diff options
Diffstat (limited to '38283-8.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 38283-8.txt | 2333 |
1 files changed, 2333 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/38283-8.txt b/38283-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efb132f --- /dev/null +++ b/38283-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2333 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Schopenhauer + +Author: Thomas Whittaker + +Release Date: December 12, 2011 [EBook #38283] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCHOPENHAUER *** + + + + +Produced by Albert László and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive) + + + + + + + + + +PHILOSOPHIES ANCIENT AND MODERN + +SCHOPENHAUER + + + + +NOTE + + +As a consequence of the success of the series of _Religions Ancient and +Modern_, Messrs. CONSTABLE have decided to issue a set of similar +primers, with brief introductions, lists of dates, and selected +authorities, presenting to the wider public the salient features of the +_Philosophies_ of Greece and Rome and of the Middle Ages, as well as of +modern Europe. They will appear in the same handy Shilling volumes, with +neat cloth bindings and paper envelopes, which have proved so attractive +in the case of the _Religions_. The writing in each case will be +confided to an eminent authority, and one who has already proved himself +capable of scholarly yet popular exposition within a small compass. + +Among the first volumes to appear will be:-- + + =Early Greek Philosophy.= By A. W. BENN, author of _The Philosophy + of Greece, Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century_. + + =Stoicism.= By Professor ST. GEORGE STOCK, author of _Deductive + Logic_, editor of the _Apology of Plato_, etc. + + =Plato.= By Professor A. E. TAYLOR, St. Andrews University, author + of _The Problem of Conduct_. + + =Scholasticism.= By Father RICKABY, S.J. + + =Hobbes.= By Professor A. E. TAYLOR. + + =Locke.= By Professor ALEXANDER, of Owens College. + + =Comte and Mill.= By T. WHITTAKER, author of _The Neoplatonists, + Apollonius of Tyana and other Essays_. + + =Herbert Spencer.= By W. H. HUDSON, author of _An Introduction to + Spencer's Philosophy_. + + =Schopenhauer.= By T. WHITTAKER. + + =Berkeley.= By Professor CAMPBELL FRASER, D.C.L., LL.D. + + =Bergsen.= By Father TYRRELL. + + + + +SCHOPENHAUER + + +By + +THOMAS WHITTAKER + +AUTHOR OF 'COMTE AND MILL,' ETC. + + +LONDON + +ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO LTD + +1909 + + + + +CONTENTS + + + CHAP. PAGE + + I. LIFE AND WRITINGS, 1 + II. THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, 15 + III. METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL, 29 + IV. ÆSTHETICS, 49 + V. ETHICS, 65 + VI. HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE, 86 + SELECTED WORKS, 93 + + + + +SCHOPENHAUER + + + + +CHAPTER I + +LIFE AND WRITINGS + + +Arthur Schopenhauer may be distinctively described as the greatest +philosophic writer of his century. So evident is this that he has +sometimes been regarded as having more importance in literature than in +philosophy; but this is an error. As a metaphysician he is second to no +one since Kant. Others of his age have surpassed him in system and in +comprehensiveness; but no one has had a firmer grasp of the essential +and fundamental problems of philosophy. On the theory of knowledge, the +nature of reality, and the meaning of the beautiful and the good, he has +solutions to offer that are all results of a characteristic and original +way of thinking. + +In one respect, as critics have noted, his spirit is different from that +of European philosophy in general. What preoccupies him in a special way +is the question of evil in the world. Like the philosophies of the +East, emerging as they do without break from religion, Schopenhauer's +philosophy is in its outcome a doctrine of redemption from sin. The name +of pessimism commonly applied to it is in some respects misleading, +though it was his own term; but it is correct if understood as he +explained it. As he was accustomed to insist, his final ethical doctrine +coincides with that of all the religions that aim, for their adepts or +their elect, at deliverance from 'this evil world.' But, as the +'world-fleeing' religions have their mitigations and accommodations, so +also has the philosophy of Schopenhauer. At various points indeed it +seems as if a mere change of accent would turn it into optimism. + +This preoccupation does not mean indifference to the theoretical +problems of philosophy. No one has insisted more strongly that the end +of philosophy is pure truth, and that only the few who care about pure +truth have any concern with it. But for Schopenhauer the desire for +speculative truth does not by itself suffice to explain the impulse of +philosophical inquiries. On one side of his complex character, he had +more resemblance to the men who turn from the world to religion, like +St. Augustine, than to the normal type of European thinker, represented +pre-eminently by Aristotle. He was a temperamental pessimist, feeling +from the first the trouble of existence; and here he finds the deepest +motive for the desire to become clear about it. He saw in the world, +what he felt in himself, a vain effort after ever new objects of desire +which give no permanent satisfaction; and this view, becoming +predominant, determined, not indeed all the ideas of his philosophy, but +its general complexion as a 'philosophy of redemption.' + +With his pessimism, personal misfortunes had nothing to do. He was, and +always recognised that he was, among the most fortunately placed of +mankind. He does not hesitate to speak sometimes of his own happiness in +complete freedom from the need to apply himself to any compulsory +occupation. This freedom, as he has put gratefully on record, he owed to +his father, Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer, who was a rich merchant of +Danzig, where the philosopher was born on the 22nd of February 1788. +Both his parents were of Dutch ancestry. His mother, Johanna +Schopenhauer, won celebrity as a novelist; and his sister, Adele, also +displayed some literary talent. Generalising from his own case, +Schopenhauer holds that men of intelligence derive their character from +their father and their intellect from their mother. With his mother, +however, he was not on sympathetic terms, as may be read in the +biographies. His father intended him for a mercantile career, and with +this view began to prepare him from the first to be a cosmopolitan man +of the world. The name of Arthur was given to him because it is spelt +alike in the leading European languages. He was taken early to France, +where he resided from 1797 to 1799, learning French so well that on his +return he had almost forgotten his German. Portions of the years 1803 to +1804 were spent in England, France, Switzerland, and Austria. In England +he was three months at a Wimbledon boarding-school kept by a clergyman. +This experience he found extremely irksome. He afterwards became highly +proficient in English: was always pleased to be taken for an Englishman, +and regarded both the English character and intelligence as on the whole +the first in Europe; but all the more deplorable did he find the +oppressive pietism which was the special form taken in the England of +that period by the reaction against the French Revolution. He is never +tired of denouncing that phase of 'cold superstition,' the dominance of +which lasted during his lifetime; for the publication of Mill's +_Liberty_ and of Darwin's _Origin of Species_, which may be considered +as marking the close of it, came only the year before his death. + +The only real break in the conformity of Schopenhauer's circumstances to +his future career came in 1805, when he was placed in a merchant's +office at Hamburg, whither his father had migrated in disgust at the +annexation of his native Danzig, then under a republican constitution of +its own, by Prussia in 1793. Soon afterwards his father died; but out of +loyalty he tried for some time longer to reconcile himself to commercial +life. Finding this at length impossible, he gained permission from his +mother, in 1807, to leave the office for the gymnasium. At this time he +seems to have begun his classical studies, his education having hitherto +been exclusively modern. They were carried on first at Gotha and then at +Weimar. In 1809 he entered the university of Göttingen as a student of +medicine. This, however, was with a view only to scientific studies, not +to practice; and he transferred himself to the philosophical faculty in +1810. Generally he was little regardful of academical authority. His +father's deliberately adopted plan of letting him mix early with the +world had given him a certain independence of judgment. At Göttingen, +however, he received an important influence from his teacher, G. E. +Schulze (known by the revived scepticism of his _Ænesidemus_), who +advised him to study Plato and Kant before Aristotle and Spinoza. From +1811 to 1813 he was at Berlin, where he heard Fichte, but was not +impressed. In 1813 the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was conferred on +him at Jena for the dissertation _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle +of Sufficient Reason_ (_Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom +zureichenden Grunde_, 2nd ed., 1847). This was the first result of his +Kantian studies. In the same year he began to be acquainted with Goethe +at Weimar, where his mother and sister had gone to reside in 1806. A +consequence of this acquaintance was that he took up and further +developed Goethe's theory of colours. His dissertation _Ueber das Sehen +und die Farben_ was published in 1816. A second edition did not appear +till 1854; but in the meantime he had published a restatement of his +doctrine in Latin, entitled _Theoria Colorum Physiologica_ (1830). This, +however, was an outlying part of his work. He had already been seized by +the impulse to set forth the system of philosophy that took shape in +him, as he says, by some formative process of which he could give no +conscious account. His great work, _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, +was ready for publication before the end of 1818, and was published with +the date 1819. Thus he is one of the most precocious philosophers on +record. For in that single volume, written before he was thirty, the +outlines of his whole system are fixed. There is some development later, +and there are endless new applications and essays towards confirmation +from all sources. His mind never rested, and his literary power gained +by exercise. Still, it has been said with truth, that there never was a +greater illusion than when he thought that he seldom repeated himself. +In reality he did little but repeat his fundamental positions with +infinite variations in expression. + +After completing his chief work, Schopenhauer wrote some verses in which +he predicted that posterity would erect a monument to him. This +prediction was fulfilled in 1895; but, for the time, the work which he +never doubted would be his enduring title to fame seemed, like Hume's +_Treatise_, to have fallen 'deadborn from the press.' This he attributed +to the hostility of the academical philosophers; and, in his later +works, attacks on the university professors form a characteristic +feature. The official teachers of the Hegelian school, he declared, were +bent only on obtaining positions for themselves by an appearance of +supporting Christian dogma; and they resented openness on the part of +any one else. Yet on one side he maintained that his own pessimism was +more truly Christian than their optimism. The essential spirit of +Christianity is that of Brahmanism and Buddhism, the great religions +that sprang from India, the first home of our race. He is even inclined +to see in it traces of Indian influence. What vitiates it in his eyes is +the Jewish element, which finds its expression in the flat modern +'Protestant-rationalistic optimism.' As optimistic religions, he groups +together Judaism, Islam, and Græco-Roman Polytheism. His antipathy, +however, only extends to the two former. He was himself in great part a +child of Humanism and of the eighteenth century, rejoicing over the +approaching downfall of all the faiths, and holding that a weak religion +(entirely different from those he admires) is favourable to +civilisation. Nothing can exceed his scorn for nearly everything that +characterised the Middle Ages. With Catholicism as a political system he +has no sympathy whatever; while on the religious side the Protestant +are as sympathetic to him as the Catholic mystics. What is common to all +priesthoods, he holds, is to exploit the metaphysical need of mankind +(in which he also believes) for the sake of their own power. +Clericalism, 'Pfaffenthum,' whether Catholic or Protestant, is the +object of his unvarying hatred and contempt. If he had cared to +appreciate Hegel, he would have found on this point much community of +spirit; but of course there was a real antithesis between the two as +philosophers. No 'conspiracy' need be invoked to explain the failure of +Schopenhauer to win early recognition. Belief in the State and in +progress was quite alien to him; and Germany was then full of political +hopes, which found nourishment in optimistic pantheism. What at length +gave his philosophy vogue was the collapse of this enthusiasm on the +failure of the revolutionary movement in 1848. Once known, it contained +enough of permanent value to secure it from again passing out of sight +with the next change of fashion. + +The rest of Schopenhauer's life in its external relations may be briefly +summed up. For a few years, it was diversified by travels in Italy and +elsewhere, and by an unsuccessful attempt at academical teaching in +Berlin. In 1831 he moved to Frankfort, where he finally settled in +1833. He lived unmarried there till his death on the 21st of September +1860. The monument, already spoken of, was unveiled at Frankfort on the +6th of June 1895. + +The almost unbroken silence with which his great work was received, +though it had a distempering effect on the man, did not discourage the +thinker. The whole series of Schopenhauer's works, indeed, was completed +before he attained anything that could be called fame. Constantly on the +alert as he was to seize upon confirmations of his system, he published +in 1836 his short work _On the Will in Nature_, pointing out +verifications of his metaphysics by recent science. In 1839 his prize +essay, _On the Freedom of the Human Will_ (finished in 1837), was +crowned by the Royal Scientific Society of Drontheim in Norway. This and +another essay, _On the Basis of Morality_, _not_ crowned by the