initial commit of ebook 38283HEADmain

9 files changed, 7901 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6833f05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitattributes
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+* text=auto
+*.txt text
+*.md text
diff --git a/38283-8.txt b/38283-8.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..efb132f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/38283-8.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2333 @@
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Schopenhauer
+
+Author: Thomas Whittaker
+
+Release Date: December 12, 2011 [EBook #38283]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCHOPENHAUER ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Albert László and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+PHILOSOPHIES ANCIENT AND MODERN
+
+SCHOPENHAUER
+
+
+
+
+NOTE
+
+
+As a consequence of the success of the series of _Religions Ancient and
+Modern_, Messrs. CONSTABLE have decided to issue a set of similar
+primers, with brief introductions, lists of dates, and selected
+authorities, presenting to the wider public the salient features of the
+_Philosophies_ of Greece and Rome and of the Middle Ages, as well as of
+modern Europe. They will appear in the same handy Shilling volumes, with
+neat cloth bindings and paper envelopes, which have proved so attractive
+in the case of the _Religions_. The writing in each case will be
+confided to an eminent authority, and one who has already proved himself
+capable of scholarly yet popular exposition within a small compass.
+
+Among the first volumes to appear will be:--
+
+  =Early Greek Philosophy.= By A. W. BENN, author of _The Philosophy
+    of Greece, Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century_.
+
+  =Stoicism.= By Professor ST. GEORGE STOCK, author of _Deductive
+    Logic_, editor of the _Apology of Plato_, etc.
+
+  =Plato.= By Professor A. E. TAYLOR, St. Andrews University, author
+    of _The Problem of Conduct_.
+
+  =Scholasticism.= By Father RICKABY, S.J.
+
+  =Hobbes.= By Professor A. E. TAYLOR.
+
+  =Locke.= By Professor ALEXANDER, of Owens College.
+
+  =Comte and Mill.= By T. WHITTAKER, author of _The Neoplatonists,
+    Apollonius of Tyana and other Essays_.
+
+  =Herbert Spencer.= By W. H. HUDSON, author of _An Introduction to
+    Spencer's Philosophy_.
+
+  =Schopenhauer.= By T. WHITTAKER.
+
+  =Berkeley.= By Professor CAMPBELL FRASER, D.C.L., LL.D.
+
+  =Bergsen.= By Father TYRRELL.
+
+
+
+
+SCHOPENHAUER
+
+
+By
+
+THOMAS WHITTAKER
+
+AUTHOR OF 'COMTE AND MILL,' ETC.
+
+
+LONDON
+
+ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO LTD
+
+1909
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+  CHAP.                             PAGE
+
+  I.   LIFE AND WRITINGS,              1
+  II.  THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE,           15
+  III. METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL,       29
+  IV.  ĆSTHETICS,                     49
+  V.   ETHICS,                        65
+  VI.  HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE,       86
+       SELECTED WORKS,                93
+
+
+
+
+SCHOPENHAUER
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+LIFE AND WRITINGS
+
+
+Arthur Schopenhauer may be distinctively described as the greatest
+philosophic writer of his century. So evident is this that he has
+sometimes been regarded as having more importance in literature than in
+philosophy; but this is an error. As a metaphysician he is second to no
+one since Kant. Others of his age have surpassed him in system and in
+comprehensiveness; but no one has had a firmer grasp of the essential
+and fundamental problems of philosophy. On the theory of knowledge, the
+nature of reality, and the meaning of the beautiful and the good, he has
+solutions to offer that are all results of a characteristic and original
+way of thinking.
+
+In one respect, as critics have noted, his spirit is different from that
+of European philosophy in general. What preoccupies him in a special way
+is the question of evil in the world. Like the philosophies of the
+East, emerging as they do without break from religion, Schopenhauer's
+philosophy is in its outcome a doctrine of redemption from sin. The name
+of pessimism commonly applied to it is in some respects misleading,
+though it was his own term; but it is correct if understood as he
+explained it. As he was accustomed to insist, his final ethical doctrine
+coincides with that of all the religions that aim, for their adepts or
+their elect, at deliverance from 'this evil world.' But, as the
+'world-fleeing' religions have their mitigations and accommodations, so
+also has the philosophy of Schopenhauer. At various points indeed it
+seems as if a mere change of accent would turn it into optimism.
+
+This preoccupation does not mean indifference to the theoretical
+problems of philosophy. No one has insisted more strongly that the end
+of philosophy is pure truth, and that only the few who care about pure
+truth have any concern with it. But for Schopenhauer the desire for
+speculative truth does not by itself suffice to explain the impulse of
+philosophical inquiries. On one side of his complex character, he had
+more resemblance to the men who turn from the world to religion, like
+St. Augustine, than to the normal type of European thinker, represented
+pre-eminently by Aristotle. He was a temperamental pessimist, feeling
+from the first the trouble of existence; and here he finds the deepest
+motive for the desire to become clear about it. He saw in the world,
+what he felt in himself, a vain effort after ever new objects of desire
+which give no permanent satisfaction; and this view, becoming
+predominant, determined, not indeed all the ideas of his philosophy, but
+its general complexion as a 'philosophy of redemption.'
+
+With his pessimism, personal misfortunes had nothing to do. He was, and
+always recognised that he was, among the most fortunately placed of
+mankind. He does not hesitate to speak sometimes of his own happiness in
+complete freedom from the need to apply himself to any compulsory
+occupation. This freedom, as he has put gratefully on record, he owed to
+his father, Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer, who was a rich merchant of
+Danzig, where the philosopher was born on the 22nd of February 1788.
+Both his parents were of Dutch ancestry. His mother, Johanna
+Schopenhauer, won celebrity as a novelist; and his sister, Adele, also
+displayed some literary talent. Generalising from his own case,
+Schopenhauer holds that men of intelligence derive their character from
+their father and their intellect from their mother. With his mother,
+however, he was not on sympathetic terms, as may be read in the
+biographies. His father intended him for a mercantile career, and with
+this view began to prepare him from the first to be a cosmopolitan man
+of the world. The name of Arthur was given to him because it is spelt
+alike in the leading European languages. He was taken early to France,
+where he resided from 1797 to 1799, learning French so well that on his
+return he had almost forgotten his German. Portions of the years 1803 to
+1804 were spent in England, France, Switzerland, and Austria. In England
+he was three months at a Wimbledon boarding-school kept by a clergyman.
+This experience he found extremely irksome. He afterwards became highly
+proficient in English: was always pleased to be taken for an Englishman,
+and regarded both the English character and intelligence as on the whole
+the first in Europe; but all the more deplorable did he find the
+oppressive pietism which was the special form taken in the England of
+that period by the reaction against the French Revolution. He is never
+tired of denouncing that phase of 'cold superstition,' the dominance of
+which lasted during his lifetime; for the publication of Mill's
+_Liberty_ and of Darwin's _Origin of Species_, which may be considered
+as marking the close of it, came only the year before his death.
+
+The only real break in the conformity of Schopenhauer's circumstances to
+his future career came in 1805, when he was placed in a merchant's
+office at Hamburg, whither his father had migrated in disgust at the
+annexation of his native Danzig, then under a republican constitution of
+its own, by Prussia in 1793. Soon afterwards his father died; but out of
+loyalty he tried for some time longer to reconcile himself to commercial
+life. Finding this at length impossible, he gained permission from his
+mother, in 1807, to leave the office for the gymnasium. At this time he
+seems to have begun his classical studies, his education having hitherto
+been exclusively modern. They were carried on first at Gotha and then at
+Weimar. In 1809 he entered the university of Göttingen as a student of
+medicine. This, however, was with a view only to scientific studies, not
+to practice; and he transferred himself to the philosophical faculty in
+1810. Generally he was little regardful of academical authority. His
+father's deliberately adopted plan of letting him mix early with the
+world had given him a certain independence of judgment. At Göttingen,
+however, he received an important influence from his teacher, G. E.
+Schulze (known by the revived scepticism of his _Ćnesidemus_), who
+advised him to study Plato and Kant before Aristotle and Spinoza. From
+1811 to 1813 he was at Berlin, where he heard Fichte, but was not
+impressed. In 1813 the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was conferred on
+him at Jena for the dissertation _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle
+of Sufficient Reason_ (_Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom
+zureichenden Grunde_, 2nd ed., 1847). This was the first result of his
+Kantian studies. In the same year he began to be acquainted with Goethe
+at Weimar, where his mother and sister had gone to reside in 1806. A
+consequence of this acquaintance was that he took up and further
+developed Goethe's theory of colours. His dissertation _Ueber das Sehen
+und die Farben_ was published in 1816. A second edition did not appear
+till 1854; but in the meantime he had published a restatement of his
+doctrine in Latin, entitled _Theoria Colorum Physiologica_ (1830). This,
+however, was an outlying part of his work. He had already been seized by
+the impulse to set forth the system of philosophy that took shape in
+him, as he says, by some formative process of which he could give no
+conscious account. His great work, _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_,
+was ready for publication before the end of 1818, and was published with
+the date 1819. Thus he is one of the most precocious philosophers on
+record. For in that single volume, written before he was thirty, the
+outlines of his whole system are fixed. There is some development later,
+and there are endless new applications and essays towards confirmation
+from all sources. His mind never rested, and his literary power gained
+by exercise. Still, it has been said with truth, that there never was a
+greater illusion than when he thought that he seldom repeated himself.
+In reality he did little but repeat his fundamental positions with
+infinite variations in expression.
+
+After completing his chief work, Schopenhauer wrote some verses in which
+he predicted that posterity would erect a monument to him. This
+prediction was fulfilled in 1895; but, for the time, the work which he
+never doubted would be his enduring title to fame seemed, like Hume's
+_Treatise_, to have fallen 'deadborn from the press.' This he attributed
+to the hostility of the academical philosophers; and, in his later
+works, attacks on the university professors form a characteristic
+feature. The official teachers of the Hegelian school, he declared, were
+bent only on obtaining positions for themselves by an appearance of
+supporting Christian dogma; and they resented openness on the part of
+any one else. Yet on one side he maintained that his own pessimism was
+more truly Christian than their optimism. The essential spirit of
+Christianity is that of Brahmanism and Buddhism, the great religions
+that sprang from India, the first home of our race. He is even inclined
+to see in it traces of Indian influence. What vitiates it in his eyes is
+the Jewish element, which finds its expression in the flat modern
+'Protestant-rationalistic optimism.' As optimistic religions, he groups
+together Judaism, Islam, and Grćco-Roman Polytheism. His antipathy,
+however, only extends to the two former. He was himself in great part a
+child of Humanism and of the eighteenth century, rejoicing over the
+approaching downfall of all the faiths, and holding that a weak religion
+(entirely different from those he admires) is favourable to
+civilisation. Nothing can exceed his scorn for nearly everything that
+characterised the Middle Ages. With Catholicism as a political system he
+has no sympathy whatever; while on the religious side the Protestant
+are as sympathetic to him as the Catholic mystics. What is common to all
+priesthoods, he holds, is to exploit the metaphysical need of mankind
+(in which he also believes) for the sake of their own power.
+Clericalism, 'Pfaffenthum,' whether Catholic or Protestant, is the
+object of his unvarying hatred and contempt. If he had cared to
+appreciate Hegel, he would have found on this point much community of
+spirit; but of course there was a real antithesis between the two as
+philosophers. No 'conspiracy' need be invoked to explain the failure of
+Schopenhauer to win early recognition. Belief in the State and in
+progress was quite alien to him; and Germany was then full of political
+hopes, which found nourishment in optimistic pantheism. What at length
+gave his philosophy vogue was the collapse of this enthusiasm on the
+failure of the revolutionary movement in 1848. Once known, it contained
+enough of permanent value to secure it from again passing out of sight
+with the next change of fashion.
+
+The rest of Schopenhauer's life in its external relations may be briefly
+summed up. For a few years, it was diversified by travels in Italy and
+elsewhere, and by an unsuccessful attempt at academical teaching in
+Berlin. In 1831 he moved to Frankfort, where he finally settled in
+1833. He lived unmarried there till his death on the 21st of September
+1860. The monument, already spoken of, was unveiled at Frankfort on the
+6th of June 1895.
+
+The almost unbroken silence with which his great work was received,
+though it had a distempering effect on the man, did not discourage the
+thinker. The whole series of Schopenhauer's works, indeed, was completed
+before he attained anything that could be called fame. Constantly on the
+alert as he was to seize upon confirmations of his system, he published
+in 1836 his short work _On the Will in Nature_, pointing out
+verifications of his metaphysics by recent science. In 1839 his prize
+essay, _On the Freedom of the Human Will_ (finished in 1837), was
+crowned by the Royal Scientific Society of Drontheim in Norway. This and
+another essay, _On the Basis of Morality_, _not_ crowned by the Royal
+Danish Society of Copenhagen in 1840, he published in 1841, with the
+inclusive title, _Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik_. In 1844 appeared
+the second edition of his principal work, to which there was added, in
+the form of a second volume, a series of elucidations and extensions
+larger in bulk than the first. This new volume contains much of his
+best and most effective writing. His last work, _Parerga und
+Paralipomena_, which appeared in 1851 (2 vols.), is from the literary
+point of view the most brilliant. It was only from this time that he
+began to be well known among the general public; though the philosophic
+'apostolate' of Julius Frauenstädt, who afterwards edited his works, had
+begun in 1840. His activity was henceforth confined to modifying and
+extending his works for new editions; an employment in which he was
+always assiduous. In consequence of this, all of them, as they stand,
+contain references from one to another; but the development of his
+thinking, so far as there was such a process after 1818, can be easily
+traced without reference to the earlier editions. There is some growth;
+but, as has been said, it does not affect many of the chief points. A
+brief exposition of his philosophy can on the whole take it as something
+fixed. The heads under which it must fall are those assigned to the
+original four books of _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_.
+
+Although Schopenhauer discountenanced the attempt to connect a
+philosophers biography with his work, something has to be said about his
+character, since this has been dwelt on to his disadvantage by
+opponents. There is abundant material for a personal estimate in the
+correspondence and reminiscences published after his death by his
+disciples Julius Frauenstädt and Wilhelm Gwinner. The apparent
+contradiction is at once obvious between the ascetic consummation of his
+ethics and his unascetic life, carefully occupied in its latter part
+with rules for the preservation of his naturally robust health. He was
+quite aware of this, but holds it absurd to require that a moralist
+should commend only the virtues which he possesses. It is as if the
+requirement were set up that a sculptor is to be himself a model of
+beauty. A saint need not be a philosopher, nor a philosopher a saint.
+The science of morals is as theoretical as any other branch of
+philosophy. Fundamentally character is unmodifiable, though knowledge,
+it is allowed, may change the mode of action within the limits of the
+particular character. The passage to the state of asceticism cannot be
+effected by moral philosophy, but depends on a kind of 'grace.' After
+all, it might be replied, philosophers, whether they succeed or not, do
+usually make at least an attempt to live in accordance with the moral
+ideal they set up. The best apology in Schopenhauer's case is that the
+fault may have been as much in his ideal as in his failure to conform
+to it. The eloquent pages he has devoted to the subject of holiness only
+make manifest the inconsequence (which he admits) in the passage to it.
+For, as we shall see, this has nothing in common with the essentially
+rational asceticism of the schools of later antiquity; which was a rule
+of self-limitation in view of the philosophic life. He did in a way of
+his own practise something of this; and, on occasion, he sets forth the
+theory of it; but he quite clearly sees the difference. His own ideal,
+which he never attempted to practise, is that of the self-torturing
+ascetics of the Christian Middle Age. Within the range of properly human
+virtue, he can in many respects hold his own, not only as a philosopher
+but as a man. If his egoism and vanity are undeniable, he undoubtedly
+possessed the virtues of rectitude and compassion. What he would have
+especially laid stress on was the conscientious devotion to his work.
+With complete singleness of purpose he used for a disinterested end the
+leisure which he regarded as the most fortunate of endowments. As he
+said near the close of his life, his intellectual conscience was clear.
+
+Of Schopenhauer's expositions of his pessimism it would be true to say,
+as Spinoza says of the Book of Job, that the matter, like the style, is
+not that of a man sitting among the ashes, but of one meditating in a
+library. This of course does not prove that they are not a genuine, if
+one-sided, rendering of human experience. All that can be said is that
+they did not turn him away from appreciation of the apparent goods of
+life. His own practical principle was furnished by what he regarded as a
+lower point of view; and this gives its direction to the semi-popular
+philosophy of the _Parerga_. From what he takes to be the higher point
+of view, the belief that happiness is attainable by man on earth is an
+illusion; but he holds that, by keeping steadily in view a kind of
+tempered happiness as the end, many mistakes may be avoided in the
+conduct of life, provided that each recognises at once the strength and
+weakness of his own character, and does not attempt things that, with
+the given limitations, are impossible. Of the highest truth, as he
+conceived it, he could therefore make no use. Only by means of a truth
+that he was bound to hold half-illusory could a working scheme be
+constructed for himself and others. This result may give us guidance in
+seeking to learn what we can from a thinker who is in reality no
+representative of a decadence, but is fundamentally sane and rational,
+even in spite of himself.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
+
+
+The title of Schopenhauer's chief work is rendered in the English
+translation, _The World as Will and Idea_. Here the term 'idea' is used
+in the sense it had for Locke and Berkeley; namely, any object of mental
+activity. Thus it includes not merely imagery, but also perception.
+Since Hume distinguished ideas' from 'impressions,' it has tended to be
+specialised in the former sense. The German word, _Vorstellung_, which
+it is used to render, conveys the generalised meaning of the Lockian
+'idea,' now frequently expressed in English and French philosophical
+works by the more technical term 'presentation' or 'representation.' By
+Schopenhauer himself the word 'Idea' was used exclusively in the sense
+of the Platonic Idea, which, as we shall see, plays an important part in
+his philosophy. The distinction is preserved in the translation by the
+use of a capital when Idea has the latter meaning; but in a brief
+exposition it seems convenient to adopt a more technical rendering of
+_Vorstellung_; and, from its common employment in psychological
+text-books, I have selected 'presentation' as the most suitable.
+
+The first proposition of Schopenhauer's philosophical system is, 'The
+world is my presentation.' By this he means that it presents itself as
+appearance to the knowing subject. This appearance is in the forms of
+time, space and causality. Under these forms every phenomenon
+necessarily appears, because they are _a priori_ forms of the subject.
+The world as it presents itself consists entirely of phenomena, that is,
+appearances, related according to these forms. The most fundamental form
+of all is the relation between object and subject, which is implied in
+all of them. Without a subject there can be no presented object.
+
+Schopenhauer is therefore an idealist in the sense in which we call
+Berkeley's theory of the external world idealism; though the expressions
+used are to some extent different. The difference proceeds from his
+following of Kant. His Kantianism consists in the recognition of _a
+priori_ forms by which the subject constructs for itself an 'objective'
+world of appearances. With Berkeley he agrees as against Kant in not
+admitting any residue whatever, in the object as such, that is not
+wholly appearance. But while he allows that Berkeley, as regards the
+general formulation of idealism, was more consistent than Kant, he finds
+him, in working out the principle, altogether inadequate. For the modern
+mind there is henceforth no way in philosophy except through Kant, from
+whom dates the revolution by which scholastic dualism was finally
+overthrown. Kant's systematic construction, however, he in effect
+reduces to very little. His is a much simplified 'Apriorism.' While
+accepting the 'forms of sensible intuition,' that is, time and space,
+just as Kant sets them forth, he clears away nearly all the superimposed
+mechanism. Kant's 'Transcendental Ćsthetic,' he says, was a real
+discovery in metaphysics; but on the basis of this he for the most part
+only gave free play to his architectonic impulse. Of the twelve
+'categories of the understanding,' which he professed to derive from the
+logical forms of judgment, all except causality are mere 'blind
+windows.' This alone, therefore, Schopenhauer adopts; placing it,
+however, not at a higher level but side by side with time and space,
+Kant's forms of intuition. These three forms, according to Schopenhauer,
+make up the understanding of men and animals. 'All intuition is
+intellectual.' It is not first mere appearance related in space and
+time, and waiting for understanding to organise it; but, in animals as
+in man, it is put in order at once under the three forms that suffice to
+explain the knowledge all have of the phenomenal world.
+
+To Reason as distinguished from Understanding, Schopenhauer assigns no
+such exalted function as was attributed to it in portions of his system
+by Kant, and still more by some of his successors. The name of 'reason,'
+he maintains, ought on etymological grounds to be restricted to the
+faculty of abstract concepts. This, and not understanding, is what
+distinguishes man from animals. It discovers and invents nothing, but it
+puts in a generalised and available form what the understanding has
+discovered in intuition.
+
+For the historical estimation of Schopenhauer, it is necessary to place
+him in relation to Kant, as he himself always insisted. Much also in his
+chief work is made clearer by knowledge of his dissertation _On the
+Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason_, to which he is
+constantly referring. Later, his manner of exposition became more
+independent; so that he can be read by the general reader with profit
+simply by himself, and without reference to antecedents. Still, it will
+always be advisable for an expositor to follow his directions, at least
+to the extent of giving some short account of the dissertation. This I
+proceed to give approximately in the place to which he has assigned it
+in his system.
+
+The name of the principle (_principium rationis sufficientis_) he took
+over from Leibniz and his successor Wolff, but gave it a new amplitude.
+With him, it stands as an inclusive term for four modes of connection by
+which the thoroughgoing relativity of phenomena to one another is
+constituted for our intelligence. The general statement adopted is,
+'Nothing is without a reason why it should be rather than not be.'
+Its four forms are the principles of becoming (_fiendi_), of knowing
+(_cognoscendi_), of being (_essendi_), and of acting (_agendi_).
+(1) Under the first head come 'causes.' These are divided into 'cause
+proper,' for inorganic things; 'stimulus,' for the vegetative life both
+of plants and animals, and 'motive,' for animals and men. The law of
+causation is applicable only to changes; not to the forces of nature, to
+matter, or to the world as a whole, which are perdurable. Cause precedes
+effect in time. Not one thing, but one state of a thing, is the cause of
+another. From the law of causation there results an infinite series _a
+parte ante_ as well as _a parte post_. (2) The principle of sufficient
+reason of knowing is applicable to concepts, which are all derived from
+intuition, that is, from percepts. The laws of logic, which come under
+this head, can yield nothing original, but can only render explicit what
+was in the understanding. (3) Under the third head come arithmetical and
+geometrical relations. These are peculiar relations of presentations,
+distinct from all others, and only intelligible in virtue of a pure _a
+priori_ intuition. For geometry this is space; for arithmetic time, in
+which counting goes on. Scientifically, arithmetic is fundamental. (4)
+As the third form of causality was enumerated 'motive' for the will; but
+in that classification it was viewed from without, as belonging to the
+world of objects. Through the direct knowledge we have of our own will,
+we know also from within this determination by the presentation we call
+a motive. Hence emerges the fourth form of the principle of sufficient
+reason. This at a later stage makes possible the transition from physics
+to metaphysics.
+
+All these forms alike are forms of necessary determination. Necessity
+has no clear and true sense but certainty of the consequence when the
+ground is posited. All necessity therefore is conditional. In accordance
+with the four expressions of the principle of sufficient reason, it
+takes the fourfold shape of physical, logical, mathematical, and moral
+necessity.
+
+The sharp distinction between logical and mathematical truth, with the
+assignment of the former to conceptual and of the latter to intuitive
+relations, comes to Schopenhauer directly from Kant. So also does his
+view that the necessary form of causation is sequence; though here his
+points of contact with English thinkers, earlier and later, are very
+marked. Only in his statement of the 'law of motivation' as 'causality
+seen from within' does he hint at his own distinctive metaphysical
+doctrine. Meanwhile, it is evident that he is to be numbered with the
+group of modern thinkers who have arrived in one way or another at a
+complete scientific phenomenism. Expositors have noted that in his
+earlier statements of this he tends to lay more stress on the character
+of the visible and tangible world as mere appearance. The impermanence,
+the relativity, of all that exists in time and space, leads him to
+describe it, in a favourite term borrowed from Indian philosophy, as
+Maya, or illusion. Later, he dwells more on the relative reality of
+things as they appear. His position, however, does not essentially
+alter, but only finds varying expression as he turns more to the
+scientific or to the metaphysical side. From Hume's view on causation he
+differs not by opposing its pure phenomenism, but only by recognising,
+as Kant does, an _a priori_ element in the form of its law. German
+critics have seen in his own formulation an anticipation of Mill, and
+this is certainly striking as regards the general conception of the
+causal order, although there is no anticipation of Mill's inductive
+logic. On the same side there is a close agreement with Malebranche and
+the Occasionalists, pointed out by Schopenhauer himself. The causal
+explanations of science, he is at one with them in insisting, give no
+ultimate account of anything. All its causes are no more than
+'occasional causes,'--merely instances, as Mill expressed it afterwards,
+of 'invariable and unconditional sequence.' From Mill of course he
+differs in holding its form to be necessary and _a priori_, not
+ultimately derived from a summation of experiences; and, with the
+Occasionalists, he goes on to metaphysics in its sense of ontology, as
+Mill never did. The difference here is that he does not clothe his
+metaphysics in a theological dress.
+
+In the later development of his thought, Schopenhauer dealt more
+expressly with the question, how this kind of phenomenism is
+reconcilable with a scientific cosmogony. On one side the proposition,
+'No object without subject,' makes materialism for ever impossible; for
+the materialist tries to explain from relations among presentations what
+is the condition of all presentation. On the other side, we are all
+compelled to agree with the materialists that knowledge of the object
+comes late in a long series of material events. Inorganic things existed
+in time before life; vegetative life before animal life; and only with
+animal life does knowledge emerge. Reasoned knowledge of the whole
+series comes only at the end of it in the human mind. This apparent
+contradiction he solves by leaving a place for metaphysics. Our
+representation of the world as it existed before the appearance of life
+was indeed non-existent at the time to which we assign it; but the real
+being of the world had a manifestation not imaginable by us. For this,
+we substitute a picture of a world such as we should have been aware of
+had our 'subject,' with its _a priori_ forms of time, space, and
+causality, been then present. What the reality is, is the problem of the
+thing-in-itself (to use the Kantian term). This problem remains over;
+but we know that the metaphysical reality cannot be matter; for matter,
+with all its qualities, is phenomenal. It exists only 'for
+understanding, through understanding, in understanding.' These
+discriminations made, Schopenhauer offers us a scientific cosmogony
+beginning with the nebular hypothesis and ending with an outline of
+organic evolution. This last differs from the Darwinian theory in
+supposing a production of species by definite steps instead of by
+accumulation of small individual variations. At a certain time, a form
+that has all the characters of a new species appears among the progeny
+of an existing species. Man is the last and highest form to be evolved.
+From Schopenhauer's metaphysics, as we shall see, it follows that no
+higher form of life will ever appear.
+
+A word may be said here on a materialistic-sounding phrase which is
+very prominent in Schopenhauer's later expositions, and has been
+remarked on as paradoxical for an idealist. The world as presentation,
+he often says, is 'in the brain.' This, it must be allowed, is not fully
+defensible from his own point of view, except with the aid of a later
+distinction. The brain as we know it is of course only a part of the
+phenomenon of the subject,--a grouping of possible perceptions. How
+then, since it is itself only appearance, can it be the bearer of the
+whole universe as appearance? The answer is that Schopenhauer meant in
+reality 'the being of the brain,' and not the brain as phenomenon. He
+had a growing sense of the importance of physiology for the
+investigation of mind; and his predilection led him to adopt a not quite
+satisfactory shorthand expression for the correspondence we know
+scientifically to exist between our mental processes and changes capable
+of objective investigation in the matter of the brain.
+
+In science his distinctive bent was to the borderland between psychology
+and physiology. Hence came the attraction exercised on him by Goethe's
+theory of colours. To his own theory, though, unlike his philosophical
+system, it has always failed to gain the attention he predicted for it,
+the merit must be allowed of treating the problem as essentially one of
+psychophysics. What he does is to attempt to ascertain the conditions in
+the sensibility of the retina that account for our actual
+colour-sensations. This problem was untouched by the Newtonian theory;
+but Schopenhauer followed Goethe in the error of trying to overthrow
+this on its own ground. He had no aptitude for the special inquiries of
+mathematics and physics, though he had gained a clear insight into their
+general nature as sciences. On the psycho-physical side there is to-day
+no fully authorised theory. The problem indeed has become ever more
+complex. Schopenhauer's attempt, by combination of sensibilities to
+'light' and 'darkness,' to explain the phenomena of complementary
+colours, deserves at least a record in the long series of essays of
+which the best known are the 'Young-Helmholtz theory' and that of
+Hering. It marks an indubitable advance on Goethe in the clear
+distinction drawn between the mixture, in the ordinary sense, that can
+only result in dilution to different shades of grey, and the kinds of
+mixture from which, in their view, true colours arise.
+
+A characteristic position in Schopenhauer's theory of knowledge, and one
+that is constantly finding new expression in his writings, is the
+distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge already touched on.
+Intuitive knowledge of the kind that is common to men and animals, as we
+have seen, makes up, in his terminology, the 'understanding'; while
+'reason' is the distinctively human faculty of concepts. When he
+depreciates this, as he often does, in comparison with 'intuition,' it
+must be remembered that he does not limit this term to perception of
+particulars, but ascribes to what he calls the 'Platonic Idea' a certain
+kind of union between reason and 'phantasy,' which gives it an intuitive
+character of its own. Thus intuition can stand, though not in every case
+for what is higher, yet always for that which is wider and greater and
+more immediate. Whatever may be done with reflective reason and its
+abstractions, every effectual process of thought must end, alike for
+knowledge and art and virtue, in some intuitive presentation. The
+importance of reason for practice is due to its generality. Its function
+is subordinate. It does not furnish the ground of virtuous action any
+more than ćsthetic precepts can enable any one to produce a work of art;
+but it can help to preserve constancy to certain maxims, as also in art
+a reasoned plan is necessary because the inspiration of genius is not
+every moment at command. Virtue and artistic genius alike, however,
+depend ultimately on intuition: and so also does every true discovery in
+science. The nature of pedantry is to try to be guided everywhere by
+concepts, and to trust nothing to perception in the particular case.
+Philosophy also Schopenhauer regards as depending ultimately on a
+certain intuitive view; but he allows that it has to translate this into
+abstractions. Its problem is to express the _what_ of the world in
+abstract form: science dealing only with the _why_ of phenomena related
+within the world. This character of philosophy as a system of abstract
+concepts deprives it of the immediate attractiveness of art; so that, as
+he says in one place, it is more fortunate to be a poet than a
+philosopher.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL
+
+
+We have seen that scientific explanation does not go beyond
+presentations ordered in space and time. This is just as true of the
+sciences of causation--the 'ćtiological' sciences--as it is of
+mathematical science. All that we learn from Mechanics, Physics,
+Chemistry and Physiology, is 'how, in accordance with an infallible
+rule, one determinate state of matter necessarily follows another: how a
+determinate change necessarily conditions and brings on another
+determinate change.' This knowledge does not satisfy us. We wish to
+learn the significance of phenomena; but we find that from outside,
+while we view them as presentations, their inner meaning is for ever
+inaccessible.
+
+The starting-point for the metaphysical knowledge we seek is given us in
+our own body. The animal body is 'the immediate object of the subject':
+in it as presentation the 'effects' of 'causes' in the order of
+presentations external to it are first recognised. Now in virtue of his
+body the investigator is not pure knowing subject standing apart from
+that which he knows. In the case of the particular system of
+presentations constituting his organism, he knows what these
+presentations signify, and that is his _will_ in a certain modification.
+The subject appears as individual through its identity with the body,
+and this body is given to it in two different ways: on one side as
+object among objects, and subjected to their laws; on the other side as
+the will immediately known to each. The act of will and the movement of
+the body are not two different states related as cause and effect; for
+the relation of cause and effect belongs only to the object, the
+phenomenon, the presentation. They are one and the same act given in
+different manners: the will, immediately to the subject; the movement,
+in sensible intuition for understanding. The action of the body is the
+objectified act of will. Called at first the immediate object of
+presentation, the body may now, from the other side, be called 'the
+objectivity of the will.'
+
+Thus, as was said, the 'law of motivation' discloses the inner nature of
+causality. In causality in general we know only relations of phenomena;
+but in the case of our own body we know something else that those
+relations express; namely, the act of will determined by motives. Now
+there are in the world as presentation other systems like that which we
+call our body. Unless all these are to be supposed mere phantoms without
+inner reality, we must infer by analogy, in correspondence with like
+phenomena, other individual wills similar to that which we know in
+ourselves. This inference from analogy, universally admitted in the case
+of human and animal bodies, must be extended to the whole corporeal
+world. The failure to take this step is where the purely intellectual
+forms of idealism have come short. Kant's 'thing-in-itself,' which is
+not subject to the forms by which presentations become experience, but
+which experience and its forms indicate as the reality, has been wrongly
+condemned by his successors as alien to idealism. It is true that Kant
+did in some respects fail to maintain the idealistic position with the
+clearness of Berkeley; but his shortcoming was not in affirming a
+thing-in-itself beyond phenomena. Here, in Schopenhauer's view, is the
+metaphysical problem that he left a place for but did not solve. The
+word of the riddle has now been pronounced. Beyond presentation, that
+is, in itself and according to its innermost essence, the world is that
+which we find in ourselves immediately as will. By this it is not meant
+that a falling stone, for example, acts from a motive; knowledge and the
+consequent action from motives belongs only to the determinate form that
+the will has in animals and men; but the reality in the stone also is
+the same in essence as that to which we apply the name of will in
+ourselves. He who possesses this key to the knowledge of nature's
+innermost being will interpret the forces of vegetation, of
+crystallisation, of magnetism, of chemical affinity, even of weight
+itself, as different only in phenomenal manifestation but in essence the
+same; namely, that which is better known to each than all else, and
+where it emerges most clearly is called will. Only the will is
+thing-in-itself. It is wholly different from presentation, and is that
+of which presentation is the phenomenon, the visibility, the
+objectivity. Differences affect only the degree of the appearing, not
+the essence of that which appears.
+
+While the reality everywhere present is not will as specifically known
+in man, the mode of indicating its essence by reference to this,
+Schopenhauer contends, is a gain in insight. The thing-in-itself ought
+to receive its name from that among all its manifestations which is the
+clearest, the most perfect, the most immediately illumined by knowledge;
+and this is man's will. When we say that every force in nature is to be
+thought of as Will, we are subsuming an unknown under a known. For the
+conception of Force is abstracted from the realm of cause and effect,
+and indicates the limit of scientific explanation. Having arrived at the
+forces of nature on the one side and the forms of the subject on the
+other, science can go no further. The conception of Will can make known
+that which was so far concealed, because it proceeds from the most
+intimate consciousness that each has of himself, where the knower and
+the known coincide.
+
+By this consciousness, in which subject and object are not yet set
+apart, we reach something universal. In itself the Will is not
+individualised, but exists whole and undivided in every single thing in
+nature, as the Subject of contemplation exists whole and undivided in
+each cognitive being. It is entirely free from all forms of the
+phenomenon. What makes plurality possible is subjection to the forms of
+time and space, by which only the phenomenon is affected. Time and space
+may therefore be called, in scholastic terminology, the 'principle of
+individuation.' While each of its phenomena is subject to the law of
+sufficient reason, which is the law of appearance in these forms, there
+is for the Will as thing-in-itself no rational ground: it is 'grundlos.'
+It is free from all plurality, although its phenomena in space and time
+are innumerable. It is one, not with the unity of an object or of a
+concept, but as that which lies outside of space and time, beyond the
+_principium individuationis_, that is, the possibility of plurality. The
+individual, the person, is not will as thing-in-itself, but phenomenon
+of the will, and as such determined. The will is 'free' because there is
+nothing beyond itself to determine it. Further, it is in itself mere
+activity without end, a blind striving. Knowledge appears only as the
+accompaniment of its ascending stages.
+
+Here we have arrived at the thought which, in its various expressions,
+constitutes Schopenhauer's metaphysics. That this cannot be
+scientifically deduced he admits; but he regards it as furnishing such
+explanation as is possible of science itself. For science there is in
+everything an inexplicable element to which it runs back, and which is
+real, not merely phenomenal. From this reality we are most remote in
+pure mathematics and in the pure _a priori_ science of nature as it was
+formulated by Kant. These owe their transparent clearness precisely to
+their absence of real content, or to the slightness of this. The attempt
+to reduce organic life to chemistry, this again to mechanism, and at
+last everything to arithmetic, could it succeed, would leave mere form
+behind, from which all the content of phenomena would have vanished. And
+the form would in the end be form of the subject. But the enterprise is
+vain. 'For in everything in nature there is something of which no ground
+can ever be given, of which no explanation is possible, no cause further
+is to be sought.' What for man is his inexplicable character,
+presupposed in every explanation of his deeds from motives, that for
+every inorganic body is its inexplicable quality, the manner of its
+acting.
+
+The basis of this too is will, and 'groundless,' inexplicable will; but
+evidently the conception here is not identical with that of the Will
+that is one and all. How do we pass from the universal to that which has
+a particular character or quality? For of the Will as thing-in-itself we
+are told that there is not a greater portion in a man and a less in a
+stone. The relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space. The
+more and less touches only the phenomenon, that is, the visibility, the
+objectivation. A higher degree of this is in the plant than in the
+stone, in the animal than in the plant, and so forth; but the Will that
+is the essence of all is untouched by degree, as it is beyond plurality,
+space and time, and the relation of cause and effect.
+
+The answer to the question here raised is given in Schopenhauer's
+interpretation of the Platonic Ideas. These he regards as stages of
+objectivation of the Will. They are, as Plato called them, eternal forms
+related to particular things as models. The lowest stage of
+objectivation of the Will is represented by the forces of inorganic
+nature. Some of these, such as weight and impenetrability, appear in all
+matter. Some are divided among its different kinds, as rigidity,
+fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical properties. They
+are not subject to the relation of cause and effect, but are presupposed
+by it. A force is neither cause of an effect nor effect of a cause.
+Philosophically, it is immediate objectivity of the will; in ćtiology,
+_qualitas occulta_. At the lowest stages of objectivation, there is no
+individuality. This does not appear in inorganic things, nor even in
+merely organic or vegetative life, but only as we ascend the scale of
+animals. Even in the higher animals the specific enormously predominates
+over the individual character. Only in man is the Idea objectified in
+the individual character as such. 'The character of each individual man,
+so far as it is thoroughly individual and not entirely comprehended in
+that of the species, may be regarded as a particular Idea, corresponding
+to a peculiar act of objectivation of the Will.'
