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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Schopenhauer
+
+Author: Thomas Whittaker
+
+Release Date: December 12, 2011 [EBook #38283]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCHOPENHAUER ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Albert László and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive)
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+
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+
+
+
+PHILOSOPHIES ANCIENT AND MODERN
+
+SCHOPENHAUER
+
+
+
+
+NOTE
+
+
+As a consequence of the success of the series of _Religions Ancient and
+Modern_, Messrs. CONSTABLE have decided to issue a set of similar
+primers, with brief introductions, lists of dates, and selected
+authorities, presenting to the wider public the salient features of the
+_Philosophies_ of Greece and Rome and of the Middle Ages, as well as of
+modern Europe. They will appear in the same handy Shilling volumes, with
+neat cloth bindings and paper envelopes, which have proved so attractive
+in the case of the _Religions_. The writing in each case will be
+confided to an eminent authority, and one who has already proved himself
+capable of scholarly yet popular exposition within a small compass.
+
+Among the first volumes to appear will be:--
+
+  =Early Greek Philosophy.= By A. W. BENN, author of _The Philosophy
+    of Greece, Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century_.
+
+  =Stoicism.= By Professor ST. GEORGE STOCK, author of _Deductive
+    Logic_, editor of the _Apology of Plato_, etc.
+
+  =Plato.= By Professor A. E. TAYLOR, St. Andrews University, author
+    of _The Problem of Conduct_.
+
+  =Scholasticism.= By Father RICKABY, S.J.
+
+  =Hobbes.= By Professor A. E. TAYLOR.
+
+  =Locke.= By Professor ALEXANDER, of Owens College.
+
+  =Comte and Mill.= By T. WHITTAKER, author of _The Neoplatonists,
+    Apollonius of Tyana and other Essays_.
+
+  =Herbert Spencer.= By W. H. HUDSON, author of _An Introduction to
+    Spencer's Philosophy_.
+
+  =Schopenhauer.= By T. WHITTAKER.
+
+  =Berkeley.= By Professor CAMPBELL FRASER, D.C.L., LL.D.
+
+  =Bergsen.= By Father TYRRELL.
+
+
+
+
+SCHOPENHAUER
+
+
+By
+
+THOMAS WHITTAKER
+
+AUTHOR OF 'COMTE AND MILL,' ETC.
+
+
+LONDON
+
+ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO LTD
+
+1909
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+  CHAP.                             PAGE
+
+  I.   LIFE AND WRITINGS,              1
+  II.  THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE,           15
+  III. METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL,       29
+  IV.  ÆSTHETICS,                     49
+  V.   ETHICS,                        65
+  VI.  HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE,       86
+       SELECTED WORKS,                93
+
+
+
+
+SCHOPENHAUER
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+LIFE AND WRITINGS
+
+
+Arthur Schopenhauer may be distinctively described as the greatest
+philosophic writer of his century. So evident is this that he has
+sometimes been regarded as having more importance in literature than in
+philosophy; but this is an error. As a metaphysician he is second to no
+one since Kant. Others of his age have surpassed him in system and in
+comprehensiveness; but no one has had a firmer grasp of the essential
+and fundamental problems of philosophy. On the theory of knowledge, the
+nature of reality, and the meaning of the beautiful and the good, he has
+solutions to offer that are all results of a characteristic and original
+way of thinking.
+
+In one respect, as critics have noted, his spirit is different from that
+of European philosophy in general. What preoccupies him in a special way
+is the question of evil in the world. Like the philosophies of the
+East, emerging as they do without break from religion, Schopenhauer's
+philosophy is in its outcome a doctrine of redemption from sin. The name
+of pessimism commonly applied to it is in some respects misleading,
+though it was his own term; but it is correct if understood as he
+explained it. As he was accustomed to insist, his final ethical doctrine
+coincides with that of all the religions that aim, for their adepts or
+their elect, at deliverance from 'this evil world.' But, as the
+'world-fleeing' religions have their mitigations and accommodations, so
+also has the philosophy of Schopenhauer. At various points indeed it
+seems as if a mere change of accent would turn it into optimism.
+
+This preoccupation does not mean indifference to the theoretical
+problems of philosophy. No one has insisted more strongly that the end
+of philosophy is pure truth, and that only the few who care about pure
+truth have any concern with it. But for Schopenhauer the desire for
+speculative truth does not by itself suffice to explain the impulse of
+philosophical inquiries. On one side of his complex character, he had
+more resemblance to the men who turn from the world to religion, like
+St. Augustine, than to the normal type of European thinker, represented
+pre-eminently by Aristotle. He was a temperamental pessimist, feeling
+from the first the trouble of existence; and here he finds the deepest
+motive for the desire to become clear about it. He saw in the world,
+what he felt in himself, a vain effort after ever new objects of desire
+which give no permanent satisfaction; and this view, becoming
+predominant, determined, not indeed all the ideas of his philosophy, but
+its general complexion as a 'philosophy of redemption.'
+
+With his pessimism, personal misfortunes had nothing to do. He was, and
+always recognised that he was, among the most fortunately placed of
+mankind. He does not hesitate to speak sometimes of his own happiness in
+complete freedom from the need to apply himself to any compulsory
+occupation. This freedom, as he has put gratefully on record, he owed to
+his father, Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer, who was a rich merchant of
+Danzig, where the philosopher was born on the 22nd of February 1788.
+Both his parents were of Dutch ancestry. His mother, Johanna
+Schopenhauer, won celebrity as a novelist; and his sister, Adele, also
+displayed some literary talent. Generalising from his own case,
+Schopenhauer holds that men of intelligence derive their character from
+their father and their intellect from their mother. With his mother,
+however, he was not on sympathetic terms, as may be read in the
+biographies. His father intended him for a mercantile career, and with
+this view began to prepare him from the first to be a cosmopolitan man
+of the world. The name of Arthur was given to him because it is spelt
+alike in the leading European languages. He was taken early to France,
+where he resided from 1797 to 1799, learning French so well that on his
+return he had almost forgotten his German. Portions of the years 1803 to
+1804 were spent in England, France, Switzerland, and Austria. In England
+he was three months at a Wimbledon boarding-school kept by a clergyman.
+This experience he found extremely irksome. He afterwards became highly
+proficient in English: was always pleased to be taken for an Englishman,
+and regarded both the English character and intelligence as on the whole
+the first in Europe; but all the more deplorable did he find the
+oppressive pietism which was the special form taken in the England of
+that period by the reaction against the French Revolution. He is never
+tired of denouncing that phase of 'cold superstition,' the dominance of
+which lasted during his lifetime; for the publication of Mill's
+_Liberty_ and of Darwin's _Origin of Species_, which may be considered
+as marking the close of it, came only the year before his death.
+
+The only real break in the conformity of Schopenhauer's circumstances to
+his future career came in 1805, when he was placed in a merchant's
+office at Hamburg, whither his father had migrated in disgust at the
+annexation of his native Danzig, then under a republican constitution of
+its own, by Prussia in 1793. Soon afterwards his father died; but out of
+loyalty he tried for some time longer to reconcile himself to commercial
+life. Finding this at length impossible, he gained permission from his
+mother, in 1807, to leave the office for the gymnasium. At this time he
+seems to have begun his classical studies, his education having hitherto
+been exclusively modern. They were carried on first at Gotha and then at
+Weimar. In 1809 he entered the university of Göttingen as a student of
+medicine. This, however, was with a view only to scientific studies, not
+to practice; and he transferred himself to the philosophical faculty in
+1810. Generally he was little regardful of academical authority. His
+father's deliberately adopted plan of letting him mix early with the
+world had given him a certain independence of judgment. At Göttingen,
+however, he received an important influence from his teacher, G. E.
+Schulze (known by the revived scepticism of his _Ænesidemus_), who
+advised him to study Plato and Kant before Aristotle and Spinoza. From
+1811 to 1813 he was at Berlin, where he heard Fichte, but was not
+impressed. In 1813 the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was conferred on
+him at Jena for the dissertation _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle
+of Sufficient Reason_ (_Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom
+zureichenden Grunde_, 2nd ed., 1847). This was the first result of his
+Kantian studies. In the same year he began to be acquainted with Goethe
+at Weimar, where his mother and sister had gone to reside in 1806. A
+consequence of this acquaintance was that he took up and further
+developed Goethe's theory of colours. His dissertation _Ueber das Sehen
+und die Farben_ was published in 1816. A second edition did not appear
+till 1854; but in the meantime he had published a restatement of his
+doctrine in Latin, entitled _Theoria Colorum Physiologica_ (1830). This,
+however, was an outlying part of his work. He had already been seized by
+the impulse to set forth the system of philosophy that took shape in
+him, as he says, by some formative process of which he could give no
+conscious account. His great work, _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_,
+was ready for publication before the end of 1818, and was published with
+the date 1819. Thus he is one of the most precocious philosophers on
+record. For in that single volume, written before he was thirty, the
+outlines of his whole system are fixed. There is some development later,
+and there are endless new applications and essays towards confirmation
+from all sources. His mind never rested, and his literary power gained
+by exercise. Still, it has been said with truth, that there never was a
+greater illusion than when he thought that he seldom repeated himself.
+In reality he did little but repeat his fundamental positions with
+infinite variations in expression.
+
+After completing his chief work, Schopenhauer wrote some verses in which
+he predicted that posterity would erect a monument to him. This
+prediction was fulfilled in 1895; but, for the time, the work which he
+never doubted would be his enduring title to fame seemed, like Hume's
+_Treatise_, to have fallen 'deadborn from the press.' This he attributed
+to the hostility of the academical philosophers; and, in his later
+works, attacks on the university professors form a characteristic
+feature. The official teachers of the Hegelian school, he declared, were
+bent only on obtaining positions for themselves by an appearance of
+supporting Christian dogma; and they resented openness on the part of
+any one else. Yet on one side he maintained that his own pessimism was
+more truly Christian than their optimism. The essential spirit of
+Christianity is that of Brahmanism and Buddhism, the great religions
+that sprang from India, the first home of our race. He is even inclined
+to see in it traces of Indian influence. What vitiates it in his eyes is
+the Jewish element, which finds its expression in the flat modern
+'Protestant-rationalistic optimism.' As optimistic religions, he groups
+together Judaism, Islam, and Græco-Roman Polytheism. His antipathy,
+however, only extends to the two former. He was himself in great part a
+child of Humanism and of the eighteenth century, rejoicing over the
+approaching downfall of all the faiths, and holding that a weak religion
+(entirely different from those he admires) is favourable to
+civilisation. Nothing can exceed his scorn for nearly everything that
+characterised the Middle Ages. With Catholicism as a political system he
+has no sympathy whatever; while on the religious side the Protestant
+are as sympathetic to him as the Catholic mystics. What is common to all
+priesthoods, he holds, is to exploit the metaphysical need of mankind
+(in which he also believes) for the sake of their own power.
+Clericalism, 'Pfaffenthum,' whether Catholic or Protestant, is the
+object of his unvarying hatred and contempt. If he had cared to
+appreciate Hegel, he would have found on this point much community of
+spirit; but of course there was a real antithesis between the two as
+philosophers. No 'conspiracy' need be invoked to explain the failure of
+Schopenhauer to win early recognition. Belief in the State and in
+progress was quite alien to him; and Germany was then full of political
+hopes, which found nourishment in optimistic pantheism. What at length
+gave his philosophy vogue was the collapse of this enthusiasm on the
+failure of the revolutionary movement in 1848. Once known, it contained
+enough of permanent value to secure it from again passing out of sight
+with the next change of fashion.
+
+The rest of Schopenhauer's life in its external relations may be briefly
+summed up. For a few years, it was diversified by travels in Italy and
+elsewhere, and by an unsuccessful attempt at academical teaching in
+Berlin. In 1831 he moved to Frankfort, where he finally settled in
+1833. He lived unmarried there till his death on the 21st of September
+1860. The monument, already spoken of, was unveiled at Frankfort on the
+6th of June 1895.