Royal +Danish Society of Copenhagen in 1840, he published in 1841, with the +inclusive title, _Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik_. In 1844 appeared +the second edition of his principal work, to which there was added, in +the form of a second volume, a series of elucidations and extensions +larger in bulk than the first. This new volume contains much of his +best and most effective writing. His last work, _Parerga und +Paralipomena_, which appeared in 1851 (2 vols.), is from the literary +point of view the most brilliant. It was only from this time that he +began to be well known among the general public; though the philosophic +'apostolate' of Julius Frauenstädt, who afterwards edited his works, had +begun in 1840. His activity was henceforth confined to modifying and +extending his works for new editions; an employment in which he was +always assiduous. In consequence of this, all of them, as they stand, +contain references from one to another; but the development of his +thinking, so far as there was such a process after 1818, can be easily +traced without reference to the earlier editions. There is some growth; +but, as has been said, it does not affect many of the chief points. A +brief exposition of his philosophy can on the whole take it as something +fixed. The heads under which it must fall are those assigned to the +original four books of _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_. + +Although Schopenhauer discountenanced the attempt to connect a +philosophers biography with his work, something has to be said about his +character, since this has been dwelt on to his disadvantage by +opponents. There is abundant material for a personal estimate in the +correspondence and reminiscences published after his death by his +disciples Julius Frauenstädt and Wilhelm Gwinner. The apparent +contradiction is at once obvious between the ascetic consummation of his +ethics and his unascetic life, carefully occupied in its latter part +with rules for the preservation of his naturally robust health. He was +quite aware of this, but holds it absurd to require that a moralist +should commend only the virtues which he possesses. It is as if the +requirement were set up that a sculptor is to be himself a model of +beauty. A saint need not be a philosopher, nor a philosopher a saint. +The science of morals is as theoretical as any other branch of +philosophy. Fundamentally character is unmodifiable, though knowledge, +it is allowed, may change the mode of action within the limits of the +particular character. The passage to the state of asceticism cannot be +effected by moral philosophy, but depends on a kind of 'grace.' After +all, it might be replied, philosophers, whether they succeed or not, do +usually make at least an attempt to live in accordance with the moral +ideal they set up. The best apology in Schopenhauer's case is that the +fault may have been as much in his ideal as in his failure to conform +to it. The eloquent pages he has devoted to the subject of holiness only +make manifest the inconsequence (which he admits) in the passage to it. +For, as we shall see, this has nothing in common with the essentially +rational asceticism of the schools of later antiquity; which was a rule +of self-limitation in view of the philosophic life. He did in a way of +his own practise something of this; and, on occasion, he sets forth the +theory of it; but he quite clearly sees the difference. His own ideal, +which he never attempted to practise, is that of the self-torturing +ascetics of the Christian Middle Age. Within the range of properly human +virtue, he can in many respects hold his own, not only as a philosopher +but as a man. If his egoism and vanity are undeniable, he undoubtedly +possessed the virtues of rectitude and compassion. What he would have +especially laid stress on was the conscientious devotion to his work. +With complete singleness of purpose he used for a disinterested end the +leisure which he regarded as the most fortunate of endowments. As he +said near the close of his life, his intellectual conscience was clear. + +Of Schopenhauer's expositions of his pessimism it would be true to say, +as Spinoza says of the Book of Job, that the matter, like the style, is +not that of a man sitting among the ashes, but of one meditating in a +library. This of course does not prove that they are not a genuine, if +one-sided, rendering of human experience. All that can be said is that +they did not turn him away from appreciation of the apparent goods of +life. His own practical principle was furnished by what he regarded as a +lower point of view; and this gives its direction to the semi-popular +philosophy of the _Parerga_. From what he takes to be the higher point +of view, the belief that happiness is attainable by man on earth is an +illusion; but he holds that, by keeping steadily in view a kind of +tempered happiness as the end, many mistakes may be avoided in the +conduct of life, provided that each recognises at once the strength and +weakness of his own character, and does not attempt things that, with +the given limitations, are impossible. Of the highest truth, as he +conceived it, he could therefore make no use. Only by means of a truth +that he was bound to hold half-illusory could a working scheme be +constructed for himself and others. This result may give us guidance in +seeking to learn what we can from a thinker who is in reality no +representative of a decadence, but is fundamentally sane and rational, +even in spite of himself. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE + + +The title of Schopenhauer's chief work is rendered in the English +translation, _The World as Will and Idea_. Here the term 'idea' is used +in the sense it had for Locke and Berkeley; namely, any object of mental +activity. Thus it includes not merely imagery, but also perception. +Since Hume distinguished ideas' from 'impressions,' it has tended to be +specialised in the former sense. The German word, _Vorstellung_, which +it is used to render, conveys the generalised meaning of the Lockian +'idea,' now frequently expressed in English and French philosophical +works by the more technical term 'presentation' or 'representation.' By +Schopenhauer himself the word 'Idea' was used exclusively in the sense +of the Platonic Idea, which, as we shall see, plays an important part in +his philosophy. The distinction is preserved in the translation by the +use of a capital when Idea has the latter meaning; but in a brief +exposition it seems convenient to adopt a more technical rendering of +_Vorstellung_; and, from its common employment in psychological +text-books, I have selected 'presentation' as the most suitable. + +The first proposition of Schopenhauer's philosophical system is, 'The +world is my presentation.' By this he means that it presents itself as +appearance to the knowing subject. This appearance is in the forms of +time, space and causality. Under these forms every phenomenon +necessarily appears, because they are _a priori_ forms of the subject. +The world as it presents itself consists entirely of phenomena, that is, +appearances, related according to these forms. The most fundamental form +of all is the relation between object and subject, which is implied in +all of them. Without a subject there can be no presented object. + +Schopenhauer is therefore an idealist in the sense in which we call +Berkeley's theory of the external world idealism; though the expressions +used are to some extent different. The difference proceeds from his +following of Kant. His Kantianism consists in the recognition of _a +priori_ forms by which the subject constructs for itself an 'objective' +world of appearances. With Berkeley he agrees as against Kant in not +admitting any residue whatever, in the object as such, that is not +wholly appearance. But while he allows that Berkeley, as regards the +general formulation of idealism, was more consistent than Kant, he finds +him, in working out the principle, altogether inadequate. For the modern +mind there is henceforth no way in philosophy except through Kant, from +whom dates the revolution by which scholastic dualism was finally +overthrown. Kant's systematic construction, however, he in effect +reduces to very little. His is a much simplified 'Apriorism.' While +accepting the 'forms of sensible intuition,' that is, time and space, +just as Kant sets them forth, he clears away nearly all the superimposed +mechanism. Kant's 'Transcendental Æsthetic,' he says, was a real +discovery in metaphysics; but on the basis of this he for the most part +only gave free play to his architectonic impulse. Of the twelve +'categories of the understanding,' which he professed to derive from the +logical forms of judgment, all except causality are mere 'blind +windows.' This alone, therefore, Schopenhauer adopts; placing it, +however, not at a higher level but side by side with time and space, +Kant's forms of intuition. These three forms, according to Schopenhauer, +make up the understanding of men and animals. 'All intuition is +intellectual.' It is not first mere appearance related in space and +time, and waiting for understanding to organise it; but, in animals as +in man, it is put in order at once under the three forms that suffice to +explain the knowledge all have of the phenomenal world. + +To Reason as distinguished from Understanding, Schopenhauer assigns no +such exalted function as was attributed to it in portions of his system +by Kant, and still more by some of his successors. The name of 'reason,' +he maintains, ought on etymological grounds to be restricted to the +faculty of abstract concepts. This, and not understanding, is what +distinguishes man from animals. It discovers and invents nothing, but it +puts in a generalised and available form what the understanding has +discovered in intuition. + +For the historical estimation of Schopenhauer, it is necessary to place +him in relation to Kant, as he himself always insisted. Much also in his +chief work is made clearer by knowledge of his dissertation _On the +Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason_, to which he is +constantly referring. Later, his manner of exposition became more +independent; so that he can be read by the general reader with profit +simply by himself, and without reference to antecedents. Still, it will +always be advisable for an expositor to follow his directions, at least +to the extent of giving some short account of the dissertation. This I +proceed to give approximately in the place to which he has assigned it +in his system. + +The name of the principle (_principium rationis sufficientis_) he took +over from Leibniz and his successor Wolff, but gave it a new amplitude. +With him, it stands as an inclusive term for four modes of connection by +which the thoroughgoing relativity of phenomena to one another is +constituted for our intelligence. The general statement adopted is, +'Nothing is without a reason why it should be rather than not be.' +Its four forms are the principles of becoming (_fiendi_), of knowing +(_cognoscendi_), of being (_essendi_), and of acting (_agendi_). +(1) Under the first head come 'causes.' These are divided into 'cause +proper,' for inorganic things; 'stimulus,' for the vegetative life both +of plants and animals, and 'motive,' for animals and men. The law of +causation is applicable only to changes; not to the forces of nature, to +matter, or to the world as a whole, which are perdurable. Cause precedes +effect in time. Not one thing, but one state of a thing, is the cause of +another. From the law of causation there results an infinite series _a +parte ante_ as well as _a parte post_. (2) The principle of sufficient +reason of knowing is applicable to concepts, which are all derived from +intuition, that is, from percepts. The laws of logic, which come under +this head, can yield nothing original, but can only render explicit what +was in the understanding. (3) Under the third head come arithmetical and +geometrical relations. These are peculiar relations of presentations, +distinct from all others, and only intelligible in virtue of a pure _a +priori_ intuition. For geometry this is space; for arithmetic time, in +which counting goes on. Scientifically, arithmetic is fundamental. (4) +As the third form of causality was enumerated 'motive' for the will; but +in that classification it was viewed from without, as belonging to the +world of objects. Through the direct knowledge we have of our own will, +we know also from within this determination by the presentation we call +a motive. Hence emerges the fourth form of the principle of sufficient +reason. This at a later stage makes possible the transition from physics +to metaphysics. + +All these forms alike are forms of necessary determination. Necessity +has no clear and true sense but certainty of the consequence when the +ground is posited. All necessity therefore is conditional. In accordance +with the four expressions of the principle of sufficient reason, it +takes the fourfold shape of physical, logical, mathematical, and moral +necessity. + +The sharp distinction between logical and mathematical truth, with the +assignment of the former to conceptual and of the latter to intuitive +relations, comes to Schopenhauer directly from Kant. So also does his +view that the necessary form of causation is sequence; though here his +points of contact with English thinkers, earlier and later, are very +marked. Only in his statement of the 'law of motivation' as 'causality +seen from within' does he hint at his own distinctive metaphysical +doctrine. Meanwhile, it is evident that he is to be numbered with the +group of modern thinkers who have arrived in one way or another at a +complete scientific phenomenism. Expositors have noted that in his +earlier statements of this he tends to lay more stress on the character +of the visible and tangible world as mere appearance. The impermanence, +the relativity, of all that exists in time and space, leads him to +describe it, in a favourite term borrowed from Indian philosophy, as +Maya, or illusion. Later, he dwells more on the relative reality of +things as they appear. His position, however, does not essentially +alter, but only finds varying expression as he turns more to the +scientific or to the metaphysical side. From Hume's view on causation he +differs not by opposing its pure phenomenism, but only by recognising, +as Kant does, an _a priori_ element in the form of its law. German +critics have seen in his own formulation an anticipation of Mill, and +this is certainly striking as regards the general conception of the +causal order, although there is no anticipation of Mill's inductive +logic. On the same side there is a close agreement with Malebranche and +the