+
+Schopenhauer warns us against substituting this philosophical
+explanation for scientific ćtiology. The chain of causes and effects, he
+points out, is not broken by the differences of the original,
+irreducible forces. The ćtiology and the philosophy of nature go side by
+side, regarding the same object from different points of view. Yet he
+also gives us in relation to his philosophy much that is not
+unsuggestive scientifically. His doctrine is not properly evolutionary,
+since the Ideas are eternal; but he has guarded incidentally against our
+supposing that all the natural kinds that manifest the Ideas
+phenomenally must be always represented in every world. For our
+particular world, comprising the sun and planets of the solar system, he
+sets forth in the _Parerga_ an account of the process by which it
+develops from the nebula to man. This was referred to in the preceding
+chapter. In his fundamental work he describes a struggle, present
+through the whole of nature, in which the phenomenal manifestations of
+the higher Ideas conquer and subjugate those of the lower, though they
+leave them still existent and ever striving to get loose. Here has been
+seen an adumbration of natural selection: he himself admits the
+difficulty he has in making it clear. We must remember that it is
+pre-Darwinian.
+
+Knowledge or intelligence he seeks to explain as an aid to the
+individual organism in its struggle to subsist and to propagate its
+kind. It first appears in animal life. It is represented by the brain or
+a large ganglion, as every endeavour of the Will in its
+self-objectivation is represented by some organ; that is, displays
+itself for presentation as such and such an appearance. Superinduced
+along with this contrivance for aid in the struggle, the world as
+presentation, with all its forms, subject and object, time, space,
+plurality and causality, is all at once there. 'Hitherto only will, it
+is now at the same time presentation, object of the knowing subject.'
+Then in man, as a higher power beyond merely intuitive intelligence,
+appears reason as the power of abstract conception. For the most part,
+rational as well as intuitive knowledge, evolved originally as a mere
+means to higher objectivation of the Will, remains wholly in its
+service. How, in exceptional cases, intellect emancipates itself, will
+be discussed under the heads of Ćsthetics and Ethics.
+
+That this view implies a teleology Schopenhauer expressly recognises.
+Indeed he is a very decided teleologist on lines of his own, and, in
+physiology, takes sides strongly with 'vitalism' as against pure
+mechanicism. True, the Will is 'endless' blind striving, and is
+essentially divided against itself. Everywhere in nature there is
+strife, and this takes the most horrible forms. Yet somehow there is in
+each individual manifestation of will a principle by which first the
+organism with its vital processes, and then the portion of it called the
+brain, in which is represented the intellect with its _a priori_ forms,
+are evolved as aids in the strife. And, adapting all the manifestations
+to one another, there is a teleology of the universe. The whole world,
+with all its phenomena, is the objectivity of the one and indivisible
+Will; the Idea which is related to all other Ideas as the harmony to the
+single voices. The unity of the Will shows itself in the unison of all
+its phenomena as related to one another. Man, its clearest and
+completest objectivation, is the summit of a pyramid, and could not
+exist without this. Inorganic and organic nature, then, were adapted to
+the future appearance of man, as man is adapted to the development that
+preceded him. But in thinking the reality, time is to be abstracted
+from. The earlier, we are obliged to say, is fitted to the later, as the
+later is fitted to the earlier; but the relation of means to end, under
+which we cannot help figuring the adaptation, is only appearance for our
+manner of knowledge. And the harmony described does not get rid of the
+conflict inherent in all will.
+
+In this account of Schopenhauer's metaphysical doctrine, I have tried to
+make the exposition as smooth as possible; but at two points the
+discontinuity can scarcely be concealed. First, the relation of the
+universal Will to the individual will is not made clear; and, secondly,
+the emergence of the world of presentation, with the knowledge in which
+it culminates, is left unintelligible because the will is conceived as
+mere blind striving without an aim. As regards the first point,
+disciples and expositors have been able to show that, by means of
+distinctions in his later writings, apparent contradictions are to some
+extent cleared away; and, moreover, that he came to recognise more
+reality in the individual will. On the second point, I think it will be
+necessary to admit that his system as such breaks down. But both points
+must be considered in their connection.
+
+One of the most noteworthy features of Schopenhauer's philosophy is, as
+he himself thought, the acceptance from first to last of Kant's
+distinction between the 'empirical' and the 'intelligible' character of
+the individual. Every act of will of every human being follows with
+necessity as phenomenon from its phenomenal causes; so that all the
+events of each person's life are determined in accordance with
+scientific law. Nevertheless, the character empirically manifested in
+the phenomenal world, while it is completely necessitated, is the
+expression of something that is free from necessitation. This
+'intelligible character' is out of time, and, itself undetermined,
+manifests itself through that which develops in time as a chain of
+necessary causes and effects. That this doctrine had been taken up,
+without any ambiguity as regards the determinism, by Schelling as well
+as by himself, he expressly acknowledges; and he finds it, as he also
+finds modern idealism, anticipated in various passages by the
+Neo-Platonists. His adaptation of it to his doctrine of the Ideas is
+distinctly Neo-Platonic in so far as he recognises 'Ideas of
+individuals'; but of course to make Will the essence belongs to his own
+system. 'The intelligible character,' he says, 'coincides with the Idea,
+or, yet more precisely, with the original act of will that manifests
+itself in it: in so far, not only is the empirical character of each
+man, but also of each animal species, nay, of each plant species, and
+even of each original force of inorganic nature, to be regarded as
+phenomenon of an intelligible character, that is, of an indivisible act
+of will out of time.' This is what he called the '_aseitas_' of the
+will; borrowing a scholastic term to indicate its derivation (if we may
+speak of it as derived) from itself (_a se_), and not from a supposed
+creative act. Only if we adopt this view are we entitled to regard
+actions as worthy of moral approval or disapproval. They are such not
+because they are not necessitated, but because they necessarily show
+forth the nature of an essence the freedom of which consists in being
+what it is. Yet he could not but find a difficulty in reconciling this
+with his position that the one universal Will is identical in all
+things, and in each is 'individuated' only by space and time. For the
+Ideas, like the thing-in-itself, are eternal, that is, outside of time
+as well as space; and all the things now enumerated, forces of nature,
+plant and animal species, and individual characters of men, are declared
+to be in themselves Ideas.
+
+He in part meets this difficulty by the subtlety that time and space do
+not, strictly speaking, determine individuality, but arise along with
+it. The diremption of individualities becomes explicit in those forms.
+Yet he must have perceived that this is not a complete answer, and
+various modifications can be seen going on. His first view clearly was
+that the individual is wholly impermanent, and at death simply
+disappears; nothing is left but the one Will and the universal Subject
+of contemplation identical in all. Metempsychosis is the best
+mythological rendering of what happens, but it is no more. Later, he
+puts forward the not very clearly defined theory of a 'palingenesia' by
+which a particular will, but not the intellect that formerly accompanied
+it, may reappear in the phenomenal world. And the hospitality he showed
+to stories of magic, clairvoyance, and ghost-seeing, is scarcely
+compatible with the view that the individual will is no more than a
+phenomenal differentiation of the universal will. A speculation (not put
+forward as anything more) on the appearance of a special providence in
+the destiny of the individual, points, as Professor Volkelt has noted,
+to the idea of a guidance, not from without, but by a kind of good
+daemon or genius that is the ultimate reality of the person. On all this
+we must not lay too much stress; but there is certainly one passage that
+can only be described as a definite concession that the individual is
+real in a sense not at first allowed. Individuality, it is said in so
+many words (_Parerga_, ii. § 117), does not rest only on the 'principle
+of individuation' (time and space), and is therefore not through and
+through phenomenon, but is rooted in the thing-in-itself. 'How deep its
+roots go belongs to the questions which I do not undertake to
+answer.'[1]
+
+  [1] _Werke_, ed. Frauenstädt, vol. vi. p. 243.
+
+This tends to modify considerably, but does not overthrow,
+Schopenhauer's original system. In very general terms, he is in the
+number of the 'pantheistic' thinkers; and it is remarkable, on
+examination, how these, in Europe at least, have nearly always
+recognised in the end some permanent reality in the individual. This is
+contrary to first impressions: but the great names may be cited of
+Plotinus, John Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, Spinoza (in Part v. of
+the _Ethics_), and finally of Schopenhauer's special aversion, Hegel,
+who has been supposed most unfavourable of all to any recognition of
+individuality as real. It is more true, Hegel maintains, that the
+individuality determines its world than that it is determined by it; and
+there is no explanation why the determination should be such and such
+except that the individuality was already what it is.[2] And, if
+Schopenhauer's more imaginative speculations seek countenance from the
+side of empiricism, there is nothing in them quite so audacious as a
+speculation of J. S. Mill on disembodied mind, thrown out during the
+time when he was writing his _Logic_.[3]
+
+  [2] _Phänomenologie des Geistes_, Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. G. Lasson, pp.
+  201-3.
+
+  [3] Letter to Robert Barclay Fox, May 10, 1842. Printed in Appendix to
+  _Letters and Journals of Caroline Fox_, third ed., vol. ii. pp. 331-2.
+  'To suppose that the eye is _necessary_ to sight,' says Mill, 'seems to
+  me the notion of one immersed in matter. What we call our bodily
+  sensations are all in the mind, and would not necessarily or probably
+  cease, because the body perishes.'
+
+The association with pantheism Schopenhauer accepts in principle, though
+the name is not congenial to him. In his system the Will is one and all,
+like the 'Deus' of Spinoza. The difference is that, instead of ascribing
+perfection to the universe that is its manifestation, he regards the
+production of a world as a lapse from which redemption is to be sought.
+His doctrine has been rightly described, in common with the predominant
+philosophical doctrines of his period, as a resultant of the deepened
+subjective analysis brought by Kant into modern philosophy on the one
+side, and of the return to Spinoza in the quest for unity of principle
+on the other. Why, then, it may be asked, are Fichte, Schelling, and
+Hegel the constant objects of his attack? The true explanation is not
+the merely external one, that they were his successful rivals for public
+favour, but is to be found in a real antithesis of thought. Within the
+limits of the idealism they all hold in common, Schopenhauer is at the
+opposite pole. In spite of his attempt to incorporate the Platonic
+Ideas, and in spite of his following of Kant, whose 'intelligible world'
+was in essence Platonic or neo-Platonic, he could find no place in his
+system for a rational order at the summit. Now this order was precisely
+what Fichte and Hegel aimed at demonstrating. If Schopenhauer is less
+unsympathetic in his references to Schelling, that is because
+Schelling's world-soul appeared to him to prefigure his own attempt to
+discover in nature the manifestation of a blindly striving will or
+feeling rather than reason. Suspicious as he shows himself of possible
+plagiarisms by others, the charge cannot be retorted against himself.
+The supreme principle of Fichte, it has been pointed out, has an
+actively volitional character and was formulated before Schopenhauer's:
+but then it is essentially rational. For Hegel, what is supreme is the
+world-reason. Hence they are at one with Plato in holding that in some
+sense 'mind is king.' For Schopenhauer, on the contrary, mind, or pure
+intellect, is an emancipated slave. Having reached its highest point,
+and seen through the work of the will, it does not turn back and
+organise it, but abolishes it as far as its insight extends.
+
+Yet to say merely this is to give a wrong impression of Schopenhauer.
+Starting though he does with blind will, and ending with the flight of
+the ascetic from the suffering inherent in the world that is the
+manifestation of such a will, he nevertheless, in the intermediate
+stages, makes the world a cosmos and not a chaos. And the Platonists on
+their side have to admit that 'the world of all of us' does not present
+itself on the surface as a manifestation of pure reason, and that it
+is a serious task to 'rationalise' it. Where he completely fails
+is where the Platonic systems also fail, though from the opposite
+starting-point. His attempt to derive presentation, intellect,
+knowledge, from blind striving, is undoubtedly a failure. But so also
+is the attempt of the Platonising thinkers to deduce a world of mixture
+from a principle of pure reason without aid from anything else
+empirically assumed. Not that in either case there is failure to give
+explanations in detail; but in both cases much is taken from experience
+without reduction to the principles of the system. What we may say by
+way of comparison is this: that if Schopenhauer had in so many words
+recognised an immanent Reason as well as Will in the reality of the
+universe, he would have formally renounced his pessimism; while it
+cannot be said that on the other side a more explicit empiricism in the
+account of the self-manifestation of Reason would necessarily destroy
+the optimism.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+ĆSTHETICS
+
+
+A portion of Schopenhauer's system by which its pessimism is
+considerably mitigated is his theory of the Beautiful and of Fine Art.
+The characteristic of ćsthetic contemplation is, he finds, that
+intellect throws off the yoke and subsists purely for itself as clear
+mirror of the world, free from all subjection to practical purposes of
+the will. In this state of freedom, temporary painlessness is attained.
+
+The theory starts from his adaptation of the Platonic Ideas. Regarded
+purely as an ćsthetic theory, it departs from Plato, as he notes; for,
+with the later Platonists, who took up the defence of poetic myths and
+of the imitative arts as against their master, he holds that Art
+penetrates to the general Idea through the particular, and hence that
+the work of art is no mere 'copy of a copy.' The difference of the Idea
+from the Concept is that it is not merely abstract and general, but
+combines with generality the characters of an intuition.
+
+The Ideas, as we have seen, constitute the determinate stages of
+objectivation of the Will. The innumerable individuals of which the
+Ideas are the patterns are subject to the law of sufficient reason. They
+appear, that is to say, under the forms of time, space, and causality.
+The Idea is beyond these forms, and therefore is clear of plurality and
+change. Since the law of sufficient reason is the common form under
+which stands all the subject's knowledge so far as the subject knows as
+individual, the Ideas lie outside the sphere of knowledge of the
+individual as such. If, therefore, the Ideas are to be the object of
+knowledge, this can only be by annulling individuality in the knowing
+subject.
+
+As thing-in-itself, the Will is exempt even from the first of the forms
+of knowledge, the form of being 'object for a subject.' The Platonic
+Idea, on the other hand, is necessarily an object, something known, a
+presentation. It has laid aside, or rather has not taken on, the
+subordinate forms; but it has retained the first and most general form.
+It is the immediate and most adequate possible objectivity of the Will;
+whereas particular things are an objectivation troubled by the forms of
+which the law of sufficient reason is the common expression.
+
+When intellect breaks loose from the service of the will, for which it
+was originally destined in the teleology of nature, then the subject
+ceases to be merely individual and becomes pure will-less subject of
+knowledge. In this state the beholder no longer tracks out relations in
+accordance with the principle of sufficient reason--which is the mode of
+scientific as well as of common knowledge--but rests in fixed
+contemplation of the given object apart from its connection with
+anything else. The contemplator thus 'lost' in the object, it is not the
+single thing as such that is known, but the Idea, the eternal form, the
+immediate objectivity of the Will at this stage. The correlate of this
+object--the pure Subject exempt from the principle of sufficient
+reason--is eternal, like the Idea.
+
+The objectivation of the Will appears faintly in inorganic
+things,--clouds, water, crystals,--more fully in the plant, yet more
+fully in the animal, most completely in man. Only the essential in these
+stages of objectivation constitutes the Idea. Its development into
+manifold phenomena under the forms of the principle of sufficient
+reason, is unessential, lies merely in the mode of knowledge for the
+individual, and has reality only for this. It is not otherwise with the
+unfolding of that Idea which is the completest objectivation of the
+Will. To the Idea of Man, the occurrences of human history are as
+unessential as the shapes they assume to the clouds, as the figures of
+its whirlpools and foam-drift to the stream, as its frost-flowers to the
+ice. The same underlying passions and dispositions everlastingly recur
+in the same modes. It is idle to suppose that anything is gained. But
+also nothing is lost: so the Earth-spirit might reply to one who
+complained of high endeavours frustrated, faculties wasted, promises of
+world-enlightenment brought to nought; for there is infinite time to
+dispose of, and all possibilities are for ever renewed.
+
+The kind of knowledge for which the Ideas are the object of
+contemplation finds its expression in Art, the work of genius. Art
+repeats in its various media the Ideas grasped by pure contemplation.
+Its only end is the communication of these. While Science, following the
+stream of events according to their determinate relations, never reaches
+an ultimate end, Art is always at the end. 'It stops the wheel of time;
+relations vanish for it: only the essence, the Idea, is its object.' The
+characteristic of genius is a predominant capacity for thus
+contemplating things independently of the principle of sufficient
+reason. Since this requires a forgetting of one's own person and the
+relations between it and things, the attitude of genius is simply the
+completest 'objectivity.' The 'subjectivity' opposed to this, in
+Schopenhauer's phraseology, is preoccupation with the interests of one's
+own will. It is, he says, as if there fell to the share of genius a
+measure of intelligence far beyond the needs of the individual will: and
+this makes possible the setting aside of individual interests, the
+stripping off of the particular personality, so that the subject becomes
+'pure knowing subject,' 'clear world-eye,' in a manner sufficiently
+sustained for that which has been grasped to be repeated in the work of
+art. A necessary element in genius is therefore Imagination. For without
+imagination to represent, in a shape not merely abstract, things that
+have not come within personal experience, genius would remain limited to
+immediate intuition, and could not make its vision apprehensible by
+others. Nor without imagination could the particular things that express
+the Idea be cleared of the imperfections by which their limited
+expression of it falls short of what nature was aiming at in their
+production. 'Inspiration' is ascribed to genius because its
+characteristic attitude is intermittent. The man of genius cannot always
+remain on a height, but has to fall back to the level of the common man,
+who can scarcely at all regard things except as they affect his
+interests,--have a relation to his will, direct or indirect.
+
+This is the statement in its first outline of a theory that became one
+of Schopenhauer's most fruitful topics. Many are the pages he has
+devoted to the contrast between the man of genius and 'the wholesale
+ware of nature, which she turns out daily by thousands.' The genius is
+for him primarily the artist. Scientific genius as a distinctive thing
+he does not fully recognise; and he regards men of action, and
+especially statesmen, rather as men of highly competent ability
+endowed with an exceptionally good physical constitution than as men of
+genius in the proper sense. Philosophers like himself, who, as he
+frankly says, appear about once in a hundred years, he classes in the
+end with the artists; though this was left somewhat indeterminate in his
+first exposition. The weakness of the man of genius in dealing with the
+ordinary circumstances of life he allows, and even insists on. Genius,
+grasping the Idea in its perfection, fails to understand individuals. A
+poet may know man profoundly, and men very ill. He admits the proximity
+of genius to madness on one side, and explains it in this way. What
+marks the stage of actual madness, as distinguished from illusion or
+hallucination, is complete disruption of the memory of past life, of the
+history of the personality as something continuous; so that the
+particular thing is viewed by itself, out of relation. This gives a kind
+of resemblance to the attitude of genius, for which present intuition
+excludes from view the relations of things to each other. Or, as we may
+perhaps sum up his thought in its most general form, 'alienation' or
+dissolution of personality has the resemblance often noted between
+extremes to the impersonality, or, as he calls it, 'objectivity,' that
+is super-personal.
+
+In spite of his contempt for the crowd, he has to admit, of course, that
+the capacity of genius to recognise the Ideas of things and to become
+momentarily impersonal must in some measure belong to all men;
+otherwise, they could not even enjoy a work of art when produced. Genius
+has the advantage only in the much higher degree and the greater
+prolongation of the insight. Since, then, the actual achievement of the
+artist is to make us look into the world through his eyes, the feelings
+for the beautiful and the sublime may be treated irrespectively of the
+question whether they are aroused by nature and human life directly or
+by means of art.
+
+Ćsthetic pleasure in contemplation of the beautiful proceeds partly from
+recognition of the individual object not as one particular thing but as
+Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of this whole kind of
+things; partly from the consciousness the knower has of himself not as
+individual, but as pure, will-less Subject of Knowledge. All volition
+springs out of need, therefore out of want, therefore out of suffering.
+No attained object of will can give permanent satisfaction. Thus, there
+can be no durable happiness or rest for us as long as we are subjects of
+will. 'The Subject of Will lies continually on the turning wheel of
+Ixion, draws ever in the sieve of the Danaides, is the eternally
+thirsting Tantalus. But in the moment of pure objective contemplation,
+free from all interest of the particular subjectivity, we enter a
+painless state: the wheel of Ixion stands still. The Flemish painters
+produce this ćsthetic effect by the sense of disinterested contemplation
+conveyed in their treatment of insignificant objects. There are certain
+natural scenes that have power in themselves, apart from artistic
+treatment, to put us in this state; but the slightest obtrusion of
+individual interest destroys the magic. Past and distant objects,
+through their apparent detachment, have the same power. The essential
+thing ćsthetically, whether we contemplate the present or the past, the
+near or the distant, is that only the world of presentation remains; the
+world as will has vanished.
+
+The difference between the feelings of the Beautiful and of the Sublime
+is this. In the feeling of the beautiful, pure intelligence gains the
+victory without a struggle, leaving in consciousness only the pure
+subject of knowledge, so that no reminiscence of the will remains. In
+the feeling of the sublime, on the other hand, the state of pure
+intelligence has to be won by a conscious breaking loose from relations
+in the object that suggest something threatening to the will; though
+there must not be actual danger; for in that case the individual will
+itself would come into play, and ćsthetic detachment would cease.
+Elevation above the sense of terror has not only to be consciously won
+but consciously maintained, and involves a continuous reminiscence, not
+indeed of any individual will, but of the will of man in general, so far
+as it is expressed through its objectivity, the human body, confronted
+by forces hostile to it. Pre-eminently this feeling arises from
+contrast between the immensities of space and time and the apparent
+insignificance of man. It means in the last resort that the beholder is
+upheld by the consciousness that as pure subject of knowledge (not as
+individual subject) he himself bears within him all the worlds and all
+the ages, and is eternal as the forces that vainly seem to threaten him
+with annihilation.
+
+On the objective side, and apart from the subjective distinction just
+set forth, the sublime and the beautiful are not essentially different.
+In both cases alike, the object of ćsthetic contemplation is not the
+single thing, but the Idea that is striving towards manifestation in it.
+Whatever is viewed ćsthetically is viewed out of relation to time and
+space: 'along with the law of sufficient reason the single thing and the
+knowing individual are taken away, and nothing remains over but the Idea
+and the pure Subject of Knowledge, which together make up the adequate
+objectivity of the Will at this stage.' There is thus a sense in which
+everything is beautiful; since the Will appears in everything at some
+stage of objectivity, and this means that it is the expression of some
+Idea. But one thing can be more beautiful than another by facilitating
+ćsthetic contemplation. This facilitation proceeds either from the
+greater clearness and perfection with which the particular thing shows
+forth the Idea of its kind, or from the higher stage of objectivation to
+which that Idea corresponds. Man being the highest stage of
+objectivation of the Will, the revelation of his essence is the highest
+aim of art. In ćsthetic contemplation of inorganic nature and vegetative
+life, whether in the reality or through the medium of art, and in
+appreciation of architecture, the subjective aspect, that is to say, the
+enjoyment of pure will-less knowledge, is predominant; the Ideas
+themselves being here lower stages of objectivity. On the other hand,
+when animals and men are the object of ćsthetic contemplation or
+representation, the enjoyment consists more in the objective
+apprehension of those Ideas in which the essence of the Will is most
+clearly and fully manifested.
+
+Of all Schopenhauer's work, its ćsthetic part has met with the most
+general appreciation. Here especially he abounds in observations drawn
+directly, in his own phrase, from intuition. To make a selection of
+these, however, is not appropriate to a brief sketch like the present. I
+pass on, therefore, to those portions of his theory of Art by which he
+makes the transition, in terms of his system, to Morality.
+
+From Architecture onward the arts are obliged to represent the Will as
+divided. Here, at the first stage, its division subsists only in a
+conflict of inorganic forces which have to be brought to equilibrium.
+The conflict between weight and rigidity is in truth the only ćsthetic
+material of architecture as a fine art. When we come to animal and
+lastly to human life, which, in the Plastic Arts and in Poetry, as form,
+individualised expression, and action, is the highest object of ćsthetic
+representation, the vehemence of divided will is fully revealed; and
+here too is revealed the essential identity of every will with our own.
+In the words of the Indian wisdom, 'Tat twam asi'; 'that thou art.'
+Under the head of Ethics it will be shown expressly that by this
+insight, when it reacts on the will, the will can deny itself. For the
+temporary release from its striving, given in ćsthetic contemplation, is
+then substituted permanent release. To this 'resignation,' the innermost
+essence of all virtue and holiness, and the final redemption from the
+world, Art itself, at its highest stages, points the way.
+
+The summits of pictorial and poetic art Schopenhauer finds in the great
+Italian painters so far as they represent the ethical spirit of
+Christianity, and in the tragic poets, ancient and modern. It is true
+that the poverty of their sacred history or mythology puts the Christian
+artists at a disadvantage; but events are merely the accidents of their
+art. Not in these, as related according to the law of sufficient reason,
+is the essence, but in the spirit we divine through the forms portrayed.
+In their representation of men full of that spirit, and especially in
+the eyes, we see mirrored the knowledge that has seized the whole
+essence of the world and of life, and that has reacted on the will, not
+so as to give it motives, but as a 'quietive'; whence proceeds complete
+resignation, and with it the annulling of the will and of the whole
+essence of this world. Of tragedy, the subject-matter is the conflict of
+the will with itself at its highest stage of objectivity. Here also the
+end is the resignation brought on by complete knowledge of the essence
+of the world. The hero, on whom at last this knowledge has acted as a
+quietive, gives up, not merely life, but the whole will to live. 'The
+true meaning of tragedy is the deeper insight, that what the hero
+expiates is not his particular sins, but original sin, that is, the
+guilt of existence itself.' To illustrate this position Schopenhauer is
+fond of quoting a passage from Calderon which declares that the greatest
+sin of man is to have been born.
+
+It seems strange that, after deriding as he does the popular notion of
+'poetic justice' so detached a thinker should imagine an at least
+equally one-sided view to receive its final confirmation from the
+Spanish dramatist's poetic phrasing of a Christian dogma. The great
+tragic poets, for Schopenhauer also, are Ćschylus, Sophocles and
+Shakespeare. Now it is safe to say that by none of these was any such
+general doctrine held either in conceptual or in intuitive form. The
+whole effect of any kind of art, of course he would admit, cannot be
+packed into a formula; but if we seek one as an aid to understanding,
+some adaptation of his own theory of the sublime would probably serve
+much better as applied to tragedy than his direct theory of the drama.
+In the case of pictorial art, all that is proved by what he says about
+the representation of ascetic saintliness, is that this, like many other
+things, can be so brought within the scope of art as to make us
+momentarily identify ourselves with its Idea in the impersonal manner he
+has himself described. His purely ćsthetic theory is quite adequate to
+the case, without any assumption that this is the representation of what
+is best. Art, pictorial or poetic, can no more prove pessimism than
+optimism. We pick out expressions of one or the other for quotation
+according to our moods or subjective preferences; but, if we have the
+feeling for art itself, our sense of actual ćsthetic value ought to be
+independent of these.
+
+Schopenhauer's ćsthetic theory, however, does not end here. There
+follows the part of it by which he has had an influence on artists
+themselves. For him, a position separate from all the other arts is held
+by music. While the rest objectify the Will mediately, that is to say,
+by means of the Ideas, Music is as immediate an objectivation of the
+whole Will as the world itself, or as the Ideas, of which the pluralised
+phenomenon constitutes the sum of particular things. The other arts
+speak of the shadow, music of the substance. There is indeed a
+parallelism, an analogy, between Music and the Ideas; yet Music never
+expresses the phenomenon in which these are manifested, but only the
+inner essence behind the appearance, the Will itself. In a sense it
+renders not feeling in its particularity, but feeling _in abstracto_;
+joy, sorrow, not a joy, a sorrow. The phenomenal world and music are to
+be regarded as two different expressions of the same thing. The world
+might be called embodied Music as well as embodied Will. 'Melodies are
+to a certain extent like general concepts, an abstract of reality.' A
+complete explanation of music, that is, a detailed repetition of it in
+concepts, were this possible, would be a complete explanation of the
+world (since both express the same thing) and therefore a true and final
+philosophy. As music only reaches its perfection in the full harmony,
+'so the one Will out of time finds its perfect objectivation only in
+complete union of all the stages which in innumerable degrees of
+heightened distinctness reveal its essence.' But here, too, Schopenhauer
+adds, the Will is felt, and can be proved, to be a divided will; and the
+deliverance wrought by this supreme art, as by all the others, is only
+temporary.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+ETHICS
+
+
+Permanent redemption from the suffering of the world is to be found only
+in the holiness of the ascetic; but to this there are many stages,
+constituting the generally accepted human virtues. Of these Schopenhauer
+has a rational account to give in terms of his philosophy; and if the
+last stage does not seem to follow by logical sequence from the others,
+this is only what is to be expected; for it is reached, in his view, by
+a sort of miracle. To the highest kind of intuitive knowledge, from
+which the ascetic denial of the will proceeds, artistic contemplation
+ought to prepare the way; and so also, on his principles, ought the
+practice of justice and goodness. Yet he is obliged to admit that few
+thus reach the goal. Of those that do reach it, the most arrive through
+personal suffering, which may be deserved. A true miracle is often
+worked in the repentant criminal, by which final deliverance is
+achieved. Though the 'intelligible character' is unalterable, and the
+empirical character can only be the unfolding of this, as every great
+dramatist intuitively recognises, yet the 'convertites,' like Duke
+Frederick in _As You Like It_, are not to be regarded as hypocrites. The
+'second voyage' to the harbour, that of the disappointed egoist, on
+condition of this miracle, brings the passenger to it as surely as the
+first, that of the true saints, which is only for the few. And in these
+equally a miraculous conversion of the will has to be finally worked.
+
+At the entrance to his distinctive theory of ethics, Schopenhauer places
+a restatement of his metaphysics as the possible basis of a mode of
+contemplating life which, he admits, has some community with an
+optimistic pantheism. The Will, through the presentation and the
+accompanying intelligence developed in its service, becomes conscious
+that that which it wills is precisely the world, life as it is. To call
+it 'the will to live' is therefore a pleonasm. 'Will' and 'will to live'
+are equivalent. For this will, life is everlastingly a certainty.
+'Neither the will, the thing-in-itself in all phenomena, nor the subject
+of knowledge, the spectator of all phenomena, is ever touched by birth
+and death.' It is true that the individual appears and disappears; but
+individuality is illusory. Past and future exist only in conceptual
+thought. 'The form of life is a present without end, howsoever the
+individuals, phenomena of the Idea, come into existence and vanish in
+time, like fugitive dreams.' Only as phenomenon is each man different
+from the other things of the world: as thing-in-itself he is the Will,
+which appears in all, and death takes away the illusion that divides his
+consciousness from the rest. 'Death is a sleep in which the
+individuality is forgotten: everything else wakes again, or rather has
+remained awake.' It is, in the expression adopted by Schopenhauer later,
+an awakening from the dream of life: though this bears with it somewhat
+different implications; and, as has been said, his theory of
+individuality became modified.
+
+With the doctrine of the eternal life of the Will are connected
+Schopenhauer's theories, developed later, of the immortality of the
+species and of individualised sexual love. The latter is by itself a
+remarkable achievement, and constitutes the one distinctly new
+development brought to completion in his later years; for the
+modifications in his theory of individuality are only tentative. His
+theory of love has a determinate conclusion, of great value for
+science, and not really compatible, it seems to me, with his pessimism.
+In its relation to ethics, on which he insisted, it is rightly placed in
+the position it occupies, between the generalised statement of his
+metaphysics just now set forth on the one side, and his theory of human
+virtue on the other.
+
+The teleology that manifests itself in individualised love is, in his
+view, not related in reality to the interests of the individual life,
+but to those of the species. That this is immortal follows from the
+eternity of the Idea it unfolds.[4] The end sought is aimed at
+unconsciously by the person. Fundamentally, for Schopenhauer, teleology
+must of course be unconscious, since the will is blind, and will, not
+intelligence, is primordial. Its typical case is the instinct of
+animals; but the 'instinctive' character belongs also to the
+accomplishment of the highest aims, as in art and virtue. What
+characterises individualised love internally is the aim, attributed to
+'nature' or 'the species,' at a certain typical beauty or perfection of
+the offspring. The lover is therefore deluded in thinking that he is
+seeking his own happiness. What looks through the eyes of lovers is the
+genius of the race, meditating on the composition of the next
+generation. It may, in the complexity of circumstances, be thwarted.
+When it reaches its end, often personal happiness is sacrificed.
+Marriages dictated by interest tend to be happier than love-matches.
+Yet, though the sacrifice of the individual to the race is involuntary
+in these, egoism is after all overcome; hence they are quite rightly the
+object of a certain admiration and sympathy, while the prudential ones
+are looked upon with a tinge of contempt. For here too that element
+appears which alone gives nobility to the life either of intellect or of
+art or of moral virtue, namely, the rising above a subjective interest
+of the individual will.
+
+  [4] The disappearance of species in time raises difficulties in more
+  than one way for his philosophy; but he formally escapes refutation by
+  the suggestion, already noted, that the Idea need not always be
+  manifested phenomenally in the same world. This, however, he did not
+  work out.
+
+No doubt there are touches of pessimism in this statement; but the
+general theory does not seem reconcilable finally with pessimism as
+Schopenhauer understands it. For it is a definitely stated position of
+his that nature keeps up the process of the world by yielding just
+enough to prevent discontinuance of the striving for an illusory end.
+Yet he admits here in the result something beyond bare continuance of
+life; for this is already secured without the particular modification of
+feeling described. What the feeling is brought in to secure is a better
+realisation of the type in actual individuals; and such realisation is
+certainly more than bare subsistence with the least possible expenditure
+of nature's resources.
+
+As the immediate preliminary to his ethics proper, Schopenhauer restates
+his doctrine on the intelligible and the empirical character in man, and
+lays down a generalised psychological position regarding the suffering
+inherent in life. Everything as phenomenon, we have seen already, is
+determined because it is subject to the law of sufficient reason. On the
+other hand, everything as thing-in-itself is free; for 'freedom' means
+only non-subjection to that law. The intelligible character of each man
+is an indivisible, unalterable act of will out of time; the developed
+and explicit phenomenon of this in time and space is the empirical
+character. Man is his own work, not in the light of knowledge, but
+before all knowledge; this is secondary and an instrument. Ultimately,
+freedom is a mystery, and takes us beyond even will as the name for the
+thing-in-itself. In reality, that which is 'will to live' need not have
+been such (though we cannot see how this is so), but has become such
+from itself and from nothing else. This is its '_aseitas_.' Hence it is
+in its power to deny itself as will to live. When it does this, the
+redemption (like the fall) comes from itself. This denial does not mean
+annihilation, except relatively to all that we know under the forms of
+our understanding. For the will, though the nearest we can get to the
+thing-in-itself, is in truth a partially phenomenalised expression of
+this. As the will to live expresses itself phenomenally, so also does
+the denial of the will to live, when this, by special 'grace,' is
+achieved. Only in man does the freedom thus attained find phenomenal
+expression. That man can attain to it proves that in him the will has
+reached its highest possible stage of objectivation; for, after it has
+turned back and denied itself, there is evidently nothing more that we
+can call existence, that is to say, phenomenal existence, beyond. What
+there is beyond in the truth of being is something that the mystics
+know--or rather, possess, for it is beyond knowledge--but cannot
+communicate.
+
+The psychological reason that can be assigned for the ascetic flight
+from the world is that all pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, is merely
+negative. The will is a striving that has no ultimate aim. It is
+sustained only by hindrances. Hindrance means suffering; and every
+satisfaction attained is only temporary, a mere liberation from need,
+want, pain, which is positive. Suffering increases with the degree of
+consciousness. The life of civilised man is an alternation between pain
+and _ennui_, which can itself become as intolerable a suffering as
+anything. The problem of moral philosophy, then, is ultimately how
+redemption from such a world is to be attained, but only so far as this
+is a matter of conceptual knowledge. For philosophy, being from
+beginning to end theoretical, cannot work the practical miracle by which
+the will denies itself.
+
+The intuitive, as distinguished from merely conceptual, knowledge by
+which the return is made, consists essentially in a clear insight into
+the identity of the suffering will in all things and the necessity of
+its suffering as long as it is will to live. This, then, is the true
+foundation of morality. The universe as metaphysical thing-in-itself, as
+noumenon, has an ethical meaning. All its stages of objectivation,
+though in the process what seems to be aimed at is preservation of the
+will as manifested, have in truth for their ultimate aim its redemption
+by suppression of the phenomenal world in which it manifests itself.
+
+Affirmation of the will is affirmation of the body, which is the
+objectivity of the will. The sexual impulse, since it affirms life
+beyond the death of the individual, is the strongest of
+self-affirmations. In it is found the meaning of the mythical
+representation that has taken shape in the theological dogma of original
+sin. For by this affirmation going beyond the individual body, suffering
+and death, as the necessary accompaniment of the phenomenon of life, are
+reaffirmed, and the possibility of redemption this time declared
+fruitless. But through the whole process there runs eternal justice. The
+justification of suffering is that the will affirms itself; and the
+self-affirmation is justified by payment of the penalty.
+
+Before the final redemption--which is not for the world but for the
+individual--there are many stages of ethical progress. These consist in
+the gradual overcoming of egoism by sympathy. And here Schopenhauer
+proceeds to set forth a practical scheme for the social life of man,
+differing from ordinary utilitarianism only by reducing all sympathy to
+pity, in accordance with his view that there can be no such thing as
+positive happiness.
+
+He begins with a theory of justice, legal and moral, very much on the
+lines of Hobbes, except that he regards it as up to a certain point _a
+priori_. Here he is consistent throughout. As in his philosophical
+account of mathematics and physics, so also in his aesthetics and
+ethics, he retained, side by side with a strong empirical tendency,
+belief in certain irreducible _a priori_ forms without which our
+knowledge cannot be constituted. The pure ethical theory of justice, he
+says, bears to the political theory the relation of pure to applied
+mathematics. Injustice he holds to be the positive conception. It means
+the breaking into the sphere of another person's will to live. The
+self-affirmation of the will that appears in one individual body is
+extended to denial of the will that appears in other bodies. Justice
+consists in non-encroachment. There is a 'natural right,' or 'moral
+right,' of resistance to injustice by infliction of what, apart from the
+attempted encroachment, would be wrong. Either force or deception may be
+used; as either may be the instrument of injustice. The purely ethical
+doctrine of justice applies only to action; since only the not doing of
+injustice depends on us. With the State and its laws, the relation is
+reversed. The object of these is to prevent the suffering of injustice.
+The State is not directed against egoism, but has sprung out of a
+rationalised collective egoism. It has for its purpose only to avoid the
+inconvenient consequences of individual aggressions on others. Outside
+of the State, there is a right of self-defence against injustice, but no
+right of punishment. The punishment threatened by the State is
+essentially a motive against committing wrong, intended to supply the
+place of ethical motives for those who are insufficiently accessible to
+them. Actual infliction of it is the carrying out of the threat when it
+has failed, so that in general the expectation of the penalty may be
+certain. Revenge, which has a view to the past, cannot be justified
+ethically: punishment is directed only to the future. There is no right
+in any one to set himself up as a moral judge and inflict pain; but man
+has a right to do what is needful for social security. The criminal's
+acts are of course necessitated; but he cannot justly complain of being
+punished for them, since it is ultimately from himself, from what he is,
+that they sprang.
