in grooves +in the bow and stern of the boat, and there retained by pins. The +roll of the surf takes the boat in, large rope-stoppers being used to +check her should she be going too fast. + +In this way some 3000 tons of stores were landed, at a very great +saving of expense over land transport. The landing operations were +at all times difficult, sometimes impossible; they were conducted +by Commander Caffin, R.N., and to him and the Naval Brigade there +stationed is due the entire credit of the excellent work done. + +Forwarding supplies and bridging the Tugela was the work of the +1st Division through May and well into June; everything military, +except convoy duty, appeared at a standstill. There was a great +deal of sickness amongst the troops, but General Crealock did much +in providing proper hospital accommodation and improving sanitary +arrangements. + +Fort Pearson was converted into an extensive hospital, where there +were as many as 400 patients at times, and whose garrison, after +the advance of the division, was composed of the convalescents. At +this hospital some wily patients managed to appropriate £5000 of the +public moneys; but this fortunately was all recovered, except about +£33. + +Telegraphic communication was established by the Royal Engineers +between Fort Chelmsford and the Lower Tugela; and Colonel Walker, +C.B., Scots Guards, was appointed to the command of this portion of +the base, and stationed at Fort Pearson. + +On the 18th June the long-expected move was made by No. 1 Division, +and General Crealock, with the advanced portion of the force, left +Fort Pearson and the Lower Tugela. Moving by Fort Chelmsford, he +reached the Umlalazi River on the 22nd. The river was bridged by the +train under Captain Blood, R.E., and a work commenced on the left +bank called “Fort Napoleon.” + +The General was engaged reconnoitring on the 23rd and following days, +capturing a few cattle, one of which appeared to resent its capture, +charging the General, and severely injuring his horse. On the 28th +the force encamped near Port Durnford. + +But little interest attaches to this division, which had great +opportunities before it. An earlier advance and a little dash +would have given the laurels of the second campaign to the 1st +Division, which at the beginning of May consisted of upwards of 9000 +men—6500 being Europeans—a sufficient force to have accomplished the +destruction of Ulundi with ease; but it was not to be. + +Many absurd stories are told as to causes of delays, one being the +want of so many rations of _pepper_; and the whole ending in the +well-known telegram, “Where is Crealock?” + +We may here devote a few remarks to the Naval Brigade, which rendered +such good service throughout the campaign; and, had opportunity +offered, would have largely added to the laurels it won. + +After the relief of Etshowe, the Naval Brigade was divided between +Lower Tugela and Fort Chelmsford, Commander Brackenbury in command at +the latter post, Captain Campbell in chief command. The main force +advanced with General Crealock—545 officers and men of _Active_, +_Boadicea_, and _Shah_, with 3 9-pounder guns, 6 rocket-troughs, and +5 Gatling guns. At Port Durnford they remained disembarking stores +till July 21st, when, after being reviewed by Sir Garnet Wolseley, +the _Active’s_ and _Shah’s_ men embarked, leaving the _Boadicea’s_ to +continue temporarily the duties of the landing station. + +Captain Bradshaw of the _Shah_, and Captain Adeane of the _Tenedos_, +rendered good service at Durban and Simon’s Bay respectively. + +The Royal Marines of the squadron served with the Naval Brigade. +Lieutenant Dowding, R.M.L.I., was at first the senior officer, and +advanced with Colonel Pearson’s column to Etshowe, remaining there +until its relief. Captain Phillips, R.M.L.I., and Captain Burrowes, +R.M.A., were landed from H.M.S. _Shah_, the former senior officer, +and in command of the Marines at the battle of Ngingindhlovu. + +We must now return to the 2nd Division and Flying Column, which +at last began to move in the right direction. Zululand had been +carefully reconnoitred to the Babanango Mountain by Colonel Buller, +and the advance of the 2nd Division, with the head-quarters, in this +direction was covered by the Flying Column, which was always within +striking distance. + +The troops now were carefully protected at night by laagers; the +ordinary form being a rectangle in three compartments, with a +shelter trench two yards outside the waggons, so that there might be +a second line of fire from the top of the waggons, without risk to +the defenders of the shelter trench. + +The Flying Column bore the brunt of work in the advances, scouting +the country in every direction, the most reliable “eyes and ears” +of the force the “Natal Native Horse,” then commanded by Captain +Cochrane. These men (Edendale men and Basutu) in small numbers +crowned the summit of every hill right and left of the route, and +miles in front they were pushed to feel the way. On the 4th June the +scouts reported a considerable number of the enemy, these, after the +exchange of a few shots, Colonel Buller tried to draw towards the +camp, but in vain, and the patrol, not being strong enough to risk an +engagement, returned to camp. There three messengers from Cetshwayo +were being received by Lord Chelmsford. + +They were sent back on June 6th with the following message: “He must +at once give proof of being earnest in desiring peace, proof to +be—1st. Two 7-pounder guns, and the oxen now with him taken from us +to be sent in with the ambassadors. 2nd. A promise from Ketchwayo +that all the arms taken during war, etc., when collected shall be +given up. 3rd. One regiment to come to my camp and lay down its arms +as a sign of submission. Pending Cetywayo’s answer, there will be no +military operations on our part; when he has complied with them, I +will order cessation of hostilities pending discussion of final terms +of peace.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 107). + +On the previous day (5th June), Colonel Buller took a force of about +300 men to reconnoitre the proposed route. The Zulus seen the day +before came out from their kraals, and formed as if for an attack. +The ground in their rear was broken and covered with thorny bush, +the kraals large, apparently belonging to a chief; and beside one of +them were four waggons, evidently taken from Isandhlwana. Colonel +Buller determined to burn the kraals, but as he approached the enemy +broke and retired into the cover, opening a heavy fire. A portion +of the force engaged the Zulus from the edge of the bush whilst the +remainder set fire to the kraals, which was accomplished with the +loss of two men wounded. + +Major-General Marshall came up with a portion of the Cavalry Brigade, +and, with a view to ensuring the safety of Colonel Buller’s retreat, +advanced three troops of the 17th Lancers under Colonel Drury-Lowe to +hold the enemy in check. + +The enemy was found to be very strongly posted in the thorns, and +the ground being impracticable for cavalry, the Lancers were ordered +to retire. Their Adjutant, Lieutenant Frith, was in this fruitless +skirmish shot through the heart. + +During this affair an incident occurred (told by an officer present +at the time), showing the individual bravery of the Zulus: A single +warrior, chased by several Lancers, found himself run down and escape +impossible. He turned and faced his enemies; spreading his arms +abroad he presented his bare breast unflinchingly to the steel, and +fell, face to the foe, as a brave soldier should. + +On the 6th a post called Fort Newdigate was established, and on this +evening the warmth of the double line of fire from the laager of the +2nd Division was unpleasantly experienced by the 5th Company Royal +Engineers. This company had marched up that afternoon in advance +of the Flying Column (which was going down-country for supplies), +and had camped close to one of the unfinished redoubts outside the +laager; an alarm was given in the laager, and a heavy fire opened +therefrom. The Engineers coolly lay down flat on the ground, and +waited till the excitement was over. It was due entirely to their +own steadiness that the casualties were not greater; as it was, one +sergeant was wounded and two horses killed. + +On the 7th, the division advanced, clearing the country of Zulus and +burning their kraals, and encamped at the Upoko River; remaining +there till the arrival of Brigadier-General Wood’s Column with a +large convoy of supplies for which it had been sent. The time was +usefully employed in reconnoitring, examining the road in advance, +making drifts practicable, etc. + +A line of telegraph was laid by the half Telegraph Troop (C) Royal +Engineers, from Quagga’s kraal (on the road between Newcastle +and Ladysmith), where it joined the colonial line to Doornberg +_viâ_ Dundee and Landtmann’s Drift, thus placing head-quarters in +communication with Pietermaritzburg, etc.; flag-signalling being +employed to communicate with Doornberg. + +On the 16th June the correspondent of _The Times_ wrote: “We are +wandering towards Ulundi much as the Children of Israel wandered +towards Canaan, without plans, or even definite notions for +the future. It would seem not impossible to form some plan of +campaign—something, at any rate, more definite than the hand-to-mouth +manner in which we are now proceeding. Deep science and tactical +skill are not necessary to contend with savages; a simple method +and plain common-sense suffice, if backed by energy, decision, and +determination.” + +The intelligence now telegraphed that Sir Garnet Wolseley was on +his way to Natal to unravel the various tangled skeins of civil and +military policy, doubtless acted as the “spur in the head” which +expedited Lord Chelmsford’s movements. + +On the 17th, Brigadier-General Wood arrived with the supplies, and +next day the force advanced to the Upoko River, where the road from +Rorke’s Drift to Ulundi crosses it. Here there was a halt for a day, +and a depôt formed, called Fort Marshall. Colonel Collingwood was +left in charge of the two posts, Forts Newdigate and Marshall; and +the whole line of communication in the enemy’s country, and such +of the garrison as were left in frontier-posts for the purpose of +patrolling, were placed under the command of Major-General Marshall. + +Fort Marshall was about twenty-five miles from Rorke’s Drift, and +sixteen from Fort Newdigate; from this post to Koppie Allein (on the +Blood River) the distance was twenty-one miles. + +Having struck down into this road, which runs into Zululand in an +easterly direction, a glance at the map will show how needless +was the waste of time and money spent in concentrating stores at +Conference Hill—so far removed from the line of communications with +Pietermaritzburg. + +The combined column reached the Umhlatusi River on the 21st, having +traversed difficult and mountainous ground, where in many places the +train was obliged to pass by single waggons. + +The Zulus took no advantage of the many opportunities for attack +that presented themselves, and the march to Ulundi was practically +unopposed. At this halting-place Fort Evelyn was built; and on the +24th the march was resumed. + +Cetshwayo’s messengers, ’Mfunzi and ’Nkisimane, came up from +Pietermaritzburg on the 24th, and next morning were sent to the king +with Lord Chelmsford’s reply to his message. + +A very awkward drift on the Uvulu River was passed by the column, +after crossing which a day’s halt was made, when a cavalry patrol was +sent out to destroy some military kraals. Two more indunas came in to +ask for peace, and were sent back to Ulundi in the evening. On the +27th the force arrived at Entonjaneni, where the arrangements for the +final advance on Ulundi were made, tents and all unnecessary baggage +left behind, and a strong post formed with the aid of waggons. Four +hundred waggons, 6000 oxen, and 800 mules were left entrenched here; +the remaining 200 waggons, with ten days’ provisions, accompanying +the advancing force. This evening two more messengers came in from +the king with elephant tusks, some hundred head of oxen, and two +trunks, the property of Lord Chelmsford. The messengers were sent +back next day. + +_The Natal Colonist_ of June 28th says: “Again we hear that Ketshwayo +has sent to Government, asking why Lord Chelmsford continues to +advance. He (the king) hopes the General will not persist in +advancing, as in that case he will be forced to fight, and what he +wants is peace. This, we believe, makes the eleventh message he has +sent in to the same effect. The General affects to doubt his _bonâ +fides_. How is this to be established? Can his lordship think of +no better guarantee than one which the most vigorous supporters of +the war cannot term anything but childish?” This latter question is +explained in another issue of the same paper, in which the editor +remarks: “It is argued that the Zulus or the Zulu king cannot be +sincere in desiring peace, because when the chance offers our troops +are fired upon. If people would but consider for a moment, that until +there is a truce or armistice agreed on we are living in a state of +war; that our troops are in the Zulu country, making war upon its +inhabitants, missing no opportunity of inflicting damage and injury +upon them, burning their kraals, destroying their grain, ravaging +their gardens, and firing on the natives themselves at every chance, +what right, they would ask themselves, have we to expect that the +Zulus should refrain from retaliation, however desirous they may be +of seeing peace restored, and an end put to all the devastation and +horror of prolonged warfare? _We_ do not profess to be otherwise than +desirous of peace—peace with honour and security for the future—and +yet are we not invading their country, and almost vaunting that we +shall dictate its terms only when our invading columns have met at +Ulundi, and planted the English flag there?” + +On the 30th the descent into the valley of the White Umvolosi was +commenced, through a country covered with scattered bush and aloes. +Two indunas were escorted in during the day, one bearing a letter +from Cetshwayo to Lord Chelmsford,[173] and the other the sword of +the Prince Imperial, which the king sent in immediately on learning +the value attached to it.[174] + +Sir Garnet Wolseley—having been ordered out to Natal as Governor of +Natal and the Transvaal, and Her Majesty’s High Commissioner for the +eastern portion of South Africa—landed at Durban on the 28th June. On +the 30th Lord Chelmsford sent him the following message: “Five miles +from Entonganini; ten miles from Umvolosi River. King’s messengers +have just left with message from me. I must advance to position on +left bank of river. This I do to-morrow, but will stop hostilities, +pending negotiations, if communicated demands are complied with by +3rd July, noon. There are indunas come with cattle and guns. I have +consented to receive 1000 captured rifles instead of a regiment +laying down its arms. As my supplies will only permit of my remaining +here until the 10th July, it is desirable I should be informed by +you of the conditions of peace to be demanded. White man with king +states he has 20,000 men. King anxious to fight; Princes not so. +Where is Crealock’s column? Signal.” + +On the 1st July the Flying Column and General Newdigate’s division +reached, without opposition, the southern bank of the White Umvolosi, +within five or six miles of the royal kraals of Ulundi. Defensible +laagers were at once formed, and the position made secure before +night. Large bodies of Zulus were seen in motion at Ulundi. Next day +the 2nd Division closed up their laager to that of the Flying Column, +and a stone redoubt was erected on knoll in rear; so that a small +garrison might hold the post, leaving the main force unencumbered to +operate as desired. The Zulu army was not seen, and no messengers +arrived from the king; but a large herd of white (royal) cattle was +observed being driven from the king’s kraal towards the camp, and +shortly afterwards driven back again. + +On the 3rd, as the Zulus were firing on watering-parties at the +river, and no message had come in, a reconnaissance on the farther +side was ordered. At noon, the cattle, sent in with the last +messengers from the king, were driven back across the river, and +about the same time Colonel Buller crossed lower down with the +mounted men of the Flying Column to reconnoitre towards Ulundi. +Detaching parties to cover his flank, he advanced rapidly to within +about 200 yards of the Ulundi river, and about three-quarters of a +mile from Ulundi, when he came upon about 5000 Zulus concealed in the +river-bed, who at once opened fire, while large bodies of the enemy, +moving down on each flank, endeavoured to cut off his retreat. + +Colonel Buller, having effected the purpose for which he had gone +forward—feeling the enemy and reconnoitring the ground—retired +with a loss of three men killed and four wounded. Many officers +distinguished themselves in endeavouring to save the men who were +lost, as well as in bringing in dismounted men: Commandant D’Arcy, +Lieut.-Colonel Buller, Captain Prior, Lord William Beresford, +Lieutenant Hayward, and also Sergeant Kerr are mentioned. + +On the 4th, at 6.45 A.M., the force crossed the river, leaving the +camp garrisoned by the 1-24th Regiment, a company of Engineers, and +casualties (about 900 Europeans, 250 natives, with one Gatling gun). + +Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with the light cavalry of the Flying Column, +crossed in advance, and occupied the high ground in front without +opposition; the main body following, marched up the broken ground +out of the valley, and formed a hollow square, the ammunition-carts, +etc., in the centre, and the guns in position ready to come into +action without delay. The Flying Column formed the front half, and +the 2nd Division the rear half of the square; front, flanks, and +rear covered by the cavalry. In this formation the troops advanced +to the spot selected by Colonel Buller, which was about 700 yards +beyond the Nodwengo kraal, and about the same distance from a stream +that crossed the road halfway to Ulundi; high ground, commanding the +adjacent country, and with little cover beyond long grass, near it. + +The guns were posted in the angles and in the centre of each face of +the square, and each face had a company of infantry in reserve. + +Large numbers of Zulus were now seen coming from the hills on the +left and left front, and other masses on the right, partly concealed +by the mist from the river, passed the Nodwengo kraal to surround the +square. + +The cavalry on the right and left became engaged at 8.45 A.M., and, +slowly retiring as the enemy advanced, passed into the square, which +immediately opened fire. + +The Zulu advance was made with great determination, but their +movements appeared to be without order. Some individuals managed to +reach within thirty or forty yards of the rear face, where there +was some cover, but the main advance on all sides was checked at +some distance by the heavy artillery fire and steady volleys of the +infantry. These were so effective that within half an hour the enemy +wavered and gave way, when the cavalry dashed out to complete their +discomfiture. Passing out by the rear face of the square, Colonel +Drury-Lowe (who had been already wounded) led the 17th Lancers in the +direction of the Nodwengo kraal, dispersing the enemy and killing +those that could not reach the shelter of the kraal or the bush +below; then wheeling to the right, he charged through the enemy, who +were endeavouring to reach the mountains beyond. + +In this manner the whole of the level ground was cleared. +Lieut.-Colonel Buller’s command also took up the pursuit, doing much +execution until the enemy mounted the slopes of the hills and were +beyond their reach. But even then a place of safety was not gained, +for some guns were moved out from the square, and got the range of +the enemy retreating over the hills. The brunt of this day’s work +fell on the cavalry. Even in the pursuit the greater part of the +Zulus turned and fought for their lives. Overtaken by a Lancer, a +Zulu would stop just before the fatal thrust was delivered, and, +dodging like lightning, evade the lance, sometimes seizing it and +holding on till the Lancer was relieved by a comrade. + +The Irregular Horse, Mounted Infantry, and Native Horse (Captain +T. Shepstone’s Basutu and the Natal Native Horse under Captain +Cochrane), thoroughly searched the ground, disposing of the enemy who +had taken refuge in dongas, bush, and long grass. 600 Zulus are said +to have fallen before the cavalry alone—150 of them being credited to +the Lancers. + +Thus was fought the battle of Ulundi. + +It was impossible for the ill-armed enemy to pass the belt of fire +that encircled the square, even had they not been shaken by the +accurate artillery fire whilst yet at a distance. + +The ease with which the attack was repelled may be gathered from the +fact that the average number of rounds fired by the infantry actually +in the ranks was less than six-and-a-half rounds per man (6·4 rounds). + +The troops certainly were very steady, and the firing—generally +volley-firing by sections—was as a rule under perfect command. + +We have heard of an officer calmly smoking his pipe whilst in command +of his company during the engagement. + +As soon as the wounded had been attended to, the force advanced to +the banks of the stream near Ulundi, whilst the cavalry swept the +country beyond. Ulundi was fired at 11.40 A.M., and the adjacent +kraals shortly afterwards. At 2 P.M., the return march to the camp +commenced. Every military kraal in the valley that had not previously +been destroyed was in flames; and not a sign of the Zulu army was to +be perceived. + +The British force engaged consisted of 4062 Europeans and 1103 +natives, with 12 guns and 2 Gatlings. The loss: killed, 2 officers +(Captain Wyatt-Edgell, 17th Lancers, and the Hon. W. Drummond, in +charge of the Intelligence Department), 13 non-commissioned officers +and men, and 3 natives; wounded, 19 officers, 59 non-commissioned +officers and men, and 7 natives. + +The Zulu force is estimated variously; some put it at 12,000, some at +20,000. Being scattered over a large extent of country, and some of +the regiments engaged having already suffered heavily, it is not easy +to arrive at a reliable conclusion. It is probable that the correct +number lay between 15,000 and 20,000. + +As regards the Zulu loss, Lord Chelmsford says: “It is impossible to +estimate with any correctness the loss of the enemy, owing to the +extent of country over which they attacked and retreated; but it +could not have been less, I consider, than 1000 killed.”—(Despatch, +4th July). + +Using the same reasoning on the 6th, Lord Chelmsford says: “But +judging by the reports of those engaged, it cannot be placed at a +less number than 1500 killed.” + +From the statements of prisoners it would seem that the attacking +force was about 15,000 strong, 5000 being in reserve. At a meeting +of the Zulu Council on the 2nd July, it appears that it was resolved +by the King to send in the royal coronation white cattle as a +peace-offering; but as they were being driven towards the English +camp on the 2nd, they were turned back at Nodwengo by the Umcityu +Regiment, who refused to let them pass, saying, as they could not +fulfil all the demands, it was useless to give up the cattle, and +therefore they would fight. The king was then at Ulundi; he said that +“as the Inkandampemvu (Umcityu) Regiment would not let the cattle go +in as a peace-offering, and as we wished to fight, the white army +being now at his home, we could fight, but we were to fight the white +men in the open, and attack before the Nodwengo and Ulundi kraals, +where we were on the day of the fight.... The army is now thoroughly +beaten, and as it was beaten in the open, it will not reassemble and +fight again. No force is watching the lower column, and none has been +sent there. How could there be, when all were ordered to be here +to-day? We mustered here by the king’s orders at the beginning of +this moon, about ten days ago. We have not been called out before.” + +The natives belonging to the British force were exceedingly struck at +the idea of their being brought into the square, whilst the soldiers +formed “a laager” of their bodies round them. + +The special correspondent of _The Daily News_, Mr. Archibald Forbes, +performed a very gallant act after the battle of Ulundi. Finding +that no despatch was being sent off by the General to announce the +victory, he determined to take the news himself, and, “taking his +life in his hand,” set out alone to ride right through the Zulu +country. This he did, riding the whole night, having frequently to +dismount and actually _feel_ his way—the tracks of the waggons on the +upward route. + +Next day, after a ride of nearly a hundred miles, he reached +Landtmann’s Drift (in fifteen hours), and was enabled to telegraph to +Sir Garnet Wolseley the news of the victory of the 4th. + +A few brief remarks on the return march are all that are necessary. +The day after the battle of Ulundi (5th July) the whole force retired +to Entonjaneni, and remained there till the 9th, when the Flying +Column moved on the road towards the coast to Kwamagwasa, _en route_ +to meet Sir Garnet Wolseley. + +On the 10th the 2nd Division marched from Entonjaneni, and arrived at +the Upoko River on the 15th. + +Lord Chelmsford accompanied the Flying Column. We cannot leave +Brigadier-General Wood’s command without a word of notice. From +the beginning to the end of the campaign its work was done in +a thoroughly soldierlike manner, leaving little or nothing to +be desired. There was a thorough reciprocal confidence between +commander and men, and a total absence of those “scares” which were +occasionally heard of during the campaign. + +Where all did well, it may seem a little invidious to single +one out for mention, but we will quote the concluding words +of Brigadier-General Wood’s despatch of 5th July, referring to +Lieut.