Occasionalists, pointed out by Schopenhauer himself. The causal +explanations of science, he is at one with them in insisting, give no +ultimate account of anything. All its causes are no more than +'occasional causes,'--merely instances, as Mill expressed it afterwards, +of 'invariable and unconditional sequence.' From Mill of course he +differs in holding its form to be necessary and _a priori_, not +ultimately derived from a summation of experiences; and, with the +Occasionalists, he goes on to metaphysics in its sense of ontology, as +Mill never did. The difference here is that he does not clothe his +metaphysics in a theological dress. + +In the later development of his thought, Schopenhauer dealt more +expressly with the question, how this kind of phenomenism is +reconcilable with a scientific cosmogony. On one side the proposition, +'No object without subject,' makes materialism for ever impossible; for +the materialist tries to explain from relations among presentations what +is the condition of all presentation. On the other side, we are all +compelled to agree with the materialists that knowledge of the object +comes late in a long series of material events. Inorganic things existed +in time before life; vegetative life before animal life; and only with +animal life does knowledge emerge. Reasoned knowledge of the whole +series comes only at the end of it in the human mind. This apparent +contradiction he solves by leaving a place for metaphysics. Our +representation of the world as it existed before the appearance of life +was indeed non-existent at the time to which we assign it; but the real +being of the world had a manifestation not imaginable by us. For this, +we substitute a picture of a world such as we should have been aware of +had our 'subject,' with its _a priori_ forms of time, space, and +causality, been then present. What the reality is, is the problem of the +thing-in-itself (to use the Kantian term). This problem remains over; +but we know that the metaphysical reality cannot be matter; for matter, +with all its qualities, is phenomenal. It exists only 'for +understanding, through understanding, in understanding.' These +discriminations made, Schopenhauer offers us a scientific cosmogony +beginning with the nebular hypothesis and ending with an outline of +organic evolution. This last differs from the Darwinian theory in +supposing a production of species by definite steps instead of by +accumulation of small individual variations. At a certain time, a form +that has all the characters of a new species appears among the progeny +of an existing species. Man is the last and highest form to be evolved. +From Schopenhauer's metaphysics, as we shall see, it follows that no +higher form of life will ever appear. + +A word may be said here on a materialistic-sounding phrase which is +very prominent in Schopenhauer's later expositions, and has been +remarked on as paradoxical for an idealist. The world as presentation, +he often says, is 'in the brain.' This, it must be allowed, is not fully +defensible from his own point of view, except with the aid of a later +distinction. The brain as we know it is of course only a part of the +phenomenon of the subject,--a grouping of possible perceptions. How +then, since it is itself only appearance, can it be the bearer of the +whole universe as appearance? The answer is that Schopenhauer meant in +reality 'the being of the brain,' and not the brain as phenomenon. He +had a growing sense of the importance of physiology for the +investigation of mind; and his predilection led him to adopt a not quite +satisfactory shorthand expression for the correspondence we know +scientifically to exist between our mental processes and changes capable +of objective investigation in the matter of the brain. + +In science his distinctive bent was to the borderland between psychology +and physiology. Hence came the attraction exercised on him by Goethe's +theory of colours. To his own theory, though, unlike his philosophical +system, it has always failed to gain the attention he predicted for it, +the merit must be allowed of treating the problem as essentially one of +psychophysics. What he does is to attempt to ascertain the conditions in +the sensibility of the retina that account for our actual +colour-sensations. This problem was untouched by the Newtonian theory; +but Schopenhauer followed Goethe in the error of trying to overthrow +this on its own ground. He had no aptitude for the special inquiries of +mathematics and physics, though he had gained a clear insight into their +general nature as sciences. On the psycho-physical side there is to-day +no fully authorised theory. The problem indeed has become ever more +complex. Schopenhauer's attempt, by combination of sensibilities to +'light' and 'darkness,' to explain the phenomena of complementary +colours, deserves at least a record in the long series of essays of +which the best known are the 'Young-Helmholtz theory' and that of +Hering. It marks an indubitable advance on Goethe in the clear +distinction drawn between the mixture, in the ordinary sense, that can +only result in dilution to different shades of grey, and the kinds of +mixture from which, in their view, true colours arise. + +A characteristic position in Schopenhauer's theory of knowledge, and one +that is constantly finding new expression in his writings, is the +distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge already touched on. +Intuitive knowledge of the kind that is common to men and animals, as we +have seen, makes up, in his terminology, the 'understanding'; while +'reason' is the distinctively human faculty of concepts. When he +depreciates this, as he often does, in comparison with 'intuition,' it +must be remembered that he does not limit this term to perception of +particulars, but ascribes to what he calls the 'Platonic Idea' a certain +kind of union between reason and 'phantasy,' which gives it an intuitive +character of its own. Thus intuition can stand, though not in every case +for what is higher, yet always for that which is wider and greater and +more immediate. Whatever may be done with reflective reason and its +abstractions, every effectual process of thought must end, alike for +knowledge and art and virtue, in some intuitive presentation. The +importance of reason for practice is due to its generality. Its function +is subordinate. It does not furnish the ground of virtuous action any +more than æsthetic precepts can enable any one to produce a work of art; +but it can help to preserve constancy to certain maxims, as also in art +a reasoned plan is necessary because the inspiration of genius is not +every moment at command. Virtue and artistic genius alike, however, +depend ultimately on intuition: and so also does every true discovery in +science. The nature of pedantry is to try to be guided everywhere by +concepts, and to trust nothing to perception in the particular case. +Philosophy also Schopenhauer regards as depending ultimately on a +certain intuitive view; but he allows that it has to translate this into +abstractions. Its problem is to express the _what_ of the world in +abstract form: science dealing only with the _why_ of phenomena related +within the world. This character of philosophy as a system of abstract +concepts deprives it of the immediate attractiveness of art; so that, as +he says in one place, it is more fortunate to be a poet than a +philosopher. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL + + +We have seen that scientific explanation does not go beyond +presentations ordered in space and time. This is just as true of the +sciences of causation--the 'ætiological' sciences--as it is of +mathematical science. All that we learn from Mechanics, Physics, +Chemistry and Physiology, is 'how, in accordance with an infallible +rule, one determinate state of matter necessarily follows another: how a +determinate change necessarily conditions and brings on another +determinate change.' This knowledge does not satisfy us. We wish to +learn the significance of phenomena; but we find that from outside, +while we view them as presentations, their inner meaning is for ever +inaccessible. + +The starting-point for the metaphysical knowledge we seek is given us in +our own body. The animal body is 'the immediate object of the subject': +in it as presentation the 'effects' of 'causes' in the order of +presentations external to it are first recognised. Now in virtue of his +body the investigator is not pure knowing subject standing apart from +that which he knows. In the case of the particular system of +presentations constituting his organism, he knows what these +presentations signify, and that is his _will_ in a certain modification. +The subject appears as individual through its identity with the body, +and this body is given to it in two different ways: on one side as +object among objects, and subjected to their laws; on the other side as +the will immediately known to each. The act of will and the movement of +the body are not two different states related as cause and effect; for +the relation of cause and effect belongs only to the object, the +phenomenon, the presentation. They are one and the same act given in +different manners: the will, immediately to the subject; the movement, +in sensible intuition for understanding. The action of the body is the +objectified act of will. Called at first the immediate object of +presentation, the body may now, from the other side, be called 'the +objectivity of the will.' + +Thus, as was said, the 'law of motivation' discloses the inner nature of +causality. In causality in general we know only relations of phenomena; +but in the case of our own body we know something else that those +relations express; namely, the act of will determined by motives. Now +there are in the world as presentation other systems like that which we +call our body. Unless all these are to be supposed mere phantoms without +inner reality, we must infer by analogy, in correspondence with like +phenomena, other individual wills similar to that which we know in +ourselves. This inference from analogy, universally admitted in the case +of human and animal bodies, must be extended to the whole corporeal +world. The failure to take this step is where the purely intellectual +forms of idealism have come short. Kant's 'thing-in-itself,' which is +not subject to the forms by which presentations become experience, but +which experience and its forms indicate as the reality, has been wrongly +condemned by his successors as alien to idealism. It is true that Kant +did in some respects fail to maintain the idealistic position with the +clearness of Berkeley; but his shortcoming was not in affirming a +thing-in-itself beyond phenomena. Here, in Schopenhauer's view, is the +metaphysical problem that he left a place for but did not solve. The +word of the riddle has now been pronounced. Beyond presentation, that +is, in itself and according to its innermost essence, the world is that +which we find in ourselves immediately as will. By this it is not meant +that a falling stone, for example, acts from a motive; knowledge and the +consequent action from motives belongs only to the determinate form that +the will has in animals and men; but the reality in the stone also is +the same in essence as that to which we apply the name of will in +ourselves. He who possesses this key to the knowledge of nature's +innermost being will interpret the forces of vegetation, of +crystallisation, of magnetism, of chemical affinity, even of weight +itself, as different only in phenomenal manifestation but in essence the +same; namely, that which is better known to each than all else, and +where it emerges most clearly is called will. Only the will is +thing-in-itself. It is wholly different from presentation, and is that +of which presentation is the phenomenon, the visibility, the +objectivity. Differences affect only the degree of the appearing, not +the essence of that which appears. + +While the reality everywhere present is not will as specifically known +in man, the mode of indicating its essence by reference to this, +Schopenhauer contends, is a gain in insight. The thing-in-itself ought +to receive its name from that among all its manifestations which is the +clearest, the most perfect, the most immediately illumined by knowledge; +and this is man's will. When we say that every force in nature is to be +thought of as Will, we are subsuming an unknown under a known. For the +conception of Force is abstracted from the realm of cause and effect, +and indicates the limit of scientific explanation. Having arrived at the +forces of nature on the one side and the forms of the subject on the +other, science can go no further. The conception of Will can make known +that which was so far concealed, because it proceeds from the most +intimate consciousness that each has of himself, where the knower and +the known coincide. + +By this consciousness, in which subject and object are not yet set +apart, we reach something universal. In itself the Will is not +individualised, but exists whole and undivided in every single thing in +nature, as the Subject of contemplation exists whole and undivided in +each cognitive being. It is entirely free from all forms of the +phenomenon. What makes plurality possible is subjection to the forms of +time and space, by which only the phenomenon is affected. Time and space +may therefore be called, in scholastic terminology, the 'principle of +individuation.' While each of its phenomena is subject to the law of +sufficient reason, which is the law of appearance in these forms, there +is for the Will as thing-in-itself no rational ground: it is 'grundlos.' +It is free from all plurality, although its phenomena in space and time +are innumerable. It is one, not with the unity of an object or of a +concept, but as that which lies outside of space and time, beyond the +_principium individuationis_, that is, the possibility of plurality. The +individual, the person, is not will as thing-in-itself, but phenomenon +of the will, and as such determined. The will is 'free' because there is +nothing beyond itself to determine it. Further, it is in itself mere +activity without end, a blind striving. Knowledge appears only as the +accompaniment of its ascending stages. + +Here we have arrived at the thought which, in its various expressions, +constitutes Schopenhauer's metaphysics. That this cannot be +scientifically deduced he admits; but he regards it as furnishing such +explanation as is possible of science itself. For science there is in +everything an inexplicable element to which it runs back, and which is +real, not merely phenomenal. From this reality we are most remote in +pure mathematics and in the pure _a priori_ science of nature as it was +formulated by Kant. These owe their transparent clearness precisely to +their absence of real content, or to the slightness of this. The attempt +to reduce organic life to chemistry, this again to mechanism, and at +last everything to arithmetic, could it succeed, would leave mere form +behind, from which all the content of phenomena would have vanished. And +the form would in the end be form of the subject. But the enterprise is +vain. 