+
+With the doctrine of 'eternal justice,' touched on above, we pass into a
+different region of thought. What is responsible for the guilt in the
+world is the Will by which everything exists, and the suffering
+everlastingly falls where the guilt is. Take the case of apparently
+unpunished injustice (from the human point of view) expressing itself in
+the extreme form of deliberate cruelty. Through this also, eternal
+justice, from which there is no escape, is fulfilled. 'The torturer and
+the tortured are one. The former errs in thinking he has no share in the
+torture; the latter in thinking he has no share in the guilt.' For all
+the pain of the world is the expiation of the sin involved in the
+self-affirmation of will, and the Will as thing-in-itself is one and the
+same in all.
+
+If this could satisfy any one, there would be no need to go further. The
+whole being as it ought to be, why try to rectify details that are
+absolutely indifferent? But of course the implication is that
+individuality is simply illusory; and this, as has been said, was a
+position that Schopenhauer neither could nor did consistently maintain.
+Indeed, immediately after setting forth this theory of 'eternal
+justice,' he goes on to a relative justification of those acts of
+disinterested vengeance by which a person knowingly sacrifices his own
+life for the sake of retribution on some extraordinary criminal. This,
+he says, is a form of punishment, not mere revenge, although it involves
+an error concerning the nature of eternal justice. Suicide involves a
+similar error, in so far as it supposes that the real being of the
+individual can be assailed through its phenomenal manifestation. It is
+not a denial of the will to live, but a strong affirmation of it, only
+not in the given circumstances: different circumstances are desired with
+such intensity that the present cannot be borne. Therefore the
+individual manifestation of the will is not suppressed. Yet, one might
+reply, if individuality is an illusion attached to the appearance in
+time and space of a particular organism, it would seem that, with the
+disappearance of this, all that distinguishes the individual must
+disappear also.
+
+Schopenhauer had no will thus to escape from life; nor did he afterwards
+devote himself to expounding further his theory of eternal justice. What
+he wrote later, either positively or as mere speculation, implies both
+greater reality in the individual and more of cosmic equity to
+correspond. His next step, even at his first stage, is to continue the
+exposition of a practicable ethics for human life. His procedure
+consists in adding beneficence to justice, with the proviso already
+mentioned, which is required by his psychology, that all beneficence can
+consist only in the relief of pain. For Schopenhauer, as for Comte,
+what is to be overcome is 'egoism,' an excessive degree of which is the
+mark of the character we call 'bad.' The 'good' is what Comte and
+Spencer call the 'altruistic' character. This difference between
+characters Schopenhauer goes on to explain in terms of his metaphysics.
+The egoist is so deluded by the principle of individuation that he
+supposes an absolute cleft between his own person and all others. The
+remorse of conscience from which he suffers proceeds in part from an
+obscure perception that the principle of individuation is illusory.
+Genuine virtue springs out of the intuitive (not merely abstract)
+knowledge that recognises in another individuality the same essence as
+in one's own. The characteristic of the good man is that he makes less
+difference than is customary between himself and others. Justice is an
+intermediate stage between the encroaching egoism of the bad and
+positive goodness. In the renunciation of rights of property, and
+provision for all personal needs without aid from others, practised by
+some religious and philosophical ascetics, it is passing over into
+something more. There is, however, a certain misunderstanding involved
+in so interpreting strict justice; for there are many ways in which the
+rich and powerful can be positively beneficent. At the other extreme,
+when they simply live on their inherited wealth, without doing anything
+in return, their mode of life is morally, though not legally, unjust.
+Rights of property Schopenhauer derived from labour spent on the things
+appropriated. The injustice, in many ways, of the present social order
+he quite recognises. If he has no sympathy with revolutions, it is
+because he has no belief in the realisation of an ideal state. This
+follows from his view of history. Human life, it is his conviction,
+never has been and never will be different as a whole. Redemption from
+evil can be attained only by the individual. All that the State can do
+is to provide certain very general conditions of security under which
+there will be no hindrance to those who desire to live in accordance
+with a moral ideal.
+
+Yet there are qualifications to make. Many passages in Schopenhauer's
+writings prove his firm belief in the future triumph of reason over
+superstition. It is to the honour of humanity, he says, that so
+detestable a form of evil as organised religious persecution has
+appeared only in one section of history. And, in his own personal case,
+he has the most complete confidence that the truths he has put forth
+cannot fail sometime to gain a hearing. In all cases, error is only
+temporary, and truth will prevail. His language on this subject, and
+indeed often on others, is indistinguishable from that of an optimist.
+
+In the last resort, his pessimism entrenches itself behind the
+psychological proposition that every satisfaction is negative, being
+only the removal of a pain. If this is unsustainable, there is nothing
+finally in his Metaphysics of Will to necessitate the pessimistic
+conclusion drawn. The mode of deduction by which he proceeds is to argue
+first to the position already noticed: that all that love of others on
+which morality is based is fundamentally pity. True benevolence can only
+be the desire to relieve others' pain, springing from the identification
+of this with our own. For that reason, moral virtue must finally pass
+over into asceticism--the denial of the will to live. In others, if we
+are able to see through the principle of individuation, we recognise the
+same essence as in ourselves, and we perceive that as long as this wills
+it must necessarily suffer. The end then is to destroy the will to live.
+This is to be done by _askesis_, self-mortification. The first step is
+complete chastity. If, says Schopenhauer, the highest phenomenon of
+will, that is, man, were to disappear through a general refusal to
+affirm life beyond the individual body, man's weaker reflexion in the
+animal world would disappear also, and the consciousness of the whole
+would cease. Knowledge being taken away, the rest would vanish into
+nothingness, since there is 'no object without subject.' That this will
+come to pass, however, he certainly did not believe. He has no
+cosmogony, like that of Hartmann, ending in a general redemption of the
+universe by such a collective act. Nor did he hold, like his later
+successor Mainländer, that through the conflict and gradual extinction
+of individualities, 'this great world shall so wear out to nought.' The
+world for him is without beginning and without end. But the exceptional
+individual can redeem himself. What he does when he has reached the
+height of holiness is by voluntary poverty and all other privations,
+inflicted for their own sake, to break and kill the will, which he
+recognises as the source of his own and of the world's suffering
+existence. In his case not merely the phenomenon ends at death, as with
+others, but the being is taken away. To be a 'world-overcomer' in this
+sense (as opposed to a 'world-conqueror') is the essence of sanctity
+when cleared of all the superstitious dogmas by which the saints try to
+explain their mode of life to themselves.
+
+The absolutely pure expression of this truth is to be found only in
+philosophy; but of the religions Buddhism comes nearest to expressing it
+without admixture. For the Buddhist saint asks aid from no god. True
+Christianity, however,--the Christianity of the New Testament and of the
+Christian mystics,--agrees both with Buddhism and with Brahmanism in
+ultimate aim. What spoils it for Schopenhauer is the Judaic element.
+This, on one side, infects it with the optimism of the Biblical story of
+creation, in which God 'saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it
+was very good.' On the other side, it contaminates the myth of original
+sin, which bears in itself a profound philosophical truth, by this same
+doctrine of a creative God; from which follows all the injustice and
+irrationality necessarily involved in the Augustinian theology, and not
+to be expelled except with its theism. Nevertheless, the story of the
+Fall of Man, of which that theology, in its fundamentally true part, is
+a reasoned expression, is the one thing, Schopenhauer avows, that
+reconciles him to the Old Testament. The truth that it clothes he finds
+also among the Greeks; Empedocles, after the Orphics and Pythagoreans,
+having taught that the soul had been doomed to wander because of some
+antenatal sin. And the mysticism that accompanies all these more or less
+pure expressions of one metaphysical truth he finds represented by the
+Sufis even in optimistic Islam; so that he can claim for his philosophy
+a world-wide consent.
+
+Religion, if we take this to include mysticism, at once rises above
+philosophy and falls below it. As 'metaphysics of the people,' it is a
+mythological expression of philosophical truth: as mysticism, it is a
+kind of 'epi-philosophy.' Beyond pure philosophy Schopenhauer does not
+profess to go; but he accepts what the mystics say as the description of
+a positive experience which becomes accessible when supreme insight is
+attained intuitively. For the philosopher as such, insight into that
+which is beyond the forms of our knowledge and even beyond the will
+itself, remains only conceptual; though it is within the province of
+philosophy to mark out the place for this. The 'something else' that is
+left when the will has been denied, is indicated by the 'ecstasy,'
+'illumination,' 'union with God,' spoken of by the mystics.
+Paradoxically, some of the mystics themselves even have identified it
+with 'nothing'; but the result of the denial of the will to live is to
+be called nothing only in relation to the world as we know it. 'On the
+other hand, to those in whom the will has turned back and denied itself,
+this so very real world of ours with all its suns and milky ways
+is--nothing.'
+
+In this terminus of his philosophy, Schopenhauer recognised his kinship
+with Indian thought, of which he was a lifelong student. To call his
+doctrine a kind of Buddhism is, however, in some ways a misapprehension.
+Undoubtedly he accepts as his ideal the ethical attitude that he finds
+to be common to Buddhism and the Christianity of the New Testament; but
+metaphysical differences mark him off from both. We have seen that he
+rejects the extra-mundane God of Semitic derivation, adopted by
+historical Christianity. Indeed he is one of the most pronounced
+anti-Jehovists of all literature. But equally his belief in a positive
+metaphysical doctrine marks him off from Buddhism, according to the
+account given of it by its most recent students, who regard it either as
+ultimately nihilistic or as having no metaphysics at all, but only a
+psychology and ethics. Nor can he be precisely identified with the
+Vedantists of orthodox Hinduism. Their ultimate reality, if we are to
+find an analogue for it in European metaphysics, seems to resemble the
+hypostasised _ego_ of Fichte, or the Kantian 'transcendental unity of
+apperception', much more than it resembles Schopenhauer's blindly
+striving will as thing-in-itself. Even in practical ethics, he does not
+follow the Indian systems at all closely. Philosophical doctrines of
+justice are of course purely European; and Schopenhauer himself points
+out the sources of his own theory. In his extension of ethics to
+animals, on which he lays much stress, he cites the teachings of Eastern
+non-Semitic religions as superior to the rest; but he does not follow
+the Indians, nor even the Pythagoreans, so far as to make abstinence
+from flesh part of the ideal. He condemns vivisection on the ground that
+animals have rights: certain ways of treating them are unjust, not
+simply uncompassionate. The discussion here again is of course wholly
+within European thought. Thus, in trying to determine his significance
+for modern philosophy, we may consider his system in its immediate
+environment, leaving it to more special students to determine how far it
+received a peculiar colouring from the Oriental philosophies, of which,
+in his time, the more exact knowledge was just beginning to penetrate to
+the West.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE
+
+
+Schopenhauer is not one of the philosophers who have founded a school,
+though he has had many disciples and enthusiastic admirers. The
+pessimism that was for a time a watchword with certain literary groups
+has passed as a mode, and his true significance must be sought
+elsewhere. Of the thinkers who have followed him in his pessimism, two
+indeed stand out as the architects of distinct systems, Eduard von
+Hartmann and Philipp Mainländer (both already incidentally referred to);
+but while they are to be classed unquestionably as philosophers, their
+systems contain an element that their master would have regarded as
+mythological. Schopenhauer declared as clearly as any of the Greeks that
+the phenomenal world is without beginning and without end. Kant's
+positing of an 'antinomy' on this point he regarded as wholly without
+rational justification. What Kant calls the 'antithesis,' namely, the
+infinite series, can be logically proved for phenomena. The 'thesis,'
+which asserts a beginning in time, is defended by mere fallacies. Now
+Hartmann and Mainländer both hold, though in different fashions, that
+there is a world-process from a beginning to an end, namely, the
+extinction of consciousness. This is the redemption of the world. Their
+affinity, therefore, seems to be with the Christian Gnostics rather than
+with the pure philosophers of the Greek tradition, continued in modern
+times by Bruno, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer.
+
+Whatever may be thought of the pessimism by which Schopenhauer's mood is
+distinguished from that of his precursors, few will fail to recognise
+that special doctrines of his system contain at least a large portion of
+truth. His theories of Art, of Genius, and of Love are enough to found
+an enduring reputation for any thinker, even if there were nothing else
+of value in his writings. But there is much else, both in systematic
+construction and in the illumination of detail. I have been inclined to
+put forward first of all the translation into idealistic terms of the
+universal sentiency held by the Ionian thinkers to be inherent in the
+primordial elements of nature. While they viewed the world as an
+objective thing having psychological qualities, Schopenhauer, after the
+long intermediate process of thought, could treat it as phenomenal
+object with a psychological or subjective essence. For both doctrines
+alike, however, mind or soul is immanent. Still, it must be allowed that
+a difference remains by which Schopenhauer was even more remote than
+they were from the later Greek idealism. As they were not materialists,
+so they did not exclude reason from the psychical properties of their
+substances. Schopenhauer, while he rejected the materialism of their
+ancient and modern successors alike, took the step of formally
+derationalising the elements of mind. This, no doubt, is unsustainable
+ultimately, if reason is ever to emerge from them. Yet the one-sidedness
+of the position has had a peculiar value in combating an equally
+one-sided rationalistic idealism. This is recognised by clear-sighted
+opponents. And Schopenhauer's calling the non-rational or anti-rational
+element in the world 'will' helps to make plainer the real problem of
+evil. There is truth in the Hegelian paradox that 'pessimism is an
+excellent basis for optimism.' An optimist like Plotinus saw that, even
+if good comes of evil, the case of the optimist must fail unless evil
+can be shown to be a necessary constituent of the world. The Platonic
+and Neo-Platonic 'matter,' a principle of diremption or individuation,
+like time and space for Schopenhauer, was an attempt to solve this
+problem; but something more positive seemed to be needed as the source
+of the stronger manifestations of evil. To the strength of these Plato
+drew attention in a passage (_Republic_, x. 610[5]) where it is
+acknowledged that injustice confers a character of vitality and
+sleeplessness upon its possessor. In the notion of a blind and vehement
+striving, Schopenhauer supplies something adequate; only, to maintain a
+rational optimism, it must be regarded as a necessary element in a
+mixture, not as the spring of the whole.
+
+  [5] Cited in one of the introductory essays to Jowett and Campbell's
+  edition, vol. ii.
+
+Much might be said on the teleology by which he tries to educe
+intelligence from the primordial strife. Against his view, that it is
+evolved as a mere instrument for preserving races in a struggle, another
+may be set that is ready to hand in a dialogue of Plutarch.[6] The
+struggle among animals, it is there incidentally argued, has for its end
+to sharpen their intelligence. Both these theories are on the surface
+compatible with evolution. If, leaving aside the problem of mechanism,
+we try to verify them by the test of results, the latter undoubtedly
+seems the more plausible. For if the struggle was a means to the
+improvement of intelligence, nature has succeeded more and more;
+whereas, if her intention was to preserve races, she has continually
+failed. This argument is at any rate perfectly valid against
+Schopenhauer himself; for he holds in common with the optimistic
+teleologists that 'nature does nothing in vain.'
+
+  [6] _De Sollertia Animalium_, 27.
+
+I will conclude with a few detached criticisms on the ethical doctrine
+which he regarded as the culmination of his system. The antithesis, it
+may first be noted, between the temporary release from the vehemence of
+the will that is gained through art, and the permanent release through
+asceticism, is not consistently maintained. Schopenhauer admits that the
+knowledge which for the ascetic is the 'quietive' of the will has to be
+won anew in a perpetual conflict. 'No one can have enduring rest on
+earth.' Again, revision of his doctrine concerning the reality of the
+individual would, I think, necessitate revision also of the position
+that not only asceticism but 'all true and pure love, nay, even freely
+rendered justice, proceeds from seeing through the _principium
+individuationis_.' If the individual is in some sense ultimately real,
+then love must be to a certain extent literally altruism. We are brought
+down to the elementary fact, in terms of the metaphysics of ethics, that
+the object of love is a real being that is itself and not ourselves,
+though having some resemblance to us and united in a larger whole. An
+objection not merely verbal might indeed be taken to Schopenhauer's
+metaphysics of ethics strictly on his own ground. If it is purely and
+simply the essence of ourselves that we recognise in everything, does
+not this reduce all love finally to a well-understood egoism? The
+genuine fact of sympathy seems to escape his mode of formulation. And,
+in the end, we shall perhaps not find the ascetic to be the supreme
+ethical type. Of the self-tormenting kind of asceticism, it is not
+enough to say with Schopenhauer that, since it is a world-wide
+phenomenon of human nature, it calls for some account from philosophy.
+The account may be sufficiently rendered by historical psychology; the
+result being to class it as an aberration born of the illusions incident
+to a certain type of mind at a certain stage. Indeed, that seems to be
+the conclusion of the Buddhists, who claim to have transcended it by
+finding it superfluous for the end it aims at. Let us then take, as our
+example of the completed type, not the monks of the Thebaid, but the
+mild ascetics of the Buddhist communities. Does not this type, even in
+its most attractive form, represent a 'second best'? Is not the final
+judgment that of Plato, that to save oneself is something, but that
+there is no full achievement unless for the life of the State also the
+ideal has been brought nearer realisation? When there is nothing in the
+world but irredeemable tyranny or anarchy, flight from it may be the
+greatest success possible as far as the individual life is concerned;
+but this is not the normal condition of humanity. Finally, may not some
+actual achievement, either practical or, like that of Schopenhauer,
+speculative, even if accompanied by real imperfections of character,
+possess a higher human value than the sanctity that rests always in
+itself?
+
+
+
+
+SELECTED WORKS
+
+
+_English Translations_
+
+  _The World as Will and Idea._ Translated by R. B. HALDANE and J. KEMP. 3
+    vols. 1883-6.
+
+  _Two Essays_: I. _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient
+    Reason_. II. _On the Will in Nature_. Bohn's Philosophical Library,
+    1889.
+
+  _Religion: A Dialogue, and other Essays._ Selected and translated by T.
+    BAILEY SAUNDERS. 3rd ed., 1891. [A series of other volumes of
+    selections excellently translated by Mr. Saunders has followed.]
+
+  _Selected Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer._ With a Biographical
+    Introduction and Sketch of his Philosophy. By E. BELFORT BAX. 1891.
+
+  _The Basis of Morality._ Translated with Introduction and Notes by A. B.
+    BULLOCK. 1903.
+
+
+_Biographical and Expository_
+
+  _Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and Philosophy._ By HELEN ZIMMERN. 1876.
+
+  _Life of Arthur Schopenhauer._ By Professor W. WALLACE. 1890.
+
+  _La Philosophie de Schopenhauer._ Par TH. RIBOT. 2nd ed., 1885.
+
+  _Arthur Schopenhauer._ Seine Persönlichkeit, seine Lehre, sein Glaube.
+    Von JOHANNAES VOLKELT. 3rd ed., 1907.
+
+  _Schopenhauer-Lexikon._ Von JULIUS FRADENSTÄDT. 2 vols., 1871.
+
+
+Printed by T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty at the Edinburgh
+University Press
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCHOPENHAUER ***
+
+***** This file should be named 38283-8.txt or 38283-8.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        http://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/2/8/38283/
+
+Produced by Albert László and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive)
+
+
+Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
+will be renamed.
+
+Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
+one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
+(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
+permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
+set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
+copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
+protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
+Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
+charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
+do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
+rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
+such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
+research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
+practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
+subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
+redistribution.
+
+
+
+*** START: FULL LICENSE ***
+
+THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
+PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
+
+To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
+distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
+(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
+http://gutenberg.org/license).
+
+
+Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works
+
+1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
+and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
+(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
+the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
+all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
+If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
+terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
+entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
+
+1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
+used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
+agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
+things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
+paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
+and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.  See paragraph 1.E below.
+
+1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
+or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
+collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
+individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
+located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
+copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
+works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
+are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
+Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
+freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
+this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
+the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
+keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.
+
+1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
+what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
+a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
+the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
+before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
+creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
+Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
+the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
+States.
+
+1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
+
+1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
+access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
+whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
+phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
+copied or distributed:
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
+from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
+posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
+and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
+or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
+with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
+work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
+through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
+Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
+1.E.9.
+
+1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
+with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
+must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
+terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
+to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
+permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
+
+1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
+work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.
+
+1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
+electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
+prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
+active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm License.
+
+1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
+compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
+word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
+distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
+"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
+posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),
+you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
+copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
+request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
+form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
+
+1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
+performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
+unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
+access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
+that
+
+- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
+     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
+     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
+     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
+     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
+     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
+     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
+     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
+     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
+     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
+     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
+     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
+     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
+     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+     License.  You must require such a user to return or
+     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
+     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
+     Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
+     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
+     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
+     of receipt of the work.
+
+- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
+     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
+forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
+both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
+Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
+Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.
+
+1.F.
+
+1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
+effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
+public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
+collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
+"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
+corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
+property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
+computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
+your equipment.
+
+1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
+of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
+liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
+fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
+LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
+PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
+TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
+LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
+INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+DAMAGE.
+
+1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
+defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
+receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
+written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
+received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
+your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
+the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
+refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
+providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
+receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
+is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
+opportunities to fix the problem.
+
+1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
+in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
+WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
+WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
+
+1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
+warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
+If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
+law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
+interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
+the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
+provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
+
+1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
+trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
+providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
+with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
+promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
+harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
+that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
+or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
+work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
+Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
+
+
+Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
+electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
+including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
+because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
+people in all walks of life.
+
+Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
+assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
+goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
+remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
+and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
+To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
+and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
+and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org.
+
+
+Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
+Foundation
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
+501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
+state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
+Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
+number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
+http://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
+permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.
+
+The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
+Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
+throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
+809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
+business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
+information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
+page at http://pglaf.org
+
+For additional contact information:
+     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
+     Chief Executive and Director
+     gbnewby@pglaf.org
+
+
+Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
+spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
+increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
+freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
+array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
+($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
+status with the IRS.
+
+The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
+charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
+States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
+considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
+with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
+where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
+SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
+particular state visit http://pglaf.org
+
+While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
+have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
+against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
+approach us with offers to donate.
+
+International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
+any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
+outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
+
+Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
+methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
+ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations.
+To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate
+
+
+Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.
+
+Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
+concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
+with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
+Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
+
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
+editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
+unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
+keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.
+
+
+Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:
+
+     http://www.gutenberg.org
+
+This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
+including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
+subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
diff --git a/38283-8.zip b/38283-8.zip
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a8d66b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/38283-8.zip
diff --git a/38283-h.zip b/38283-h.zip
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdb5e23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/38283-h.zip
diff --git a/38283-h/38283-h.htm b/38283-h/38283-h.htm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32b6dc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/38283-h/38283-h.htm
@@ -0,0 +1,3219 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
+    "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en">
+  <head>
+    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" />
+    <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" />
+    <title>
+      The Project Gutenberg eBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker.
+    </title>
+    <style type="text/css">
+
+body {
+    margin-left: 10%;
+    margin-right: 10%;
+}
+
+    h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 {
+    text-align: center; /* all headings centered */
+    clear: both;
+}
+
+p {
+    margin-top: .75em;
+    text-align: justify;
+    margin-bottom: .75em;
+}
+
+hr {
+    width: 33%;
+    margin-top: 2em;
+    margin-bottom: 2em;
+    margin-left: auto;
+    margin-right: auto;
+    clear: both;
+}
+
+hr.chap {width: 65%}
+
+table {
+    margin-left: auto;
+    margin-right: auto;
+}
+
+.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */
+    /*  visibility: hidden;  */
+    position: absolute;
+	color: gray;
+	right: 1%;
+    font-size: smaller;
+    text-align: right;
+} /* page numbers */
+
+.hanging-indent {
+        margin-left: 5%;
+        margin-right: 5%;
+	text-indent: -2em;
+	padding-left: 2em;
+}
+
+.hanging-indent-small {
+        margin-left: 5%;
+        margin-right: 5%;
+	text-indent: -1em;
+	padding-left: 1em;
+}
+
+.center   {text-align: center;}
+
+.smcap    {font-variant: small-caps;}
+
+/* Footnotes */
+.footnote         {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;}
+
+.footnote .label  {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;}
+
+.fnanchor {
+    vertical-align: super;
+    font-size: .8em;
+    text-decoration:
+    none;
+}
+
+/* Transcriber's notes */
+.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA;
+    color: black;
+     font-size:smaller;
+     padding:0.5em;
+     margin-bottom:5em;
+     font-family:sans-serif, serif; }
+
+    </style>
+  </head>
+<body>
+
+
+<pre>
+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Schopenhauer
+
+Author: Thomas Whittaker
+
+Release Date: December 12, 2011 [EBook #38283]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCHOPENHAUER ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Albert László and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+<hr class="chap" />
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Philosophies Ancient and Modern</span></h3>
+
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h1>SCHOPENHAUER</h1>
+
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+
+<hr class="chap" />
+
+<h2><a name="NOTE" id="NOTE"></a>NOTE</h2>
+
+
+<p>As a consequence of the success of the series of <i>Religions
+Ancient and Modern</i>, Messrs. <span class="smcap">Constable</span> have decided to issue
+a set of similar primers, with brief introductions, lists of dates,
+and selected authorities, presenting to the wider public the
+salient features of the <i>Philosophies</i> of Greece and Rome and of
+the Middle Ages, as well as of modern Europe. They will
+appear in the same handy Shilling volumes, with neat cloth
+bindings and paper envelopes, which have proved so attractive
+in the case of the <i>Religions</i>. The writing in each case will be
+confided to an eminent authority, and one who has already
+proved himself capable of scholarly yet popular exposition
+within a small compass.</p>
+
+<p>Among the first volumes to appear will be:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="hanging-indent"><p><b>Early Greek Philosophy.</b> By <span class="smcap">A. W. Benn</span>, author of <i>The Philosophy
+of Greece, Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century</i>.</p>
+
+<p><b>Stoicism.</b> By Professor <span class="smcap">St. George Stock</span>, author of <i>Deductive Logic</i>,
+editor of the <i>Apology of Plato</i>, etc.</p>
+
+<p><b>Plato.</b> By Professor <span class="smcap">A. E. Taylor</span>, St. Andrews University,
+author of <i>The Problem of Conduct</i>.</p>
+
+<p><b>Scholasticism.</b> By Father <span class="smcap">Rickaby</span>, S.J.</p>
+
+<p><b>Hobbes.</b> By Professor <span class="smcap">A. E. Taylor</span>.</p>
+
+<p><b>Locke.</b> By Professor <span class="smcap">Alexander</span>, of Owens College.</p>
+
+<p><b>Comte and Mill.</b> By <span class="smcap">T. Whittaker</span>, author of <i>The
+Neoplatonists, Apollonius of Tyana and other Essays</i>.</p>
+
+<p><b>Herbert Spencer.</b> By <span class="smcap">W. H. Hudson</span>, author of <i>An Introduction
+to Spencer's Philosophy</i>.</p>
+
+<p><b>Schopenhauer.</b> By <span class="smcap">T. Whittaker</span>.</p>
+
+<p><b>Berkeley.</b> By Professor <span class="smcap">Campbell Fraser</span>, D.C.L., LL.D.</p>
+
+<p><b>Bergsen.</b> By Father <span class="smcap">Tyrrell</span>.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr class="chap" />
+
+<h1>SCHOPENHAUER</h1>
+
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h3>By</h3>
+
+<h2>THOMAS WHITTAKER</h2>
+
+<h5>AUTHOR OF 'COMTE AND MILL,' ETC.</h5>
+
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h5>LONDON<br />
+<small>ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE &amp; CO LTD</small><br />
+1909</h5>
+
+
+<hr class="chap" />
+
+<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS</h2>
+
+<div class='center'>
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="Contents">
+
+<tr><td align='left'><small>CHAP.</small></td>
+<td align='left'></td>
+<td align='left'><small>PAGE</small></td></tr>
+
+<tr><td align='right'><small>I.</small></td>
+<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Life and Writings</span>,</td>
+<td align='right'><a href='#Page_1'>1</a></td></tr>
+
+<tr><td align='right'><small>II.</small></td>
+<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Theory of Knowledge</span>,</td>
+<td align='right'><a href='#Page_15'>15</a></td></tr>
+
+<tr><td align='right'><small>III.</small></td>
+<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Metaphysics of the Will</span>,</td>
+<td align='right'><a href='#Page_29'>29</a></td></tr>
+
+<tr><td align='right'><small>IV.</small></td>
+<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Ćsthetics</span>,</td>
+<td align='right'><a href='#Page_49'>49</a></td></tr>
+
+<tr><td align='right'><small>V.</small></td>
+<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Ethics</span>,</td>
+<td align='right'><a href='#Page_65'>65</a></td></tr>
+
+<tr><td align='right'><small>VI.</small></td>
+<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Historical Significance</span>,</td>
+<td align='right'><a href='#Page_86'>86</a></td></tr>
+
+<tr><td align='right'></td>
+<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Selected Works</span>,</td>
+<td align='right'><a href='#Page_93'>93</a></td></tr>
+
+</table></div>
+
+<hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p>
+
+<h1><a name="SCHOPENHAUER" id="SCHOPENHAUER"></a>SCHOPENHAUER</h1>
+
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2>
+
+<h3>LIFE AND WRITINGS</h3>
+
+
+<p>Arthur Schopenhauer may be distinctively
+described as the greatest philosophic writer of
+his century. So evident is this that he has
+sometimes been regarded as having more importance
+in literature than in philosophy; but this
+is an error. As a metaphysician he is second to
+no one since Kant. Others of his age have surpassed
+him in system and in comprehensiveness;
+but no one has had a firmer grasp of the essential
+and fundamental problems of philosophy.
+On the theory of knowledge, the nature of reality,
+and the meaning of the beautiful and the good,
+he has solutions to offer that are all results of a
+characteristic and original way of thinking.</p>
+
+<p>In one respect, as critics have noted, his spirit
+is different from that of European philosophy in
+general. What preoccupies him in a special way
+is the question of evil in the world. Like the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span>
+philosophies of the East, emerging as they do
+without break from religion, Schopenhauer's
+philosophy is in its outcome a doctrine of redemption
+from sin. The name of pessimism commonly
+applied to it is in some respects misleading,
+though it was his own term; but it is correct if
+understood as he explained it. As he was accustomed
+to insist, his final ethical doctrine coincides
+with that of all the religions that aim, for their
+adepts or their elect, at deliverance from 'this
+evil world.' But, as the 'world-fleeing' religions
+have their mitigations and accommodations, so
+also has the philosophy of Schopenhauer. At
+various points indeed it seems as if a mere
+change of accent would turn it into optimism.</p>
+
+<p>This preoccupation does not mean indifference
+to the theoretical problems of philosophy. No
+one has insisted more strongly that the end of
+philosophy is pure truth, and that only the few
+who care about pure truth have any concern with
+it. But for Schopenhauer the desire for speculative
+truth does not by itself suffice to explain
+the impulse of philosophical inquiries. On one
+side of his complex character, he had more
+resemblance to the men who turn from the world
+to religion, like St. Augustine, than to the normal
+type of European thinker, represented pre-emi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span>nently
+by Aristotle. He was a temperamental
+pessimist, feeling from the first the trouble of
+existence; and here he finds the deepest motive
+for the desire to become clear about it. He saw
+in the world, what he felt in himself, a vain effort
+after ever new objects of desire which give no
+permanent satisfaction; and this view, becoming
+predominant, determined, not indeed all the ideas
+of his philosophy, but its general complexion as
+a 'philosophy of redemption.'</p>
+
+<p>With his pessimism, personal misfortunes had
+nothing to do. He was, and always recognised
+that he was, among the most fortunately placed
+of mankind. He does not hesitate to speak
+sometimes of his own happiness in complete
+freedom from the need to apply himself to any
+compulsory occupation. This freedom, as he has
+put gratefully on record, he owed to his father,
+Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer, who was a rich
+merchant of Danzig, where the philosopher was
+born on the 22nd of February 1788. Both his
+parents were of Dutch ancestry. His mother,
+Johanna Schopenhauer, won celebrity as a novelist;
+and his sister, Adele, also displayed some
+literary talent. Generalising from his own case,
+Schopenhauer holds that men of intelligence
+derive their character from their father and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span>
+their intellect from their mother. With his
+mother, however, he was not on sympathetic
+terms, as may be read in the biographies. His
+father intended him for a mercantile career, and
+with this view began to prepare him from the
+first to be a cosmopolitan man of the world. The
+name of Arthur was given to him because it is
+spelt alike in the leading European languages.
+He was taken early to France, where he resided
+from 1797 to 1799, learning French so well that
+on his return he had almost forgotten his German.
+Portions of the years 1803 to 1804 were spent
+in England, France, Switzerland, and Austria. In
+England he was three months at a Wimbledon
+boarding-school kept by a clergyman. This experience
+he found extremely irksome. He afterwards
+became highly proficient in English: was
+always pleased to be taken for an Englishman,
+and regarded both the English character and
+intelligence as on the whole the first in Europe;
+but all the more deplorable did he find the oppressive
+pietism which was the special form taken in
+the England of that period by the reaction against
+the French Revolution. He is never tired of
+denouncing that phase of 'cold superstition,'
+the dominance of which lasted during his lifetime;
+for the publication of Mill's <i>Liberty</i> and of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span>
+Darwin's <i>Origin of Species</i>, which may be considered
+as marking the close of it, came only the
+year before his death.</p>
+
+<p>The only real break in the conformity of
+Schopenhauer's circumstances to his future career
+came in 1805, when he was placed in a merchant's
+office at Hamburg, whither his father had
+migrated in disgust at the annexation of his
+native Danzig, then under a republican constitution
+of its own, by Prussia in 1793. Soon
+afterwards his father died; but out of loyalty he
+tried for some time longer to reconcile himself
+to commercial life. Finding this at length impossible,
+he gained permission from his mother,
+in 1807, to leave the office for the gymnasium.
+At this time he seems to have begun his classical
+studies, his education having hitherto been exclusively
+modern. They were carried on first at
+Gotha and then at Weimar. In 1809 he entered
+the university of Göttingen as a student of
+medicine. This, however, was with a view only
+to scientific studies, not to practice; and he transferred
+himself to the philosophical faculty in
+1810. Generally he was little regardful of
+academical authority. His father's deliberately
+adopted plan of letting him mix early with the
+world had given him a certain independence of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span>
+judgment. At Göttingen, however, he received
+an important influence from his teacher, G. E.
+Schulze (known by the revived scepticism of
+his <i>Ćnesidemus</i>), who advised him to study Plato
+and Kant before Aristotle and Spinoza. From
+1811 to 1813 he was at Berlin, where he heard
+Fichte, but was not impressed. In 1813 the
+degree of Doctor of Philosophy was conferred on
+him at Jena for the dissertation <i>On the Fourfold
+Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason</i>
+(<i>Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden
+Grunde</i>, 2nd ed., 1847). This was the
+first result of his Kantian studies. In the same
+year he began to be acquainted with Goethe at
+Weimar, where his mother and sister had gone
+to reside in 1806. A consequence of this
+acquaintance was that he took up and further
+developed Goethe's theory of colours. His dissertation
+<i>Ueber das Sehen und die Farben</i> was
+published in 1816. A second edition did not
+appear till 1854; but in the meantime he had
+published a restatement of his doctrine in Latin,
+entitled <i>Theoria Colorum Physiologica</i> (1830).
+This, however, was an outlying part of his work.
+He had already been seized by the impulse to
+set forth the system of philosophy that took
+shape in him, as he says, by some formative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span>
+process of which he could give no conscious
+account. His great work, <i>Die Welt als Wille
+und Vorstellung</i>, was ready for publication
+before the end of 1818, and was published with
+the date 1819. Thus he is one of the most
+precocious philosophers on record. For in that
+single volume, written before he was thirty, the
+outlines of his whole system are fixed. There
+is some development later, and there are endless
+new applications and essays towards confirmation
+from all sources. His mind never rested,
+and his literary power gained by exercise. Still,
+it has been said with truth, that there never
+was a greater illusion than when he thought that
+he seldom repeated himself. In reality he did
+little but repeat his fundamental positions with
+infinite variations in expression.</p>
+
+<p>After completing his chief work, Schopenhauer
+wrote some verses in which he predicted
+that posterity would erect a monument to him.
+This prediction was fulfilled in 1895; but, for the
+time, the work which he never doubted would
+be his enduring title to fame seemed, like Hume's
+<i>Treatise</i>, to have fallen 'deadborn from the press.'
+This he attributed to the hostility of the academical
+philosophers; and, in his later works, attacks
+on the university professors form a characteristic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span>
+feature. The official teachers of the Hegelian
+school, he declared, were bent only on obtaining
+positions for themselves by an appearance of
+supporting Christian dogma; and they resented
+openness on the part of any one else.
+Yet on one side he maintained that his own
+pessimism was more truly Christian than their
+optimism. The essential spirit of Christianity is
+that of Brahmanism and Buddhism, the great
+religions that sprang from India, the first home
+of our race. He is even inclined to see in it
+traces of Indian influence. What vitiates it in
+his eyes is the Jewish element, which finds its
+expression in the flat modern 'Protestant-rationalistic
+optimism.' As optimistic religions, he
+groups together Judaism, Islam, and Grćco-Roman
+Polytheism. His antipathy, however,
+only extends to the two former. He was himself
+in great part a child of Humanism and of the
+eighteenth century, rejoicing over the approaching
+downfall of all the faiths, and holding that
+a weak religion (entirely different from those he
+admires) is favourable to civilisation. Nothing
+can exceed his scorn for nearly everything that
+characterised the Middle Ages. With Catholicism
+as a political system he has no sympathy
+whatever; while on the religious side the Pro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span>testant
+are as sympathetic to him as the Catholic
+mystics. What is common to all priesthoods,
+he holds, is to exploit the metaphysical need of
+mankind (in which he also believes) for the sake
+of their own power. Clericalism, 'Pfaffenthum,'
+whether Catholic or Protestant, is the object of
+his unvarying hatred and contempt. If he had
+cared to appreciate Hegel, he would have found
+on this point much community of spirit; but of
+course there was a real antithesis between the
+two as philosophers. No 'conspiracy' need be
+invoked to explain the failure of Schopenhauer
+to win early recognition. Belief in the State and
+in progress was quite alien to him; and Germany
+was then full of political hopes, which found
+nourishment in optimistic pantheism. What at
+length gave his philosophy vogue was the collapse
+of this enthusiasm on the failure of the revolutionary
+movement in 1848. Once known, it
+contained enough of permanent value to secure
+it from again passing out of sight with the next
+change of fashion.</p>
+
+<p>The rest of Schopenhauer's life in its external
+relations may be briefly summed up. For a few
+years, it was diversified by travels in Italy and
+elsewhere, and by an unsuccessful attempt at
+academical teaching in Berlin. In 1831 he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span>
+moved to Frankfort, where he finally settled
+in 1833. He lived unmarried there till his death
+on the 21st of September 1860. The monument,
+already spoken of, was unveiled at Frankfort on
+the 6th of June 1895.</p>
+
+<p>The almost unbroken silence with which his
+great work was received, though it had a distempering
+effect on the man, did not discourage
+the thinker. The whole series of Schopenhauer's
+works, indeed, was completed before he attained
+anything that could be called fame. Constantly
+on the alert as he was to seize upon confirmations
+of his system, he published in 1836 his short
+work <i>On the Will in Nature</i>, pointing out verifications
+of his metaphysics by recent science. In
+1839 his prize essay, <i>On the Freedom of the Human
+Will</i> (finished in 1837), was crowned by the Royal
+Scientific Society of Drontheim in Norway. This
+and another essay, <i>On the Basis of Morality</i>, <i>not</i>
+crowned by the Royal Danish Society of Copenhagen
+in 1840, he published in 1841, with the
+inclusive title, <i>Die beiden Grundprobleme der
+Ethik</i>. In 1844 appeared the second edition of
+his principal work, to which there was added,
+in the form of a second volume, a series of
+elucidations and extensions larger in bulk than
+the first. This new volume contains much of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span>
+his best and most effective writing. His last
+work, <i>Parerga und Paralipomena</i>, which appeared
+in 1851 (2 vols.), is from the literary point
+of view the most brilliant. It was only from this
+time that he began to be well known among the
+general public; though the philosophic 'apostolate'
+of Julius Frauenstädt, who afterwards
+edited his works, had begun in 1840. His activity
+was henceforth confined to modifying and extending
+his works for new editions; an employment
+in which he was always assiduous. In
+consequence of this, all of them, as they stand,
+contain references from one to another; but the
+development of his thinking, so far as there was
+such a process after 1818, can be easily traced
+without reference to the earlier editions. There
+is some growth; but, as has been said, it does not
+affect many of the chief points. A brief exposition
+of his philosophy can on the whole take it as
+something fixed. The heads under which it must
+fall are those assigned to the original four books
+of <i>Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Although Schopenhauer discountenanced the
+attempt to connect a philosophers biography
+with his work, something has to be said about
+his character, since this has been dwelt on to his
+disadvantage by opponents. There is abundant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span>
+material for a personal estimate in the correspondence
+and reminiscences published after his
+death by his disciples Julius Frauenstädt and
+Wilhelm Gwinner. The apparent contradiction
+is at once obvious between the ascetic consummation
+of his ethics and his unascetic life,
+carefully occupied in its latter part with rules for
+the preservation of his naturally robust health.