+
+The almost unbroken silence with which his great work was received,
+though it had a distempering effect on the man, did not discourage the
+thinker. The whole series of Schopenhauer's works, indeed, was completed
+before he attained anything that could be called fame. Constantly on the
+alert as he was to seize upon confirmations of his system, he published
+in 1836 his short work _On the Will in Nature_, pointing out
+verifications of his metaphysics by recent science. In 1839 his prize
+essay, _On the Freedom of the Human Will_ (finished in 1837), was
+crowned by the Royal Scientific Society of Drontheim in Norway. This and
+another essay, _On the Basis of Morality_, _not_ crowned by the Royal
+Danish Society of Copenhagen in 1840, he published in 1841, with the
+inclusive title, _Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik_. In 1844 appeared
+the second edition of his principal work, to which there was added, in
+the form of a second volume, a series of elucidations and extensions
+larger in bulk than the first. This new volume contains much of his
+best and most effective writing. His last work, _Parerga und
+Paralipomena_, which appeared in 1851 (2 vols.), is from the literary
+point of view the most brilliant. It was only from this time that he
+began to be well known among the general public; though the philosophic
+'apostolate' of Julius Frauenstädt, who afterwards edited his works, had
+begun in 1840. His activity was henceforth confined to modifying and
+extending his works for new editions; an employment in which he was
+always assiduous. In consequence of this, all of them, as they stand,
+contain references from one to another; but the development of his
+thinking, so far as there was such a process after 1818, can be easily
+traced without reference to the earlier editions. There is some growth;
+but, as has been said, it does not affect many of the chief points. A
+brief exposition of his philosophy can on the whole take it as something
+fixed. The heads under which it must fall are those assigned to the
+original four books of _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_.
+
+Although Schopenhauer discountenanced the attempt to connect a
+philosophers biography with his work, something has to be said about his
+character, since this has been dwelt on to his disadvantage by
+opponents. There is abundant material for a personal estimate in the
+correspondence and reminiscences published after his death by his
+disciples Julius Frauenstädt and Wilhelm Gwinner. The apparent
+contradiction is at once obvious between the ascetic consummation of his
+ethics and his unascetic life, carefully occupied in its latter part
+with rules for the preservation of his naturally robust health. He was
+quite aware of this, but holds it absurd to require that a moralist
+should commend only the virtues which he possesses. It is as if the
+requirement were set up that a sculptor is to be himself a model of
+beauty. A saint need not be a philosopher, nor a philosopher a saint.
+The science of morals is as theoretical as any other branch of
+philosophy. Fundamentally character is unmodifiable, though knowledge,
+it is allowed, may change the mode of action within the limits of the
+particular character. The passage to the state of asceticism cannot be
+effected by moral philosophy, but depends on a kind of 'grace.' After
+all, it might be replied, philosophers, whether they succeed or not, do
+usually make at least an attempt to live in accordance with the moral
+ideal they set up. The best apology in Schopenhauer's case is that the
+fault may have been as much in his ideal as in his failure to conform
+to it. The eloquent pages he has devoted to the subject of holiness only
+make manifest the inconsequence (which he admits) in the passage to it.
+For, as we shall see, this has nothing in common with the essentially
+rational asceticism of the schools of later antiquity; which was a rule
+of self-limitation in view of the philosophic life. He did in a way of
+his own practise something of this; and, on occasion, he sets forth the
+theory of it; but he quite clearly sees the difference. His own ideal,
+which he never attempted to practise, is that of the self-torturing
+ascetics of the Christian Middle Age. Within the range of properly human
+virtue, he can in many respects hold his own, not only as a philosopher
+but as a man. If his egoism and vanity are undeniable, he undoubtedly
+possessed the virtues of rectitude and compassion. What he would have
+especially laid stress on was the conscientious devotion to his work.
+With complete singleness of purpose he used for a disinterested end the
+leisure which he regarded as the most fortunate of endowments. As he
+said near the close of his life, his intellectual conscience was clear.
+
+Of Schopenhauer's expositions of his pessimism it would be true to say,
+as Spinoza says of the Book of Job, that the matter, like the style, is
+not that of a man sitting among the ashes, but of one meditating in a
+library. This of course does not prove that they are not a genuine, if
+one-sided, rendering of human experience. All that can be said is that
+they did not turn him away from appreciation of the apparent goods of
+life. His own practical principle was furnished by what he regarded as a
+lower point of view; and this gives its direction to the semi-popular
+philosophy of the _Parerga_. From what he takes to be the higher point
+of view, the belief that happiness is attainable by man on earth is an
+illusion; but he holds that, by keeping steadily in view a kind of
+tempered happiness as the end, many mistakes may be avoided in the
+conduct of life, provided that each recognises at once the strength and
+weakness of his own character, and does not attempt things that, with
+the given limitations, are impossible. Of the highest truth, as he
+conceived it, he could therefore make no use. Only by means of a truth
+that he was bound to hold half-illusory could a working scheme be
+constructed for himself and others. This result may give us guidance in
+seeking to learn what we can from a thinker who is in reality no
+representative of a decadence, but is fundamentally sane and rational,
+even in spite of himself.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
+
+
+The title of Schopenhauer's chief work is rendered in the English
+translation, _The World as Will and Idea_. Here the term 'idea' is used
+in the sense it had for Locke and Berkeley; namely, any object of mental
+activity. Thus it includes not merely imagery, but also perception.
+Since Hume distinguished ideas' from 'impressions,' it has tended to be
+specialised in the former sense. The German word, _Vorstellung_, which
+it is used to render, conveys the generalised meaning of the Lockian
+'idea,' now frequently expressed in English and French philosophical
+works by the more technical term 'presentation' or 'representation.' By
+Schopenhauer himself the word 'Idea' was used exclusively in the sense
+of the Platonic Idea, which, as we shall see, plays an important part in
+his philosophy. The distinction is preserved in the translation by the
+use of a capital when Idea has the latter meaning; but in a brief
+exposition it seems convenient to adopt a more technical rendering of
+_Vorstellung_; and, from its common employment in psychological
+text-books, I have selected 'presentation' as the most suitable.
+
+The first proposition of Schopenhauer's philosophical system is, 'The
+world is my presentation.' By this he means that it presents itself as
+appearance to the knowing subject. This appearance is in the forms of
+time, space and causality. Under these forms every phenomenon
+necessarily appears, because they are _a priori_ forms of the subject.
+The world as it presents itself consists entirely of phenomena, that is,
+appearances, related according to these forms. The most fundamental form
+of all is the relation between object and subject, which is implied in
+all of them. Without a subject there can be no presented object.
+
+Schopenhauer is therefore an idealist in the sense in which we call
+Berkeley's theory of the external world idealism; though the expressions
+used are to some extent different. The difference proceeds from his
+following of Kant. His Kantianism consists in the recognition of _a
+priori_ forms by which the subject constructs for itself an 'objective'
+world of appearances. With Berkeley he agrees as against Kant in not
+admitting any residue whatever, in the object as such, that is not
+wholly appearance. But while he allows that Berkeley, as regards the
+general formulation of idealism, was more consistent than Kant, he finds
+him, in working out the principle, altogether inadequate. For the modern
+mind there is henceforth no way in philosophy except through Kant, from
+whom dates the revolution by which scholastic dualism was finally
+overthrown. Kant's systematic construction, however, he in effect
+reduces to very little. His is a much simplified 'Apriorism.' While
+accepting the 'forms of sensible intuition,' that is, time and space,
+just as Kant sets them forth, he clears away nearly all the superimposed
+mechanism. Kant's 'Transcendental Æsthetic,' he says, was a real
+discovery in metaphysics; but on the basis of this he for the most part
+only gave free play to his architectonic impulse. Of the twelve
+'categories of the understanding,' which he professed to derive from the
+logical forms of judgment, all except causality are mere 'blind
+windows.' This alone, therefore, Schopenhauer adopts; placing it,
+however, not at a higher level but side by side with time and space,
+Kant's forms of intuition. These three forms, according to Schopenhauer,
+make up the understanding of men and animals. 'All intuition is
+intellectual.' It is not first mere appearance related in space and
+time, and waiting for understanding to organise it; but, in animals as
+in man, it is put in order at once under the three forms that suffice to
+explain the knowledge all have of the phenomenal world.
+
+To Reason as distinguished from Understanding, Schopenhauer assigns no
+such exalted function as was attributed to it in portions of his system
+by Kant, and still more by some of his successors. The name of 'reason,'
+he maintains, ought on etymological grounds to be restricted to the
+faculty of abstract concepts. This, and not understanding, is what
+distinguishes man from animals. It discovers and invents nothing, but it
+puts in a generalised and available form what the understanding has
+discovered in intuition.
+
+For the historical estimation of Schopenhauer, it is necessary to place
+him in relation to Kant, as he himself always insisted. Much also in his
+chief work is made clearer by knowledge of his dissertation _On the
+Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason_, to which he is
+constantly referring. Later, his manner of exposition became more
+independent; so that he can be read by the general reader with profit
+simply by himself, and without reference to antecedents. Still, it will
+always be advisable for an expositor to follow his directions, at least
+to the extent of giving some short account of the dissertation. This I
+proceed to give approximately in the place to which he has assigned it
+in his system.
+
+The name of the principle (_principium rationis sufficientis_) he took
+over from Leibniz and his successor Wolff, but gave it a new amplitude.
+With him, it stands as an inclusive term for four modes of connection by
+which the thoroughgoing relativity of phenomena to one another is
+constituted for our intelligence. The general statement adopted is,
+'Nothing is without a reason why it should be rather than not be.'
+Its four forms are the principles of becoming (_fiendi_), of knowing
+(_cognoscendi_), of being (_essendi_), and of acting (_agendi_).
+(1) Under the first head come 'causes.' These are divided into 'cause
+proper,' for inorganic things; 'stimulus,' for the vegetative life both
+of plants and animals, and 'motive,' for animals and men. The law of
+causation is applicable only to changes; not to the forces of nature, to
+matter, or to the world as a whole, which are perdurable. Cause precedes
+effect in time. Not one thing, but one state of a thing, is the cause of
+another. From the law of causation there results an infinite series _a
+parte ante_ as well as _a parte post_. (2) The principle of sufficient
+reason of knowing is applicable to concepts, which are all derived from
+intuition, that is, from percepts. The laws of logic, which come under
+this head, can yield nothing original, but can only render explicit what
+was in the understanding. (3) Under the third head come arithmetical and
+geometrical relations. These are peculiar relations of presentations,
+distinct from all others, and only intelligible in virtue of a pure _a
+priori_ intuition. For geometry this is space; for arithmetic time, in
+which counting goes on. Scientifically, arithmetic is fundamental. (4)
+As the third form of causality was enumerated 'motive' for the will; but
+in that classification it was viewed from without, as belonging to the
+world of objects. Through the direct knowledge we have of our own will,
+we know also from within this determination by the presentation we call
+a motive. Hence emerges the fourth form of the principle of sufficient
+reason. This at a later stage makes possible the transition from physics
+to metaphysics.
+
+All these forms alike are forms of necessary determination. Necessity
+has no clear and true sense but certainty of the consequence when the
+ground is posited. All necessity therefore is conditional. In accordance
+with the four expressions of the principle of sufficient reason, it
+takes the fourfold shape of physical, logical, mathematical, and moral
+necessity.
+
+The sharp distinction between logical and mathematical truth, with the
+assignment of the former to conceptual and of the latter to intuitive
+relations, comes to Schopenhauer directly from Kant. So also does his
+view that the necessary form of causation is sequence; though here his
+points of contact with English thinkers, earlier and later, are very
+marked. Only in his statement of the 'law of motivation' as 'causality
+seen from within' does he hint at his own distinctive metaphysical
+doctrine. Meanwhile, it is evident that he is to be numbered with the
+group of modern thinkers who have arrived in one way or another at a
+complete scientific phenomenism. Expositors have noted that in his
+earlier statements of this he tends to lay more stress on the character
+of the visible and tangible world as mere appearance. The impermanence,
+the relativity, of all that exists in time and space, leads him to
+describe it, in a favourite term borrowed from Indian philosophy, as
+Maya, or illusion. Later, he dwells more on the relative reality of
+things as they appear. His position, however, does not essentially
+alter, but only finds varying expression as he turns more to the
+scientific or to the metaphysical side. From Hume's view on causation he
+differs not by opposing its pure phenomenism, but only by recognising,
+as Kant does, an _a priori_ element in the form of its law. German
+critics have seen in his own formulation an anticipation of Mill, and
+this is certainly striking as regards the general conception of the
+causal order, although there is no anticipation of Mill's inductive
+logic. On the same side there is a close agreement with Malebranche and
+the Occasionalists, pointed out by Schopenhauer himself. The causal
+explanations of science, he is at one with them in insisting, give no
+ultimate account of anything. All its causes are no more than
+'occasional causes,'--merely instances, as Mill expressed it afterwards,
+of 'invariable and unconditional sequence.' From Mill of course he
+differs in holding its form to be necessary and _a priori_, not
+ultimately derived from a summation of experiences; and, with the
+Occasionalists, he goes on to metaphysics in its sense of ontology, as
+Mill never did. The difference here is that he does not clothe his
+metaphysics in a theological dress.
+
+In the later development of his thought, Schopenhauer dealt more
+expressly with the question, how this kind of phenomenism is
+reconcilable with a scientific cosmogony. On one side the proposition,
+'No object without subject,' makes materialism for ever impossible; for
+the materialist tries to explain from relations among presentations what
+is the condition of all presentation. On the other side, we are all
+compelled to agree with the materialists that knowledge of the object
+comes late in a long series of material events. Inorganic things existed
+in time before life; vegetative life before animal life; and only with
+animal life does knowledge emerge. Reasoned knowledge of the whole
+series comes only at the end of it in the human mind. This apparent
+contradiction he solves by leaving a place for metaphysics. Our
+representation of the world as it existed before the appearance of life
+was indeed non-existent at the time to which we assign it; but the real
+being of the world had a manifestation not imaginable by us. For this,
+we substitute a picture of a world such as we should have been aware of
+had our 'subject,' with its _a priori_ forms of time, space, and
+causality, been then present. What the reality is, is the problem of the
+thing-in-itself (to use the Kantian term). This problem remains over;
+but we know that the metaphysical reality cannot be matter; for matter,
+with all its qualities, is phenomenal. It exists only 'for
+understanding, through understanding, in understanding.' These
+discriminations made, Schopenhauer offers us a scientific cosmogony
+beginning with the nebular hypothesis and ending with an outline of
+organic evolution. This last differs from the Darwinian theory in
+supposing a production of species by definite steps instead of by
+accumulation of small individual variations. At a certain time, a form
+that has all the characters of a new species appears among the progeny
+of an existing species. Man is the last and highest form to be evolved.
+From Schopenhauer's metaphysics, as we shall see, it follows that no
+higher form of life will ever appear.
+
+A word may be said here on a materialistic-sounding phrase which is
+very prominent in Schopenhauer's later expositions, and has been
+remarked on as paradoxical for an idealist. The world as presentation,
+he often says, is 'in the brain.' This, it must be allowed, is not fully
+defensible from his own point of view, except with the aid of a later
+distinction. The brain as we know it is of course only a part of the
+phenomenon of the subject,--a grouping of possible perceptions. How
+then, since it is itself only appearance, can it be the bearer of the
+whole universe as appearance? The answer is that Schopenhauer meant in
+reality 'the being of the brain,' and not the brain as phenomenon. He
+had a growing sense of the importance of physiology for the
+investigation of mind; and his predilection led him to adopt a not quite
+satisfactory shorthand expression for the correspondence we know
+scientifically to exist between our mental processes and changes capable
+of objective investigation in the matter of the brain.
+
+In science his distinctive bent was to the borderland between psychology
+and physiology. Hence came the attraction exercised on him by Goethe's
+theory of colours. To his own theory, though, unlike his philosophical
+system, it has always failed to gain the attention he predicted for it,
+the merit must be allowed of treating the problem as essentially one of
+psychophysics. What he does is to attempt to ascertain the conditions in
+the sensibility of the retina that account for our actual
+colour-sensations. This problem was untouched by the Newtonian theory;
+but Schopenhauer followed Goethe in the error of trying to overthrow
+this on its own ground. He had no aptitude for the special inquiries of
+mathematics and physics, though he had gained a clear insight into their
+general nature as sciences. On the psycho-physical side there is to-day
+no fully authorised theory. The problem indeed has become ever more
+complex. Schopenhauer's attempt, by combination of sensibilities to
+'light' and 'darkness,' to explain the phenomena of complementary
+colours, deserves at least a record in the long series of essays of
+which the best known are the 'Young-Helmholtz theory' and that of
+Hering. It marks an indubitable advance on Goethe in the clear
+distinction drawn between the mixture, in the ordinary sense, that can
+only result in dilution to different shades of grey, and the kinds of
+mixture from which, in their view, true colours arise.
+
+A characteristic position in Schopenhauer's theory of knowledge, and one
+that is constantly finding new expression in his writings, is the
+distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge already touched on.
+Intuitive knowledge of the kind that is common to men and animals, as we
+have seen, makes up, in his terminology, the 'understanding'; while
+'reason' is the distinctively human faculty of concepts. When he
+depreciates this, as he often does, in comparison with 'intuition,' it
+must be remembered that he does not limit this term to perception of
+particulars, but ascribes to what he calls the 'Platonic Idea' a certain
+kind of union between reason and 'phantasy,' which gives it an intuitive
+character of its own. Thus intuition can stand, though not in every case
+for what is higher, yet always for that which is wider and greater and
+more immediate. Whatever may be done with reflective reason and its
+abstractions, every effectual process of thought must end, alike for
+knowledge and art and virtue, in some intuitive presentation. The
+importance of reason for practice is due to its generality. Its function
+is subordinate. It does not furnish the ground of virtuous action any
+more than æsthetic precepts can enable any one to produce a work of art;
+but it can help to preserve constancy to certain maxims, as also in art
+a reasoned plan is necessary because the inspiration of genius is not
+every moment at command. Virtue and artistic genius alike, however,
+depend ultimately on intuition: and so also does every true discovery in
+science. The nature of pedantry is to try to be guided everywhere by
+concepts, and to trust nothing to perception in the particular case.
+Philosophy also Schopenhauer regards as depending ultimately on a
+certain intuitive view; but he allows that it has to translate this into
+abstractions. Its problem is to express the _what_ of the world in
+abstract form: science dealing only with the _why_ of phenomena related
+within the world. This character of philosophy as a system of abstract
+concepts deprives it of the immediate attractiveness of art; so that, as
+he says in one place, it is more fortunate to be a poet than a
+philosopher.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL
+
+
+We have seen that scientific explanation does not go beyond
+presentations ordered in space and time. This is just as true of the
+sciences of causation--the 'ætiological' sciences--as it is of
+mathematical science. All that we learn from Mechanics, Physics,
+Chemistry and Physiology, is 'how, in accordance with an infallible
+rule, one determinate state of matter necessarily follows another: how a
+determinate change necessarily conditions and brings on another
+determinate change.' This knowledge does not satisfy us. We wish to
+learn the significance of phenomena; but we find that from outside,
+while we view them as presentations, their inner meaning is for ever
+inaccessible.
+
+The starting-point for the metaphysical knowledge we seek is given us in
+our own body. The animal body is 'the immediate object of the subject':
+in it as presentation the 'effects' of 'causes' in the order of
+presentations external to it are first recognised. Now in virtue of his
+body the investigator is not pure knowing subject standing apart from
+that which he knows. In the case of the particular system of
+presentations constituting his organism, he knows what these
+presentations signify, and that is his _will_ in a certain modification.
+The subject appears as individual through its identity with the body,
+and this body is given to it in two different ways: on one side as
+object among objects, and subjected to their laws; on the other side as
+the will immediately known to each. The act of will and the movement of
+the body are not two different states related as cause and effect; for
+the relation of cause and effect belongs only to the object, the
+phenomenon, the presentation. They are one and the same act given in
+different manners: the will, immediately to the subject; the movement,
+in sensible intuition for understanding. The action of the body is the
+objectified act of will. Called at first the immediate object of
+presentation, the body may now, from the other side, be called 'the
+objectivity of the will.'
+
+Thus, as was said, the 'law of motivation' discloses the inner nature of
+causality. In causality in general we know only relations of phenomena;
+but in the case of our own body we know something else that those
+relations express; namely, the act of will determined by motives. Now
+there are in the world as presentation other systems like that which we
+call our body. Unless all these are to be supposed mere phantoms without
+inner reality, we must infer by analogy, in correspondence with like
+phenomena, other individual wills similar to that which we know in
+ourselves. This inference from analogy, universally admitted in the case
+of human and animal bodies, must be extended to the whole corporeal
+world. The failure to take this step is where the purely intellectual
+forms of idealism have come short. Kant's 'thing-in-itself,' which is
+not subject to the forms by which presentations become experience, but
+which experience and its forms indicate as the reality, has been wrongly
+condemned by his successors as alien to idealism. It is true that Kant
+did in some respects fail to maintain the idealistic position with the
+clearness of Berkeley; but his shortcoming was not in affirming a
+thing-in-itself beyond phenomena. Here, in Schopenhauer's view, is the
+metaphysical problem that he left a place for but did not solve. The
+word of the riddle has now been pronounced. Beyond presentation, that
+is, in itself and according to its innermost essence, the world is that
+which we find in ourselves immediately as will. By this it is not meant
+that a falling stone, for example, acts from a motive; knowledge and the
+consequent action from motives belongs only to the determinate form that
+the will has in animals and men; but the reality in the stone also is
+the same in essence as that to which we apply the name of will in
+ourselves. He who possesses this key to the knowledge of nature's
+innermost being will interpret the forces of vegetation, of
+crystallisation, of magnetism, of chemical affinity, even of weight
+itself, as different only in phenomenal manifestation but in essence the
+same; namely, that which is better known to each than all else, and
+where it emerges most clearly is called will. Only the will is
+thing-in-itself. It is wholly different from presentation, and is that
+of which presentation is the phenomenon, the visibility, the
+objectivity. Differences affect only the degree of the appearing, not
+the essence of that which appears.
+
+While the reality everywhere present is not will as specifically known
+in man, the mode of indicating its essence by reference to this,
+Schopenhauer contends, is a gain in insight. The thing-in-itself ought
+to receive its name from that among all its manifestations which is the
+clearest, the most perfect, the most immediately illumined by knowledge;
+and this is man's will. When we say that every force in nature is to be
+thought of as Will, we are subsuming an unknown under a known. For the
+conception of Force is abstracted from the realm of cause and effect,
+and indicates the limit of scientific explanation. Having arrived at the
+forces of nature on the one side and the forms of the subject on the
+other, science can go no further. The conception of Will can make known
+that which was so far concealed, because it proceeds from the most
+intimate consciousness that each has of himself, where the knower and
+the known coincide.
+
+By this consciousness, in which subject and object are not yet set
+apart, we reach something universal. In itself the Will is not
+individualised, but exists whole and undivided in every single thing in
+nature, as the Subject of contemplation exists whole and undivided in
+each cognitive being. It is entirely free from all forms of the
+phenomenon. What makes plurality possible is subjection to the forms of
+time and space, by which only the phenomenon is affected. Time and space
+may therefore be called, in scholastic terminology, the 'principle of
+individuation.' While each of its phenomena is subject to the law of
+sufficient reason, which is the law of appearance in these forms, there
+is for the Will as thing-in-itself no rational ground: it is 'grundlos.'
+It is free from all plurality, although its phenomena in space and time
+are innumerable. It is one, not with the unity of an object or of a
+concept, but as that which lies outside of space and time, beyond the
+_principium individuationis_, that is, the possibility of plurality. The
+individual, the person, is not will as thing-in-itself, but phenomenon
+of the will, and as such determined. The will is 'free' because there is
+nothing beyond itself to determine it. Further, it is in itself mere
+activity without end, a blind striving. Knowledge appears only as the
+accompaniment of its ascending stages.
+
+Here we have arrived at the thought which, in its various expressions,
+constitutes Schopenhauer's metaphysics. That this cannot be
+scientifically deduced he admits; but he regards it as furnishing such
+explanation as is possible of science itself. For science there is in
+everything an inexplicable element to which it runs back, and which is
+real, not merely phenomenal. From this reality we are most remote in
+pure mathematics and in the pure _a priori_ science of nature as it was
+formulated by Kant. These owe their transparent clearness precisely to
+their absence of real content, or to the slightness of this. The attempt
+to reduce organic life to chemistry, this again to mechanism, and at
+last everything to arithmetic, could it succeed, would leave mere form
+behind, from which all the content of phenomena would have vanished. And
+the form would in the end be form of the subject. But the enterprise is
+vain. 'For in everything in nature there is something of which no ground
+can ever be given, of which no explanation is possible, no cause further
+is to be sought.' What for man is his inexplicable character,
+presupposed in every explanation of his deeds from motives, that for
+every inorganic body is its inexplicable quality, the manner of its
+acting.
+
+The basis of this too is will, and 'groundless,' inexplicable will; but
+evidently the conception here is not identical with that of the Will
+that is one and all. How do we pass from the universal to that which has
+a particular character or quality? For of the Will as thing-in-itself we
+are told that there is not a greater portion in a man and a less in a
+stone. The relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space. The
+more and less touches only the phenomenon, that is, the visibility, the
+objectivation. A higher degree of this is in the plant than in the
+stone, in the animal than in the plant, and so forth; but the Will that
+is the essence of all is untouched by degree, as it is beyond plurality,
+space and time, and the relation of cause and effect.
+
+The answer to the question here raised is given in Schopenhauer's
+interpretation of the Platonic Ideas. These he regards as stages of
+objectivation of the Will. They are, as Plato called them, eternal forms
+related to particular things as models. The lowest stage of
+objectivation of the Will is represented by the forces of inorganic
+nature. Some of these, such as weight and impenetrability, appear in all
+matter. Some are divided among its different kinds, as rigidity,
+fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical properties. They
+are not subject to the relation of cause and effect, but are presupposed
+by it. A force is neither cause of an effect nor effect of a cause.
+Philosophically, it is immediate objectivity of the will; in ætiology,
+_qualitas occulta_. At the lowest stages of objectivation, there is no
+individuality. This does not appear in inorganic things, nor even in
+merely organic or vegetative life, but only as we ascend the scale of
+animals. Even in the higher animals the specific enormously predominates
+over the individual character. Only in man is the Idea objectified in
+the individual character as such. 'The character of each individual man,
+so far as it is thoroughly individual and not entirely comprehended in
+that of the species, may be regarded as a particular Idea, corresponding
+to a peculiar act of objectivation of the Will.'
+
+Schopenhauer warns us against substituting this philosophical
+explanation for scientific ætiology. The chain of causes and effects, he
+points out, is not broken by the differences of the original,
+irreducible forces. The ætiology and the philosophy of nature go side by
+side, regarding the same object from different points of view. Yet he
+also gives us in relation to his philosophy much that is not
+unsuggestive scientifically. His doctrine is not properly evolutionary,
+since the Ideas are eternal; but he has guarded incidentally against our
+supposing that all the natural kinds that manifest the Ideas
+phenomenally must be always represented in every world. For our
+particular world, comprising the sun and planets of the solar system, he
+sets forth in the _Parerga_ an account of the process by which it
+develops from the nebula to man. This was referred to in the preceding
+chapter. In his fundamental work he describes a struggle, present
+through the whole of nature, in which the phenomenal manifestations of
+the higher Ideas conquer and subjugate those of the lower, though they
+leave them still existent and ever striving to get loose. Here has been
+seen an adumbration of natural selection: he himself admits the
+difficulty he has in making it clear. We must remember that it is
+pre-Darwinian.
+
+Knowledge or intelligence he seeks to explain as an aid to the
+individual organism in its struggle to subsist and to propagate its
+kind. It first appears in animal life. It is represented by the brain or
+a large ganglion, as every endeavour of the Will in its
+self-objectivation is represented by some organ; that is, displays
+itself for presentation as such and such an appearance. Superinduced
+along with this contrivance for aid in the struggle, the world as
+presentation, with all its forms, subject and object, time, space,
+plurality and causality, is all at once there. 'Hitherto only will, it
+is now at the same time presentation, object of the knowing subject.'
+Then in man, as a higher power beyond merely intuitive intelligence,
+appears reason as the power of abstract conception. For the most part,
+rational as well as intuitive knowledge, evolved originally as a mere
+means to higher objectivation of the Will, remains wholly in its
+service. How, in exceptional cases, intellect emancipates itself, will
+be discussed under the heads of Æsthetics and Ethics.
+
+That this view implies a teleology Schopenhauer expressly recognises.
+Indeed he is a very decided teleologist on lines of his own, and, in
+physiology, takes sides strongly with 'vitalism' as against pure
+mechanicism. True, the Will is 'endless' blind striving, and is
+essentially divided against itself. Everywhere in nature there is
+strife, and this takes the most horrible forms. Yet somehow there is in
+each individual manifestation of will a principle by which first the
+organism with its vital processes, and then the portion of it called the
+brain, in which is represented the intellect with its _a priori_ forms,
+are evolved as aids in the strife. And, adapting all the manifestations
+to one another, there is a teleology of the universe. The whole world,
+with all its phenomena, is the objectivity of the one and indivisible
+Will; the Idea which is related to all other Ideas as the harmony to the
+single voices. The unity of the Will shows itself in the unison of all
+its phenomena as related to one another. Man, its clearest and
+completest objectivation, is the summit of a pyramid, and could not
+exist without this. Inorganic and organic nature, then, were adapted to
+the future appearance of man, as man is adapted to the development that
+preceded him. But in thinking the reality, time is to be abstracted
+from. The earlier, we are obliged to say, is fitted to the later, as the
+later is fitted to the earlier; but the relation of means to end, under
+which we cannot help figuring the adaptation, is only appearance for our
+manner of knowledge. And the harmony described does not get rid of the
+conflict inherent in all will.
+
+In this account of Schopenhauer's metaphysical doctrine, I have tried to
+make the exposition as smooth as possible; but at two points the
+discontinuity can scarcely be concealed. First, the relation of the
+universal Will to the individual will is not made clear; and, secondly,
+the emergence of the world of presentation, with the knowledge in which
+it culminates, is left unintelligible because the will is conceived as
+mere blind striving without an aim. As regards the first point,
+disciples and expositors have been able to show that, by means of
+distinctions in his later writings, apparent contradictions are to some
+extent cleared away; and, moreover, that he came to recognise more
+reality in the individual will. On the second point, I think it will be
+necessary to admit that his system as such breaks down. But both points
+must be considered in their connection.
+
+One of the most noteworthy features of Schopenhauer's philosophy is, as
+he himself thought, the acceptance from first to last of Kant's
+distinction between the 'empirical' and the 'intelligible' character of
+the individual. Every act of will of every human being follows with
+necessity as phenomenon from its phenomenal causes; so that all the
+events of each person's life are determined in accordance with
+scientific law. Nevertheless, the character empirically manifested in
+the phenomenal world, while it is completely necessitated, is the
+expression of something that is free from necessitation. This
+'intelligible character' is out of time, and, itself undetermined,
+manifests itself through that which develops in time as a chain of
+necessary causes and effects. That this doctrine had been taken up,
+without any ambiguity as regards the determinism, by Schelling as well
+as by himself, he expressly acknowledges; and he finds it, as he also
+finds modern idealism, anticipated in various passages by the
+Neo-Platonists. His adaptation of it to his doctrine of the Ideas is
+distinctly Neo-Platonic in so far as he recognises 'Ideas of
+individuals'; but of course to make Will the essence belongs to his own
+system. 'The intelligible character,' he says, 'coincides with the Idea,
+or, yet more precisely, with the original act of will that manifests
+itself in it: in so far, not only is the empirical character of each
+man, but also of each animal species, nay, of each plant species, and
+even of each original force of inorganic nature, to be regarded as
+phenomenon of an intelligible character, that is, of an indivisible act
+of will out of time.' This is what he called the '_aseitas_' of the
+will; borrowing a scholastic term to indicate its derivation (if we may
+speak of it as derived) from itself (_a se_), and not from a supposed
+creative act. Only if we adopt this view are we entitled to regard
+actions as worthy of moral approval or disapproval. They are such not
+because they are not necessitated, but because they necessarily show
+forth the nature of an essence the freedom of which consists in being
+what it is. Yet he could not but find a difficulty in reconciling this
+with his position that the one universal Will is identical in all
+things, and in each is 'individuated' only by space and time. For the
+Ideas, like the thing-in-itself, are eternal, that is, outside of time
+as well as space; and all the things now enumerated, forces of nature,
+plant and animal species, and individual characters of men, are declared
+to be in themselves Ideas.
+
+He in part meets this difficulty by the subtlety that time and space do
+not, strictly speaking, determine individuality, but arise along with
+it. The diremption of individualities becomes explicit in those forms.
+Yet he must have perceived that this is not a complete answer, and
+various modifications can be seen going on. His first view clearly was
+that the individual is wholly impermanent, and at death simply
+disappears; nothing is left but the one Will and the universal Subject
+of contemplation identical in all. Metempsychosis is the best
+mythological rendering of what happens, but it is no more. Later, he
+puts forward the not very clearly defined theory of a 'palingenesia' by
+which a particular will, but not the intellect that formerly accompanied
+it, may reappear in the phenomenal world. And the hospitality he showed
+to stories of magic, clairvoyance, and ghost-seeing, is scarcely
+compatible with the view that the individual will is no more than a
+phenomenal differentiation of the universal will. A speculation (not put
+forward as anything more) on the appearance of a special providence in
+the destiny of the individual, points, as Professor Volkelt has noted,
+to the idea of a guidance, not from without, but by a kind of good
+daemon or genius that is the ultimate reality of the person. On all this
+we must not lay too much stress; but there is certainly one passage that
+can only be described as a definite concession that the individual is
+real in a sense not at first allowed. Individuality, it is said in so
+many words (_Parerga_, ii. § 117), does not rest only on the 'principle
+of individuation' (time and space), and is therefore not through and
+through phenomenon, but is rooted in the thing-in-itself. 'How deep its
+roots go belongs to the questions which I do not undertake to
+answer.'[1]
+
+  [1] _Werke_, ed. Frauenstädt, vol. vi. p. 243.
+
+This tends to modify considerably, but does not overthrow,
+Schopenhauer's original system. In very general terms, he is in the
+number of the 'pantheistic' thinkers; and it is remarkable, on
+examination, how these, in Europe at least, have nearly always
+recognised in the end some permanent reality in the individual. This is
+contrary to first impressions: but the great names may be cited of
+Plotinus, John Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, Spinoza (in Part v. of
+the _Ethics_), and finally of Schopenhauer's special aversion, Hegel,
+who has been supposed most unfavourable of all to any recognition of
+individuality as real. It is more true, Hegel maintains, that the
+individuality determines its world than that it is determined by it; and
+there is no explanation why the determination should be such and such
+except that the individuality was already what it is.[2] And, if
+Schopenhauer's more imaginative speculations seek countenance from the
+side of empiricism, there is nothing in them quite so audacious as a
+speculation of J. S. Mill on disembodied mind, thrown out during the
+time when he was writing his _Logic_.[3]
+
+  [2] _Phänomenologie des Geistes_, Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. G. Lasson, pp.
+  201-3.
+
+  [3] Letter to Robert Barclay Fox, May 10, 1842. Printed in Appendix to
+  _Letters and Journals of Caroline Fox_, third ed., vol. ii. pp. 331-2.
+  'To suppose that the eye is _necessary_ to sight,' says Mill, 'seems to
+  me the notion of one immersed in matter. What we call our bodily
+  sensations are all in the mind, and would not necessarily or probably
+  cease, because the body perishes.'
+
+The association with pantheism Schopenhauer accepts in principle, though
+the name is not congenial to him. In his system the Will is one and all,
+like the 'Deus' of Spinoza. The difference is that, instead of ascribing
+perfection to the universe that is its manifestation, he regards the
+production of a world as a lapse from which redemption is to be sought.
+His doctrine has been rightly described, in common with the predominant
+philosophical doctrines of his period, as a resultant of the deepened
+subjective analysis brought by Kant into modern philosophy on the one
+side, and of the return to Spinoza in the quest for unity of principle
+on the other. Why, then, it may be asked, are Fichte, Schelling, and
+Hegel the constant objects of his attack? The true explanation is not
+the merely external one, that they were his successful rivals for public
+favour, but is to be found in a real antithesis of thought. Within the
+limits of the idealism they all hold in common, Schopenhauer is at the
+opposite pole. In spite of his attempt to incorporate the Platonic
+Ideas, and in spite of his following of Kant, whose 'intelligible world'
+was in essence Platonic or neo-Platonic, he could find no place in his
+system for a rational order at the summit. Now this order was precisely
+what Fichte and Hegel aimed at demonstrating. If Schopenhauer is less
+unsympathetic in his references to Schelling, that is because
+Schelling's world-soul appeared to him to prefigure his own attempt to
+discover in nature the manifestation of a blindly striving will or
+feeling rather than reason. Suspicious as he shows himself of possible
+plagiarisms by others, the charge cannot be retorted against himself.
+The supreme principle of Fichte, it has been pointed out, has an
+actively volitional character and was formulated before Schopenhauer's:
+but then it is essentially rational. For Hegel, what is supreme is the
+world-reason. Hence they are at one with Plato in holding that in some
+sense 'mind is king.' For Schopenhauer, on the contrary, mind, or pure
+intellect, is an emancipated slave. Having reached its highest point,
+and seen through the work of the will, it does not turn back and
+organise it, but abolishes it as far as its insight extends.
+
+Yet to say merely this is to give a wrong impression of Schopenhauer.
+Starting though he does with blind will, and ending with the flight of
+the ascetic from the suffering inherent in the world that is the
+manifestation of such a will, he nevertheless, in the intermediate
+stages, makes the world a cosmos and not a chaos. And the Platonists on
+their side have to admit that 'the world of all of us' does not present
+itself on the surface as a manifestation of pure reason, and that it
+is a serious task to 'rationalise' it. Where he completely fails
+is where the Platonic systems also fail, though from the opposite
+starting-point. His attempt to derive presentation, intellect,
+knowledge, from blind striving, is undoubtedly a failure. But so also
+is the attempt of the Platonising thinkers to deduce a world of mixture
+from a principle of pure reason without aid from anything else
+empirically assumed. Not that in either case there is failure to give
+explanations in detail; but in both cases much is taken from experience
+without reduction to the principles of the system. What we may say by
+way of comparison is this: that if Schopenhauer had in so many words
+recognised an immanent Reason as well as Will in the reality of the
+universe, he would have formally renounced his pessimism; while it
+cannot be said that on the other side a more explicit empiricism in the
+account of the self-manifestation of Reason would necessarily destroy
+the optimism.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+ÆSTHETICS
+
+
+A portion of Schopenhauer's system by which its pessimism is
+considerably mitigated is his theory of the Beautiful and of Fine Art.
+The characteristic of æsthetic contemplation is, he finds, that
+intellect throws off the yoke and subsists purely for itself as clear
+mirror of the world, free from all subjection to practical purposes of
+the will. In this state of freedom, temporary painlessness is attained.
+
+The theory starts from his adaptation of the Platonic Ideas. Regarded
+purely as an æsthetic theory, it departs from Plato, as he notes; for,
+with the later Platonists, who took up the defence of poetic myths and
+of the imitative arts as against their master, he holds that Art
+penetrates to the general Idea through the particular, and hence that
+the work of art is no mere 'copy of a copy.' The difference of the Idea
+from the Concept is that it is not merely abstract and general, but
+combines with generality the characters of an intuition.
+
+The Ideas, as we have seen, constitute the determinate stages of
+objectivation of the Will. The innumerable individuals of which the
+Ideas are the patterns are subject to the law of sufficient reason. They
+appear, that is to say, under the forms of time, space, and causality.
+The Idea is beyond these forms, and therefore is clear of plurality and
+change. Since the law of sufficient reason is the common form under
+which stands all the subject's knowledge so far as the subject knows as
+individual, the Ideas lie outside the sphere of knowledge of the
+individual as such. If, therefore, the Ideas are to be the object of
+knowledge, this can only be by annulling individuality in the knowing
+subject.
+
+As thing-in-itself, the Will is exempt even from the first of the forms
+of knowledge, the form of being 'object for a subject.' The Platonic
+Idea, on the other hand, is necessarily an object, something known, a
+presentation. It has laid aside, or rather has not taken on, the
+subordinate forms; but it has retained the first and most general form.
+It is the immediate and most adequate possible objectivity of the Will;
+whereas particular things are an objectivation troubled by the forms of
+which the law of sufficient reason is the common expression.
+
+When intellect breaks loose from the service of the will, for which it
+was originally destined in the teleology of nature, then the subject
+ceases to be merely individual and becomes pure will-less subject of
+knowledge. In this state the beholder no longer tracks out relations in
+accordance with the principle of sufficient reason--which is the mode of
+scientific as well as of common knowledge--but rests in fixed
+contemplation of the given object apart from its connection with
+anything else. The contemplator thus 'lost' in the object, it is not the
+single thing as such that is known, but the Idea, the eternal form, the
+immediate objectivity of the Will at this stage. The correlate of this
+object--the pure Subject exempt from the principle of sufficient
+reason--is eternal, like the Idea.
+
+The objectivation of the Will appears faintly in inorganic
+things,--clouds, water, crystals,--more fully in the plant, yet more
+fully in the animal, most completely in man. Only the essential in these
+stages of objectivation constitutes the Idea. Its development into
+manifold phenomena under the forms of the principle of sufficient
+reason, is unessential, lies merely in the mode of knowledge for the
+individual, and has reality only for this. It is not otherwise with the
+unfolding of that Idea which is the completest objectivation of the
+Will. To the Idea of Man, the occurrences of human history are as
+unessential as the shapes they assume to the clouds, as the figures of
+its whirlpools and foam-drift to the stream, as its frost-flowers to the
+ice. The same underlying passions and dispositions everlastingly recur
+in the same modes. It is idle to suppose that anything is gained. But
+also nothing is lost: so the Earth-spirit might reply to one who
+complained of high endeavours frustrated, faculties wasted, promises of
+world-enlightenment brought to nought; for there is infinite time to
+dispose of, and all possibilities are for ever renewed.
+
+The kind of knowledge for which the Ideas are the object of
+contemplation finds its expression in Art, the work of genius. Art
+repeats in its various media the Ideas grasped by pure contemplation.
+Its only end is the communication of these. While Science, following the
+stream of events according to their determinate relations, never reaches
+an ultimate end, Art is always at the end. 'It stops the wheel of time;
+relations vanish for it: only the essence, the Idea, is its object.' The
+characteristic of genius is a predominant capacity for thus
+contemplating things independently of the principle of sufficient
+reason. Since this requires a forgetting of one's own person and the
+relations between it and things, the attitude of genius is simply the
+completest 'objectivity.' The 'subjectivity' opposed to this, in
+Schopenhauer's phraseology, is preoccupation with the interests of one's
+own will. It is, he says, as if there fell to the share of genius a
+measure of intelligence far beyond the needs of the individual will: and
+this makes possible the setting aside of individual interests, the
+stripping off of the particular personality, so that the subject becomes
+'pure knowing subject,' 'clear world-eye,' in a manner sufficiently
+sustained for that which has been grasped to be repeated in the work of
+art. A necessary element in genius is therefore Imagination. For without
+imagination to represent, in a shape not merely abstract, things that
+have not come within personal experience, genius would remain limited to
+immediate intuition, and could not make its vision apprehensible by
+others. Nor without imagination could the particular things that express
+the Idea be cleared of the imperfections by which their limited
+expression of it falls short of what nature was aiming at in their
+production. 'Inspiration' is ascribed to genius because its
+characteristic attitude is intermittent. The man of genius cannot always
+remain on a height, but has to fall back to the level of the common man,
+who can scarcely at all regard things except as they affect his
+interests,--have a relation to his will, direct or indirect.
+
+This is the statement in its first outline of a theory that became one
+of Schopenhauer's most fruitful topics. Many are the pages he has
+devoted to the contrast between the man of genius and 'the wholesale
+ware of nature, which she turns out daily by thousands.' The genius is
+for him primarily the artist. Scientific genius as a distinctive thing
+he does not fully recognise; and he regards men of action, and
+especially statesmen, rather as men of highly competent ability
+endowed with an exceptionally good physical constitution than as men of
+genius in the proper sense. Philosophers like himself, who, as he
+frankly says, appear about once in a hundred years, he classes in the
+end with the artists; though this was left somewhat indeterminate in his
+first exposition. The weakness of the man of genius in dealing with the
+ordinary circumstances of life he allows, and even insists on. Genius,
+grasping the Idea in its perfection, fails to understand individuals. A
+poet may know man profoundly, and men very ill. He admits the proximity
+of genius to madness on one side, and explains it in this way. What
+marks the stage of actual madness, as distinguished from illusion or
+hallucination, is complete disruption of the memory of past life, of the
+history of the personality as something continuous; so that the
+particular thing is viewed by itself, out of relation. This gives a kind
+of resemblance to the attitude of genius, for which present intuition
+excludes from view the relations of things to each other. Or, as we may
+perhaps sum up his thought in its most general form, 'alienation' or
+dissolution of personality has the resemblance often noted between
+extremes to the impersonality, or, as he calls it, 'objectivity,' that
+is super-personal.
+
+In spite of his contempt for the crowd, he has to admit, of course, that
+the capacity of genius to recognise the Ideas of things and to become
+momentarily impersonal must in some measure belong to all men;
+otherwise, they could not even enjoy a work of art when produced. Genius
+has the advantage only in the much higher degree and the greater
+prolongation of the insight. Since, then, the actual achievement of the
+artist is to make us look into the world through his eyes, the feelings
+for the beautiful and the sublime may be treated irrespectively of the
+question whether they are aroused by nature and human life directly or
+by means of art.
+
+Æsthetic pleasure in contemplation of the beautiful proceeds partly from
+recognition of the individual object not as one particular thing but as
+Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of this whole kind of
+things; partly from the consciousness the knower has of himself not as
+individual, but as pure, will-less Subject of Knowledge. All volition
+springs out of need, therefore out of want, therefore out of suffering.
+No attained object of will can give permanent satisfaction. Thus, there
+can be no durable happiness or rest for us as long as we are subjects of
+will. 'The Subject of Will lies continually on the turning wheel of
+Ixion, draws ever in the sieve of the Danaides, is the eternally
+thirsting Tantalus. But in the moment of pure objective contemplation,
+free from all interest of the particular subjectivity, we enter a
+painless state: the wheel of Ixion stands still. The Flemish painters
+produce this æsthetic effect by the sense of disinterested contemplation
+conveyed in their treatment of insignificant objects. There are certain
+natural scenes that have power in themselves, apart from artistic
+treatment, to put us in this state; but the slightest obtrusion of
+individual interest destroys the magic. Past and distant objects,
+through their apparent detachment, have the same power. The essential
+thing æsthetically, whether we contemplate the present or the past, the
+near or the distant, is that only the world of presentation remains; the
+world as will has vanished.
+
+The difference between the feelings of the Beautiful and of the Sublime
+is this. In the feeling of the beautiful, pure intelligence gains the
+victory without a struggle, leaving in consciousness only the pure
+subject of knowledge, so that no reminiscence of the will remains. In
+the feeling of the sublime, on the other hand, the state of pure
+intelligence has to be won by a conscious breaking loose from relations
+in the object that suggest something threatening to the will; though
+there must not be actual danger; for in that case the individual will
+itself would come into play, and æsthetic detachment would cease.
+Elevation above the sense of terror has not only to be consciously won
+but consciously maintained, and involves a continuous reminiscence, not
+indeed of any individual will, but of the will of man in general, so far
+as it is expressed through its objectivity, the human body, confronted
+by forces hostile to it. Pre-eminently this feeling arises from
+contrast between the immensities of space and time and the apparent
+insignificance of man. It means in the last resort that the beholder is
+upheld by the consciousness that as pure subject of knowledge (not as
+individual subject) he himself bears within him all the worlds and all
+the ages, and is eternal as the forces that vainly seem to threaten him
+with annihilation.
+
+On the objective side, and apart from the subjective distinction just
+set forth, the sublime and the beautiful are not essentially different.
+In both cases alike, the object of æsthetic contemplation is not the
+single thing, but the Idea that is striving towards manifestation in it.
+Whatever is viewed æsthetically is viewed out of relation to time and
+space: 'along with the law of sufficient reason the single thing and the
+knowing individual are taken away, and nothing remains over but the Idea
+and the pure Subject of Knowledge, which together make up the adequate
+objectivity of the Will at this stage.' There is thus a sense in which
+everything is beautiful; since the Will appears in everything at some
+stage of objectivity, and this means that it is the expression of some
+Idea. But one thing can be more beautiful than another by facilitating
+æsthetic contemplation. This facilitation proceeds either from the
+greater clearness and perfection with which the particular thing shows
+forth the Idea of its kind, or from the higher stage of objectivation to
+which that Idea corresponds. Man being the highest stage of
+objectivation of the Will, the revelation of his essence is the highest
+aim of art. In æsthetic contemplation of inorganic nature and vegetative
+life, whether in the reality or through the medium of art, and in
+appreciation of architecture, the subjective aspect, that is to say, the
+enjoyment of pure will-less knowledge, is predominant; the Ideas
+themselves being here lower stages of objectivity. On the other hand,
+when animals and men are the object of æsthetic contemplation or
+representation, the enjoyment consists more in the objective
+apprehension of those Ideas in which the essence of the Will is most
+clearly and fully manifested.
+
+Of all Schopenhauer's work, its æsthetic part has met with the most
+general appreciation. Here especially he abounds in observations drawn
+directly, in his own phrase, from intuition. To make a selection of
+these, however, is not appropriate to a brief sketch like the present. I
+pass on, therefore, to those portions of his theory of Art by which he
+makes the transition, in terms of his system, to Morality.
+
+From Architecture onward the arts are obliged to represent the Will as
+divided. Here, at the first stage, its division subsists only in a
+conflict of inorganic forces which have to be brought to equilibrium.
+The conflict between weight and rigidity is in truth the only æsthetic
+material of architecture as a fine art. When we come to animal and
+lastly to human life, which, in the Plastic Arts and in Poetry, as form,
+individualised expression, and action, is the highest object of æsthetic
+representation, the vehemence of divided will is fully revealed; and
+here too is revealed the essential identity of every will with our own.
+In the words of the Indian wisdom, 'Tat twam asi'; 'that thou art.'
+Under the head of Ethics it will be shown expressly that by this
+insight, when it reacts on the will, the will can deny itself. For the
+temporary release from its striving, given in æsthetic contemplation, is
+then substituted permanent release. To this 'resignation,' the innermost
+essence of all virtue and holiness, and the final redemption from the
+world, Art itself, at its highest stages, points the way.
+
+The summits of pictorial and poetic art Schopenhauer finds in the great
+Italian painters so far as they represent the ethical spirit of
+Christianity, and in the tragic poets, ancient and modern. It is true
+that the poverty of their sacred history or mythology puts the Christian
+artists at a disadvantage; but events are merely the accidents of their
+art. Not in these, as related according to the law of sufficient reason,
+is the essence, but in the spirit we divine through the forms portrayed.
+In their representation of men full of that spirit, and especially in
+the eyes, we see mirrored the knowledge that has seized the whole
+essence of the world and of life, and that has reacted on the will, not
+so as to give it motives, but as a 'quietive'; whence proceeds complete
+resignation, and with it the annulling of the will and of the whole
+essence of this world. Of tragedy, the subject-matter is the conflict of
+the will with itself at its highest stage of objectivity. Here also the
+end is the resignation brought on by complete knowledge of the essence
+of the world. The hero, on whom at last this knowledge has acted as a
+quietive, gives up, not merely life, but the whole will to live. 'The
+true meaning of tragedy is the deeper insight, that what the hero
+expiates is not his particular sins, but original sin, that is, the
+guilt of existence itself.' To illustrate this position Schopenhauer is
+fond of quoting a passage from Calderon which declares that the greatest
+sin of man is to have been born.
+
+It seems strange that, after deriding as he does the popular notion of
+'poetic justice' so detached a thinker should imagine an at least
+equally one-sided view to receive its final confirmation from the
+Spanish dramatist's poetic phrasing of a Christian dogma. The great
+tragic poets, for Schopenhauer also, are Æschylus, Sophocles and
+Shakespeare. Now it is safe to say that by none of these was any such
+general doctrine held either in conceptual or in intuitive form. The
+whole effect of any kind of art, of course he would admit, cannot be
+packed into a formula; but if we seek one as an aid to understanding,
+some adaptation of his own theory of the sublime would probably serve
+much better as applied to tragedy than his direct theory of the drama.
+In the case of pictorial art, all that is proved by what he says about
+the representation of ascetic saintliness, is that this, like many other
+things, can be so brought within the scope of art as to make us
+momentarily identify ourselves with its Idea in the impersonal manner he
+has himself described. His purely æsthetic theory is quite adequate to
+the case, without any assumption that this is the representation of what
+is best. Art, pictorial or poetic, can no more prove pessimism than
+optimism. We pick out expressions of one or the other for quotation
+according to our moods or subjective preferences; but, if we have the
+feeling for art itself, our sense of actual æsthetic value ought to be
+independent of these.
+
+Schopenhauer's æsthetic theory, however, does not end here. There
+follows the part of it by which he has had an influence on artists
+themselves. For him, a position separate from all the other arts is held
+by music. While the rest objectify the Will mediately, that is to say,
+by means of the Ideas, Music is as immediate an objectivation of the
+whole Will as the world itself, or as the Ideas, of which the pluralised
+phenomenon constitutes the sum of particular things. The other arts
+speak of the shadow, music of the substance. There is indeed a
+parallelism, an analogy, between Music and the Ideas; yet Music never
+expresses the phenomenon in which these are manifested, but only the
+inner essence behind the appearance, the Will itself. In a sense it
+renders not feeling in its particularity, but feeling _in abstracto_;
+joy, sorrow, not a joy, a sorrow. The phenomenal world and music are to
+be regarded as two different expressions of the same thing. The world
+might be called embodied Music as well as embodied Will. 'Melodies are
+to a certain extent like general concepts, an abstract of reality.' A
+complete explanation of music, that is, a detailed repetition of it in
+concepts, were this possible, would be a complete explanation of the
+world (since both express the same thing) and therefore a true and final
+philosophy. As music only reaches its perfection in the full harmony,
+'so the one Will out of time finds its perfect objectivation only in
+complete union of all the stages which in innumerable degrees of
+heightened distinctness reveal its essence.' But here, too, Schopenhauer
+adds, the Will is felt, and can be proved, to be a divided will; and the
+deliverance wrought by this supreme art, as by all the others, is only
+temporary.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+ETHICS
+
+
+Permanent redemption from the suffering of the world is to be found only
+in the holiness of the ascetic; but to this there are many stages,
+constituting the generally accepted human virtues. Of these Schopenhauer
+has a rational account to give in terms of his philosophy; and if the
+last stage does not seem to follow by logical sequence from the others,
+this is only what is to be expected; for it is reached, in his view, by
+a sort of miracle. To the highest kind of intuitive knowledge, from
+which the ascetic denial of the will proceeds, artistic contemplation
+ought to prepare the way; and so also, on his principles, ought the
+practice of justice and goodness. Yet he is obliged to admit that few
+thus reach the goal. Of those that do reach it, the most arrive through
+personal suffering, which may be deserved. A true miracle is often
+worked in the repentant criminal, by which final deliverance is
+achieved. Though the 'intelligible character' is unalterable, and the
+empirical character can only be the unfolding of this, as every great
+dramatist intuitively recognises, yet the 'convertites,' like Duke
+Frederick in _As You Like It_, are not to be regarded as hypocrites. The
+'second voyage' to the harbour, that of the disappointed egoist, on
+condition of this miracle, brings the passenger to it as surely as the
+first, that of the true saints, which is only for the few. And in these
+equally a miraculous conversion of the will has to be finally worked.
+
+At the entrance to his distinctive theory of ethics, Schopenhauer places
+a restatement of his metaphysics as the possible basis of a mode of
+contemplating life which, he admits, has some community with an
+optimistic pantheism. The Will, through the presentation and the
+accompanying intelligence developed in its service, becomes conscious
+that that which it wills is precisely the world, life as it is. To call
+it 'the will to live' is therefore a pleonasm. 'Will' and 'will to live'
+are equivalent. For this will, life is everlastingly a certainty.
+'Neither the will, the thing-in-itself in all phenomena, nor the subject
+of knowledge, the spectator of all phenomena, is ever touched by birth
+and death.' It is true that the individual appears and disappears; but
+individuality is illusory. Past and future exist only in conceptual
+thought. 'The form of life is a present without end, howsoever the
+individuals, phenomena of the Idea, come into existence and vanish in
+time, like fugitive dreams.' Only as phenomenon is each man different
+from the other things of the world: as thing-in-itself he is the Will,
+which appears in all, and death takes away the illusion that divides his
+consciousness from the rest. 'Death is a sleep in which the
+individuality is forgotten: everything else wakes again, or rather has
+remained awake.' It is, in the expression adopted by Schopenhauer later,
+an awakening from the dream of life: though this bears with it somewhat
+different implications; and, as has been said, his theory of
+individuality became modified.
+
+With the doctrine of the eternal life of the Will are connected
+Schopenhauer's theories, developed later, of the immortality of the
+species and of individualised sexual love. The latter is by itself a
+remarkable achievement, and constitutes the one distinctly new
+development brought to completion in his later years; for the
+modifications in his theory of individuality are only tentative. His
+theory of love has a determinate conclusion, of great value for
+science, and not really compatible, it seems to me, with his pessimism.
+In its relation to ethics, on which he insisted, it is rightly placed in
+the position it occupies, between the generalised statement of his
+metaphysics just now set forth on the one side, and his theory of human
+virtue on the other.
+
+The teleology that manifests itself in individualised love is, in his
+view, not related in reality to the interests of the individual life,
+but to those of the species. That this is immortal follows from the
+eternity of the Idea it unfolds.[4] The end sought is aimed at
+unconsciously by the person. Fundamentally, for Schopenhauer, teleology
+must of course be unconscious, since the will is blind, and will, not
+intelligence, is primordial. Its typical case is the instinct of
+animals; but the 'instinctive' character belongs also to the
+accomplishment of the highest aims, as in art and virtue. What
+characterises individualised love internally is the aim, attributed to
+'nature' or 'the species,' at a certain typical beauty or perfection of
+the offspring. The lover is therefore deluded in thinking that he is
+seeking his own happiness. What looks through the eyes of lovers is the
+genius of the race, meditating on the composition of the next
+generation. It may, in the complexity of circumstances, be thwarted.
+When it reaches its end, often personal happiness is sacrificed.
+Marriages dictated by interest tend to be happier than love-matches.
+Yet, though the sacrifice of the individual to the race is involuntary
+in these, egoism is after all overcome; hence they are quite rightly the
+object of a certain admiration and sympathy, while the prudential ones
+are looked upon with a tinge of contempt. For here too that element
+appears which alone gives nobility to the life either of intellect or of
+art or of moral virtue, namely, the rising above a subjective interest
+of the individual will.
+
+  [4] The disappearance of species in time raises difficulties in more
+  than one way for his philosophy; but he formally escapes refutation by
+  the suggestion, already noted, that the Idea need not always be
+  manifested phenomenally in the same world. This, however, he did not
+  work out.
+
+No doubt there are touches of pessimism in this statement; but the
+general theory does not seem reconcilable finally with pessimism as
+Schopenhauer understands it. For it is a definitely stated position of
+his that nature keeps up the process of the world by yielding just
+enough to prevent discontinuance of the striving for an illusory end.
+Yet he admits here in the result something beyond bare continuance of
+life; for this is already secured without the particular modification of
+feeling described. What the feeling is brought in to secure is a better
+realisation of the type in actual individuals; and such realisation is
+certainly more than bare subsistence with the least possible expenditure
+of nature's resources.
+
+As the immediate preliminary to his ethics proper, Schopenhauer restates
+his doctrine on the intelligible and the empirical character in man, and
+lays down a generalised psychological position regarding the suffering
+inherent in life. Everything as phenomenon, we have seen already, is
+determined because it is subject to the law of sufficient reason. On the
+other hand, everything as thing-in-itself is free; for 'freedom' means
+only non-subjection to that law. The intelligible character of each man
+is an indivisible, unalterable act of will out of time; the developed
+and explicit phenomenon of this in time and space is the empirical
+character. Man is his own work, not in the light of knowledge, but
+before all knowledge; this is secondary and an instrument. Ultimately,
+freedom is a mystery, and takes us beyond even will as the name for the
+thing-in-itself. In reality, that which is 'will to live' need not have
+been such (though we cannot see how this is so), but has become such
+from itself and from nothing else. This is its '_aseitas_.' Hence it is
+in its power to deny itself as will to live. When it does this, the
+redemption (like the fall) comes from itself. This denial does not mean
+annihilation, except relatively to all that we know under the forms of
+our understanding. For the will, though the nearest we can get to the
+thing-in-itself, is in truth a partially phenomenalised expression of
+this. As the will to live expresses itself phenomenally, so also does
+the denial of the will to live, when this, by special 'grace,' is
+achieved. Only in man does the freedom thus attained find phenomenal
+expression. That man can attain to it proves that in him the will has
+reached its highest possible stage of objectivation; for, after it has
+turned back and denied itself, there is evidently nothing more that we
+can call existence, that is to say, phenomenal existence, beyond. What
+there is beyond in the truth of being is something that the mystics
+know--or rather, possess, for it is beyond knowledge--but cannot
+communicate.
+
+The psychological reason that can be assigned for the ascetic flight
+from the world is that all pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, is merely
+negative. The will is a striving that has no ultimate aim. It is
+sustained only by hindrances. Hindrance means suffering; and every
+satisfaction attained is only temporary, a mere liberation from need,
+want, pain, which is positive. Suffering increases with the degree of
+consciousness. The life of civilised man is an alternation between pain
+and _ennui_, which can itself become as intolerable a suffering as
+anything. The problem of moral philosophy, then, is ultimately how
+redemption from such a world is to be attained, but only so far as this
+is a matter of conceptual knowledge. For philosophy, being from
+beginning to end theoretical, cannot work the practical miracle by which
+the will denies itself.
+
+The intuitive, as distinguished from merely conceptual, knowledge by
+which the return is made, consists essentially in a clear insight into
+the identity of the suffering will in all things and the necessity of
+its suffering as long as it is will to live. This, then, is the true
+foundation of morality. The universe as metaphysical thing-in-itself, as
+noumenon, has an ethical meaning. All its stages of objectivation,
+though in the process what seems to be aimed at is preservation of the
+will as manifested, have in truth for their ultimate aim its redemption
+by suppression of the phenomenal world in which it manifests itself.
+
+Affirmation of the will is affirmation of the body, which is the
+objectivity of the will. The sexual impulse, since it affirms life
+beyond the death of the individual, is the strongest of
+self-affirmations. In it is found the meaning of the mythical
+representation that has taken shape in the theological dogma of original
+sin. For by this affirmation going beyond the individual body, suffering
+and death, as the necessary accompaniment of the phenomenon of life, are
+reaffirmed, and the possibility of redemption this time declared
+fruitless. But through the whole process there runs eternal justice. The
+justification of suffering is that the will affirms itself; and the
+self-affirmation is justified by payment of the penalty.
+
+Before the final redemption--which is not for the world but for the
+individual--there are many stages of ethical progress. These consist in
+the gradual overcoming of egoism by sympathy. And here Schopenhauer
+proceeds to set forth a practical scheme for the social life of man,
+differing from ordinary utilitarianism only by reducing all sympathy to
+pity, in accordance with his view that there can be no such thing as
+positive happiness.
+
+He begins with a theory of justice, legal and moral, very much on the
+lines of Hobbes, except that he regards it as up to a certain point _a
+priori_. Here he is consistent throughout. As in his philosophical
+account of mathematics and physics, so also in his aesthetics and
+ethics, he retained, side by side with a strong empirical tendency,
+belief in certain irreducible _a priori_ forms without which our
+knowledge cannot be constituted. The pure ethical theory of justice, he
+says, bears to the political theory the relation of pure to applied
+mathematics. Injustice he holds to be the positive conception. It means
+the breaking into the sphere of another person's will to live. The
+self-affirmation of the will that appears in one individual body is
+extended to denial of the will that appears in other bodies. Justice
+consists in non-encroachment. There is a 'natural right,' or 'moral
+right,' of resistance to injustice by infliction of what, apart from the
+attempted encroachment, would be wrong. Either force or deception may be
+used; as either may be the instrument of injustice. The purely ethical
+doctrine of justice applies only to action; since only the not doing of
+injustice depends on us. With the State and its laws, the relation is
+reversed. The object of these is to prevent the suffering of injustice.
+The State is not directed against egoism, but has sprung out of a
+rationalised collective egoism. It has for its purpose only to avoid the
+inconvenient consequences of individual aggressions on others. Outside
+of the State, there is a right of self-defence against injustice, but no
+right of punishment. The punishment threatened by the State is
+essentially a motive against committing wrong, intended to supply the
+place of ethical motives for those who are insufficiently accessible to
+them. Actual infliction of it is the carrying out of the threat when it
+has failed, so that in general the expectation of the penalty may be
+certain. Revenge, which has a view to the past, cannot be justified
+ethically: punishment is directed only to the future. There is no right
+in any one to set himself up as a moral judge and inflict pain; but man
+has a right to do what is needful for social security. The criminal's
+acts are of course necessitated; but he cannot justly complain of being
+punished for them, since it is ultimately from himself, from what he is,
+that they sprang.
+
+With the doctrine of 'eternal justice,' touched on above, we pass into a
+different region of thought. What is responsible for the guilt in the
+world is the Will by which everything exists, and the suffering
+everlastingly falls where the guilt is. Take the case of apparently
+unpunished injustice (from the human point of view) expressing itself in
+the extreme form of deliberate cruelty. Through this also, eternal
+justice, from which there is no escape, is fulfilled. 'The torturer and
+the tortured are one. The former errs in thinking he has no share in the
+torture; the latter in thinking he has no share in the guilt.' For all
+the pain of the world is the expiation of the sin involved in the
+self-affirmation of will, and the Will as thing-in-itself is one and the
+same in all.
+
+If this could satisfy any one, there would be no need to go further. The
+whole being as it ought to be, why try to rectify details that are
+absolutely indifferent? But of course the implication is that
+individuality is simply illusory; and this, as has been said, was a
+position that Schopenhauer neither could nor did consistently maintain.
+Indeed, immediately after setting forth this theory of 'eternal
+justice,' he goes on to a relative justification of those acts of
+disinterested vengeance by which a person knowingly sacrifices his own
+life for the sake of retribution on some extraordinary criminal. This,
+he says, is a form of punishment, not mere revenge, although it involves
+an error concerning the nature of eternal justice. Suicide involves a
+similar error, in so far as it supposes that the real being of the
+individual can be assailed through its phenomenal manifestation. It is
+not a denial of the will to live, but a strong affirmation of it, only
+not in the given circumstances: different circumstances are desired with
+such intensity that the present cannot be borne. Therefore the
+individual manifestation of the will is not suppressed. Yet, one might
+reply, if individuality is an illusion attached to the appearance in
+time and space of a particular organism, it would seem that, with the
+disappearance of this, all that distinguishes the individual must
+disappear also.
+
+Schopenhauer had no will thus to escape from life; nor did he afterwards
+devote himself to expounding further his theory of eternal justice. What
+he wrote later, either positively or as mere speculation, implies both
+greater reality in the individual and more of cosmic equity to
+correspond. His next step, even at his first stage, is to continue the
+exposition of a practicable ethics for human life. His procedure
+consists in adding beneficence to justice, with the proviso already
+mentioned, which is required by his psychology, that all beneficence can
+consist only in the relief of pain. For Schopenhauer, as for Comte,
+what is to be overcome is 'egoism,' an excessive degree of which is the
+mark of the character we call 'bad.' The 'good' is what Comte and
+Spencer call the 'altruistic' character. This difference between
+characters Schopenhauer goes on to explain in terms of his metaphysics.
+The egoist is so deluded by the principle of individuation that he
+supposes an absolute cleft between his own person and all others. The
+remorse of conscience from which he suffers proceeds in part from an
+obscure perception that the principle of individuation is illusory.
+Genuine virtue springs out of the intuitive (not merely abstract)
+knowledge that recognises in another individuality the same essence as
+in one's own. The characteristic of the good man is that he makes less
+difference than is customary between himself and others. Justice is an
+intermediate stage between the encroaching egoism of the bad and
+positive goodness. In the renunciation of rights of property, and
+provision for all personal needs without aid from others, practised by
+some religious and philosophical ascetics, it is passing over into
+something more. There is, however, a certain misunderstanding involved
+in so interpreting strict justice; for there are many ways in which the
+rich and powerful can be positively beneficent. At the other extreme,
+when they simply live on their inherited wealth, without doing anything
+in return, their mode of life is morally, though not legally, unjust.
+Rights of property Schopenhauer derived from labour spent on the things
+appropriated. The injustice, in many ways, of the present social order
+he quite recognises. If he has no sympathy with revolutions, it is
+because he has no belief in the realisation of an ideal state. This
+follows from his view of history. Human life, it is his conviction,
+never has been and never will be different as a whole. Redemption from
+evil can be attained only by the individual. All that the State can do
+is to provide certain very general conditions of security under which
+there will be no hindrance to those who desire to live in accordance
+with a moral ideal.
+
+Yet there are qualifications to make. Many passages in Schopenhauer's
+writings prove his firm belief in the future triumph of reason over
+superstition. It is to the honour of humanity, he says, that so
+detestable a form of evil as organised religious persecution has
+appeared only in one section of history. And, in his own personal case,
+he has the most complete confidence that the truths he has put forth
+cannot fail sometime to gain a hearing. In all cases, error is only
+temporary, and truth will prevail. His language on this subject, and
+indeed often on others, is indistinguishable from that of an optimist.
+
+In the last resort, his pessimism entrenches itself behind the
+psychological proposition that every satisfaction is negative, being
+only the removal of a pain. If this is unsustainable, there is nothing
+finally in his Metaphysics of Will to necessitate the pessimistic
+conclusion drawn. The mode of deduction by which he proceeds is to argue
+first to the position already noticed: that all that love of others on
+which morality is based is fundamentally pity. True benevolence can only
+be the desire to relieve others' pain, springing from the identification
+of this with our own. For that reason, moral virtue must finally pass
+over into asceticism--the denial of the will to live. In others, if we
+are able to see through the principle of individuation, we recognise the
+same essence as in ourselves, and we perceive that as long as this wills
+it must necessarily suffer. The end then is to destroy the will to live.
+This is to be done by _askesis_, self-mortification. The first step is
+complete chastity. If, says Schopenhauer, the highest phenomenon of
+will, that is, man, were to disappear through a general refusal to
+affirm life beyond the individual body, man's weaker reflexion in the
+animal world would disappear also, and the consciousness of the whole
+would cease. Knowledge being taken away, the rest would vanish into
+nothingness, since there is 'no object without subject.' That this will
+come to pass, however, he certainly did not believe. He has no
+cosmogony, like that of Hartmann, ending in a general redemption of the
+universe by such a collective act. Nor did he hold, like his later
+successor Mainländer, that through the conflict and gradual extinction
+of individualities, 'this great world shall so wear out to nought.' The
+world for him is without beginning and without end. But the exceptional
+individual can redeem himself. What he does when he has reached the
+height of holiness is by voluntary poverty and all other privations,
+inflicted for their own sake, to break and kill the will, which he
+recognises as the source of his own and of the world's suffering
+existence. In his case not merely the phenomenon ends at death, as with
+others, but the being is taken away. To be a 'world-overcomer' in this
+sense (as opposed to a 'world-conqueror') is the essence of sanctity
+when cleared of all the superstitious dogmas by which the saints try to
+explain their mode of life to themselves.
+
+The absolutely pure expression of this truth is to be found only in
+philosophy; but of the religions Buddhism comes nearest to expressing it
+without admixture. For the Buddhist saint asks aid from no god. True
+Christianity, however,--the Christianity of the New Testament and of the
+Christian mystics,--agrees both with Buddhism and with Brahmanism in
+ultimate aim. What spoils it for Schopenhauer is the Judaic element.
+This, on one side, infects it with the optimism of the Biblical story of
+creation, in which God 'saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it
+was very good.' On the other side, it contaminates the myth of original
+sin, which bears in itself a profound philosophical truth, by this same
+doctrine of a creative God; from which follows all the injustice and
+irrationality necessarily involved in the Augustinian theology, and not
+to be expelled except with its theism. Nevertheless, the story of the
+Fall of Man, of which that theology, in its fundamentally true part, is
+a reasoned expression, is the one thing, Schopenhauer avows, that
+reconciles him to the Old Testament. The truth that it clothes he finds
+also among the Greeks; Empedocles, after the Orphics and Pythagoreans,
+having taught that the soul had been doomed to wander because of some
+antenatal sin. And the mysticism that accompanies all these more or less
+pure expressions of one metaphysical truth he finds represented by the
+Sufis even in optimistic Islam; so that he can claim for his philosophy
+a world-wide consent.
+
+Religion, if we take this to include mysticism, at once rises above
+philosophy and falls below it. As 'metaphysics of the people,' it is a
+mythological expression of philosophical truth: as mysticism, it is a
+kind of 'epi-philosophy.' Beyond pure philosophy Schopenhauer does not
+profess to go; but he accepts what the mystics say as the description of
+a positive experience which becomes accessible when supreme insight is
+attained intuitively. For the philosopher as such, insight into that
+which is beyond the forms of our knowledge and even beyond the will
+itself, remains only conceptual; though it is within the province of
+philosophy to mark out the place for this. The 'something else' that is
+left when the will has been denied, is indicated by the 'ecstasy,'
+'illumination,' 'union with God,' spoken of by the mystics.
+Paradoxically, some of the mystics themselves even have identified it
+with 'nothing'; but the result of the denial of the will to live is to
+be called nothing only in relation to the world as we know it. 'On the
+other hand, to those in whom the will has turned back and denied itself,
+this so very real world of ours with all its suns and milky ways
+is--nothing.'
+
+In this terminus of his philosophy, Schopenhauer recognised his kinship
+with Indian thought, of which he was a lifelong student. To call his
+doctrine a kind of Buddhism is, however, in some ways a misapprehension.
+Undoubtedly he accepts as his ideal the ethical attitude that he finds
+to be common to Buddhism and the Christianity of the New Testament; but
+metaphysical differences mark him off from both. We have seen that he
+rejects the extra-mundane God of Semitic derivation, adopted by
+historical Christianity. Indeed he is one of the most pronounced
+anti-Jehovists of all literature. But equally his belief in a positive
+metaphysical doctrine marks him off from Buddhism, according to the
+account given of it by its most recent students, who regard it either as
+ultimately nihilistic or as having no metaphysics at all, but only a
+psychology and ethics. Nor can he be precisely identified with the
+Vedantists of orthodox Hinduism. Their ultimate reality, if we are to
+find an analogue for it in European metaphysics, seems to resemble the
+hypostasised _ego_ of Fichte, or the Kantian 'transcendental unity of
+apperception', much more than it resembles Schopenhauer's blindly
+striving will as thing-in-itself. Even in practical ethics, he does not
+follow the Indian systems at all closely. Philosophical doctrines of
+justice are of course purely European; and Schopenhauer himself points
+out the sources of his own theory. In his extension of ethics to
+animals, on which he lays much stress, he cites the teachings of Eastern
+non-Semitic religions as superior to the rest; but he does not follow
+the Indians, nor even the Pythagoreans, so far as to make abstinence
+from flesh part of the ideal. He condemns vivisection on the ground that
+animals have rights: certain ways of treating them are unjust, not
+simply uncompassionate. The discussion here again is of course wholly
+within European thought. Thus, in trying to determine his significance
+for modern philosophy, we may consider his system in its immediate
+environment, leaving it to more special students to determine how far it
+received a peculiar colouring from the Oriental philosophies, of which,
+in his time, the more exact knowledge was just beginning to penetrate to
+the West.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE
+
+
+Schopenhauer is not one of the philosophers who have founded a school,
+though he has had many disciples and enthusiastic admirers. The
+pessimism that was for a time a watchword with certain literary groups
+has passed as a mode, and his true significance must be sought
+elsewhere. Of the thinkers who have followed him in his pessimism, two
+indeed stand out as the architects of distinct systems, Eduard von
+Hartmann and Philipp Mainländer (both already incidentally referred to);
+but while they are to be classed unquestionably as philosophers, their
+systems contain an element that their master would have regarded as
+mythological. Schopenhauer declared as clearly as any of the Greeks that
+the phenomenal world is without beginning and without end. Kant's
+positing of an 'antinomy' on this point he regarded as wholly without
+rational justification. What Kant calls the 'antithesis,' namely, the
+infinite series, can be logically proved for phenomena. The 'thesis,'
+which asserts a beginning in time, is defended by mere fallacies. Now
+Hartmann and Mainländer both hold, though in different fashions, that
+there is a world-process from a beginning to an end, namely, the
+extinction of consciousness. This is the redemption of the world. Their
+affinity, therefore, seems to be with the Christian Gnostics rather than
+with the pure philosophers of the Greek tradition, continued in modern
+times by Bruno, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer.
+
+Whatever may be thought of the pessimism by which Schopenhauer's mood is
+distinguished from that of his precursors, few will fail to recognise
+that special doctrines of his system contain at least a large portion of
+truth. His theories of Art, of Genius, and of Love are enough to found
+an enduring reputation for any thinker, even if there were nothing else
+of value in his writings. But there is much else, both in systematic
+construction and in the illumination of detail. I have been inclined to
+put forward first of all the translation into idealistic terms of the
+universal sentiency held by the Ionian thinkers to be inherent in the
+primordial elements of nature. While they viewed the world as an
+objective thing having psychological qualities, Schopenhauer, after the
+long intermediate process of thought, could treat it as phenomenal
+object with a psychological or subjective essence. For both doctrines
+alike, however, mind or soul is immanent. Still, it must be allowed that
+a difference remains by which Schopenhauer was even more remote than
+they were from the later Greek idealism. As they were not materialists,
+so they did not exclude reason from the psychical properties of their
+substances. Schopenhauer, while he rejected the materialism of their
+ancient and modern successors alike, took the step of formally
+derationalising the elements of mind. This, no doubt, is unsustainable
+ultimately, if reason is ever to emerge from them. Yet the one-sidedness
+of the position has had a peculiar value in combating an equally
+one-sided rationalistic idealism. This is recognised by clear-sighted
+opponents. And Schopenhauer's calling the non-rational or anti-rational
+element in the world 'will' helps to make plainer the real problem of
+evil. There is truth in the Hegelian paradox that 'pessimism is an
+excellent basis for optimism.' An optimist like Plotinus saw that, even
+if good comes of evil, the case of the optimist must fail unless evil
+can be shown to be a necessary constituent of the world. The Platonic
+and Neo-Platonic 'matter,' a principle of diremption or individuation,
+like time and space for Schopenhauer, was an attempt to solve this
+problem; but something more positive seemed to be needed as the source
+of the stronger manifestations of evil. To the strength of these Plato
+drew attention in a passage (_Republic_, x. 610[5]) where it is
+acknowledged that injustice confers a character of vitality and
+sleeplessness upon its possessor. In the notion of a blind and vehement
+striving, Schopenhauer supplies something adequate; only, to maintain a
+rational optimism, it must be regarded as a necessary element in a
+mixture, not as the spring of the whole.
+
+  [5] Cited in one of the introductory essays to Jowett and Campbell's
+  edition, vol. ii.
+
+Much might be said on the teleology by which he tries to educe
+intelligence from the primordial strife. Against his view, that it is
+evolved as a mere instrument for preserving races in a struggle, another
+may be set that is ready to hand in a dialogue of Plutarch.[6] The
+struggle among animals, it is there incidentally argued, has for its end
+to sharpen their intelligence. Both these theories are on the surface
+compatible with evolution. If, leaving aside the problem of mechanism,
+we try to verify them by the test of results, the latter undoubtedly
+seems the more plausible. For if the struggle was a means to the
+improvement of intelligence, nature has succeeded more and more;
+whereas, if her intention was to preserve races, she has continually
+failed. This argument is at any rate perfectly valid against
+Schopenhauer himself; for he holds in common with the optimistic
+teleologists that 'nature does nothing in vain.'
+
+  [6] _De Sollertia Animalium_, 27.
+
+I will conclude with a few detached criticisms on the ethical doctrine
+which he regarded as the culmination of his system. The antithesis, it
+may first be noted, between the temporary release from the vehemence of
+the will that is gained through art, and the permanent release through
+asceticism, is not consistently maintained. Schopenhauer admits that the
+knowledge which for the ascetic is the 'quietive' of the will has to be
+won anew in a perpetual conflict. 'No one can have enduring rest on
+earth.' Again, revision of his doctrine concerning the reality of the
+individual would, I think, necessitate revision also of the position
+that not only asceticism but 'all true and pure love, nay, even freely
+rendered justice, proceeds from seeing through the _principium
+individuationis_.' If the individual is in some sense ultimately real,
+then love must be to a certain extent literally altruism. We are brought
+down to the elementary fact, in terms of the metaphysics of ethics, that
+the object of love is a real being that is itself and not ourselves,
+though having some resemblance to us and united in a larger whole. An
+objection not merely verbal might indeed be taken to Schopenhauer's
+metaphysics of ethics strictly on his own ground. If it is purely and
+simply the essence of ourselves that we recognise in everything, does
+not this reduce all love finally to a well-understood egoism? The
+genuine fact of sympathy seems to escape his mode of formulation. And,
+in the end, we shall perhaps not find the ascetic to be the supreme
+ethical type. Of the self-tormenting kind of asceticism, it is not
+enough to say with Schopenhauer that, since it is a world-wide
+phenomenon of human nature, it calls for some account from philosophy.
+The account may be sufficiently rendered by historical psychology; the
+result being to class it as an aberration born of the illusions incident
+to a certain type of mind at a certain stage. Indeed, that seems to be
+the conclusion of the Buddhists, who claim to have transcended it by
+finding it superfluous for the end it aims at. Let us then take, as our
+example of the completed type, not the monks of the Thebaid, but the
+mild ascetics of the Buddhist communities. Does not this type, even in
+its most attractive form, represent a 'second best'? Is not the final
+judgment that of Plato, that to save oneself is something, but that
+there is no full achievement unless for the life of the State also the
+ideal has been brought nearer realisation? When there is nothing in the
+world but irredeemable tyranny or anarchy, flight from it may be the
+greatest success possible as far as the individual life is concerned;
+but this is not the normal condition of humanity. Finally, may not some
+actual achievement, either practical or, like that of Schopenhauer,
+speculative, even if accompanied by real imperfections of character,
+possess a higher human value than the sanctity that rests always in
+itself?
+
+
+
+
+SELECTED WORKS
+
+
+_English Translations_
+
+  _The World as Will and Idea._ Translated by R. B. HALDANE and J. KEMP. 3
+    vols. 1883-6.
+
+  _Two Essays_: I. _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient
+    Reason_. II. _On the Will in Nature_. Bohn's Philosophical Library,
+    1889.
+
+  _Religion: A Dialogue, and other Essays._ Selected and translated by T.
+    BAILEY SAUNDERS. 3rd ed., 1891. [A series of other volumes of
+    selections excellently translated by Mr. Saunders has followed.]
+
+  _Selected Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer._ With a Biographical
+    Introduction and Sketch of his Philosophy. By E. BELFORT BAX. 1891.
+
+  _The Basis of Morality._ Translated with Introduction and Notes by A. B.
+    BULLOCK. 1903.
+
+
+_Biographical and Expository_
+
+  _Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and Philosophy._ By HELEN ZIMMERN. 1876.
+
+  _Life of Arthur Schopenhauer._ By Professor W. WALLACE. 1890.
+
+  _La Philosophie de Schopenhauer._ Par TH. RIBOT. 2nd ed., 1885.
+
+  _Arthur Schopenhauer._ Seine Persönlichkeit, seine Lehre, sein Glaube.
+    Von JOHANNAES VOLKELT. 3rd ed., 1907.
+
+  _Schopenhauer-Lexikon._ Von JULIUS FRADENSTÄDT. 2 vols., 1871.
+
+
+Printed by T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty at the Edinburgh
+University Press
+
+
+
+
+
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