'For in everything in nature there is something of which no ground +can ever be given, of which no explanation is possible, no cause further +is to be sought.' What for man is his inexplicable character, +presupposed in every explanation of his deeds from motives, that for +every inorganic body is its inexplicable quality, the manner of its +acting. + +The basis of this too is will, and 'groundless,' inexplicable will; but +evidently the conception here is not identical with that of the Will +that is one and all. How do we pass from the universal to that which has +a particular character or quality? For of the Will as thing-in-itself we +are told that there is not a greater portion in a man and a less in a +stone. The relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space. The +more and less touches only the phenomenon, that is, the visibility, the +objectivation. A higher degree of this is in the plant than in the +stone, in the animal than in the plant, and so forth; but the Will that +is the essence of all is untouched by degree, as it is beyond plurality, +space and time, and the relation of cause and effect. + +The answer to the question here raised is given in Schopenhauer's +interpretation of the Platonic Ideas. These he regards as stages of +objectivation of the Will. They are, as Plato called them, eternal forms +related to particular things as models. The lowest stage of +objectivation of the Will is represented by the forces of inorganic +nature. Some of these, such as weight and impenetrability, appear in all +matter. Some are divided among its different kinds, as rigidity, +fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical properties. They +are not subject to the relation of cause and effect, but are presupposed +by it. A force is neither cause of an effect nor effect of a cause. +Philosophically, it is immediate objectivity of the will; in ætiology, +_qualitas occulta_. At the lowest stages of objectivation, there is no +individuality. This does not appear in inorganic things, nor even in +merely organic or vegetative life, but only as we ascend the scale of +animals. Even in the higher animals the specific enormously predominates +over the individual character. Only in man is the Idea objectified in +the individual character as such. 'The character of each individual man, +so far as it is thoroughly individual and not entirely comprehended in +that of the species, may be regarded as a particular Idea, corresponding +to a peculiar act of objectivation of the Will.' + +Schopenhauer warns us against substituting this philosophical +explanation for scientific ætiology. The chain of causes and effects, he +points out, is not broken by the differences of the original, +irreducible forces. The ætiology and the philosophy of nature go side by +side, regarding the same object from different points of view. Yet he +also gives us in relation to his philosophy much that is not +unsuggestive scientifically. His doctrine is not properly evolutionary, +since the Ideas are eternal; but he has guarded incidentally against our +supposing that all the natural kinds that manifest the Ideas +phenomenally must be always represented in every world. For our +particular world, comprising the sun and planets of the solar system, he +sets forth in the _Parerga_ an account of the process by which it +develops from the nebula to man. This was referred to in the preceding +chapter. In his fundamental work he describes a struggle, present +through the whole of nature, in which the phenomenal manifestations of +the higher Ideas conquer and subjugate those of the lower, though they +leave them still existent and ever striving to get loose. Here has been +seen an adumbration of natural selection: he himself admits the +difficulty he has in making it clear. We must remember that it is +pre-Darwinian. + +Knowledge or intelligence he seeks to explain as an aid to the +individual organism in its struggle to subsist and to propagate its +kind. It first appears in animal life. It is represented by the brain or +a large ganglion, as every endeavour of the Will in its +self-objectivation is represented by some organ; that is, displays +itself for presentation as such and such an appearance. Superinduced +along with this contrivance for aid in the struggle, the world as +presentation, with all its forms, subject and object, time, space, +plurality and causality, is all at once there. 'Hitherto only will, it +is now at the same time presentation, object of the knowing subject.' +Then in man, as a higher power beyond merely intuitive intelligence, +appears reason as the power of abstract conception. For the most part, +rational as well as intuitive knowledge, evolved originally as a mere +means to higher objectivation of the Will, remains wholly in its +service. How, in exceptional cases, intellect emancipates itself, will +be discussed under the heads of Æsthetics and Ethics. + +That this view implies a teleology Schopenhauer expressly recognises. +Indeed he is a very decided teleologist on lines of his own, and, in +physiology, takes sides strongly with 'vitalism' as against pure +mechanicism. True, the Will is 'endless' blind striving, and is +essentially divided against itself. Everywhere in nature there is +strife, and this takes the most horrible forms. Yet somehow there is in +each individual manifestation of will a principle by which first the +organism with its vital processes, and then the portion of it called the +brain, in which is represented the intellect with its _a priori_ forms, +are evolved as aids in the strife. And, adapting all the manifestations +to one another, there is a teleology of the universe. The whole world, +with all its phenomena, is the objectivity of the one and indivisible +Will; the Idea which is related to all other Ideas as the harmony to the +single voices. The unity of the Will shows itself in the unison of all +its phenomena as related to one another. Man, its clearest and +completest objectivation, is the summit of a pyramid, and could not +exist without this. Inorganic and organic nature, then, were adapted to +the future appearance of man, as man is adapted to the development that +preceded him. But in thinking the reality, time is to be abstracted +from. The earlier, we are obliged to say, is fitted to the later, as the +later is fitted to the earlier; but the relation of means to end, under +which we cannot help figuring the adaptation, is only appearance for our +manner of knowledge. And the harmony described does not get rid of the +conflict inherent in all will. + +In this account of Schopenhauer's metaphysical doctrine, I have tried to +make the exposition as smooth as possible; but at two points the +discontinuity can scarcely be concealed. First, the relation of the +universal Will to the individual will is not made clear; and, secondly, +the emergence of the world of presentation, with the knowledge in which +it culminates, is left unintelligible because the will is conceived as +mere blind striving without an aim. As regards the first point, +disciples and expositors have been able to show that, by means of +distinctions in his later writings, apparent contradictions are to some +extent cleared away; and, moreover, that he came to recognise more +reality in the individual will. On the second point, I think it will be +necessary to admit that his system as such breaks down. But both points +must be considered in their connection. + +One of the most noteworthy features of Schopenhauer's philosophy is, as +he himself thought, the acceptance from first to last of Kant's +distinction between the 'empirical' and the 'intelligible' character of +the individual. Every act of will of every human being follows with +necessity as phenomenon from its phenomenal causes; so that all the +events of each person's life are determined in accordance with +scientific law. Nevertheless, the character empirically manifested in +the phenomenal world, while it is completely necessitated, is the +expression of something that is free from necessitation. This +'intelligible character' is out of time, and, itself undetermined, +manifests itself through that which develops in time as a chain of +necessary causes and effects. That this doctrine had been taken up, +without any ambiguity as regards the determinism, by Schelling as well +as by himself, he expressly acknowledges; and he finds it, as he also +finds modern idealism, anticipated in various passages by the +Neo-Platonists. His adaptation of it to his doctrine of the Ideas is +distinctly Neo-Platonic in so far as he recognises 'Ideas of +individuals'; but of course to make Will the essence belongs to his own +system. 'The intelligible character,' he says, 'coincides with the Idea, +or, yet more precisely, with the original act of will that manifests +itself in it: in so far, not only is the empirical character of each +man, but also of each animal species, nay, of each plant species, and +even of each original force of inorganic nature, to be regarded as +phenomenon of an intelligible character, that is, of an indivisible act +of will out of time.' This is what he called the '_aseitas_' of the +will; borrowing a scholastic term to indicate its derivation (if we may +speak of it as derived) from itself (_a se_), and not from a supposed +creative act. Only if we adopt this view are we entitled to regard +actions as worthy of moral approval or disapproval. They are such not +because they are not necessitated, but because they necessarily show +forth the nature of an essence the freedom of which consists in being +what it is. Yet he could not but find a difficulty in reconciling this +with his position that the one universal Will is identical in all +things, and in each is 'individuated' only by space and time. For the +Ideas, like the thing-in-itself, are eternal, that is, outside of time +as well as space; and all the things now enumerated, forces of nature, +plant and animal species, and individual characters of men, are declared +to be in themselves Ideas. + +He in part meets this difficulty by the subtlety that time and space do +not, strictly speaking, determine individuality, but arise along with +it. The diremption of individualities becomes explicit in those forms. +Yet he must have perceived that this is not a complete answer, and +various modifications can be seen going on. His first view clearly was +that the individual is wholly impermanent, and at death simply +disappears; nothing is left but the one Will and the universal Subject +of contemplation identical in all. Metempsychosis is the best +mythological rendering of what happens, but it is no more. Later, he +puts forward the not very clearly defined theory of a 'palingenesia' by +which a particular will, but not the intellect that formerly accompanied +it, may reappear in the phenomenal world. And the hospitality he showed +to stories of magic, clairvoyance, and ghost-seeing, is scarcely +compatible with the view that the individual will is no more than a +phenomenal differentiation of the universal will. A speculation (not put +forward as anything more) on the appearance of a special providence in +the destiny of the individual, points, as Professor Volkelt has noted, +to the idea of a guidance, not from without, but by a kind of good +daemon or genius that is the ultimate reality of the person. On all this +we must not lay too much stress; but there is certainly one passage that +can only be described as a definite concession that the individual is +real in a sense not at first allowed. Individuality, it is said in so +many words (_Parerga_, ii. § 117), does not rest only on the 'principle +of individuation' (time and space), and is therefore not through and +through phenomenon, but is rooted in the thing-in-itself. 'How deep its +roots go belongs to the questions which I do not undertake to +answer.'[1] + + [1] _Werke_, ed. Frauenstädt, vol. vi. p. 243. + +This tends to modify considerably, but does not overthrow, +Schopenhauer's original system. In very general terms, he is in the +number of the 'pantheistic' thinkers; and it is remarkable, on +examination, how these, in Europe at least, have nearly always +recognised in the end some permanent reality in the individual. This is +contrary to first impressions: but the great names may be cited of +Plotinus, John Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, Spinoza (in Part v. of +the _Ethics_), and finally of Schopenhauer's special aversion, Hegel, +who has been supposed most unfavourable of all to any recognition of +individuality as real. It is more true, Hegel maintains, that the +individuality determines its world than that it is determined by it; and +there is no explanation why the determination should be such and such +except that the individuality was already what it is.[2] And, if +Schopenhauer's more imaginative speculations seek countenance from the +side of empiricism, there is nothing in them quite so audacious as a +speculation of J. S. Mill on disembodied mind, thrown out during the +time when he was writing his _Logic_.