+He was quite aware of this, but holds it absurd
+to require that a moralist should commend only
+the virtues which he possesses. It is as if the
+requirement were set up that a sculptor is to be
+himself a model of beauty. A saint need not be
+a philosopher, nor a philosopher a saint. The
+science of morals is as theoretical as any other
+branch of philosophy. Fundamentally character
+is unmodifiable, though knowledge, it is allowed,
+may change the mode of action within the limits
+of the particular character. The passage to the
+state of asceticism cannot be effected by moral
+philosophy, but depends on a kind of 'grace.'
+After all, it might be replied, philosophers,
+whether they succeed or not, do usually make
+at least an attempt to live in accordance with
+the moral ideal they set up. The best apology
+in Schopenhauer's case is that the fault may
+have been as much in his ideal as in his failure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span>
+to conform to it. The eloquent pages he has
+devoted to the subject of holiness only make
+manifest the inconsequence (which he admits)
+in the passage to it. For, as we shall see, this
+has nothing in common with the essentially
+rational asceticism of the schools of later antiquity;
+which was a rule of self-limitation in view of the
+philosophic life. He did in a way of his own
+practise something of this; and, on occasion, he
+sets forth the theory of it; but he quite clearly
+sees the difference. His own ideal, which he
+never attempted to practise, is that of the self-torturing
+ascetics of the Christian Middle Age.
+Within the range of properly human virtue, he
+can in many respects hold his own, not only as
+a philosopher but as a man. If his egoism and
+vanity are undeniable, he undoubtedly possessed
+the virtues of rectitude and compassion. What
+he would have especially laid stress on was the
+conscientious devotion to his work. With complete
+singleness of purpose he used for a disinterested
+end the leisure which he regarded as the most fortunate
+of endowments. As he said near the close
+of his life, his intellectual conscience was clear.</p>
+
+<p>Of Schopenhauer's expositions of his pessimism
+it would be true to say, as Spinoza says of the
+Book of Job, that the matter, like the style, is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span>
+that of a man sitting among the ashes, but of one
+meditating in a library. This of course does not
+prove that they are not a genuine, if one-sided,
+rendering of human experience. All that can be
+said is that they did not turn him away from
+appreciation of the apparent goods of life. His
+own practical principle was furnished by what he
+regarded as a lower point of view; and this gives
+its direction to the semi-popular philosophy of
+the <i>Parerga</i>. From what he takes to be the
+higher point of view, the belief that happiness is
+attainable by man on earth is an illusion; but he
+holds that, by keeping steadily in view a kind of
+tempered happiness as the end, many mistakes
+may be avoided in the conduct of life, provided
+that each recognises at once the strength and
+weakness of his own character, and does not
+attempt things that, with the given limitations,
+are impossible. Of the highest truth, as he conceived
+it, he could therefore make no use. Only
+by means of a truth that he was bound to hold
+half-illusory could a working scheme be constructed
+for himself and others. This result may give us
+guidance in seeking to learn what we can from
+a thinker who is in reality no representative of a
+decadence, but is fundamentally sane and rational,
+even in spite of himself.</p><hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II</h2>
+
+<h3>THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE</h3>
+
+<p>The title of Schopenhauer's chief work is rendered
+in the English translation, <i>The World as
+Will and Idea</i>. Here the term 'idea' is used in
+the sense it had for Locke and Berkeley; namely,
+any object of mental activity. Thus it includes
+not merely imagery, but also perception. Since
+Hume distinguished ideas' from 'impressions,'
+it has tended to be specialised in the former
+sense. The German word, <i>Vorstellung</i>, which it
+is used to render, conveys the generalised meaning
+of the Lockian 'idea,' now frequently expressed
+in English and French philosophical works by the
+more technical term 'presentation' or 'representation.'
+By Schopenhauer himself the word
+'Idea' was used exclusively in the sense of the
+Platonic Idea, which, as we shall see, plays an
+important part in his philosophy. The distinction
+is preserved in the translation by the use of
+a capital when Idea has the latter meaning; but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span>
+in a brief exposition it seems convenient to adopt
+a more technical rendering of <i>Vorstellung</i>; and,
+from its common employment in psychological
+text-books, I have selected 'presentation' as the
+most suitable.</p>
+
+<p>The first proposition of Schopenhauer's philosophical
+system is, 'The world is my presentation.'
+By this he means that it presents itself as appearance
+to the knowing subject. This appearance is
+in the forms of time, space and causality. Under
+these forms every phenomenon necessarily
+appears, because they are <i>a priori</i> forms of the
+subject. The world as it presents itself consists
+entirely of phenomena, that is, appearances,
+related according to these forms. The most fundamental
+form of all is the relation between object
+and subject, which is implied in all of them.
+Without a subject there can be no presented
+object.</p>
+
+<p>Schopenhauer is therefore an idealist in the
+sense in which we call Berkeley's theory of the
+external world idealism; though the expressions
+used are to some extent different. The difference
+proceeds from his following of Kant. His Kantianism
+consists in the recognition of <i>a priori</i>
+forms by which the subject constructs for itself an
+'objective' world of appearances. With Berkeley<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span>
+he agrees as against Kant in not admitting
+any residue whatever, in the object as such, that
+is not wholly appearance. But while he allows
+that Berkeley, as regards the general formulation
+of idealism, was more consistent than Kant, he
+finds him, in working out the principle, altogether
+inadequate. For the modern mind there is henceforth
+no way in philosophy except through Kant,
+from whom dates the revolution by which scholastic
+dualism was finally overthrown. Kant's
+systematic construction, however, he in effect
+reduces to very little. His is a much simplified
+'Apriorism.' While accepting the 'forms of sensible
+intuition,' that is, time and space, just as
+Kant sets them forth, he clears away nearly all
+the superimposed mechanism. Kant's 'Transcendental
+Ćsthetic,' he says, was a real discovery in
+metaphysics; but on the basis of this he for the
+most part only gave free play to his architectonic
+impulse. Of the twelve 'categories of the understanding,'
+which he professed to derive from the
+logical forms of judgment, all except causality are
+mere 'blind windows.' This alone, therefore,
+Schopenhauer adopts; placing it, however, not at
+a higher level but side by side with time and
+space, Kant's forms of intuition. These three
+forms, according to Schopenhauer, make up the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span>
+understanding of men and animals. 'All intuition
+is intellectual.' It is not first mere appearance
+related in space and time, and waiting for understanding
+to organise it; but, in animals as in
+man, it is put in order at once under the three
+forms that suffice to explain the knowledge all
+have of the phenomenal world.</p>
+
+<p>To Reason as distinguished from Understanding,
+Schopenhauer assigns no such exalted function as
+was attributed to it in portions of his system by
+Kant, and still more by some of his successors.
+The name of 'reason,' he maintains, ought on
+etymological grounds to be restricted to the faculty
+of abstract concepts. This, and not understanding,
+is what distinguishes man from animals. It
+discovers and invents nothing, but it puts in a
+generalised and available form what the understanding
+has discovered in intuition.</p>
+
+<p>For the historical estimation of Schopenhauer,
+it is necessary to place him in relation to Kant,
+as he himself always insisted. Much also in his
+chief work is made clearer by knowledge of his
+dissertation <i>On the Fourfold Root of the Principle
+of Sufficient Reason</i>, to which he is constantly
+referring. Later, his manner of exposition became
+more independent; so that he can be read by the
+general reader with profit simply by himself, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span>
+without reference to antecedents. Still, it will
+always be advisable for an expositor to follow his
+directions, at least to the extent of giving some
+short account of the dissertation. This I proceed
+to give approximately in the place to which he
+has assigned it in his system.</p>
+
+<p>The name of the principle (<i>principium rationis
+sufficientis</i>) he took over from Leibniz and his
+successor Wolff, but gave it a new amplitude.
+With him, it stands as an inclusive term for four
+modes of connection by which the thoroughgoing
+relativity of phenomena to one another is constituted
+for our intelligence. The general statement
+adopted is, 'Nothing is without a reason
+why it should be rather than not be.' Its four
+forms are the principles of becoming (<i>fiendi</i>), of
+knowing (<i>cognoscendi</i>), of being (<i>essendi</i>), and
+of acting (<i>agendi</i>). (1) Under the first head
+come 'causes.' These are divided into 'cause
+proper,' for inorganic things; 'stimulus,' for the
+vegetative life both of plants and animals, and
+'motive,' for animals and men. The law of causation
+is applicable only to changes; not to the
+forces of nature, to matter, or to the world as a
+whole, which are perdurable. Cause precedes
+effect in time. Not one thing, but one state of a
+thing, is the cause of another. From the law of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span>
+causation there results an infinite series <i>a parte
+ante</i> as well as <i>a parte post</i>. (2) The principle of
+sufficient reason of knowing is applicable to concepts, which
+are all derived from intuition, that
+is, from percepts. The laws of logic, which come
+under this head, can yield nothing original, but
+can only render explicit what was in the understanding.
+(3) Under the third head come arithmetical
+and geometrical relations. These are
+peculiar relations of presentations, distinct from
+all others, and only intelligible in virtue of a pure
+<i>a priori</i> intuition. For geometry this is space;
+for arithmetic time, in which counting goes on.
+Scientifically, arithmetic is fundamental. (4) As
+the third form of causality was enumerated
+'motive' for the will; but in that classification it
+was viewed from without, as belonging to the
+world of objects. Through the direct knowledge
+we have of our own will, we know also from
+within this determination by the presentation we
+call a motive. Hence emerges the fourth form of
+the principle of sufficient reason. This at a later
+stage makes possible the transition from physics
+to metaphysics.</p>
+
+<p>All these forms alike are forms of necessary
+determination. Necessity has no clear and true
+sense but certainty of the consequence when the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span>
+ground is posited. All necessity therefore is conditional.
+In accordance with the four expressions
+of the principle of sufficient reason, it takes the
+fourfold shape of physical, logical, mathematical,
+and moral necessity.</p>
+
+<p>The sharp distinction between logical and
+mathematical truth, with the assignment of the
+former to conceptual and of the latter to intuitive
+relations, comes to Schopenhauer directly from
+Kant. So also does his view that the necessary
+form of causation is sequence; though here his
+points of contact with English thinkers, earlier
+and later, are very marked. Only in his statement
+of the 'law of motivation' as 'causality seen
+from within' does he hint at his own distinctive
+metaphysical doctrine. Meanwhile, it is evident
+that he is to be numbered with the group of
+modern thinkers who have arrived in one way or
+another at a complete scientific phenomenism.
+Expositors have noted that in his earlier statements
+of this he tends to lay more stress on the
+character of the visible and tangible world as
+mere appearance. The impermanence, the
+relativity, of all that exists in time and space,
+leads him to describe it, in a favourite term
+borrowed from Indian philosophy, as Maya, or
+illusion. Later, he dwells more on the relative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span>
+reality of things as they appear. His position,
+however, does not essentially alter, but only finds
+varying expression as he turns more to the
+scientific or to the metaphysical side. From
+Hume's view on causation he differs not by
+opposing its pure phenomenism, but only by
+recognising, as Kant does, an <i>a priori</i> element in
+the form of its law. German critics have seen in
+his own formulation an anticipation of Mill, and
+this is certainly striking as regards the general
+conception of the causal order, although there is
+no anticipation of Mill's inductive logic. On the
+same side there is a close agreement with Malebranche
+and the Occasionalists, pointed out by
+Schopenhauer himself. The causal explanations
+of science, he is at one with them in insisting,
+give no ultimate account of anything. All its
+causes are no more than 'occasional causes,'&mdash;merely
+instances, as Mill expressed it afterwards,
+of 'invariable and unconditional sequence.' From
+Mill of course he differs in holding its form to be
+necessary and <i>a priori</i>, not ultimately derived
+from a summation of experiences; and, with the
+Occasionalists, he goes on to metaphysics in its
+sense of ontology, as Mill never did. The difference
+here is that he does not clothe his metaphysics
+in a theological dress.</p><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>In the later development of his thought,
+Schopenhauer dealt more expressly with the
+question, how this kind of phenomenism is
+reconcilable with a scientific cosmogony. On one
+side the proposition, 'No object without subject,'
+makes materialism for ever impossible; for the
+materialist tries to explain from relations among
+presentations what is the condition of all presentation.
+On the other side, we are all compelled
+to agree with the materialists that knowledge of
+the object comes late in a long series of material
+events. Inorganic things existed in time before
+life; vegetative life before animal life; and only
+with animal life does knowledge emerge.
+Reasoned knowledge of the whole series comes
+only at the end of it in the human mind. This
+apparent contradiction he solves by leaving a
+place for metaphysics. Our representation of the
+world as it existed before the appearance of life
+was indeed non-existent at the time to which we
+assign it; but the real being of the world had
+a manifestation not imaginable by us. For this,
+we substitute a picture of a world such as we
+should have been aware of had our 'subject,' with
+its <i>a priori</i> forms of time, space, and causality,
+been then present. What the reality is, is the
+problem of the thing-in-itself (to use the Kantian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span>
+term). This problem remains over; but we know
+that the metaphysical reality cannot be matter;
+for matter, with all its qualities, is phenomenal.
+It exists only 'for understanding, through understanding,
+in understanding.' These discriminations
+made, Schopenhauer offers us a scientific
+cosmogony beginning with the nebular hypothesis
+and ending with an outline of organic evolution.
+This last differs from the Darwinian theory in
+supposing a production of species by definite steps
+instead of by accumulation of small individual
+variations. At a certain time, a form that has all
+the characters of a new species appears among
+the progeny of an existing species. Man is the
+last and highest form to be evolved. From
+Schopenhauer's metaphysics, as we shall see, it
+follows that no higher form of life will ever
+appear.</p>
+
+<p>A word may be said here on a materialistic-sounding
+phrase which is very prominent in
+Schopenhauer's later expositions, and has been
+remarked on as paradoxical for an idealist. The
+world as presentation, he often says, is 'in the
+brain.' This, it must be allowed, is not fully
+defensible from his own point of view, except
+with the aid of a later distinction. The brain as
+we know it is of course only a part of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span>
+phenomenon of the subject,&mdash;a grouping of
+possible perceptions. How then, since it is itself
+only appearance, can it be the bearer of the whole
+universe as appearance? The answer is that
+Schopenhauer meant in reality 'the being of the
+brain,' and not the brain as phenomenon. He
+had a growing sense of the importance of
+physiology for the investigation of mind; and
+his predilection led him to adopt a not quite
+satisfactory shorthand expression for the correspondence
+we know scientifically to exist between
+our mental processes and changes capable of
+objective investigation in the matter of the
+brain.</p>
+
+<p>In science his distinctive bent was to the
+borderland between psychology and physiology.
+Hence came the attraction exercised on him by
+Goethe's theory of colours. To his own theory,
+though, unlike his philosophical system, it has
+always failed to gain the attention he predicted
+for it, the merit must be allowed of treating the
+problem as essentially one of psychophysics.
+What he does is to attempt to ascertain the
+conditions in the sensibility of the retina that
+account for our actual colour-sensations. This
+problem was untouched by the Newtonian
+theory; but Schopenhauer followed Goethe in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span>
+the error of trying to overthrow this on its own
+ground. He had no aptitude for the special
+inquiries of mathematics and physics, though he
+had gained a clear insight into their general
+nature as sciences. On the psycho-physical side
+there is to-day no fully authorised theory. The
+problem indeed has become ever more complex.
+Schopenhauer's attempt, by combination of sensibilities
+to 'light' and 'darkness,' to explain the
+phenomena of complementary colours, deserves
+at least a record in the long series of essays of
+which the best known are the 'Young-Helmholtz
+theory' and that of Hering. It marks an indubitable
+advance on Goethe in the clear distinction
+drawn between the mixture, in the ordinary
+sense, that can only result in dilution to different
+shades of grey, and the kinds of mixture from
+which, in their view, true colours arise.</p>
+
+<p>A characteristic position in Schopenhauer's
+theory of knowledge, and one that is constantly
+finding new expression in his writings, is the
+distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge already
+touched on. Intuitive knowledge
+of the kind that is common to men and animals,
+as we have seen, makes up, in his terminology,
+the 'understanding'; while 'reason' is the distinctively
+human faculty of concepts. When he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span>
+depreciates this, as he often does, in comparison
+with 'intuition,' it must be remembered that he
+does not limit this term to perception of particulars,
+but ascribes to what he calls the
+'Platonic Idea' a certain kind of union between
+reason and 'phantasy,' which gives it an intuitive
+character of its own. Thus intuition can stand,
+though not in every case for what is higher, yet
+always for that which is wider and greater and
+more immediate. Whatever may be done with
+reflective reason and its abstractions, every
+effectual process of thought must end, alike for
+knowledge and art and virtue, in some intuitive
+presentation. The importance of reason for
+practice is due to its generality. Its function is
+subordinate. It does not furnish the ground of
+virtuous action any more than ćsthetic precepts
+can enable any one to produce a work of art;
+but it can help to preserve constancy to certain
+maxims, as also in art a reasoned plan is necessary
+because the inspiration of genius is not every
+moment at command. Virtue and artistic genius
+alike, however, depend ultimately on intuition:
+and so also does every true discovery in science.
+The nature of pedantry is to try to be guided
+everywhere by concepts, and to trust nothing to
+perception in the particular case. Philosophy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span>
+also Schopenhauer regards as depending ultimately
+on a certain intuitive view; but he allows
+that it has to translate this into abstractions.
+Its problem is to express the <i>what</i> of the world
+in abstract form: science dealing only with the
+<i>why</i> of phenomena related within the world.
+This character of philosophy as a system of
+abstract concepts deprives it of the immediate
+attractiveness of art; so that, as he says in one
+place, it is more fortunate to be a poet than a
+philosopher.</p><hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III</h2>
+
+<h3>METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL</h3>
+
+
+<p>We have seen that scientific explanation does
+not go beyond presentations ordered in space and
+time. This is just as true of the sciences of
+causation&mdash;the 'ćtiological' sciences&mdash;as it is of
+mathematical science. All that we learn from
+Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry and Physiology,
+is 'how, in accordance with an infallible rule,
+one determinate state of matter necessarily
+follows another: how a determinate change
+necessarily conditions and brings on another
+determinate change.' This knowledge does not
+satisfy us. We wish to learn the significance of
+phenomena; but we find that from outside, while
+we view them as presentations, their inner meaning
+is for ever inaccessible.</p>
+
+<p>The starting-point for the metaphysical knowledge
+we seek is given us in our own body. The
+animal body is 'the immediate object of the
+subject': in it as presentation the 'effects' of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span>
+'causes' in the order of presentations external
+to it are first recognised. Now in virtue of his
+body the investigator is not pure knowing
+subject standing apart from that which he knows.
+In the case of the particular system of presentations
+constituting his organism, he knows what
+these presentations signify, and that is his <i>will</i>
+in a certain modification. The subject appears
+as individual through its identity with the
+body, and this body is given to it in two different
+ways: on one side as object among objects, and
+subjected to their laws; on the other side as the
+will immediately known to each. The act of
+will and the movement of the body are not two
+different states related as cause and effect; for
+the relation of cause and effect belongs only to
+the object, the phenomenon, the presentation.
+They are one and the same act given in different
+manners: the will, immediately to the subject;
+the movement, in sensible intuition for understanding.
+The action of the body is the objectified
+act of will. Called at first the immediate
+object of presentation, the body may
+now, from the other side, be called 'the objectivity
+of the will.'</p>
+
+<p>Thus, as was said, the 'law of motivation'
+discloses the inner nature of causality. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span>
+causality in general we know only relations of
+phenomena; but in the case of our own body we
+know something else that those relations express;
+namely, the act of will determined by motives.
+Now there are in the world as presentation other
+systems like that which we call our body. Unless
+all these are to be supposed mere phantoms without
+inner reality, we must infer by analogy, in
+correspondence with like phenomena, other individual
+wills similar to that which we know in ourselves.
+This inference from analogy, universally
+admitted in the case of human and animal bodies,
+must be extended to the whole corporeal world.
+The failure to take this step is where the purely
+intellectual forms of idealism have come short.
+Kant's 'thing-in-itself,' which is not subject to
+the forms by which presentations become experience,
+but which experience and its forms indicate
+as the reality, has been wrongly condemned by
+his successors as alien to idealism. It is true
+that Kant did in some respects fail to maintain
+the idealistic position with the clearness of
+Berkeley; but his shortcoming was not in affirming
+a thing-in-itself beyond phenomena. Here,
+in Schopenhauer's view, is the metaphysical
+problem that he left a place for but did not solve.
+The word of the riddle has now been pronounced.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span>
+Beyond presentation, that is, in itself and according
+to its innermost essence, the world is that
+which we find in ourselves immediately as will.
+By this it is not meant that a falling stone, for
+example, acts from a motive; knowledge and the
+consequent action from motives belongs only to
+the determinate form that the will has in animals
+and men; but the reality in the stone also is the
+same in essence as that to which we apply the
+name of will in ourselves. He who possesses this
+key to the knowledge of nature's innermost
+being will interpret the forces of vegetation, of
+crystallisation, of magnetism, of chemical affinity,
+even of weight itself, as different only in phenomenal
+manifestation but in essence the same;
+namely, that which is better known to each than
+all else, and where it emerges most clearly is
+called will. Only the will is thing-in-itself. It is
+wholly different from presentation, and is that of
+which presentation is the phenomenon, the visibility,
+the objectivity. Differences affect only the
+degree of the appearing, not the essence of that
+which appears.</p>
+
+<p>While the reality everywhere present is not
+will as specifically known in man, the mode
+of indicating its essence by reference to this,
+Schopenhauer contends, is a gain in insight. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span>
+thing-in-itself ought to receive its name from
+that among all its manifestations which is the
+clearest, the most perfect, the most immediately
+illumined by knowledge; and this is man's will.
+When we say that every force in nature is to be
+thought of as Will, we are subsuming an unknown
+under a known. For the conception of Force is
+abstracted from the realm of cause and effect,
+and indicates the limit of scientific explanation.
+Having arrived at the forces of nature on the one
+side and the forms of the subject on the other,
+science can go no further. The conception of
+Will can make known that which was so far concealed,
+because it proceeds from the most intimate
+consciousness that each has of himself, where the
+knower and the known coincide.</p>
+
+<p>By this consciousness, in which subject and
+object are not yet set apart, we reach something
+universal. In itself the Will is not individualised,
+but exists whole and undivided in every single
+thing in nature, as the Subject of contemplation
+exists whole and undivided in each cognitive
+being. It is entirely free from all forms of the
+phenomenon. What makes plurality possible is
+subjection to the forms of time and space, by
+which only the phenomenon is affected. Time
+and space may therefore be called, in scholastic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span>
+terminology, the 'principle of individuation.'
+While each of its phenomena is subject to the
+law of sufficient reason, which is the law of
+appearance in these forms, there is for the Will as
+thing-in-itself no rational ground: it is 'grundlos.'
+It is free from all plurality, although its phenomena
+in space and time are innumerable. It is
+one, not with the unity of an object or of a concept,
+but as that which lies outside of space and
+time, beyond the <i>principium individuationis</i>,
+that is, the possibility of plurality. The individual,
+the person, is not will as thing-in-itself,
+but phenomenon of the will, and as such determined.
+The will is 'free' because there is
+nothing beyond itself to determine it. Further,
+it is in itself mere activity without end, a blind
+striving. Knowledge appears only as the accompaniment
+of its ascending stages.</p>
+
+<p>Here we have arrived at the thought which, in
+its various expressions, constitutes Schopenhauer's
+metaphysics. That this cannot be scientifically
+deduced he admits; but he regards it as
+furnishing such explanation as is possible of
+science itself. For science there is in everything
+an inexplicable element to which it runs back,
+and which is real, not merely phenomenal. From
+this reality we are most remote in pure mathe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span>matics
+and in the pure <i>a priori</i> science of nature
+as it was formulated by Kant. These owe their
+transparent clearness precisely to their absence of
+real content, or to the slightness of this. The
+attempt to reduce organic life to chemistry, this
+again to mechanism, and at last everything to
+arithmetic, could it succeed, would leave mere
+form behind, from which all the content of phenomena
+would have vanished. And the form would
+in the end be form of the subject. But the enterprise
+is vain. 'For in everything in nature there
+is something of which no ground can ever be
+given, of which no explanation is possible, no
+cause further is to be sought.' What for man is
+his inexplicable character, presupposed in every
+explanation of his deeds from motives, that for
+every inorganic body is its inexplicable quality,
+the manner of its acting.</p>
+
+<p>The basis of this too is will, and 'groundless,'
+inexplicable will; but evidently the conception
+here is not identical with that of the Will that is
+one and all. How do we pass from the universal
+to that which has a particular character or
+quality? For of the Will as thing-in-itself we are
+told that there is not a greater portion in a man
+and a less in a stone. The relation of part and
+whole belongs exclusively to space. The more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span>
+and less touches only the phenomenon, that is,
+the visibility, the objectivation. A higher degree
+of this is in the plant than in the stone, in the
+animal than in the plant, and so forth; but the
+Will that is the essence of all is untouched by
+degree, as it is beyond plurality, space and time,
+and the relation of cause and effect.</p>
+
+<p>The answer to the question here raised is given
+in Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Platonic
+Ideas. These he regards as stages of objectivation
+of the Will. They are, as Plato called them,
+eternal forms related to particular things as
+models. The lowest stage of objectivation of the
+Will is represented by the forces of inorganic
+nature. Some of these, such as weight and impenetrability,
+appear in all matter. Some are
+divided among its different kinds, as rigidity,
+fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical
+properties. They are not subject to the
+relation of cause and effect, but are presupposed
+by it. A force is neither cause of an effect nor
+effect of a cause. Philosophically, it is immediate
+objectivity of the will; in ćtiology, <i>qualitas
+occulta</i>. At the lowest stages of objectivation,
+there is no individuality. This does not appear
+in inorganic things, nor even in merely organic
+or vegetative life, but only as we ascend the scale<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span>
+of animals. Even in the higher animals the
+specific enormously predominates over the individual
+character. Only in man is the Idea
+objectified in the individual character as such.
+'The character of each individual man, so far as
+it is thoroughly individual and not entirely comprehended
+in that of the species, may be regarded
+as a particular Idea, corresponding to a peculiar
+act of objectivation of the Will.'</p>
+
+<p>Schopenhauer warns us against substituting
+this philosophical explanation for scientific ćtiology.
+The chain of causes and effects, he points
+out, is not broken by the differences of the
+original, irreducible forces. The ćtiology and
+the philosophy of nature go side by side, regarding
+the same object from different points of view.
+Yet he also gives us in relation to his philosophy
+much that is not unsuggestive scientifically.
+His doctrine is not properly evolutionary, since
+the Ideas are eternal; but he has guarded incidentally
+against our supposing that all the
+natural kinds that manifest the Ideas phenomenally
+must be always represented in every world.
+For our particular world, comprising the sun and
+planets of the solar system, he sets forth in the
+<i>Parerga</i> an account of the process by which it
+develops from the nebula to man. This was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span>
+referred to in the preceding chapter. In his
+fundamental work he describes a struggle,
+present through the whole of nature, in which
+the phenomenal manifestations of the higher
+Ideas conquer and subjugate those of the lower,
+though they leave them still existent and ever
+striving to get loose. Here has been seen an
+adumbration of natural selection: he himself
+admits the difficulty he has in making it clear.
+We must remember that it is pre-Darwinian.</p>
+
+<p>Knowledge or intelligence he seeks to explain
+as an aid to the individual organism in its
+struggle to subsist and to propagate its kind. It
+first appears in animal life. It is represented by
+the brain or a large ganglion, as every endeavour
+of the Will in its self-objectivation is represented
+by some organ; that is, displays itself for presentation
+as such and such an appearance.
+Superinduced along with this contrivance for
+aid in the struggle, the world as presentation,
+with all its forms, subject and object, time, space,
+plurality and causality, is all at once there.
+'Hitherto only will, it is now at the same time
+presentation, object of the knowing subject.'
+Then in man, as a higher power beyond merely
+intuitive intelligence, appears reason as the power
+of abstract conception. For the most part,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>
+rational as well as intuitive knowledge, evolved
+originally as a mere means to higher objectivation
+of the Will, remains wholly in its service.
+How, in exceptional cases, intellect emancipates
+itself, will be discussed under the heads of
+Ćsthetics and Ethics.</p>
+
+<p>That this view implies a teleology Schopenhauer
+expressly recognises. Indeed he is a very
+decided teleologist on lines of his own, and, in
+physiology, takes sides strongly with 'vitalism'
+as against pure mechanicism. True, the Will is
+'endless' blind striving, and is essentially divided
+against itself. Everywhere in nature there is
+strife, and this takes the most horrible forms.
+Yet somehow there is in each individual manifestation
+of will a principle by which first the
+organism with its vital processes, and then the
+portion of it called the brain, in which is represented
+the intellect with its <i>a priori</i> forms, are
+evolved as aids in the strife. And, adapting all
+the manifestations to one another, there is a
+teleology of the universe. The whole world, with
+all its phenomena, is the objectivity of the one
+and indivisible Will; the Idea which is related
+to all other Ideas as the harmony to the single
+voices. The unity of the Will shows itself in the
+unison of all its phenomena as related to one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span>
+another. Man, its clearest and completest objectivation,
+is the summit of a pyramid, and could
+not exist without this. Inorganic and organic
+nature, then, were adapted to the future appearance
+of man, as man is adapted to the development
+that preceded him. But in thinking the
+reality, time is to be abstracted from. The
+earlier, we are obliged to say, is fitted to the
+later, as the later is fitted to the earlier; but the
+relation of means to end, under which we cannot
+help figuring the adaptation, is only appearance
+for our manner of knowledge. And the harmony
+described does not get rid of the conflict inherent
+in all will.</p>
+
+<p>In this account of Schopenhauer's metaphysical
+doctrine, I have tried to make the exposition as
+smooth as possible; but at two points the discontinuity
+can scarcely be concealed. First, the
+relation of the universal Will to the individual
+will is not made clear; and, secondly, the emergence
+of the world of presentation, with the
+knowledge in which it culminates, is left unintelligible
+because the will is conceived as mere
+blind striving without an aim. As regards the
+first point, disciples and expositors have been able
+to show that, by means of distinctions in his later
+writings, apparent contradictions are to some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span>
+extent cleared away; and, moreover, that he
+came to recognise more reality in the individual
+will. On the second point, I think it will be
+necessary to admit that his system as such breaks
+down. But both points must be considered in
+their connection.</p>
+
+<p>One of the most noteworthy features of
+Schopenhauer's philosophy is, as he himself
+thought, the acceptance from first to last of Kant's
+distinction between the 'empirical' and the 'intelligible'
+character of the individual. Every act
+of will of every human being follows with necessity
+as phenomenon from its phenomenal causes;
+so that all the events of each person's life are
+determined in accordance with scientific law.
+Nevertheless, the character empirically manifested
+in the phenomenal world, while it is completely
+necessitated, is the expression of something that
+is free from necessitation. This 'intelligible
+character' is out of time, and, itself undetermined,
+manifests itself through that which develops in
+time as a chain of necessary causes and effects.
+That this doctrine had been taken up, without
+any ambiguity as regards the determinism, by
+Schelling as well as by himself, he expressly
+acknowledges; and he finds it, as he also finds
+modern idealism, anticipated in various passages<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span>
+by the Neo-Platonists. His adaptation of it to
+his doctrine of the Ideas is distinctly Neo-Platonic
+in so far as he recognises 'Ideas of individuals';
+but of course to make Will the essence belongs to
+his own system. 'The intelligible character,' he
+says, 'coincides with the Idea, or, yet more precisely,
+with the original act of will that manifests
+itself in it: in so far, not only is the empirical
+character of each man, but also of each animal
+species, nay, of each plant species, and even of
+each original force of inorganic nature, to be regarded
+as phenomenon of an intelligible character,
+that is, of an indivisible act of will out of time.'
+This is what he called the '<i>aseitas</i>' of the will;
+borrowing a scholastic term to indicate its derivation
+(if we may speak of it as derived) from
+itself (<i>a se</i>), and not from a supposed creative act.
+Only if we adopt this view are we entitled to
+regard actions as worthy of moral approval or
+disapproval. They are such not because they are
+not necessitated, but because they necessarily
+show forth the nature of an essence the freedom
+of which consists in being what it is. Yet he
+could not but find a difficulty in reconciling this
+with his position that the one universal Will is
+identical in all things, and in each is 'individuated'
+only by space and time. For the Ideas, like the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span>
+thing-in-itself, are eternal, that is, outside of time
+as well as space; and all the things now enumerated,
+forces of nature, plant and animal species,
+and individual characters of men, are declared to
+be in themselves Ideas.</p>
+
+<p>He in part meets this difficulty by the subtlety
+that time and space do not, strictly speaking,
+determine individuality, but arise along with it.
+The diremption of individualities becomes explicit
+in those forms. Yet he must have perceived that
+this is not a complete answer, and various modifications
+can be seen going on. His first view
+clearly was that the individual is wholly impermanent,
+and at death simply disappears; nothing
+is left but the one Will and the universal Subject
+of contemplation identical in all. Metempsychosis
+is the best mythological rendering of what happens,
+but it is no more. Later, he puts forward the not
+very clearly defined theory of a 'palingenesia' by
+which a particular will, but not the intellect that
+formerly accompanied it, may reappear in the
+phenomenal world. And the hospitality he
+showed to stories of magic, clairvoyance, and
+ghost-seeing, is scarcely compatible with the view
+that the individual will is no more than a
+phenomenal differentiation of the universal will.
+A speculation (not put forward as anything more)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span>
+on the appearance of a special providence in the
+destiny of the individual, points, as Professor
+Volkelt has noted, to the idea of a guidance, not
+from without, but by a kind of good daemon or
+genius that is the ultimate reality of the person.
+On all this we must not lay too much stress; but
+there is certainly one passage that can only be
+described as a definite concession that the individual
+is real in a sense not at first allowed.
+Individuality, it is said in so many words
+(<i>Parerga</i>, ii. § 117), does not rest only on the
+'principle of individuation' (time and space), and
+is therefore not through and through phenomenon,
+but is rooted in the thing-in-itself. 'How deep
+its roots go belongs to the questions which I do
+not undertake to answer.'<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p>
+
+<p>This tends to modify considerably, but does not
+overthrow, Schopenhauer's original system. In
+very general terms, he is in the number of the
+'pantheistic' thinkers; and it is remarkable, on
+examination, how these, in Europe at least, have
+nearly always recognised in the end some permanent
+reality in the individual. This is contrary
+to first impressions: but the great names
+may be cited of Plotinus, John Scotus Erigena,
+Giordano Bruno, Spinoza (in Part v. of the <i>Ethics</i>),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span>
+and finally of Schopenhauer's special aversion,
+Hegel, who has been supposed most unfavourable
+of all to any recognition of individuality as real.
+It is more true, Hegel maintains, that the individuality
+determines its world than that it is
+determined by it; and there is no explanation
+why the determination should be such and such
+except that the individuality was already what it
+is.<a name="FNanchor_1_2" id="FNanchor_1_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> And, if Schopenhauer's more imaginative
+speculations seek countenance from the side of
+empiricism, there is nothing in them quite so
+audacious as a speculation of J. S. Mill on disembodied
+mind, thrown out during the time when
+he was writing his <i>Logic</i>.<a name="FNanchor_2_3" id="FNanchor_2_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p>
+
+<p>The association with pantheism Schopenhauer
+accepts in principle, though the name is not congenial
+to him. In his system the Will is one and
+all, like the 'Deus' of Spinoza. The difference is
+that, instead of ascribing perfection to the universe
+that is its manifestation, he regards the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span>
+production of a world as a lapse from which
+redemption is to be sought. His doctrine has
+been rightly described, in common with the predominant
+philosophical doctrines of his period,
+as a resultant of the deepened subjective analysis
+brought by Kant into modern philosophy on the
+one side, and of the return to Spinoza in the
+quest for unity of principle on the other. Why,
+then, it may be asked, are Fichte, Schelling, and
+Hegel the constant objects of his attack? The
+true explanation is not the merely external one,
+that they were his successful rivals for public
+favour, but is to be found in a real antithesis of
+thought. Within the limits of the idealism they
+all hold in common, Schopenhauer is at the
+opposite pole. In spite of his attempt to incorporate
+the Platonic Ideas, and in spite of his
+following of Kant, whose 'intelligible world' was
+in essence Platonic or neo-Platonic, he could find
+no place in his system for a rational order at the
+summit. Now this order was precisely what
+Fichte and Hegel aimed at demonstrating. If
+Schopenhauer is less unsympathetic in his
+references to Schelling, that is because Schelling's
+world-soul appeared to him to prefigure his own
+attempt to discover in nature the manifestation
+of a blindly striving will or feeling rather than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span>
+reason. Suspicious as he shows himself of
+possible plagiarisms by others, the charge cannot
+be retorted against himself. The supreme principle
+of Fichte, it has been pointed out, has an
+actively volitional character and was formulated
+before Schopenhauer's: but then it is essentially
+rational. For Hegel, what is supreme is the
+world-reason. Hence they are at one with Plato
+in holding that in some sense 'mind is king.'