-Colonel Redvers Buller, not only on account of this officer’s +merit, but “to point the moral” as to where was the neglect which led +primarily to the disaster to the Head-quarter Column in January: + +“He has never failed to cover the column with his mounted men, for +from ten to twelve miles in front, and on the flanks. + +“Constitutionally fearless, he is prudent in counsel, and though +resolute, is very careful of the lives of his troops in action. He +possesses, in my opinion, all the attributes of a perfect leader of +light cavalry.” + +It is stated (_Standard_, August 22nd, 1879) that, on reaching +the White Umvolosi, despatches arrived from Sir Garnet Wolseley, +requesting Lord Chelmsford to fall back and meet him at Kwamagwasa—a +mission station, where it had at one time been proposed that the 1st +and 2nd Divisions should effect a junction. + +On the 4th, Lord Chelmsford sent a despatch to Sir Garnet Wolseley, +in which he said: “As I have fully accomplished the object for which +I advanced, I consider I shall now be best carrying out Sir Garnet +Wolseley’s instructions by moving at once to Entonjanini, and thence +to Kwamagwaza.” + +Why the blow struck at Ulundi was not followed up it is difficult to +say. If Lord Chelmsford’s instructions permitted him to advance and +engage the enemy, they would be sufficiently elastic to enable him +to follow up the victory. The king was known to have a new kraal in +a strong position at the junction of the White and Black Umvolosi +Rivers, within a day’s march of Ulundi; the Zulu army was thoroughly +beaten and dispersed, and there was absolutely nothing to prevent an +advance for the destruction of this stronghold, the moral effect of +which on the native mind would have been very great. There was an +ample force, willing hearts, and no lack of supplies. The solution of +the problem must be sought in Lord Chelmsford’s words: “I have fully +accomplished the object for which I advanced.” He withdrew at once +from the scene of his victory, and—resigned his command. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII. + +SIR GARNET WOLSELEY—CAPTURE OF CETSHWAYO. + + +Sir Bartle Frere, whose continued popularity spoke somewhat of +colonial approval of the war, had returned to the Cape in June, and +his reception at Cape Town “capped the climax of an uninterrupted +triumph,” according to _The Natal Mercury_. That he thought himself +deserving of the honours due to a conqueror returning home in triumph +we may gather from the fact that he sent no instructions to suppress +any demonstrations of delight at his return, although at that very +time the latest and perhaps the saddest tragedy of all the sad +results of his policy had just been enacted, and Natal, as with one +voice, was lamenting the Prince Imperial’s death. + +“So be it,” says _The Natal Witness_ of June 12th, 1879, commenting +upon this text; “Sir Bartle Frere’s reception capped the climax of an +uninterrupted triumph. We are quite ready to believe this, and, as +we have said, we are glad at last to have so decided an intimation +of what Sir Bartle Frere has intended to do. There are triumphs of +various kinds. There is the triumph which surrounds the statesman, +who, by gentle persuasion, by cautious reforms, by a personal +example of uprightness and unselfishness, has reduced threatening +elements of danger, and evolved peace and security out of storm and +terror. There is the triumph which is his who, impressed with a deep +sense of the value of human life, lays his head upon his pillow every +night in the happy confidence that never through his means, either +directly or indirectly, has a human life been needlessly sacrificed. +There is the triumph of the philanthropist, who, feeling deep in +his heart the claims of an aboriginal people to the consideration +of a civilised power, has, in his dealings with that people, been +careful rather to strain doubtful points in their favour, than to +take advantage of their presumed simplicity. There is the triumph +of the Christian legislator, who regards the authority entrusted +to him as entrusted with a solemn injunction to use that authority +in the name of his divine Master, for the purpose of spreading and +confirming the kingdom of peace and good will. There is the triumph +of the diplomatist, who, in respect of his dealings with state +questions, can lay his hand upon his heart, and affirm that he never +misled his superiors, ... never wrote a line which he did not believe +to be true. All these triumphs we doubt not will be yet achieved by +Sir Bartle Frere, if only the fatigue caused by his ‘troubles and +journeying’ does not suggest an early return to Europe.” + +Would Sir Bartle Frere be supported by the Home Government? and would +Lord Chelmsford be upheld by his military superiors in England? +Such were the questions perpetually asked in the colony, to which +there seemed no full and sufficient answer. True, both had received +messages of sympathy and confidence; but these were sent palpably on +the spur of the moment, and long before all the facts of the case had +been brought to light; and, on the other hand, Sir Bartle Frere had +received a very severe rebuke in the despatches mentioned in Chapter +XII. Still the tide of events was permitted to flow on, and many +doubted the reality of the condemnation. + +From the time of the disaster at Isandhlwana, prophecies were current +that Lord Chelmsford would be recalled, and as misfortune pursued our +arms the prophecies were renewed. Many were the conjectures as to who +would be sent to replace Lord Chelmsford should he be recalled, and a +general idea was prevalent that the sprightly Sir Garnet Wolseley and +his “brilliant staff” would once more grace the shores of Natal. The +despatch announcing his approach reached the colony in the middle of +June, and the telegram to Lord Chelmsford announcing his appointment +ran as follows: “Her Majesty’s Government have determined to send out +Sir Garnet Wolseley as Administrator in that part of South-Eastern +Africa in the neighbourhood of the seat of war, with plenary powers, +both civil and military. Sir Bartle Frere, instructed accordingly by +Colonial Office. The appointment of a senior officer is not intended +as a censure on yourself, but you will, as in ordinary course of +service, submit and subordinate your plans to his control. He leaves +this country by next mail” (sent _viâ_ St. Vincent, 29th May, 1879). + +Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Durban on the 28th June, and proceeded +direct to Pietermaritzburg, where he was the same day sworn in as +Governor of Natal. Certainly Sir Garnet did not let the grass grow +under his feet. On Sunday, the 29th, he telegraphed to Colonel Walker +at Fort Pearson: “Send back Zulu messengers immediately to the king +with following message from me: ‘If the king wants peace he must +send Umnyamana, Umfanawendhela, and Vumandaba to General Crealock’s +column, where I will depute an officer of rank to hear what the king +has to say. I alone have power to make peace. All the other Generals +are under my orders.’ Explain to the messengers who I am. They are to +tell the king, and remind him that I was here as Governor before, and +had many communications with him then.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 149). + +The message from Cetshwayo was delivered by two Zulu messengers at +the Lower Tugela, on June 25th, to Mr. Fynney, Administrator and +Border Agent. + +“We are sent by the king straight to you. We were ordered not to go +to the troop at the Umlatazi, as other messengers (Sintwangu) will +go there.... The king asks you to speak to the great white Chief +with the Upper Column, and ask to stay the advance of the troops +till he (the king) can hear plainly what he has done, what great sin +he has committed. If he ever killed a white man or white woman, or +ever took cattle from a white man before the war? Did he ever walk +over the words spoken at the Umlambongwenya Kraal by Somtseu? (Sir +T. Shepstone). The king wished us to say if he is to be destroyed +he could die happy if he knew first really what wrong he had done. +The king begs you will speak to the great white Chief with the Upper +Column to stay a further advance till chosen representatives from +both sides can meet and hear really the cause of the war, and what +wrong he has done. The king does not ask for favour if it is proved +he has been wrong. He wants to hear, and he wishes the troops not to +advance till he can hear; for if they do he cannot help fighting, +as there will be nothing left but to try and push aside a tree if +falling upon him.” + +“This is our message from the king to you, and he ordered us to tell +you that it is from himself; even the indunas do not know he has sent +it” (_ibid._ p. 154). + +On the same day (29th) Sir Garnet sent the following order to Captain +McLeod: “Make arrangements at once, with Swazis, for massing north +of Pongolo River, with view to invading Zululand. Spread abroad news +that the invasion will take place immediately, but do not let them +cross river without my orders. When they are ready to cross let me +know, and I will send you further instructions. Impress urgently upon +them that women and children must not be murdered, but promise them +all cattle they take. This promise to be made as public as possible. +I am now High Commissioner, with full powers to decide all terms of +peace. All reports must be sent to me, care of General Clifford, +’Maritzburg” (_ibid._ p. 150). + +The object of this message was “to establish a standing menace, and +to bring formidable pressure to bear in that quarter upon the Zulus.” + +The barbarity of the Swazis in warfare, and the keen delight +with which they would have found themselves let loose upon their +hereditary enemies the Zulus, whose army was either scattered or +destroyed, was a well-known fact, and many wondered that such a +course should be proposed. + +Captain McLeod, a hardy soldier and brave man, had been for many +months in about as unenviable a position as can well be imagined—in +an unsettled border district in war time, threatened both by Boers +and Zulus. He had been posted at Derby, to guide and control the +movements of our ally the Swazi king, who, it was imagined, would be +stanch to us or not, according to the fortunes of the Zulu war. + +Captain McLeod knew the Swazis well, and how little chance there +would be of keeping them under control if once let loose upon the +helpless Zulu people; he therefore begged that they might be used +only as a last resource. + +With the view of still further spreading alarm through the Zulu +country, Sir Garnet sent a message to the Amatongas that he might +“possibly ascend the Maputa River with a force and use their +territory as a base of operations against the Zulus from the north” +(_ibid._ p. 149). + +On the 30th, after a long conference with General Clifford and +Commissary-General Strickland, Sir Garnet Wolseley had an interview +with about seventy Natal native chiefs, who had been assembled at +his request, and addressed them, through an interpreter, to the +effect that the great English Queen had sent him to carry on the +war against Cetshwayo, and to thank them for what they had already +done. That the chiefs need have no fear but that the Queen would +send as many armies as are necessary, if the troops sent were not +sufficient. “They may depend upon it, and the past history of our +nation is a guarantee thereof, that when we give a promise we will +perform it. Our war is not against the Zulu people, but against +Ketshwayo, who has broken all his promises. We have no wish to rob +the Zulu people of their property or their land; but tell the chiefs +this, that I say this war is going to be finished by us, and finished +in a satisfactory manner. The Queen is most anxious that the war in +Natal should be finished.” Then (as there was a scarcity of grass for +draught-oxen) Sir Garnet requested the chiefs to furnish a certain +number (2000) of their young men to carry provisions for the troops; +the men to carry their arms whilst so employed, and to be paid and +fed by him. + +Once more, then, we hear the words: “_Our war is not against the Zulu +people!_” + +These “carriers” were taken from the Tugela Valley, which had lately +suffered from the Zulu raid, and where many of the men had belonged +to the native levies raised for the defence of the border; they +naturally did not appreciate an employment which removed them from +the protection of their families, and which was at variance with +their customs[175] and prejudices. + +There was not much work for these “carriers” after all; they were +assembled at the Lower Tugela, and marched up to Fort Chelmsford, +each man with a fifty-pound mealie-bag on his head.[176] Their +commander, Major Schwabe, left the loads there, and took the men on +to Port Durnford, where they were employed as required. Having, after +some time, received their pay, the “carriers” quietly walked off to +their homes. + +The Commander-in-Chief remained but two days in Pietermaritzburg, +returning to Durban on the 1st of July. The same evening he embarked +on board H.M.S. _Shah_, intending to land at Port Durnford, and +thus reach the scene of action. For once in his life Sir Garnet’s +good fortune deserted him; the heavy surf on the beach prevented +his landing, and the _Shah_ brought him back to Durban. Here he +received the news of the battle of Ulundi, telegraphed to him by Mr. +Archibald Forbes. + +No one quite knew what Lord Chelmsford was about, but everyone +understood that he would try and end the war before he was +superseded; and the general feeling in the colony was certainly one +of hope that “poor Lord Chelmsford” might get a chance, win a battle, +and have his bonfire in the enemy’s city of straw. Some few, indeed, +argued that as Lord Chelmsford could not possibly, in the time left +him, settle the Zulu question by the sword, it might occur to him +at last to pay some attention to the hard-pressed Zulu monarch’s +repeated messages imploring peace, and propose some conditions +possible for Cetshwayo to accept and fulfil. Without further +bloodshed an honourable peace might thus have been concluded before +Sir Garnet Wolseley could step upon the scene. + +We left the 1st Division at the Umlalazi River, close to the +landing-place, Port Durnford. There the force remained, General +Crealock occupied in receiving the submission of the neighbouring +Zulus, who were flocking in from every direction. + +But whilst Lord Chelmsford, on his approach to Ulundi, was inquiring, +“Where is Crealock?” Crealock was quietly established near the coast, +his military activity being displayed in the burning of Empangeni +and other kraals north of the Umlatuzi River. As the Zulus all round +were coming in, and no “impi” was even heard of, the object of this +exhibition of force seems a little doubtful. As was remarked by +_The Cape Times_: “Why the British soldier was ordered to destroy +the shelter, and, with the shelter, the store of grain food of some +thousands of poor women and children whose husbands and fathers +were making their submission, we can no more understand than we can +comprehend the strategy by which a large British force was held back +for months at the edge of the enemy’s country, while commissariat +supplies were accumulating sufficient to support a long campaign, +the whole work before them being to march a hundred miles, and with +one fight close up the war. If they were beaten they could fall back +on the base; but with caution and generalship defeat was out of the +question.” However, Major-General Crealock must have the credit of +quieting the eastern portion of Zululand before the termination of +the war. From his despatches of the 5th July we gather that the +“district people are all wanting to come in,” that he was “sending +back the people to their districts; difficulty of feeding them would +be great.” His division paraded under arms to receive the “official +submission” of “Mabilwana, Manyingo, and other chiefs,” who, with +some 250 men, double that number of women and children, and their +cattle, etc., had come in—these people belonging to the coast +district, but were not strictly speaking warriors, or necessarily +belonging to the Zulu army; nor could their submission be looked upon +as any desertion of their king by the fighting-men of the nation. +They were told that the General accepted their submission, and should +look to them in future to keep peace in that district. If any Zulus +were found in arms, their chief or headman would suffer; but, if they +behaved themselves well, he would give them back their cattle and +his protection. The men then received passes (or tickets) and were +permitted to return to their districts.[177] + +Sir Garnet Wolseley crossed the Tugela with his staff and escort on +July 6th, and proceeded to the head-quarters of the 1st Division, +near Port Durnford, which he reached on the 7th. He at once set +to work “to reduce the excessive rate of expenditure which has so +far been maintained in connection with this war,” and “arranged +with the Commodore to embark the Naval Brigade at the earliest +opportunity,” and also “dispensed with the services of some of the +colonial troops.” Reinforcements of all kinds were stopped, including +a fine battalion of Marine Infantry and strong detachment of Marine +Artillery, just arrived at the Cape in H.M.S. _Jumna_. + +On July 10th, Sir Garnet also put on one side “the plan of a Swazi +invasion.” (P. P. [C. 2454] p. 163.) All the chiefs up to St. Lucia +Bay tendered their submission, and sent in their arms. + +Sir Garnet Wolseley and Lord Chelmsford met at St. Paul’s on the +15th July, the latter arriving with Brigadier-General Wood’s Flying +Column. This Sir Garnet inspected on the following day, taking the +opportunity of decorating Major Chard, R.E., with the Victoria Cross, +awarded him for his gallantry at Rorke’s Drift. + +Lord Chelmsford left St. Paul’s on the 17th, on his way home. His +“brilliant victory” had turned the tide of popular favour somewhat in +his direction, and he found that (as he said) “nothing succeeds like +success.” + +In Durban he was accorded a reception which must have been highly +gratifying to his feelings. One of his last remarks in Natal, +in reply to a speech made as he was about to embark, was to the +following effect: “I think I may say confidently that we have now +seen the beginning of the end of this campaign, and any success which +has attended my efforts, I feel, is due to the prayers of the people, +and the kindly ordinations of Divine Providence; for I am one of +those who believe firmly and implicitly in the efficacy of prayer and +in the intervention of Providence.” + +In this comfortable frame of mind Lord Chelmsford passes from the +scene. + +Sir Garnet Wolseley completed the chain of forts across Zululand, +commencing with St. Paul’s, an English mission station on the coast +road a little north of where it crosses the Umlatusi. Fifteen miles +west of this is Kwamagwasa. Twenty miles a little south of west lies +Fort Evelyn, on the road from Rorke’s Drift to Ulundi. Fort Marshall +about twenty miles west-south-west of Fort Evelyn, Fort Newdigate, +twelve miles north-west of Fort Evelyn, and a fort on Itelezi Hill +completes the chain to the Blood River. Some of these forts were +constructed on the upward march of the 2nd Division and Flying +Column, to keep open their communications. In addition to these, +Fort Cambridge was built near where the road from Conference Hill +crosses the White Umvolosi; and a little later an entrenched post +(Fort George) was thrown up near Enhlongana mission station, thus +thoroughly, by these detached posts, commanding the country. + +Patrols were pushed out in various directions, by one of which +the two guns lost at Isandhlwana were found between Ulundi and +Maizekanye. They had not been spiked, but the Zulus had screwed +rifle-nipples into the vents, and had also apparently tried to load +the guns by ramming home shells, but without cartridges. + +The Cavalry Brigade was broken up, and a fresh disposition of the +troops made. Sir Garnet visited various posts, interviewing the Zulu +chiefs who had surrendered themselves. Some of the most important, +however, of those who came in, and were supposed to have submitted +and deserted their king, had, in point of fact, no such intention, +appearing merely to make their often and vainly repeated attempt at +procuring “terms” for Cetshwayo and themselves. It had always been +prophesied that the Zulu nation would desert their king. Before the +war began, some of those who professed to understand the people best, +declared that they would be thankful to throw off the yoke of one +whom, it was alleged, they regarded with fear and hatred, and would +side with the English as soon as the latter crossed their border. + +The fallacy of this idea was discovered to our cost. + +It was then asserted that the Zulu army had given a temporary +strength to the authority of their king, which would last until we +had beaten his troops and proved our superiority, and this assertion +was used by those who insisted that no peace must be made, however +earnestly desired by the Zulus, until we had beaten them and shown +them that we were their masters. + +After Ulundi, it was argued that the people would be glad to procure +peace by giving up their king, whose unconditional submission, or +capture, was announced by us to be the only possible conclusion to +the war. + +The Zulus had ceased to struggle with their powerful conquerors, and +it now only remained to find Cetshwayo, who was said to be north +of the Black Umvolosi River, with a very small following. A flying +column, under Lieut.-Colonel Baker Russell, was sent out from Fort +Newdigate early in August, but his patrols were not successful. + +On August 14th, a cavalry force under Major Barrow, with Lord +Gifford, started from Ulundi to try and find Cetshwayo, who had +hitherto eluded all attempts to capture him. Day after day it was +reported that the pursuers were close upon the fugitive: they had +come to a kraal where he had slept the previous night, they reached +another where he had been that very morning, and then they lost “the +scent,” and for some time could trace him no farther. They tried in +vain to persuade his people to betray him, but this “hated tyrant,” +although beaten and powerless, flying through the land now in the +possession of his conquerors, had still such a hold over the loyalty +and affection of his people, that they were true to him in his +adversity, and refused to give him up or to set his enemies on his +track. + +Severe measures were taken to procure by force the information which +could not otherwise be obtained. Orders were given to one party of +the pursuers that at each kraal they reached, if the inhabitants +refused to speak, so many huts should be burnt, so many principal men +and women taken prisoners, and all cattle confiscated. Many kraals +were thus treated, and so many prisoners collected in this manner, +that the number to be taken at each kraal had to be reduced from +eight to four, then to two, and at last to one of each sex; thus +proving how steadfast were the people generally in their loyalty to +their king. On approaching some of these kraals, the headmen came out +and offered the passes or papers promising protection, given them +on surrendering their arms; but the unhappy people received another +lesson on the text, “When we give a promise we will perform it,” +and were told that their papers were worthless now; they must tell +where the king was, or suffer like the rest. One of the officers +concerned in carrying out these orders, exclaimed at the time with +natural indignation: “I don’t care what may be said of the necessity +of catching Cetshwayo; necessary or not, we are committing a crime in +what we are doing now!” + +These measures proving useless, five prisoners were flogged to make +them speak—yet they held their peace. An interpreter, who accompanied +Major Barrow’s party, writes: “I had been a long time in Zululand. I +knew the people and their habits, and although I believed they would +be true to their king, I never expected such devotion. Nothing would +move them. Neither the loss of their cattle, the fear of death, or +the offering of large bribes, would make them false to their king.” + +For many days this work of trying to persuade or force the people +to betray their king was continued, and, at last a woman was +frightened into giving a clue, which resulted in taking prisoners +three brothers, at whose kraal the king had slept the night before. +“They were questioned,” says the interpreter, “but denied in the most +solemn way that they knew anything about the king. We threatened to +shoot them, but they said: ‘If you kill us we shall die innocently.’ +This was about nine o’clock at night, a beautiful moonlight night, +and the picture was rather an effective one. There were all our men +sitting round at their fireplaces, our select tribunal facing the +three men, who were calm and collected, whilst we, as a sort of +inquisition, were trying to force them to divulge their secret. As +a last resource we took one man and led him away blindfolded behind +a bush, and then a rifle was fired off to make believe that he was +shot. We then separated and blindfolded the remaining two, and said +to one of them: ‘You saw your brother blindfolded and led away; +we have shot him. Now we shall shoot you. You had better tell the +truth.’ After a good deal of coaxing (?) one told us where the king +had slept the night before, and which was about fifteen miles away, +and also where he had seen him that very morning ... it was now +eleven o’clock. Lord Gifford gave orders for our party to saddle up, +which was smartly done, and we started off with the two brothers as +guides. We left the one brother behind so as to keep on the screw, to +make the two believe he had been shot. They took us over as ugly a +piece of country as ever horse crossed, and at daybreak we surrounded +the kraal. But disappointment was again in store for us, for our bird +had flown about twelve hours previously.” + +The direction he had taken being pointed out, the party followed +until they got within four or five miles of a kraal, where the king +had halted for the day. Lord Gifford sent off a note addressed to +Captain Maurice, saying he was on the track and hoped for speedy +capture; and, finding the kraal could not be approached without his +being seen, seems to have made up his mind to wait till nightfall. It +is perhaps fortunate that this arrangement was not carried out, as, +in the darkness and hurry of a night attack, it is possible that we +might have had the additional wrong laid upon us of having shot the +Zulu king. + +Amongst other patrols sent out to look for Cetshwayo was one under +Major Marter, King’s Dragoon Guards, consisting of one squadron +Dragoons, ten men Mounted Infantry and Lonsdale’s Horse, and one +company Natal Native Contingent, their orders being to get on the +king’s track and capture him, if possible, and to reconnoitre the +Ngome Forest, and report if it could be traversed. + +This force started on the 27th August, Major Marter sending two +natives on in the direction of the Ngome to impress upon the people +that until the king was captured they could not have rest, as troops +would be constantly on the move amongst them, and require supplies, +etc., and to suggest it would be to their advantage to give him some +hint or sign about the king. He had found the natives friendly, +but they said frankly that if they knew the king to be close by +they would not tell him; he, therefore, remembering the language of +symbols was pleasant to the native mind, endeavoured, by indirect +means, to obtain the information he sought. Having got over about +twenty-four miles of rough country, the little column halted on +the summit of the Inenge Mountain, and, starting at daylight next +morning, had crossed the Ibuluwane River about ten o’clock, when +a Zulu came from the hill in front, sent by a headman to whom +the scouts had been, and began to talk on indifferent subjects, +not appearing to wish to speak about the king. After some time +he casually remarked: “I have heard the wind blow from this side +to-day,” pointing to the Ngome Forest, “but you should take that road +until you come to Nisaka’s kraal,” showing a track leading upwards +and along the side of the range. + +About half an hour afterwards a native brought a note addressed to +Captain Maurice. As this officer was out in another direction on +the same service, Major Marter opened and read it. It was from Lord +Gifford, who said he was on the track again and hoped for a speedy +capture of the king, but gave no information as to where either the +king or Lord Gifford were. Sending the man on in Captain Maurice’s +direction, Major Marter proceeded to Nisaka’s kraal, some distance +up the mountain. After some talk a suggestion of guides was made to +Nisaka, who said they had better go to his brother’s kraal on top of +the mountain, and called two men to go as guides. On reaching this +kraal the guides made signs for the party to halt where trees hid +them from being seen from below, and then took Major Marter on to the +edge of the precipice, crawling along on hands and knees; they then +stopped, and told him to go to a bush a little farther on and look +down. He did so, and saw a kraal in an open space about 2000 feet +below, in a basin, three sides of which were precipitous and covered +with dense forest. He considered it would be useless to approach the +kraal from the open side, as one minute’s warning would enable the +king to escape to the nearest point of the forest; and therefore +decided to venture down the side of the mountain under cover of the +forest, feeling that the importance of the capture would warrant the +risk. + +Having rejoined his men, Major Marter ordered the natives to take off +their uniform, and, with their arms and ammunition only, pass down +the precipitous mountain to the lower edge of the forest nearest to +the kraal, and remain concealed till the cavalry were seen coming +from the forest on the other side; they were then to rush out towards +the open side of the kraal and surround it. The cavalry left led +horses, pack-animals, and every article which could make a noise +or impede their progress, and followed Major Marter, leading their +horses down the descent in single file. They left the upper part +of the mountain at 1.45 P.M., and, after a scramble over rocks and +watercourses, floundering in bogs, and hampered everywhere by trees +and gigantic creepers, reached the foot about three o’clock, having +lost two horses killed in the descent, and one man having his arm +badly hurt. In a little dell they mounted, and at a gallop dashed +out—one troop to the right, one to the left, the irregulars straight +to the front—over boulders, through high grass and every impediment, +up to the kraal; the natives reaching it at the same moment. + +Seeing that the men in the kraal were armed with guns as well as +assegais, Major Marter desired his interpreter to call out that if +any resistance were offered he would shoot down every one and burn +the kraal; and then dismounting, with a few of his men, he entered +the enclosure, which was strongly stockaded. A chief—Umkosana—met +him, and was asked where the king was; after some delay, seeing it +was a hopeless case, he pointed out a hut on the farther side of +the enclosure. Major Marter called on the king to come out, but he +insisted the officer should go in to him. A threat of setting fire to +the hut was then made, when the king asked the rank of the officer, +and, after some further parley, came out and stood erect and quite +the king, looking at Major Marter, saying: “You would not have taken +me, but I never thought troops could come down the mountain through +the forest.” + +Besides the Chief Umkosana, there were with Cetshwayo seven men and a +lad, five women and a girl, of his personal attendants. + +There were twenty guns in the kraal, four of them rifles that had +belonged to the 24th Regiment, much ammunition, some belts of the +24th, and many assegais, one of which—the king’s—was sent by Sir +Garnet Wolseley to the Queen. + +Taking the most open line of country, the party set out for Ulundi, +Major Marter taking personal charge of the king, who was in good +health, and showing no signs of over-fatigue. + +On the evening of the second day three men and a woman sprang +suddenly into the thick bush through which they were passing and +tried to escape; but two of the men were shot. They had been +repeatedly warned that anyone trying to escape would be shot. + +On the morning of the 31st August, Major Marter safely reached the +camp at Ulundi with Cetshwayo; who is described by his captor as “a +noble specimen of a man, without any bad expression, and the king all +over in appearance and manner.” + +Sir Garnet Wolseley did not receive the fallen king himself, or +accord him any of the signs of respect to which he was entitled, and +which at least generosity demanded. That this was deeply felt is +apparent from the words of an eye-witness, the interpreter attached +to Major Barrow’s force. “Cetywayo,” he says, “who appreciates nicely +the courtesies due to rank—as those who knew him tell me—felt this +keenly. Sir Garnet Wolseley did not see him at all, and Mr. John +Shepstone only had an interview with him to tell him that he would +leave under the charge of Major Poole, R.A., for—no one knew where. +The instructions to the Major were, on leaving Ulundi, to proceed to +Pietermaritzburg _viâ_ Rorke’s Drift, but the camp had not been left +many miles behind before a messenger to the Major from the General +gave Port Durnford as the port of embarkation. + +“Cetshwayo spent less than three hours amidst the ruins of Ulundi, +and when he left them he was not aware of his destination. His hope +was that he was going to Pietermaritzburg.... This he believed was +where he was going until he came to Kwamagwasa, and he said, ‘This +is not the way to the Tugela.’ He grew moody after this, and used to +moan, ‘It was better to be killed than sent over the sea.’” + +The party reached Port Durnford on the 4th September, and was +immediately embarked for Cape Town. There the king met with a fitting +reception, and was conveyed to the castle, where he remained under +strict surveillance in the custody of Colonel Hassard, C.B., R.E., +Commandant at Cape Town. + +One peculiarity regarding the treatment of Cetshwayo may be +illustrated by the following personal anecdote: + +A son and daughter of the Bishop of Natal, on their way to England, +called at Cape Town on board a steamer at the time of the king’s +arrival. They asked permission to see him, feeling that if anything +could be a solace to the captive it would be an interview with +members of a family which he knew had kindly feelings towards +him.[178] This request was refused by Sir Bertie Frere, who regretted +that he could not “at present give anyone permission to visit +Cetewayo,” and said that “all intercourse with him must be regulated +by the orders of the General Commanding H. M. Forces in the Field, +to whom all applications to communicate with the prisoner should be +referred.” After this communication, it was rather surprising to find +that several of the passengers on board the mail-steamer, leaving +the Cape the next day, had not only seen the king, but had found no +difficulty in so doing.[179] + + + + +CONCLUSION. + + +The fall of Ulundi was looked upon by some as the finishing touch +to the Zulu power and the end of the war, while others considered +peace ensured only and completely by the capture of the king. Much, +however, remained to be done before Natal could be thought of as at +peace with her neighbours and herself, and what has been commonly +called the “Settlement of Zululand,” was a task which required the +gravest consideration and the most careful handling. + +Sir Garnet Wolseley’s first act in this direction was to call +together as many of the principal Zulu chiefs and officials as could +be found, and to address them upon the situation. This meeting took +place at Ulundi on the 1st of September, the day after the captive +king’s departure for Port Durnford. About 200 Zulus, including two of +Cetshwayo’s brothers, and his prime minister Mnyamana, had responded +to the summons; and seating themselves in rows four deep, with the +principal chiefs in front, a few paces from the flagstaff at Sir G. +Wolseley’s tent, waited in perfect silence. When Sir Garnet, with his +staff, at last appeared, he addressed the assembled chiefs through +Mr. John Shepstone, who accompanied him as interpreter. He informed +them that it was six years that very day since Cetshwayo was crowned +king of the Zulus, and that he was now carried away never to return. +This, he told them, was in consequence of his having broken his +coronation promises, and having failed to make and keep such laws +amongst his people as the Queen of England could approve, therefore +his kingdom was taken from him; and would now be divided amongst a +number of chiefs, who would be expected to rule with justice. In +future no life was to be taken without trial, and trivial offences +were to be punished by fines; no standing army would be allowed, nor +the possession of guns and ammunition by any Zulu; nor would any +stores be permitted to be landed on the Zulu coast, in case, under +the guise of merchandise, arms should be brought into the country. +The young men would be allowed to marry when and whom they pleased, +provided they had sufficient for the support of a wife, and could +obtain the consent of the girl’s parents, and “smelling out” for +witchcraft was to be put down. Nevertheless, the Queen had no wish to +force our laws and customs upon them. By their own rules of war and +conquest, Zululand now belonged to her; but she had already enough +land in Africa, and had therefore no intention of depriving the Zulus +of theirs. Finally, the missionaries were not to be forced upon them, +and the Zulus were even forbidden to encourage their settling amongst +them. + +To secure the fulfilment of all these commands, Sir G. Wolseley told +the chiefs that he intended to leave an English officer as resident, +to be the eyes and ears of England, to watch over the people, and +to see the laws observed and that the chiefs ruled with justice and +equity. With what machinery the officer in question was to perform +so wide a task does not appear. Whether his position is to be a real +one, requiring several British regiments to support it, or whether it +is to be a mere farce, a fine-sounding pretence, remains yet to be +proved. + +At the conclusion of the General’s discourse he produced a document, +the purport of which, he said, he had now told them, and which was to +be signed by all the chiefs whom he had chosen as rulers of the land, +to each of whom a duplicate copy would be given, while he retained a +similar one himself. + +The first to sign his name was Mr. John Dunn, whose chieftainship +was by far the largest; and after him the Zulu chiefs touched the +pen while Mr. Shepstone made their crosses for them, in place of the +signature which they could not form. + +For once in the history of Natal, all classes, from whatever widely +differing motives, were united in condemning the arrangement. + +“The so-called settlement of Zululand,” says _The Cape Times_, on +September 16th, “is regarded with anything but satisfaction in Natal, +if we may accept the press of that colony as representative of public +opinion. Sir Garnet Wolseley was probably acting under instructions +in making peace on a barbarian basis; such a peace, however, has no +guarantee for continuance, but on the contrary an inherent weakness, +forbidding any hope of permanence. A savage nation is now divided +into a number of savage nations, each leaning to the other with all +the force of common blood and common traditions, while to check +the impulses of that force there is absolutely nothing beyond the +influence of two or three British residents, unsupported by any armed +retinue, and clothed with no more than a shadow of authority. And +as the embodiment of British civilisation, and as Her Majesty the +Queen’s own representative in Zululand, is placed Mr. John Dunn.... +But whatever John Dunn’s merits may be, his appointment as Chief +Resident in Zululand is a shock to civilisation. His ways are Zulu +ways; his associations, Zulu associations; his very habits of thought +imbued with the Zulu character. A white man who for twenty years or +more has lived the Zulu life, wedded Zulu wives, and chosen their +society in preference to that of such women as a white man should +love and honour, is not the man to represent the Queen of England +in a nation of savages. The settlement of Zululand means simply +the appointment of a dozen Cetywayos, with a white man to look +after them, who is a Cetywayo in all but colour. And now Sir Garnet +Wolseley skips off in his light and airy fashion to the Transvaal, +flattering himself that he has made things pleasant in Zululand. It +is a miserable delusion....” + +The “engagements” into which the Zulu chiefs entered are: + +“1. I will observe and respect whatever boundaries shall be assigned +to my territory by the British Government through the Resident of the +division in which my territory is situated. + +“2. I will not permit the existence of the Zulu military system, or +the existence of any military system of organisation whatever, in my +territory, and I will proclaim and make it a rule that all men shall +be allowed to marry when they choose and as they choose, according +to the good ancient customs of my people, known and followed in the +days preceding the establishment by Chaka of the system known as the +military system; and I will allow and encourage all men living within +my territory to go and come freely for peaceful purposes, and to work +in Natal and the Transvaal and elsewhere for themselves or for hire. + +“3. I will not import or allow to be imported into my territory by +any person, upon any pretext or for any object whatever, any arms +or ammunition from any part whatsoever, or any goods or merchandise +by the sea-coast of Zululand, without the express sanction of the +Resident of the division in which my territory is situated; and I +will not encourage or promote, or take part in, or countenance in any +way whatever, the importation in any other part of Zululand of arms +or ammunition from any part whatever, or goods or merchandise by the +sea-coast of Zululand, without such sanction, and I will confiscate +and hand over to the Natal Government all arms and ammunition, and +goods and merchandise, so imported into my territory, and I will +punish by fine or by other sufficient punishment any person guilty +of or concerned in any such unsanctioned importation, and any person +found possessing arms or ammunition, or goods or merchandise, +knowingly obtained thereby. + +“4. I will not allow the life of any of my people to be taken for +any cause, except after sentence passed in a council of the chief men +of my territory, and after fair and impartial trial in my presence +and after the hearing of witnesses; and I will not tolerate the +employment of witch-doctors, or the practice known as smelling-out, +or any practices of witchcraft. + +“5. The surrender of persons fugitive in my territory from justice, +when demanded by the government of any British colony, territory, or +province, in the interests of justice, shall be readily and promptly +made to such government; and the escape into my territory of persons +accused or convicted of offences against British laws shall be +prevented by all possible means, and every exertion shall be made to +seize and deliver up such persons to British authority. + +“6. I will not make war upon any chief or chiefs, or people, without +the sanction of the British Government, through the Resident of the +division in which my territory is situated. + +“7. The succession to the chieftainship of my territory shall be +according to the ancient laws and customs of my people, and the +nomination of each successor shall be subject to the approval of the +British Government. + +“8. I will not sell, or in any way alienate, or permit, or +countenance any sale or alienation of any part of the land in my +territory. + +“9. I will permit all people residing in my territory to there +remain, upon the condition that they recognise my authority as chief, +and any persons not wishing to recognise my authority and desiring +to quit my territory I will permit to quit and to pass unmolested +elsewhere. + +“10. In all cases of dispute in which British subjects are involved +I will appeal to and abide by the decision of the British Resident +of the division in which my territory is situated. In all cases when +accusations of offence or crime committed in my territory are brought +against British subjects, or against my people in relation to British +subjects, I will hold no trial and pass no sentence except with the +approval of such British Resident. + +“11. In all matters not included within these terms, conditions, and +limitations, and in all cases provided for herein, and in all cases +when there may be doubt or uncertainty as to the laws, rules, or +stipulations applicable to matters to be dealt with, I will govern, +order, or decide in accordance with the ancient laws and usage of my +people.” + +The following letter, addressed to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, +and published in _The Guardian_ of December 10th, 1879, by the Dean +of ’Maritzburg, contains such valuable and important matter that we +quote it verbatim: + + THE DEANERY, ’MARITZBURG, NATAL, + _September 27th, 1879_. + + SIR,—Though I have not the honour of being known to you, yet, + as the affairs of South Africa must necessarily engage the + attention of Parliament when it next meets, I venture to hope + you will not consider it an intrusion if I lay before you + some of the conclusions I have arrived at after thirty years’ + residence as a clergyman in Natal. I do so as I know from + experience how extremely difficult it is for those who have + passed their lives in the midst of a highly organised society, + to realise the conditions of a colony, and especially of one + which is brought into contact with the undeveloped races of South + Africa. The first question that presents itself is, What is + the meaning of the apparent antagonism of the native races, at + the present time, to the white man? I attribute it immediately + to the natives suddenly and unexpectedly finding themselves in + the possession of firearms. When the Diamond Fields were first + opened out, no restrictions were placed on the gun-trade by the + Cape Government, and so soon as this became known the natives + flocked there in thousands from all parts of South Africa, + hiring themselves out to work, and stipulating to be paid in + rifles. Young men everywhere will arm themselves if they can, + and especially in a country in which there is abundant room for + hunting, and still more so when the young men are savages, and + know of no distinction except that which comes from exhibiting + prowess in war. I do not myself think they were influenced by + any feelings of hatred to the white man, or that there existed + any deep-seated conspiracy amongst the chiefs or old men. But + the young men suddenly discovered they could obtain firearms, so + got them; and having got them, they then desired to use them. + Everywhere they were armed, and so everywhere they began to + talk of fighting; the leaven had been put in and the whole lump + worked. The war which arose is now over, and the Cape Government + is engaged in steadily disarming the natives under its rule; + its loyal subjects, the Fingoes and the Basutos, as well as the + recently conquered tribes. Sir Garnet Wolseley told the Zulus + also to bring in their guns; but they have treated his order with + contempt, and he has made no attempt to enforce it; the Zulus + themselves, I am afraid, will soon adduce this as evidence that + they were not beaten. I may say, also, the Natal Governor always + placed restrictions on the natives possessing firearms, and, so + far as he could, enforced those restrictions on his own natives + returning from the Diamond Fields, and they have proved perfectly + loyal. Whilst at the time I deprecated the reckless trade allowed + by the Cape Government, still it seems to me rather hard, after + having allowed the natives to purchase guns, to set to work to + disarm them. The wisest course I consider would be to impose a + tax on the possession of firearms generally, granting privileges + to members of volunteer corps, etc. In that way, without drawing + invidious distinctions between white and coloured, our own young + men would be exempted from paying by serving as volunteers; and + if the tax were a heavy one the natives would be deterred from + keeping guns, and, further, the Government would know exactly to + what extent they were armed. + + To leave, however, the native races in general, and to confine + ourselves to the Zulus. They never went to war with us, but + we with them; they have always been excellent neighbours; for + thirty years they have never been accused of stealing a sheep, + or an ox, or a horse from the Natal side. Natal had no quarrel + with them nor Cetywayo with us; it has been our misfortune that + it has been found convenient to carry on the war from Natal; + but Sir H. Bulwer, our Governor, has been true to the colony + in insisting that it was no war of ours. If there was any + justification of the war, it must be sought in the interests of + Transvaal, and then it can only be accepted as a judgment. The + Crown had not a shadow of right to annex the Transvaal. True, + they were not governing themselves very well in that State; + neither, perhaps, is Germany, but we do not annex Germany. We + did take over the Transvaal, however, in direct violation of + engagements which had been entered into with the Dutch Boers. + Shepstone, in his proclamation, was obliged to say that we must + read between the lines of that engagement—_i.e._ the promises + of the British Government were worth nothing. The simple fact + was that the Cape and Transvaal merchants had been overtrading + in that republic; it was bankrupt, so many of them were on the + brink of insolvency. I cannot say more without mentioning names, + but there was no difficulty in seeing what influences were + brought to bear on Lord Carnarvon. The Republic was annexed; + farms were accepted at a nominal price in payment of debts, and + resold again in London, say at sixpence per acre, which amply + repaid the merchant, who thus saved himself, whilst the Boers + were left without their independence, and poorer than ever. Had + we stayed our hand, finding themselves hopelessly bankrupt, in + a few months they might probably have sought our assistance, + and then we could have annexed them without their having a + grievance; as it is they cannot forget it. I am sorry for them, + for they are a simple people. Shepstone went up as Governor, and + Cetywayo at once asked to have his old disputes with the Boers + arranged—in former days both he and his father, whenever they had + had any difference with the Transvaal, always sent messengers + in to the Natal Government to advise with it—and Shepstone, + the Secretary for Natal Affairs, according to his wont, always + temporised, admitting in a half-and-half way that they were + right, but advising patience. When, however, he found himself + at the Transvaal he suddenly sided with the Dutch, and Cetywayo + became greatly incensed and declared himself betrayed. I believe + he would at once have invaded the Transvaal, but from fear of us + in Natal. He hesitated, however, and according to the old maxim, + he who hesitates does not fight; but before he had quieted down + Sir B. Frere interfered with his _ultimatum_, and Cetywayo stood + grandly on the defensive. He is a savage, and his ambition was + to be a great savage; I do not mean a cruel one, but a powerful, + influential savage. He was ambitious, but disliked progress, + and such men must fail; so he has fallen, but with dignity. He + has never attacked a neighbour, white or black; he has defended + his country bravely, and has been guilty of no excesses. It has + been our war, not his. Sir B. Frere says most truly that almost + everyone he spoke to encouraged him to go to war; but I am afraid + he avoided those who, he was told, were against war—and when + will not Englishmen advise war? No argument was used, except + the one that Cetywayo might overrun Natal at any moment; but he + had never shown a disposition to do so, and we were stronger + than men would allow. Men who do not trust in the arm of God do + not see the defences which surround them. The Tugela, the river + which separates Natal from Zululand, was a great protection, + as in summer-time, even if fordable, the Zulus would not cross + it, lest it should rise in their rear; and in the winter, our + dry season, they cannot keep the field, as their naked bodies + are quite unable to bear exposure to the cold nights. Moreover, + though our own army will never acknowledge it, Cetywayo’s force + did not exceed 30,000 naked savages. Of course we are told they + were 60,000 or 80,000 strong; but if you casually inquire of any + officer who has been in Zululand whether the kraals were thickly + dotted over the country, he will tell you artlessly, “No, quite + the contrary.” I have again and again inquired of traders as to + the density of the population relative to Natal. I have inquired + of those who have lived at Ulundi, and have seen Cetywayo’s + regiments mustered, and I am confident that 30,000 is the very + outside at which the Zulu force could be put. I may return to + this. I mention it now to show why I do not agree with Sir Bartle + in his view of our position; and certainly I cannot admit, + because a neighbour is powerful, that therefore we are justified + in going to war with him. + + But, now that we have been at war, on what terms is peace to + be arranged? In the Cape Colony the natives—as the Basutos, + the Fingoes, and others—live in districts to themselves, not + intermingled with the white man. The young men leave their homes, + and go into the colony, and work for a time in the towns or on + the farms; but their home is in Basutoland, Fingoland, etc. The + same holds good in the Transvaal. The natives there are on the + border; but Natal is the one exception to this rule; in this + colony we live intermingled; and a few years ago we were regarded + as living in the crater of a volcano. It was thought that the + Natal natives, who outnumber the European settlers eighteenfold, + might at any moment overwhelm us, so that Cape politicians and + others refused to be connected with this colony. In 1876, + however, before the rising of the natives on the frontier, I was + bold enough to point out to my fellow-colonists that our supposed + weakness was in reality our strength. And so it has proved. + During the last two years Natal has been the oasis of South + Africa; everywhere else the natives have either been in arms, + or shown themselves disaffected, if we except the Fingoes; but + the position in which they stand to the Kafir tribes around them + compels them to be loyal, so they are scarcely to be taken into + account. + + Whilst, then, throughout South Africa the natives have been a + source of uneasiness, the overwhelming native population of + Natal (360,000, against 22,000 whites) has been perfectly true + to the Government, and the grounds of their loyalty are now, I + think, recognised in Natal. They are these: 1. The natives are + not, like Englishmen, self-reliant, but naturally dependent; + consequently, they use the machinery of Government much more + than we do. An Englishman dislikes appealing to a magistrate, as + it implies a want of power to take care of himself or to govern + his dependents. Not so the native; he habitually leans upon the + magistrate. Thirty years ago in Natal the native leant upon his + chief; now he has become familiar with the magistrate, who has + become a necessity to him. I argue, therefore, that a people will + not plot or even desire to throw off an authority which enters + into their daily life. 2. Natives who have resided amongst white + men feel the need of their presence. The native races cannot + develop themselves—nor, when in some degree developed, can they + stand by themselves—as their wills are weak, and intellectually + they are lawyers, fond of argument, but without imagination; so + they can neither plan nor construct. In their independent state + they have no criminal law, no commercial code, no municipal one, + no law of tenure of landed property; they possess only a few + customs regulating marriage and the division of their cattle + amongst the family; but, scattered amongst white men, they are + able to expand. The effect is seen in many ways—amongst others, + in the increase of their families. 3. They are naturally fond of + trading. In many ways they may be compared to the Celtic race, as + they cannot rise above the tribal organisation; but, unlike the + Celt, they are not intellectual; and, unlike him, their natural + bent is towards trading. They are good soldiers, but they prefer + trading to everything; consequently, on this account, they are + unwilling to separate from the white man. 4. The natives never + go to war unless they can first send their cattle to the rear; + but this they cannot do when distributed amongst the Europeans, + and this operates alone as a great check. During the thirty years + I have been in Natal we have only had three chiefs give the + slightest trouble, and these three have all been on the borders, + and so have been able to send their cattle away. I am convinced, + therefore, that, if the Government wishes to maintain peace and + to develop the native races, it should intermingle them with the + Europeans. The Aborigines Society at home will probably object. + It is easy to say the white man seeks only to dispossess the + native, but whatever the individual motive, the white man is the + benefactor by his presence. He may have hunted down the North + American Indian and the Aborigines of Australia, but not so in + South Africa. Here not only does the magistrate protect him, + but the Kafir is a worker, which the North American Indian and + the native of Australia is not. The white man wants the Kafir’s + labour, and to secure it has to be just and kind. A farm-servant + in England is by no means so independent as a Kafir out here. Mix + up the races therefore, and to some extent at least the problem + of governing and improving the native race is solved. After the + defeat at Isandhlwana, new-comers like the military thought our + natives might rise; but their wives, children, waggons, cattle, + etc., were in the colony, so they made common cause with us, and + showed themselves zealously loyal. I consider it, therefore, + to be most foolish to try and keep the races apart; we must + intermingle them. It was Alexander’s principle and the Roman + rule; the present European families have been founded on this + method—so we must go on mingling, not separating. + + I send you a copy of Sir Garnet Wolseley’s conditions of peace, + as published in _The Natal Witness_. They are universally + condemned here. 1. The chiefs are to be under British Residents, + and they must be supported by a force. But who is to pay? It + is said the Zulus are not to be taxed, as that would amount to + annexation; or, rather, it would test Sir Garnet’s arrangements. + If he is afraid to tax the Zulus the Residents will be afraid + to control them. The test of defeat with Kafirs is the loss of + cattle—they do not estimate the loss of life; but we have not + taken cattle. Indeed, the balance is on their side: they have + carried off more than we have.[180] The test of submission is + obedience, and they have with one accord disobeyed the order to + give up their guns. The test of the Queen’s authority in South + Africa is the payment of taxes. Even Cetywayo offered to pay a + hut-tax; and if Sir Garnet does not impose one, all the young men + in Zululand, before a year is over, will point to their cattle, + their guns, and their immunity from taxes, and boast that they + were not beaten. If the Zulus are to be controlled by British + Residents they should pay a hut-tax. Our natives pay a hut-tax + of 14s. per hut. I have understood that the Cape Government wish + it to be uniform throughout South Africa, and to be fixed at £1. + We estimate the population at three-and-a-half persons to a hut, + and at 14s. it amounts to 4s. per head. Besides that the natives + on farms pay rent to the farmer, and the more they adopt our + habits the more do they pay through the Customs. The Zulus could + readily pay £1 per hut, or, say £36,000 per annum. Cetywayo’s + Government was an expensive one. His commissariat alone was a + heavy drain upon the resources of the people. Savages, as well + as civilised persons, understand that they must support their + Government; the Zulus, therefore, would recognise the justice + of being taxed; and not to tax them is, I consider, to abandon + one of the duties of Government. Moreover, it is said we are to + be taxed to pay our quota of the recent expenditure. But our + natives will hardly understand first fighting the Zulus, and then + having to pay for it. It will seem to them as if they were the + offending party, if they, and not the Zulus, are taxed. 2. The + conditions discourage trade. It ought to be encouraged to the + utmost. Instead of forbidding importation by sea, a Custom-house + should be established at the one port or landing-place, 3. The + alienation of land is forbidden, in order to keep out the white + man; but he should be encouraged to enter, and so long as the + land is held in common by the whole tribe there will be no + improvement in agriculture. Or, to take the conditions in order—2 + is impossible; the young men will be quarrelling with one another + at weddings and other gatherings, tribal fights will ensue, and + the chiefs must have a force at their command. 3 I have touched + upon. 4 is nugatory; if a chief wishes to put to death he can + give a man a mock trial and have done with it. 6 overlooks that + wars often do not begin with the chiefs; the young men bring + them about. 8 I have touched upon. The whole implies the active + and constant superintendence of the Resident, and that will be + resisted: some kraal or kraals will be disobedient to orders, + the chief will be unable or unwilling to enforce obedience, and + the Resident must call in other assistance at great expense; and + at whose? There is nothing enduring, nothing practical in this + settlement, if it deserves to be called such. It is not likely + to last, and everyone expects, after a short interval, more + bloodshed and more reckless expenditure. The burden cannot be + thrown on the Colony, as the Government has not been consulted on + the terms of peace. The whole thing is a cruelty to the Zulus, + to the colonists, and to the suffering home population, for + there will be another £3,000,000 or more to be voted yet; but + during the whole time meat was 8d. and bread 4d. per pound. 1s. + 6d. per diem was consequently ample allowance for the keep of a + soldier; of course I am aware there were numerous other sources + of expenditure, but it is extreme folly to send an army out to + a distant place, with power to draw upon the Treasury at will; + it is too great a trial for human nature. As a blind, all sorts + of things are said about the colonists; a great deal or even all + may be true, but it does not explain half. That, however, is by + the way; but I must mention, before concluding, that one of the + newly-appointed chiefs is a white man named John Dunn. He left + home when about fifteen or sixteen, and has since lived with the + Zulus, taking to himself a number of wives. This appointment is + looked upon as an outrage to public morals and as an insult to + the colonists. I say nothing about the missionaries, as I do + not wish that they should lean upon the civil power; the Church + must do her proper work in her proper way. I simply write as an + Englishman, to one who largely guides the counsels of the nation, + to lift up my voice against what has been done, and is being + done, in this part of the empire. Trusting you will excuse my + thus trespassing upon your time, believe me to remain yours most + respectfully, + JAMES GREEN, + _Dean of ’Maritzburg_. + +But at all events we had gained one definite result by all the blood +and money spent in the Zulu war. The most important and earnestly +insisted on immediate cause of our attack upon Zululand was the +invasion of our soil, and the violation of our sanctuary, committed +by Mehlokazulu and his brother, sons of Sihayo, when they seized and +carried off two women who had taken refuge in Natal. We “requested” +the Zulu king to deliver up the young men to us for judgment and for +punishment, and he begged us to accept a fine in lieu of the persons +of the offenders. We declined this proposal and repeated our request, +which suddenly became a “demand” when it appeared in the ultimatum, +and as such remained. + +It was said at the time that, had the young men been given up even +after the troops had crossed the border, hostilities would have been +suspended until the rest of the demands could be complied with. But +they were not, so we went to war. + +And now, at last, the war was over, one of Sihayo’s sons had fallen +in battle, and Mehlokazulu, the other, was in our hands. Here was +what we had fought for, and obtained! What would be done with him? +By the military authorities he could only be treated like any +other prisoner of war, and released unharmed amongst the other +Zulus. He was therefore handed over to the civil authorities at +Pietermaritzburg to be tried by them, although he was denied the +same advantages of counsel which are accorded by law to other civil +prisoners. + +This denial was commented upon unfavourably by those who desired +justice to be done, but, apparently, Mehlokazulu required no counsel, +for he was not tried. He had committed no offence on British soil +punishable in a Zulu subject by British law. His own king could have +punished him by our request, but we had deposed and transported +that king, and there was no law by which we could have inflicted +anything beyond a trifling fine for trespass upon the man whom we had +compassed heaven and earth, and shed so much of England’s noblest +blood, to seize. The magistrate declined to commit him for trial, +and Mehlokazulu was permitted to return to his home. “Doubtless,” +remarks _The Natal Colonist_ of October 27th, “the legal adviser of +the Crown was concerned in the case, and framed the charge which +there was the best chance of being substantiated. And this is the +result—‘there was no evidence to maintain the charge.’... It is a +miserable conclusion to a most miserable affair.... The charge which, +as we have seen, is almost made the chief occasion of the war which +has desolated so many homes, and cost millions of money, completely +breaks down when brought to the test of legal trial, and the prisoner +is, of necessity, set at liberty. We never believed much in the +other pretexts for the war put forward by Sir Bartle Frere, but we +confess that we always thought the outrage by Sihayo’s sons was one +to be visited with condign punishment, whether it was one which would +justify war or not; and even though we knew it was only a pretext, +seeing that it only took place long after war had been determined on, +and preparations for it had been begun to be made.” + +“But the ultimatum and its demands are things of the past. Rivers of +blood have flowed to enforce these demands, and now they are put on +one side as utterly valueless, both by the settlement of Zululand and +the release of Sirayo’s son.”[181] + +With this humiliating fact we must close our record of the Zulu War. +In doing so, we feel that too many of the circumstances which we have +thus recorded reflect no credit on the name of England—that name +which as English men and women we most desire should be honoured by +the world at large; and we realise with pain that, so far as our work +may be perused by dwellers upon other shores, so far have we lessened +the glory of our motherland in their eyes. But, however much we may +regret the necessity, we do not therefore think it a less imperative +duty to bring to the light as much as possible whatever wrong and +injustice has been committed and concealed by those to whom England +has entrusted her power and her fame. That the light of publicity +should be thrown upon them is the first step towards their cure, +or at least towards the prevention of any further wrong, and it is +with the truest loyalty to our Sovereign, and the deepest love and +reverence for our country, that we have undertaken the task now +completed. + + +THE END. + + +CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS, CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] “Few things struck me more than the evident haste and temporary +character of the defensive measures undertaken by the English part of +the population”—in the border districts of Natal. (See letter from +Sir Bartle Frere to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, dated March 28th, 1879. +P. P. [C. 2318] p. 32.) + +[2] Spelt thus to give the nearest proper pronunciation of “Cetywayo.” + +[3] Residence of the Bishop of Natal. + +[4] These people had refused to leave their homes, or desert their +Bishop, as long as he and his family remained at Bishopstowe, +although both black and white, for miles around, had sought shelter +elsewhere. + +[5] A system not unlike the Inquisition in its evil results. + +[6] Who, it may be remarked, have always been well treated in +Zululand. + +[7] Portions of this letter are omitted from the Blue-book. It would +be interesting to see the letter as originally received. + +[8] One put to death in 1861 was condemned on a charge of high +treason. + +[9] As he had previously, in the year 1861, visited Zululand for the +purpose of fixing the succession upon the house of Cetshwayo. + +[10] Since by our desire he refrained from protecting it by force of +arms. + +[11] He gives as reasons for his objections: first, that such +treaties “involve an admission of equality between the contracting +parties,” and therefore “encourage presumption” on the part of the +inferior, etc.; secondly, that “men who cannot read are apt to forget +or distort the words of a treaty.” A third reason, which does not +seem to have occurred to Mr. Shepstone, lies in the ease with which +a savage may be deceived as to the contents of a written document, +which facility we shall soon largely illustrate in the matter of Boer +treaties with the natives. + +[12] See Lecky’s “Rationalism in Europe”:—7000 at Trèves; 600 by a +single Bishop of Bamberg; 800 in _one_ year, in the bishopric of +Wurtzburg; 1000 in the province of Como; 400 at _once_, at Toulouse; +500 in three months, at Geneva; 48 at Constance; 80 at the little +town of Valary in Saxony; 70 in Sweden; and one _Christian_ judge +boasted that he himself had been the means of putting to death, in +sixteen years, 800 witches! + +In Scotland, two centuries ago, but after many centuries of +Christianity and civilisation, John Brown, the Ayrshire carrier, was +shot, and, within a fortnight, an aged widow and a young maid were +tied to stakes in the Solway and drowned by the rising tide, for the +crime of neglecting episcopal worship, and going aside into the moor +to spend the Sabbath day in prayer and praise. + +[13] P. P. [C. 1401] p. 30. + +[14] Natives of Basutoland, resident for many years in Natal. + +[15] See Field Force Order, 1873. + +[16] In the Zulu language the word _abantwana_ (children) is a +general one, including both women and children. + +[17] It is only fair to Major Durnford to state that during the whole +of these proceedings he was away over the mountains, in vain pursuit +of an enemy to be fought. + +[18] 1. The following account of the above transaction was given by +one of those concerned, in a letter to _The Natal Times_ of that +date: “Twenty of us volunteered yesterday to go up and into a cave +about eight miles from here. We found only one native, whom we shot, +took a lot of goats (eighty-seven), and any amount of assegais and +other weapons. We also searched about the country and killed a few +niggers, taking fourteen prisoners. One fellow in a cave loaded his +rifle with stones, and slightly wounded Wheelwright and Lieutenant +Clarke, R.A. We, however, got him out, and Moodie shot him through +the brains. Fifteen of ours have just volunteered to go to a cave +supposed to contain niggers. We are gradually wiping out the three +poor fellows who were shot, and all our men are determined to have +some more.” + +2. _The Natal Government Gazette_, December 9th, 1873, contains the +following enactment: “All officers and other persons who have acted +under the authority of Sir Benjamin Chillay Campbell Pine, K.C.M.G., +as Lieut.-Governor of the colony of Natal, or as Supreme Chief over +the native population, or have acted _bonâ fide_ for the purposes +and during the time aforesaid, whether such acts were done in any +district, county, or division of the colony in which martial law was +proclaimed or not, are hereby indemnified in respect of all acts, +matters, and things done, in order to suppress the rebellion and +prevent the spread thereof; and such acts so done are hereby made and +declared to be lawful, and are confirmed.” + +[19] It is hard to understand why these people should yet be detained +and their harmless old chief still kept prisoner at Capetown. The +common saying that they are all content and the chief better off than +he ever was before in his life, is an entirely and cruelly false one. +Langalibalele is wearying for his freedom and his own people; the few +women with him are tired of their loneliness, and longing to be with +their children in Natal. The present writer paid the chief a visit in +September of this year (1879), and found him very sad. “I am weary; +when will they let me go?” was his continual question. + +[20] Not including those individual acts of cruelty which no one +could defend, although many speak of them as unavoidable. + +[21] The Lieut.-Governor of the colony. + +[22] Kafir law, under which Langalibalele was tried, because most +of the offences with which he was charged were not recognisable by +English law. + +[23] Ordinance No. 3, 1849. + +[24] The italics are the Author’s own in this and following charge. + +[25] The other rebel chiefs of the Cape Colony here alluded to, +however, were not “banished,” but merely imprisoned in a portion of +their own Supreme Chiefs territory, where, at proper times, they +could be visited by members of their families and tribes; moreover, +they were duly tried and convicted before the ordinary courts of +serious crimes committed by themselves individually, and they had +actually resisted by force their Supreme Chief within his territory; +whereas Langalibalele had made no resistance—he was a runaway, but +no rebel; he had not been tried and condemned for any crime in the +Colonial Court, and banishment for life to Robben Island, away from +all his people, was a fate worse than death in his and their eyes. + +[26] The same Magema, the Bishop’s printer, before mentioned. + +[27] Although Mawiza’s lies were plainly exposed, he was never +punished, but remains to this day in charge of a large tribe, over +which he has been placed by the Government. + +[28] On June 24th, 1874, the Bishop presented this “Appeal on behalf +of Langalibalele” to His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of Natal +and the executive committee of the Colony. The appeal was made in +the first instance to Sir B. C. C. Pine, who altogether refused to +listen to it. On this the Bishop forwarded a letter through the +Lieut.-Governor to the Earl of Carnarvon, enclosing a copy of his +correspondence with Sir B. C. C. Pine, and stating his reasons for +acting as he had done in the matter. This letter was dated August +6th, 1874, and on August 16th the Bishop left home _en route_ to +England. + +[29] He was a bright intelligent lad, keenly anxious for +self-improvement, and with a great desire, unusual amongst his kind, +to go to England, and see a civilised country. + +[30] The Zulus and Zulu-Kafirs bathe their persons frequently, but +they have not our ideas of cleanliness in respect to dress and +habitations, although they are very particular about their food, +utensils, and other matters. + +[31] This was done at the expense of Government, which likewise +allowed certain supplies of meal, salt, and a little meat to the +captives. + +[32] The boy was one of those who in the meanwhile had learnt at +Bishopstowe to read and write, and who therefore could be of some +use to his father as scribe, although his usefulness in that respect +is much curtailed by the exceeding caution of the Government, which +in its absurd and causeless fear of “treasonable correspondence,” +will not allow written words of any description to reach or leave +the poor old chief without official inspection. This precaution +goes so far that in one instance some mats made by the women for +Miss Colenso, and sent from Uitvlugt (the place of Langalibalele’s +confinement after he was removed from the island), never reached +their destination, owing to the paper attached, signifying for whom +they were intended, being removed, as coming under the head of +prohibited liberties. Another case is that of a lady who visited the +family in September, 1879, and asked them to tell her what trifles +they would like her to send them from Cape Town, but found that she +had no power to send some babies’ socks which the women had chosen, +and a comforter for the old man’s neck, except through an official +individual and by formal permission. + +[33] A woman, wife of one of the fugitives, being taken prisoner +during the expedition, found favour, much against her will, in the +eyes of one Adam (a follower of the Secretary for Native Affairs), +who asked to be allowed to take her as his wife. Permission was +granted, but the woman refused, saying that she had a husband +already, to whom she was attached. Her wishes were disregarded, and +she was conveyed home by Adam, from whom she shortly escaped. Adam +applied to the nearest magistrate for an order to take forcible +possession of the fugitive, and the woman was thrown into gaol by +the magistrate, until she should consent to be Adam’s wife. The man +took her home a second time, and she again escaped from him; in fact +her determination was so great that the matter was finally given up +altogether. Eventually she rejoined her own husband, who received her +and her child with the kindness which her constancy deserved. + +[34] Reaching home early in October, 1874. + +[35] Acts of “defiance” and “resistance,” too vague for any special +instance to be given, probably striking his lordship as being of a +slightly imaginary character. + +[36] Implying plainly that strict justice would demand it. + +[37] Author’s italics. + +[38] No notice was ever taken of the recommendation. + +[39] It is reported that Sir B. Pine has felt the injustice to +himself so keenly that he refuses longer to acknowledge his title of +K.C.M.G., and styles himself simply Mr. Pine. There can be little +doubt that in point of fact Mr. Shepstone was mainly responsible for +all that happened; but “the right man to annex the Transvaal” could +not well be spared, and a scapegoat was found for him in Sir Benjamin +Pine. + +[40] Three at last. + +[41] It would be an injustice to an association, called into +existence and maintained by a true spirit of Christian charity, to +pass over in silence the active, if seemingly ineffectual, efforts +of the Aborigines Protection Society to obtain justice for the +unfortunate people of the Putini tribe. + +[42] The annexation of the Transvaal:—so stated by one of his own +staff. + +[43] It is neither customary nor convenient to speak publicly of a +parent, and I desire to let facts speak for themselves as much as +possible. I feel, however, bound to remark that of all the mistakes +made by a succession of rulers in Natal, perhaps the most foolish +and unnecessary has been that jealousy of episcopal “or unofficial” +interference, which has blinded them to the fact that the Bishop has +always been ready to give any assistance in his power to the local +Government in carrying out all just and expedient measures towards +the natives, without claiming any credit or taking any apparently +prominent position beyond his own; and, so long as justice is done, +would greatly prefer its being done by those in office. He has never +interfered, except when his duty as a man, and as the servant of a +just and merciful Master, has made it imperatively necessary that he +should do so; nor does he covet any political power or influence. To +a government which intends to carry out a certain line of policy in +defiance of justice and honour, he would ever be an opponent; but +one which honestly aims at the truth would assuredly meet with his +earnest support. + +[44] “The recollection of past events”—that is to say, of the +slaughter of many men, women, and children, the destruction of homes, +and the sufferings of the living;—this can hardly with reason be said +to be _kept alive_ by attempts to ameliorate the condition of those +that remained, and to show them some small kindness and pity. How +“a good feeling” was to be restored between the victims and their +conquerors by other means, Sir Garnet does not suggest. + +[45] In common only with the rest of the tribe. + +[46] Three women and two children only have been allowed to join him. + +[47] Which did not prevent their being of the utmost importance +in considering the case of the chief under trial at the time the +statements were made. + +[48] Sir B. Pine complains in his despatch, December 31st, 1874, of +the “intolerable injustice” of charges being made against Mr. J. +Shepstone, upon evidence taken by the Bishop _ex parte_, without +the _safety of publicity_ and the opportunity of cross-examination. +Yet Sir Garnet Wolseley refused to allow publicity or searching +cross-examination by experienced advocates. + +[49] One of the original four. + +[50] Mr. Shepstone says in his second report that a day or two +previous to the meeting with Matshana, he had received information to +the effect that the chief’s intentions were to put him and his people +to death at the expected interview, and all the efforts made by Mr. +Shepstone and his witnesses were to prove, first, the murderous +intentions of Matshana; and, secondly, that _nevertheless_ Mr. +Shepstone had no counter-plans for violence, and did not fire upon +the people. + +[51] Author’s italics. + +[52] Rather by the determination of their rulers to preserve their +land from Boer encroachments. + +[53] SAND RIVER TREATY.—“Evidence was adduced that the Transvaal +Boers, who, by the Sand River Convention, and in consideration of +the independence which that convention assured to them, had solemnly +pledged themselves to this country (England) not to reintroduce +slavery into their Republic, had been in the habit of capturing, +buying, selling, and holding in forced servitude, African children, +called by the cant name of ‘black ivory,’ murdering the fathers, +and driving off the mothers; that this slave trade was carried on +with the sanction of the subordinate Transvaal authorities, and that +the President did actually imprison and threaten to ruin by State +prosecution a fellow-countryman who brought it to the notice of +the English authority—an authority which, if it had not the power +to prevent, had at any rate a treaty right to denounce it. This +and more was done, sometimes in a barbarous way, under an assumed +divine authority to exterminate those who resisted them. So much was +established by Dutch and German evidence. But it was supplemented +and carried farther by the evidence of natives as to their own +sufferings, and of English officers as to that general notoriety +which used to be called _publica fama_.”—_From an article by Lord +Blachford in The Nineteenth Century Review, August 1879_, p. 265. + +[54] A native chief. + +[55] Written in October, 1879. + +[56] Lord Blachford says in the article already quoted from: “The +citizens of these Republics have gone out from among us into a +hostile wilderness, because they could not endure a humanitarianism +which not only runs counter to their habits and interest, but +blasphemes that combination of gain with godliness which is part of +their religion. While that humanitarianism forms a leading principle +of our government they will not submit to it. Why should we bribe +or force them to do so? It is no doubt right and wise to remain, if +possible, on good terms with them. It is wise and generous to save +them, if possible, in their day of calamity—as, with our own opposite +policy, we have been able to save them—by a wave of the hand—twice +from the Basutos, and once from the Zulus. (Once for all rather, +through the course of many years, during which we have restrained +the Zulus from asserting their own rights to the disputed territory, +by promises that we would see justice done.—_Author._) But it is +neither wise nor necessary to embroil ourselves in their quarrels +until they call for help, until they have had occasion to feel the +evil effects of their own methods, and the measure of their weakness, +and are ready, not in whispers or innuendos and confidential corners, +but outspokenly in public meetings, or through their constituted +authorities, to accept with gratitude our intervention on our own +terms, until they are, if they ever can be, thus taught by adversity. +I do not myself believe that we could enter into any political union +with them except at the sacrifice of that character for justice to +which, I persist in saying, we owe so much of our power and security +in South Africa. Nor so long as we observe the rules of justice to +them shall we do any good by disguising our substantial differences, +or refraining from indignant remonstrances against proceedings which +are not only repugnant to humanity, but violate their engagements +with us and endanger our security.” + +[57] Colonel Durnford, R.E., who paid a flying visit to Pretoria at +the time. + +[58] Mr. John Dunn is said to have stated to the Special +Correspondent of _The Cape Argus_, and to have since reaffirmed his +statement, that Sir T. Shepstone “sent word to Cetshwayo that he was +being hemmed in, and the king was to hold himself in readiness to +come to his assistance.” This assertion has also been denied by Sir +T. Shepstone’s supporters. + +[59] P. P. [C. 1776] p. 88. + +[60] It may be interesting to compare the above with the wording of +Sir T. Shepstone’s “Commission”—P. P. [C. 1776] p. 111. + +[61] The chief repeatedly refused to sign any paper presented to +him by the Boers, on the grounds that he could not tell what it +might contain, beyond the points explained to him, to which he might +afterwards be said to have agreed; showing plainly to what the +natives were accustomed in their dealings with the Transvaal. + +[62] That claimed by the Boers. + +[63] P. P. (2079, pp. 51-54). + +[64] The conclusion arrived at, after a careful consideration of all +producible evidence, by the Rorke’s Drift Commission, in 1878. + +[65] A liability transferred to the Zulu king by Sir Bartle Frere in +his correspondence with the Bishop of Natal. + +[66] That is to say, that they may be bribed by substantial benefits +to acquiesce in the loss of their liberties. + +[67] Was it by inadvertence that Sir T. Shepstone speaks of “us” and +“we,” thus producing a sentence so strangely and unhappily applicable? + +[68] Italics not Sir B. Frere’s. + +[69] Author’s italics throughout. + +[70] Author’s italics. + +[71] “_Ama_-Swazi” for the plural correctly, as also “Ama-Zulu.” + +[72] Sir Henry Bulwer, speaking of the disputed territory generally, +writes as follows: “The Zulu king had always, in deference very +much to the wishes and advice of this Government (Natal), forborne +from doing anything in respect of the question that might produce +a collision, trusting to the good offices of this Government to +arrange the difficulty by other means. But no such arrangement had +ever been made; and thus the question had drifted on until the +formal annexation of the disputed territory by the Government of the +Republic last year, and their subsequent attempt to give a practical +effect to their proclamation of annexation by levying taxes upon the +Zulus residing in the territory, provoked a resistance and a feeling +of resentment which threatened to precipitate a general collision at +any moment.”—SIR H. BULWER, _June 29th, 1876_ (C. 1961, p. 1). + +[73] Umtonga escaped again, and is now living in the Transvaal. His +brother was still living in Zululand, as head of Umtonga’s kraal, at +the beginning of the war, and no injury appears to have been done to +any of the four. + +[74] Thereby pointing the truth of his own remark at a previous +date—March 30th, 1876 (1748, p. 24): “But messages from the Zulu king +are becoming more frequent and urgent, and _the replies he receives +seem to him to be both temporising and evasive_.” (Author’s italics). + +[75] Immediately after they had signed the instrument of appointment +the two Zulu messengers were sent in to the Government by Messrs. +Smith and Colenso, and took with them a letter (C. 2000) which +mentioned them as its bearers, and announced what they had done. + +[76] ’Mfunzi and ’Nkisimane were sent down again to ’Maritzburg by +Cetshwayo, at the request of Sir H. Bulwer, and denied the whole +transaction, though it was attested by the signatures of the notary +and two white witnesses. It was afterwards discovered that they had +been frightened into this denial by a Natal Government messenger, +who told them that they had made the Governor very angry with them +and their king by making this appointment; and John Dunn also, after +receiving letters from ’Maritzburg, told them that they had committed +a great fault, and that he saw that they would never _all_ come home +again. + +[77] Messrs. Smith and Colenso’s explanatory letter to Sir M. +Hicks-Beach, dated June 9th, 1878, concludes as follows: + +“This business, as far as we are concerned, is, therefore, ended. We +had hoped to be instrumental in embodying in a contract a proposal +which we knew was advantageous to both parties. To do so only +required the intervention of European lawyers trusted by Cetewayo. +We knew that he trusted us, and would trust no others. The task of +acting for the king was, therefore, imposed on us as lawyers and as +gentlemen. Of pecuniary reward, or its equivalent, our labours have +brought us nothing. We do not require it. Honour we did not desire, +nor had a savage prince any means of conferring it. The duty thus +undertaken we give up only in despair, and we have nothing to regret. + +“Such information, however, as we have gleaned in the course of our +agency you are entitled to hear from us, as we are British subjects. + +“The Zulus are hostile to the Boers of the Transvaal, and would +fight with them but for fear of being involved in a quarrel with the +English. But neither Cetewayo himself, who is wise and peaceful, nor +the most hot-blooded of his young warriors have any desire to fight +with England, _i.e._ Natal. + +“If they wished to do so there is nothing to prevent them, and never +has been. As they march, they could march from their border to this +city or to Durban in a little more than twenty-four hours. Their only +fear is, that the English will come with an army ‘to make them pay +taxes.’ They say they will rather die than do so. The king says the +same. Almost every man has a gun. Guns and ammunition are cheaper at +any military kraal in Zululand than at Port Natal. These goods are +imported by Tonga men, who come in large gangs from Delagoa Bay, for +white merchants. An Enfield rifle may be had for a sheep of a Tonga +man; many have breech-loaders. The missionaries, whose principal +occupation was trading, deal in ammunition. The missionaries have +recently lost most of their converts, who have gone trading on their +own account. Without these converts the missionaries cannot do +business, and they have left the country, except Bishop Schreuder, +who has gone back, that it may not be said that a white man is not +safe there. Cetewayo says that he has asked the missionaries to stop. +They have certainly not been turned out or threatened. Their going +makes the Zulus think that we are about to invade the country. + +“Nothing but gross mismanagement will bring about a quarrel between +England and the Zulus.”—(P. P. [C. 2144] pp. 215, 216). + +[78] This is apparently a figure of speech, since Luneburg, near +which the kraal was being built, would seem by the map _not_ to +lie “to the rear”—as seen from Zululand—of Utrecht, where Sir T. +Shepstone was staying. + +[79] Compare the account of the delay on the part of the Boer +Government when Mr. Keate proposed to arbitrate. See last chapter, p. +182. + +[80] 2144, p. 191. + +[81] The Zulus, of course, would not have appreciated the convenience +of a table and chairs; they had no “documents” to lay upon the +former; and their opinion of the comfort of the latter is best +expressed by the well-known Zulu saying that, “_Only Englishmen +and chickens sit upon perches._” The mats provided for them were, +therefore, a proper equivalent to the tables and seats placed for the +other delegates. + +[82] Sir Bartle Frere gives a very unfair account of this +matter-of-course fact when he transmits to the Secretary of State +the above despatch, “informing me of the incomplete result, in +consequence of the attitude of Cetshwayo’s representatives at the +Commission of Inquiry.” + +[83] The king’s kraal at that time. + +[84] The homestead specially spoken of in this case does not appear +to have been destroyed or injured till March, 1879, in the midst of +the war, nor was any human being, white or black, belonging to these +farms, killed by this “savage, unbridled, revengeful nation,” before +the war began. + +[85] Apparently by Sir T. Shepstone’s orders, as the following phrase +appears in one of the Boer protests against arbitration, April 25th, +1873: “The majority of the people have, by order of your Excellency, +trekked into laager on December 14th last, and after having remained +in laager for nearly five months, _we are to go and live on our farms +again_.” + +[86] The married women work in the mealie-gardens, etc., and the +_little_ girls carry the babies; but the marriageable young women +seem to have an interval of happy freedom from all labour and care. + +[87] This was comprehensible during the attempt, which proved so +signal a failure, on the part of Sir T. Shepstone, to impose a +_marriage tax_ upon the natives. The tax was so extremely unpopular +that it was thought advisable to relinquish it, and to make the +desired increase in the revenue of the colony by doubling the hut-tax. + +[88] Sir T. Shepstone, when he says (1137, p. 18) “Natal gives up the +_cattle_ of Zulu refugees.... The refugees themselves are not given +up,” plainly includes women amongst the cattle or “property” of the +Zulus. + +[89] And later, Nov. 18, 1878 (2222, p. 173), he says: “I do not +hold the King responsible for the commission of the act, because +there is nothing to show that it had his previous concurrence or +even cognizance. But he becomes responsible for the act after its +commission, and for such reparation as we may consider is due for it.” + +[90] Since rifled by our troops, and the bones of the old king +brought over to England. + +[91] No “demand” was made until it appeared in Sir B. Frere’s +ultimatum. + +[92] On perusing the above italicised words, one learns for the first +time that the ultimatum, which Sir Bartle Frere sent to the Zulu king +a few months later, was actually sent for the express purpose of +putting “an end to pacific relations with our neighbours.” This is +hardly the light in which the British public has been taught to look +upon the matter. + +[93] Mr. H. Shepstone (Secretary for Native Affairs in the Transvaal) +acknowledges that this fine was paid (2222, p. 99). + +[94] Manyonyoba owed allegiance to Cetshwayo (as did Umbilini). He +lived north of the Pongolo, in a part of the country over which +Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Henry Bulwer altogether deny Cetshwayo’s +supremacy, and was claimed as a subject of the Transvaal Government. + +[95] Sir H. Bulwer says “they have suspected, quite wrongly, that +we had some design against them in making it” (the new road to the +drift). It is to be questioned how far their suspicion was a wrongful +one, seeing that it was understood from the first that the drift +was intended especially for military purposes, and was undoubtedly +inspected by Mr. Smith for the same. + +[96] Quotations from Mr. Deighton’s report to Mr. Wheelwright. + +[97] Words applied to him by Mr. Brownlee, late Secretary for Native +Affairs of the Cape Government. + +[98] Author’s italics. + +[99] On one of these visits a missionary is reported to have said to +the king coarsely in Zulu, “You are a liar!” (unamanga!) upon which +Cetshwayo turned his back to him, and spoke with him no more. + +[100] Or rather he was angry with them for the rudeness which they +committed in going _without taking leave_. He said they had never +received anything but kindness from him, and might as well have paid +him the compliment of a farewell salutation. + +[101] Author’s italics. + +[102] “Our Correspondent” of _The Daily News_ speaks, in to-day’s +issue (November 17th, 1879), of the “tranquillising fear” of +Cetshwayo having been removed from “our own native population.” + +[103] A mere assertion, often made, but never supported by the +slightest proof. + +[104] And so the Rev. Mr. Glockner, speaking of the late war, says +that they (the missionaries) had often warned the native chiefs of +what would befall them, if they refused to become Christians.—_Vide +The Scotsman, February 5th, 1880._ + +[105] Story of Maqamsela, from _The Natal Colonist_ of May 4th, 1877: +“Another case referred to in our previous article was that of a man +named Maqamsela, particulars of which, derived from eye-witnesses, +we have received from different sources. On Friday, March 9th, he +attended morning service at Etshowe mission station as usual, went +home to his kraal, and at noon started to go over to the kraal of +Minyegana, but was seized on the road and killed because he was a +Christian! + +“For many years he had wished to become a Christian, and this at his +own desire was reported to Gaozi, his immediate chief, who _scolded +him, saying, ‘it would occasion him_ (Gaozi) _trouble_.’ The earnest +and repeated solicitation of Maqamsela was that the missionary +(Mr. Oftebro) would take him to the king to obtain his permission +to profess Christianity. Last winter the missionary consented to +mention it to the king; but, _failing to see Gaozi first, deemed +it imprudent to do so at that time_. Maqamsela was greatly grieved +at this, saying, ‘I am not afraid of death; it will be well if I +am killed for being a Christian.’ When an opportunity occurred of +speaking to Gaozi about Maqamsela’s wish to be baptized, _he would +give no direct answer, but complained of his bad conduct_. Maqamsela, +however, persisted in his entreaties that his case should be reported +to the king. ‘If they kill me because I believe, they may do so; the +Lord will receive me. Has not Christ died for me? Why should I fear?’ +A favourable opportunity of naming the matter to the king presented +itself some time after. Cetshwayo appeared very friendly, and +proposed that the Christians should pay a tax, but said that their +service should be building houses for him when called; otherwise +they might remain in peace. Maqamsela was then mentioned as being +desirous to become a Christian. He was an old man, who could not +leave his kraal, and could not come up to serve. He had therefore +been eaten up, and had not now a single head of cattle. On his name +being mentioned, the king replied that _he would say nothing, Gaozi, +Minyegana, and Xubane not being there_. Maqamsela was glad when he +heard what had been done, and said, ‘If they kill me now, it is all +right.’ + +“A week later his time came. An induna, named Jubane, sent for him, +and on his return from Jubane’s, an impi came to him, saying they +had orders to kill him. He asked for what reason, and being told it +was because he was a Christian and for nothing else, he said again, +‘Well, I rejoice to die for the word of the Lord.’ He begged leave to +kneel down and pray, which he was allowed to do. After praying, he +said, ‘Kill me now.’ They had never seen any man act in this manner +before, when about to be killed, and seemed afraid to touch him. +After a long pause, however, a young lad took a gun and shot him, and +they all ran away.” + +[106] This indiscriminate killing is disproved and denied by +Cetshwayo himself and his principal chiefs (_vide_ “A Visit to King +Ketshwayo,” “Macmillan’s Magazine,” March, 1878). + +[107] Author’s italics throughout. + +[108] Two Zulu prisoners, captured while on a peaceful errand, just +before the commencement of hostilities, and who were permitted to +reside at Bishopstowe when released from gaol, until they could +safely return home, were questioned concerning these regulations, +and said that they applied only to those who voluntarily joined the +regiments, concerning which there was no compulsion at all, beyond +the moral effect produced by the fact that it was looked upon, by +the young people themselves, as rather a poor thing to do to decline +joining. Once joined, however, they were obliged to obey orders +unhesitatingly. These young men said that in the coast, and outlying +districts, there were large numbers of people who had retained +their liberty and married as they pleased, but that strict loyalty +was the _fashion_ nearer the _court_. It was in these very coast +districts that the Zulus surrendered during the late war, the _loyal_ +inhabitants proving their loyalty to _the bitter end_. + +[109] “We are equal,” said the interpreter; but the expression used +is more correctly translated as above. + +[110] The natives of Natal, “peaceful subjects of Her Majesty,” were +living in perfect security on one side of the border, and the Zulus +on the other, the two populations intermarrying and mingling in the +most friendly manner, without the smallest apprehension of injury to +life or property, when Sir B. Frere landed at Durban. + +[111] Compare with 9 and 10 the distinct instructions on this point +given by Lord Carnarvon during the previous year (1961, p. 60): +“I request, therefore, that you will cause the missionaries to +understand distinctly that Her Majesty’s Government cannot undertake +to compel the king to permit the maintenance of the mission stations +in Zululand.” Yet here the clause is made one of the conditions of an +ultimatum, the alternative of which is war. + +[112] Sir T. Shepstone’s incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear +evidence, sifted and proved worthless by the Commissioners. + +[113] Sir Bartle Frere declares (Correspondence, p. 57) that +Cetshwayo “could have known nothing of the memorandum,” although +(_ibid._ p. 6) he himself asserts that “it was intended to explain +for Cetshwayo’s benefit what was the nature of the cession to him,” +and it was plainly very generally known, and therefore naturally by +the king. + +[114] Correspondence, p. 3. + +[115] Ibid. p. 6. + +[116] Compare with Sir Bartle Frere’s suggestion to Sir Henry Bulwer +that the latter should persuade the Zulu king that the _Active_ +and her fellows were mostly merchant vessels, but that the English +war-vessels would be sufficient to _protect his coast_! + +[117] Our own troops’ experience showed that this was no idle excuse. + +[118] One of Colonel Durnford’s officers writes, January 26th, +“that he (the Colonel) had worked so hard at equipping this Native +Contingent, against much opposition, and took special pride in his +mounted men, three hundred men, that he called ‘The Natal Native +Horse.’” + +[119] These words deserve special remark. + +[120] After-events proved the fallacy of these “reports.” Even when +the Zulus could have swept Natal with fatal effect, they refrained. + +[121] Lord Chelmsford, January 16th, 1879. (P. P. [C. 2252] p. 63.) + +[122] Captain N. Newman. + +[123] Some Zulus (a chief named Gandama, and others) came into the +camp on the 21st, saw the General, and were allowed to depart.—(P. P. +[C. 2454] p. 182). + +[124] P. P. (C. 2260) p. 81. + +[125] Major Clery. + +[126] “There were no high words,” Lieutenant Cochrane says, of +any kind between the colonels, as some would lead the public to +suppose. The above remarks are taken from Lieutenant Cochrane’s +account of what passed; and he says: “I think no one lives who was +present during the conversation but myself; so that anything said +contradictory to my statement is _invented_.” + +[127] Captain Essex, 75th Regiment. + +[128] Lieutenant Raw, Natal Native Horse. + +[129] Lieutenant Cochrane, 32nd Regiment. + +[130] Mr. Brickhill. + +[131] Having disengaged his men, Captain G. Shepstone said: “I must +go and see where my Chief is,” and rode in again. His devotion cost +him his life. + +[132] Captain Gardner. + +[133] Captain Essex. + +[134] Lieutenant Curling, R.A. + +[135] Captain Essex. + +[136] Lieutenant Cochrane. + +[137] Mr. Brickhill. + +[138] Lieutenant Curling. + +[139] Three mounted Zulu scouts were seen on the hills on the right +from the rear guard, by an officer, who pointed them out to one of +the staff. + +[140] Some remarks made by Lieutenant Milne, R.N. (aide-de-camp), +are worthy of notice: “_January 21st._—We then rode up to the high +land to the left of our camp, the ascent very steep, but possible +for horses. On reaching the summit of the highest hill, I counted +fourteen Zulu horsemen watching us at the distance of about four +miles; they ultimately disappeared over a slight rise. Two vedettes +were stationed at the spot from where I saw these horsemen; they +said they had seen these men several times during the day, and had +reported the fact.... We then returned to camp, the General having +determined to send out a patrol in this direction the next day.”—(P. +P. [C. 2454] p. 183). + +_January 22nd._—Lieutenant Milne was sent to the top of a hill to see +what was doing in camp, and says: “On reaching the summit I could see +the camp; all the cattle had been driven in close around the tents. I +could see nothing of the enemy on the left” (_ibid._ p. 184). + +“We are not quite certain about the time. But it is just possible +that what I took to be the cattle having been driven into camp may +possibly have been the Zulu ‘impi’” (_ibid._ p. 187). + +[141] One message only is mentioned by the General or his military +secretary as having been received from the camp. But an officer +(of rank) _who had seen them_, says that five or six messages were +received from the camp during the day by the General or his staff; +and he says distinctly that the messages were in the possession of +Lieut.-Colonel Crealock. + +[142] About this hour the tents in camp suddenly disappeared. + +[143] No spare ammunition was taken by the force with the General. + +[144] The reserve ammunition is said to have been packed in waggons, +which were then filled up with stores. + +[145] The _first_ official mention of this appears in a Blue-book of +August, 1879, where Lieutenant Milne, R.N. (aide-de-camp), says: “In +the meantime, news came that Colonel Harness had heard the firing, +and was proceeding with his guns and companies of infantry escorting +them to camp. Orders were immediately sent to him to return and +rejoin Colonel Glyn.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 184). + +[146] By the General’s directions this statement was to be “of the +facts which came under his cognizance on the day in question.”—(P. P. +[C. 2260] p. 80). + +[147] “The panic and confusion were fearful,” says one of themselves. + +[148] The number of prisoners thus killed is said to have been about +twenty. + +[149] Yet Sir B. Frere, on the 30th June, writes: “The position of +Wood’s and Pearson’s columns effectually checked the execution of +an attempt at invasion.” These two columns, being some ninety miles +apart and secure in their own positions _only_, would have been of +little avail _had_ the Zulu king desired to make “an attempt at +invasion.” It needed no better strategists than Cetshwayo and his +chiefs to have masked each of the posts at Kambula and Etshowe with +some 5000 men, and then “the Zulus might march at will through the +country.” + +[150] Some officers who were with the advance column, and who +afterwards visited Isandhlwana, say that they appear to have “tried +to get the waggons together to form a laager,” but there was not time. + +[151] With respect to this, Lord Chelmsford lays down a principle +(relative to the border raids, but even more strongly applicable +here) that if a force remains “on the passive defensive, without +endeavouring by means of scouting in small bodies or by raiding in +large ones, to discover what the enemy is doing in its immediate +front, it deserves to be surprised and overpowered.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] +p. 80). + +[152] It is stated that on the previous evening there was no +intention on the part of the Zulus to attack the camp upon the +22nd, which was not thought by them a propitious day, being that of +the new moon. It is also said that the Zulu army came with pacific +intentions, in order to give up Sihayo’s sons, and the cattle for the +fine. In all probability they _left the king_ with such orders—that +is to say, to make terms if possible, but to fight if forced to it, +and if the English intentions were plainly hostile. This hostility +was thoroughly proved before the morning of the 22nd, when the +departure of Lord Chelmsford’s force from the camp must have been a +strong temptation to the Zulus to attack the latter. + +Warning of the Zulu army moving against Nos. 1 and 3 Columns was +received on the border, and communicated to Mr. Fannin, Border Agent, +on January 20th. The warning stated that the whole Zulu army, over +35,000 strong (except about 4000 who remained with the king), was +marched in two columns, the strongest against Colonel Glyn’s column, +the other against Colonel Pearson; this was to take up its position +on the 20th or 21st January at the royal kraal near Inyezane, and +the first to approach Rorke’s Drift. The writer complains of the +little and inadequate use made of the information, which might have +been communicated from Fort Pearson to Rorke’s Drift in time to have +averted the fearful disaster of the 22nd January.—(P. P. [C. 2308] +pp. 69, 70). + +[153] P. P. (C. 2318) p. 12. + +[154] Had Lord Chelmsford been acquainted with this peculiarity of +the Zulus, he might not have thought it necessary to hurry away +from Isandhlwana on the 23rd. There was no fear of the same force +attacking again for some days to come. + +[155] P. P. (C. 2318) pp. 11-17. + +[156] Who, it is said, insisted upon the animals being fine and in +good condition, returning some which were sent in below the required +mark. + +[157] Captain Clarke’s report (C. 2144), p. 37. + +[158] Sir T. Shepstone to Sir H. Bulwer, April 16th, 1878 (C. 2144). + +[159] Upon the Zulu border. + +[160] C. 2367, p. 90. + +[161] Sondolosi, deceased brother of Seketwayo. + +[162] Trooper Grandier’s story of ill-treatment has since been +contradicted by this Dutchman. + +[163] C. 2374, p. 109. + +[164] Nevertheless, during the end of March and beginning of April +communications took place between the Lieut.-Governor and the General +commanding, on this subject (C. 2318, p. 45); therefore _both_ the +military and civil authorities _were_ aware of it. + +[165] John Dunn is understood to have come back from his interview +with the last peace messengers, and to have reported that the message +was _bonâ fide_, and that Cetshwayo “means to have peace if possible.” + +[166] This company of Native Pioneers (one of those organised +by Colonel Durnford, R.E., before the war) was raised from the +_employés_ of the Colonial Engineer Department, and commanded by +Captain Beddoes of the same department; this officer being highly +commended by his chief. The company worked under the supervision +of Lieutenant Main, R.E., and rendered excellent service. Colonel +Pearson remarked: “The men worked cheerfully. They had eyes like +hawks, and they did their scouting to perfection.” + +[167] One of the hardest workers in this department was Commissary J. +W. Elmes, who distinguished himself by his untiring zeal and energy. + +[168] P. P. (C. 2260) p. 104. + +[169] P. P. (C. 2374) p. 115. + +[170] Mr. Mansel, the officer commanding this troop of Natal Mounted +Police, says: “When we went out the morning before the fight we left +thirty-one men behind, men whose horses had sore backs, etc. These +men were in charge of only a corporal. Seven men escaped, and we +buried all of the twenty-four that were killed. Twenty were killed +just around Colonel Durnford. Three about two hundred yards away, and +one at the Fugitives’ Drift.” + +[171] Properly Uzulu—the Zulu nation. + +[172] The above is corroborated on all main points by Mehlokazulu, +son of Sihayo, who states that he was sent with three other indunas +(mounted), on the morning of the 22nd, to see what the English were +doing. On reporting to Tshingwayo, he said, “All right, we will +see what they are going to do.” “Presently,” says Mehlokazulu, “I +heard Tshingwayo give orders for the Tulwana and Ngyaza regiments to +assemble. When they had done so, he gave orders for the others to +assemble and advance in the direction of the English camp. We were +fired on first by the mounted men, who checked our advance for some +little time.” He says the soldiers were at first “in loose order,” +but afterwards he saw them “massing together,” when “they fired at a +fearful rate.” When the Zulus broke the infantry and closed in, they +“came on to a mixed party of mounted men and infantry men,” about one +hundred, who “made a desperate resistance, some firing with pistols +and others using swords, and I repeatedly heard the word ‘Fire!’ +given by someone. But we proved too many for them, and killed them +all where they stood. When all was over I had a look at these men, +and saw a dead officer, with his arm in a sling and a big moustache +(Colonel Durnford, R.E.), surrounded by dead carbineers, soldiers, +and other men whom I did not know.”—_Vide R. E. Journal, Feb. 1880._ + +[173] Written for him by a Dutch trader, residing with him. + +[174] This information he obtained through his messengers ’Mfunzi and +’Nkisimane, who were in Pietermaritzburg in June. The message (sent +by Mr. Colenso) being, that the young officer killed at the Styotyozi +river was a Prince; that his sword would be desired by his family, +and that if Cetshwayo wanted to make peace he had better return it. +The result was that, as soon as the king received the message, he +sent the sword on to Lord Chelmsford. + +[175] Amongst the wild natives of South Africa it is thought that the +carrying of burdens is not a manly task. In a family of travelling +Zulus the women and lads perform the duties of carriers, while the +man of the party marches ahead, unencumbered except by his weapons, +ready if necessary to defend his flock against the attack of man or +beast. An officer, travelling in the eastern province some years +ago, met and questioned a party proceeding in this fashion. “Why,” +he asked the leader of the little band, “do you allow these women +and girls to carry heavy loads, while you, a strong able-bodied man, +have nothing but your assegais and knob-kerries in your hand?” Such +questions are not seldom resented when they touch on native customs, +and are asked in an overbearing manner. This officer was uniformly +kind and courteous to the natives, and the man smilingly replied, “It +is our custom, and the women prefer it;” referring his questioner to +the women themselves for their opinion. The chief of these latter +thereupon replied, with much grace and dignity: “Does the white chief +think we would let _our man_ do woman’s work? It is our work to +carry, and we should not like to see him do it.” + +[176] The appearance of the native carrier on the march was very +ludicrous. Picture a stalwart Kafir carrying his sleeping mats, +provisions, cooking-pot, drinking-gourd, shield, bundle of assegais +and knob-kerries, and perched on top of all, on his head, a +fifty-pound mealie-bag; the result was likened to a Christmas-tree. + +[177] A splendid elephant’s tusk (the Zulu emblem of international +good-will and sincerity) had been sent by Cetshwayo, with one of his +messages, to General Crealock; this Sir Garnet Wolseley sent home to +the Queen, who thus has received a valuable present from her dusky +antagonist. + +[178] Mr. Colenso was acquainted with him, having, as already +related, paid him a visit in 1877. + +[179] At the same time many residents in Cape Town obtained, from +mere motives of curiosity, that interview which, to those who had +desired it for humanity’s sake, had been refused, while all who know +his language, or are likely to sympathise, are rigidly excluded. +Orders were given afterwards that the name of the Bishop of Natal +should not be mentioned to Cetshwayo, “because it excited the +prisoner.” + +[180] We think this statement is hardly correct. + +[181] _The Daily News_, 30th October, 1879. + + + + + * * * * * + * * * * * + + + _February 16, 1880._ + + BOOKS + + PUBLISHED BY + + CHAPMAN & HALL LIMITED, + + 193, PICCADILLY. + + (A Selection from their general Catalogue.) + + + THE LETTERS OF CHARLES DICKENS. + (_NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PUBLISHED._) + Edited by his SISTER-IN-LAW and ELDEST DAUGHTER. + 2 vols. demy 8vo, 30_s._ Second Edition. + + +_BEESLY (EDWARD SPENCER)—Professor of History in University College, +London_— + + CATILINE, CLODIUS, AND TIBERIUS. Large crown 8vo, 6_s._ + + +_BLAKE (MRS.)_ + + THE REALITIES OF FREEMASONRY. Author of “Twelve Months in + Southern Europe.” Demy 8vo, 9_s._ + + “A singularly interesting and entertaining volume, clearly, + concisely, and systematically arranged in a series of chapters, + each of which contributes, in its proper place and order, to + the elucidation of the common purpose of them all, that is, the + _rationale_ of Freemasonry as it exists and is practised in + the present day. Mrs. Blake is never desultory or discursive; + possessing her subject thoroughly, and writing with all the + calmness of dispassionate investigation.”—_Daily News._ + + +_BOYLE (F.)—Author of “Camp Notes.”_ + + CHRONICLES OF NO MAN’S LAND. Large crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ + + “It would be difficult to single one essay out above another in + Mr. Boyle’s series of remarkably equal sketches.”—_Standard._ + + +_BRADLEY (THOMAS)—of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich_— + + ELEMENTS OF GEOMETRICAL DRAWING. In Two Parts, with Sixty Plates. + Oblong folio, half-bound, each Part, 16_s._ + + +_BUCKLAND (FRANK)_— + + LOG-BOOK OF A FISHERMAN AND ZOOLOGIST. Second Edition. With + numerous Illustrations. Large crown 8vo 12_s._ + + “We welcome once more the freshest and most genial of the many + writers who aim at popularising among us habits of observation, + and the intelligent lover of natural history.”—_Graphic._ + + +_BURCHETT (R.)_— + + DEFINITIONS OF GEOMETRY. New Edition. 24mo, cloth, 5_d._ + + LINEAR PERSPECTIVE, for the Use of Schools of Art. Twenty-first + Thousand. With Illustrations. Post 8vo, cloth, 7_s._ + + PRACTICAL GEOMETRY: The Course of Construction of Plane + Geometrical Figures. With 137 Diagrams. Eighteenth Edition. Post + 8vo, cloth, 5_s._ + + +_BURNAND (F. C.), B.A., Trin. Coll. Camb._ + + THE “A. D. C.”; being Personal Reminiscences of the University + Amateur Dramatic Club, Cambridge. Demy 8vo, 12_s._ Second Edition. + + “An eminently readable and pleasant book.”—_Examiner._ + + “A singularly amusing and interesting book.”—_Saturday Review._ + + +_CAMPION (J. S.) late Major, Staff, 1st Br. C.N.G., U.S.A._— + + ON THE FRONTIER. Reminiscences of Wild Sport, Personal + Adventures, and Strange Scenes. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo, + 16_s._ Second Edition. + + “Every chapter is a finished picture.... The book will not only + delight the sportsman, but will prove irresistibly attractive + to all who like good stories thoroughly well told. To those in + search of fresh information about the aborigines or animals or + physical geography of Western America, Major Campion’s work will + yield many new facts. We hope to meet him again.”—_Times._ + + ON FOOT IN SPAIN. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 16_s._ Second + Edition. + + “No one will look for word-painting, elaborate description, or + profound observation in a book of this kind; and, moreover, the + author seems to have a positive dread of what he calls ‘Coming + Barlow over the reader’—referring, we presume, to the terrible + mentor of Sandford and Merton. But in an unpretending way it + gives a much more graphic picture of the scenery, people, and + ways of North Spain than many a more ambitious work. Few readers, + we imagine, will lay it down without feeling they have a clearer + idea of the country, and without feeling also a kind of liking + for the author.”—_Pall Mall Gazette._ + + +_CARLYLE (DR.)_— + + DANTE’S DIVINE COMEDY.—Literal Prose Translation of THE INFERNO, + with text and Notes. Second Edition. Post 8vo, 14_s._ + + CARLYLE BIRTHDAY BOOK. Prepared by permission of Mr. Thomas + Carlyle. Small crown 8vo, 3_s._ + + “An elegant little volume of the usual kind, with all its + quotations selected from Mr. Carlyle’s writings. Apart from its + primary use, this is really a book worth having, as it forms a + very good anthology of his wise and witty sayings.”—_Whitehall + Review._ + + +_CLINTON (R. H.)_— + + A COMPENDIUM OF ENGLISH HISTORY, from the Earliest Times to A.D. + 1872. With Copious Quotations on the Leading Events and the + Constitutional History, together with Appendices. Post 8vo, 7_s._ + 6_d._ + + “This is an invaluable book. In 280 pages it gives the whole + course of the history from the earliest ages, judiciously + interspersed with quotations from the best historians down to our + own time....”—_Examiner._ + + +_CRAIK (GEORGE LILLIE)_— + + ENGLISH OF SHAKESPEARE. Illustrated in a Philological Commentary + on his Julius Cæsar. Fifth Edition. Post 8vo, cloth, 5_s._ + + OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. Ninth Edition. + Post 8vo, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._ + + +_DAVIDSON (ELLIS A.)_— + + PRETTY ARTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF LEISURE HOURS. A Book for + Ladies. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 6_s._ + + THE AMATEUR HOUSE CARPENTER: a Guide in Building, Making, and + Repairing. With numerous Illustrations, drawn on Wood by the + Author. Royal 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ + + +_DAVISON (THE MISSES)_— + + TRIQUETI MARBLES IN THE ALBERT MEMORIAL CHAPEL, WINDSOR. A Series + of Photographs. Dedicated by express permission to Her Majesty + the Queen. The Work consists of 117 Photographs, with descriptive + Letterpress, mounted on 49 sheets of cardboard, half-imperial. + Price £10 10_s._ + + +_DE POMAR (THE DUKE)_— + + FASHION AND PASSION; or, Life in Mayfair. New Edition. Crown 8vo, + 6_s._ + + +_DIXON (W. HEPWORTH)_— + + BRITISH CYPRUS. Demy 8vo, with Frontispiece, 15_s._ + + “‘British Cyprus’ is in essential points an able and piquant + work, and full of fresh and valuable information.”—_Graphic._ + + THE HOLY LAND. Fourth Edition. With 2 Steel and 12 Wood + Engravings, Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ + + +_DRAYSON (LIEUT.-COL. A. W.)_— + + PRACTICAL MILITARY SURVEYING AND SKETCHING. Fifth Edition. Post + 8vo, cloth, 4_s._ 6_d._ + + +_DYCE (WILLIAM), R.A._— + + DRAWING-BOOK OF THE GOVERNMENT SCHOOL OF DESIGN; OR, ELEMENTARY + OUTLINES OF ORNAMENT. Fifty selected Plates. Folio, sewed, 5_s._; + mounted, 18_s._ + + Text to ditto. Sewed, 6_d._ + + +_ESCOTT (T. H. S.)_— + + PILLARS OF THE EMPIRE: Short Biographical Sketches. Demy 8vo, + 10_s._ 6_d._ + + “The editor of the present volume deserves praise for the skill + displayed both in arranging the gallery and in painting some + of the more striking portraits which adorn it. From first to + last these sketches are full of fresh and lively interest; and + it would be no easy matter to select any one chapter which at + all falls short of the high standard reached by the volume + as a whole. The story of the lives and achievements of the + distinguished men whose career is here so brightly and freshly + recorded presents many varied contributions to the history of + the Empire, which appear as different illustrations of Imperial + service and aspects of the Imperial idea.... With bright touches, + happy illustrations, and pithy epigrams the whole book abounds, + and is readable from first to last.”—_Standard._ + + +_EWALD (ALEX. CHARLES), F.S.A._— + + REPRESENTATIVE STATESMEN: Political Studies. Two Vols. Large + crown 8vo, 24_s._ + + “Contains much interesting matter well put together.... Mr. Ewald + has a happy knack of seizing the most salient points of the story + which he has to tell.”—_John Bull._ + + +_FANE (VIOLET)_— + + DENZIL PLACE: a Story in Verse. Crown 8vo, cloth, 8_s._ + + QUEEN OF THE FAIRIES (A Village Story) and other Poems. By the + Author of “Denzil Place.” Crown 8vo, 6_s._ + + ANTHONY BABINGTON: a Drama. By the Author of “Denzil Place,” “The + Queen of the Fairies,” &c. Crown 8vo, 6_s._ + + +_FEARNLEY (W.), late Principal of the Edinburgh Veterinary College; +Author of “Lectures on the Examination of Horses as to Soundness”_— + + LESSONS IN HORSE JUDGING, AND THE SUMMERING OF HUNTERS. With + Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 4_s._ + + “An excellent description (with diagrams) of the points of a + horse one by one, followed by an equally excellent appendix on + the ‘Summering of Hunters.’”—_Graphic._ + + +_FITZ-PATRICK (W. J.)_— + + LIFE OF CHARLES LEVER. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, 30_s._ + + “Mr. Fitzpatrick’s book is one of the most interesting of the + season; and we are glad that the task of writing about a writer + of whom all will be anxious to know all that can be known, + should have fallen into such conscientious and pains-taking + hands.”—_John Bull._ + + +_FLEMING (GEORGE), F.R.C.S._— + + ANIMAL PLAGUES: THEIR HISTORY, NATURE, AND PREVENTION. 8vo, + cloth, 15_s._ + + HORSES AND HORSE-SHOEING: their Origin, History, Uses, and + Abuses. 210 Engravings. 8vo, cloth, £1 1_s._ + + PRACTICAL HORSE-SHOEING: With 37 Illustrations. Second Edition, + enlarged. 8vo, sewed, 2_s._ + + RABIES AND HYDROPHOBIA: THEIR HISTORY, NATURE, CAUSES, SYMPTOMS, + AND PREVENTION. With 8 Illustrations. 8vo, cloth, 15_s._ + + “Such a work as that now before us has long been a desideratum. + There have been useful treatises, more or less elaborated, upon + dog-madness, but there has not hitherto been any one which could + pretend to such a degree of completeness as the subject deserved. + It is not too much to say that Mr. Fleming has brought to its + consideration a remarkable amount of varied research and of + practical knowledge and judgment, and it must be acknowledged + that he has fulfilled the task he had assigned to himself in the + most ample and satisfactory manner.”—_Athenæum._ + + A MANUAL OF VETERINARY SANITARY SCIENCE AND POLICE. With 33 + Illustrations. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, 36_s._ + + “His book is quite an encyclopædia of veterinary science, and + cannot fail to be of great value to all who have animals about + them. Mr. Fleming has resorted to the best authorities both in + this country and on the Continent, and has been able to add to + what he has obtained from them the results of a wide and varied + practical experience. His works on ‘Animal Plagues,’ and ‘Rabies + and Hydrophobia,’ have already secured his reputation as a writer + on veterinary science, and a material addition will be made + to it by the present extremely valuable and fairly exhaustive + treatise.”—_Pall Mall Gazette._ + + +_FORSTER (JOHN)_— + + THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. With Portraits and other + Illustrations. 15th Thousand. 3 vols. 8vo, cloth, £2 2_s._ + + “Mr. Forster’s life of Dickens will always be eagerly read + as long as Dickens himself is eagerly read; and that will + be as long as Englishmen retain their delight in English + literature.”—_Spectator._ + + THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. Uniform with the Illustrated Edition + of Dickens’s Works. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, £1 8_s._ + + THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. Uniform with the Library Edition. + Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ + + THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. Uniform with the “C. D.” Edition of + his Works. With Numerous Illustrations. 2 vols. 7_s._ + + THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. Uniform with the Household Edition. + With Illustrations by F. BARNARD. Crown 4to, cloth, 4_s._ 6_d._; + paper, 3_s._ 6_d._ + + WALTER SAVAGE LANDOR: a Biography, 1775-1864. With Portraits and + Vignettes. A New and Revised Edition, in 1 vol. Demy 8vo, 12_s._ + + +_FRANCATELLI (C. E.)_— + + ROYAL CONFECTIONER: English and Foreign. A Practical Treatise. + With Coloured Illustrations. 3rd Edition. Post 8vo, cloth, 7_s._ + 6_d._ + + “Under the above abbreviated designation we are announcing a + work, the mere title-page of which is a catalogue of culinary + mysteries, and the programme of an exhibition of subtle and + ambrosial art. ‘The Royal English and Foreign Confectioner,’ + as this title-page avers, is a practical treatise on the art + of confectionery in all its branches, comprising ornamental + confectionery artistically developed; different methods of + preserving fruit, fruit pulps, and juices in bottles, the + preparation of jams and jellies, fruit and other syrups, + summer beverages, and a great variety of national drinks; with + directions for making dessert cakes, plain and fancy bread, + candies, bonbons, comfits, spirituous essences, and cordials; + also, the art of ice-making, and the arrangement and general + economy of fashionable desserts. By Charles Elmé Francatelli, + pupil to the celebrated Carême, and late maître d’hotel to Her + Majesty the Queen, author of ‘The Modern Cook,’ ‘The Cook’s + Guide,’ and ‘Cookery for the Working Classes.’ With numerous + illustrations in chromo-lithography. We shall not affect to pass + judgment on the vast variety of recipes which carry out the + abundant promise of Francatelli’s title-page. It is enough to + absolve us from such endless labour to mention that the contents + of the chapters occupy 15 pages, and that the index in which the + references are printed very closely, comprises upwards of 20 + pages, and includes all imaginable products of the confectionery + art.... WE SALUTE FRANCATELLI RESPECTFULLY IN DISMISSING HIS + BOOK; ONLY ADDING THAT HIS RECIPE FOR BEIGNETS OF PINK-APPLES, ON + PAGE 252, IS WORTH ALL THE MONEY WHICH THE PURCHASER WILL PAY FOR + THIS VERY OPPORTUNE VOLUME.”—_Times._ + + +_HANCOCK (E. CAMPBELL)_— + + THE AMATEUR POTTERY AND GLASS PAINTER. With Directions for + Gilding, Chasing, Burnishing, Bronzing, and Ground Laying. + Illustrated. Including Fac-similes from the Sketch-Book of N. H. + J. WESTLAKE, F.S.A. With an Appendix. Demy 8vo, 5_s._ + + “A most useful handbook to the now fashionable art of painting + on china and glass, containing minute instructions which only + have to be thoroughly mastered to render the student capable of + turning out reasonably artistic work. The illustrations will also + be found very useful by the beginner, as they show the sort of + designs best adapted for the purpose in hand. For the general + reader, who does not aspire to become a crockery painter, some + interesting chapters on pottery and porcelain are provided, + in which they will find descriptions of many of the chief + manufactories, with particulars of the special productions that + have rendered them famous. Any person bitten with the china mania + cannot fail to be pleased with the information given in this part + of the book.”—_Globe._ + + +_HALL (SIDNEY)_— + + A TRAVELLING ATLAS OF THE ENGLISH COUNTIES. Fifty Maps, Coloured. + New Edition, including the Railways, corrected up to the present + date. Demy 8vo, in roan tuck, 10_s._ 6_d._ + + +_HILL (MISS G.)_— + + THE PLEASURES AND PROFITS OF OUR LITTLE POULTRY FARM. Small crown + 8vo, 3_s._ + + +_HITCHMAN (FRANCIS)_— + + THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, + 32_s._ + + +_HOLBEIN_— + + TWELVE HEADS AFTER HOLBEIN. Selected from Drawings in Her + Majesty’s Collection at Windsor. Reproduced in Autotype, in + portfolio. 36_s._ + + +_HOVELACQUE (ABEL)_— + + THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE: LINGUISTICS, PHILOLOGY, AND ETYMOLOGY. + With Maps. Large crown 8vo, cloth, 5_s._ Being the first volume + of “The Library of Contemporary Science.” + + “This is a translation of the first work of a new French series + of Popular Scientific Works. The high character of the series, + and also its bias, may be inferred from the names of some of its + writers, _e.g._ P. Broca, Ch. Martins, C. Vogt, &c. The English + publishers announce that the present volume will be followed + immediately by others on Anthropology and Biology. If they are + like their precursor, they will be clear and well written, + somewhat polemical, and nobly contemptuous of opponents.... + The translator has done his work throughout with care and + success.”—_Athenæum._ + + +_JARRY (GENERAL)_— + + NAPIER (MAJ.-GEN. W. C. E.)—OUTPOST DUTY. Translated, with + TREATISES ON MILITARY RECONNAISSANCE AND ON ROAD-MAKING. Third + Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ + + +_KEMPIS (THOMAS À)_— + + ON THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. Four Books, Beautifully Illustrated + Edition. Demy 8vo, 16_s._ + + “It is illustrated with great ability—even the head and tail + pieces are themselves complete pictures, suggestive, quaint, + beautiful. The paper is of the best, and the printing very + careful. On the whole, for a gift or for presentation, we hardly + know where else to look for a book to match it. Clearly neither + care nor expense has been spared in producing this tasteful but + sumptuous volume.”—_Nonconformist._ + + +_KLACZKO (M. JULIAN)_— + + TWO CHANCELLORS: PRINCE GORTCHAKOF and PRINCE BISMARCK. + Translated by Mrs. Tait. New and cheaper edition, 6_s._ + + “This is a most interesting and valuable book.... The object + is to trace out the working and the results of a ten years’ + partnership between the two famous Chancellors of Russia and + Germany, Prince Gortchakoff and Prince Bismarck and these are + delineated with considerable artistic power, and in a manner + which betokens considerable political insight, and an intimate + acquaintance with the diplomatic world.”—_Blackwood’s Magazine._ + + +_LEFÈVRE (ANDRÉ)_— + + PHILOSOPHY, Historical and Critical. Translated, with an + introduction, by A. W. KEANE, B.A. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ + + +_LETOURNEAU (DR. CHARLES)_— + + BIOLOGY. Translated by William MacCall. With Illustrations. Large + crown 8vo, 6_s._ + + +_LUCAS (CAPTAIN)_— + + THE ZULUS AND THE BRITISH FRONTIER. Demy 8vo, 16_s._ + + “Even if South Africa did not so much engage public attention + at this moment, Mr. Lucas’s book would be well worth reading. + It is not a catchpenny publication, but a well written and + well arranged study of our relations with the Zulus. Mr. Lucas + expresses himself in a vigorous and manly style, without waste + of words; and, though he makes use occasionally of the figure + of irony, he never declaims, and never tries to be humorous out + of place. He himself has had some military experience near the + scene of the present disturbances, and he writes with a military + clearness and directness which command attention.”—_Saturday + Review._ + + CAMP LIFE AND SPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA. With Episodes in Kaffir + Warfare. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 12_s._ + + “Mr. Lucas has admirably executed the task which he set himself + to perform, and that was to touch upon some of the salient points + of life and character in South Africa, at the same time weaving + into them some of the everyday incidents of garrison life whilst + serving with his old regiment, the Cape Mounted Rifles. The book + is full of interest from the first page to the last, containing + as it does descriptions of the chief places in South Africa, its + various inhabitants, the peculiarities of Kaffir warfare, and the + sport to be met with.”—_Naval and Military Gazette._ + + +_LYTTON (ROBERT, LORD)_— + + POETICAL WORKS—COLLECTED EDITION. Complete in 5 vols. + + FABLES IN SONG. 2 vols. Fcap. 8vo, 12_s._ LUCILE. Fcap. 8vo, + 6_s._ THE WANDERER. Fcap. 8vo, 6_s._ POEMS, HISTORICAL AND + CHARACTERISTIC. Fcap. 6_s._ + + +_MAXSE (FITZH.)_— + + PRINCE BISMARCK’S LETTERS. Translated from the German. Second + Edition. Small crown 8vo, cloth, 6_s._ + + +_MAZADE (CHARLES DE)_— + + THE LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. Translated from the French. Demy 8vo, + 16_s._ + + “The arrangement of incidents, the juxtaposition of historical + contrasts, and the entire elaboration of M. de Mazade’s material, + are very artistic and very effective.... There is also much in + M. de Mazade’s work, which, by-the-bye, is well translated, + that may gratify English pride as well as instruct English + politicians.”—_World._ + + +_McCOAN (J. CARLILE)_— + + OUR NEW PROTECTORATE. TURKEY IN ASIA: ITS GEOGRAPHY, RACES, + RESOURCES, AND GOVERNMENT. With a Map, showing the Existing and + Projected Public Works. 2 vols. large crown 8vo, 24_s._ + + “If a good book was to be made about Asiatic Turkey, it is + difficult to see how it could have been made with greater success + than has attended the efforts of Mr. McCoan. He has told us all + that we could wish to know; he has put his information into a + compact and readable shape; and he has supplied just as much + detail as gives body to his work without overloading it. He has, + too, a personal knowledge of many parts of the vast district he + describes; and has been for years familiar with the Turks, their + ways and work.”—_Saturday Review._ + + +_MOLESWORTH (W. NASSAU)_— + + HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE YEAR 1830 TO THE RESIGNATION OF THE + GLADSTONE MINISTRY. + + A Cheap Edition, carefully revised, and carried up to March, + 1874. 3 vols. crown 8vo, 18_s._ + + A School Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ + + “It is a great misfortune that the history of our country that + is nearest our own times young men are least acquainted with. It + is not written in histories that were read at school, and they + are not old enough, as I am old enough, to remember almost every + political fact since the great Reform Bill of 1832. I wish young + men would read some history of this period. A neighbour and a + friend of mine, a most intelligent and accomplished clergyman—Mr. + Molesworth—has published a work, being a political history + of England from the year 1830—that is, from the first Reform + Bill—until within the last two or three years; a book honestly + written, in which facts are plainly—and I believe truly—stated, + and a work which would give great information to all the young + men of the country, if they could be prevailed upon to read + it.”—_From the Right Hon. John Bright’s Speech at Birmingham._ + + +_MORLEY (HENRY)_— + + ENGLISH WRITERS. Vol. I. Part I. THE CELTS AND ANGLO-SAXONS. With + an Introductory Sketch of the Four Periods of English Literature. + Part II. FROM THE CONQUEST TO CHAUCER. (Making 2 vols.) 8vo, + cloth, £1 2_s._ + + ⁂ Each Part is indexed separately. The Two Parts complete the + account of English Literature during the Period of the Formation + of the Language, or of THE WRITERS BEFORE CHAUCER. + + “Mr. Morley’s volume, looks, at first sight, a formidable + addition to the existing mass of English writings after Chaucer; + but it is well worth reading. It comprises the foundation and + ground story, so to speak, of a work upon the whole sequence of + English literature. If carried out with the same spirit and on + the same scale as the volume already published, the complete work + will undoubtedly form a valuable contribution towards the story + of the growth of the literary mind of England, told as a national + biography of continuous interest.”—_Saturday Review._ + + Vol. II. Part I. FROM CHAUCER TO DUNBAR. 8vo, cloth, 12_s._ + + TABLES OF ENGLISH LITERATURE. Containing 20 Charts. Second + Edition, with Index. Royal 4to, cloth, 12_s._ + + In Three Parts. Parts I. and II., containing Three Charts, each + 1_s._ 6_d._ + + Part III., containing 14 Charts, 7_s._ Part III., also kept in + Sections, 1, 2, and 1_s._ 6_d._ each; 3 and 4 together, 3_s._ ⁂ + The Charts sold separately. + + +_MORLEY (JOHN)_— + + DIDEROT AND THE ENCYCLOPÆDISTS. 2 vols. demy 8vo, 26_s._ + + “We have here the story of a life, full in itself of human + interest, vividly and dramatically told; we have also glimpses + of the lives of others whose interest is scarcely inferior; have + a perfect treasure-house of social and political knowledge, + literary and artistic criticism; and we have another of those + singularly valuable contributions to the history of the + ‘modern spirit,’ which Mr. Morley is perhaps better qualified + than any living English writer to furnish, and which are + achieving for him a reputation that is more than English in its + comprehensiveness.”—_World._ + + CRITICAL MISCELLANIES. Second Series. France in the Eighteenth + Century—Robespierre—Turgot—Death of Mr. Mill—Mr. Mill on + Religion—On Popular Culture—Macaulay. Demy 8vo, cloth, 14_s._ + + VOLTAIRE. Large crown 8vo, 6_s._ + + “It is impossible to read his volume without being struck by + its independence of thought, its sincerity and candour of + expression, as well as by its ability and literary power. We have + freely expressed our dissent from the views which it presents + of the value and wholesomeness of the Voltairean philosophy, + if that name can fairly be applied to anything so essentially + unphilosophical; but at the same time it is well that such views + should be fairly argued out, and that, whatever inconvenience it + may occasion to people who, having once made up their minds on + a subject, dislike to have them disturbed, accepted conclusions + should be occasionally tested over again. Mr. Morley has given us + a valuable and highly suggestive study of the great man of a very + critical age.”—_Saturday Review._ + + ROUSSEAU. Large crown 8vo, 9_s._ + + CRITICAL MISCELLANIES. First Series. Large crown 8vo, 6_s._ + + CRITICAL MISCELLANIES. Second Series. [_In the Press._ + + “The papers one and all will bear reading not once but + twice—papers full of suggestive thought on subjects of undying + interest.”—_Graphic._ + + DIDEROT AND THE ENCYCLOPÆDISTS. Large crown 8vo, 12_s._ + + ON COMPROMISE. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._ + + STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL EDUCATION. Third Edition. 8vo, cloth, 3_s._ + + +_MORRIS (M. O’CONNOR)_— + + HIBERNIA VENATICA. With Portraits of the Marchioness of + Waterford, the Marchioness of Ormonde, Lady Randolph Churchill, + Hon. Mrs. Malone, Miss Persse (of Moyode Castle), Mrs. Stewart + Duckett, and Miss Myra Watson. Large crown 8vo, 18_s._ + + TRIVIATA; or, Cross Road Chronicles of Passages in Irish Hunting + History during the season of 1875-76. With illustrations. Large + crown 8vo, 16_s._ + + “The highest compliment paid to the merits of ‘Triviator’s’ + volume will be found to proceed from outsiders beyond the circle + of ‘hunting men,’ who have found interest and amusement in its + pages. The illustrations do not pretend to high line in art, but + are not lacking in humour and fidelity, and altogether we can + without scruple commend a perusal of ‘Triviata’ to all lovers + of hunting, on whose shelves it should find a place among the + standard works of that enthusiastic body.”—_Illustrated Sporting + and Dramatic News._ + + +_MURPHY (J. M.)_— + + RAMBLES IN NORTH-WEST AMERICA. With Frontispiece and Map. 16_s._ + + “Mr. Murphy has not only written a very readable volume, + but must have employed infinite pains in collecting his + materials.”—_Saturday Review._ + + +_OLIVER (PROFESSOR), F.R.S., &c._— + + ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL NATURAL ORDERS OF THE VEGETABLE + KINGDOM, PREPARED FOR THE SCIENCE AND ART DEPARTMENT, SOUTH + KENSINGTON. Oblong 8vo, with 109 Plates. Price, plain, 16_s._; + coloured, £1 6_s._ + + +_PIERCE (GILBERT A.)_— + + THE DICKENS DICTIONARY: a Key to the Characters and Principal + Incidents in the Tales of Charles Dickens. With additions by + WILLIAM A. WHEELER. Large crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ + + “The description of the external and internal peculiarities of + the characters is, as far as possible, given in Dickens’s own + words, a sign of laudable discretion on the editor’s part. The + volume forms a useful, we may say necessary, supplement to the + library edition of Dickens’s works.”—_Mayfair._ + + +_POLLOK (LIEUT.-COLONEL)_— + + SPORT IN BRITISH BURMAH, ASSAM, AND THE CASSYAH AND JYNTIAH + HILLS. With Notes of Sport in the Hilly Districts of the Northern + Division, Madras Presidency. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, with Illustrations + and 2 Maps. 24_s._ + + “Colonel Pollok’s ‘Sport in British Burmah’ must be ranked among + the best books of its class.”—_Graphic._ + + +_POYNTER (E. J.), R.A._— + + TEN LECTURES ON ART. Second Edition. Large crown 8vo, 9_s._ + + “This is a fine book, probably one of the books on art for a good + many years, full of clearly and deftly wrought-out explanations + upon subjects of much intricacy.... The remaining contents of + this remarkable book we must not even indicate. Its chief lessons + will, perhaps, centre upon the skilful teaching of thoroughness, + nobility, and patience that appears in almost every page, and + upon the remarkable illustrations and exposure of false taste in + decorative art.”—_Spectator._ + + +_PRINSEP (VAL), A.R.A._— + + IMPERIAL INDIA. Containing numerous Illustrations and Maps made + during a Tour to the Courts of the Principal Rajahs and Princes + of India. Second Edition. Demy, 8vo, 21_s._ + + “It is to be hoped that the author of this work may be as + successful in his delineation of the Great Durbar on canvas as + he has been in the wood pictures we have noticed. His book is + one of the most readable that has lately appeared on the subject + of India, full of interest and of touches of humour which make + it a pleasant companion from the first chapter to the last.... + It may be added that the illustrations are superlatively + good.”—_Athenæum._ + + +_REDGRAVE (SAMUEL)_— + + A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF THE HISTORICAL COLLECTION OF + WATER-COLOUR PAINTINGS IN THE SOUTH KENSINGTON MUSEUM. With + an Introductory Notice by SAMUEL REDGRAVE. With numerous + Chromo-lithographs and other Illustrations. Published for the + Science and Art Department of the Committee of Council on + Education. Royal 8vo, £1 1_s._ + + “A book which is a real contribution to British art.”—_Graphic._ + + +_ROBSON (REV. J. H., M.A., LL.M.)—late Foundation Scholar of Downing +College, Cambridge_— + + AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON ALGEBRA. Post 8vo. 6_s._ + + +_ROLAND (ARTHUR)_— + + FARMING FOR PLEASURE AND PROFIT. + + VOL. I.—DAIRY FARMING, MANAGEMENT OF COWS, &c. Edited by WILLIAM + ABLETT. Large crown 8vo, 6_s._ + + “We cannot follow our author in detail, but we may confidently + recommend his book, not only to the attention of amateurs, but + also to that of experts, who will find a good many hints of + advantage to them.”—_Gardeners’ Chronicle._ + + “The book contains much information that will be useful to people + who may wish to keep their own cows and utilize their produce, + but are at present ignorant as to the best methods of going to + work.”—_Queen._ + + VOL. II.—POULTRY-KEEPING. Edited by WILLIAM ABLETT. Large crown + 8vo, 5_s._ + + “Mr. Roland’s book gives much useful and instructive information + on the keeping and management of fowls; but we particularly + recommend his directions for the construction of a proper + fowl-house, which, though of the utmost importance and + absolutely necessary to success, is, as often as not, hopelessly + neglected.”—_Graphic._ + + VOL. III.—TREE-PLANTING, for Ornamentation or Profit, suitable to + every Soil and Situation. Edited by WILLIAM ABLETT. Large crown + 8vo, 5_s._ + + “The book comprises much useful and practical information as + to the nature, uses, and growth of various kinds of trees; it + possesses the additional merit of being very readable, and + interesting to all admirers of sylvan beauty.”—_Queen._ + + VOL. IV.—STOCK-KEEPING AND CATTLE-REARING. [_In the Press._ + + VOL. V.—DRAINAGE OF LAND, MANURES, &c. [_In the Press._ + + VOL. VI.—ROOT-GROWING, HOPS, &c. [_In the Press._ + + +_SCOTT-STEVENSON (MRS.)_— + + OUR HOME IN CYPRUS. With a Map and Illustrations. Demy 8vo, + 14_s._ Second Edition. + + “Mrs. Scott-Stevenson tells her story with delightful _naïveté_ + and womanly simplicity; she gives us many amusing pictures of + life in Cyprus, and her sketches of her interesting female + friends at Kyrenia are particularly graphic. Her book is + altogether really attractive reading, gives one a fair idea of + several aspects of the island, and would prove useful to any + one contemplating a stay, especially for the sake of health. + It is accompanied by an excellent new map, containing many + important corrections on existing maps and a number of attractive + illustrations.”—_Times._ + + +_STORY (W. W.)_— + + ROBA DI ROMA. Seventh Edition, with Additions and Portrait. Post + 8vo, cloth, 10_s._ 6_d._ + + THE PROPORTIONS OF THE HUMAN FRAME, ACCORDING TO A NEW CANON. + With Plates. Royal 8vo, cloth, 10_s._ + + CASTLE ST. ANGELO. Uniform with “Roba di Roma.” With + Illustrations. Large crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ + + +_STREETER (E. W.)_— + + GOLD; OR, LEGAL REGULATIONS FOR THIS METAL IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES + OF THE WORLD. Crown 8vo cloth, 3_s._ 6_d._ + + +_TANNER (PROFESSOR HENRY), F.C.S._— + + JACK’S EDUCATION; OR, HOW HE LEARNT FARMING. Large crown 8vo, + 4_s._ + + “Few people now fail to appreciate the value of popular + lectures on science and education, and the result of studies + in agricultural science is put into a taking narrative form by + Professor H. Tanner in ‘Jack’s Education,’ wherein he traces the + spread of agricultural knowledge in a certain district from a + stray remark dropped by a student at some provincial lectures. + Even the most unenlightened in farming matters could not fail to + understand and be interested in Professor Tanner’s volume.” + + +_TOPINARD (DR. PAUL)_— + + ANTHROPOLOGY. With a Preface by Professor PAUL BROCA, Secretary + of the Société d’Anthropologie, and Translated by ROBERT J. H. + BARTLETT, M.D. With numerous Illustrations. Large crown 8vo, + 7_s._ 6_d._ + + +_TREVELYAN (L. R.)_— + + A YEAR IN PESHAWUR AND A LADY’S RIDE INTO THE KHYBER PASS. Crown + 8vo, 9_s._ + + “Mrs. Trevelyan has made the best of her opportunities for + observing what was worth noting while she was stationed at + Peshawur. The incidents of frontier life are well described, + as also are all the doings that go to make up life at that + important station, the whole being told in a pleasantly written + story.”—_Naval and Military Gazette._ + + +_TROLLOPE (ANTHONY)_— + + THE CHRONICLES OF BARSETSHIRE. A Uniform Edition, consisting of 8 + vols., large crown 8vo, 6_s._ each, handsomely printed, each vol. + containing Frontispiece. + + THE WARDEN. + BARCHESTER TOWERS. + DR. THORNE. + FRAMLEY PARSONAGE. + THE SMALL HOUSE AT ALLINGTON. 2 vols. + LAST CHRONICLE OF BARSET. 2 vols. + + AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. A Cheap Edition with Maps. 2 vols. + Small 8vo, cloth, 7_s._ 6_d._ + + SOUTH AFRICA. 2 vols. Large crown 8vo, with Maps. Fourth Edition, + £1 10_s._ + + SOUTH AFRICA, 1 vol. Crown 8vo, 6_s._ + + +_VÉRON (EUGÈNE)_— + + ÆSTHETICS. Translated by W. H. ARMSTRONG. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ + 6_d._ + + “It is utterly impossible, within our limits, to go far into so + vast a subject as æsthetics, which M. Véron himself can only + treat briefly and summarily in a volume of 473 pages. We can only + say that it is, on the whole, by far the best book on the subject + we ever met with. M. Véron is at the same time a master of his + subject and singularly free from those traditional prejudices + which usually hamper the judgment of a Frenchman in art matters. + He is quite independent of the stupid and tiresome official + teaching, and in perfect sympathy with true artistic genius in + its various manifestations.”—_Saturday Review._ + + +_WHITE (WALTER)_— + + HOLIDAYS IN TYROL: Kufstein, Klobenstein, and Paneveggio. Large + crown 8vo, 14_s._ + + “A delightful holiday volume, full of pleasant chat and valuable + hints. Mr. Walter White has an eye that sees everything, a memory + which forgets nothing, a judgment to discriminate between what + is and is not worth repeating, and a fluent and cheery style, + neither striving artificially at epigram, nor relapsing through + feebleness into platitude.”—_World._ + + LONDONER’S WALK TO THE LAND’S END, AND A TRIP TO THE SCILLY + ISLES. Post 8vo. With 4 Maps. Third Edition. 4_s._ + + MONTH IN YORKSHIRE. Post 8vo. With a Map. Fifth Edition. 4_s._ + + “These volumes are written with intelligence, and are full of + information which should be welcome to every reader. There + are few parts of England which will not yield delight to + the pedestrian: but the counties visited by Mr. White are + inexhaustible in wealth of association and beauty of scenery, and + if his pleasantly written books excite a desire for home travel + they will not have been published in vain.”—_Pall Mall Gazette._ + + +_WORNUM (R. N.)_— + + ANALYSIS OF ORNAMENT: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF STYLES. An + Introduction to the Study of the History of Ornamental Art. With + many Illustrations. Sixth Edition. Royal 8vo, cloth, 8_s._ + + +_WYLDE (ATHERTON)_— + + MY CHIEF AND I; or, Six Months in Natal after the Langalibalele + Outbreak. With Portrait of Colonel Durnford. Demy 8vo, 14_s._ + + “We may add that the book is extremely interesting. Written + simply, but in good, plain English, without any attempt at + ‘word-painting,’ the very first pages gain the reader’s sympathy, + and when the last is reached, he parts from Mr. Wylde with + regret.”—_Examiner._ + + +_YOUNGE (C. D.)_— + + PARALLEL LIVES OF ANCIENT AND MODERN HEROES. New Edition. 12mo, + cloth, 4_s._ 6_d._ + + +OFFICIAL HANDBOOK FOR THE NATIONAL TRAINING SCHOOL FOR COOKERY. +Containing Lessons on Cookery; forming the Course of Instruction in +the School. With List of Utensils Necessary, and Lessons on Cleaning +Utensils. Compiled by “R. O. C.” Large crown 8vo. Fifth Edition, 8_s._ + +“The good point about the book is that it presupposes complete +ignorance on the part of the pupil; nothing is left to haphazard; +every quantity is given in its exact and due proportion, and the +price of each ingredient carefully set down. All these lessons, +moreover, have been practically tested in the National Training +School, and may therefore be accepted in good faith. It is not, +however, to be supposed that any cunning recipes or rare and costly +dishes are to be found in this book; the ‘first principles’ of good +cookery is the lesson it professes to teach, and certainly the method +of tuition is direct and easy to follow.”—_Times._ + + +FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW.—First Series, May, 1865, to Dec. 1866. 6 vols. +Cloth, 13_s._ each. + +New Series, 1867 to 1872. In Half-yearly Volumes. Cloth, 13_s._ each. + +From January, 1873, to June 30, 1879, in Half-yearly Volumes. Cloth, +16_s._ each. + + + + +WHYTE-MELVILLE’S WORKS. + + +CHEAP EDITION. + +_Crown 8vo, fancy boards, 2s. each, or 2s. 6d. in cloth._ + + UNCLE JOHN. + THE WHITE ROSE. + CERISE. + BROOKES OF BRIDLEMERE. + “BONES AND I.” + “M., OR N.” + CONTRABAND. + MARKET HARBOROUGH. + SARCHEDON. + SONGS AND VERSES. + SATANELLA. + THE TRUE CROSS. + KATERFELTO. + SISTER LOUISE. + ROSINE. + ROY’S WIFE. + BLACK BUT COMELY. + + + + +CARLYLE’S (THOMAS) WORKS. + + +LIBRARY EDITION COMPLETE. + +Handsomely printed in 34 vols. Demy 8vo, cloth, £15. + + SARTOR RESARTUS. The Life and Opinions of Herr Teufelsdrockh. + With a Portrait, 7_s._ 6_d._ + + THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. A History. 3 vols., each 9_s._ + + LIFE OF FREDERICK SCHILLER AND EXAMINATION OF HIS WORKS. With + Supplement of 1872. Portrait and Plates, 9_s._ The Supplement + _separately_, 2_s._ + + CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS. With Portrait. 6 vols., each + 9_s._ + + ON HEROES, HERO WORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY. 7_s._ 6_d._ + + PAST AND PRESENT. 9_s._ + + OLIVER CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES. With Portraits. 5 vols., + each 9_s._ + + LATTER-DAY PAMPHLETS. 9_s._ + + LIFE OF JOHN STERLING. With Portrait, 9_s._ + + HISTORY OF FREDERICK THE SECOND. 10 vols., each 9_s._ + + TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GERMAN. 3 vols., each 9_s._ + + GENERAL INDEX TO THE LIBRARY EDITION. 8vo, cloth, 6_s._ + + EARLY KINGS OF NORWAY; also AN ESSAY ON THE PORTRAITS OF JOHN + KNOX. Crown 8vo, with Portrait Illustrations, 7_s._ 6_d._ + + +CHEAP AND UNIFORM EDITION. + +_In 23 vols., Crown 8vo, cloth, £7 5s._ + + THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A History. 2 vols., 12_s._ + + OLIVER CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES, with Elucidations, &c. 3 + vols., 18_s._ + + LIVES OF SCHILLER AND JOHN STERLING, 1 vol., 6_s._ + + CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS. 2 vols., £1 4_s._ + + SARTOR RESARTUS AND LECTURES ON HEROES, 1 vol., 6_s._ + + LATTER-DAY PAMPHLETS. 1 vol., 6_s._ + + CHARTISM AND PAST AND PRESENT. 1 vol., 6_s._ + + TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GERMAN OF MUSÆUS, TIECK, AND RICHTER. 1 + vol., 6_s._ + + WILHELM MEISTER, by Göthe. A Translation. 2 vols., 12_s._ + + HISTORY OF FRIEDRICH THE SECOND, called Frederick the Great. + Vols. I. and II., containing Part I.—“Friedrich till his + Accession.” 14_s._ Vols. III. and IV., containing Part II.—“The + First Two Silesian Wars.” 14_s._ Vols. V. VI., VII., completing + the Work, £1 1_s._ + + +PEOPLE’S EDITION. + +_In 37 vols., small Crown 8vo. Price 2s. each vol. bound in cloth; or +in sets of 37 vols. in 18, cloth gilt, for £3 14s._ + + SARTOR RESARTUS. + + FRENCH REVOLUTION. 3 vols. + + LIFE OF JOHN STERLING. + + OLIVER CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES. 5 vols. + + ON HEROES AND HERO WORSHIP. + + PAST AND PRESENT. + + CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS. 7 vols. + + LATTER-DAY PAMPHLETS. + + LIFE OF SCHILLER. + + FREDERICK THE GREAT. 10 vols. + + WILHELM MEISTER. 3 vols. + + TRANSLATIONS FROM MUSÆUS, TIECK, AND RICHTER. 2 vols. + + THE EARLY KINGS OF NORWAY; also an Essay on the Portraits of John + Knox, with Illustrations. Small crown 8vo. Bound up with the + Index and uniform with the “People’s Edition.” + + + + +DICKENS’S (CHARLES) WORKS. + + +ORIGINAL EDITIONS. + +_In Demy 8vo._ + + THE MYSTERY OF EDWIN DROOD. With Illustrations by S. L. Fildes, + and a Portrait engraved by Baker. Cloth, 7_s._ 6_d._ + + OUR MUTUAL FRIEND. With Forty Illustrations by Marcus Stone. + Cloth, £1 1_s._ + + THE PICKWICK PAPERS. With Forty-three Illustrations by Seymour + and Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._ + + NICHOLAS NICKLEBY. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 + 1_s._ + + SKETCHES BY “BOZ.” With Forty Illustrations by George Cruikshank. + Cloth, £1 1_s._ + + MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 + 1_s._ + + DOMBEY AND SON. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._ + + DAVID COPPERFIELD. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 + 1_s._ + + BLEAK HOUSE. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._ + + LITTLE DORRIT. With Forty Illustrations by Phiz. Cloth, £1 1_s._ + + THE OLD CURIOSITY SHOP. With Seventy-five Illustrations by George + Cattermole and H. K. Browne. A New Edition. Uniform with the + other volumes, £1 1_s._ + + BARNABY RUDGE: a Tale of the Riots of ’Eighty. With Seventy-eight + Illustrations by G. Cattermole and H. K. Browne. Uniform with the + other volumes, £1 1_s._ + + CHRISTMAS BOOKS: Containing—The Christmas Carol; The Cricket on + the Hearth; The Chimes; The Battle of Life; The Haunted House. + With all the original Illustrations. Cloth, 12_s._ + + OLIVER TWIST and TALE OF TWO CITIES. In one volume. Cloth, £1 + 1_s._ + + OLIVER TWIST. Separately. With Twenty-four Illustrations by + George Cruikshank. + + A TALE OF TWO CITIES. Separately. With Sixteen Illustrations by + Phiz. Cloth, 9_s._ + +⁂ _The remainder of Dickens’s Works were not originally printed in +Demy 8vo._ + + +LIBRARY EDITION. + +_In Post 8vo. With the Original Illustrations, 30 vols., cloth, £12._ + + _s. d._ + PICKWICK PAPERS 43 Illustrations, 2 vols. 16 0 + NICHOLAS NICKLEBY 39 ” 2 vols. 16 0 + MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT 40 ” 2 vols. 16 0 + OLD CURIOSITY SHOP and REPRINTED + PIECES 36 ” 2 vols. 16 0 + BARNABY RUDGE and HARD TIMES 36 ” 2 vols. 16 0 + BLEAK HOUSE 40 ” 2 vols. 16 0 + LITTLE DORRIT 40 ” 2 vols. 16 0 + DOMBEY AND SON 38 ” 2 vols. 16 0 + DAVID COPPERFIELD 38 ” 2 vols. 16 0 + OUR MUTUAL FRIEND 40 ” 2 vols. 16 0 + SKETCHES BY “BOZ” 39 ” 1 vol. 8 0 + OLIVER TWIST 24 ” 1 vol. 8 0 + CHRISTMAS BOOKS 17 ” 1 vol. 8 0 + A TALE OF TWO CITIES 16 ” 1 vol. 8 0 + GREAT EXPECTATIONS 8 ” 1 vol. 8 0 + PICTURES FROM ITALY and AMERICAN + NOTES 8 ” 1 vol. 8 0 + UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER 8 ” 1 vol. 8 0 + CHILD’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND 8 ” 1 vol. 8 0 + EDWIN DROOD and MISCELLANIES 12 ” 1 vol. 8 0 + CHRISTMAS STORIES from “Household + Words,” &c. 14 ” 1 vol. 8 0 + +THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. By JOHN FORSTER. A New Edition. With +Illustrations. Uniform with the Library Edition, post 8vo, of his +Works. 10_s._ 6_d._ + + +THE “CHARLES DICKENS” EDITION. + +_In Crown 8vo. In 21 vols., cloth, with Illustrations, £3 9s. 6d._ + + _s. d._ + PICKWICK PAPERS 8 Illustrations 3 6 + MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT 8 ” 3 6 + DOMBEY AND SON 8 ” 3 6 + NICHOLAS NICKLEBY 8 ” 3 6 + DAVID COPPERFIELD 8 ” 3 6 + BLEAK HOUSE 8 ” 3 6 + LITTLE DORRIT 8 ” 3 6 + OUR MUTUAL FRIEND 8 ” 3 6 + BARNABY RUDGE 8 ” 3 6 + OLD CURIOSITY SHOP 8 ” 3 6 + A CHILD’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND 4 ” 3 6 + EDWIN DROOD and OTHER STORIES 8 ” 3 6 + CHRISTMAS STORIES, from “Household Words” 8 ” 3 6 + TALE OF TWO CITIES 8 ” 3 0 + SKETCHES BY “BOZ” 8 ” 3 0 + AMERICAN NOTES and REPRINTED PIECES 8 ” 3 0 + CHRISTMAS BOOKS 8 ” 3 0 + OLIVER TWIST 8 ” 3 0 + GREAT EXPECTATIONS 8 ” 3 0 + HARD TIMES and PICTURES FROM ITALY 8 ” 3 0 + UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER 4 ” 3 0 + +THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS. Uniform with this Edition, with numerous +Illustrations. 2 vols. 7_s._ + + +THE ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY EDITION. + +_Complete in 30 Volumes. Demy 8vo, 10s. each; or set, £15._ + +This Edition is printed on a finer paper and in a larger type +than has been employed in any previous edition. The type has been +cast especially for it, and the page is of a size to admit of the +introduction of all the original illustrations. + +No such attractive issue has been made of the writings of Mr. +Dickens, which, various as have been the forms of publication adapted +to the demands of an ever widely-increasing popularity, have never +yet been worthily presented in a really handsome library form. + +The collection comprises all the minor writings it was Mr. Dickens’s +wish to preserve. + + SKETCHES BY “BOZ.” With 40 Illustrations by George Cruikshank. + + PICKWICK PAPERS. 2 vols. With 42 Illustrations by Phiz. + + OLIVER TWIST. With 24 Illustrations by Cruikshank. + + NICHOLAS NICKLEBY. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz. + + OLD CURIOSITY SHOP and REPRINTED PIECES. 2 vols. With + Illustrations by Cattermole, &c. + + BARNABY RUDGE and HARD TIMES. 2 vols. With Illustrations by + Cattermole, &c. + + MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz. + + AMERICAN NOTES and PICTURES FROM ITALY. 1 vol. With 8 + Illustrations. + + DOMBEY AND SON. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz. + + DAVID COPPERFIELD. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz. + + BLEAK HOUSE. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz. + + LITTLE DORRIT. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Phiz. + + A TALE OF TWO CITIES. With 16 Illustrations by Phiz. + + THE UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER. With 8 Illustrations by Marcus Stone. + + GREAT EXPECTATIONS. With 8 Illustrations by Marcus Stone. + + OUR MUTUAL FRIEND. 2 vols. With 40 Illustrations by Marcus Stone. + + CHRISTMAS BOOKS. With 17 Illustrations by Sir Edwin Landseer, + R.A., Maclise, R.A., &c. &c. + + HISTORY OF ENGLAND. With 8 Illustrations by Marcus Stone. + + CHRISTMAS STORIES. (From “Household Words” and “All the Year + Round.”) With 14 Illustrations. + + EDWIN DROOD AND OTHER STORIES. With 12 Illustrations by S. L. + Fildes. + + +HOUSEHOLD EDITION. + +This Edition consists of 22 Volumes, containing nearly 900 +Illustrations by F. Barnard, J. Mahony, F. A. Fraser, C. Green, &c. +Price £3 14_s._ 6_d._ in cloth; and £2 15_s._ in paper binding. + + OLIVER TWIST, with 28 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._; paper, + 1_s._ 9_d._ + + MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT, with 59 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, + 3_s._ + + DAVID COPPERFIELD, with 60 Illustrations and a Portrait, cloth, + 4_s._; paper, 3_s._ + + BLEAK HOUSE, with 61 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._ + + LITTLE DORRIT, with 58 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._ + + PICKWICK PAPERS, with 56 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._ + + BARNABY RUDGE, with 46 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._ + + A TALE OF TWO CITIES, with 25 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._; + paper, 1_s._ 9_d._ + + OUR MUTUAL FRIEND, with 58 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, + 3_s._ + + NICHOLAS NICKLEBY, with 59 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, + 3_s._ + + GREAT EXPECTATIONS, with 26 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._; + paper, 1_s._ 9_d._ + + OLD CURIOSITY SHOP, with 39 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, + 3_s._ + + SKETCHES BY “BOZ,” with 36 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._; + paper, 1_s._ 9_d._ + + HARD TIMES, with 20 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._; paper, 1_s._ + 6_d._ + + DOMBEY AND SON, with 61 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._ + + UNCOMMERCIAL TRAVELLER, with 26 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ + 6_d._; paper, 1_s._ 9_d._ + + CHRISTMAS BOOKS, with 28 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._; + sewed, 1_s._ 9_d._ + + THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, with 15 Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ + 6_d._; paper, 1_s._ 9_d._ + + AMERICAN NOTES and PICTURES FROM ITALY, with 18 New + Illustrations, cloth, 2_s._ 6_d._; paper, 1_s._ 9_d._ + + EDWIN DROOD; REPRINTED PIECES; and other STORIES, with 30 + Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, 3_s._ + + CHRISTMAS STORIES, with 23 Illustrations, cloth, 4_s._; paper, + 3_s._ + + THE LIFE OF DICKENS. By JOHN FORSTER. With 40 Illustrations. + Cloth, 4_s._ 6_d._; paper, 3_s._ 6_d._ + +Messrs. CHAPMAN & HALL trust that by this Edition they will be +enabled to place the works of the most popular British Author of the +present day in the hands of all English readers. + + +_THE CHEAPEST AND HANDIEST EDITION OF_ + +THE WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS. + +THE POCKET VOLUME EDITION. + +_30 vols., small fcap. 8vo, £2 5s._ + + +MR. DICKENS’S READINGS. + +_Fcap. 8vo. sewed._ + + CHRISTMAS CAROL IN PROSE. 1_s._ + CRICKET ON THE HEARTH. 1_s._ + CHIMES: A GOBLIN STORY. 1_s._ + STORY OF LITTLE DOMBEY. 1_s._ + POOR TRAVELLER, BOOTS AT THE HOLLY-TREE INN, + and MRS. GAMP. 1_s._ + + A CHRISTMAS CAROL, with the Original Coloured Plates; being a + reprint of the Original Edition. Small 8vo, red cloth, gilt + edges, 5_s._ + + + + +LEVER’S (CHARLES) WORKS. + +THE ORIGINAL EDITION WITH THE ILLUSTRATIONS. + +_In 17 vols. Demy 8vo. Cloth, 6s. each._ + + +CHEAP EDITION. + +_Fancy boards, 2s. 6d._ + + CHARLES O’MALLEY. + TOM BURKE. + THE KNIGHT OF GWYNNE. + MARTINS OF CROMARTIN. + THE DALTONS. + ROLAND CASHEL. + DAVENPORT DUNN. + DODD FAMILY. + +_Fancy boards, 2s._ + + THE O’DONOGHUE. + FORTUNES OF GLENCORE. + HARRY LORREQUER. + ONE OF THEM. + A DAY’S RIDE. + JACK HINTON. + BARRINGTON. + TONY BUTLER. + MAURICE TIERNAY. + SIR BROOKE FOSBROOKE. + BRAMLEIGHS OF BISHOP’S FOLLY. + LORD KILGOBBI. + LUTTRELL OF ARRAN. + RENT IN THE CLOUD and ST. PATRICK’S EVE. + CON CREGAN. + ARTHUR O’LEARY. + THAT BOY OF NORCOTTS. + CORNELIUS O’DOWD. + SIR JASPER CAREW. + NUTS AND NUT-CRACKERS. + +_Also in sets, 27 vols., cloth, for £4 4s._ + + + + +TROLLOPE’S (ANTHONY) WORKS. + + +CHEAP EDITION. + +_Boards, 2s. 6d.; cloth, 3s. 6d._ + + THE PRIME MINISTER. + PHINEAS FINN. + ORLEY FARM. + CAN YOU FORGIVE HER? + PHINEAS REDUX. + HE KNEW HE WAS RIGHT. + EUSTACE DIAMONDS. + +_Boards, 2s.; cloth, 3s._ + + VICAR OF BULLHAMPTON. + RALPH THE HEIR. + THE BERTRAMS. + KELLYS AND O’KELLYS. + McDERMOT OF BALLYCLORAN. + CASTLE RICHMOND. + BELTON ESTATE. + MISS MACKENSIE. + AN EYE FOR AN EYE. + LADY ANNA. + HARRY HOTSPUR. + RACHEL RAY. + TALES OF ALL COUNTRIES. + MARY GRESLEY. + LOTTA SCHMIDT. + LA VENDÉE. + DOCTOR THORNE. + IS HE POPENJOY? + + + + +SOUTH KENSINGTON MUSEUM SCIENCE AND ART HANDBOOKS. + +_Published for the Committee of Council on Education._ + + THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS IN SPAIN. By JUAN F. RIANO. Illustrated. + Large crown 8vo, 4_s._ + + GLASS. By ALEXANDER NESBITT. Illustrated. Large Crown 8vo, 2_s._ + 6_d._ + + GOLD AND SILVER SMITHS’ WORK. By JOHN HUNGERFORD POLLEN. With + numerous Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ + + TAPESTRY. By ALFRED CHAMPEAUX. With Woodcuts. 2_s._ 6_d._ + + BRONZES. By C. DRURY E. FORTNUM, F.S.A. With numerous Woodcuts. + Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ + + PLAIN WORDS ABOUT WATER. By A. H. CHURCH, M.A., Oxon. Large crown + 8vo, sewed, 6_d._ + + ANIMAL PRODUCTS: their Preparation, Commercial Uses and Value. By + T. L. SIMMONDS. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ + + FOOD: A Short Account of the Sources, Constituents, and Uses of + Food; intended chiefly as a Guide to the Food Collection in the + Bethnal Green Museum. By A. H. CHURCH, M.A., Oxon. Large crown + 8vo, 3_s._ + + SCIENCE CONFERENCES. Delivered at the South Kensington Museum. + Crown 8vo, 2 vols., 6_s._ each. + + VOL. I.—Physics and Mechanics. + + VOL. II.—Chemistry, Biology, Physical Geography, Geology, + Mineralogy, and Meteorology. + + ECONOMIC ENTOMOLOGY. By ANDREW MURRAY, F.L.S. APTERA. With + numerous Illustrations. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ + + HANDBOOK TO THE SPECIAL LOAN COLLECTION of Scientific Apparatus. + Large crown 8vo, 3_s._ + + THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS: Historical Sketches. With 242 Illustrations. + Demy 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ + + TEXTILE FABRICS. By the Very Rev. DANIEL ROCK, D.D. With numerous + Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ + + IVORIES: ANCIENT AND MEDIÆVAL. By WILLIAM MASKELL. With numerous + Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ + + ANCIENT & MODERN FURNITURE & WOODWORK. By JOHN HUNGERFORD POLLEN. + With numerous Woodcuts. Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ + + MAIOLICA. By C. DRURY E. FORTNUM, F.S.A. With numerous Woodcuts. + Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ + + MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS. By CARL ENGEL. With numerous Woodcuts. Large + crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ + + MANUAL OF DESIGN, compiled from the Writings and Addresses of + RICHARD REDGRAVE, R.A. By GILBERT R. REDGRAVE. With Woodcuts. + Large crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ + + PERSIAN ART. By MAJOR R. MURDOCK SMITH, R.E. Second Edition. With + Additional Illustrations. [_In the Press._ + + FREE EVENING LECTURES. Delivered in connection with the Special + Loan Collection of Scientific Apparatus, 1876. Large crown 8vo, + 8_s._ + + + + +CHAPMAN AND HALL’S + +LIST OF DIAGRAMS. + +_Issued under the Authority of the Science and Art Department, South +Kensington_, + +For the use of Schools and Art and Science Classes. + + +LARGE DIAGRAMS. + +ASTRONOMICAL: + + TWELVE SHEETS. By JOHN DREW, Ph. Dr., F.R.S.A. Prepared for the + Committee of Council on Education. Sheets, £2 8_s._; on rollers + and varnished, £4 4_s._ + +BOTANICAL: + + NINE SHEETS. Illustrating a Practical Method of Teaching Botany. + By Professor HENSLOW, F.L.S. £2; on rollers, and varnished, £3 + 3_s._ + + CLASS. DIVISION. SECTION. DIAGRAM. + { { Thalamifloral 1 + { { Calycifloral 2 & 3 + Dicotyledon { Angiospermous { Corollifloral 4 + { { Incomplete 5 + { Gymnospermous 6 + + { Petaloid { Superior 7 + Monocotyledons { { Inferior 8 + { Glumaceous 9 + +BUILDING CONSTRUCTION: + + TEN SHEETS. By WILLIAM J. GLENNY, Professor of Drawing, King’s + College. In sets, £1 1_s._ + +GEOLOGICAL: + + DIAGRAM OF BRITISH STRATA. By H. W. BRISTOW, F.R.S., F.G.S. A + Sheet, 4_s._; on roller and varnished, 7_s._ 6_d._ + +MECHANICAL: + + DIAGRAMS OF THE MECHANICAL POWERS, AND THEIR APPLICATIONS IN + MACHINERY AND THE ARTS GENERALLY. By DR. JOHN ANDERSON. + + 8 Diagrams, highly coloured on stout paper, 3 feet 6 inches by 2 + feet 6 inches. Sheets £1 per set; mounted on rollers, £2. + + DIAGRAMS OF THE STEAM-ENGINE. By Professor GOODEVE and Professor + SHELLEY. Stout paper, 40 inches by 27 inches, highly coloured. + + Sets of 41 Diagrams (52½ Sheets), £6 6_s._; varnished and mounted + on rollers, £11 11_s._ + + MACHINE DETAILS. By Professor UNWIN. 16 Coloured Diagrams. + Sheets, £2 2_s._; mounted on rollers and varnished, £3 14_s._ + +ZOOLOGICAL: + + TEN SHEETS. Illustrating the Classification of Animals. By ROBERT + PATTERSON, £2; on canvas and rollers, varnished, £3 10_s._ + + The same, reduced in size on Royal paper, in 9 sheets uncoloured, + 12_s._ + + + + +THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW. + +Edited by JOHN MORLEY. + +THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW is published on the 1st of every month (the +issue on the 15th being suspended), and a Volume is completed every +Six Months. + + +_The following are among the Contributors_:— + + SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK. + PROFESSOR BAIN. + PROFESSOR BEESLY. + DR. BRIDGES. + HON. GEORGE C. BRODRICK. + SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL, M.P. + J. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P. + PROFESSOR SYDNEY COLVIN. + MONTAGUE COOKSON, Q.C. + L. H. COURTNEY, M.P. + G. H. DARWIN. + F. W. FARRAR. + PROFESSOR FAWCETT, M.P. + EDWARD A. FREEMAN. + MRS. GARRET-ANDERSON. + M. E. GRANT DUFF, M.P. + THOMAS HARE. + F. HARRISON. + LORD HOUGHTON. + PROFESSOR HUXLEY. + PROFESSOR JEVONS. + ÉMILE DE LAVELEYE. + T. E. CLIFFE LESLIE. + RIGHT HON. R. LOWE, M.P. + SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, M.P. + LORD LYTTON. + SIR H. S. MAINE. + DR. MAUDSLEY. + PROFESSOR MAX MÜLLER. + PROFESSOR HENRY MORLEY. + G. OSBORNE MORGAN, Q.C., M.P. + WILLIAM MORRIS. + F. W. NEWMAN. + W. G. PALGRAVE. + WALTER H. PATER. + RT. HON. LYON PLAYFAIR, M.P. + DANTE GABRIEL ROSSETTI. + HERBERT SPENCER. + HON. E. L. STANLEY. + SIR J. FITZJAMES STEPHEN, Q.C. + LESLIE STEPHEN. + J. HUTCHISON STIRLING. + A. C. SWINBURNE. + DR. VON SYBEL. + J. A. SYMONDS. + W. T. THORNTON. + HON. LIONEL A. TOLLEMACHE. + ANTHONY TROLLOPE. + PROFESSOR TYNDALL. + THE EDITOR. + +&c. &c. &c. + + + THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW _is published at 2s. 6d._ + + + CHAPMAN & HALL LIMITED, 193, PICCADILLY. + + BRADBURY, AGNEW, & CO.,] [PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS. + + + + + TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE + + Footnote [68] is referenced twice from page 135. + + Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been + corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within + the text and consultation of external sources. + + Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, + when a predominant preference was found in the original book. + + Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings of names + and words in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have + been left unchanged. + + Pg viii: page number ‘23’ replaced by ‘273’. + Pg 56: ‘retractation of the’ replaced by ‘retraction of the’. + Pg 124: ‘African Rupublic’ replaced by ‘African Republic’. + Pg 295: ‘the beleagured camp’ replaced by ‘the beleaguered camp’. + Pg 348: ‘Schumbrucker’ replaced by ‘Schermbrucker’. + Pg 398: ‘where-ever the enemy’ replaced by ‘wherever the enemy’. + Pg 439: ‘casualities were’ replaced by ‘casualties were’. + Pg 457: ‘will send yon’ replaced by ‘will send you’. + + Catalog + Pg c6: ‘trace ou the’ replaced by ‘trace out the’. + Pg c9: ‘knowledge, terary’ replaced by ‘knowledge, literary’. + Pg c23: ‘Sheets, £2 2.’ replaced by ‘Sheets, £2 2_s._. + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75320 *** |