[3] + + [2] _Phänomenologie des Geistes_, Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. G. Lasson, pp. + 201-3. + + [3] Letter to Robert Barclay Fox, May 10, 1842. Printed in Appendix to + _Letters and Journals of Caroline Fox_, third ed., vol. ii. pp. 331-2. + 'To suppose that the eye is _necessary_ to sight,' says Mill, 'seems to + me the notion of one immersed in matter. What we call our bodily + sensations are all in the mind, and would not necessarily or probably + cease, because the body perishes.' + +The association with pantheism Schopenhauer accepts in principle, though +the name is not congenial to him. In his system the Will is one and all, +like the 'Deus' of Spinoza. The difference is that, instead of ascribing +perfection to the universe that is its manifestation, he regards the +production of a world as a lapse from which redemption is to be sought. +His doctrine has been rightly described, in common with the predominant +philosophical doctrines of his period, as a resultant of the deepened +subjective analysis brought by Kant into modern philosophy on the one +side, and of the return to Spinoza in the quest for unity of principle +on the other. Why, then, it may be asked, are Fichte, Schelling, and +Hegel the constant objects of his attack? The true explanation is not +the merely external one, that they were his successful rivals for public +favour, but is to be found in a real antithesis of thought. Within the +limits of the idealism they all hold in common, Schopenhauer is at the +opposite pole. In spite of his attempt to incorporate the Platonic +Ideas, and in spite of his following of Kant, whose 'intelligible world' +was in essence Platonic or neo-Platonic, he could find no place in his +system for a rational order at the summit. Now this order was precisely +what Fichte and Hegel aimed at demonstrating. If Schopenhauer is less +unsympathetic in his references to Schelling, that is because +Schelling's world-soul appeared to him to prefigure his own attempt to +discover in nature the manifestation of a blindly striving will or +feeling rather than reason. Suspicious as he shows himself of possible +plagiarisms by others, the charge cannot be retorted against himself. +The supreme principle of Fichte, it has been pointed out, has an +actively volitional character and was formulated before Schopenhauer's: +but then it is essentially rational. For Hegel, what is supreme is the +world-reason. Hence they are at one with Plato in holding that in some +sense 'mind is king.' For Schopenhauer, on the contrary, mind, or pure +intellect, is an emancipated slave. Having reached its highest point, +and seen through the work of the will, it does not turn back and +organise it, but abolishes it as far as its insight extends. + +Yet to say merely this is to give a wrong impression of Schopenhauer. +Starting though he does with blind will, and ending with the flight of +the ascetic from the suffering inherent in the world that is the +manifestation of such a will, he nevertheless, in the intermediate +stages, makes the world a cosmos and not a chaos. And the Platonists on +their side have to admit that 'the world of all of us' does not present +itself on the surface as a manifestation of pure reason, and that it +is a serious task to 'rationalise' it. Where he completely fails +is where the Platonic systems also fail, though from the opposite +starting-point. His attempt to derive presentation, intellect, +knowledge, from blind striving, is undoubtedly a failure. But so also +is the attempt of the Platonising thinkers to deduce a world of mixture +from a principle of pure reason without aid from anything else +empirically assumed. Not that in either case there is failure to give +explanations in detail; but in both cases much is taken from experience +without reduction to the principles of the system. What we may say by +way of comparison is this: that if Schopenhauer had in so many words +recognised an immanent Reason as well as Will in the reality of the +universe, he would have formally renounced his pessimism; while it +cannot be said that on the other side a more explicit empiricism in the +account of the self-manifestation of Reason would necessarily destroy +the optimism. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +ÆSTHETICS + + +A portion of Schopenhauer's system by which its pessimism is +considerably mitigated is his theory of the Beautiful and of Fine Art. +The characteristic of æsthetic contemplation is, he finds, that +intellect throws off the yoke and subsists purely for itself as clear +mirror of the world, free from all subjection to practical purposes of +the will. In this state of freedom, temporary painlessness is attained. + +The theory starts from his adaptation of the Platonic Ideas. Regarded +purely as an æsthetic theory, it departs from Plato, as he notes; for, +with the later Platonists, who took up the defence of poetic myths and +of the imitative arts as against their master, he holds that Art +penetrates to the general Idea through the particular, and hence that +the work of art is no mere 'copy of a copy.' The difference of the Idea +from the Concept is that it is not merely abstract and general, but +combines with generality the characters of an intuition. + +The Ideas, as we have seen, constitute the determinate stages of +objectivation of the Will. The innumerable individuals of which the +Ideas are the patterns are subject to the law of sufficient reason. They +appear, that is to say, under the forms of time, space, and causality. +The Idea is beyond these forms, and therefore is clear of plurality and +change. Since the law of sufficient reason is the common form under +which stands all the subject's knowledge so far as the subject knows as +individual, the Ideas lie outside the sphere of knowledge of the +individual as such. If, therefore, the Ideas are to be the object of +knowledge, this can only be by annulling individuality in the knowing +subject. + +As thing-in-itself, the Will is exempt even from the first of the forms +of knowledge, the form of being 'object for a subject.' The Platonic +Idea, on the other hand, is necessarily an object, something known, a +presentation. It has laid aside, or rather has not taken on, the +subordinate forms; but it has retained the first and most general form. +It is the immediate and most adequate possible objectivity of the Will; +whereas particular things are an objectivation troubled by the forms of +which the law of sufficient reason is the common expression. + +When intellect breaks loose from the service of the will, for which it +was originally destined in the teleology of nature, then the subject +ceases to be merely individual and becomes pure will-less subject of +knowledge. In this state the beholder no longer tracks out relations in +accordance with the principle of sufficient reason--which is the mode of +scientific as well as of common knowledge--but rests in fixed +contemplation of the given object apart from its connection with +anything else. The contemplator thus 'lost' in the object, it is not the +single thing as such that is known, but the Idea, the eternal form, the +immediate objectivity of the Will at this stage. The correlate of this +object--the pure Subject exempt from the principle of sufficient +reason--is eternal, like the Idea. + +The objectivation of the Will appears faintly in inorganic +things,--clouds, water, crystals,--more fully in the plant, yet more +fully in the animal, most completely in man. Only the essential in these +stages of objectivation constitutes the Idea. Its development into +manifold phenomena under the forms of the principle of sufficient +reason, is unessential, lies merely in the mode of knowledge for the +individual, and has reality only for this. It is not otherwise with the +unfolding of that Idea which is the completest objectivation of the +Will. To the Idea of Man, the occurrences of human history are as +unessential as the shapes they assume to the clouds, as the figures of +its whirlpools and foam-drift to the stream, as its frost-flowers to the +ice. The same underlying passions and dispositions everlastingly recur +in the same modes. It is idle to suppose that anything is gained. But +also nothing is lost: so the Earth-spirit might reply to one who +complained of high endeavours frustrated, faculties wasted, promises of +world-enlightenment brought to nought; for there is infinite time to +dispose of, and all possibilities are for ever renewed. + +The kind of knowledge for which the Ideas are the object of +contemplation finds its expression in Art, the work of genius. Art +repeats in its various media the Ideas grasped by pure contemplation. +Its only end is the communication of these. While Science, following the +stream of events according to their determinate relations, never reaches +an ultimate end, Art is always at the end. 'It stops the wheel of time; +relations vanish for it: only the essence, the Idea, is its object.' The +characteristic of genius is a predominant capacity for thus +contemplating things independently of the principle of sufficient +reason. Since this requires a forgetting of one's own person and the +relations between it and things, the attitude of genius is simply the +completest 'objectivity.' The 'subjectivity' opposed to this, in +Schopenhauer's phraseology, is preoccupation with the interests of one's +own will. It is, he says, as if there fell to the share of genius a +measure of intelligence far beyond the needs of the individual will: and +this makes possible the setting aside of individual interests, the +stripping off of the particular personality, so that the subject becomes +'pure knowing subject,' 'clear world-eye,' in a manner sufficiently +sustained for that which has been grasped to be repeated in the work of +art. A necessary element in genius is therefore Imagination. For without +imagination to represent, in a shape not merely abstract, things that +have not come within personal experience, genius would remain limited to +immediate intuition, and could not make its vision apprehensible by +others. Nor without imagination could the particular things that express +the Idea be cleared of the imperfections by which their limited +expression of it falls short of what nature was aiming at in their +production. 'Inspiration' is ascribed to genius because its +characteristic attitude is intermittent. The man of genius cannot always +remain on a height, but has to fall back to the level of the common man, +who can scarcely at all regard things except as they affect his +interests,--have a relation to his will, direct or indirect. + +This is the statement in its first outline of a theory that became one +of Schopenhauer's most fruitful topics. Many are the pages he has +devoted to the contrast between the man of genius and 'the wholesale +ware of nature, which she turns out daily by thousands.' The genius is +for him primarily the artist. Scientific genius as a distinctive thing +he does not fully recognise; and he regards men of action, and +especially statesmen, rather as men of highly competent ability +endowed with an exceptionally good physical constitution than as men of +genius in the proper sense. Philosophers like himself, who, as he +frankly says, appear about once in a hundred years, he classes in the +end with the artists; though this was left somewhat indeterminate in his +first exposition. The weakness of the man of genius in dealing with the +ordinary circumstances of life he allows, and even insists on. Genius, +grasping the Idea in its perfection, fails to understand individuals. A +poet may know man profoundly, and men very ill. He admits the proximity +of genius to madness on one side, and explains it in this way. What +marks the stage of actual madness, as distinguished from illusion or +hallucination, is complete disruption of the memory of past life, of the +history of the personality as something continuous; so that the +particular thing is viewed by itself, out of relation. This gives a kind +of resemblance to the attitude of genius, for which present intuition +excludes from view the relations of things to each other. Or, as we may +perhaps sum up his thought in its most general form, 'alienation' or +dissolution of personality has the resemblance often noted between +extremes to the impersonality, or, as he calls it, 'objectivity,' that +is super-personal. + +In spite of his contempt for the crowd, he has to admit, of course, that +the capacity of genius to recognise the Ideas of things and to become +momentarily impersonal must in some measure belong to all men; +otherwise, they could not even enjoy a work of art when produced. Genius +has the advantage only in the much higher degree and the greater +prolongation of the insight. Since, then, the actual achievement of the +artist is to make us look into the world through his eyes, the feelings +for the beautiful and the sublime may be treated irrespectively of the +question whether they are aroused by nature and human life directly or +by means of art. + +Æsthetic pleasure in contemplation of the beautiful proceeds partly from +recognition of the individual object not as one particular thing but as +Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of this whole kind of +things; partly from the consciousness the knower has of himself not as +individual, but as pure, will-less Subject of Knowledge. All volition +springs out of need, therefore out of want, therefore out of suffering. +No attained object of will can give permanent satisfaction. Thus, there +can be no durable happiness or rest for us as long as we are subjects of +will. 'The Subject of Will lies continually on the turning wheel of +Ixion, draws ever in the sieve of the Danaides, is the eternally +thirsting Tantalus. But in the moment of pure objective contemplation, +free from all interest of the particular subjectivity, we enter a +painless state: the wheel of Ixion stands still. The Flemish painters +produce this æsthetic effect by the sense of disinterested contemplation +conveyed in their treatment of insignificant objects. There are certain +natural scenes that have power in themselves, apart from artistic +treatment, to put us in this state; but the slightest obtrusion of +individual interest destroys the magic. Past and distant objects, +through their apparent detachment, have the same power. The essential +thing æsthetically, whether we contemplate the present or the past, the +near or the distant, is that only the world of presentation remains; the +world as will has vanished. + +The difference between the feelings of the Beautiful and of the Sublime +is this. In the feeling of the beautiful, pure intelligence gains the +victory without a struggle, leaving in consciousness only the pure +subject of knowledge, so that no reminiscence of the will remains. In +the feeling of the sublime, on the other hand, the state of pure +intelligence has to be won by a conscious breaking loose from relations +in the object that suggest something threatening to the will; though +there must not be actual danger; for in that case the individual will +itself would come into play, and æsthetic detachment would cease. +Elevation above the sense of terror has not only to be consciously won +but consciously maintained, and involves a continuous reminiscence, not +indeed of any individual will, but of the will of man in general, so far +as it is expressed through its objectivity, the human body, confronted +by forces hostile to it. Pre-eminently this feeling arises from +contrast between the immensities of space and time and the apparent +insignificance of man. It means in the last resort that the beholder is +upheld by the consciousness that as pure subject of knowledge (not as +individual subject) he himself bears within him all the worlds and all +the ages, and is eternal as the forces that vainly seem to threaten him +with annihilation. + +On the objective side, and apart from the subjective distinction just +set forth, the sublime and the beautiful are not essentially different. +In both cases alike, the object