+For Schopenhauer, on the contrary, mind, or
+pure intellect, is an emancipated slave. Having
+reached its highest point, and seen through the
+work of the will, it does not turn back and
+organise it, but abolishes it as far as its insight
+extends.</p>
+
+<p>Yet to say merely this is to give a wrong impression
+of Schopenhauer. Starting though he
+does with blind will, and ending with the flight
+of the ascetic from the suffering inherent in the
+world that is the manifestation of such a will, he
+nevertheless, in the intermediate stages, makes
+the world a cosmos and not a chaos. And the
+Platonists on their side have to admit that 'the
+world of all of us' does not present itself on the
+surface as a manifestation of pure reason, and
+that it is a serious task to 'rationalise' it. Where
+he completely fails is where the Platonic systems<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span>
+also fail, though from the opposite starting-point.
+His attempt to derive presentation, intellect,
+knowledge, from blind striving, is undoubtedly
+a failure. But so also is the attempt of the
+Platonising thinkers to deduce a world of mixture
+from a principle of pure reason without aid from
+anything else empirically assumed. Not that in
+either case there is failure to give explanations
+in detail; but in both cases much is taken from
+experience without reduction to the principles of
+the system. What we may say by way of comparison
+is this: that if Schopenhauer had in so
+many words recognised an immanent Reason as
+well as Will in the reality of the universe, he
+would have formally renounced his pessimism;
+while it cannot be said that on the other side a
+more explicit empiricism in the account of the
+self-manifestation of Reason would necessarily
+destroy the optimism.</p><hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2>
+
+<h3>ĆSTHETICS</h3>
+
+
+<p>A portion of Schopenhauer's system by which
+its pessimism is considerably mitigated is his
+theory of the Beautiful and of Fine Art. The
+characteristic of ćsthetic contemplation is, he
+finds, that intellect throws off the yoke and
+subsists purely for itself as clear mirror of the
+world, free from all subjection to practical purposes
+of the will. In this state of freedom,
+temporary painlessness is attained.</p>
+
+<p>The theory starts from his adaptation of the
+Platonic Ideas. Regarded purely as an ćsthetic
+theory, it departs from Plato, as he notes; for,
+with the later Platonists, who took up the defence
+of poetic myths and of the imitative arts as
+against their master, he holds that Art penetrates
+to the general Idea through the particular, and
+hence that the work of art is no mere 'copy of a
+copy.' The difference of the Idea from the
+Concept is that it is not merely abstract and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span>
+general, but combines with generality the characters
+of an intuition.</p>
+
+<p>The Ideas, as we have seen, constitute the
+determinate stages of objectivation of the Will.
+The innumerable individuals of which the Ideas
+are the patterns are subject to the law of sufficient
+reason. They appear, that is to say, under the
+forms of time, space, and causality. The Idea is
+beyond these forms, and therefore is clear of
+plurality and change. Since the law of sufficient
+reason is the common form under which stands
+all the subject's knowledge so far as the subject
+knows as individual, the Ideas lie outside the
+sphere of knowledge of the individual as such.
+If, therefore, the Ideas are to be the object of
+knowledge, this can only be by annulling individuality
+in the knowing subject.</p>
+
+<p>As thing-in-itself, the Will is exempt even
+from the first of the forms of knowledge, the form
+of being 'object for a subject.' The Platonic
+Idea, on the other hand, is necessarily an object,
+something known, a presentation. It has laid
+aside, or rather has not taken on, the subordinate
+forms; but it has retained the first and most
+general form. It is the immediate and most
+adequate possible objectivity of the Will; whereas
+particular things are an objectivation troubled by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span>
+the forms of which the law of sufficient reason is
+the common expression.</p>
+
+<p>When intellect breaks loose from the service of
+the will, for which it was originally destined in
+the teleology of nature, then the subject ceases
+to be merely individual and becomes pure will-less
+subject of knowledge. In this state the beholder
+no longer tracks out relations in accordance with
+the principle of sufficient reason&mdash;which is the
+mode of scientific as well as of common knowledge&mdash;but
+rests in fixed contemplation of the given
+object apart from its connection with anything
+else. The contemplator thus 'lost' in the object,
+it is not the single thing as such that is known,
+but the Idea, the eternal form, the immediate
+objectivity of the Will at this stage. The correlate
+of this object&mdash;the pure Subject exempt from the
+principle of sufficient reason&mdash;is eternal, like the
+Idea.</p>
+
+<p>The objectivation of the Will appears faintly in
+inorganic things,&mdash;clouds, water, crystals,&mdash;more
+fully in the plant, yet more fully in the animal,
+most completely in man. Only the essential in
+these stages of objectivation constitutes the Idea.
+Its development into manifold phenomena under
+the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, is
+unessential, lies merely in the mode of knowledge<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span>
+for the individual, and has reality only for this.
+It is not otherwise with the unfolding of that
+Idea which is the completest objectivation of the
+Will. To the Idea of Man, the occurrences of
+human history are as unessential as the shapes
+they assume to the clouds, as the figures of its
+whirlpools and foam-drift to the stream, as its
+frost-flowers to the ice. The same underlying
+passions and dispositions everlastingly recur in
+the same modes. It is idle to suppose that anything
+is gained. But also nothing is lost: so the
+Earth-spirit might reply to one who complained
+of high endeavours frustrated, faculties wasted,
+promises of world-enlightenment brought to
+nought; for there is infinite time to dispose of,
+and all possibilities are for ever renewed.</p>
+
+<p>The kind of knowledge for which the Ideas are
+the object of contemplation finds its expression
+in Art, the work of genius. Art repeats in its
+various media the Ideas grasped by pure contemplation.
+Its only end is the communication of
+these. While Science, following the stream of
+events according to their determinate relations,
+never reaches an ultimate end, Art is always at
+the end. 'It stops the wheel of time; relations
+vanish for it: only the essence, the Idea, is its
+object.' The characteristic of genius is a pre<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span>dominant
+capacity for thus contemplating things
+independently of the principle of sufficient reason.
+Since this requires a forgetting of one's own
+person and the relations between it and things,
+the attitude of genius is simply the completest
+'objectivity.' The 'subjectivity' opposed to this,
+in Schopenhauer's phraseology, is preoccupation
+with the interests of one's own will. It is, he
+says, as if there fell to the share of genius a
+measure of intelligence far beyond the needs of
+the individual will: and this makes possible the
+setting aside of individual interests, the stripping
+off of the particular personality, so that the subject
+becomes 'pure knowing subject,' 'clear world-eye,'
+in a manner sufficiently sustained for that which
+has been grasped to be repeated in the work of
+art. A necessary element in genius is therefore
+Imagination. For without imagination to represent,
+in a shape not merely abstract, things that
+have not come within personal experience, genius
+would remain limited to immediate intuition, and
+could not make its vision apprehensible by others.
+Nor without imagination could the particular
+things that express the Idea be cleared of the
+imperfections by which their limited expression
+of it falls short of what nature was aiming at
+in their production. 'Inspiration' is ascribed to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span>
+genius because its characteristic attitude is intermittent.
+The man of genius cannot always remain
+on a height, but has to fall back to the
+level of the common man, who can scarcely at all
+regard things except as they affect his interests,&mdash;have
+a relation to his will, direct or indirect.</p>
+
+<p>This is the statement in its first outline of a
+theory that became one of Schopenhauer's most
+fruitful topics. Many are the pages he has devoted
+to the contrast between the man of genius
+and 'the wholesale ware of nature, which she
+turns out daily by thousands.' The genius is for
+him primarily the artist. Scientific genius as a
+distinctive thing he does not fully recognise; and
+he regards men of action, and especially statesmen,
+rather as men of highly competent ability
+endowed with an exceptionally good physical
+constitution than as men of genius in the proper
+sense. Philosophers like himself, who, as he
+frankly says, appear about once in a hundred
+years, he classes in the end with the artists;
+though this was left somewhat indeterminate in
+his first exposition. The weakness of the man of
+genius in dealing with the ordinary circumstances
+of life he allows, and even insists on. Genius,
+grasping the Idea in its perfection, fails to understand
+individuals. A poet may know man pro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span>foundly,
+and men very ill. He admits the
+proximity of genius to madness on one side, and
+explains it in this way. What marks the stage
+of actual madness, as distinguished from illusion
+or hallucination, is complete disruption of the
+memory of past life, of the history of the personality
+as something continuous; so that the particular
+thing is viewed by itself, out of relation. This
+gives a kind of resemblance to the attitude of
+genius, for which present intuition excludes from
+view the relations of things to each other. Or, as
+we may perhaps sum up his thought in its most
+general form, 'alienation' or dissolution of personality
+has the resemblance often noted between
+extremes to the impersonality, or, as he calls it,
+'objectivity,' that is super-personal.</p>
+
+<p>In spite of his contempt for the crowd, he has
+to admit, of course, that the capacity of genius
+to recognise the Ideas of things and to become
+momentarily impersonal must in some measure
+belong to all men; otherwise, they could not even
+enjoy a work of art when produced. Genius has
+the advantage only in the much higher degree
+and the greater prolongation of the insight.
+Since, then, the actual achievement of the artist
+is to make us look into the world through his
+eyes, the feelings for the beautiful and the sublime<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span>
+may be treated irrespectively of the question
+whether they are aroused by nature and human
+life directly or by means of art.</p>
+
+<p>Ćsthetic pleasure in contemplation of the
+beautiful proceeds partly from recognition of the
+individual object not as one particular thing but
+as Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of
+this whole kind of things; partly from the consciousness
+the knower has of himself not as
+individual, but as pure, will-less Subject of Knowledge.
+All volition springs out of need, therefore
+out of want, therefore out of suffering. No attained
+object of will can give permanent satisfaction.
+Thus, there can be no durable happiness
+or rest for us as long as we are subjects of will.
+'The Subject of Will lies continually on the turning
+wheel of Ixion, draws ever in the sieve of
+the Danaides, is the eternally thirsting Tantalus.
+But in the moment of pure objective contemplation,
+free from all interest of the particular
+subjectivity, we enter a painless state: the wheel
+of Ixion stands still. The Flemish painters
+produce this ćsthetic effect by the sense of
+disinterested contemplation conveyed in their
+treatment of insignificant objects. There are
+certain natural scenes that have power in themselves,
+apart from artistic treatment, to put us in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span>
+this state; but the slightest obtrusion of individual
+interest destroys the magic. Past and distant
+objects, through their apparent detachment, have
+the same power. The essential thing ćsthetically,
+whether we contemplate the present or the past,
+the near or the distant, is that only the world
+of presentation remains; the world as will has
+vanished.</p>
+
+<p>The difference between the feelings of the
+Beautiful and of the Sublime is this. In the feeling
+of the beautiful, pure intelligence gains the
+victory without a struggle, leaving in consciousness
+only the pure subject of knowledge, so that
+no reminiscence of the will remains. In the feeling
+of the sublime, on the other hand, the state
+of pure intelligence has to be won by a conscious
+breaking loose from relations in the object that
+suggest something threatening to the will; though
+there must not be actual danger; for in that case
+the individual will itself would come into play,
+and ćsthetic detachment would cease. Elevation
+above the sense of terror has not only to be consciously
+won but consciously maintained, and
+involves a continuous reminiscence, not indeed of
+any individual will, but of the will of man in
+general, so far as it is expressed through its objectivity,
+the human body, confronted by forces<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span>
+hostile to it. Pre-eminently this feeling arises
+from contrast between the immensities of space
+and time and the apparent insignificance of man.
+It means in the last resort that the beholder is
+upheld by the consciousness that as pure subject
+of knowledge (not as individual subject) he himself
+bears within him all the worlds and all the
+ages, and is eternal as the forces that vainly seem
+to threaten him with annihilation.</p>
+
+<p>On the objective side, and apart from the subjective
+distinction just set forth, the sublime and
+the beautiful are not essentially different. In
+both cases alike, the object of ćsthetic contemplation
+is not the single thing, but the Idea that
+is striving towards manifestation in it. Whatever
+is viewed ćsthetically is viewed out of relation to
+time and space: 'along with the law of sufficient
+reason the single thing and the knowing individual
+are taken away, and nothing remains over
+but the Idea and the pure Subject of Knowledge,
+which together make up the adequate objectivity
+of the Will at this stage.' There is thus a sense
+in which everything is beautiful; since the Will
+appears in everything at some stage of objectivity,
+and this means that it is the expression of some
+Idea. But one thing can be more beautiful than
+another by facilitating ćsthetic contemplation.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span>
+This facilitation proceeds either from the greater
+clearness and perfection with which the particular
+thing shows forth the Idea of its kind, or from the
+higher stage of objectivation to which that Idea
+corresponds. Man being the highest stage of
+objectivation of the Will, the revelation of his
+essence is the highest aim of art. In ćsthetic
+contemplation of inorganic nature and vegetative
+life, whether in the reality or through the medium
+of art, and in appreciation of architecture, the subjective
+aspect, that is to say, the enjoyment of pure
+will-less knowledge, is predominant; the Ideas
+themselves being here lower stages of objectivity.
+On the other hand, when animals and men are
+the object of ćsthetic contemplation or representation,
+the enjoyment consists more in the objective
+apprehension of those Ideas in which the essence
+of the Will is most clearly and fully manifested.</p>
+
+<p>Of all Schopenhauer's work, its ćsthetic part
+has met with the most general appreciation.
+Here especially he abounds in observations drawn
+directly, in his own phrase, from intuition. To
+make a selection of these, however, is not appropriate
+to a brief sketch like the present. I pass
+on, therefore, to those portions of his theory of
+Art by which he makes the transition, in terms of
+his system, to Morality.</p><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>From Architecture onward the arts are obliged
+to represent the Will as divided. Here, at the
+first stage, its division subsists only in a conflict
+of inorganic forces which have to be brought to
+equilibrium. The conflict between weight and
+rigidity is in truth the only ćsthetic material of
+architecture as a fine art. When we come to
+animal and lastly to human life, which, in the
+Plastic Arts and in Poetry, as form, individualised
+expression, and action, is the highest object of
+ćsthetic representation, the vehemence of divided
+will is fully revealed; and here too is revealed
+the essential identity of every will with our own.
+In the words of the Indian wisdom, 'Tat twam
+asi'; 'that thou art.' Under the head of Ethics
+it will be shown expressly that by this insight,
+when it reacts on the will, the will can deny itself.
+For the temporary release from its striving, given
+in ćsthetic contemplation, is then substituted
+permanent release. To this 'resignation,' the
+innermost essence of all virtue and holiness, and
+the final redemption from the world, Art itself, at
+its highest stages, points the way.</p>
+
+<p>The summits of pictorial and poetic art Schopenhauer
+finds in the great Italian painters so far as
+they represent the ethical spirit of Christianity,
+and in the tragic poets, ancient and modern. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span>
+is true that the poverty of their sacred history or
+mythology puts the Christian artists at a disadvantage;
+but events are merely the accidents of
+their art. Not in these, as related according to
+the law of sufficient reason, is the essence, but in
+the spirit we divine through the forms portrayed.
+In their representation of men full of that spirit,
+and especially in the eyes, we see mirrored the
+knowledge that has seized the whole essence of
+the world and of life, and that has reacted on
+the will, not so as to give it motives, but as a
+'quietive'; whence proceeds complete resignation,
+and with it the annulling of the will and of the
+whole essence of this world. Of tragedy, the
+subject-matter is the conflict of the will with
+itself at its highest stage of objectivity. Here
+also the end is the resignation brought on by
+complete knowledge of the essence of the world.
+The hero, on whom at last this knowledge has
+acted as a quietive, gives up, not merely life, but
+the whole will to live. 'The true meaning of
+tragedy is the deeper insight, that what the hero
+expiates is not his particular sins, but original sin,
+that is, the guilt of existence itself.' To illustrate
+this position Schopenhauer is fond of quoting a
+passage from Calderon which declares that the
+greatest sin of man is to have been born.</p><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>It seems strange that, after deriding as he does
+the popular notion of 'poetic justice' so detached
+a thinker should imagine an at least equally one-sided
+view to receive its final confirmation from
+the Spanish dramatist's poetic phrasing of a
+Christian dogma. The great tragic poets, for
+Schopenhauer also, are Ćschylus, Sophocles and
+Shakespeare. Now it is safe to say that by none
+of these was any such general doctrine held either
+in conceptual or in intuitive form. The whole
+effect of any kind of art, of course he would
+admit, cannot be packed into a formula; but if
+we seek one as an aid to understanding, some
+adaptation of his own theory of the sublime would
+probably serve much better as applied to tragedy
+than his direct theory of the drama. In the case
+of pictorial art, all that is proved by what he says
+about the representation of ascetic saintliness, is
+that this, like many other things, can be so
+brought within the scope of art as to make us
+momentarily identify ourselves with its Idea in
+the impersonal manner he has himself described.
+His purely ćsthetic theory is quite adequate to
+the case, without any assumption that this is the
+representation of what is best. Art, pictorial or
+poetic, can no more prove pessimism than optimism.
+We pick out expressions of one or the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span>
+other for quotation according to our moods or
+subjective preferences; but, if we have the feeling
+for art itself, our sense of actual ćsthetic value
+ought to be independent of these.</p>
+
+<p>Schopenhauer's ćsthetic theory, however, does
+not end here. There follows the part of it by
+which he has had an influence on artists themselves.
+For him, a position separate from all the
+other arts is held by music. While the rest
+objectify the Will mediately, that is to say, by
+means of the Ideas, Music is as immediate an
+objectivation of the whole Will as the world itself,
+or as the Ideas, of which the pluralised phenomenon
+constitutes the sum of particular things.
+The other arts speak of the shadow, music of the
+substance. There is indeed a parallelism, an analogy,
+between Music and the Ideas; yet Music
+never expresses the phenomenon in which these are
+manifested, but only the inner essence behind the
+appearance, the Will itself. In a sense it renders
+not feeling in its particularity, but feeling <i>in
+abstracto</i>; joy, sorrow, not a joy, a sorrow. The
+phenomenal world and music are to be regarded
+as two different expressions of the same thing.
+The world might be called embodied Music as
+well as embodied Will. 'Melodies are to a certain
+extent like general concepts, an abstract of reality.'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span>
+A complete explanation of music, that is, a detailed
+repetition of it in concepts, were this
+possible, would be a complete explanation of the
+world (since both express the same thing) and
+therefore a true and final philosophy. As music
+only reaches its perfection in the full harmony,
+'so the one Will out of time finds its perfect objectivation
+only in complete union of all the stages
+which in innumerable degrees of heightened distinctness
+reveal its essence.' But here, too,
+Schopenhauer adds, the Will is felt, and can
+be proved, to be a divided will; and the deliverance
+wrought by this supreme art, as by all the others,
+is only temporary.</p><hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V</h2>
+
+<h3>ETHICS</h3>
+
+
+<p>Permanent redemption from the suffering of the
+world is to be found only in the holiness of the
+ascetic; but to this there are many stages, constituting
+the generally accepted human virtues.
+Of these Schopenhauer has a rational account
+to give in terms of his philosophy; and if the
+last stage does not seem to follow by logical
+sequence from the others, this is only what is to
+be expected; for it is reached, in his view, by a
+sort of miracle. To the highest kind of intuitive
+knowledge, from which the ascetic denial of the
+will proceeds, artistic contemplation ought to
+prepare the way; and so also, on his principles,
+ought the practice of justice and goodness. Yet
+he is obliged to admit that few thus reach the
+goal. Of those that do reach it, the most arrive
+through personal suffering, which may be deserved.
+A true miracle is often worked in the repentant
+criminal, by which final deliverance is achieved.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span>
+Though the 'intelligible character' is unalterable,
+and the empirical character can only be the unfolding
+of this, as every great dramatist intuitively
+recognises, yet the 'convertites,' like Duke
+Frederick in <i>As You Like It</i>, are not to be regarded
+as hypocrites. The 'second voyage' to the harbour,
+that of the disappointed egoist, on condition
+of this miracle, brings the passenger to it as
+surely as the first, that of the true saints, which is
+only for the few. And in these equally a miraculous
+conversion of the will has to be finally
+worked.</p>
+
+<p>At the entrance to his distinctive theory of
+ethics, Schopenhauer places a restatement of his
+metaphysics as the possible basis of a mode of
+contemplating life which, he admits, has some
+community with an optimistic pantheism. The
+Will, through the presentation and the accompanying
+intelligence developed in its service,
+becomes conscious that that which it wills is precisely
+the world, life as it is. To call it 'the will
+to live' is therefore a pleonasm. 'Will' and 'will
+to live' are equivalent. For this will, life is everlastingly
+a certainty. 'Neither the will, the thing-in-itself
+in all phenomena, nor the subject of
+knowledge, the spectator of all phenomena, is ever
+touched by birth and death.' It is true that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span>
+individual appears and disappears; but individuality
+is illusory. Past and future exist only in
+conceptual thought. 'The form of life is a present
+without end, howsoever the individuals, phenomena
+of the Idea, come into existence and vanish
+in time, like fugitive dreams.' Only as phenomenon
+is each man different from the other
+things of the world: as thing-in-itself he is the
+Will, which appears in all, and death takes away
+the illusion that divides his consciousness from
+the rest. 'Death is a sleep in which the individuality
+is forgotten: everything else wakes again,
+or rather has remained awake.' It is, in the expression
+adopted by Schopenhauer later, an
+awakening from the dream of life: though this
+bears with it somewhat different implications;
+and, as has been said, his theory of individuality
+became modified.</p>
+
+<p>With the doctrine of the eternal life of the
+Will are connected Schopenhauer's theories, developed
+later, of the immortality of the species
+and of individualised sexual love. The latter is
+by itself a remarkable achievement, and constitutes
+the one distinctly new development
+brought to completion in his later years; for the
+modifications in his theory of individuality are
+only tentative. His theory of love has a deter<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span>minate
+conclusion, of great value for science, and
+not really compatible, it seems to me, with his
+pessimism. In its relation to ethics, on which he
+insisted, it is rightly placed in the position it
+occupies, between the generalised statement of
+his metaphysics just now set forth on the one
+side, and his theory of human virtue on the
+other.</p>
+
+<p>The teleology that manifests itself in individualised
+love is, in his view, not related in reality to
+the interests of the individual life, but to those of
+the species. That this is immortal follows from
+the eternity of the Idea it unfolds.<a name="FNanchor_1_4" id="FNanchor_1_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> The end
+sought is aimed at unconsciously by the person.
+Fundamentally, for Schopenhauer, teleology must
+of course be unconscious, since the will is blind,
+and will, not intelligence, is primordial. Its
+typical case is the instinct of animals; but the
+'instinctive' character belongs also to the accomplishment
+of the highest aims, as in art and
+virtue. What characterises individualised love
+internally is the aim, attributed to 'nature' or
+'the species,' at a certain typical beauty or per<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span>fection
+of the offspring. The lover is therefore
+deluded in thinking that he is seeking his own
+happiness. What looks through the eyes of
+lovers is the genius of the race, meditating on the
+composition of the next generation. It may, in the
+complexity of circumstances, be thwarted. When
+it reaches its end, often personal happiness is
+sacrificed. Marriages dictated by interest tend
+to be happier than love-matches. Yet, though
+the sacrifice of the individual to the race is involuntary
+in these, egoism is after all overcome;
+hence they are quite rightly the object of a
+certain admiration and sympathy, while the
+prudential ones are looked upon with a tinge of
+contempt. For here too that element appears
+which alone gives nobility to the life either of
+intellect or of art or of moral virtue, namely, the
+rising above a subjective interest of the individual
+will.</p>
+
+<p>No doubt there are touches of pessimism in
+this statement; but the general theory does not
+seem reconcilable finally with pessimism as
+Schopenhauer understands it. For it is a definitely
+stated position of his that nature keeps up the
+process of the world by yielding just enough to
+prevent discontinuance of the striving for an
+illusory end. Yet he admits here in the result<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span>
+something beyond bare continuance of life; for
+this is already secured without the particular
+modification of feeling described. What the feeling
+is brought in to secure is a better realisation
+of the type in actual individuals; and such realisation
+is certainly more than bare subsistence
+with the least possible expenditure of nature's
+resources.</p>
+
+<p>As the immediate preliminary to his ethics
+proper, Schopenhauer restates his doctrine on the
+intelligible and the empirical character in man,
+and lays down a generalised psychological position
+regarding the suffering inherent in life.
+Everything as phenomenon, we have seen already,
+is determined because it is subject to the law of
+sufficient reason. On the other hand, everything
+as thing-in-itself is free; for 'freedom' means
+only non-subjection to that law. The intelligible
+character of each man is an indivisible, unalterable
+act of will out of time; the developed and
+explicit phenomenon of this in time and space is
+the empirical character. Man is his own work,
+not in the light of knowledge, but before all
+knowledge; this is secondary and an instrument.
+Ultimately, freedom is a mystery, and takes us
+beyond even will as the name for the thing-in-itself.
+In reality, that which is 'will to live' need<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span>
+not have been such (though we cannot see how
+this is so), but has become such from itself and
+from nothing else. This is its '<i>aseitas</i>.' Hence
+it is in its power to deny itself as will to live.
+When it does this, the redemption (like the fall)
+comes from itself. This denial does not mean
+annihilation, except relatively to all that we know
+under the forms of our understanding. For the
+will, though the nearest we can get to the thing-in-itself,
+is in truth a partially phenomenalised
+expression of this. As the will to live expresses
+itself phenomenally, so also does the denial of the
+will to live, when this, by special 'grace,' is
+achieved. Only in man does the freedom thus
+attained find phenomenal expression. That man
+can attain to it proves that in him the will has
+reached its highest possible stage of objectivation;
+for, after it has turned back and denied itself,
+there is evidently nothing more that we can call
+existence, that is to say, phenomenal existence,
+beyond. What there is beyond in the truth of
+being is something that the mystics know&mdash;or
+rather, possess, for it is beyond knowledge&mdash;but
+cannot communicate.</p>
+
+<p>The psychological reason that can be assigned
+for the ascetic flight from the world is that all
+pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, is merely nega<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span>tive.
+The will is a striving that has no ultimate
+aim. It is sustained only by hindrances. Hindrance
+means suffering; and every satisfaction
+attained is only temporary, a mere liberation from
+need, want, pain, which is positive. Suffering
+increases with the degree of consciousness. The
+life of civilised man is an alternation between
+pain and <i>ennui</i>, which can itself become as intolerable
+a suffering as anything. The problem
+of moral philosophy, then, is ultimately how
+redemption from such a world is to be attained,
+but only so far as this is a matter of conceptual
+knowledge. For philosophy, being from beginning
+to end theoretical, cannot work the practical
+miracle by which the will denies itself.</p>
+
+<p>The intuitive, as distinguished from merely
+conceptual, knowledge by which the return is
+made, consists essentially in a clear insight into
+the identity of the suffering will in all things and
+the necessity of its suffering as long as it is will
+to live. This, then, is the true foundation of
+morality. The universe as metaphysical thing-in-itself,
+as noumenon, has an ethical meaning. All
+its stages of objectivation, though in the process
+what seems to be aimed at is preservation of the
+will as manifested, have in truth for their ultimate
+aim its redemption by suppression of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span>
+the phenomenal world in which it manifests
+itself.</p>
+
+<p>Affirmation of the will is affirmation of the
+body, which is the objectivity of the will. The
+sexual impulse, since it affirms life beyond the
+death of the individual, is the strongest of self-affirmations.
+In it is found the meaning of the
+mythical representation that has taken shape in
+the theological dogma of original sin. For by this
+affirmation going beyond the individual body,
+suffering and death, as the necessary accompaniment
+of the phenomenon of life, are reaffirmed,
+and the possibility of redemption this time
+declared fruitless. But through the whole process
+there runs eternal justice. The justification of
+suffering is that the will affirms itself; and the
+self-affirmation is justified by payment of the
+penalty.</p>
+
+<p>Before the final redemption&mdash;which is not for
+the world but for the individual&mdash;there are many
+stages of ethical progress. These consist in the
+gradual overcoming of egoism by sympathy. And
+here Schopenhauer proceeds to set forth a practical
+scheme for the social life of man, differing from
+ordinary utilitarianism only by reducing all sympathy
+to pity, in accordance with his view that
+there can be no such thing as positive happiness.</p><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>He begins with a theory of justice, legal and
+moral, very much on the lines of Hobbes, except
+that he regards it as up to a certain point <i>a
+priori</i>. Here he is consistent throughout. As
+in his philosophical account of mathematics and
+physics, so also in his aesthetics and ethics, he
+retained, side by side with a strong empirical
+tendency, belief in certain irreducible <i>a priori</i>
+forms without which our knowledge cannot be
+constituted. The pure ethical theory of justice,
+he says, bears to the political theory the relation
+of pure to applied mathematics. Injustice he
+holds to be the positive conception. It means
+the breaking into the sphere of another person's
+will to live. The self-affirmation of the will that
+appears in one individual body is extended to
+denial of the will that appears in other bodies.
+Justice consists in non-encroachment. There is
+a 'natural right,' or 'moral right,' of resistance to
+injustice by infliction of what, apart from the attempted
+encroachment, would be wrong. Either
+force or deception may be used; as either may be
+the instrument of injustice. The purely ethical
+doctrine of justice applies only to action; since
+only the not doing of injustice depends on us.
+With the State and its laws, the relation is reversed.
+The object of these is to prevent the suffering of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span>
+injustice. The State is not directed against egoism,
+but has sprung out of a rationalised collective
+egoism. It has for its purpose only to avoid the
+inconvenient consequences of individual aggressions
+on others. Outside of the State, there is a
+right of self-defence against injustice, but no right
+of punishment. The punishment threatened by
+the State is essentially a motive against committing
+wrong, intended to supply the place of ethical
+motives for those who are insufficiently accessible
+to them. Actual infliction of it is the carrying
+out of the threat when it has failed, so that in
+general the expectation of the penalty may be
+certain. Revenge, which has a view to the past,
+cannot be justified ethically: punishment is
+directed only to the future. There is no right
+in any one to set himself up as a moral judge
+and inflict pain; but man has a right to do what
+is needful for social security. The criminal's acts
+are of course necessitated; but he cannot justly
+complain of being punished for them, since it is
+ultimately from himself, from what he is, that
+they sprang.</p>
+
+<p>With the doctrine of 'eternal justice,' touched
+on above, we pass into a different region of
+thought. What is responsible for the guilt in
+the world is the Will by which everything exists,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span>
+and the suffering everlastingly falls where the
+guilt is. Take the case of apparently unpunished
+injustice (from the human point of view) expressing
+itself in the extreme form of deliberate cruelty.
+Through this also, eternal justice, from which
+there is no escape, is fulfilled. 'The torturer and
+the tortured are one. The former errs in thinking
+he has no share in the torture; the latter in
+thinking he has no share in the guilt.' For all
+the pain of the world is the expiation of the sin
+involved in the self-affirmation of will, and the
+Will as thing-in-itself is one and the same in all.</p>
+
+<p>If this could satisfy any one, there would be no
+need to go further. The whole being as it ought
+to be, why try to rectify details that are absolutely
+indifferent? But of course the implication is that
+individuality is simply illusory; and this, as has
+been said, was a position that Schopenhauer
+neither could nor did consistently maintain.
+Indeed, immediately after setting forth this theory
+of 'eternal justice,' he goes on to a relative justification
+of those acts of disinterested vengeance
+by which a person knowingly sacrifices his own
+life for the sake of retribution on some extraordinary
+criminal. This, he says, is a form of
+punishment, not mere revenge, although it involves
+an error concerning the nature of eternal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span>
+justice. Suicide involves a similar error, in so
+far as it supposes that the real being of the individual
+can be assailed through its phenomenal
+manifestation. It is not a denial of the will to
+live, but a strong affirmation of it, only not in the
+given circumstances: different circumstances are
+desired with such intensity that the present cannot
+be borne. Therefore the individual manifestation
+of the will is not suppressed. Yet, one might
+reply, if individuality is an illusion attached to
+the appearance in time and space of a particular
+organism, it would seem that, with the disappearance
+of this, all that distinguishes the
+individual must disappear also.</p>
+
+<p>Schopenhauer had no will thus to escape from
+life; nor did he afterwards devote himself to
+expounding further his theory of eternal justice.
+What he wrote later, either positively or as mere
+speculation, implies both greater reality in the
+individual and more of cosmic equity to correspond.
+His next step, even at his first stage, is
+to continue the exposition of a practicable ethics
+for human life. His procedure consists in adding
+beneficence to justice, with the proviso already
+mentioned, which is required by his psychology,
+that all beneficence can consist only in the relief
+of pain. For Schopenhauer, as for Comte, what<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span>
+is to be overcome is 'egoism,' an excessive degree
+of which is the mark of the character we call
+'bad.' The 'good' is what Comte and Spencer
+call the 'altruistic' character. This difference
+between characters Schopenhauer goes on to
+explain in terms of his metaphysics. The egoist
+is so deluded by the principle of individuation
+that he supposes an absolute cleft between his
+own person and all others. The remorse of
+conscience from which he suffers proceeds in
+part from an obscure perception that the principle
+of individuation is illusory. Genuine virtue
+springs out of the intuitive (not merely abstract)
+knowledge that recognises in another individuality
+the same essence as in one's own. The
+characteristic of the good man is that he makes
+less difference than is customary between himself
+and others. Justice is an intermediate stage
+between the encroaching egoism of the bad and
+positive goodness. In the renunciation of rights
+of property, and provision for all personal needs
+without aid from others, practised by some
+religious and philosophical ascetics, it is passing
+over into something more. There is, however,
+a certain misunderstanding involved in so interpreting
+strict justice; for there are many ways
+in which the rich and powerful can be positively<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>
+beneficent. At the other extreme, when they
+simply live on their inherited wealth, without
+doing anything in return, their mode of life is
+morally, though not legally, unjust. Rights of
+property Schopenhauer derived from labour
+spent on the things appropriated. The injustice,
+in many ways, of the present social order he quite
+recognises. If he has no sympathy with revolutions,
+it is because he has no belief in the
+realisation of an ideal state. This follows from
+his view of history. Human life, it is his conviction,
+never has been and never will be different
+as a whole. Redemption from evil can be
+attained only by the individual. All that the
+State can do is to provide certain very general
+conditions of security under which there will be
+no hindrance to those who desire to live in
+accordance with a moral ideal.</p>
+
+<p>Yet there are qualifications to make. Many
+passages in Schopenhauer's writings prove his
+firm belief in the future triumph of reason over
+superstition. It is to the honour of humanity,
+he says, that so detestable a form of evil
+as organised religious persecution has appeared
+only in one section of history. And, in his
+own personal case, he has the most complete
+confidence that the truths he has put forth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span>
+cannot fail sometime to gain a hearing. In all
+cases, error is only temporary, and truth will
+prevail. His language on this subject, and indeed
+often on others, is indistinguishable from
+that of an optimist.</p>
+
+<p>In the last resort, his pessimism entrenches
+itself behind the psychological proposition that
+every satisfaction is negative, being only the
+removal of a pain. If this is unsustainable, there
+is nothing finally in his Metaphysics of Will to
+necessitate the pessimistic conclusion drawn.
+The mode of deduction by which he proceeds is
+to argue first to the position already noticed:
+that all that love of others on which morality is
+based is fundamentally pity. True benevolence
+can only be the desire to relieve others' pain,
+springing from the identification of this with
+our own. For that reason, moral virtue must
+finally pass over into asceticism&mdash;the denial of
+the will to live. In others, if we are able to see
+through the principle of individuation, we recognise
+the same essence as in ourselves, and we
+perceive that as long as this wills it must
+necessarily suffer. The end then is to destroy the
+will to live. This is to be done by <i>askesis</i>, self-mortification.
+The first step is complete chastity.
+If, says Schopenhauer, the highest phenomenon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span>
+of will, that is, man, were to disappear through
+a general refusal to affirm life beyond the
+individual body, man's weaker reflexion in the
+animal world would disappear also, and the
+consciousness of the whole would cease. Knowledge
+being taken away, the rest would vanish
+into nothingness, since there is 'no object without
+subject.' That this will come to pass, however,
+he certainly did not believe. He has no cosmogony,
+like that of Hartmann, ending in a general
+redemption of the universe by such a collective
+act. Nor did he hold, like his later successor
+Mainländer, that through the conflict and gradual
+extinction of individualities, 'this great world
+shall so wear out to nought.' The world for
+him is without beginning and without end. But
+the exceptional individual can redeem himself.
+What he does when he has reached the height of
+holiness is by voluntary poverty and all other
+privations, inflicted for their own sake, to break
+and kill the will, which he recognises as the
+source of his own and of the world's suffering
+existence. In his case not merely the phenomenon
+ends at death, as with others, but the
+being is taken away. To be a 'world-overcomer'
+in this sense (as opposed to a 'world-conqueror')
+is the essence of sanctity when cleared of all the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span>
+superstitious dogmas by which the saints try to
+explain their mode of life to themselves.</p>
+
+<p>The absolutely pure expression of this truth is
+to be found only in philosophy; but of the
+religions Buddhism comes nearest to expressing
+it without admixture. For the Buddhist saint
+asks aid from no god. True Christianity, however,&mdash;the
+Christianity of the New Testament
+and of the Christian mystics,&mdash;agrees both with
+Buddhism and with Brahmanism in ultimate aim.
+What spoils it for Schopenhauer is the Judaic
+element. This, on one side, infects it with the
+optimism of the Biblical story of creation, in
+which God 'saw everything that he had made,
+and, behold, it was very good.' On the other
+side, it contaminates the myth of original sin,
+which bears in itself a profound philosophical
+truth, by this same doctrine of a creative God;
+from which follows all the injustice and irrationality
+necessarily involved in the Augustinian
+theology, and not to be expelled except with its
+theism. Nevertheless, the story of the Fall of
+Man, of which that theology, in its fundamentally
+true part, is a reasoned expression, is the one
+thing, Schopenhauer avows, that reconciles him
+to the Old Testament. The truth that it clothes
+he finds also among the Greeks; Empedocles,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span>
+after the Orphics and Pythagoreans, having
+taught that the soul had been doomed to wander
+because of some antenatal sin. And the mysticism
+that accompanies all these more or less pure expressions
+of one metaphysical truth he finds represented
+by the Sufis even in optimistic Islam; so
+that he can claim for his philosophy a world-wide
+consent.</p>
+
+<p>Religion, if we take this to include mysticism,
+at once rises above philosophy and falls below it.
+As 'metaphysics of the people,' it is a mythological
+expression of philosophical truth: as
+mysticism, it is a kind of 'epi-philosophy.'
+Beyond pure philosophy Schopenhauer does not
+profess to go; but he accepts what the mystics
+say as the description of a positive experience
+which becomes accessible when supreme insight
+is attained intuitively. For the philosopher as
+such, insight into that which is beyond the forms
+of our knowledge and even beyond the will itself,
+remains only conceptual; though it is within the
+province of philosophy to mark out the place for
+this. The 'something else' that is left when the
+will has been denied, is indicated by the 'ecstasy,'
+'illumination,' 'union with God,' spoken of by
+the mystics. Paradoxically, some of the mystics
+themselves even have identified it with 'nothing';<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span>
+but the result of the denial of the will to live is to
+be called nothing only in relation to the world as
+we know it. 'On the other hand, to those in
+whom the will has turned back and denied itself,
+this so very real world of ours with all its suns
+and milky ways is&mdash;nothing.'</p>
+
+<p>In this terminus of his philosophy, Schopenhauer
+recognised his kinship with Indian thought,
+of which he was a lifelong student. To call his
+doctrine a kind of Buddhism is, however, in some
+ways a misapprehension. Undoubtedly he accepts
+as his ideal the ethical attitude that he finds to
+be common to Buddhism and the Christianity of
+the New Testament; but metaphysical differences
+mark him off from both. We have seen that he
+rejects the extra-mundane God of Semitic derivation,
+adopted by historical Christianity. Indeed
+he is one of the most pronounced anti-Jehovists
+of all literature. But equally his belief in a positive
+metaphysical doctrine marks him off from
+Buddhism, according to the account given of it by
+its most recent students, who regard it either as
+ultimately nihilistic or as having no metaphysics
+at all, but only a psychology and ethics. Nor can
+he be precisely identified with the Vedantists of
+orthodox Hinduism. Their ultimate reality, if
+we are to find an analogue for it in European<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span>
+metaphysics, seems to resemble the hypostasised
+<i>ego</i> of Fichte, or the Kantian 'transcendental
+unity of apperception', much more than it
+resembles Schopenhauer's blindly striving will as
+thing-in-itself. Even in practical ethics, he does
+not follow the Indian systems at all closely.
+Philosophical doctrines of justice are of course
+purely European; and Schopenhauer himself
+points out the sources of his own theory. In his
+extension of ethics to animals, on which he lays
+much stress, he cites the teachings of Eastern
+non-Semitic religions as superior to the rest; but
+he does not follow the Indians, nor even the
+Pythagoreans, so far as to make abstinence from
+flesh part of the ideal. He condemns vivisection
+on the ground that animals have rights: certain
+ways of treating them are unjust, not simply uncompassionate.
+The discussion here again is of
+course wholly within European thought. Thus,
+in trying to determine his significance for modern
+philosophy, we may consider his system in its
+immediate environment, leaving it to more special
+students to determine how far it received a
+peculiar colouring from the Oriental philosophies,
+of which, in his time, the more exact knowledge
+was just beginning to penetrate to the West.</p><hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2>
+
+<h3>HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE</h3>
+
+
+<p>Schopenhauer is not one of the philosophers
+who have founded a school, though he has had
+many disciples and enthusiastic admirers. The
+pessimism that was for a time a watchword with
+certain literary groups has passed as a mode, and
+his true significance must be sought elsewhere.
+Of the thinkers who have followed him in his
+pessimism, two indeed stand out as the architects
+of distinct systems, Eduard von Hartmann and
+Philipp Mainländer (both already incidentally
+referred to); but while they are to be classed unquestionably
+as philosophers, their systems contain
+an element that their master would have regarded
+as mythological. Schopenhauer declared as
+clearly as any of the Greeks that the phenomenal
+world is without beginning and without end.
+Kant's positing of an 'antinomy' on this point he
+regarded as wholly without rational justification.
+What Kant calls the 'antithesis,' namely, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span>
+infinite series, can be logically proved for phenomena.
+The 'thesis,' which asserts a beginning in
+time, is defended by mere fallacies. Now Hartmann
+and Mainländer both hold, though in
+different fashions, that there is a world-process
+from a beginning to an end, namely, the extinction
+of consciousness. This is the redemption of
+the world. Their affinity, therefore, seems to be
+with the Christian Gnostics rather than with the
+pure philosophers of the Greek tradition, continued
+in modern times by Bruno, Spinoza, and
+Schopenhauer.</p>
+
+<p>Whatever may be thought of the pessimism
+by which Schopenhauer's mood is distinguished
+from that of his precursors, few will fail to recognise
+that special doctrines of his system contain
+at least a large portion of truth. His theories of
+Art, of Genius, and of Love are enough to found
+an enduring reputation for any thinker, even if
+there were nothing else of value in his writings.
+But there is much else, both in systematic construction
+and in the illumination of detail. I
+have been inclined to put forward first of all the
+translation into idealistic terms of the universal
+sentiency held by the Ionian thinkers to be inherent
+in the primordial elements of nature.
+While they viewed the world as an objective<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span>
+thing having psychological qualities, Schopenhauer,
+after the long intermediate process of
+thought, could treat it as phenomenal object with
+a psychological or subjective essence. For both
+doctrines alike, however, mind or soul is immanent.
+Still, it must be allowed that a difference
+remains by which Schopenhauer was even more
+remote than they were from the later Greek
+idealism. As they were not materialists, so they
+did not exclude reason from the psychical properties
+of their substances. Schopenhauer, while
+he rejected the materialism of their ancient and
+modern successors alike, took the step of formally
+derationalising the elements of mind. This, no
+doubt, is unsustainable ultimately, if reason is
+ever to emerge from them. Yet the one-sidedness
+of the position has had a peculiar value in
+combating an equally one-sided rationalistic
+idealism. This is recognised by clear-sighted
+opponents. And Schopenhauer's calling the non-rational
+or anti-rational element in the world
+'will' helps to make plainer the real problem of
+evil. There is truth in the Hegelian paradox that
+'pessimism is an excellent basis for optimism.'
+An optimist like Plotinus saw that, even if good
+comes of evil, the case of the optimist must fail
+unless evil can be shown to be a necessary con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span>stituent
+of the world. The Platonic and Neo-Platonic
+'matter,' a principle of diremption or
+individuation, like time and space for Schopenhauer,
+was an attempt to solve this problem; but
+something more positive seemed to be needed
+as the source of the stronger manifestations of
+evil. To the strength of these Plato drew attention
+in a passage (<i>Republic</i>, x. 610<a name="FNanchor_1_5" id="FNanchor_1_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>) where it is
+acknowledged that injustice confers a character of
+vitality and sleeplessness upon its possessor. In
+the notion of a blind and vehement striving,
+Schopenhauer supplies something adequate; only,
+to maintain a rational optimism, it must be regarded
+as a necessary element in a mixture, not
+as the spring of the whole.</p>
+
+<p>Much might be said on the teleology by which
+he tries to educe intelligence from the primordial
+strife. Against his view, that it is evolved as
+a mere instrument for preserving races in a
+struggle, another may be set that is ready to
+hand in a dialogue of Plutarch.<a name="FNanchor_2_6" id="FNanchor_2_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> The struggle
+among animals, it is there incidentally argued,
+has for its end to sharpen their intelligence.
+Both these theories are on the surface compatible<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span>
+with evolution. If, leaving aside the problem of
+mechanism, we try to verify them by the test of
+results, the latter undoubtedly seems the more
+plausible. For if the struggle was a means to
+the improvement of intelligence, nature has succeeded
+more and more; whereas, if her intention
+was to preserve races, she has continually failed.
+This argument is at any rate perfectly valid
+against Schopenhauer himself; for he holds in
+common with the optimistic teleologists that
+'nature does nothing in vain.'</p>
+
+<p>I will conclude with a few detached criticisms
+on the ethical doctrine which he regarded as the
+culmination of his system. The antithesis, it
+may first be noted, between the temporary release
+from the vehemence of the will that is gained
+through art, and the permanent release through
+asceticism, is not consistently maintained. Schopenhauer
+admits that the knowledge which for
+the ascetic is the 'quietive' of the will has to be
+won anew in a perpetual conflict. 'No one can
+have enduring rest on earth.' Again, revision of
+his doctrine concerning the reality of the individual
+would, I think, necessitate revision also of
+the position that not only asceticism but 'all true
+and pure love, nay, even freely rendered justice,
+proceeds from seeing through the <i>principium<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span>
+individuationis</i>.' If the individual is in some
+sense ultimately real, then love must be to a certain
+extent literally altruism. We are brought
+down to the elementary fact, in terms of the
+metaphysics of ethics, that the object of love is a
+real being that is itself and not ourselves, though
+having some resemblance to us and united in
+a larger whole. An objection not merely verbal
+might indeed be taken to Schopenhauer's metaphysics
+of ethics strictly on his own ground. If
+it is purely and simply the essence of ourselves
+that we recognise in everything, does not this reduce
+all love finally to a well-understood egoism?
+The genuine fact of sympathy seems to escape his
+mode of formulation. And, in the end, we shall
+perhaps not find the ascetic to be the supreme
+ethical type. Of the self-tormenting kind of
+asceticism, it is not enough to say with Schopenhauer
+that, since it is a world-wide phenomenon
+of human nature, it calls for some account from
+philosophy. The account may be sufficiently
+rendered by historical psychology; the result
+being to class it as an aberration born of the illusions
+incident to a certain type of mind at a certain
+stage. Indeed, that seems to be the conclusion
+of the Buddhists, who claim to have transcended
+it by finding it superfluous for the end it aims at.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span>
+Let us then take, as our example of the completed
+type, not the monks of the Thebaid, but the
+mild ascetics of the Buddhist communities. Does
+not this type, even in its most attractive form,
+represent a 'second best'? Is not the final
+judgment that of Plato, that to save oneself is
+something, but that there is no full achievement
+unless for the life of the State also the ideal has
+been brought nearer realisation? When there is
+nothing in the world but irredeemable tyranny or
+anarchy, flight from it may be the greatest success
+possible as far as the individual life is concerned;
+but this is not the normal condition of humanity.
+Finally, may not some actual achievement, either
+practical or, like that of Schopenhauer, speculative,
+even if accompanied by real imperfections of
+character, possess a higher human value than the
+sanctity that rests always in itself?</p>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap" />
+
+<h3>FOOTNOTES</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Werke</i>, ed. Frauenstädt, vol. vi. p. 243.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_2" id="Footnote_1_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Phänomenologie des Geistes</i>, Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. G. Lasson,
+pp. 201-3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_3" id="Footnote_2_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Letter to Robert Barclay Fox, May 10, 1842. Printed in
+Appendix to <i>Letters and Journals of Caroline Fox</i>, third ed.,
+vol. ii. pp. 331-2. 'To suppose that the eye is <i>necessary</i> to
+sight,' says Mill, 'seems to me the notion of one immersed in
+matter. What we call our bodily sensations are all in the
+mind, and would not necessarily or probably cease, because the
+body perishes.'</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_4" id="Footnote_1_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The disappearance of species in time raises difficulties in
+more than one way for his philosophy; but he formally escapes
+refutation by the suggestion, already noted, that the Idea need
+not always be manifested phenomenally in the same world.
+This, however, he did not work out.</p></div>
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_5" id="Footnote_1_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Cited in one of the introductory essays to Jowett and
+Campbell's edition, vol. ii.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_6" id="Footnote_2_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>De Sollertia Animalium</i>, 27.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+<h2><a name="SELECTED_WORKS" id="SELECTED_WORKS"></a>SELECTED WORKS</h2>
+
+
+<h4><i>English Translations</i></h4>
+
+<div class="hanging-indent-small"><p><i>The World as Will and Idea.</i> Translated by <span class="smcap">R. B. Haldane</span>
+and <span class="smcap">J. Kemp</span>. 3 vols. 1883-6.</p>
+
+<p><i>Two Essays</i>: I. <i>On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of
+Sufficient Reason</i>. II. <i>On the Will in Nature</i>. Bohn's
+Philosophical Library, 1889.</p>
+
+<p><i>Religion: A Dialogue, and other Essays.</i> Selected and translated
+by <span class="smcap">T. Bailey Saunders</span>. 3rd ed., 1891. [A series
+of other volumes of selections excellently translated by Mr.
+Saunders has followed.]</p>
+
+<p><i>Selected Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer.</i> With a Biographical
+Introduction and Sketch of his Philosophy. By <span class="smcap">E. Belfort
+Bax</span>. 1891.</p>
+
+<p><i>The Basis of Morality.</i> Translated with Introduction and
+Notes by <span class="smcap">A. B. Bullock</span>. 1903.</p></div>
+
+
+<h4><i>Biographical and Expository</i></h4>
+
+<div class="hanging-indent-small"><p><i>Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and Philosophy.</i> By <span class="smcap">Helen
+Zimmern</span>. 1876.</p>
+
+<p><i>Life of Arthur Schopenhauer.</i> By Professor <span class="smcap">W. Wallace</span>.
+1890.</p><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span></p>
+
+<p><i>La Philosophie de Schopenhauer.</i> Par <span class="smcap">Th. Ribot</span>. 2nd ed.,
+1885.</p>
+
+<p><i>Arthur Schopenhauer.</i> Seine Persönlichkeit, seine Lehre,
+sein Glaube. Von <span class="smcap">Johannaes Volkelt</span>. 3rd ed., 1907.</p>
+
+<p><i>Schopenhauer-Lexikon.</i> Von <span class="smcap">Julius Fradenstädt</span>. 2 vols.,
+1871.</p></div>
+
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+
+<p class="center">Printed by T. and A. <span class="smcap">Constable</span>, Printers to His Majesty
+at the Edinburgh University Press</p>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCHOPENHAUER ***
+
+***** This file should be named 38283-h.htm or 38283-h.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        http://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/2/8/38283/
+
+Produced by Albert László and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive)
+
+
+Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
+will be renamed.
+
+Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
+one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
+(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
+permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
+set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
+copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
+protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
+Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
+charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
+do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
+rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
+such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
+research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
+practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
+subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
+redistribution.
+
+
+
+*** START: FULL LICENSE ***
+
+THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
+PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
+
+To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
+distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
+(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
+http://gutenberg.org/license).
+
+
+Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works
+
+1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
+and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
+(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
+the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
+all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
+If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
+terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
+entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
+
+1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
+used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
+agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
+things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
+paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
+and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.  See paragraph 1.E below.
+
+1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
+or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
+collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
+individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
+located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
+copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
+works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
+are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
+Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
+freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
+this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
+the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
+keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.
+
+1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
+what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
+a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
+the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
+before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
+creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
+Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
+the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
+States.
+
+1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
+
+1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
+access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
+whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
+phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
+copied or distributed:
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
+from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
+posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
+and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
+or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
+with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
+work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
+through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
+Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
+1.E.9.
+
+1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
+with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
+must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
+terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
+to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
+permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
+
+1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
+work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.
+
+1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
+electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
+prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
+active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm License.
+
+1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
+compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
+word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
+distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
+"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
+posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),
+you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
+copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
+request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
+form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
+
+1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
+performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
+unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
+access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
+that
+
+- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
+     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
+     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
+     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
+     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
+     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
+     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
+     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
+     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
+     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
+     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
+     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
+     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
+     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+     License.  You must require such a user to return or
+     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
+     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
+     Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
+     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
+     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
+     of receipt of the work.
+
+- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
+     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
+forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
+both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
+Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
+Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.
+
+1.F.
+
+1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
+effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
+public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
+collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
+"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
+corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
+property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
+computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
+your equipment.
+
+1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
+of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
+liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
+fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
+LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
+PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
+TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
+LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
+INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+DAMAGE.
+
+1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
+defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
+receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
+written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
+received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
+your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
+the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
+refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
+providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
+receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
+is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
+opportunities to fix the problem.
+
+1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
+in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
+WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
+WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
+
+1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
+warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
+If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
+law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
+interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
+the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
+provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
+
+1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
+trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
+providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
+with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
+promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
+harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
+that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
+or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
+work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
+Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
+
+
+Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
+electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
+including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
+because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
+people in all walks of life.
+
+Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
+assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
+goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
+remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
+and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
+To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
+and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
+and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org.
+
+
+Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
+Foundation
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
+501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
+state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
+Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
+number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
+http://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
+permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.
+
+The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
+Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
+throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
+809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
+business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
+information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
+page at http://pglaf.org
+
+For additional contact information:
+     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
+     Chief Executive and Director
+     gbnewby@pglaf.org
+
+
+Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
+spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
+increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
+freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
+array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
+($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
+status with the IRS.
+
+The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
+charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
+States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
+considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
+with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
+where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
+SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
+particular state visit http://pglaf.org
+
+While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
+have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
+against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
+approach us with offers to donate.
+
+International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
+any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
+outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
+
+Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
+methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
+ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations.
+To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate
+
+
+Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.
+
+Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
+concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
+with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
+Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
+
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
+editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
+unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
+keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.
+
+
+Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:
+
+     http://www.gutenberg.org
+
+This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
+including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
+subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
+
+
+</pre>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/38283.txt b/38283.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6a4d55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/38283.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2333 @@
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Schopenhauer
+
+Author: Thomas Whittaker
+
+Release Date: December 12, 2011 [EBook #38283]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCHOPENHAUER ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Albert Laszlo and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+PHILOSOPHIES ANCIENT AND MODERN
+
+SCHOPENHAUER
+
+
+
+
+NOTE
+
+
+As a consequence of the success of the series of _Religions Ancient and
+Modern_, Messrs. CONSTABLE have decided to issue a set of similar
+primers, with brief introductions, lists of dates, and selected
+authorities, presenting to the wider public the salient features of the
+_Philosophies_ of Greece and Rome and of the Middle Ages, as well as of
+modern Europe. They will appear in the same handy Shilling volumes, with
+neat cloth bindings and paper envelopes, which have proved so attractive
+in the case of the _Religions_. The writing in each case will be
+confided to an eminent authority, and one who has already proved himself
+capable of scholarly yet popular exposition within a small compass.
+
+Among the first volumes to appear will be:--
+
+  =Early Greek Philosophy.= By A. W. BENN, author of _The Philosophy
+    of Greece, Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century_.
+
+  =Stoicism.= By Professor ST. GEORGE STOCK, author of _Deductive
+    Logic_, editor of the _Apology of Plato_, etc.
+
+  =Plato.= By Professor A. E. TAYLOR, St. Andrews University, author
+    of _The Problem of Conduct_.
+
+  =Scholasticism.= By Father RICKABY, S.J.
+
+  =Hobbes.= By Professor A. E. TAYLOR.
+
+  =Locke.= By Professor ALEXANDER, of Owens College.
+
+  =Comte and Mill.= By T. WHITTAKER, author of _The Neoplatonists,
+    Apollonius of Tyana and other Essays_.
+
+  =Herbert Spencer.= By W. H. HUDSON, author of _An Introduction to
+    Spencer's Philosophy_.
+
+  =Schopenhauer.= By T. WHITTAKER.
+
+  =Berkeley.= By Professor CAMPBELL FRASER, D.C.L., LL.D.
+
+  =Bergsen.= By Father TYRRELL.
+
+
+
+
+SCHOPENHAUER
+
+
+By
+
+THOMAS WHITTAKER
+
+AUTHOR OF 'COMTE AND MILL,' ETC.
+
+
+LONDON
+
+ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO LTD
+
+1909
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+  CHAP.                             PAGE
+
+  I.   LIFE AND WRITINGS,              1
+  II.  THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE,           15
+  III. METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL,       29
+  IV.  AESTHETICS,                     49
+  V.   ETHICS,                        65
+  VI.  HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE,       86
+       SELECTED WORKS,                93
+
+
+
+
+SCHOPENHAUER
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+LIFE AND WRITINGS
+
+
+Arthur Schopenhauer may be distinctively described as the greatest
+philosophic writer of his century. So evident is this that he has
+sometimes been regarded as having more importance in literature than in
+philosophy; but this is an error. As a metaphysician he is second to no
+one since Kant. Others of his age have surpassed him in system and in
+comprehensiveness; but no one has had a firmer grasp of the essential
+and fundamental problems of philosophy. On the theory of knowledge, the
+nature of reality, and the meaning of the beautiful and the good, he has
+solutions to offer that are all results of a characteristic and original
+way of thinking.
+
+In one respect, as critics have noted, his spirit is different from that
+of European philosophy in general. What preoccupies him in a special way
+is the question of evil in the world. Like the philosophies of the
+East, emerging as they do without break from religion, Schopenhauer's
+philosophy is in its outcome a doctrine of redemption from sin. The name
+of pessimism commonly applied to it is in some respects misleading,
+though it was his own term; but it is correct if understood as he
+explained it. As he was accustomed to insist, his final ethical doctrine
+coincides with that of all the religions that aim, for their adepts or
+their elect, at deliverance from 'this evil world.' But, as the
+'world-fleeing' religions have their mitigations and accommodations, so
+also has the philosophy of Schopenhauer. At various points indeed it
+seems as if a mere change of accent would turn it into optimism.
+
+This preoccupation does not mean indifference to the theoretical
+problems of philosophy. No one has insisted more strongly that the end
+of philosophy is pure truth, and that only the few who care about pure
+truth have any concern with it. But for Schopenhauer the desire for
+speculative truth does not by itself suffice to explain the impulse of
+philosophical inquiries. On one side of his complex character, he had
+more resemblance to the men who turn from the world to religion, like
+St. Augustine, than to the normal type of European thinker, represented
+pre-eminently by Aristotle. He was a temperamental pessimist, feeling
+from the first the trouble of existence; and here he finds the deepest
+motive for the desire to become clear about it. He saw in the world,
+what he felt in himself, a vain effort after ever new objects of desire
+which give no permanent satisfaction; and this view, becoming
+predominant, determined, not indeed all the ideas of his philosophy, but
+its general complexion as a 'philosophy of redemption.'
+
+With his pessimism, personal misfortunes had nothing to do. He was, and
+always recognised that he was, among the most fortunately placed of
+mankind. He does not hesitate to speak sometimes of his own happiness in
+complete freedom from the need to apply himself to any compulsory
+occupation. This freedom, as he has put gratefully on record, he owed to
+his father, Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer, who was a rich merchant of
+Danzig, where the philosopher was born on the 22nd of February 1788.
+Both his parents were of Dutch ancestry. His mother, Johanna
+Schopenhauer, won celebrity as a novelist; and his sister, Adele, also
+displayed some literary talent. Generalising from his own case,
+Schopenhauer holds that men of intelligence derive their character from
+their father and their intellect from their mother. With his mother,
+however, he was not on sympathetic terms, as may be read in the
+biographies. His father intended him for a mercantile career, and with
+this view began to prepare him from the first to be a cosmopolitan man
+of the world. The name of Arthur was given to him because it is spelt
+alike in the leading European languages. He was taken early to France,
+where he resided from 1797 to 1799, learning French so well that on his
+return he had almost forgotten his German. Portions of the years 1803 to
+1804 were spent in England, France, Switzerland, and Austria. In England
+he was three months at a Wimbledon boarding-school kept by a clergyman.
+This experience he found extremely irksome. He afterwards became highly
+proficient in English: was always pleased to be taken for an Englishman,
+and regarded both the English character and intelligence as on the whole
+the first in Europe; but all the more deplorable did he find the
+oppressive pietism which was the special form taken in the England of
+that period by the reaction against the French Revolution. He is never
+tired of denouncing that phase of 'cold superstition,' the dominance of
+which lasted during his lifetime; for the publication of Mill's
+_Liberty_ and of Darwin's _Origin of Species_, which may be considered
+as marking the close of it, came only the year before his death.
+
+The only real break in the conformity of Schopenhauer's circumstances to
+his future career came in 1805, when he was placed in a merchant's
+office at Hamburg, whither his father had migrated in disgust at the
+annexation of his native Danzig, then under a republican constitution of
+its own, by Prussia in 1793. Soon afterwards his father died; but out of
+loyalty he tried for some time longer to reconcile himself to commercial
+life. Finding this at length impossible, he gained permission from his
+mother, in 1807, to leave the office for the gymnasium. At this time he
+seems to have begun his classical studies, his education having hitherto
+been exclusively modern. They were carried on first at Gotha and then at
+Weimar. In 1809 he entered the university of Goettingen as a student of
+medicine. This, however, was with a view only to scientific studies, not
+to practice; and he transferred himself to the philosophical faculty in
+1810. Generally he was little regardful of academical authority. His
+father's deliberately adopted plan of letting him mix early with the
+world had given him a certain independence of judgment. At Goettingen,
+however, he received an important influence from his teacher, G. E.
+Schulze (known by the revived scepticism of his _AEnesidemus_), who
+advised him to study Plato and Kant before Aristotle and Spinoza. From
+1811 to 1813 he was at Berlin, where he heard Fichte, but was not
+impressed. In 1813 the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was conferred on
+him at Jena for the dissertation _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle
+of Sufficient Reason_ (_Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom
+zureichenden Grunde_, 2nd ed., 1847). This was the first result of his
+Kantian studies. In the same year he began to be acquainted with Goethe
+at Weimar, where his mother and sister had gone to reside in 1806. A
+consequence of this acquaintance was that he took up and further
+developed Goethe's theory of colours. His dissertation _Ueber das Sehen
+und die Farben_ was published in 1816. A second edition did not appear
+till 1854; but in the meantime he had published a restatement of his
+doctrine in Latin, entitled _Theoria Colorum Physiologica_ (1830). This,
+however, was an outlying part of his work. He had already been seized by
+the impulse to set forth the system of philosophy that took shape in
+him, as he says, by some formative process of which he could give no
+conscious account. His great work, _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_,
+was ready for publication before the end of 1818, and was published with
+the date 1819. Thus he is one of the most precocious philosophers on
+record. For in that single volume, written before he was thirty, the
+outlines of his whole system are fixed. There is some development later,
+and there are endless new applications and essays towards confirmation
+from all sources. His mind never rested, and his literary power gained
+by exercise. Still, it has been said with truth, that there never was a
+greater illusion than when he thought that he seldom repeated himself.
+In reality he did little but repeat his fundamental positions with
+infinite variations in expression.
+
+After completing his chief work, Schopenhauer wrote some verses in which
+he predicted that posterity would erect a monument to him. This
+prediction was fulfilled in 1895; but, for the time, the work which he
+never doubted would be his enduring title to fame seemed, like Hume's
+_Treatise_, to have fallen 'deadborn from the press.' This he attributed
+to the hostility of the academical philosophers; and, in his later
+works, attacks on the university professors form a characteristic
+feature. The official teachers of the Hegelian school, he declared, were
+bent only on obtaining positions for themselves by an appearance of
+supporting Christian dogma; and they resented openness on the part of
+any one else. Yet on one side he maintained that his own pessimism was
+more truly Christian than their optimism. The essential spirit of
+Christianity is that of Brahmanism and Buddhism, the great religions
+that sprang from India, the first home of our race. He is even inclined
+to see in it traces of Indian influence. What vitiates it in his eyes is
+the Jewish element, which finds its expression in the flat modern
+'Protestant-rationalistic optimism.' As optimistic religions, he groups
+together Judaism, Islam, and Graeco-Roman Polytheism. His antipathy,
+however, only extends to the two former. He was himself in great part a
+child of Humanism and of the eighteenth century, rejoicing over the
+approaching downfall of all the faiths, and holding that a weak religion
+(entirely different from those he admires) is favourable to
+civilisation. Nothing can exceed his scorn for nearly everything that
+characterised the Middle Ages. With Catholicism as a political system he
+has no sympathy whatever; while on the religious side the Protestant
+are as sympathetic to him as the Catholic mystics. What is common to all
+priesthoods, he holds, is to exploit the metaphysical need of mankind
+(in which he also believes) for the sake of their own power.
+Clericalism, 'Pfaffenthum,' whether Catholic or Protestant, is the
+object of his unvarying hatred and contempt. If he had cared to
+appreciate Hegel, he would have found on this point much community of
+spirit; but of course there was a real antithesis between the two as
+philosophers. No 'conspiracy' need be invoked to explain the failure of
+Schopenhauer to win early recognition. Belief in the State and in
+progress was quite alien to him; and Germany was then full of political
+hopes, which found nourishment in optimistic pantheism. What at length
+gave his philosophy vogue was the collapse of this enthusiasm on the
+failure of the revolutionary movement in 1848. Once known, it contained
+enough of permanent value to secure it from again passing out of sight
+with the next change of fashion.
+
+The rest of Schopenhauer's life in its external relations may be briefly
+summed up. For a few years, it was diversified by travels in Italy and
+elsewhere, and by an unsuccessful attempt at academical teaching in
+Berlin. In 1831 he moved to Frankfort, where he finally settled in
+1833. He lived unmarried there till his death on the 21st of September
+1860. The monument, already spoken of, was unveiled at Frankfort on the
+6th of June 1895.
+
+The almost unbroken silence with which his great work was received,
+though it had a distempering effect on the man, did not discourage the
+thinker. The whole series of Schopenhauer's works, indeed, was completed
+before he attained anything that could be called fame. Constantly on the
+alert as he was to seize upon confirmations of his system, he published
+in 1836 his short work _On the Will in Nature_, pointing out
+verifications of his metaphysics by recent science. In 1839 his prize
+essay, _On the Freedom of the Human Will_ (finished in 1837), was
+crowned by the Royal Scientific Society of Drontheim in Norway. This and
+another essay, _On the Basis of Morality_, _not_ crowned by the Royal
+Danish Society of Copenhagen in 1840, he published in 1841, with the
+inclusive title, _Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik_. In 1844 appeared
+the second edition of his principal work, to which there was added, in
+the form of a second volume, a series of elucidations and extensions
+larger in bulk than the first. This new volume contains much of his
+best and most effective writing. His last work, _Parerga und
+Paralipomena_, which appeared in 1851 (2 vols.), is from the literary
+point of view the most brilliant. It was only from this time that he
+began to be well known among the general public; though the philosophic
+'apostolate' of Julius Frauenstaedt, who afterwards edited his works, had
+begun in 1840. His activity was henceforth confined to modifying and
+extending his works for new editions; an employment in which he was
+always assiduous. In consequence of this, all of them, as they stand,
+contain references from one to another; but the development of his
+thinking, so far as there was such a process after 1818, can be easily
+traced without reference to the earlier editions. There is some growth;
+but, as has been said, it does not affect many of the chief points. A
+brief exposition of his philosophy can on the whole take it as something
+fixed. The heads under which it must fall are those assigned to the
+original four books of _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_.
+
+Although Schopenhauer discountenanced the attempt to connect a
+philosophers biography with his work, something has to be said about his
+character, since this has been dwelt on to his disadvantage by
+opponents. There is abundant material for a personal estimate in the
+correspondence and reminiscences published after his death by his
+disciples Julius Frauenstaedt and Wilhelm Gwinner. The apparent
+contradiction is at once obvious between the ascetic consummation of his
+ethics and his unascetic life, carefully occupied in its latter part
+with rules for the preservation of his naturally robust health. He was
+quite aware of this, but holds it absurd to require that a moralist
+should commend only the virtues which he possesses. It is as if the
+requirement were set up that a sculptor is to be himself a model of
+beauty. A saint need not be a philosopher, nor a philosopher a saint.
+The science of morals is as theoretical as any other branch of
+philosophy. Fundamentally character is unmodifiable, though knowledge,
+it is allowed, may change the mode of action within the limits of the
+particular character. The passage to the state of asceticism cannot be
+effected by moral philosophy, but depends on a kind of 'grace.' After
+all, it might be replied, philosophers, whether they succeed or not, do
+usually make at least an attempt to live in accordance with the moral
+ideal they set up. The best apology in Schopenhauer's case is that the
+fault may have been as much in his ideal as in his failure to conform
+to it. The eloquent pages he has devoted to the subject of holiness only
+make manifest the inconsequence (which he admits) in the passage to it.
+For, as we shall see, this has nothing in common with the essentially
+rational asceticism of the schools of later antiquity; which was a rule
+of self-limitation in view of the philosophic life. He did in a way of
+his own practise something of this; and, on occasion, he sets forth the
+theory of it; but he quite clearly sees the difference. His own ideal,
+which he never attempted to practise, is that of the self-torturing
+ascetics of the Christian Middle Age. Within the range of properly human
+virtue, he can in many respects hold his own, not only as a philosopher
+but as a man. If his egoism and vanity are undeniable, he undoubtedly
+possessed the virtues of rectitude and compassion. What he would have
+especially laid stress on was the conscientious devotion to his work.
+With complete singleness of purpose he used for a disinterested end the
+leisure which he regarded as the most fortunate of endowments. As he
+said near the close of his life, his intellectual conscience was clear.
+
+Of Schopenhauer's expositions of his pessimism it would be true to say,
+as Spinoza says of the Book of Job, that the matter, like the style, is
+not that of a man sitting among the ashes, but of one meditating in a
+library. This of course does not prove that they are not a genuine, if
+one-sided, rendering of human experience. All that can be said is that
+they did not turn him away from appreciation of the apparent goods of
+life. His own practical principle was furnished by what he regarded as a
+lower point of view; and this gives its direction to the semi-popular
+philosophy of the _Parerga_. From what he takes to be the higher point
+of view, the belief that happiness is attainable by man on earth is an
+illusion; but he holds that, by keeping steadily in view a kind of
+tempered happiness as the end, many mistakes may be avoided in the
+conduct of life, provided that each recognises at once the strength and
+weakness of his own character, and does not attempt things that, with
+the given limitations, are impossible. Of the highest truth, as he
+conceived it, he could therefore make no use. Only by means of a truth
+that he was bound to hold half-illusory could a working scheme be
+constructed for himself and others. This result may give us guidance in
+seeking to learn what we can from a thinker who is in reality no
+representative of a decadence, but is fundamentally sane and rational,
+even in spite of himself.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
+
+
+The title of Schopenhauer's chief work is rendered in the English
+translation, _The World as Will and Idea_. Here the term 'idea' is used
+in the sense it had for Locke and Berkeley; namely, any object of mental
+activity. Thus it includes not merely imagery, but also perception.
+Since Hume distinguished ideas' from 'impressions,' it has tended to be
+specialised in the former sense. The German word, _Vorstellung_, which
+it is used to render, conveys the generalised meaning of the Lockian
+'idea,' now frequently expressed in English and French philosophical
+works by the more technical term 'presentation' or 'representation.' By
+Schopenhauer himself the word 'Idea' was used exclusively in the sense
+of the Platonic Idea, which, as we shall see, plays an important part in
+his philosophy. The distinction is preserved in the translation by the
+use of a capital when Idea has the latter meaning; but in a brief
+exposition it seems convenient to adopt a more technical rendering of
+_Vorstellung_; and, from its common employment in psychological
+text-books, I have selected 'presentation' as the most suitable.
+
+The first proposition of Schopenhauer's philosophical system is, 'The
+world is my presentation.' By this he means that it presents itself as
+appearance to the knowing subject. This appearance is in the forms of
+time, space and causality. Under these forms every phenomenon
+necessarily appears, because they are _a priori_ forms of the subject.
+The world as it presents itself consists entirely of phenomena, that is,
+appearances, related according to these forms. The most fundamental form
+of all is the relation between object and subject, which is implied in
+all of them. Without a subject there can be no presented object.
+
+Schopenhauer is therefore an idealist in the sense in which we call
+Berkeley's theory of the external world idealism; though the expressions
+used are to some extent different. The difference proceeds from his
+following of Kant. His Kantianism consists in the recognition of _a
+priori_ forms by which the subject constructs for itself an 'objective'
+world of appearances. With Berkeley he agrees as against Kant in not
+admitting any residue whatever, in the object as such, that is not
+wholly appearance. But while he allows that Berkeley, as regards the
+general formulation of idealism, was more consistent than Kant, he finds
+him, in working out the principle, altogether inadequate. For the modern
+mind there is henceforth no way in philosophy except through Kant, from
+whom dates the revolution by which scholastic dualism was finally
+overthrown. Kant's systematic construction, however, he in effect
+reduces to very little. His is a much simplified 'Apriorism.' While
+accepting the 'forms of sensible intuition,' that is, time and space,
+just as Kant sets them forth, he clears away nearly all the superimposed
+mechanism. Kant's 'Transcendental AEsthetic,' he says, was a real
+discovery in metaphysics; but on the basis of this he for the most part
+only gave free play to his architectonic impulse. Of the twelve
+'categories of the understanding,' which he professed to derive from the
+logical forms of judgment, all except causality are mere 'blind
+windows.' This alone, therefore, Schopenhauer adopts; placing it,
+however, not at a higher level but side by side with time and space,
+Kant's forms of intuition. These three forms, according to Schopenhauer,
+make up the understanding of men and animals. 'All intuition is
+intellectual.' It is not first mere appearance related in space and
+time, and waiting for understanding to organise it; but, in animals as
+in man, it is put in order at once under the three forms that suffice to
+explain the knowledge all have of the phenomenal world.
+
+To Reason as distinguished from Understanding, Schopenhauer assigns no
+such exalted function as was attributed to it in portions of his system
+by Kant, and still more by some of his successors. The name of 'reason,'
+he maintains, ought on etymological grounds to be restricted to the
+faculty of abstract concepts. This, and not understanding, is what
+distinguishes man from animals. It discovers and invents nothing, but it
+puts in a generalised and available form what the understanding has
+discovered in intuition.
+
+For the historical estimation of Schopenhauer, it is necessary to place
+him in relation to Kant, as he himself always insisted. Much also in his
+chief work is made clearer by knowledge of his dissertation _On the
+Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason_, to which he is
+constantly referring. Later, his manner of exposition became more
+independent; so that he can be read by the general reader with profit
+simply by himself, and without reference to antecedents. Still, it will
+always be advisable for an expositor to follow his directions, at least
+to the extent of giving some short account of the dissertation. This I
+proceed to give approximately in the place to which he has assigned it
+in his system.
+
+The name of the principle (_principium rationis sufficientis_) he took
+over from Leibniz and his successor Wolff, but gave it a new amplitude.
+With him, it stands as an inclusive term for four modes of connection by
+which the thoroughgoing relativity of phenomena to one another is
+constituted for our intelligence. The general statement adopted is,
+'Nothing is without a reason why it should be rather than not be.'
+Its four forms are the principles of becoming (_fiendi_), of knowing
+(_cognoscendi_), of being (_essendi_), and of acting (_agendi_).
+(1) Under the first head come 'causes.' These are divided into 'cause
+proper,' for inorganic things; 'stimulus,' for the vegetative life both
+of plants and animals, and 'motive,' for animals and men. The law of
+causation is applicable only to changes; not to the forces of nature, to
+matter, or to the world as a whole, which are perdurable. Cause precedes
+effect in time. Not one thing, but one state of a thing, is the cause of
+another. From the law of causation there results an infinite series _a
+parte ante_ as well as _a parte post_. (2) The principle of sufficient
+reason of knowing is applicable to concepts, which are all derived from
+intuition, that is, from percepts. The laws of logic, which come under
+this head, can yield nothing original, but can only render explicit what
+was in the understanding. (3) Under the third head come arithmetical and
+geometrical relations. These are peculiar relations of presentations,
+distinct from all others, and only intelligible in virtue of a pure _a
+priori_ intuition. For geometry this is space; for arithmetic time, in
+which counting goes on. Scientifically, arithmetic is fundamental. (4)
+As the third form of causality was enumerated 'motive' for the will; but
+in that classification it was viewed from without, as belonging to the
+world of objects. Through the direct knowledge we have of our own will,
+we know also from within this determination by the presentation we call
+a motive. Hence emerges the fourth form of the principle of sufficient
+reason. This at a later stage makes possible the transition from physics
+to metaphysics.
+
+All these forms alike are forms of necessary determination. Necessity
+has no clear and true sense but certainty of the consequence when the
+ground is posited. All necessity therefore is conditional. In accordance
+with the four expressions of the principle of sufficient reason, it
+takes the fourfold shape of physical, logical, mathematical, and moral
+necessity.
+
+The sharp distinction between logical and mathematical truth, with the
+assignment of the former to conceptual and of the latter to intuitive
+relations, comes to Schopenhauer directly from Kant. So also does his
+view that the necessary form of causation is sequence; though here his
+points of contact with English thinkers, earlier and later, are very
+marked. Only in his statement of the 'law of motivation' as 'causality
+seen from within' does he hint at his own distinctive metaphysical
+doctrine. Meanwhile, it is evident that he is to be numbered with the
+group of modern thinkers who have arrived in one way or another at a
+complete scientific phenomenism. Expositors have noted that in his
+earlier statements of this he tends to lay more stress on the character
+of the visible and tangible world as mere appearance. The impermanence,
+the relativity, of all that exists in time and space, leads him to
+describe it, in a favourite term borrowed from Indian philosophy, as
+Maya, or illusion. Later, he dwells more on the relative reality of
+things as they appear. His position, however, does not essentially
+alter, but only finds varying expression as he turns more to the
+scientific or to the metaphysical side. From Hume's view on causation he
+differs not by opposing its pure phenomenism, but only by recognising,
+as Kant does, an _a priori_ element in the form of its law. German
+critics have seen in his own formulation an anticipation of Mill, and
+this is certainly striking as regards the general conception of the
+causal order, although there is no anticipation of Mill's inductive
+logic. On the same side there is a close agreement with Malebranche and
+the Occasionalists, pointed out by Schopenhauer himself. The causal
+explanations of science, he is at one with them in insisting, give no
+ultimate account of anything. All its causes are no more than
+'occasional causes,'--merely instances, as Mill expressed it afterwards,
+of 'invariable and unconditional sequence.' From Mill of course he
+differs in holding its form to be necessary and _a priori_, not
+ultimately derived from a summation of experiences; and, with the
+Occasionalists, he goes on to metaphysics in its sense of ontology, as
+Mill never did. The difference here is that he does not clothe his
+metaphysics in a theological dress.
+
+In the later development of his thought, Schopenhauer dealt more
+expressly with the question, how this kind of phenomenism is
+reconcilable with a scientific cosmogony. On one side the proposition,
+'No object without subject,' makes materialism for ever impossible; for
+the materialist tries to explain from relations among presentations what
+is the condition of all presentation. On the other side, we are all
+compelled to agree with the materialists that knowledge of the object
+comes late in a long series of material events. Inorganic things existed
+in time before life; vegetative life before animal life; and only with
+animal life does knowledge emerge. Reasoned knowledge of the whole
+series comes only at the end of it in the human mind. This apparent
+contradiction he solves by leaving a place for metaphysics. Our
+representation of the world as it existed before the appearance of life
+was indeed non-existent at the time to which we assign it; but the real
+being of the world had a manifestation not imaginable by us. For this,
+we substitute a picture of a world such as we should have been aware of
+had our 'subject,' with its _a priori_ forms of time, space, and
+causality, been then present. What the reality is, is the problem of the
+thing-in-itself (to use the Kantian term). This problem remains over;
+but we know that the metaphysical reality cannot be matter; for matter,
+with all its qualities, is phenomenal. It exists only 'for
+understanding, through understanding, in understanding.' These
+discriminations made, Schopenhauer offers us a scientific cosmogony
+beginning with the nebular hypothesis and ending with an outline of
+organic evolution. This last differs from the Darwinian theory in
+supposing a production of species by definite steps instead of by
+accumulation of small individual variations. At a certain time, a form
+that has all the characters of a new species appears among the progeny
+of an existing species. Man is the last and highest form to be evolved.
+From Schopenhauer's metaphysics, as we shall see, it follows that no
+higher form of life will ever appear.
+
+A word may be said here on a materialistic-sounding phrase which is
+very prominent in Schopenhauer's later expositions, and has been
+remarked on as paradoxical for an idealist. The world as presentation,
+he often says, is 'in the brain.' This, it must be allowed, is not fully
+defensible from his own point of view, except with the aid of a later
+distinction. The brain as we know it is of course only a part of the
+phenomenon of the subject,--a grouping of possible perceptions. How
+then, since it is itself only appearance, can it be the bearer of the
+whole universe as appearance? The answer is that Schopenhauer meant in
+reality 'the being of the brain,' and not the brain as phenomenon. He
+had a growing sense of the importance of physiology for the
+investigation of mind; and his predilection led him to adopt a not quite
+satisfactory shorthand expression for the correspondence we know
+scientifically to exist between our mental processes and changes capable
+of objective investigation in the matter of the brain.
+
+In science his distinctive bent was to the borderland between psychology
+and physiology. Hence came the attraction exercised on him by Goethe's
+theory of colours. To his own theory, though, unlike his philosophical
+system, it has always failed to gain the attention he predicted for it,
+the merit must be allowed of treating the problem as essentially one of
+psychophysics. What he does is to attempt to ascertain the conditions in
+the sensibility of the retina that account for our actual
+colour-sensations. This problem was untouched by the Newtonian theory;
+but Schopenhauer followed Goethe in the error of trying to overthrow
+this on its own ground. He had no aptitude for the special inquiries of
+mathematics and physics, though he had gained a clear insight into their
+general nature as sciences. On the psycho-physical side there is to-day
+no fully authorised theory. The problem indeed has become ever more
+complex. Schopenhauer's attempt, by combination of sensibilities to
+'light' and 'darkness,' to explain the phenomena of complementary
+colours, deserves at least a record in the long series of essays of
+which the best known are the 'Young-Helmholtz theory' and that of
+Hering. It marks an indubitable advance on Goethe in the clear
+distinction drawn between the mixture, in the ordinary sense, that can
+only result in dilution to different shades of grey, and the kinds of
+mixture from which, in their view, true colours arise.
+
+A characteristic position in Schopenhauer's theory of knowledge, and one
+that is constantly finding new expression in his writings, is the
+distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge already touched on.
+Intuitive knowledge of the kind that is common to men and animals, as we
+have seen, makes up, in his terminology, the 'understanding'; while
+'reason' is the distinctively human faculty of concepts. When he
+depreciates this, as he often does, in comparison with 'intuition,' it
+must be remembered that he does not limit this term to perception of
+particulars, but ascribes to what he calls the 'Platonic Idea' a certain
+kind of union between reason and 'phantasy,' which gives it an intuitive
+character of its own. Thus intuition can stand, though not in every case
+for what is higher, yet always for that which is wider and greater and
+more immediate. Whatever may be done with reflective reason and its
+abstractions, every effectual process of thought must end, alike for
+knowledge and art and virtue, in some intuitive presentation. The
+importance of reason for practice is due to its generality. Its function
+is subordinate. It does not furnish the ground of virtuous action any
+more than aesthetic precepts can enable any one to produce a work of art;
+but it can help to preserve constancy to certain maxims, as also in art
+a reasoned plan is necessary because the inspiration of genius is not
+every moment at command. Virtue and artistic genius alike, however,
+depend ultimately on intuition: and so also does every true discovery in
+science. The nature of pedantry is to try to be guided everywhere by
+concepts, and to trust nothing to perception in the particular case.
+Philosophy also Schopenhauer regards as depending ultimately on a
+certain intuitive view; but he allows that it has to translate this into
+abstractions. Its problem is to express the _what_ of the world in
+abstract form: science dealing only with the _why_ of phenomena related
+within the world. This character of philosophy as a system of abstract
+concepts deprives it of the immediate attractiveness of art; so that, as
+he says in one place, it is more fortunate to be a poet than a
+philosopher.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL
+
+
+We have seen that scientific explanation does not go beyond
+presentations ordered in space and time. This is just as true of the
+sciences of causation--the 'aetiological' sciences--as it is of
+mathematical science. All that we learn from Mechanics, Physics,
+Chemistry and Physiology, is 'how, in accordance with an infallible
+rule, one determinate state of matter necessarily follows another: how a
+determinate change necessarily conditions and brings on another
+determinate change.' This knowledge does not satisfy us. We wish to
+learn the significance of phenomena; but we find that from outside,
+while we view them as presentations, their inner meaning is for ever
+inaccessible.
+
+The starting-point for the metaphysical knowledge we seek is given us in
+our own body. The animal body is 'the immediate object of the subject':
+in it as presentation the 'effects' of 'causes' in the order of
+presentations external to it are first recognised. Now in virtue of his
+body the investigator is not pure knowing subject standing apart from
+that which he knows. In the case of the particular system of
+presentations constituting his organism, he knows what these
+presentations signify, and that is his _will_ in a certain modification.
+The subject appears as individual through its identity with the body,
+and this body is given to it in two different ways: on one side as
+object among objects, and subjected to their laws; on the other side as
+the will immediately known to each. The act of will and the movement of
+the body are not two different states related as cause and effect; for
+the relation of cause and effect belongs only to the object, the
+phenomenon, the presentation. They are one and the same act given in
+different manners: the will, immediately to the subject; the movement,
+in sensible intuition for understanding. The action of the body is the
+objectified act of will. Called at first the immediate object of
+presentation, the body may now, from the other side, be called 'the
+objectivity of the will.'
+
+Thus, as was said, the 'law of motivation' discloses the inner nature of
+causality. In causality in general we know only relations of phenomena;
+but in the case of our own body we know something else that those
+relations express; namely, the act of will determined by motives. Now
+there are in the world as presentation other systems like that which we
+call our body. Unless all these are to be supposed mere phantoms without
+inner reality, we must infer by analogy, in correspondence with like
+phenomena, other individual wills similar to that which we know in
+ourselves. This inference from analogy, universally admitted in the case
+of human and animal bodies, must be extended to the whole corporeal
+world. The failure to take this step is where the purely intellectual
+forms of idealism have come short. Kant's 'thing-in-itself,' which is
+not subject to the forms by which presentations become experience, but
+which experience and its forms indicate as the reality, has been wrongly
+condemned by his successors as alien to idealism. It is true that Kant
+did in some respects fail to maintain the idealistic position with the
+clearness of Berkeley; but his shortcoming was not in affirming a
+thing-in-itself beyond phenomena. Here, in Schopenhauer's view, is the
+metaphysical problem that he left a place for but did not solve. The
+word of the riddle has now been pronounced. Beyond presentation, that
+is, in itself and according to its innermost essence, the world is that
+which we find in ourselves immediately as will. By this it is not meant
+that a falling stone, for example, acts from a motive; knowledge and the
+consequent action from motives belongs only to the determinate form that
+the will has in animals and men; but the reality in the stone also is
+the same in essence as that to which we apply the name of will in
+ourselves. He who possesses this key to the knowledge of nature's
+innermost being will interpret the forces of vegetation, of
+crystallisation, of magnetism, of chemical affinity, even of weight
+itself, as different only in phenomenal manifestation but in essence the
+same; namely, that which is better known to each than all else, and
+where it emerges most clearly is called will. Only the will is
+thing-in-itself. It is wholly different from presentation, and is that
+of which presentation is the phenomenon, the visibility, the
+objectivity. Differences affect only the degree of the appearing, not
+the essence of that which appears.
+
+While the reality everywhere present is not will as specifically known
+in man, the mode of indicating its essence by reference to this,
+Schopenhauer contends, is a gain in insight. The thing-in-itself ought
+to receive its name from that among all its manifestations which is the
+clearest, the most perfect, the most immediately illumined by knowledge;
+and this is man's will. When we say that every force in nature is to be
+thought of as Will, we are subsuming an unknown under a known. For the
+conception of Force is abstracted from the realm of cause and effect,
+and indicates the limit of scientific explanation. Having arrived at the
+forces of nature on the one side and the forms of the subject on the
+other, science can go no further. The conception of Will can make known
+that which was so far concealed, because it proceeds from the most
+intimate consciousness that each has of himself, where the knower and
+the known coincide.
+
+By this consciousness, in which subject and object are not yet set
+apart, we reach something universal. In itself the Will is not
+individualised, but exists whole and undivided in every single thing in
+nature, as the Subject of contemplation exists whole and undivided in
+each cognitive being. It is entirely free from all forms of the
+phenomenon. What makes plurality possible is subjection to the forms of
+time and space, by which only the phenomenon is affected. Time and space
+may therefore be called, in scholastic terminology, the 'principle of
+individuation.' While each of its phenomena is subject to the law of
+sufficient reason, which is the law of appearance in these forms, there
+is for the Will as thing-in-itself no rational ground: it is 'grundlos.'
+It is free from all plurality, although its phenomena in space and time
+are innumerable. It is one, not with the unity of an object or of a
+concept, but as that which lies outside of space and time, beyond the
+_principium individuationis_, that is, the possibility of plurality. The
+individual, the person, is not will as thing-in-itself, but phenomenon
+of the will, and as such determined. The will is 'free' because there is
+nothing beyond itself to determine it. Further, it is in itself mere
+activity without end, a blind striving. Knowledge appears only as the
+accompaniment of its ascending stages.
+
+Here we have arrived at the thought which, in its various expressions,
+constitutes Schopenhauer's metaphysics. That this cannot be
+scientifically deduced he admits; but he regards it as furnishing such
+explanation as is possible of science itself. For science there is in
+everything an inexplicable element to which it runs back, and which is
+real, not merely phenomenal. From this reality we are most remote in
+pure mathematics and in the pure _a priori_ science of nature as it was
+formulated by Kant. These owe their transparent clearness precisely to
+their absence of real content, or to the slightness of this. The attempt
+to reduce organic life to chemistry, this again to mechanism, and at
+last everything to arithmetic, could it succeed, would leave mere form
+behind, from which all the content of phenomena would have vanished. And
+the form would in the end be form of the subject. But the enterprise is
+vain. 'For in everything in nature there is something of which no ground
+can ever be given, of which no explanation is possible, no cause further
+is to be sought.' What for man is his inexplicable character,
+presupposed in every explanation of his deeds from motives, that for
+every inorganic body is its inexplicable quality, the manner of its
+acting.
+
+The basis of this too is will, and 'groundless,' inexplicable will; but
+evidently the conception here is not identical with that of the Will
+that is one and all. How do we pass from the universal to that which has
+a particular character or quality? For of the Will as thing-in-itself we
+are told that there is not a greater portion in a man and a less in a
+stone. The relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space. The
+more and less touches only the phenomenon, that is, the visibility, the
+objectivation. A higher degree of this is in the plant than in the
+stone, in the animal than in the plant, and so forth; but the Will that
+is the essence of all is untouched by degree, as it is beyond plurality,
+space and time, and the relation of cause and effect.
+
+The answer to the question here raised is given in Schopenhauer's
+interpretation of the Platonic Ideas. These he regards as stages of
+objectivation of the Will. They are, as Plato called them, eternal forms
+related to particular things as models. The lowest stage of
+objectivation of the Will is represented by the forces of inorganic
+nature. Some of these, such as weight and impenetrability, appear in all
+matter. Some are divided among its different kinds, as rigidity,
+fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical properties. They
+are not subject to the relation of cause and effect, but are presupposed
+by it. A force is neither cause of an effect nor effect of a cause.
+Philosophically, it is immediate objectivity of the will; in aetiology,
+_qualitas occulta_. At the lowest stages of objectivation, there is no
+individuality. This does not appear in inorganic things, nor even in
+merely organic or vegetative life, but only as we ascend the scale of
+animals. Even in the higher animals the specific enormously predominates
+over the individual character. Only in man is the Idea objectified in
+the individual character as such. 'The character of each individual man,
+so far as it is thoroughly individual and not entirely comprehended in
+that of the species, may be regarded as a particular Idea, corresponding
+to a peculiar act of objectivation of the Will.'
+
+Schopenhauer warns us against substituting this philosophical
+explanation for scientific aetiology. The chain of causes and effects, he
+points out, is not broken by the differences of the original,
+irreducible forces. The aetiology and the philosophy of nature go side by
+side, regarding the same object from different points of view. Yet he
+also gives us in relation to his philosophy much that is not
+unsuggestive scientifically. His doctrine is not properly evolutionary,
+since the Ideas are eternal; but he has guarded incidentally against our
+supposing that all the natural kinds that manifest the Ideas
+phenomenally must be always represented in every world. For our
+particular world, comprising the sun and planets of the solar system, he
+sets forth in the _Parerga_ an account of the process by which it
+develops from the nebula to man. This was referred to in the preceding
+chapter. In his fundamental work he describes a struggle, present
+through the whole of nature, in which the phenomenal manifestations of
+the higher Ideas conquer and subjugate those of the lower, though they
+leave them still existent and ever striving to get loose. Here has been
+seen an adumbration of natural selection: he himself admits the
+difficulty he has in making it clear. We must remember that it is
+pre-Darwinian.
+
+Knowledge or intelligence he seeks to explain as an aid to the
+individual organism in its struggle to subsist and to propagate its
+kind. It first appears in animal life. It is represented by the brain or
+a large ganglion, as every endeavour of the Will in its
+self-objectivation is represented by some organ; that is, displays
+itself for presentation as such and such an appearance. Superinduced
+along with this contrivance for aid in the struggle, the world as
+presentation, with all its forms, subject and object, time, space,
+plurality and causality, is all at once there. 'Hitherto only will, it
+is now at the same time presentation, object of the knowing subject.'
+Then in man, as a higher power beyond merely intuitive intelligence,
+appears reason as the power of abstract conception. For the most part,
+rational as well as intuitive knowledge, evolved originally as a mere
+means to higher objectivation of the Will, remains wholly in its
+service. How, in exceptional cases, intellect emancipates itself, will
+be discussed under the heads of AEsthetics and Ethics.
+
+That this view implies a teleology Schopenhauer expressly recognises.
+Indeed he is a very decided teleologist on lines of his own, and, in
+physiology, takes sides strongly with 'vitalism' as against pure
+mechanicism. True, the Will is 'endless' blind striving, and is
+essentially divided against itself. Everywhere in nature there is
+strife, and this takes the most horrible forms. Yet somehow there is in
+each individual manifestation of will a principle by which first the
+organism with its vital processes, and then the portion of it called the
+brain, in which is represented the intellect with its _a priori_ forms,
+are evolved as aids in the strife. And, adapting all the manifestations
+to one another, there is a teleology of the universe. The whole world,
+with all its phenomena, is the objectivity of the one and indivisible
+Will; the Idea which is related to all other Ideas as the harmony to the
+single voices. The unity of the Will shows itself in the unison of all
+its phenomena as related to one another. Man, its clearest and
+completest objectivation, is the summit of a pyramid, and could not
+exist without this. Inorganic and organic nature, then, were adapted to
+the future appearance of man, as man is adapted to the development that
+preceded him. But in thinking the reality, time is to be abstracted
+from. The earlier, we are obliged to say, is fitted to the later, as the
+later is fitted to the earlier; but the relation of means to end, under
+which we cannot help figuring the adaptation, is only appearance for our
+manner of knowledge. And the harmony described does not get rid of the
+conflict inherent in all will.
+
+In this account of Schopenhauer's metaphysical doctrine, I have tried to
+make the exposition as smooth as possible; but at two points the
+discontinuity can scarcely be concealed. First, the relation of the
+universal Will to the individual will is not made clear; and, secondly,
+the emergence of the world of presentation, with the knowledge in which
+it culminates, is left unintelligible because the will is conceived as
+mere blind striving without an aim. As regards the first point,
+disciples and expositors have been able to show that, by means of
+distinctions in his later writings, apparent contradictions are to some
+extent cleared away; and, moreover, that he came to recognise more
+reality in the individual will. On the second point, I think it will be
+necessary to admit that his system as such breaks down. But both points
+must be considered in their connection.
+
+One of the most noteworthy features of Schopenhauer's philosophy is, as
+he himself thought, the acceptance from first to last of Kant's
+distinction between the 'empirical' and the 'intelligible' character of
+the individual. Every act of will of every human being follows with
+necessity as phenomenon from its phenomenal causes; so that all the
+events of each person's life are determined in accordance with
+scientific law. Nevertheless, the character empirically manifested in
+the phenomenal world, while it is completely necessitated, is the
+expression of something that is free from necessitation. This
+'intelligible character' is out of time, and, itself undetermined,
+manifests itself through that which develops in time as a chain of
+necessary causes and effects. That this doctrine had been taken up,
+without any ambiguity as regards the determinism, by Schelling as well
+as by himself, he expressly acknowledges; and he finds it, as he also
+finds modern idealism, anticipated in various passages by the
+Neo-Platonists. His adaptation of it to his doctrine of the Ideas is
+distinctly Neo-Platonic in so far as he recognises 'Ideas of
+individuals'; but of course to make Will the essence belongs to his own
+system. 'The intelligible character,' he says, 'coincides with the Idea,
+or, yet more precisely, with the original act of will that manifests
+itself in it: in so far, not only is the empirical character of each
+man, but also of each animal species, nay, of each plant species, and
+even of each original force of inorganic nature, to be regarded as
+phenomenon of an intelligible character, that is, of an indivisible act
+of will out of time.' This is what he called the '_aseitas_' of the
+will; borrowing a scholastic term to indicate its derivation (if we may
+speak of it as derived) from itself (_a se_), and not from a supposed
+creative act. Only if we adopt this view are we entitled to regard
+actions as worthy of moral approval or disapproval. They are such not
+because they are not necessitated, but because they necessarily show
+forth the nature of an essence the freedom of which consists in being
+what it is. Yet he could not but find a difficulty in reconciling this
+with his position that the one universal Will is identical in all
+things, and in each is 'individuated' only by space and time. For the
+Ideas, like the thing-in-itself, are eternal, that is, outside of time
+as well as space; and all the things now enumerated, forces of nature,
+plant and animal species, and individual characters of men, are declared
+to be in themselves Ideas.
+
+He in part meets this difficulty by the subtlety that time and space do
+not, strictly speaking, determine individuality, but arise along with
+it. The diremption of individualities becomes explicit in those forms.
+Yet he must have perceived that this is not a complete answer, and
+various modifications can be seen going on. His first view clearly was
+that the individual is wholly impermanent, and at death simply
+disappears; nothing is left but the one Will and the universal Subject
+of contemplation identical in all. Metempsychosis is the best
+mythological rendering of what happens, but it is no more. Later, he
+puts forward the not very clearly defined theory of a 'palingenesia' by
+which a particular will, but not the intellect that formerly accompanied
+it, may reappear in the phenomenal world. And the hospitality he showed
+to stories of magic, clairvoyance, and ghost-seeing, is scarcely
+compatible with the view that the individual will is no more than a
+phenomenal differentiation of the universal will. A speculation (not put
+forward as anything more) on the appearance of a special providence in
+the destiny of the individual, points, as Professor Volkelt has noted,
+to the idea of a guidance, not from without, but by a kind of good
+daemon or genius that is the ultimate reality of the person. On all this
+we must not lay too much stress; but there is certainly one passage that
+can only be described as a definite concession that the individual is
+real in a sense not at first allowed. Individuality, it is said in so
+many words (_Parerga_, ii. Sec. 117), does not rest only on the 'principle
+of individuation' (time and space), and is therefore not through and
+through phenomenon, but is rooted in the thing-in-itself. 'How deep its
+roots go belongs to the questions which I do not undertake to
+answer.'[1]
+
+  [1] _Werke_, ed. Frauenstaedt, vol. vi. p. 243.
+
+This tends to modify considerably, but does not overthrow,
+Schopenhauer's original system. In very general terms, he is in the
+number of the 'pantheistic' thinkers; and it is remarkable, on
+examination, how these, in Europe at least, have nearly always
+recognised in the end some permanent reality in the individual. This is
+contrary to first impressions: but the great names may be cited of
+Plotinus, John Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, Spinoza (in Part v. of
+the _Ethics_), and finally of Schopenhauer's special aversion, Hegel,
+who has been supposed most unfavourable of all to any recognition of
+individuality as real. It is more true, Hegel maintains, that the
+individuality determines its world than that it is determined by it; and
+there is no explanation why the determination should be such and such
+except that the individuality was already what it is.[2] And, if
+Schopenhauer's more imaginative speculations seek countenance from the
+side of empiricism, there is nothing in them quite so audacious as a
+speculation of J. S. Mill on disembodied mind, thrown out during the
+time when he was writing his _Logic_.[3]
+
+  [2] _Phaenomenologie des Geistes_, Jubilaeumsausgabe, ed. G. Lasson, pp.
+  201-3.
+
+  [3] Letter to Robert Barclay Fox, May 10, 1842. Printed in Appendix to
+  _Letters and Journals of Caroline Fox_, third ed., vol. ii. pp. 331-2.
+  'To suppose that the eye is _necessary_ to sight,' says Mill, 'seems to
+  me the notion of one immersed in matter. What we call our bodily
+  sensations are all in the mind, and would not necessarily or probably
+  cease, because the body perishes.'
+
+The association with pantheism Schopenhauer accepts in principle, though
+the name is not congenial to him. In his system the Will is one and all,
+like the 'Deus' of Spinoza. The difference is that, instead of ascribing
+perfection to the universe that is its manifestation, he regards the
+production of a world as a lapse from which redemption is to be sought.
+His doctrine has been rightly described, in common with the predominant
+philosophical doctrines of his period, as a resultant of the deepened
+subjective analysis brought by Kant into modern philosophy on the one
+side, and of the return to Spinoza in the quest for unity of principle
+on the other. Why, then, it may be asked, are Fichte, Schelling, and
+Hegel the constant objects of his attack? The true explanation is not
+the merely external one, that they were his successful rivals for public
+favour, but is to be found in a real antithesis of thought. Within the
+limits of the idealism they all hold in common, Schopenhauer is at the
+opposite pole. In spite of his attempt to incorporate the Platonic
+Ideas, and in spite of his following of Kant, whose 'intelligible world'
+was in essence Platonic or neo-Platonic, he could find no place in his
+system for a rational order at the summit. Now this order was precisely
+what Fichte and Hegel aimed at demonstrating. If Schopenhauer is less
+unsympathetic in his references to Schelling, that is because
+Schelling's world-soul appeared to him to prefigure his own attempt to
+discover in nature the manifestation of a blindly striving will or
+feeling rather than reason. Suspicious as he shows himself of possible
+plagiarisms by others, the charge cannot be retorted against himself.
+The supreme principle of Fichte, it has been pointed out, has an
+actively volitional character and was formulated before Schopenhauer's:
+but then it is essentially rational. For Hegel, what is supreme is the
+world-reason. Hence they are at one with Plato in holding that in some
+sense 'mind is king.' For Schopenhauer, on the contrary, mind, or pure
+intellect, is an emancipated slave. Having reached its highest point,
+and seen through the work of the will, it does not turn back and
+organise it, but abolishes it as far as its insight extends.
+
+Yet to say merely this is to give a wrong impression of Schopenhauer.
+Starting though he does with blind will, and ending with the flight of
+the ascetic from the suffering inherent in the world that is the
+manifestation of such a will, he nevertheless, in the intermediate
+stages, makes the world a cosmos and not a chaos. And the Platonists on
+their side have to admit that 'the world of all of us' does not present
+itself on the surface as a manifestation of pure reason, and that it
+is a serious task to 'rationalise' it. Where he completely fails
+is where the Platonic systems also fail, though from the opposite
+starting-point. His attempt to derive presentation, intellect,
+knowledge, from blind striving, is undoubtedly a failure. But so also
+is the attempt of the Platonising thinkers to deduce a world of mixture
+from a principle of pure reason without aid from anything else
+empirically assumed. Not that in either case there is failure to give
+explanations in detail; but in both cases much is taken from experience
+without reduction to the principles of the system. What we may say by
+way of comparison is this: that if Schopenhauer had in so many words
+recognised an immanent Reason as well as Will in the reality of the
+universe, he would have formally renounced his pessimism; while it
+cannot be said that on the other side a more explicit empiricism in the
+account of the self-manifestation of Reason would necessarily destroy
+the optimism.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+AESTHETICS
+
+
+A portion of Schopenhauer's system by which its pessimism is
+considerably mitigated is his theory of the Beautiful and of Fine Art.
+The characteristic of aesthetic contemplation is, he finds, that
+intellect throws off the yoke and subsists purely for itself as clear
+mirror of the world, free from all subjection to practical purposes of
+the will. In this state of freedom, temporary painlessness is attained.
+
+The theory starts from his adaptation of the Platonic Ideas. Regarded
+purely as an aesthetic theory, it departs from Plato, as he notes; for,
+with the later Platonists, who took up the defence of poetic myths and
+of the imitative arts as against their master, he holds that Art
+penetrates to the general Idea through the particular, and hence that
+the work of art is no mere 'copy of a copy.' The difference of the Idea
+from the Concept is that it is not merely abstract and general, but
+combines with generality the characters of an intuition.
+
+The Ideas, as we have seen, constitute the determinate stages of
+objectivation of the Will. The innumerable individuals of which the
+Ideas are the patterns are subject to the law of sufficient reason. They
+appear, that is to say, under the forms of time, space, and causality.
+The Idea is beyond these forms, and therefore is clear of plurality and
+change. Since the law of sufficient reason is the common form under
+which stands all the subject's knowledge so far as the subject knows as
+individual, the Ideas lie outside the sphere of knowledge of the
+individual as such. If, therefore, the Ideas are to be the object of
+knowledge, this can only be by annulling individuality in the knowing
+subject.
+
+As thing-in-itself, the Will is exempt even from the first of the forms
+of knowledge, the form of being 'object for a subject.' The Platonic
+Idea, on the other hand, is necessarily an object, something known, a
+presentation. It has laid aside, or rather has not taken on, the
+subordinate forms; but it has retained the first and most general form.
+It is the immediate and most adequate possible objectivity of the Will;
+whereas particular things are an objectivation troubled by the forms of
+which the law of sufficient reason is the common expression.
+
+When intellect breaks loose from the service of the will, for which it
+was originally destined in the teleology of nature, then the subject
+ceases to be merely individual and becomes pure will-less subject of
+knowledge. In this state the beholder no longer tracks out relations in
+accordance with the principle of sufficient reason--which is the mode of
+scientific as well as of common knowledge--but rests in fixed
+contemplation of the given object apart from its connection with
+anything else. The contemplator thus 'lost' in the object, it is not the
+single thing as such that is known, but the Idea, the eternal form, the
+immediate objectivity of the Will at this stage. The correlate of this
+object--the pure Subject exempt from the principle of sufficient
+reason--is eternal, like the Idea.
+
+The objectivation of the Will appears faintly in inorganic
+things,--clouds, water, crystals,--more fully in the plant, yet more
+fully in the animal, most completely in man. Only the essential in these
+stages of objectivation constitutes the Idea. Its development into
+manifold phenomena under the forms of the principle of sufficient
+reason, is unessential, lies merely in the mode of knowledge for the
+individual, and has reality only for this. It is not otherwise with the
+unfolding of that Idea which is the completest objectivation of the
+Will. To the Idea of Man, the occurrences of human history are as
+unessential as the shapes they assume to the clouds, as the figures of
+its whirlpools and foam-drift to the stream, as its frost-flowers to the
+ice. The same underlying passions and dispositions everlastingly recur
+in the same modes. It is idle to suppose that anything is gained. But
+also nothing is lost: so the Earth-spirit might reply to one who
+complained of high endeavours frustrated, faculties wasted, promises of
+world-enlightenment brought to nought; for there is infinite time to
+dispose of, and all possibilities are for ever renewed.
+
+The kind of knowledge for which the Ideas are the object of
+contemplation finds its expression in Art, the work of genius. Art
+repeats in its various media the Ideas grasped by pure contemplation.
+Its only end is the communication of these. While Science, following the
+stream of events according to their determinate relations, never reaches
+an ultimate end, Art is always at the end. 'It stops the wheel of time;
+relations vanish for it: only the essence, the Idea, is its object.' The
+characteristic of genius is a predominant capacity for thus
+contemplating things independently of the principle of sufficient
+reason. Since this requires a forgetting of one's own person and the
+relations between it and things, the attitude of genius is simply the
+completest 'objectivity.' The 'subjectivity' opposed to this, in
+Schopenhauer's phraseology, is preoccupation with the interests of one's
+own will. It is, he says, as if there fell to the share of genius a
+measure of intelligence far beyond the needs of the individual will: and
+this makes possible the setting aside of individual interests, the
+stripping off of the particular personality, so that the subject becomes
+'pure knowing subject,' 'clear world-eye,' in a manner sufficiently
+sustained for that which has been grasped to be repeated in the work of
+art. A necessary element in genius is therefore Imagination. For without
+imagination to represent, in a shape not merely abstract, things that
+have not come within personal experience, genius would remain limited to
+immediate intuition, and could not make its vision apprehensible by
+others. Nor without imagination could the particular things that express
+the Idea be cleared of the imperfections by which their limited
+expression of it falls short of what nature was aiming at in their
+production. 'Inspiration' is ascribed to genius because its
+characteristic attitude is intermittent. The man of genius cannot always
+remain on a height, but has to fall back to the level of the common man,
+who can scarcely at all regard things except as they affect his
+interests,--have a relation to his will, direct or indirect.
+
+This is the statement in its first outline of a theory that became one
+of Schopenhauer's most fruitful topics. Many are the pages he has
+devoted to the contrast between the man of genius and 'the wholesale
+ware of nature, which she turns out daily by thousands.' The genius is
+for him primarily the artist. Scientific genius as a distinctive thing
+he does not fully recognise; and he regards men of action, and
+especially statesmen, rather as men of highly competent ability
+endowed with an exceptionally good physical constitution than as men of
+genius in the proper sense. Philosophers like himself, who, as he
+frankly says, appear about once in a hundred years, he classes in the
+end with the artists; though this was left somewhat indeterminate in his
+first exposition. The weakness of the man of genius in dealing with the
+ordinary circumstances of life he allows, and even insists on. Genius,
+grasping the Idea in its perfection, fails to understand individuals. A
+poet may know man profoundly, and men very ill. He admits the proximity
+of genius to madness on one side, and explains it in this way. What
+marks the stage of actual madness, as distinguished from illusion or
+hallucination, is complete disruption of the memory of past life, of the
+history of the personality as something continuous; so that the
+particular thing is viewed by itself, out of relation. This gives a kind
+of resemblance to the attitude of genius, for which present intuition
+excludes from view the relations of things to each other. Or, as we may
+perhaps sum up his thought in its most general form, 'alienation' or
+dissolution of personality has the resemblance often noted between
+extremes to the impersonality, or, as he calls it, 'objectivity,' that
+is super-personal.
+
+In spite of his contempt for the crowd, he has to admit, of course, that
+the capacity of genius to recognise the Ideas of things and to become
+momentarily impersonal must in some measure belong to all men;
+otherwise, they could not even enjoy a work of art when produced. Genius
+has the advantage only in the much higher degree and the greater
+prolongation of the insight. Since, then, the actual achievement of the
+artist is to make us look into the world through his eyes, the feelings
+for the beautiful and the sublime may be treated irrespectively of the
+question whether they are aroused by nature and human life directly or
+by means of art.
+
+AEsthetic pleasure in contemplation of the beautiful proceeds partly from
+recognition of the individual object not as one particular thing but as
+Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of this whole kind of
+things; partly from the consciousness the knower has of himself not as
+individual, but as pure, will-less Subject of Knowledge. All volition
+springs out of need, therefore out of want, therefore out of suffering.
+No attained object of will can give permanent satisfaction. Thus, there
+can be no durable happiness or rest for us as long as we are subjects of
+will. 'The Subject of Will lies continually on the turning wheel of
+Ixion, draws ever in the sieve of the Danaides, is the eternally
+thirsting Tantalus. But in the moment of pure objective contemplation,
+free from all interest of the particular subjectivity, we enter a
+painless state: the wheel of Ixion stands still. The Flemish painters
+produce this aesthetic effect by the sense of disinterested contemplation
+conveyed in their treatment of insignificant objects. There are certain
+natural scenes that have power in themselves, apart from artistic
+treatment, to put us in this state; but the slightest obtrusion of
+individual interest destroys the magic. Past and distant objects,
+through their apparent detachment, have the same power. The essential
+thing aesthetically, whether we contemplate the present or the past, the
+near or the distant, is that only the world of presentation remains; the
+world as will has vanished.
+
+The difference between the feelings of the Beautiful and of the Sublime
+is this. In the feeling of the beautiful, pure intelligence gains the
+victory without a struggle, leaving in consciousness only the pure
+subject of knowledge, so that no reminiscence of the will remains. In
+the feeling of the sublime, on the other hand, the state of pure
+intelligence has to be won by a conscious breaking loose from relations
+in the object that suggest something threatening to the will; though
+there must not be actual danger; for in that case the individual will
+itself would come into play, and aesthetic detachment would cease.
+Elevation above the sense of terror has not only to be consciously won
+but consciously maintained, and involves a continuous reminiscence, not
+indeed of any individual will, but of the will of man in general, so far
+as it is expressed through its objectivity, the human body, confronted
+by forces hostile to it. Pre-eminently this feeling arises from
+contrast between the immensities of space and time and the apparent
+insignificance of man. It means in the last resort that the beholder is
+upheld by the consciousness that as pure subject of knowledge (not as
+individual subject) he himself bears within him all the worlds and all
+the ages, and is eternal as the forces that vainly seem to threaten him
+with annihilation.
+
+On the objective side, and apart from the subjective distinction just
+set forth, the sublime and the beautiful are not essentially different.
+In both cases alike, the object of aesthetic contemplation is not the
+single thing, but the Idea that is striving towards manifestation in it.
+Whatever is viewed aesthetically is viewed out of relation to time and
+space: 'along with the law of sufficient reason the single thing and the
+knowing individual are taken away, and nothing remains over but the Idea
+and the pure Subject of Knowledge, which together make up the adequate
+objectivity of the Will at this stage.' There is thus a sense in which
+everything is beautiful; since the Will appears in everything at some
+stage of objectivity, and this means that it is the expression of some
+Idea. But one thing can be more beautiful than another by facilitating
+aesthetic contemplation. This facilitation proceeds either from the
+greater clearness and perfection with which the particular thing shows
+forth the Idea of its kind, or from the higher stage of objectivation to
+which that Idea corresponds. Man being the highest stage of
+objectivation of the Will, the revelation of his essence is the highest
+aim of art. In aesthetic contemplation of inorganic nature and vegetative
+life, whether in the reality or through the medium of art, and in
+appreciation of architecture, the subjective aspect, that is to say, the
+enjoyment of pure will-less knowledge, is predominant; the Ideas
+themselves being here lower stages of objectivity. On the other hand,
+when animals and men are the object of aesthetic contemplation or
+representation, the enjoyment consists more in the objective
+apprehension of those Ideas in which the essence of the Will is most
+clearly and fully manifested.
+
+Of all Schopenhauer's work, its aesthetic part has met with the most
+general appreciation. Here especially he abounds in observations drawn
+directly, in his own phrase, from intuition. To make a selection of
+these, however, is not appropriate to a brief sketch like the present. I
+pass on, therefore, to those portions of his theory of Art by which he
+makes the transition, in terms of his system, to Morality.
+
+From Architecture onward the arts are obliged to represent the Will as
+divided. Here, at the first stage, its division subsists only in a
+conflict of inorganic forces which have to be brought to equilibrium.
+The conflict between weight and rigidity is in truth the only aesthetic
+material of architecture as a fine art. When we come to animal and
+lastly to human life, which, in the Plastic Arts and in Poetry, as form,
+individualised expression, and action, is the highest object of aesthetic
+representation, the vehemence of divided will is fully revealed; and
+here too is revealed the essential identity of every will with our own.
+In the words of the Indian wisdom, 'Tat twam asi'; 'that thou art.'
+Under the head of Ethics it will be shown expressly that by this
+insight, when it reacts on the will, the will can deny itself. For the
+temporary release from its striving, given in aesthetic contemplation, is
+then substituted permanent release. To this 'resignation,' the innermost
+essence of all virtue and holiness, and the final redemption from the
+world, Art itself, at its highest stages, points the way.
+
+The summits of pictorial and poetic art Schopenhauer finds in the great
+Italian painters so far as they represent the ethical spirit of
+Christianity, and in the tragic poets, ancient and modern. It is true
+that the poverty of their sacred history or mythology puts the Christian
+artists at a disadvantage; but events are merely the accidents of their
+art. Not in these, as related according to the law of sufficient reason,
+is the essence, but in the spirit we divine through the forms portrayed.
+In their representation of men full of that spirit, and especially in
+the eyes, we see mirrored the knowledge that has seized the whole
+essence of the world and of life, and that has reacted on the will, not
+so as to give it motives, but as a 'quietive'; whence proceeds complete
+resignation, and with it the annulling of the will and of the whole
+essence of this world. Of tragedy, the subject-matter is the conflict of
+the will with itself at its highest stage of objectivity. Here also the
+end is the resignation brought on by complete knowledge of the essence
+of the world. The hero, on whom at last this knowledge has acted as a
+quietive, gives up, not merely life, but the whole will to live. 'The
+true meaning of tragedy is the deeper insight, that what the hero
+expiates is not his particular sins, but original sin, that is, the
+guilt of existence itself.' To illustrate this position Schopenhauer is
+fond of quoting a passage from Calderon which declares that the greatest
+sin of man is to have been born.
+
+It seems strange that, after deriding as he does the popular notion of
+'poetic justice' so detached a thinker should imagine an at least
+equally one-sided view to receive its final confirmation from the
+Spanish dramatist's poetic phrasing of a Christian dogma. The great
+tragic poets, for Schopenhauer also, are AEschylus, Sophocles and
+Shakespeare. Now it is safe to say that by none of these was any such
+general doctrine held either in conceptual or in intuitive form. The
+whole effect of any kind of art, of course he would admit, cannot be
+packed into a formula; but if we seek one as an aid to understanding,
+some adaptation of his own theory of the sublime would probably serve
+much better as applied to tragedy than his direct theory of the drama.
+In the case of pictorial art, all that is proved by what he says about
+the representation of ascetic saintliness, is that this, like many other
+things, can be so brought within the scope of art as to make us
+momentarily identify ourselves with its Idea in the impersonal manner he
+has himself described. His purely aesthetic theory is quite adequate to
+the case, without any assumption that this is the representation of what
+is best. Art, pictorial or poetic, can no more prove pessimism than
+optimism. We pick out expressions of one or the other for quotation
+according to our moods or subjective preferences; but, if we have the
+feeling for art itself, our sense of actual aesthetic value ought to be
+independent of these.
+
+Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory, however, does not end here. There
+follows the part of it by which he has had an influence on artists
+themselves. For him, a position separate from all the other arts is held
+by music. While the rest objectify the Will mediately, that is to say,
+by means of the Ideas, Music is as immediate an objectivation of the
+whole Will as the world itself, or as the Ideas, of which the pluralised
+phenomenon constitutes the sum of particular things. The other arts
+speak of the shadow, music of the substance. There is indeed a
+parallelism, an analogy, between Music and the Ideas; yet Music never
+expresses the phenomenon in which these are manifested, but only the
+inner essence behind the appearance, the Will itself. In a sense it
+renders not feeling in its particularity, but feeling _in abstracto_;
+joy, sorrow, not a joy, a sorrow. The phenomenal world and music are to
+be regarded as two different expressions of the same thing. The world
+might be called embodied Music as well as embodied Will. 'Melodies are
+to a certain extent like general concepts, an abstract of reality.' A
+complete explanation of music, that is, a detailed repetition of it in
+concepts, were this possible, would be a complete explanation of the
+world (since both express the same thing) and therefore a true and final
+philosophy. As music only reaches its perfection in the full harmony,
+'so the one Will out of time finds its perfect objectivation only in
+complete union of all the stages which in innumerable degrees of
+heightened distinctness reveal its essence.' But here, too, Schopenhauer
+adds, the Will is felt, and can be proved, to be a divided will; and the
+deliverance wrought by this supreme art, as by all the others, is only
+temporary.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+ETHICS
+
+
+Permanent redemption from the suffering of the world is to be found only
+in the holiness of the ascetic; but to this there are many stages,
+constituting the generally accepted human virtues. Of these Schopenhauer
+has a rational account to give in terms of his philosophy; and if the
+last stage does not seem to follow by logical sequence from the others,
+this is only what is to be expected; for it is reached, in his view, by
+a sort of miracle. To the highest kind of intuitive knowledge, from
+which the ascetic denial of the will proceeds, artistic contemplation
+ought to prepare the way; and so also, on his principles, ought the
+practice of justice and goodness. Yet he is obliged to admit that few
+thus reach the goal. Of those that do reach it, the most arrive through
+personal suffering, which may be deserved. A true miracle is often
+worked in the repentant criminal, by which final deliverance is
+achieved. Though the 'intelligible character' is unalterable, and the
+empirical character can only be the unfolding of this, as every great
+dramatist intuitively recognises, yet the 'convertites,' like Duke
+Frederick in _As You Like It_, are not to be regarded as hypocrites. The
+'second voyage' to the harbour, that of the disappointed egoist, on
+condition of this miracle, brings the passenger to it as surely as the
+first, that of the true saints, which is only for the few. And in these
+equally a miraculous conversion of the will has to be finally worked.
+
+At the entrance to his distinctive theory of ethics, Schopenhauer places
+a restatement of his metaphysics as the possible basis of a mode of
+contemplating life which, he admits, has some community with an
+optimistic pantheism. The Will, through the presentation and the
+accompanying intelligence developed in its service, becomes conscious
+that that which it wills is precisely the world, life as it is. To call
+it 'the will to live' is therefore a pleonasm. 'Will' and 'will to live'
+are equivalent. For this will, life is everlastingly a certainty.
+'Neither the will, the thing-in-itself in all phenomena, nor the subject
+of knowledge, the spectator of all phenomena, is ever touched by birth
+and death.' It is true that the individual appears and disappears; but
+individuality is illusory. Past and future exist only in conceptual
+thought. 'The form of life is a present without end, howsoever the
+individuals, phenomena of the Idea, come into existence and vanish in
+time, like fugitive dreams.' Only as phenomenon is each man different
+from the other things of the world: as thing-in-itself he is the Will,
+which appears in all, and death takes away the illusion that divides his
+consciousness from the rest. 'Death is a sleep in which the
+individuality is forgotten: everything else wakes again, or rather has
+remained awake.' It is, in the expression adopted by Schopenhauer later,
+an awakening from the dream of life: though this bears with it somewhat
+different implications; and, as has been said, his theory of
+individuality became modified.
+
+With the doctrine of the eternal life of the Will are connected
+Schopenhauer's theories, developed later, of the immortality of the
+species and of individualised sexual love. The latter is by itself a
+remarkable achievement, and constitutes the one distinctly new
+development brought to completion in his later years; for the
+modifications in his theory of individuality are only tentative. His
+theory of love has a determinate conclusion, of great value for
+science, and not really compatible, it seems to me, with his pessimism.
+In its relation to ethics, on which he insisted, it is rightly placed in
+the position it occupies, between the generalised statement of his
+metaphysics just now set forth on the one side, and his theory of human
+virtue on the other.
+
+The teleology that manifests itself in individualised love is, in his
+view, not related in reality to the interests of the individual life,
+but to those of the species. That this is immortal follows from the
+eternity of the Idea it unfolds.[4] The end sought is aimed at
+unconsciously by the person. Fundamentally, for Schopenhauer, teleology
+must of course be unconscious, since the will is blind, and will, not
+intelligence, is primordial. Its typical case is the instinct of
+animals; but the 'instinctive' character belongs also to the
+accomplishment of the highest aims, as in art and virtue. What
+characterises individualised love internally is the aim, attributed to
+'nature' or 'the species,' at a certain typical beauty or perfection of
+the offspring. The lover is therefore deluded in thinking that he is
+seeking his own happiness. What looks through the eyes of lovers is the
+genius of the race, meditating on the composition of the next
+generation. It may, in the complexity of circumstances, be thwarted.
+When it reaches its end, often personal happiness is sacrificed.
+Marriages dictated by interest tend to be happier than love-matches.
+Yet, though the sacrifice of the individual to the race is involuntary
+in these, egoism is after all overcome; hence they are quite rightly the
+object of a certain admiration and sympathy, while the prudential ones
+are looked upon with a tinge of contempt. For here too that element
+appears which alone gives nobility to the life either of intellect or of
+art or of moral virtue, namely, the rising above a subjective interest
+of the individual will.
+
+  [4] The disappearance of species in time raises difficulties in more
+  than one way for his philosophy; but he formally escapes refutation by
+  the suggestion, already noted, that the Idea need not always be
+  manifested phenomenally in the same world. This, however, he did not
+  work out.
+
+No doubt there are touches of pessimism in this statement; but the
+general theory does not seem reconcilable finally with pessimism as
+Schopenhauer understands it. For it is a definitely stated position of
+his that nature keeps up the process of the world by yielding just
+enough to prevent discontinuance of the striving for an illusory end.
+Yet he admits here in the result something beyond bare continuance of
+life; for this is already secured without the particular modification of
+feeling described. What the feeling is brought in to secure is a better
+realisation of the type in actual individuals; and such realisation is
+certainly more than bare subsistence with the least possible expenditure
+of nature's resources.
+
+As the immediate preliminary to his ethics proper, Schopenhauer restates
+his doctrine on the intelligible and the empirical character in man, and
+lays down a generalised psychological position regarding the suffering
+inherent in life. Everything as phenomenon, we have seen already, is
+determined because it is subject to the law of sufficient reason. On the
+other hand, everything as thing-in-itself is free; for 'freedom' means
+only non-subjection to that law. The intelligible character of each man
+is an indivisible, unalterable act of will out of time; the developed
+and explicit phenomenon of this in time and space is the empirical
+character. Man is his own work, not in the light of knowledge, but
+before all knowledge; this is secondary and an instrument. Ultimately,
+freedom is a mystery, and takes us beyond even will as the name for the
+thing-in-itself. In reality, that which is 'will to live' need not have
+been such (though we cannot see how this is so), but has become such
+from itself and from nothing else. This is its '_aseitas_.' Hence it is
+in its power to deny itself as will to live. When it does this, the
+redemption (like the fall) comes from itself. This denial does not mean
+annihilation, except relatively to all that we know under the forms of
+our understanding. For the will, though the nearest we can get to the
+thing-in-itself, is in truth a partially phenomenalised expression of
+this. As the will to live expresses itself phenomenally, so also does
+the denial of the will to live, when this, by special 'grace,' is
+achieved. Only in man does the freedom thus attained find phenomenal
+expression. That man can attain to it proves that in him the will has
+reached its highest possible stage of objectivation; for, after it has
+turned back and denied itself, there is evidently nothing more that we
+can call existence, that is to say, phenomenal existence, beyond. What
+there is beyond in the truth of being is something that the mystics
+know--or rather, possess, for it is beyond knowledge--but cannot
+communicate.
+
+The psychological reason that can be assigned for the ascetic flight
+from the world is that all pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, is merely
+negative. The will is a striving that has no ultimate aim. It is
+sustained only by hindrances. Hindrance means suffering; and every
+satisfaction attained is only temporary, a mere liberation from need,
+want, pain, which is positive. Suffering increases with the degree of
+consciousness. The life of civilised man is an alternation between pain
+and _ennui_, which can itself become as intolerable a suffering as
+anything. The problem of moral philosophy, then, is ultimately how
+redemption from such a world is to be attained, but only so far as this
+is a matter of conceptual knowledge. For philosophy, being from
+beginning to end theoretical, cannot work the practical miracle by which
+the will denies itself.
+
+The intuitive, as distinguished from merely conceptual, knowledge by
+which the return is made, consists essentially in a clear insight into
+the identity of the suffering will in all things and the necessity of
+its suffering as long as it is will to live. This, then, is the true
+foundation of morality. The universe as metaphysical thing-in-itself, as
+noumenon, has an ethical meaning. All its stages of objectivation,
+though in the process what seems to be aimed at is preservation of the
+will as manifested, have in truth for their ultimate aim its redemption
+by suppression of the phenomenal world in which it manifests itself.
+
+Affirmation of the will is affirmation of the body, which is the
+objectivity of the will. The sexual impulse, since it affirms life
+beyond the death of the individual, is the strongest of
+self-affirmations. In it is found the meaning of the mythical
+representation that has taken shape in the theological dogma of original
+sin. For by this affirmation going beyond the individual body, suffering
+and death, as the necessary accompaniment of the phenomenon of life, are
+reaffirmed, and the possibility of redemption this time declared
+fruitless. But through the whole process there runs eternal justice. The
+justification of suffering is that the will affirms itself; and the
+self-affirmation is justified by payment of the penalty.
+
+Before the final redemption--which is not for the world but for the
+individual--there are many stages of ethical progress. These consist in
+the gradual overcoming of egoism by sympathy. And here Schopenhauer
+proceeds to set forth a practical scheme for the social life of man,
+differing from ordinary utilitarianism only by reducing all sympathy to
+pity, in accordance with his view that there can be no such thing as
+positive happiness.
+
+He begins with a theory of justice, legal and moral, very much on the
+lines of Hobbes, except that he regards it as up to a certain point _a
+priori_. Here he is consistent throughout. As in his philosophical
+account of mathematics and physics, so also in his aesthetics and
+ethics, he retained, side by side with a strong empirical tendency,
+belief in certain irreducible _a priori_ forms without which our
+knowledge cannot be constituted. The pure ethical theory of justice, he
+says, bears to the political theory the relation of pure to applied
+mathematics. Injustice he holds to be the positive conception. It means
+the breaking into the sphere of another person's will to live. The
+self-affirmation of the will that appears in one individual body is
+extended to denial of the will that appears in other bodies. Justice
+consists in non-encroachment. There is a 'natural right,' or 'moral
+right,' of resistance to injustice by infliction of what, apart from the
+attempted encroachment, would be wrong. Either force or deception may be
+used; as either may be the instrument of injustice. The purely ethical
+doctrine of justice applies only to action; since only the not doing of
+injustice depends on us. With the State and its laws, the relation is
+reversed. The object of these is to prevent the suffering of injustice.
+The State is not directed against egoism, but has sprung out of a
+rationalised collective egoism. It has for its purpose only to avoid the
+inconvenient consequences of individual aggressions on others. Outside
+of the State, there is a right of self-defence against injustice, but no
+right of punishment. The punishment threatened by the State is
+essentially a motive against committing wrong, intended to supply the
+place of ethical motives for those who are insufficiently accessible to
+them. Actual infliction of it is the carrying out of the threat when it
+has failed, so that in general the expectation of the penalty may be
+certain. Revenge, which has a view to the past, cannot be justified
+ethically: punishment is directed only to the future. There is no right
+in any one to set himself up as a moral judge and inflict pain; but man
+has a right to do what is needful for social security. The criminal's
+acts are of course necessitated; but he cannot justly complain of being
+punished for them, since it is ultimately from himself, from what he is,
+that they sprang.
+
+With the doctrine of 'eternal justice,' touched on above, we pass into a
+different region of thought. What is responsible for the guilt in the
+world is the Will by which everything exists, and the suffering
+everlastingly falls where the guilt is. Take the case of apparently
+unpunished injustice (from the human point of view) expressing itself in
+the extreme form of deliberate cruelty. Through this also, eternal
+justice, from which there is no escape, is fulfilled. 'The torturer and
+the tortured are one. The former errs in thinking he has no share in the
+torture; the latter in thinking he has no share in the guilt.' For all
+the pain of the world is the expiation of the sin involved in the
+self-affirmation of will, and the Will as thing-in-itself is one and the
+same in all.
+
+If this could satisfy any one, there would be no need to go further. The
+whole being as it ought to be, why try to rectify details that are
+absolutely indifferent? But of course the implication is that
+individuality is simply illusory; and this, as has been said, was a
+position that Schopenhauer neither could nor did consistently maintain.
+Indeed, immediately after setting forth this theory of 'eternal
+justice,' he goes on to a relative justification of those acts of
+disinterested vengeance by which a person knowingly sacrifices his own
+life for the sake of retribution on some extraordinary criminal. This,
+he says, is a form of punishment, not mere revenge, although it involves
+an error concerning the nature of eternal justice. Suicide involves a
+similar error, in so far as it supposes that the real being of the
+individual can be assailed through its phenomenal manifestation. It is
+not a denial of the will to live, but a strong affirmation of it, only
+not in the given circumstances: different circumstances are desired with
+such intensity that the present cannot be borne. Therefore the
+individual manifestation of the will is not suppressed. Yet, one might
+reply, if individuality is an illusion attached to the appearance in
+time and space of a particular organism, it would seem that, with the
+disappearance of this, all that distinguishes the individual must
+disappear also.
+
+Schopenhauer had no will thus to escape from life; nor did he afterwards
+devote himself to expounding further his theory of eternal justice. What
+he wrote later, either positively or as mere speculation, implies both
+greater reality in the individual and more of cosmic equity to
+correspond. His next step, even at his first stage, is to continue the
+exposition of a practicable ethics for human life. His procedure
+consists in adding beneficence to justice, with the proviso already
+mentioned, which is required by his psychology, that all beneficence can
+consist only in the relief of pain. For Schopenhauer, as for Comte,
+what is to be overcome is 'egoism,' an excessive degree of which is the
+mark of the character we call 'bad.' The 'good' is what Comte and
+Spencer call the 'altruistic' character. This difference between
+characters Schopenhauer goes on to explain in terms of his metaphysics.
+The egoist is so deluded by the principle of individuation that he
+supposes an absolute cleft between his own person and all others. The
+remorse of conscience from which he suffers proceeds in part from an
+obscure perception that the principle of individuation is illusory.
+Genuine virtue springs out of the intuitive (not merely abstract)
+knowledge that recognises in another individuality the same essence as
+in one's own. The characteristic of the good man is that he makes less
+difference than is customary between himself and others. Justice is an
+intermediate stage between the encroaching egoism of the bad and
+positive goodness. In the renunciation of rights of property, and
+provision for all personal needs without aid from others, practised by
+some religious and philosophical ascetics, it is passing over into
+something more. There is, however, a certain misunderstanding involved
+in so interpreting strict justice; for there are many ways in which the
+rich and powerful can be positively beneficent. At the other extreme,
+when they simply live on their inherited wealth, without doing anything
+in return, their mode of life is morally, though not legally, unjust.
+Rights of property Schopenhauer derived from labour spent on the things
+appropriated. The injustice, in many ways, of the present social order
+he quite recognises. If he has no sympathy with revolutions, it is
+because he has no belief in the realisation of an ideal state. This
+follows from his view of history. Human life, it is his conviction,
+never has been and never will be different as a whole. Redemption from
+evil can be attained only by the individual. All that the State can do
+is to provide certain very general conditions of security under which
+there will be no hindrance to those who desire to live in accordance
+with a moral ideal.
+
+Yet there are qualifications to make. Many passages in Schopenhauer's
+writings prove his firm belief in the future triumph of reason over
+superstition. It is to the honour of humanity, he says, that so
+detestable a form of evil as organised religious persecution has
+appeared only in one section of history. And, in his own personal case,
+he has the most complete confidence that the truths he has put forth
+cannot fail sometime to gain a hearing. In all cases, error is only
+temporary, and truth will prevail. His language on this subject, and
+indeed often on others, is indistinguishable from that of an optimist.
+
+In the last resort, his pessimism entrenches itself behind the
+psychological proposition that every satisfaction is negative, being
+only the removal of a pain. If this is unsustainable, there is nothing
+finally in his Metaphysics of Will to necessitate the pessimistic
+conclusion drawn. The mode of deduction by which he proceeds is to argue
+first to the position already noticed: that all that love of others on
+which morality is based is fundamentally pity. True benevolence can only
+be the desire to relieve others' pain, springing from the identification
+of this with our own. For that reason, moral virtue must finally pass
+over into asceticism--the denial of the will to live. In others, if we
+are able to see through the principle of individuation, we recognise the
+same essence as in ourselves, and we perceive that as long as this wills
+it must necessarily suffer. The end then is to destroy the will to live.
+This is to be done by _askesis_, self-mortification. The first step is
+complete chastity. If, says Schopenhauer, the highest phenomenon of
+will, that is, man, were to disappear through a general refusal to
+affirm life beyond the individual body, man's weaker reflexion in the
+animal world would disappear also, and the consciousness of the whole
+would cease. Knowledge being taken away, the rest would vanish into
+nothingness, since there is 'no object without subject.' That this will
+come to pass, however, he certainly did not believe. He has no
+cosmogony, like that of Hartmann, ending in a general redemption of the
+universe by such a collective act. Nor did he hold, like his later
+successor Mainlaender, that through the conflict and gradual extinction
+of individualities, 'this great world shall so wear out to nought.' The
+world for him is without beginning and without end. But the exceptional
+individual can redeem himself. What he does when he has reached the
+height of holiness is by voluntary poverty and all other privations,
+inflicted for their own sake, to break and kill the will, which he
+recognises as the source of his own and of the world's suffering
+existence. In his case not merely the phenomenon ends at death, as with
+others, but the being is taken away. To be a 'world-overcomer' in this
+sense (as opposed to a 'world-conqueror') is the essence of sanctity
+when cleared of all the superstitious dogmas by which the saints try to
+explain their mode of life to themselves.
+
+The absolutely pure expression of this truth is to be found only in
+philosophy; but of the religions Buddhism comes nearest to expressing it
+without admixture. For the Buddhist saint asks aid from no god. True
+Christianity, however,--the Christianity of the New Testament and of the
+Christian mystics,--agrees both with Buddhism and with Brahmanism in
+ultimate aim. What spoils it for Schopenhauer is the Judaic element.
+This, on one side, infects it with the optimism of the Biblical story of
+creation, in which God 'saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it
+was very good.' On the other side, it contaminates the myth of original
+sin, which bears in itself a profound philosophical truth, by this same
+doctrine of a creative God; from which follows all the injustice and
+irrationality necessarily involved in the Augustinian theology, and not
+to be expelled except with its theism. Nevertheless, the story of the
+Fall of Man, of which that theology, in its fundamentally true part, is
+a reasoned expression, is the one thing, Schopenhauer avows, that
+reconciles him to the Old Testament. The truth that it clothes he finds
+also among the Greeks; Empedocles, after the Orphics and Pythagoreans,
+having taught that the soul had been doomed to wander because of some
+antenatal sin. And the mysticism that accompanies all these more or less
+pure expressions of one metaphysical truth he finds represented by the
+Sufis even in optimistic Islam; so that he can claim for his philosophy
+a world-wide consent.
+
+Religion, if we take this to include mysticism, at once rises above
+philosophy and falls below it. As 'metaphysics of the people,' it is a
+mythological expression of philosophical truth: as mysticism, it is a
+kind of 'epi-philosophy.' Beyond pure philosophy Schopenhauer does not
+profess to go; but he accepts what the mystics say as the description of
+a positive experience which becomes accessible when supreme insight is
+attained intuitively. For the philosopher as such, insight into that
+which is beyond the forms of our knowledge and even beyond the will
+itself, remains only conceptual; though it is within the province of
+philosophy to mark out the place for this. The 'something else' that is
+left when the will has been denied, is indicated by the 'ecstasy,'
+'illumination,' 'union with God,' spoken of by the mystics.
+Paradoxically, some of the mystics themselves even have identified it
+with 'nothing'; but the result of the denial of the will to live is to
+be called nothing only in relation to the world as we know it. 'On the
+other hand, to those in whom the will has turned back and denied itself,
+this so very real world of ours with all its suns and milky ways
+is--nothing.'
+
+In this terminus of his philosophy, Schopenhauer recognised his kinship
+with Indian thought, of which he was a lifelong student. To call his
+doctrine a kind of Buddhism is, however, in some ways a misapprehension.
+Undoubtedly he accepts as his ideal the ethical attitude that he finds
+to be common to Buddhism and the Christianity of the New Testament; but
+metaphysical differences mark him off from both. We have seen that he
+rejects the extra-mundane God of Semitic derivation, adopted by
+historical Christianity. Indeed he is one of the most pronounced
+anti-Jehovists of all literature. But equally his belief in a positive
+metaphysical doctrine marks him off from Buddhism, according to the
+account given of it by its most recent students, who regard it either as
+ultimately nihilistic or as having no metaphysics at all, but only a
+psychology and ethics. Nor can he be precisely identified with the
+Vedantists of orthodox Hinduism. Their ultimate reality, if we are to
+find an analogue for it in European metaphysics, seems to resemble the
+hypostasised _ego_ of Fichte, or the Kantian 'transcendental unity of
+apperception', much more than it resembles Schopenhauer's blindly
+striving will as thing-in-itself. Even in practical ethics, he does not
+follow the Indian systems at all closely. Philosophical doctrines of
+justice are of course purely European; and Schopenhauer himself points
+out the sources of his own theory. In his extension of ethics to
+animals, on which he lays much stress, he cites the teachings of Eastern
+non-Semitic religions as superior to the rest; but he does not follow
+the Indians, nor even the Pythagoreans, so far as to make abstinence
+from flesh part of the ideal. He condemns vivisection on the ground that
+animals have rights: certain ways of treating them are unjust, not
+simply uncompassionate. The discussion here again is of course wholly
+within European thought. Thus, in trying to determine his significance
+for modern philosophy, we may consider his system in its immediate
+environment, leaving it to more special students to determine how far it
+received a peculiar colouring from the Oriental philosophies, of which,
+in his time, the more exact knowledge was just beginning to penetrate to
+the West.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE
+
+
+Schopenhauer is not one of the philosophers who have founded a school,
+though he has had many disciples and enthusiastic admirers. The
+pessimism that was for a time a watchword with certain literary groups
+has passed as a mode, and his true significance must be sought
+elsewhere. Of the thinkers who have followed him in his pessimism, two
+indeed stand out as the architects of distinct systems, Eduard von
+Hartmann and Philipp Mainlaender (both already incidentally referred to);
+but while they are to be classed unquestionably as philosophers, their
+systems contain an element that their master would have regarded as
+mythological. Schopenhauer declared as clearly as any of the Greeks that
+the phenomenal world is without beginning and without end. Kant's
+positing of an 'antinomy' on this point he regarded as wholly without
+rational justification. What Kant calls the 'antithesis,' namely, the
+infinite series, can be logically proved for phenomena. The 'thesis,'
+which asserts a beginning in time, is defended by mere fallacies. Now
+Hartmann and Mainlaender both hold, though in different fashions, that
+there is a world-process from a beginning to an end, namely, the
+extinction of consciousness. This is the redemption of the world. Their
+affinity, therefore, seems to be with the Christian Gnostics rather than
+with the pure philosophers of the Greek tradition, continued in modern
+times by Bruno, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer.
+
+Whatever may be thought of the pessimism by which Schopenhauer's mood is
+distinguished from that of his precursors, few will fail to recognise
+that special doctrines of his system contain at least a large portion of
+truth. His theories of Art, of Genius, and of Love are enough to found
+an enduring reputation for any thinker, even if there were nothing else
+of value in his writings. But there is much else, both in systematic
+construction and in the illumination of detail. I have been inclined to
+put forward first of all the translation into idealistic terms of the
+universal sentiency held by the Ionian thinkers to be inherent in the
+primordial elements of nature. While they viewed the world as an
+objective thing having psychological qualities, Schopenhauer, after the
+long intermediate process of thought, could treat it as phenomenal
+object with a psychological or subjective essence. For both doctrines
+alike, however, mind or soul is immanent. Still, it must be allowed that
+a difference remains by which Schopenhauer was even more remote than
+they were from the later Greek idealism. As they were not materialists,
+so they did not exclude reason from the psychical properties of their
+substances. Schopenhauer, while he rejected the materialism of their
+ancient and modern successors alike, took the step of formally
+derationalising the elements of mind. This, no doubt, is unsustainable
+ultimately, if reason is ever to emerge from them. Yet the one-sidedness
+of the position has had a peculiar value in combating an equally
+one-sided rationalistic idealism. This is recognised by clear-sighted
+opponents. And Schopenhauer's calling the non-rational or anti-rational
+element in the world 'will' helps to make plainer the real problem of
+evil. There is truth in the Hegelian paradox that 'pessimism is an
+excellent basis for optimism.' An optimist like Plotinus saw that, even
+if good comes of evil, the case of the optimist must fail unless evil
+can be shown to be a necessary constituent of the world. The Platonic
+and Neo-Platonic 'matter,' a principle of diremption or individuation,
+like time and space for Schopenhauer, was an attempt to solve this
+problem; but something more positive seemed to be needed as the source
+of the stronger manifestations of evil. To the strength of these Plato
+drew attention in a passage (_Republic_, x. 610[5]) where it is
+acknowledged that injustice confers a character of vitality and
+sleeplessness upon its possessor. In the notion of a blind and vehement
+striving, Schopenhauer supplies something adequate; only, to maintain a
+rational optimism, it must be regarded as a necessary element in a
+mixture, not as the spring of the whole.
+
+  [5] Cited in one of the introductory essays to Jowett and Campbell's
+  edition, vol. ii.
+
+Much might be said on the teleology by which he tries to educe
+intelligence from the primordial strife. Against his view, that it is
+evolved as a mere instrument for preserving races in a struggle, another
+may be set that is ready to hand in a dialogue of Plutarch.[6] The
+struggle among animals, it is there incidentally argued, has for its end
+to sharpen their intelligence. Both these theories are on the surface
+compatible with evolution. If, leaving aside the problem of mechanism,
+we try to verify them by the test of results, the latter undoubtedly
+seems the more plausible. For if the struggle was a means to the
+improvement of intelligence, nature has succeeded more and more;
+whereas, if her intention was to preserve races, she has continually
+failed. This argument is at any rate perfectly valid against
+Schopenhauer himself; for he holds in common with the optimistic
+teleologists that 'nature does nothing in vain.'
+
+  [6] _De Sollertia Animalium_, 27.
+
+I will conclude with a few detached criticisms on the ethical doctrine
+which he regarded as the culmination of his system. The antithesis, it
+may first be noted, between the temporary release from the vehemence of
+the will that is gained through art, and the permanent release through
+asceticism, is not consistently maintained. Schopenhauer admits that the
+knowledge which for the ascetic is the 'quietive' of the will has to be
+won anew in a perpetual conflict. 'No one can have enduring rest on
+earth.' Again, revision of his doctrine concerning the reality of the
+individual would, I think, necessitate revision also of the position
+that not only asceticism but 'all true and pure love, nay, even freely
+rendered justice, proceeds from seeing through the _principium
+individuationis_.' If the individual is in some sense ultimately real,
+then love must be to a certain extent literally altruism. We are brought
+down to the elementary fact, in terms of the metaphysics of ethics, that
+the object of love is a real being that is itself and not ourselves,
+though having some resemblance to us and united in a larger whole. An
+objection not merely verbal might indeed be taken to Schopenhauer's
+metaphysics of ethics strictly on his own ground. If it is purely and
+simply the essence of ourselves that we recognise in everything, does
+not this reduce all love finally to a well-understood egoism? The
+genuine fact of sympathy seems to escape his mode of formulation. And,
+in the end, we shall perhaps not find the ascetic to be the supreme
+ethical type. Of the self-tormenting kind of asceticism, it is not
+enough to say with Schopenhauer that, since it is a world-wide
+phenomenon of human nature, it calls for some account from philosophy.
+The account may be sufficiently rendered by historical psychology; the
+result being to class it as an aberration born of the illusions incident
+to a certain type of mind at a certain stage. Indeed, that seems to be
+the conclusion of the Buddhists, who claim to have transcended it by
+finding it superfluous for the end it aims at. Let us then take, as our
+example of the completed type, not the monks of the Thebaid, but the
+mild ascetics of the Buddhist communities. Does not this type, even in
+its most attractive form, represent a 'second best'? Is not the final
+judgment that of Plato, that to save oneself is something, but that
+there is no full achievement unless for the life of the State also the
+ideal has been brought nearer realisation? When there is nothing in the
+world but irredeemable tyranny or anarchy, flight from it may be the
+greatest success possible as far as the individual life is concerned;
+but this is not the normal condition of humanity. Finally, may not some
+actual achievement, either practical or, like that of Schopenhauer,
+speculative, even if accompanied by real imperfections of character,
+possess a higher human value than the sanctity that rests always in
+itself?
+
+
+
+
+SELECTED WORKS
+
+
+_English Translations_
+
+  _The World as Will and Idea._ Translated by R. B. HALDANE and J. KEMP. 3
+    vols. 1883-6.
+
+  _Two Essays_: I. _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient
+    Reason_. II. _On the Will in Nature_. Bohn's Philosophical Library,
+    1889.
+
+  _Religion: A Dialogue, and other Essays._ Selected and translated by T.
+    BAILEY SAUNDERS. 3rd ed., 1891. [A series of other volumes of
+    selections excellently translated by Mr. Saunders has followed.]
+
+  _Selected Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer._ With a Biographical
+    Introduction and Sketch of his Philosophy. By E. BELFORT BAX. 1891.
+
+  _The Basis of Morality._ Translated with Introduction and Notes by A. B.
+    BULLOCK. 1903.
+
+
+_Biographical and Expository_
+
+  _Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and Philosophy._ By HELEN ZIMMERN. 1876.
+
+  _Life of Arthur Schopenhauer._ By Professor W. WALLACE. 1890.
+
+  _La Philosophie de Schopenhauer._ Par TH. RIBOT. 2nd ed., 1885.
+
+  _Arthur Schopenhauer._ Seine Persoenlichkeit, seine Lehre, sein Glaube.
+    Von JOHANNAES VOLKELT. 3rd ed., 1907.
+
+  _Schopenhauer-Lexikon._ Von JULIUS FRADENSTAeDT. 2 vols., 1871.
+
+
+Printed by T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty at the Edinburgh
+University Press
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCHOPENHAUER ***
+
+***** This file should be named 38283.txt or 38283.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        http://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/2/8/38283/
+
+Produced by Albert Laszlo and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive)
+
+
+Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
+will be renamed.
+
+Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
+one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
+(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
+permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
+set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
+copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
+protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
+Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
+charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
+do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
+rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
+such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
+research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
+practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
+subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
+redistribution.
+
+
+
+*** START: FULL LICENSE ***
+
+THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
+PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
+
+To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
+distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
+(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
+http://gutenberg.org/license).
+
+
+Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works
+
+1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
+and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
+(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
+the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
+all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
+If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
+terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
+entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
+
+1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
+used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
+agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
+things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
+paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
+and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.  See paragraph 1.E below.
+
+1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
+or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
+collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
+individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
+located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
+copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
+works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
+are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
+Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
+freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
+this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
+the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
+keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.
+
+1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
+what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
+a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
+the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
+before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
+creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
+Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
+the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
+States.
+
+1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
+
+1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
+access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
+whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
+phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
+copied or distributed:
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
+from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
+posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
+and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
+or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
+with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
+work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
+through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
+Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
+1.E.9.
+
+1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
+with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
+must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
+terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
+to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
+permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
+
+1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
+work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.
+
+1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
+electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
+prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
+active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm License.
+
+1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
+compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
+word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
+distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
+"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
+posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),
+you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
+copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
+request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
+form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
+
+1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
+performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
+unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
+access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
+that
+
+- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
+     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
+     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
+     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
+     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
+     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
+     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
+     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
+     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
+     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
+     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
+     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
+     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
+     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+     License.  You must require such a user to return or
+     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
+     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
+     Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
+     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
+     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
+     of receipt of the work.
+
+- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
+     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
+forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
+both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
+Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
+Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.
+
+1.F.
+
+1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
+effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
+public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
+collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
+"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
+corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
+property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
+computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
+your equipment.
+
+1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
+of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
+liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
+fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
+LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
+PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
+TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
+LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
+INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+DAMAGE.
+
+1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
+defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
+receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
+written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
+received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
+your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
+the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
+refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
+providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
+receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
+is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
+opportunities to fix the problem.
+
+1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
+in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
+WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
+WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
+
+1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
+warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
+If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
+law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
+interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
+the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
+provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
+
+1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
+trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
+providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
+with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
+promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
+harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
+that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
+or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
+work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
+Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
+
+
+Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
+electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
+including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
+because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
+people in all walks of life.
+
+Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
+assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
+goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
+remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
+and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
+To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
+and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
+and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org.
+
+
+Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
+Foundation
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
+501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
+state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
+Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
+number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
+http://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
+permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.
+
+The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
+Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
+throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
+809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
+business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
+information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
+page at http://pglaf.org
+
+For additional contact information:
+     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
+     Chief Executive and Director
+     gbnewby@pglaf.org
+
+
+Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
+spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
+increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
+freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
+array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
+($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
+status with the IRS.
+
+The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
+charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
+States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
+considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
+with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
+where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
+SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
+particular state visit http://pglaf.org
+
+While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
+have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
+against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
+approach us with offers to donate.
+
+International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
+any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
+outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
+
+Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
+methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
+ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations.
+To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate
+
+
+Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.
+
+Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
+concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
+with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
+Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
+
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
+editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
+unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
+keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.
+
+
+Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:
+
+     http://www.gutenberg.org
+
+This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
+including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
+subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
diff --git a/38283.zip b/38283.zip
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30da41a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/38283.zip
diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6312041
--- /dev/null
+++ b/LICENSE.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements,
+metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be
+in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES.
+
+Procedures for determining public domain status are described in
+the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org.
+
+No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in
+jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize
+this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright
+status under the laws that apply to them.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20ca623
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+eBook #38283 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/38283)