of æsthetic contemplation is not the +single thing, but the Idea that is striving towards manifestation in it. +Whatever is viewed æsthetically is viewed out of relation to time and +space: 'along with the law of sufficient reason the single thing and the +knowing individual are taken away, and nothing remains over but the Idea +and the pure Subject of Knowledge, which together make up the adequate +objectivity of the Will at this stage.' There is thus a sense in which +everything is beautiful; since the Will appears in everything at some +stage of objectivity, and this means that it is the expression of some +Idea. But one thing can be more beautiful than another by facilitating +æsthetic contemplation. This facilitation proceeds either from the +greater clearness and perfection with which the particular thing shows +forth the Idea of its kind, or from the higher stage of objectivation to +which that Idea corresponds. Man being the highest stage of +objectivation of the Will, the revelation of his essence is the highest +aim of art. In æsthetic contemplation of inorganic nature and vegetative +life, whether in the reality or through the medium of art, and in +appreciation of architecture, the subjective aspect, that is to say, the +enjoyment of pure will-less knowledge, is predominant; the Ideas +themselves being here lower stages of objectivity. On the other hand, +when animals and men are the object of æsthetic contemplation or +representation, the enjoyment consists more in the objective +apprehension of those Ideas in which the essence of the Will is most +clearly and fully manifested. + +Of all Schopenhauer's work, its æsthetic part has met with the most +general appreciation. Here especially he abounds in observations drawn +directly, in his own phrase, from intuition. To make a selection of +these, however, is not appropriate to a brief sketch like the present. I +pass on, therefore, to those portions of his theory of Art by which he +makes the transition, in terms of his system, to Morality. + +From Architecture onward the arts are obliged to represent the Will as +divided. Here, at the first stage, its division subsists only in a +conflict of inorganic forces which have to be brought to equilibrium. +The conflict between weight and rigidity is in truth the only æsthetic +material of architecture as a fine art. When we come to animal and +lastly to human life, which, in the Plastic Arts and in Poetry, as form, +individualised expression, and action, is the highest object of æsthetic +representation, the vehemence of divided will is fully revealed; and +here too is revealed the essential identity of every will with our own. +In the words of the Indian wisdom, 'Tat twam asi'; 'that thou art.' +Under the head of Ethics it will be shown expressly that by this +insight, when it reacts on the will, the will can deny itself. For the +temporary release from its striving, given in æsthetic contemplation, is +then substituted permanent release. To this 'resignation,' the innermost +essence of all virtue and holiness, and the final redemption from the +world, Art itself, at its highest stages, points the way. + +The summits of pictorial and poetic art Schopenhauer finds in the great +Italian painters so far as they represent the ethical spirit of +Christianity, and in the tragic poets, ancient and modern. It is true +that the poverty of their sacred history or mythology puts the Christian +artists at a disadvantage; but events are merely the accidents of their +art. Not in these, as related according to the law of sufficient reason, +is the essence, but in the spirit we divine through the forms portrayed. +In their representation of men full of that spirit, and especially in +the eyes, we see mirrored the knowledge that has seized the whole +essence of the world and of life, and that has reacted on the will, not +so as to give it motives, but as a 'quietive'; whence proceeds complete +resignation, and with it the annulling of the will and of the whole +essence of this world. Of tragedy, the subject-matter is the conflict of +the will with itself at its highest stage of objectivity. Here also the +end is the resignation brought on by complete knowledge of the essence +of the world. The hero, on whom at last this knowledge has acted as a +quietive, gives up, not merely life, but the whole will to live. 'The +true meaning of tragedy is the deeper insight, that what the hero +expiates is not his particular sins, but original sin, that is, the +guilt of existence itself.' To illustrate this position Schopenhauer is +fond of quoting a passage from Calderon which declares that the greatest +sin of man is to have been born. + +It seems strange that, after deriding as he does the popular notion of +'poetic justice' so detached a thinker should imagine an at least +equally one-sided view to receive its final confirmation from the +Spanish dramatist's poetic phrasing of a Christian dogma. The great +tragic poets, for Schopenhauer also, are Æschylus, Sophocles and +Shakespeare. Now it is safe to say that by none of these was any such +general doctrine held either in conceptual or in intuitive form. The +whole effect of any kind of art, of course he would admit, cannot be +packed into a formula; but if we seek one as an aid to understanding, +some adaptation of his own theory of the sublime would probably serve +much better as applied to tragedy than his direct theory of the drama. +In the case of pictorial art, all that is proved by what he says about +the representation of ascetic saintliness, is that this, like many other +things, can be so brought within the scope of art as to make us +momentarily identify ourselves with its Idea in the impersonal manner he +has himself described. His purely æsthetic theory is quite adequate to +the case, without any assumption that this is the representation of what +is best. Art, pictorial or poetic, can no more prove pessimism than +optimism. We pick out expressions of one or the other for quotation +according to our moods or subjective preferences; but, if we have the +feeling for art itself, our sense of actual æsthetic value ought to be +independent of these. + +Schopenhauer's æsthetic theory, however, does not end here. There +follows the part of it by which he has had an influence on artists +themselves. For him, a position separate from all the other arts is held +by music. While the rest objectify the Will mediately, that is to say, +by means of the Ideas, Music is as immediate an objectivation of the +whole Will as the world itself, or as the Ideas, of which the pluralised +phenomenon constitutes the sum of particular things. The other arts +speak of the shadow, music of the substance. There is indeed a +parallelism, an analogy, between Music and the Ideas; yet Music never +expresses the phenomenon in which these are manifested, but only the +inner essence behind the appearance, the Will itself. In a sense it +renders not feeling in its particularity, but feeling _in abstracto_; +joy, sorrow, not a joy, a sorrow. The phenomenal world and music are to +be regarded as two different expressions of the same thing. The world +might be called embodied Music as well as embodied Will. 'Melodies are +to a certain extent like general concepts, an abstract of reality.' A +complete explanation of music, that is, a detailed repetition of it in +concepts, were this possible, would be a complete explanation of the +world (since both express the same thing) and therefore a true and final +philosophy. As music only reaches its perfection in the full harmony, +'so the one Will out of time finds its perfect objectivation only in +complete union of all the stages which in innumerable degrees of +heightened distinctness reveal its essence.' But here, too, Schopenhauer +adds, the Will is felt, and can be proved, to be a divided will; and the +deliverance wrought by this supreme art, as by all the others, is only +temporary. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +ETHICS + + +Permanent redemption from the suffering of the world is to be found only +in the holiness of the ascetic; but to this there are many stages, +constituting the generally accepted human virtues. Of these Schopenhauer +has a rational account to give in terms of his philosophy; and if the +last stage does not seem to follow by logical sequence from the others, +this is only what is to be expected; for it is reached, in his view, by +a sort of miracle. To the highest kind of intuitive knowledge, from +which the ascetic denial of the will proceeds, artistic contemplation +ought to prepare the way; and so also, on his principles, ought the +practice of justice and goodness. Yet he is obliged to admit that few +thus reach the goal. Of those that do reach it, the most arrive through +personal suffering, which may be deserved. A true miracle is often +worked in the repentant criminal, by which final deliverance is +achieved. Though the 'intelligible character' is unalterable, and the +empirical character can only be the unfolding of this, as every great +dramatist intuitively recognises, yet the 'convertites,' like Duke +Frederick in _As You Like It_, are not to be regarded as hypocrites. The +'second voyage' to the harbour, that of the disappointed egoist, on +condition of this miracle, brings the passenger to it as surely as the +first, that of the true saints, which is only for the few. And in these +equally a miraculous conversion of the will has to be finally worked. + +At the entrance to his distinctive theory of ethics, Schopenhauer places +a restatement of his metaphysics as the possible basis of a mode of +contemplating life which, he admits, has some community with an +optimistic pantheism. The Will, through the presentation and the +accompanying intelligence developed in its service, becomes conscious +that that which it wills is precisely the world, life as it is. To call +it 'the will to live' is therefore a pleonasm. 'Will' and 'will to live' +are equivalent. For this will, life is everlastingly a certainty. +'Neither the will, the thing-in-itself in all phenomena, nor the subject +of knowledge, the spectator of all phenomena, is ever touched by birth +and death.' It is true that the individual appears and disappears; but +individuality is illusory. Past and future exist only in conceptual +thought. 'The form of life is a present without end, howsoever the +individuals, phenomena of the Idea, come into existence and vanish in +time, like fugitive dreams.' Only as phenomenon is each man different +from the other things of the world: as thing-in-itself he is the Will, +which appears in all, and death takes away the illusion that divides his +consciousness from the rest. 'Death is a sleep in which the +individuality is forgotten: everything else wakes again, or rather has +remained awake.' It is, in the expression adopted by Schopenhauer later, +an awakening from the dream of life: though this bears with it somewhat +different implications; and, as has been said, his theory of +individuality became modified. + +With the doctrine of the eternal life of the Will are connected +Schopenhauer's theories, developed later, of the immortality of the +species and of individualised sexual love. The latter is by itself a +remarkable achievement, and constitutes the one distinctly new +development brought to completion in his later years; for the +modifications in his theory of individuality are only tentative. His +theory of love has a determinate conclusion, of great value for +science, and not really compatible, it seems to me, with his pessimism. +In its relation to ethics, on which he insisted, it is rightly placed in +the position it occupies, between the generalised statement of his +metaphysics just now set forth on the one side, and his theory of human +virtue on the other. + +The teleology that manifests itself in individualised love is, in his +view, not related in reality to the interests of the individual life, +but to those of the species. That this is immortal follows from the +eternity of the Idea it unfolds.[4] The end sought is aimed at +unconsciously by the person. Fundamentally, for Schopenhauer, teleology +must of course be unconscious, since the will is blind, and will, not +intelligence, is primordial. Its typical case is the instinct of +animals; but the 'instinctive' character belongs also to the +accomplishment of the highest aims, as in art and virtue. What +characterises individualised love internally is the aim, attributed to +'nature' or 'the species,' at a certain typical beauty or perfection of +the offspring. The lover is therefore deluded in thinking that he is +seeking his own happiness. What looks through the eyes of lovers is the +genius of the race, meditating on the composition of the next +generation. It may, in the complexity of circumstances, be thwarted. +When it reaches its end, often personal happiness is sacrificed. +Marriages dictated by interest tend to be happier than love-matches. +Yet, though the sacrifice of the individual to the race is involuntary +in these, egoism is after all overcome; hence they are quite rightly the +object of a certain admiration and sympathy, while the prudential ones +are looked upon with a tinge of contempt. For here too that element +appears which alone gives nobility to the life either of intellect or of +art or of moral virtue, namely, the rising above a subjective interest +of the individual will. + + [4] The disappearance of species in time raises difficulties in more + than one way for his philosophy; but he formally escapes refutation by + the suggestion, already noted, that the Idea need not always be + manifested phenomenally in the same world. This, however, he did not + work out. + +No doubt there are touches of pessimism in this statement; but the +general theory does not seem reconcilable finally with pessimism as +Schopenhauer understands it. For it is a definitely stated position of +his that nature keeps up the process of the world by yielding just +enough to prevent discontinuance of the striving for an illusory end. +Yet he admits here in the result something beyond bare continuance of +life; for this is already secured without the particular modification of +feeling described. What the feeling is brought in to secure is a better +realisation of the type in actual individuals; and such realisation is +certainly more than bare subsistence with the least possible expenditure +of nature's resources. + +As the immediate preliminary to his ethics proper, Schopenhauer restates +his doctrine on the intelligible and the empirical character in man, and +lays down a generalised psychological position regarding the suffering +inherent in life. Everything as phenomenon, we have seen already, is +determined because it is subject to the law of sufficient reason. On the +other hand, everything as thing-in-itself is free; for 'freedom' means +only non-subjection to that law. The intelligible character of each man +is an indivisible, unalterable act of will out of time; the developed +and explicit phenomenon of this in time and space is the empirical +character. Man is his own work, not in the light of knowledge, but +before all knowledge; this is secondary and an instrument. Ultimately, +freedom is a mystery, and takes us beyond even will as the name for the +thing-in-itself. In reality, that which is 'will to live' need not have +been such (though we cannot see how this is so), but has become such +from itself and from nothing else. This is its '_aseitas_.' Hence it is +in its power to deny itself as will to live. When it does this, the +redemption (like the fall) comes from itself. This denial does not mean +annihilation, except relatively to all that we know under the forms of +our understanding. For the will, though the nearest we can get to the +thing-in-itself, is in truth a partially phenomenalised expression of +this. As the will to live expresses itself phenomenally, so also does +the denial of the will to live, when this, by special 'grace,' is +achieved. Only in man does the freedom thus attained find phenomenal +expression. That man can attain to it proves that in him the will has +reached its highest possible stage of objectivation; for, after it has +turned back and denied itself, there is evidently nothing more that we +can call existence, that is to say, phenomenal existence, beyond. What +there is beyond in the truth of being is something that the mystics +know--or rather, possess, for it is beyond knowledge--but cannot +communicate. + +The psychological reason that can be assigned for the ascetic flight +from the world is that all pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, is merely +negative. The will is a striving that has no ultimate aim. It is +sustained only by hindrances. Hindrance means suffering; and every +satisfaction attained is only temporary, a mere liberation from need, +want, pain, which is positive. Suffering increases with the degree of +consciousness. The life of civilised man is an alternation between pain +and _ennui_, which can itself become as intolerable a suffering as +anything. The problem of moral philosophy, then, is ultimately how +redemption from such a world is to be attained, but only so far as this +is a matter of conceptual knowledge. For philosophy, being from +beginning to end theoretical, cannot work the practical miracle by which +the will denies itself. + +The intuitive, as distinguished from merely conceptual, knowledge by +which the return is made, consists essentially in a clear insight into +the identity of the suffering will in all things and the necessity of +its suffering as long as it is will to live. This, then, is the true +foundation of morality. The universe as metaphysical thing-in-itself, as +noumenon, has an ethical meaning. All its stages of objectivation, +though in the process what seems to be aimed at is preservation of the +will as manifested, have in truth for their ultimate aim its redemption +by suppression of the phenomenal world in which it manifests itself. + +Affirmation of the will is affirmation of the body, which is the +objectivity of the will. The sexual impulse, since it affirms life +beyond the death of the individual, is the strongest of +self-affirmations. In it is found the meaning of the mythical +representation that has taken shape in the theological dogma of original +sin. For by this affirmation going beyond the individual body, suffering +and death, as the necessary accompaniment of the phenomenon of life, are +reaffirmed, and the possibility of redemption this time declared +fruitless. But through the whole process there runs eternal justice. The +justification of suffering is that the will affirms itself; and the +self-affirmation is justified by payment of the penalty. + +Before the final redemption--which is not for the world but for the +individual--there are many stages of ethical progress. These consist in +the gradual overcoming of egoism by sympathy. And here Schopenhauer +proceeds to set forth a practical scheme for the social life of man, +differing from ordinary utilitarianism only by reducing all sympathy to +pity, in accordance with his view that there can be no such thing as +positive happiness. + +He begins with a theory of justice, legal and moral, very much on the +lines of Hobbes, except that he regards it as up to a certain point _a +priori_. Here he is consistent throughout. As in his philosophical +account of mathematics and physics, so also in his aesthetics and +ethics, he retained, side by side with a strong empirical tendency, +belief in certain irreducible _a priori_ forms without which our +knowledge cannot be constituted. The pure ethical theory of justice, he +says, bears to the political theory the relation of pure to applied +mathematics. Injustice he holds to be the positive conception. It means +the breaking into the sphere of another person's will to live. The +self-affirmation of the will that appears in one individual body is +extended to denial of the will that appears in other bodies. Justice +consists in non-encroachment. There is a 'natural right,' or 'moral +right,' of resistance to injustice by infliction of what, apart from the +attempted encroachment, would be wrong. Either force or deception may be +used; as either may be the instrument of injustice. The purely ethical +doctrine of justice applies only to action; since only the not doing of +injustice depends on us. With the State and its laws, the relation is +reversed. The object of these is to prevent the suffering of injustice. +The State is not directed against egoism, but has sprung out of a +rationalised collective egoism. It has for its purpose only to avoid the +inconvenient consequences of individual aggressions on others. Outside +of the State, there is a right of self-defence against injustice, but no +right of punishment. The punishment threatened by the State is +essentially a motive against committing wrong, intended to supply the +place of ethical motives for those who are insufficiently accessible to +them. Actual infliction of it is the carrying out of the threat when it +has failed, so that in general the expectation of the penalty may be +certain. Revenge, which has a view to the past, cannot be justified +ethically: punishment is directed only to the future. There is no right +in any one to set himself up as a moral judge and inflict pain; but man +has a right to do what is needful for social security. The criminal's +acts are of course necessitated; but he cannot justly complain of being +punished for them, since it is ultimately from himself, from what he is, +that they sprang. + +With the doctrine of 'eternal justice,' touched on above, we pass into a +different region of thought. What is responsible for the guilt in the +world is the Will by which everything exists, and the suffering +everlastingly falls where the guilt is. Take the case of apparently +unpunished injustice (from the human point of view) expressing itself in +the extreme form of deliberate cruelty. Through this also, eternal +justice, from which there is no escape, is fulfilled. 'The torturer and +the tortured are one. The former errs in thinking he has no share in the +torture; the latter in thinking he has no share in the guilt.' For all +the pain of the world is the expiation of the sin involved in the +self-affirmation of will, and the Will as thing-in-itself is one and the +same in all. + +If this could satisfy any one, there would be no need to go further. The +whole being as it ought to be, why try to rectify details that are +absolutely indifferent? But of course the implication is that +individuality is simply illusory; and this, as has been said, was a +position that Schopenhauer neither could nor did consistently maintain. +Indeed, immediately after setting forth this theory of 'eternal +justice,' he goes on to a relative justification of those acts of +disinterested vengeance by which a person knowingly sacrifices his own +life for the sake of retribution on some extraordinary criminal. This, +he says, is a form of punishment, not mere revenge, although it involves +an error concerning the nature of eternal justice. Suicide involves a +similar error, in so far as it supposes that the real being of the +individual can be assailed through its phenomenal manifestation. It is +not a denial of the will to live, but a strong affirmation of it, only +not in the given circumstances: different circumstances are desired with +such intensity that the present cannot be borne. Therefore the +individual manifestation of the will is not suppressed. Yet, one might +reply, if individuality is an illusion attached to the appearance in +time and space of a particular organism, it would seem that, with the +disappearance of this, all that distinguishes the individual must +disappear also. + +Schopenhauer had no will thus to escape from life; nor did he afterwards +devote himself to expounding further his theory of eternal justice. What +he wrote later, either positively or as mere speculation, implies both +greater reality in the individual and more of cosmic equity to +correspond. His next step, even at his first stage, is to continue the +exposition of a practicable ethics for human life. His procedure +consists in adding beneficence to justice, with the proviso already +mentioned, which is required by his psychology, that all beneficence can +consist only in the relief of pain. For Schopenhauer, as for Comte, +what is to be overcome is 'egoism,' an excessive degree of which is the +mark of the character we call 'bad.' The 'good' is what Comte and +Spencer call the 'altruistic' character. This difference between +characters Schopenhauer goes on to explain in terms of his metaphysics. +The egoist is so deluded by the principle of individuation that he +supposes an absolute cleft between his own person and all others. The +remorse of conscience from which he suffers proceeds in part from an +obscure perception that the principle of individuation is illusory. +Genuine virtue springs out of the intuitive (not merely abstract) +knowledge that recognises in another individuality the same essence as +in one's own. The characteristic of the good man is that he makes less +difference than is customary between himself and others. Justice is an +intermediate stage between the encroaching egoism of the bad and +positive goodness. In the renunciation of rights of property, and +provision for all personal needs without aid from others, practised by +some religious and philosophical ascetics, it is passing over into +something more. There is, however, a certain misunderstanding involved +in so interpreting strict justice; for there are many ways in which the +rich and powerful can be positively beneficent. At the other extreme, +when they simply live on their inherited wealth, without doing anything +in return, their mode of life is morally, though not legally, unjust. +Rights of property Schopenhauer derived from labour spent on the things +appropriated. The injustice, in many ways, of the present social order +he quite recognises. If he has no sympathy with revolutions, it is +because he has no belief in the realisation of an ideal state. This +follows from his view of history. Human life, it is his conviction, +never has been and never will be different as a whole. Redemption from +evil can be attained only by the individual. All that the State can do +is to provide certain very general conditions of security under which +there will be no hindrance to those who desire to live in accordance +with a moral ideal. + +Yet there are qualifications to make. Many passages in Schopenhauer's +writings prove his firm belief in the future triumph of reason over +superstition. It is to the honour of humanity, he says, that so +detestable a form of evil as organised religious persecution has +appeared only in one section of history. And, in his own personal case, +he has the most complete confidence that the truths he has put forth +cannot fail sometime to gain a hearing. In all cases, error is only +temporary, and truth will prevail. His language on this subject, and +indeed often on others, is indistinguishable from that of an optimist. + +In the last resort, his pessimism entrenches itself behind the +psychological proposition that every satisfaction is negative, being +only the removal of a pain. If this is unsustainable, there is nothing +finally in his Metaphysics of Will to necessitate the pessimistic +conclusion drawn. The mode of deduction by which he proceeds is to argue +first to the position already noticed: that all that love of others on +which morality is based is fundamentally pity. True benevolence can only +be the desire to relieve others' pain, springing from the identification +of this with our own. For that reason, moral virtue must finally pass +over into asceticism--the denial of the will to live. In others, if we +are able to see through the principle of individuation, we recognise the +same essence as in ourselves, and we perceive that as long as this wills +it must necessarily suffer. The end then is to destroy the will to live. +This is to be done by _askesis_, self-mortification. The first step is +complete chastity. If, says Schopenhauer, the highest phenomenon of +will, that is, man, were to disappear through a general refusal to +affirm life beyond the individual body, man's weaker reflexion in the +animal world would disappear also, and the consciousness of the whole +would cease. Knowledge being taken away, the rest would vanish into +nothingness, since there is 'no object without subject.' That this will +come to pass, however, he certainly did not believe. He has no +cosmogony, like that of Hartmann, ending in a general redemption of the +universe by such a collective act. Nor did he hold, like his later +successor Mainländer, that through the conflict and gradual extinction +of individualities, 'this great world shall so wear out to nought.' The +world for him is without beginning and without end. But the exceptional +individual can redeem himself. What he does when he has reached the +height of holiness is by voluntary poverty and all other privations, +inflicted for their own sake, to break and kill the will, which he +recognises as the source of his own and of the world's suffering +existence. In his case not merely the phenomenon ends at death, as with +others, but the being is taken away. To be a 'world-overcomer' in this +sense (as opposed to a 'world-conqueror') is the essence of sanctity +when cleared of all the superstitious dogmas by which the saints try to +explain their mode of life to themselves. + +The absolutely pure expression of this truth is to be found only in +philosophy; but of the religions Buddhism comes nearest to expressing it +without admixture. For the Buddhist saint asks aid from no god. True +Christianity, however,--the Christianity of the New Testament and of the +Christian mystics,--agrees both with Buddhism and with Brahmanism in +ultimate aim. What spoils it for Schopenhauer is the Judaic element. +This, on one side, infects it with the optimism of the Biblical story of +creation, in which God 'saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it +was very good.' On the other side, it contaminates the myth of original +sin, which bears in itself a profound philosophical truth, by this same +doctrine of a creative God; from which follows all the injustice and +irrationality necessarily involved in the Augustinian theology, and not +to be expelled except with its theism. Nevertheless, the story of the +Fall of Man, of which that theology, in its fundamentally true part, is +a reasoned expression, is the one thing, Schopenhauer avows, that +reconciles him to the Old Testament. The truth that it clothes he finds +also among the Greeks; Empedocles, after the Orphics and Pythagoreans, +having taught that the soul had been doomed to wander because of some +antenatal sin. And the mysticism that accompanies all these more or less +pure expressions of one metaphysical truth he finds represented by the +Sufis even in optimistic Islam; so that he can claim for his philosophy +a world-wide consent. + +Religion, if we take this to include mysticism, at once rises above +philosophy and falls below it. As 'metaphysics of the people,' it is a +mythological expression of philosophical truth: as mysticism, it is a +kind of 'epi-philosophy.' Beyond pure philosophy Schopenhauer does not +profess to go; but he accepts what the mystics say as the description of +a positive experience which becomes accessible when supreme insight is +attained intuitively. For the philosopher as such, insight into that +which is beyond the forms of our knowledge and even beyond the will +itself, remains only conceptual; though it is within the province of +philosophy to mark out the place for this. The 'something else' that is +left when the will has been denied, is indicated by the 'ecstasy,' +'illumination,' 'union with God,' spoken of by the mystics. +Paradoxically, some of the mystics themselves even have identified it +with 'nothing'; but the result of the denial of the will to live is to +be called nothing only in relation to the world as we know it. 'On the +other hand, to those in whom the will has turned back and denied itself, +this so very real world of ours with all its suns and milky ways +is--nothing.' + +In this terminus of his philosophy, Schopenhauer recognised his kinship +with Indian thought, of which he was a lifelong student. To call his +doctrine a kind of Buddhism is, however, in some ways a misapprehension. +Undoubtedly he accepts as his ideal the ethical attitude that he finds +to be common to Buddhism and the Christianity of the New Testament; but +metaphysical differences mark him off from both. We have seen that he +rejects the extra-mundane God of Semitic derivation, adopted by +historical Christianity. Indeed he is one of the most pronounced +anti-Jehovists of all literature. But equally his belief in a positive +metaphysical doctrine marks him off from Buddhism, according to the +account given of it by its most recent students, who regard it either as +ultimately nihilistic or as having no metaphysics at all, but only a +psychology and ethics. Nor can he be precisely identified with the +Vedantists of orthodox Hinduism. Their ultimate reality, if we are to +find an analogue for it in European metaphysics, seems to resemble the +hypostasised _ego_ of Fichte, or the Kantian 'transcendental unity of +apperception', much more than it resembles Schopenhauer's blindly +striving will as thing-in-itself. Even in practical ethics, he does not +follow the Indian systems at all closely. Philosophical doctrines of +justice are of course purely European; and Schopenhauer himself points +out the sources of his own theory. In his extension of ethics to +animals, on which he lays much stress, he cites the teachings of Eastern +non-Semitic religions as superior to the rest; but he does not follow +the Indians, nor even the Pythagoreans, so far as to make abstinence +from flesh part of the ideal. He condemns vivisection on the ground that +animals have rights: certain ways of treating them are unjust, not +simply uncompassionate. The discussion here again is of course wholly +within European thought. Thus, in trying to determine his significance +for modern philosophy, we may consider his system in its immediate +environment, leaving it to more special students to determine how far it +received a peculiar colouring from the Oriental philosophies, of which, +in his time, the more exact knowledge was just beginning to penetrate to +the West. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE + + +Schopenhauer is not one of the philosophers who have founded a school, +though he has had many disciples and enthusiastic admirers. The +pessimism that was for a time a watchword with certain literary groups +has passed as a mode, and his true significance must be sought +elsewhere. Of the thinkers who have followed him in his pessimism, two +indeed stand out as the architects of distinct systems, Eduard von +Hartmann and Philipp Mainländer (both already incidentally referred to); +but while they are to be classed unquestionably as philosophers, their +systems contain an element that their master would have regarded as +mythological. Schopenhauer declared as clearly as any of the Greeks that +the phenomenal world is without beginning and without end. Kant's +positing of an 'antinomy' on this point he regarded as wholly without +rational justification. What Kant calls the 'antithesis,' namely, the +infinite series, can be logically proved for phenomena. The 'thesis,' +which asserts a beginning in time, is defended by mere fallacies. Now +Hartmann and Mainländer both hold, though in different fashions, that +there is a world-process from a beginning to an end, namely, the +extinction of consciousness. This is the redemption of the world. Their +affinity, therefore, seems to be with the Christian Gnostics rather than +with the pure philosophers of the Greek tradition, continued in modern +times by Bruno, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer. + +Whatever may be thought of the pessimism by which Schopenhauer's mood is +distinguished from that of his precursors, few will fail to recognise +that special doctrines of his system contain at least a large portion of +truth. His theories of Art, of Genius, and of Love are enough to found +an enduring reputation for any thinker, even if there were nothing else +of value in his writings. But there is much else, both in systematic +construction and in the illumination of detail. I have been inclined to +put forward first of all the translation into idealistic terms of the +universal sentiency held by the Ionian thinkers to be inherent in the +primordial elements of nature. While they viewed the world as an +objective thing having psychological qualities, Schopenhauer, after the +long intermediate process of thought, could treat it as phenomenal +object with a psychological or subjective essence. For both doctrines +alike, however, mind or soul is immanent. Still, it must be allowed that +a difference remains by which Schopenhauer was even more remote than +they were from the later Greek idealism. As they were not materialists, +so they did not exclude reason from the psychical properties of their +substances. Schopenhauer, while he rejected the materialism of their +ancient and modern successors alike, took the step of formally +derationalising the elements of mind. This, no doubt, is unsustainable +ultimately, if reason is ever to emerge from them. Yet the one-sidedness +of the position has had a peculiar value in combating an equally +one-sided rationalistic idealism. This is recognised by clear-sighted +opponents. And Schopenhauer's calling the non-rational or anti-rational +element in the world 'will' helps to make plainer the real problem of +evil. There is truth in the Hegelian paradox that 'pessimism is an +excellent basis for optimism.' An optimist like Plotinus saw that, even +if good comes of evil, the case of the optimist must fail unless evil +can be shown to be a necessary constituent of the world. The Platonic +and Neo-Platonic 'matter,' a principle of diremption or individuation, +like time and space for Schopenhauer, was an attempt to solve this +problem; but something more positive seemed to be needed as the source +of the stronger manifestations of evil. To the strength of these Plato +drew attention in a passage (_Republic_, x. 610[5]) where it is +acknowledged that injustice confers a character of vitality and +sleeplessness upon its possessor. In the notion of a blind and vehement +striving, Schopenhauer supplies something adequate; only, to maintain a +rational optimism, it must be regarded as a necessary element in a +mixture, not as the spring of the whole. + + [5] Cited in one of the introductory essays to Jowett and Campbell's + edition, vol. ii. + +Much might be said on the teleology by which he tries to educe +intelligence from the primordial strife. Against his view, that it is +evolved as a mere instrument for preserving races in a struggle, another +may be set that is ready to hand in a dialogue of Plutarch.[6] The +struggle among animals, it is there incidentally argued, has for its end +to sharpen their intelligence. Both these theories are on the surface +compatible with evolution. If, leaving aside the problem of mechanism, +we try to verify them by the test of results, the latter undoubtedly +seems the more plausible. For if the struggle was a means to the +improvement of intelligence, nature has succeeded more and more; +whereas, if her intention was to preserve races, she has continually +failed. This argument is at any rate perfectly valid against +Schopenhauer himself; for he holds in common with the optimistic +teleologists that 'nature does nothing in vain.' + + [6] _De Sollertia Animalium_, 27. + +I will conclude with a few detached criticisms on the ethical doctrine +which he regarded as the culmination of his system. The antithesis, it +may first be noted, between the temporary release from the vehemence of +the will that is gained through art, and the permanent release through +asceticism, is not consistently maintained. Schopenhauer admits that the +knowledge which for the ascetic is the 'quietive' of the will has to be +won anew in a perpetual conflict. 'No one can have enduring rest on +earth.' Again, revision of his doctrine concerning the reality of the +individual would, I think, necessitate revision also of the position +that not only asceticism but 'all true and pure love, nay, even freely +rendered justice, proceeds from seeing through the _principium +individuationis_.' If the individual is in some sense ultimately real, +then love must be to a certain extent literally altruism. We are brought +down to the elementary fact, in terms of the metaphysics of ethics, that +the object of love is a real being that is itself and not ourselves, +though having some resemblance to us and united in a larger whole. An +objection not merely verbal might indeed be taken to Schopenhauer's +metaphysics of ethics strictly on his own ground. If it is purely and +simply the essence of ourselves that we recognise in everything, does +not this reduce all love finally to a well-understood egoism? The +genuine fact of sympathy seems to escape his mode of formulation. And, +in the end, we shall perhaps not find the ascetic to be the supreme +ethical type. Of the self-tormenting kind of asceticism, it is not +enough to say with Schopenhauer that, since it is a world-wide +phenomenon of human nature, it calls for some account from philosophy. +The account may be sufficiently rendered by historical psychology; the +result being to class it as an aberration born of the illusions incident +to a certain type of mind at a certain stage. Indeed, that seems to be +the conclusion of the Buddhists, who claim to have transcended it by +finding it superfluous for the end it aims at. Let us then take, as our +example of the completed type, not the monks of the Thebaid, but the +mild ascetics of the Buddhist communities. Does not this type, even in +its most attractive form, represent a 'second best'? Is not the final +judgment that of Plato, that to save oneself is something, but that +there is no full achievement unless for the life of the State also the +ideal has been brought nearer realisation? When there is nothing in the +world but irredeemable tyranny or anarchy, flight from it may be the +greatest success possible as far as the individual life is concerned; +but this is not the normal condition of humanity. Finally, may not some +actual achievement, either practical or, like that of Schopenhauer, +speculative, even if accompanied by real imperfections of character, +possess a higher human value than the sanctity that rests always in +itself? + + + + +SELECTED WORKS + + +_English Translations_ + + _The World as Will and Idea._ Translated by R. B. HALDANE and J. KEMP. 3 + vols. 1883-6. + + _Two Essays_: I. _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient + Reason_. II. _On the Will in Nature_. Bohn's Philosophical Library, + 1889. + + _Religion: A Dialogue, and other Essays._ Selected and translated by T. + BAILEY SAUNDERS. 3rd ed., 1891. [A series of other volumes of + selections excellently translated by Mr. Saunders has followed.] + + _Selected Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer._ With a Biographical + Introduction and Sketch of his Philosophy. By E. BELFORT BAX. 1891. + + _The Basis of Morality._ Translated with Introduction and Notes by A. B. + BULLOCK. 1903. + + +_Biographical and Expository_ + + _Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and Philosophy._ By HELEN ZIMMERN. 1876. + + _Life of Arthur Schopenhauer._ By Professor W. WALLACE. 1890. + + _La Philosophie de Schopenhauer._ Par TH. RIBOT. 2nd ed., 1885. + + _Arthur Schopenhauer._ Seine Persönlichkeit, seine Lehre, sein Glaube. + Von JOHANNAES VOLKELT. 3rd ed., 1907. + + _Schopenhauer-Lexikon._ Von JULIUS FRADENSTÄDT. 2 vols., 1871. + + +Printed by T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty at the Edinburgh +University Press + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCHOPENHAUER *** + +***** This file should be named 38283-8.txt or 38283-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/2/8/38283/ + +Produced by Albert László and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |