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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/1616-0.txt b/1616-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2080233 --- /dev/null +++ b/1616-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6079 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook of Cratylus, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you +will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before +using this eBook. + +Title: Cratylus + +Author: Plato + +Translator: B. Jowett + +Release Date: January, 1999 [eBook #1616] +[Most recently updated: April 27, 2022] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +Produced by: Sue Asscher + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CRATYLUS *** + + + + +CRATYLUS + +By Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +Contents + + INTRODUCTION + CRATYLUS + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +The Cratylus has always been a source of perplexity to the student of +Plato. While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and +metaphysical originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of +the Platonic writings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive +of the piece, which interpreters have hitherto not succeeded in +dispelling. We need not suppose that Plato used words in order to +conceal his thoughts, or that he would have been unintelligible to an +educated contemporary. In the Phaedrus and Euthydemus we also find a +difficulty in determining the precise aim of the author. Plato wrote +satires in the form of dialogues, and his meaning, like that of other +satirical writers, has often slept in the ear of posterity. Two causes +may be assigned for this obscurity: 1st, the subtlety and allusiveness +of this species of composition; 2nd, the difficulty of reproducing a +state of life and literature which has passed away. A satire is +unmeaning unless we can place ourselves back among the persons and +thoughts of the age in which it was written. Had the treatise of +Antisthenes upon words, or the speculations of Cratylus, or some other +Heracleitean of the fourth century B.C., on the nature of language been +preserved to us; or if we had lived at the time, and been “rich enough +to attend the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus,” we should have +understood Plato better, and many points which are now attributed to +the extravagance of Socrates’ humour would have been found, like the +allusions of Aristophanes in the Clouds, to have gone home to the +sophists and grammarians of the day. + +For the age was very busy with philological speculation; and many +questions were beginning to be asked about language which were parallel +to other questions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were +illustrated in a similar manner by the analogy of the arts. Was there a +correctness in words, and were they given by nature or convention? In +the presocratic philosophy mankind had been striving to attain an +expression of their ideas, and now they were beginning to ask +themselves whether the expression might not be distinguished from the +idea? They were also seeking to distinguish the parts of speech and to +enquire into the relation of subject and predicate. Grammar and logic +were moving about somewhere in the depths of the human soul, but they +were not yet awakened into consciousness and had not found names for +themselves, or terms by which they might be expressed. Of these +beginnings of the study of language we know little, and there +necessarily arises an obscurity when the surroundings of such a work as +the Cratylus are taken away. Moreover, in this, as in most of the +dialogues of Plato, allowance has to be made for the character of +Socrates. For the theory of language can only be propounded by him in a +manner which is consistent with his own profession of ignorance. Hence +his ridicule of the new school of etymology is interspersed with many +declarations “that he knows nothing,” “that he has learned from +Euthyphro,” and the like. Even the truest things which he says are +depreciated by himself. He professes to be guessing, but the guesses of +Plato are better than all the other theories of the ancients respecting +language put together. + +The dialogue hardly derives any light from Plato’s other writings, and +still less from Scholiasts and Neoplatonist writers. Socrates must be +interpreted from himself, and on first reading we certainly have a +difficulty in understanding his drift, or his relation to the two other +interlocutors in the dialogue. Does he agree with Cratylus or with +Hermogenes, and is he serious in those fanciful etymologies, extending +over more than half the dialogue, which he seems so greatly to relish? +Or is he serious in part only; and can we separate his jest from his +earnest?—_Sunt bona, sunt quaedum mediocria, sunt mala plura_. Most of +them are ridiculously bad, and yet among them are found, as if by +accident, principles of philology which are unsurpassed in any ancient +writer, and even in advance of any philologer of the last century. May +we suppose that Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by +writing a comedy in the form of a prose dialogue? And what is the final +result of the enquiry? Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory +of language, which he acknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to +imply that a perfect language can only be based on his own theory of +ideas? Or if this latter explanation is refuted by his silence, then in +what relation does his account of language stand to the rest of his +philosophy? Or may we be so bold as to deny the connexion between them? +(For the allusion to the ideas at the end of the dialogue is merely +intended to show that we must not put words in the place of things or +realities, which is a thesis strongly insisted on by Plato in many +other passages)...These are some of the first thoughts which arise in +the mind of the reader of the Cratylus. And the consideration of them +may form a convenient introduction to the general subject of the +dialogue. + +We must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally +to some clearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the +absolute proportion of the whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek +temple or statue; nor should his works be tried by any such standard. +They have often the beauty of poetry, but they have also the freedom of +conversation. “Words are more plastic than wax” (Rep.), and may be +moulded into any form. He wanders on from one topic to another, +careless of the unity of his work, not fearing any “judge, or +spectator, who may recall him to the point” (Theat.), “whither the +argument blows we follow” (Rep.). To have determined beforehand, as in +a modern didactic treatise, the nature and limits of the subject, would +have been fatal to the spirit of enquiry or discovery, which is the +soul of the dialogue...These remarks are applicable to nearly all the +works of Plato, but to the Cratylus and Phaedrus more than any others. +See Phaedrus, Introduction. + +There is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may +be more truly viewed:—they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We +have found that in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, we +arrived at no conclusion—the different sides of the argument were +personified in the different speakers; but the victory was not +distinctly attributed to any of them, nor the truth wholly the property +of any. And in the Cratylus we have no reason to assume that Socrates +is either wholly right or wholly wrong, or that Plato, though he +evidently inclines to him, had any other aim than that of personifying, +in the characters of Hermogenes, Socrates, and Cratylus, the three +theories of language which are respectively maintained by them. + +The two subordinate persons of the dialogue, Hermogenes and Cratylus, +are at the opposite poles of the argument. But after a while the +disciple of the Sophist and the follower of Heracleitus are found to be +not so far removed from one another as at first sight appeared; and +both show an inclination to accept the third view which Socrates +interposes between them. First, Hermogenes, the poor brother of the +rich Callias, expounds the doctrine that names are conventional; like +the names of slaves, they may be given and altered at pleasure. This is +one of those principles which, whether applied to society or language, +explains everything and nothing. For in all things there is an element +of convention; but the admission of this does not help us to understand +the rational ground or basis in human nature on which the convention +proceeds. Socrates first of all intimates to Hermogenes that his view +of language is only a part of a sophistical whole, and ultimately tends +to abolish the distinction between truth and falsehood. Hermogenes is +very ready to throw aside the sophistical tenet, and listens with a +sort of half admiration, half belief, to the speculations of Socrates. + +Cratylus is of opinion that a name is either a true name or not a name +at all. He is unable to conceive of degrees of imitation; a word is +either the perfect expression of a thing, or a mere inarticulate sound +(a fallacy which is still prevalent among theorizers about the origin +of language). He is at once a philosopher and a sophist; for while +wanting to rest language on an immutable basis, he would deny the +possibility of falsehood. He is inclined to derive all truth from +language, and in language he sees reflected the philosophy of +Heracleitus. His views are not like those of Hermogenes, hastily taken +up, but are said to be the result of mature consideration, although he +is described as still a young man. With a tenacity characteristic of +the Heracleitean philosophers, he clings to the doctrine of the flux. +(Compare Theaet.) Of the real Cratylus we know nothing, except that he +is recorded by Aristotle to have been the friend or teacher of Plato; +nor have we any proof that he resembled the likeness of him in Plato +any more than the Critias of Plato is like the real Critias, or the +Euthyphro in this dialogue like the other Euthyphro, the diviner, in +the dialogue which is called after him. + +Between these two extremes, which have both of them a sophistical +character, the view of Socrates is introduced, which is in a manner the +union of the two. Language is conventional and also natural, and the +true conventional-natural is the rational. It is a work not of chance, +but of art; the dialectician is the artificer of words, and the +legislator gives authority to them. They are the expressions or +imitations in sound of things. In a sense, Cratylus is right in saying +that things have by nature names; for nature is not opposed either to +art or to law. But vocal imitation, like any other copy, may be +imperfectly executed; and in this way an element of chance or +convention enters in. There is much which is accidental or exceptional +in language. Some words have had their original meaning so obscured, +that they require to be helped out by convention. But still the true +name is that which has a natural meaning. Thus nature, art, chance, all +combine in the formation of language. And the three views respectively +propounded by Hermogenes, Socrates, Cratylus, may be described as the +conventional, the artificial or rational, and the natural. The view of +Socrates is the meeting-point of the other two, just as conceptualism +is the meeting-point of nominalism and realism. + +We can hardly say that Plato was aware of the truth, that “languages +are not made, but grow.” But still, when he says that “the legislator +made language with the dialectician standing on his right hand,” we +need not infer from this that he conceived words, like coins, to be +issued from the mint of the State. The creator of laws and of social +life is naturally regarded as the creator of language, according to +Hellenic notions, and the philosopher is his natural advisor. We are +not to suppose that the legislator is performing any extraordinary +function; he is merely the Eponymus of the State, who prescribes rules +for the dialectician and for all other artists. According to a truly +Platonic mode of approaching the subject, language, like virtue in the +Republic, is examined by the analogy of the arts. Words are works of +art which may be equally made in different materials, and are well made +when they have a meaning. Of the process which he thus describes, Plato +had probably no very definite notion. But he means to express generally +that language is the product of intelligence, and that languages belong +to States and not to individuals. + +A better conception of language could not have been formed in Plato’s +age, than that which he attributes to Socrates. Yet many persons have +thought that the mind of Plato is more truly seen in the vague realism +of Cratylus. This misconception has probably arisen from two causes: +first, the desire to bring Plato’s theory of language into accordance +with the received doctrine of the Platonic ideas; secondly, the +impression created by Socrates himself, that he is not in earnest, and +is only indulging the fancy of the hour. + +1. We shall have occasion to show more at length, in the Introduction +to future dialogues, that the so-called Platonic ideas are only a +semi-mythical form, in which he attempts to realize abstractions, and +that they are replaced in his later writings by a rational theory of +psychology. (See introductions to the Meno and the Sophist.) And in the +Cratylus he gives a general account of the nature and origin of +language, in which Adam Smith, Rousseau, and other writers of the last +century, would have substantially agreed. At the end of the dialogue, +he speaks as in the Symposium and Republic of absolute beauty and good; +but he never supposed that they were capable of being embodied in +words. Of the names of the ideas, he would have said, as he says of the +names of the Gods, that we know nothing. Even the realism of Cratylus +is not based upon the ideas of Plato, but upon the flux of Heracleitus. +Here, as in the Sophist and Politicus, Plato expressly draws attention +to the want of agreement in words and things. Hence we are led to +infer, that the view of Socrates is not the less Plato’s own, because +not based upon the ideas; 2nd, that Plato’s theory of language is not +inconsistent with the rest of his philosophy. + +2. We do not deny that Socrates is partly in jest and partly in +earnest. He is discoursing in a high-flown vein, which may be compared +to the “dithyrambics of the Phaedrus.” They are mysteries of which he +is speaking, and he professes a kind of ludicrous fear of his imaginary +wisdom. When he is arguing out of Homer, about the names of Hector’s +son, or when he describes himself as inspired or maddened by Euthyphro, +with whom he has been sitting from the early dawn (compare Phaedrus and +Lysias; Phaedr.) and expresses his intention of yielding to the +illusion to-day, and to-morrow he will go to a priest and be purified, +we easily see that his words are not to be taken seriously. In this +part of the dialogue his dread of committing impiety, the pretended +derivation of his wisdom from another, the extravagance of some of his +etymologies, and, in general, the manner in which the fun, fast and +furious, _vires acquirit eundo_, remind us strongly of the Phaedrus. +The jest is a long one, extending over more than half the dialogue. But +then, we remember that the Euthydemus is a still longer jest, in which +the irony is preserved to the very end. There he is parodying the +ingenious follies of early logic; in the Cratylus he is ridiculing the +fancies of a new school of sophists and grammarians. The fallacies of +the Euthydemus are still retained at the end of our logic books; and +the etymologies of the Cratylus have also found their way into later +writers. Some of these are not much worse than the conjectures of +Hemsterhuis, and other critics of the last century; but this does not +prove that they are serious. For Plato is in advance of his age in his +conception of language, as much as he is in his conception of +mythology. (Compare Phaedrus.) + +When the fervour of his etymological enthusiasm has abated, Socrates +ends, as he has begun, with a rational explanation of language. Still +he preserves his “know nothing” disguise, and himself declares his +first notions about names to be reckless and ridiculous. Having +explained compound words by resolving them into their original +elements, he now proceeds to analyse simple words into the letters of +which they are composed. The Socrates who “knows nothing,” here passes +into the teacher, the dialectician, the arranger of species. There is +nothing in this part of the dialogue which is either weak or +extravagant. Plato is a supporter of the Onomatopoetic theory of +language; that is to say, he supposes words to be formed by the +imitation of ideas in sounds; he also recognises the effect of time, +the influence of foreign languages, the desire of euphony, to be +formative principles; and he admits a certain element of chance. But he +gives no imitation in all this that he is preparing the way for the +construction of an ideal language. Or that he has any Eleatic +speculation to oppose to the Heracleiteanism of Cratylus. + +The theory of language which is propounded in the Cratylus is in +accordance with the later phase of the philosophy of Plato, and would +have been regarded by him as in the main true. The dialogue is also a +satire on the philological fancies of the day. Socrates in pursuit of +his vocation as a detector of false knowledge, lights by accident on +the truth. He is guessing, he is dreaming; he has heard, as he says in +the Phaedrus, from another: no one is more surprised than himself at +his own discoveries. And yet some of his best remarks, as for example +his view of the derivation of Greek words from other languages, or of +the permutations of letters, or again, his observation that in speaking +of the Gods we are only speaking of our names of them, occur among +these flights of humour. + +We can imagine a character having a profound insight into the nature of +men and things, and yet hardly dwelling upon them seriously; blending +inextricably sense and nonsense; sometimes enveloping in a blaze of +jests the most serious matters, and then again allowing the truth to +peer through; enjoying the flow of his own humour, and puzzling mankind +by an ironical exaggeration of their absurdities. Such were +Aristophanes and Rabelais; such, in a different style, were Sterne, +Jean Paul, Hamann,—writers who sometimes become unintelligible through +the extravagance of their fancies. Such is the character which Plato +intends to depict in some of his dialogues as the Silenus Socrates; and +through this medium we have to receive our theory of language. + +There remains a difficulty which seems to demand a more exact answer: +In what relation does the satirical or etymological portion of the +dialogue stand to the serious? Granting all that can be said about the +provoking irony of Socrates, about the parody of Euthyphro, or +Prodicus, or Antisthenes, how does the long catalogue of etymologies +furnish any answer to the question of Hermogenes, which is evidently +the main thesis of the dialogue: What is the truth, or correctness, or +principle of names? + +After illustrating the nature of correctness by the analogy of the +arts, and then, as in the Republic, ironically appealing to the +authority of the Homeric poems, Socrates shows that the truth or +correctness of names can only be ascertained by an appeal to etymology. +The truth of names is to be found in the analysis of their elements. +But why does he admit etymologies which are absurd, based on +Heracleitean fancies, fourfold interpretations of words, impossible +unions and separations of syllables and letters? + +1. The answer to this difficulty has been already anticipated in part: +Socrates is not a dogmatic teacher, and therefore he puts on this wild +and fanciful disguise, in order that the truth may be permitted to +appear: 2. as Benfey remarks, an erroneous example may illustrate a +principle of language as well as a true one: 3. many of these +etymologies, as, for example, that of dikaion, are indicated, by the +manner in which Socrates speaks of them, to have been current in his +own age: 4. the philosophy of language had not made such progress as +would have justified Plato in propounding real derivations. Like his +master Socrates, he saw through the hollowness of the incipient +sciences of the day, and tries to move in a circle apart from them, +laying down the conditions under which they are to be pursued, but, as +in the Timaeus, cautious and tentative, when he is speaking of actual +phenomena. To have made etymologies seriously, would have seemed to him +like the interpretation of the myths in the Phaedrus, the task “of a +not very fortunate individual, who had a great deal of time on his +hands.” The irony of Socrates places him above and beyond the errors of +his contemporaries. + +The Cratylus is full of humour and satirical touches: the inspiration +which comes from Euthyphro, and his prancing steeds, the light +admixture of quotations from Homer, and the spurious dialectic which is +applied to them; the jest about the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus, +which is declared on the best authority, viz. his own, to be a complete +education in grammar and rhetoric; the double explanation of the name +Hermogenes, either as “not being in luck,” or “being no speaker;” the +dearly-bought wisdom of Callias, the Lacedaemonian whose name was +“Rush,” and, above all, the pleasure which Socrates expresses in his +own dangerous discoveries, which “to-morrow he will purge away,” are +truly humorous. While delivering a lecture on the philosophy of +language, Socrates is also satirizing the endless fertility of the +human mind in spinning arguments out of nothing, and employing the most +trifling and fanciful analogies in support of a theory. Etymology in +ancient as in modern times was a favourite recreation; and Socrates +makes merry at the expense of the etymologists. The simplicity of +Hermogenes, who is ready to believe anything that he is told, heightens +the effect. Socrates in his genial and ironical mood hits right and +left at his adversaries: Ouranos is so called apo tou oran ta ano, +which, as some philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind; the +sophists are by a fanciful explanation converted into heroes; “the +givers of names were like some philosophers who fancy that the earth +goes round because their heads are always going round.” There is a +great deal of “mischief” lurking in the following: “I found myself in +greater perplexity about justice than I was before I began to learn;” +“The rho in katoptron must be the addition of some one who cares +nothing about truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into shape;” +“Tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the Tragic and goatish +life, and tragedy is the place of them.” Several philosophers and +sophists are mentioned by name: first, Protagoras and Euthydemus are +assailed; then the interpreters of Homer, oi palaioi Omerikoi (compare +Arist. Met.) and the Orphic poets are alluded to by the way; then he +discovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of Heracleitus;—the +doctrine of the flux is contained in the word ousia (= osia the pushing +principle), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in psuche and +selene. Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling out and +putting in letters which were in vogue among the philologers of his +time; or slightly scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, he +is impatient of hearing from the half-converted Cratylus the doctrine +that falsehood can neither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed; a +piece of sophistry attributed to Gorgias, which reappears in the +Sophist. And he proceeds to demolish, with no less delight than he had +set up, the Heracleitean theory of language. + +In the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious, +though he does not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the +Heracleiteans, whom here, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to +ridicule. What was the origin of this enmity we can hardly +determine:—was it due to the natural dislike which may be supposed to +exist between the “patrons of the flux” and the “friends of the ideas” +(Soph.)? or is it to be attributed to the indignation which Plato felt +at having wasted his time upon “Cratylus and the doctrines of +Heracleitus” in the days of his youth? Socrates, touching on some of +the characteristic difficulties of early Greek philosophy, endeavours +to show Cratylus that imitation may be partial or imperfect, that a +knowledge of things is higher than a knowledge of names, and that there +can be no knowledge if all things are in a state of transition. But +Cratylus, who does not easily apprehend the argument from common sense, +remains unconvinced, and on the whole inclines to his former opinion. +Some profound philosophical remarks are scattered up and down, +admitting of an application not only to language but to knowledge +generally; such as the assertion that “consistency is no test of +truth:” or again, “If we are over-precise about words, truth will say +‘too late’ to us as to the belated traveller in Aegina.” + +The place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with +certainty. The style and subject, and the treatment of the character of +Socrates, have a close resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially +to the Phaedrus and Euthydemus. The manner in which the ideas are +spoken of at the end of the dialogue, also indicates a comparatively +early date. The imaginative element is still in full vigour; the +Socrates of the Cratylus is the Socrates of the Apology and Symposium, +not yet Platonized; and he describes, as in the Theaetetus, the +philosophy of Heracleitus by “unsavoury” similes—he cannot believe that +the world is like “a leaky vessel,” or “a man who has a running at the +nose”; he attributes the flux of the world to the swimming in some +folks’ heads. On the other hand, the relation of thought to language is +omitted here, but is treated of in the Sophist. These grounds are not +sufficient to enable us to arrive at a precise conclusion. But we shall +not be far wrong in placing the Cratylus about the middle, or at any +rate in the first half, of the series. + +Cratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the brother of +Callias, have been arguing about names; the former maintaining that +they are natural, the latter that they are conventional. Cratylus +affirms that his own is a true name, but will not allow that the name +of Hermogenes is equally true. Hermogenes asks Socrates to explain to +him what Cratylus means; or, far rather, he would like to know, What +Socrates himself thinks about the truth or correctness of names? +Socrates replies, that hard is knowledge, and the nature of names is a +considerable part of knowledge: he has never been to hear the +fifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having only attended the +single-drachma course, he is not competent to give an opinion on such +matters. When Cratylus denies that Hermogenes is a true name, he +supposes him to mean that he is not a true son of Hermes, because he is +never in luck. But he would like to have an open council and to hear +both sides. + +Hermogenes is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may +be changed, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please, and +the altered name is as good as the original one. + +You mean to say, for instance, rejoins Socrates, that if I agree to +call a man a horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me, +and a man by the rest of the world? But, surely, there is in words a +true and a false, as there are true and false propositions. If a whole +proposition be true or false, then the parts of a proposition may be +true or false, and the least parts as well as the greatest; and the +least parts are names, and therefore names may be true or false. Would +Hermogenes maintain that anybody may give a name to anything, and as +many names as he pleases; and would all these names be always true at +the time of giving them? Hermogenes replies that this is the only way +in which he can conceive that names are correct; and he appeals to the +practice of different nations, and of the different Hellenic tribes, in +confirmation of his view. Socrates asks, whether the things differ as +the words which represent them differ:—Are we to maintain with +Protagoras, that what appears is? Hermogenes has always been puzzled +about this, but acknowledges, when he is pressed by Socrates, that +there are a few very good men in the world, and a great many very bad; +and the very good are the wise, and the very bad are the foolish; and +this is not mere appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say with +Euthydemus, that all things equally and always belong to all men; in +that case, again, there would be no distinction between bad and good +men. But then, the only remaining possibility is, that all things have +their several distinct natures, and are independent of our notions +about them. And not only things, but actions, have distinct natures, +and are done by different processes. There is a natural way of cutting +or burning, and a natural instrument with which men cut or burn, and +any other way will fail;—this is true of all actions. And speaking is a +kind of action, and naming is a kind of speaking, and we must name +according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument. We cut +with a knife, we pierce with an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name +with a name. And as a shuttle separates the warp from the woof, so a +name distinguishes the natures of things. The weaver will use the +shuttle well,—that is, like a weaver; and the teacher will use the name +well,—that is, like a teacher. The shuttle will be made by the +carpenter; the awl by the smith or skilled person. But who makes a +name? Does not the law give names, and does not the teacher receive +them from the legislator? He is the skilled person who makes them, and +of all skilled workmen he is the rarest. But how does the carpenter +make or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? Will he not look +at the ideal which he has in his mind? And as the different kinds of +work differ, so ought the instruments which make them to differ. The +several kinds of shuttles ought to answer in material and form to the +several kinds of webs. And the legislator ought to know the different +materials and forms of which names are made in Hellas and other +countries. But who is to be the judge of the proper form? The judge of +shuttles is the weaver who uses them; the judge of lyres is the player +of the lyre; the judge of ships is the pilot. And will not the judge +who is able to direct the legislator in his work of naming, be he who +knows how to use the names—he who can ask and answer questions—in +short, the dialectician? The pilot directs the carpenter how to make +the rudder, and the dialectician directs the legislator how he is to +impose names; for to express the ideal forms of things in syllables and +letters is not the easy task, Hermogenes, which you imagine. + +“I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me this natural +correctness of names.” + +Indeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit +that there is a correctness of names, and that not every one can give a +name. But what is the nature of this correctness or truth, you must +learn from the Sophists, of whom your brother Callias has bought his +reputation for wisdom rather dearly; and since they require to be paid, +you, having no money, had better learn from him at second-hand. “Well, +but I have just given up Protagoras, and I should be inconsistent in +going to learn of him.” Then if you reject him you may learn of the +poets, and in particular of Homer, who distinguishes the names given by +Gods and men to the same things, as in the verse about the river God +who fought with Hephaestus, “whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call +Scamander;” or in the lines in which he mentions the bird which the +Gods call “Chalcis,” and men “Cymindis;” or the hill which men call +“Batieia,” and the Gods “Myrinna’s Tomb.” Here is an important lesson; +for the Gods must of course be right in their use of names. And this is +not the only truth about philology which may be learnt from Homer. Does +he not say that Hector’s son had two names— + +“Hector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax”? + +Now, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the other +name was conferred by the women? And which are more likely to be +right—the wiser or the less wise, the men or the women? Homer evidently +agreed with the men: and of the name given by them he offers an +explanation;—the boy was called Astyanax (“king of the city”), because +his father saved the city. The names Astyanax and Hector, moreover, are +really the same,—the one means a king, and the other is “a holder or +possessor.” For as the lion’s whelp may be called a lion, or the +horse’s foal a foal, so the son of a king may be called a king. But if +the horse had produced a calf, then that would be called a calf. +Whether the syllables of a name are the same or not makes no +difference, provided the meaning is retained. For example; the names of +letters, whether vowels or consonants, do not correspond to their +sounds, with the exception of epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega. The +name Beta has three letters added to the sound—and yet this does not +alter the sense of the word, or prevent the whole name having the value +which the legislator intended. And the same may be said of a king and +the son of a king, who like other animals resemble each other in the +course of nature; the words by which they are signified may be +disguised, and yet amid differences of sound the etymologist may +recognise the same notion, just as the physician recognises the power +of the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell. Hector +and Astyanax have only one letter alike, but they have the same +meaning; and Agis (leader) is altogether different in sound from +Polemarchus (chief in war), or Eupolemus (good warrior); but the two +words present the same idea of leader or general, like the words +Iatrocles and Acesimbrotus, which equally denote a physician. The son +succeeds the father as the foal succeeds the horse, but when, out of +the course of nature, a prodigy occurs, and the offspring no longer +resembles the parent, then the names no longer agree. This may be +illustrated by the case of Agamemnon and his son Orestes, of whom the +former has a name significant of his patience at the siege of Troy; +while the name of the latter indicates his savage, man-of-the-mountain +nature. Atreus again, for his murder of Chrysippus, and his cruelty to +Thyestes, is rightly named Atreus, which, to the eye of the +etymologist, is ateros (destructive), ateires (stubborn), atreotos +(fearless); and Pelops is o ta pelas oron (he who sees what is near +only), because in his eagerness to win Hippodamia, he was unconscious +of the remoter consequences which the murder of Myrtilus would entail +upon his race. The name Tantalus, if slightly changed, offers two +etymologies; either apo tes tou lithou talanteias, or apo tou +talantaton einai, signifying at once the hanging of the stone over his +head in the world below, and the misery which he brought upon his +country. And the name of his father, Zeus, Dios, Zenos, has an +excellent meaning, though hard to be understood, because really a +sentence which is divided into two parts (Zeus, Dios). For he, being +the lord and king of all, is the author of our being, and in him all +live: this is implied in the double form, Dios, Zenos, which being put +together and interpreted is di on ze panta. There may, at first sight, +appear to be some irreverence in calling him the son of Cronos, who is +a proverb for stupidity; but the meaning is that Zeus himself is the +son of a mighty intellect; Kronos, quasi koros, not in the sense of a +youth, but quasi to katharon kai akeraton tou nou—the pure and +garnished mind, which in turn is begotten of Uranus, who is so called +apo tou oran ta ano, from looking upwards; which, as philosophers say, +is the way to have a pure mind. The earlier portion of Hesiod’s +genealogy has escaped my memory, or I would try more conclusions of the +same sort. “You talk like an oracle.” I caught the infection from +Euthyphro, who gave me a long lecture which began at dawn, and has not +only entered into my ears, but filled my soul, and my intention is to +yield to the inspiration to-day; and to-morrow I will be exorcised by +some priest or sophist. “Go on; I am anxious to hear the rest.” Now +that we have a general notion, how shall we proceed? What names will +afford the most crucial test of natural fitness? Those of heroes and +ordinary men are often deceptive, because they are patronymics or +expressions of a wish; let us try gods and demi-gods. Gods are so +called, apo tou thein, from the verb “to run;” because the sun, moon, +and stars run about the heaven; and they being the original gods of the +Hellenes, as they still are of the Barbarians, their name is given to +all Gods. The demons are the golden race of Hesiod, and by golden he +means not literally golden, but good; and they are called demons, quasi +daemones, which in old Attic was used for daimones—good men are well +said to become daimones when they die, because they are knowing. Eros +(with an epsilon) is the same word as eros (with an eta): “the sons of +God saw the daughters of men that they were fair;” or perhaps they were +a species of sophists or rhetoricians, and so called apo tou erotan, or +eirein, from their habit of spinning questions; for eirein is +equivalent to legein. I get all this from Euthyphro; and now a new and +ingenious idea comes into my mind, and, if I am not careful, I shall be +wiser than I ought to be by to-morrow’s dawn. My idea is, that we may +put in and pull out letters at pleasure and alter the accents (as, for +example, Dii philos may be turned into Diphilos), and we may make words +into sentences and sentences into words. The name anthrotos is a case +in point, for a letter has been omitted and the accent changed; the +original meaning being o anathron a opopen—he who looks up at what he +sees. Psuche may be thought to be the reviving, or refreshing, or +animating principle—e anapsuchousa to soma; but I am afraid that +Euthyphro and his disciples will scorn this derivation, and I must find +another: shall we identify the soul with the “ordering mind” of +Anaxagoras, and say that psuche, quasi phuseche = e phusin echei or +ochei?—this might easily be refined into psyche. “That is a more +artistic etymology.” + +After psuche follows soma; this, by a slight permutation, may be either += (1) the “grave” of the soul, or (2) may mean “that by which the soul +signifies (semainei) her wishes.” But more probably, the word is +Orphic, and simply denotes that the body is the place of ward in which +the soul suffers the penalty of sin,—en o sozetai. “I should like to +hear some more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that +excellent one of Zeus.” The truest names of the Gods are those which +they give themselves; but these are unknown to us. Less true are those +by which we propitiate them, as men say in prayers, “May he graciously +receive any name by which I call him.” And to avoid offence, I should +like to let them know beforehand that we are not presuming to enquire +about them, but only about the names which they usually bear. Let us +begin with Hestia. What did he mean who gave the name Hestia? “That is +a very difficult question.” O, my dear Hermogenes, I believe that there +was a power of philosophy and talk among the first inventors of names, +both in our own and in other languages; for even in foreign words a +principle is discernible. Hestia is the same with esia, which is an old +form of ousia, and means the first principle of things: this agrees +with the fact that to Hestia the first sacrifices are offered. There is +also another reading—osia, which implies that “pushing” (othoun) is the +first principle of all things. And here I seem to discover a delicate +allusion to the flux of Heracleitus—that antediluvian philosopher who +cannot walk twice in the same stream; and this flux of his may +accomplish yet greater marvels. For the names Cronos and Rhea cannot +have been accidental; the giver of them must have known something about +the doctrine of Heracleitus. Moreover, there is a remarkable +coincidence in the words of Hesiod, when he speaks of Oceanus, “the +origin of Gods;” and in the verse of Orpheus, in which he describes +Oceanus espousing his sister Tethys. Tethys is nothing more than the +name of a spring—to diattomenon kai ethoumenon. Poseidon is posidesmos, +the chain of the feet, because you cannot walk on the sea—the epsilon +is inserted by way of ornament; or perhaps the name may have been +originally polleidon, meaning, that the God knew many things (polla +eidos): he may also be the shaker, apo tou seiein,—in this case, pi and +delta have been added. Pluto is connected with ploutos, because wealth +comes out of the earth; or the word may be a euphemism for Hades, which +is usually derived apo tou aeidous, because the God is concerned with +the invisible. But the name Hades was really given him from his knowing +(eidenai) all good things. Men in general are foolishly afraid of him, +and talk with horror of the world below from which no one may return. +The reason why his subjects never wish to come back, even if they +could, is that the God enchains them by the strongest of spells, namely +by the desire of virtue, which they hope to obtain by constant +association with him. He is the perfect and accomplished Sophist and +the great benefactor of the other world; for he has much more than he +wants there, and hence he is called Pluto or the rich. He will have +nothing to do with the souls of men while in the body, because he +cannot work his will with them so long as they are confused and +entangled by fleshly lusts. Demeter is the mother and giver of food—e +didousa meter tes edodes. Here is erate tis, or perhaps the legislator +may have been thinking of the weather, and has merely transposed the +letters of the word aer. Pherephatta, that word of awe, is pheretapha, +which is only an euphonious contraction of e tou pheromenou +ephaptomene,—all things are in motion, and she in her wisdom moves with +them, and the wise God Hades consorts with her—there is nothing very +terrible in this, any more than in the her other appellation +Persephone, which is also significant of her wisdom (sophe). Apollo is +another name, which is supposed to have some dreadful meaning, but is +susceptible of at least four perfectly innocent explanations. First, he +is the purifier or purger or absolver (apolouon); secondly, he is the +true diviner, Aplos, as he is called in the Thessalian dialect (aplos = +aplous, sincere); thirdly, he is the archer (aei ballon), always +shooting; or again, supposing alpha to mean ama or omou, Apollo becomes +equivalent to ama polon, which points to both his musical and his +heavenly attributes; for there is a “moving together” alike in music +and in the harmony of the spheres. The second lambda is inserted in +order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction. The Muses are so +called—apo tou mosthai. The gentle Leto or Letho is named from her +willingness (ethelemon), or because she is ready to forgive and forget +(lethe). Artemis is so called from her healthy well-balanced nature, +dia to artemes, or as aretes istor; or as a lover of virginity, aroton +misesasa. One of these explanations is probably true,—perhaps all of +them. Dionysus is o didous ton oinon, and oinos is quasi oionous +because wine makes those think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (nous) +who have none. The established derivation of Aphrodite dia ten tou +athrou genesin may be accepted on the authority of Hesiod. Again, there +is the name of Pallas, or Athene, which we, who are Athenians, must not +forget. Pallas is derived from armed dances—apo tou pallein ta opla. +For Athene we must turn to the allegorical interpreters of Homer, who +make the name equivalent to theonoe, or possibly the word was +originally ethonoe and signified moral intelligence (en ethei noesis). +Hephaestus, again, is the lord of light—o tou phaeos istor. This is a +good notion; and, to prevent any other getting into our heads, let us +go on to Ares. He is the manly one (arren), or the unchangeable one +(arratos). Enough of the Gods; for, by the Gods, I am afraid of them; +but if you suggest other words, you will see how the horses of +Euthyphro prance. “Only one more God; tell me about my godfather +Hermes.” He is ermeneus, the messenger or cheater or thief or +bargainer; or o eirein momenos, that is, eiremes or ermes—the speaker +or contriver of speeches. “Well said Cratylus, then, that I am no son +of Hermes.” Pan, as the son of Hermes, is speech or the brother of +speech, and is called Pan because speech indicates everything—o pan +menuon. He has two forms, a true and a false; and is in the upper part +smooth, and in the lower part shaggy. He is the goat of Tragedy, in +which there are plenty of falsehoods. + +“Will you go on to the elements—sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, +fire, water, seasons, years?” Very good: and which shall I take first? +Let us begin with elios, or the sun. The Doric form elios helps us to +see that he is so called because at his rising he gathers (alizei) men +together, or because he rolls about (eilei) the earth, or because he +variegates (aiolei = poikillei) the earth. Selene is an anticipation of +Anaxagoras, being a contraction of selaenoneoaeia, the light (selas) +which is ever old and new, and which, as Anaxagoras says, is borrowed +from the sun; the name was harmonized into selanaia, a form which is +still in use. “That is a true dithyrambic name.” Meis is so called apo +tou meiousthai, from suffering diminution, and astron is from astrape +(lightning), which is an improvement of anastrope, that which turns the +eyes inside out. “How do you explain pur n udor?” I suspect that pur, +which, like udor n kuon, is found in Phrygian, is a foreign word; for +the Hellenes have borrowed much from the barbarians, and I always +resort to this theory of a foreign origin when I am at a loss. Aer may +be explained, oti airei ta apo tes ges; or, oti aei rei; or, oti pneuma +ex autou ginetai (compare the poetic word aetai). So aither quasi +aeitheer oti aei thei peri ton aera: ge, gaia quasi genneteira (compare +the Homeric form gegaasi); ora (with an omega), or, according to the +old Attic form ora (with an omicron), is derived apo tou orizein, +because it divides the year; eniautos and etos are the same thought—o +en eauto etazon, cut into two parts, en eauto and etazon, like di on ze +into Dios and Zenos. + +“You make surprising progress.” True; I am run away with, and am not +even yet at my utmost speed. “I should like very much to hear your +account of the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those +charming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?” To +explain all that will be a serious business; still, as I have put on +the lion’s skin, appearances must be maintained. My opinion is, that +primitive men were like some modern philosophers, who, by always going +round in their search after the nature of things, become dizzy; and +this phenomenon, which was really in themselves, they imagined to take +place in the external world. You have no doubt remarked, that the +doctrine of the universal flux, or generation of things, is indicated +in names. “No, I never did.” Phronesis is only phoras kai rou noesis, +or perhaps phoras onesis, and in any case is connected with pheresthai; +gnome is gones skepsis kai nomesis; noesis is neou or gignomenon esis; +the word neos implies that creation is always going on—the original +form was neoesis; sophrosune is soteria phroneseos; episteme is e +epomene tois pragmasin—the faculty which keeps close, neither +anticipating nor lagging behind; sunesis is equivalent to sunienai, +sumporeuesthai ten psuche, and is a kind of conclusion—sullogismos tis, +akin therefore in idea to episteme; sophia is very difficult, and has a +foreign look—the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things, +and may be illustrated by the poetical esuthe and the Lacedaemonian +proper name Sous, or Rush; agathon is ro agaston en te tachuteti,—for +all things are in motion, and some are swifter than others: dikaiosune +is clearly e tou dikaiou sunesis. The word dikaion is more troublesome, +and appears to mean the subtle penetrating power which, as the lovers +of motion say, preserves all things, and is the cause of all things, +quasi diaion going through—the letter kappa being inserted for the sake +of euphony. This is a great mystery which has been confided to me; but +when I ask for an explanation I am thought obtrusive, and another +derivation is proposed to me. Justice is said to be o kaion, or the +sun; and when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered, +“What, is there no justice when the sun is down?” And when I entreat my +questioner to tell me his own opinion, he replies, that justice is fire +in the abstract, or heat in the abstract; which is not very +intelligible. Others laugh at such notions, and say with Anaxagoras, +that justice is the ordering mind. “I think that some one must have +told you this.” And not the rest? Let me proceed then, in the hope of +proving to you my originality. Andreia is quasi anpeia quasi e ano roe, +the stream which flows upwards, and is opposed to injustice, which +clearly hinders the principle of penetration; arren and aner have a +similar derivation; gune is the same as gone; thelu is derived apo tes +theles, because the teat makes things flourish (tethelenai), and the +word thallein itself implies increase of youth, which is swift and +sudden ever (thein and allesthai). I am getting over the ground fast: +but much has still to be explained. There is techne, for instance. +This, by an aphaeresis of tau and an epenthesis of omicron in two +places, may be identified with echonoe, and signifies “that which has +mind.” + +“A very poor etymology.” Yes; but you must remember that all language +is in process of change; letters are taken in and put out for the sake +of euphony, and time is also a great alterer of words. For example, +what business has the letter rho in the word katoptron, or the letter +sigma in the word sphigx? The additions are often such that it is +impossible to make out the original word; and yet, if you may put in +and pull out, as you like, any name is equally good for any object. The +fact is, that great dictators of literature like yourself should +observe the rules of moderation. “I will do my best.” But do not be too +much of a precisian, or you will paralyze me. If you will let me add +mechane, apo tou mekous, which means polu, and anein, I shall be at the +summit of my powers, from which elevation I will examine the two words +kakia and arete. The first is easily explained in accordance with what +has preceded; for all things being in a flux, kakia is to kakos ion. +This derivation is illustrated by the word deilia, which ought to have +come after andreia, and may be regarded as o lian desmos tes psuches, +just as aporia signifies an impediment to motion (from alpha not, and +poreuesthai to go), and arete is euporia, which is the opposite of +this—the everflowing (aei reousa or aeireite), or the eligible, quasi +airete. You will think that I am inventing, but I say that if kakia is +right, then arete is also right. But what is kakon? That is a very +obscure word, to which I can only apply my old notion and declare that +kakon is a foreign word. Next, let us proceed to kalon, aischron. The +latter is doubtless contracted from aeischoroun, quasi aei ischon roun. +The inventor of words being a patron of the flux, was a great enemy to +stagnation. Kalon is to kaloun ta pragmata—this is mind (nous or +dianoia); which is also the principle of beauty; and which doing the +works of beauty, is therefore rightly called the beautiful. The meaning +of sumpheron is explained by previous examples;—like episteme, +signifying that the soul moves in harmony with the world (sumphora, +sumpheronta). Kerdos is to pasi kerannumenon—that which mingles with +all things: lusiteloun is equivalent to to tes phoras luon to telos, +and is not to be taken in the vulgar sense of gainful, but rather in +that of swift, being the principle which makes motion immortal and +unceasing; ophelimon is apo tou ophellein—that which gives increase: +this word, which is Homeric, is of foreign origin. Blaberon is to +blamton or boulomenon aptein tou rou—that which injures or seeks to +bind the stream. The proper word would be boulapteroun, but this is too +much of a mouthful—like a prelude on the flute in honour of Athene. The +word zemiodes is difficult; great changes, as I was saying, have been +made in words, and even a small change will alter their meaning very +much. The word deon is one of these disguised words. You know that +according to the old pronunciation, which is especially affected by the +women, who are great conservatives, iota and delta were used where we +should now use eta and zeta: for example, what we now call emera was +formerly called imera; and this shows the meaning of the word to have +been “the desired one coming after night,” and not, as is often +supposed, “that which makes things gentle” (emera). So again, zugon is +duogon, quasi desis duein eis agogen—(the binding of two together for +the purpose of drawing.) Deon, as ordinarily written, has an evil +sense, signifying the chain (desmos) or hindrance of motion; but in its +ancient form dion is expressive of good, quasi diion, that which +penetrates or goes through all. Zemiodes is really demiodes, and means +that which binds motion (dounti to ion): edone is e pros ten onrsin +teinousa praxis—the delta is an insertion: lupe is derived apo tes +dialuseos tou somatos: ania is from alpha and ienai, to go: algedon is +a foreign word, and is so called apo tou algeinou: odune is apo tes +enduseos tes lupes: achthedon is in its very sound a burden: chapa +expresses the flow of soul: terpsis is apo tou terpnou, and terpnon is +properly erpnon, because the sensation of pleasure is likened to a +breath (pnoe) which creeps (erpei) through the soul: euphrosune is +named from pheresthai, because the soul moves in harmony with nature: +epithumia is e epi ton thumon iousa dunamis: thumos is apo tes thuseos +tes psuches: imeros—oti eimenos pei e psuche: pothos, the desire which +is in another place, allothi pou: eros was anciently esros, and so +called because it flows into (esrei) the soul from without: doxa is e +dioxis tou eidenai, or expresses the shooting from a bow (toxon). The +latter etymology is confirmed by the words boulesthai, boule, aboulia, +which all have to do with shooting (bole): and similarly oiesis is +nothing but the movement (oisis) of the soul towards essence. Ekousion +is to eikon—the yielding—anagke is e an agke iousa, the passage through +ravines which impede motion: aletheia is theia ale, divine motion. +Pseudos is the opposite of this, implying the principle of constraint +and forced repose, which is expressed under the figure of sleep, to +eudon; the psi is an addition. Onoma, a name, affirms the real +existence of that which is sought after—on ou masma estin. On and ousia +are only ion with an iota broken off; and ouk on is ouk ion. “And what +are ion, reon, doun?” One way of explaining them has been already +suggested—they may be of foreign origin; and possibly this is the true +answer. But mere antiquity may often prevent our recognizing words, +after all the complications which they have undergone; and we must +remember that however far we carry back our analysis some ultimate +elements or roots will remain which can be no further analyzed. For +example; the word agathos was supposed by us to be a compound of +agastos and thoos, and probably thoos may be further resolvable. But if +we take a word of which no further resolution seems attainable, we may +fairly conclude that we have reached one of these original elements, +and the truth of such a word must be tested by some new method. Will +you help me in the search? + +All names, whether primary or secondary, are intended to show the +nature of things; and the secondary, as I conceive, derive their +significance from the primary. But then, how do the primary names +indicate anything? And let me ask another question,—If we had no +faculty of speech, how should we communicate with one another? Should +we not use signs, like the deaf and dumb? The elevation of our hands +would mean lightness—heaviness would be expressed by letting them drop. +The running of any animal would be described by a similar movement of +our own frames. The body can only express anything by imitation; and +the tongue or mouth can imitate as well as the rest of the body. But +this imitation of the tongue or voice is not yet a name, because people +may imitate sheep or goats without naming them. What, then, is a name? +In the first place, a name is not a musical, or, secondly, a pictorial +imitation, but an imitation of that kind which expresses the nature of +a thing; and is the invention not of a musician, or of a painter, but +of a namer. + +And now, I think that we may consider the names about which you were +asking. The way to analyze them will be by going back to the letters, +or primary elements of which they are composed. First, we separate the +alphabet into classes of letters, distinguishing the consonants, mutes, +vowels, and semivowels; and when we have learnt them singly, we shall +learn to know them in their various combinations of two or more +letters; just as the painter knows how to use either a single colour, +or a combination of colours. And like the painter, we may apply letters +to the expression of objects, and form them into syllables; and these +again into words, until the picture or figure—that is, language—is +completed. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I mean to +say that this was the way in which the ancients framed language. And +this leads me to consider whether the primary as well as the secondary +elements are rightly given. I may remark, as I was saying about the +Gods, that we can only attain to conjecture of them. But still we +insist that ours is the true and only method of discovery; otherwise we +must have recourse, like the tragic poets, to a Deus ex machina, and +say that God gave the first names, and therefore they are right; or +that the barbarians are older than we are, and that we learnt of them; +or that antiquity has cast a veil over the truth. Yet all these are not +reasons; they are only ingenious excuses for having no reasons. + +I will freely impart to you my own notions, though they are somewhat +crude:—the letter rho appears to me to be the general instrument which +the legislator has employed to express all motion or kinesis. (I ought +to explain that kinesis is just iesis (going), for the letter eta was +unknown to the ancients; and the root, kiein, is a foreign form of +ienai: of kinesis or eisis, the opposite is stasis). This use of rho is +evident in the words tremble, break, crush, crumble, and the like; the +imposer of names perceived that the tongue is most agitated in the +pronunciation of this letter, just as he used iota to express the +subtle power which penetrates through all things. The letters phi, psi, +sigma, zeta, which require a great deal of wind, are employed in the +imitation of such notions as shivering, seething, shaking, and in +general of what is windy. The letters delta and tau convey the idea of +binding and rest in a place: the lambda denotes smoothness, as in the +words slip, sleek, sleep, and the like. But when the slipping tongue is +detained by the heavier sound of gamma, then arises the notion of a +glutinous clammy nature: nu is sounded from within, and has a notion of +inwardness: alpha is the expression of size; eta of length; omicron of +roundness, and therefore there is plenty of omicron in the word +goggulon. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the correctness of names; and +I should like to hear what Cratylus would say. “But, Socrates, as I was +telling you, Cratylus mystifies me; I should like to ask him, in your +presence, what he means by the fitness of names?” To this appeal, +Cratylus replies “that he cannot explain so important a subject all in +a moment.” “No, but you may ‘add little to little,’ as Hesiod says.” +Socrates here interposes his own request, that Cratylus will give some +account of his theory. Hermogenes and himself are mere sciolists, but +Cratylus has reflected on these matters, and has had teachers. Cratylus +replies in the words of Achilles: “‘Illustrious Ajax, you have spoken +in all things much to my mind,’ whether Euthyphro, or some Muse +inhabiting your own breast, was the inspirer.” Socrates replies, that +he is afraid of being self-deceived, and therefore he must “look fore +and aft,” as Homer remarks. Does not Cratylus agree with him that names +teach us the nature of things? “Yes.” And naming is an art, and the +artists are legislators, and like artists in general, some of them are +better and some of them are worse than others, and give better or worse +laws, and make better or worse names. Cratylus cannot admit that one +name is better than another; they are either true names, or they are +not names at all; and when he is asked about the name of Hermogenes, +who is acknowledged to have no luck in him, he affirms this to be the +name of somebody else. Socrates supposes him to mean that falsehood is +impossible, to which his own answer would be, that there has never been +a lack of liars. Cratylus presses him with the old sophistical +argument, that falsehood is saying that which is not, and therefore +saying nothing;—you cannot utter the word which is not. Socrates +complains that this argument is too subtle for an old man to +understand: Suppose a person addressing Cratylus were to say, Hail, +Athenian Stranger, Hermogenes! would these words be true or false? “I +should say that they would be mere unmeaning sounds, like the hammering +of a brass pot.” But you would acknowledge that names, as well as +pictures, are imitations, and also that pictures may give a right or +wrong representation of a man or woman:—why may not names then equally +give a representation true and right or false and wrong? Cratylus +admits that pictures may give a true or false representation, but +denies that names can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man and +say “this is year picture,” and again, he may go and say to him “this +is your name”—in the one case appealing to his sense of sight, and in +the other to his sense of hearing;—may he not? “Yes.” Then you will +admit that there is a right or a wrong assignment of names, and if of +names, then of verbs and nouns; and if of verbs and nouns, then of the +sentences which are made up of them; and comparing nouns to pictures, +you may give them all the appropriate sounds, or only some of them. And +as he who gives all the colours makes a good picture, and he who gives +only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but still a picture; so he +who gives all the sounds makes a good name, and he who gives only some +of them, a bad or imperfect one, but a name still. The artist of names, +that is, the legislator, may be a good or he may be a bad artist. “Yes, +Socrates, but the cases are not parallel; for if you subtract or +misplace a letter, the name ceases to be a name.” Socrates admits that +the number 10, if an unit is subtracted, would cease to be 10, but +denies that names are of this purely quantitative nature. Suppose that +there are two objects—Cratylus and the image of Cratylus; and let us +imagine that some God makes them perfectly alike, both in their outward +form and in their inner nature and qualities: then there will be two +Cratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of Cratylus. But an +image in fact always falls short in some degree of the original, and if +images are not exact counterparts, why should names be? if they were, +they would be the doubles of their originals, and indistinguishable +from them; and how ridiculous would this be! Cratylus admits the truth +of Socrates’ remark. But then Socrates rejoins, he should have the +courage to acknowledge that letters may be wrongly inserted in a noun, +or a noun in a sentence; and yet the noun or the sentence may retain a +meaning. Better to admit this, that we may not be punished like the +traveller in Egina who goes about at night, and that Truth herself may +not say to us, “Too late.” And, errors excepted, we may still affirm +that a name to be correct must have proper letters, which bear a +resemblance to the thing signified. I must remind you of what +Hermogenes and I were saying about the letter rho accent, which was +held to be expressive of motion and hardness, as lambda is of +smoothness;—and this you will admit to be their natural meaning. But +then, why do the Eritreans call that skleroter which we call sklerotes? +We can understand one another, although the letter rho accent is not +equivalent to the letter s: why is this? You reply, because the two +letters are sufficiently alike for the purpose of expressing motion. +Well, then, there is the letter lambda; what business has this in a +word meaning hardness? “Why, Socrates, I retort upon you, that we put +in and pull out letters at pleasure.” And the explanation of this is +custom or agreement: we have made a convention that the rho shall mean +s and a convention may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. +How could there be names for all the numbers unless you allow that +convention is used? Imitation is a poor thing, and has to be +supplemented by convention, which is another poor thing; although I +agree with you in thinking that the most perfect form of language is +found only where there is a perfect correspondence of sound and +meaning. But let me ask you what is the use and force of names? “The +use of names, Socrates, is to inform, and he who knows names knows +things.” Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the +discovery of things? “Yes.” But do you not see that there is a degree +of deception about names? He who first gave names, gave them according +to his conception, and that may have been erroneous. “But then, why, +Socrates, is language so consistent? all words have the same laws.” +Mere consistency is no test of truth. In geometrical problems, for +example, there may be a flaw at the beginning, and yet the conclusion +may follow consistently. And, therefore, a wise man will take especial +care of first principles. But are words really consistent; are there +not as many terms of praise which signify rest as which signify motion? +There is episteme, which is connected with stasis, as mneme is with +meno. Bebaion, again, is the expression of station and position; +istoria is clearly descriptive of the stopping istanai of the stream; +piston indicates the cessation of motion; and there are many words +having a bad sense, which are connected with ideas of motion, such as +sumphora, amartia, etc.: amathia, again, might be explained, as e ama +theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus +the bad names are framed on the same principle as the good, and other +examples might be given, which would favour a theory of rest rather +than of motion. “Yes; but the greater number of words express motion.” +Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is correctness of names to be +determined by the voice of a majority? + +Here is another point: we were saying that the legislator gives names; +and therefore we must suppose that he knows the things which he names: +but how can he have learnt things from names before there were any +names? “I believe, Socrates, that some power more than human first gave +things their names, and that these were necessarily true names.” Then +how came the giver of names to contradict himself, and to make some +names expressive of rest, and others of motion? “I do not suppose that +he did make them both.” Then which did he make—those which are +expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion?...But if +some names are true and others false, we can only decide between them, +not by counting words, but by appealing to things. And, if so, we must +allow that things may be known without names; for names, as we have +several times admitted, are the images of things; and the higher +knowledge is of things, and is not to be derived from names; and though +I do not doubt that the inventors of language gave names, under the +idea that all things are in a state of motion and flux, I believe that +they were mistaken; and that having fallen into a whirlpool themselves, +they are trying to drag us after them. For is there not a true beauty +and a true good, which is always beautiful and always good? Can the +thing beauty be vanishing away from us while the words are yet in our +mouths? And they could not be known by any one if they are always +passing away—for if they are always passing away, the observer has no +opportunity of observing their state. Whether the doctrine of the flux +or of the eternal nature be the truer, is hard to determine. But no man +of sense will put himself, or the education of his mind, in the power +of names: he will not condemn himself to be an unreal thing, nor will +he believe that everything is in a flux like the water in a leaky +vessel, or that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This +doctrine may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue; +and therefore I would have you reflect while you are young, and find +out the truth, and when you know come and tell me. “I have thought, +Socrates, and after a good deal of thinking I incline to Heracleitus.” +Then another day, my friend, you shall give me a lesson. “Very good, +Socrates, and I hope that you will continue to study these things +yourself.” + + +We may now consider (I) how far Plato in the Cratylus has discovered +the true principles of language, and then (II) proceed to compare +modern speculations respecting the origin and nature of language with +the anticipations of his genius. + +I. (1) Plato is aware that language is not the work of chance; nor does +he deny that there is a natural fitness in names. He only insists that +this natural fitness shall be intelligibly explained. But he has no +idea that language is a natural organism. He would have heard with +surprise that languages are the common work of whole nations in a +primitive or semi-barbarous age. How, he would probably have argued, +could men devoid of art have contrived a structure of such complexity? +No answer could have been given to this question, either in ancient or +in modern times, until the nature of primitive antiquity had been +thoroughly studied, and the instincts of man had been shown to exist in +greater force, when his state approaches more nearly to that of +children or animals. The philosophers of the last century, after their +manner, would have vainly endeavoured to trace the process by which +proper names were converted into common, and would have shown how the +last effort of abstraction invented prepositions and auxiliaries. The +theologian would have proved that language must have had a divine +origin, because in childhood, while the organs are pliable, the +intelligence is wanting, and when the intelligence is able to frame +conceptions, the organs are no longer able to express them. Or, as +others have said: Man is man because he has the gift of speech; and he +could not have invented that which he is. But this would have been an +“argument too subtle” for Socrates, who rejects the theological account +of the origin of language “as an excuse for not giving a reason,” which +he compares to the introduction of the “Deus ex machina” by the tragic +poets when they have to solve a difficulty; thus anticipating many +modern controversies in which the primary agency of the divine Being is +confused with the secondary cause; and God is assumed to have worked a +miracle in order to fill up a lacuna in human knowledge. (Compare +Timaeus.) + +Neither is Plato wrong in supposing that an element of design and art +enters into language. The creative power abating is supplemented by a +mechanical process. “Languages are not made but grow,” but they are +made as well as grow; bursting into life like a plant or a flower, they +are also capable of being trained and improved and engrafted upon one +another. The change in them is effected in earlier ages by musical and +euphonic improvements, at a later stage by the influence of grammar and +logic, and by the poetical and literary use of words. They develope +rapidly in childhood, and when they are full grown and set they may +still put forth intellectual powers, like the mind in the body, or +rather we may say that the nobler use of language only begins when the +frame-work is complete. The savage or primitive man, in whom the +natural instinct is strongest, is also the greatest improver of the +forms of language. He is the poet or maker of words, as in civilised +ages the dialectician is the definer or distinguisher of them. The +latter calls the second world of abstract terms into existence, as the +former has created the picture sounds which represent natural objects +or processes. Poetry and philosophy—these two, are the two great +formative principles of language, when they have passed their first +stage, of which, as of the first invention of the arts in general, we +only entertain conjecture. And mythology is a link between them, +connecting the visible and invisible, until at length the sensuous +exterior falls away, and the severance of the inner and outer world, of +the idea and the object of sense, becomes complete. At a later period, +logic and grammar, sister arts, preserve and enlarge the decaying +instinct of language, by rule and method, which they gather from +analysis and observation. + +(2) There is no trace in any of Plato’s writings that he was acquainted +with any language but Greek. Yet he has conceived very truly the +relation of Greek to foreign languages, which he is led to consider, +because he finds that many Greek words are incapable of explanation. +Allowing a good deal for accident, and also for the fancies of the +conditores linguae Graecae, there is an element of which he is unable +to give an account. These unintelligible words he supposes to be of +foreign origin, and to have been derived from a time when the Greeks +were either barbarians, or in close relations to the barbarians. +Socrates is aware that this principle is liable to great abuse; and, +like the “Deus ex machina,” explains nothing. Hence he excuses himself +for the employment of such a device, and remarks that in foreign words +there is still a principle of correctness, which applies equally both +to Greeks and barbarians. + +(3) But the greater number of primary words do not admit of derivation +from foreign languages; they must be resolved into the letters out of +which they are composed, and therefore the letters must have a meaning. +The framers of language were aware of this; they observed that alpha +was adapted to express size; eta length; omicron roundness; nu +inwardness; rho accent rush or roar; lambda liquidity; gamma lambda the +detention of the liquid or slippery element; delta and tau binding; +phi, psi, sigma, xi, wind and cold, and so on. Plato’s analysis of the +letters of the alphabet shows a wonderful insight into the nature of +language. He does not expressively distinguish between mere imitation +and the symbolical use of sound to express thought, but he recognises +in the examples which he gives both modes of imitation. Gesture is the +mode which a deaf and dumb person would take of indicating his meaning. +And language is the gesture of the tongue; in the use of the letter rho +accent, to express a rushing or roaring, or of omicron to express +roundness, there is a direct imitation; while in the use of the letter +alpha to express size, or of eta to express length, the imitation is +symbolical. The use of analogous or similar sounds, in order to express +similar analogous ideas, seems to have escaped him. + +In passing from the gesture of the body to the movement of the tongue, +Plato makes a great step in the physiology of language. He was probably +the first who said that “language is imitative sound,” which is the +greatest and deepest truth of philology; although he is not aware of +the laws of euphony and association by which imitation must be +regulated. He was probably also the first who made a distinction +between simple and compound words, a truth second only in importance to +that which has just been mentioned. His great insight in one direction +curiously contrasts with his blindness in another; for he appears to be +wholly unaware (compare his derivation of agathos from agastos and +thoos) of the difference between the root and termination. But we must +recollect that he was necessarily more ignorant than any schoolboy of +Greek grammar, and had no table of the inflexions of verbs and nouns +before his eyes, which might have suggested to him the distinction. + +(4) Plato distinctly affirms that language is not truth, or +“philosophie une langue bien faite.” At first, Socrates has delighted +himself with discovering the flux of Heracleitus in language. But he is +covertly satirising the pretence of that or any other age to find +philosophy in words; and he afterwards corrects any erroneous inference +which might be gathered from his experiment. For he finds as many, or +almost as many, words expressive of rest, as he had previously found +expressive of motion. And even if this had been otherwise, who would +learn of words when he might learn of things? There is a great +controversy and high argument between Heracleiteans and Eleatics, but +no man of sense would commit his soul in such enquiries to the imposers +of names...In this and other passages Plato shows that he is as +completely emancipated from the influence of “Idols of the tribe” as +Bacon himself. + +The lesson which may be gathered from words is not metaphysical or +moral, but historical. They teach us the affinity of races, they tell +us something about the association of ideas, they occasionally preserve +the memory of a disused custom; but we cannot safely argue from them +about right and wrong, matter and mind, freedom and necessity, or the +other problems of moral and metaphysical philosophy. For the use of +words on such subjects may often be metaphorical, accidental, derived +from other languages, and may have no relation to the contemporary +state of thought and feeling. Nor in any case is the invention of them +the result of philosophical reflection; they have been commonly +transferred from matter to mind, and their meaning is the very reverse +of their etymology. Because there is or is not a name for a thing, we +cannot argue that the thing has or has not an actual existence; or that +the antitheses, parallels, conjugates, correlatives of language have +anything corresponding to them in nature. There are too many words as +well as too few; and they generalize the objects or ideas which they +represent. The greatest lesson which the philosophical analysis of +language teaches us is, that we should be above language, making words +our servants, and not allowing them to be our masters. + +Plato does not add the further observation, that the etymological +meaning of words is in process of being lost. If at first framed on a +principle of intelligibility, they would gradually cease to be +intelligible, like those of a foreign language, he is willing to admit +that they are subject to many changes, and put on many disguises. He +acknowledges that the “poor creature” imitation is supplemented by +another “poor creature,”—convention. But he does not see that “habit +and repute,” and their relation to other words, are always exercising +an influence over them. Words appear to be isolated, but they are +really the parts of an organism which is always being reproduced. They +are refined by civilization, harmonized by poetry, emphasized by +literature, technically applied in philosophy and art; they are used as +symbols on the border-ground of human knowledge; they receive a fresh +impress from individual genius, and come with a new force and +association to every lively-minded person. They are fixed by the +simultaneous utterance of millions, and yet are always imperceptibly +changing;—not the inventors of language, but writing and speaking, and +particularly great writers, or works which pass into the hearts of +nations, Homer, Shakespear, Dante, the German or English Bible, Kant +and Hegel, are the makers of them in later ages. They carry with them +the faded recollection of their own past history; the use of a word in +a striking and familiar passage gives a complexion to its use +everywhere else, and the new use of an old and familiar phrase has also +a peculiar power over us. But these and other subtleties of language +escaped the observation of Plato. He is not aware that the languages of +the world are organic structures, and that every word in them is +related to every other; nor does he conceive of language as the joint +work of the speaker and the hearer, requiring in man a faculty not only +of expressing his thoughts but of understanding those of others. + +On the other hand, he cannot be justly charged with a desire to frame +language on artificial principles. Philosophers have sometimes dreamed +of a technical or scientific language, in words which should have fixed +meanings, and stand in the same relation to one another as the +substances which they denote. But there is no more trace of this in +Plato than there is of a language corresponding to the ideas; nor, +indeed, could the want of such a language be felt until the sciences +were far more developed. Those who would extend the use of technical +phraseology beyond the limits of science or of custom, seem to forget +that freedom and suggestiveness and the play of association are +essential characteristics of language. The great master has shown how +he regarded pedantic distinctions of words or attempts to confine their +meaning in the satire on Prodicus in the Protagoras. + +(5) In addition to these anticipations of the general principles of +philology, we may note also a few curious observations on words and +sounds. “The Eretrians say sklerotes for skleroter;” “the Thessalians +call Apollo Amlos;” “The Phrygians have the words pur, udor, kunes +slightly changed;” “there is an old Homeric word emesato, meaning ‘he +contrived’;” “our forefathers, and especially the women, who are most +conservative of the ancient language, loved the letters iota and delta; +but now iota is changed into eta and epsilon, and delta into zeta; this +is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.” Plato was very +willing to use inductive arguments, so far as they were within his +reach; but he would also have assigned a large influence to chance. Nor +indeed is induction applicable to philology in the same degree as to +most of the physical sciences. For after we have pushed our researches +to the furthest point, in language as in all the other creations of the +human mind, there will always remain an element of exception or +accident or free-will, which cannot be eliminated. + +The question, “whether falsehood is impossible,” which Socrates +characteristically sets aside as too subtle for an old man (compare +Euthyd.), could only have arisen in an age of imperfect consciousness, +which had not yet learned to distinguish words from things. Socrates +replies in effect that words have an independent existence; thus +anticipating the solution of the mediaeval controversy of Nominalism +and Realism. He is aware too that languages exist in various degrees of +perfection, and that the analysis of them can only be carried to a +certain point. “If we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, +which are the appropriate expressions, that would be the most perfect +state of language.” These words suggest a question of deeper interest +than the origin of language; viz. what is the ideal of language, how +far by any correction of their usages existing languages might become +clearer and more expressive than they are, more poetical, and also more +logical; or whether they are now finally fixed and have received their +last impress from time and authority. + +On the whole, the Cratylus seems to contain deeper truths about +language than any other ancient writing. But feeling the uncertain +ground upon which he is walking, and partly in order to preserve the +character of Socrates, Plato envelopes the whole subject in a robe of +fancy, and allows his principles to drop out as if by accident. + +II. What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and +nature of language? Like other modern metaphysical enquiries, they end +at last in a statement of facts. But, in order to state or understand +the facts, a metaphysical insight seems to be required. There are more +things in language than the human mind easily conceives. And many +fallacies have to be dispelled, as well as observations made. The true +spirit of philosophy or metaphysics can alone charm away metaphysical +illusions, which are always reappearing, formerly in the fancies of +neoplatonist writers, now in the disguise of experience and common +sense. An analogy, a figure of speech, an intelligible theory, a +superficial observation of the individual, have often been mistaken for +a true account of the origin of language. + +Speaking is one of the simplest natural operations, and also the most +complex. Nothing would seem to be easier or more trivial than a few +words uttered by a child in any language. Yet into the formation of +those words have entered causes which the human mind is not capable of +calculating. They are a drop or two of the great stream or ocean of +speech which has been flowing in all ages. They have been transmitted +from one language to another; like the child himself, they go back to +the beginnings of the human race. How they originated, who can tell? +Nevertheless we can imagine a stage of human society in which the +circle of men’s minds was narrower and their sympathies and instincts +stronger; in which their organs of speech were more flexible, and the +sense of hearing finer and more discerning; in which they lived more in +company, and after the manner of children were more given to express +their feelings; in which “they moved all together,” like a herd of wild +animals, “when they moved at all.” Among them, as in every society, a +particular person would be more sensitive and intelligent than the +rest. Suddenly, on some occasion of interest (at the approach of a wild +beast, shall we say?), he first, they following him, utter a cry which +resounds through the forest. The cry is almost or quite involuntary, +and may be an imitation of the roar of the animal. Thus far we have not +speech, but only the inarticulate expression of feeling or emotion in +no respect differing from the cries of animals; for they too call to +one another and are answered. But now suppose that some one at a +distance not only hears the sound, but apprehends the meaning: or we +may imagine that the cry is repeated to a member of the society who had +been absent; the others act the scene over again when he returns home +in the evening. And so the cry becomes a word. The hearer in turn gives +back the word to the speaker, who is now aware that he has acquired a +new power. Many thousand times he exercises this power; like a child +learning to talk, he repeats the same cry again, and again he is +answered; he tries experiments with a like result, and the speaker and +the hearer rejoice together in their newly-discovered faculty. At first +there would be few such cries, and little danger of mistaking or +confusing them. For the mind of primitive man had a narrow range of +perceptions and feelings; his senses were microscopic; twenty or thirty +sounds or gestures would be enough for him, nor would he have any +difficulty in finding them. Naturally he broke out into speech—like the +young infant he laughed and babbled; but not until there were hearers +as well as speakers did language begin. Not the interjection or the +vocal imitation of the object, but the interjection or the vocal +imitation of the object understood, is the first rudiment of human +speech. + +After a while the word gathers associations, and has an independent +existence. The imitation of the lion’s roar calls up the fears and +hopes of the chase, which are excited by his appearance. In the moment +of hearing the sound, without any appreciable interval, these and other +latent experiences wake up in the mind of the hearer. Not only does he +receive an impression, but he brings previous knowledge to bear upon +that impression. Necessarily the pictorial image becomes less vivid, +while the association of the nature and habits of the animal is more +distinctly perceived. The picture passes into a symbol, for there would +be too many of them and they would crowd the mind; the vocal imitation, +too, is always in process of being lost and being renewed, just as the +picture is brought back again in the description of the poet. Words now +can be used more freely because there are more of them. What was once +an involuntary expression becomes voluntary. Not only can men utter a +cry or call, but they can communicate and converse; they can not only +use words, but they can even play with them. The word is separated both +from the object and from the mind; and slowly nations and individuals +attain to a fuller consciousness of themselves. + +Parallel with this mental process the articulation of sounds is +gradually becoming perfected. The finer sense detects the differences +of them, and begins, first to agglomerate, then to distinguish them. +Times, persons, places, relations of all kinds, are expressed by +modifications of them. The earliest parts of speech, as we may call +them by anticipation, like the first utterances of children, probably +partook of the nature of interjections and nouns; then came verbs; at +length the whole sentence appeared, and rhythm and metre followed. Each +stage in the progress of language was accompanied by some corresponding +stage in the mind and civilisation of man. In time, when the family +became a nation, the wild growth of dialects passed into a language. +Then arose poetry and literature. We can hardly realize to ourselves +how much with each improvement of language the powers of the human mind +were enlarged; how the inner world took the place of outer; how the +pictorial or symbolical or analogical word was refined into a notion; +how language, fair and large and free, was at last complete. + +So we may imagine the speech of man to have begun as with the cries of +animals, or the stammering lips of children, and to have attained by +degrees the perfection of Homer and Plato. Yet we are far from saying +that this or any other theory of language is proved by facts. It is not +difficult to form an hypothesis which by a series of imaginary +transitions will bridge over the chasm which separates man from the +animals. Differences of kind may often be thus resolved into +differences of degree. But we must not assume that we have in this way +discovered the true account of them. Through what struggles the +harmonious use of the organs of speech was acquired; to what extent the +conditions of human life were different; how far the genius of +individuals may have contributed to the discovery of this as of the +other arts, we cannot say: Only we seem to see that language is as much +the creation of the ear as of the tongue, and the expression of a +movement stirring the hearts not of one man only but of many, “as the +trees of the wood are stirred by the wind.” The theory is consistent or +not inconsistent with our own mental experience, and throws some degree +of light upon a dark corner of the human mind. + +In the later analysis of language, we trace the opposite and contrasted +elements of the individual and nation, of the past and present, of the +inward and outward, of the subject and object, of the notional and +relational, of the root or unchanging part of the word and of the +changing inflexion, if such a distinction be admitted, of the vowel and +the consonant, of quantity and accent, of speech and writing, of poetry +and prose. We observe also the reciprocal influence of sounds and +conceptions on each other, like the connexion of body and mind; and +further remark that although the names of objects were originally +proper names, as the grammarian or logician might call them, yet at a +later stage they become universal notions, which combine into +particulars and individuals, and are taken out of the first rude +agglomeration of sounds that they may be replaced in a higher and more +logical order. We see that in the simplest sentences are contained +grammar and logic—the parts of speech, the Eleatic philosophy and the +Kantian categories. So complex is language, and so expressive not only +of the meanest wants of man, but of his highest thoughts; so various +are the aspects in which it is regarded by us. Then again, when we +follow the history of languages, we observe that they are always slowly +moving, half dead, half alive, half solid, half fluid; the breath of a +moment, yet like the air, continuous in all ages and countries,—like +the glacier, too, containing within them a trickling stream which +deposits debris of the rocks over which it passes. There were happy +moments, as we may conjecture, in the lives of nations, at which they +came to the birth—as in the golden age of literature, the man and the +time seem to conspire; the eloquence of the bard or chief, as in later +times the creations of the great writer who is the expression of his +age, became impressed on the minds of their countrymen, perhaps in the +hour of some crisis of national development—a migration, a conquest, or +the like. The picture of the word which was beginning to be lost, is +now revived; the sound again echoes to the sense; men find themselves +capable not only of expressing more feelings, and describing more +objects, but of expressing and describing them better. The world before +the flood, that is to say, the world of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand +years ago, has passed away and left no sign. But the best conception +that we can form of it, though imperfect and uncertain, is gained from +the analogy of causes still in action, some powerful and sudden, others +working slowly in the course of infinite ages. Something too may be +allowed to “the persistency of the strongest,” to “the survival of the +fittest,” in this as in the other realms of nature. + +These are some of the reflections which the modern philosophy of +language suggests to us about the powers of the human mind and the +forces and influences by which the efforts of men to utter articulate +sounds were inspired. Yet in making these and similar generalizations +we may note also dangers to which we are exposed. (1) There is the +confusion of ideas with facts—of mere possibilities, and generalities, +and modes of conception with actual and definite knowledge. The words +“evolution,” “birth,” “law,” development,” “instinct,” “implicit,” +“explicit,” and the like, have a false clearness or comprehensiveness, +which adds nothing to our knowledge. The metaphor of a flower or a +tree, or some other work of nature or art, is often in like manner only +a pleasing picture. (2) There is the fallacy of resolving the languages +which we know into their parts, and then imagining that we can discover +the nature of language by reconstructing them. (3) There is the danger +of identifying language, not with thoughts but with ideas. (4) There is +the error of supposing that the analysis of grammar and logic has +always existed, or that their distinctions were familiar to Socrates +and Plato. (5) There is the fallacy of exaggerating, and also of +diminishing the interval which separates articulate from inarticulate +language—the cries of animals from the speech of man—the instincts of +animals from the reason of man. (6) There is the danger which besets +all enquiries into the early history of man—of interpreting the past by +the present, and of substituting the definite and intelligible for the +true but dim outline which is the horizon of human knowledge. + +The greatest light is thrown upon the nature of language by analogy. We +have the analogy of the cries of animals, of the songs of birds (“man, +like the nightingale, is a singing bird, but is ever binding up +thoughts with musical notes”), of music, of children learning to speak, +of barbarous nations in which the linguistic instinct is still +undecayed, of ourselves learning to think and speak a new language, of +the deaf and dumb who have words without sounds, of the various +disorders of speech; and we have the after-growth of mythology, which, +like language, is an unconscious creation of the human mind. We can +observe the social and collective instincts of animals, and may remark +how, when domesticated, they have the power of understanding but not of +speaking, while on the other hand, some birds which are comparatively +devoid of intelligence, make a nearer approach to articulate speech. We +may note how in the animals there is a want of that sympathy with one +another which appears to be the soul of language. We can compare the +use of speech with other mental and bodily operations; for speech too +is a kind of gesture, and in the child or savage accompanied with +gesture. We may observe that the child learns to speak, as he learns to +walk or to eat, by a natural impulse; yet in either case not without a +power of imitation which is also natural to him—he is taught to read, +but he breaks forth spontaneously in speech. We can trace the impulse +to bind together the world in ideas beginning in the first efforts to +speak and culminating in philosophy. But there remains an element which +cannot be explained, or even adequately described. We can understand +how man creates or constructs consciously and by design; and see, if we +do not understand, how nature, by a law, calls into being an organised +structure. But the intermediate organism which stands between man and +nature, which is the work of mind yet unconscious, and in which mind +and matter seem to meet, and mind unperceived to herself is really +limited by all other minds, is neither understood nor seen by us, and +is with reluctance admitted to be a fact. + +Language is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations, the +transfiguration of the world in thought, the meeting-point of the +physical and mental sciences, and also the mirror in which they are +reflected, present at every moment to the individual, and yet having a +sort of eternal or universal nature. When we analyze our own mental +processes, we find words everywhere in every degree of clearness and +consistency, fading away in dreams and more like pictures, rapidly +succeeding one another in our waking thoughts, attaining a greater +distinctness and consecutiveness in speech, and a greater still in +writing, taking the place of one another when we try to become +emancipated from their influence. For in all processes of the mind +which are conscious we are talking to ourselves; the attempt to think +without words is a mere illusion,—they are always reappearing when we +fix our thoughts. And speech is not a separate faculty, but the +expression of all our faculties, to which all our other powers of +expression, signs, looks, gestures, lend their aid, of which the +instrument is not the tongue only, but more than half the human frame. + +The minds of men are sometimes carried on to think of their lives and +of their actions as links in a chain of causes and effects going back +to the beginning of time. A few have seemed to lose the sense of their +own individuality in the universal cause or nature. In like manner we +might think of the words which we daily use, as derived from the first +speech of man, and of all the languages in the world, as the +expressions or varieties of a single force or life of language of which +the thoughts of men are the accident. Such a conception enables us to +grasp the power and wonder of languages, and is very natural to the +scientific philologist. For he, like the metaphysician, believes in the +reality of that which absorbs his own mind. Nor do we deny the enormous +influence which language has exercised over thought. Fixed words, like +fixed ideas, have often governed the world. But in such representations +we attribute to language too much the nature of a cause, and too little +of an effect,—too much of an absolute, too little of a relative +character,—too much of an ideal, too little of a matter-of-fact +existence. + +Or again, we may frame a single abstract notion of language of which +all existent languages may be supposed to be the perversion. But we +must not conceive that this logical figment had ever a real existence, +or is anything more than an effort of the mind to give unity to +infinitely various phenomena. There is no abstract language “in rerum +natura,” any more than there is an abstract tree, but only languages in +various stages of growth, maturity, and decay. Nor do other logical +distinctions or even grammatical exactly correspond to the facts of +language; for they too are attempts to give unity and regularity to a +subject which is partly irregular. + +We find, however, that there are distinctions of another kind by which +this vast field of language admits of being mapped out. There is the +distinction between biliteral and triliteral roots, and the various +inflexions which accompany them; between the mere mechanical cohesion +of sounds or words, and the “chemical” combination of them into a new +word; there is the distinction between languages which have had a free +and full development of their organisms, and languages which have been +stunted in their growth,—lamed in their hands or feet, and never able +to acquire afterwards the powers in which they are deficient; there is +the distinction between synthetical languages like Greek and Latin, +which have retained their inflexions, and analytical languages like +English or French, which have lost them. Innumerable as are the +languages and dialects of mankind, there are comparatively few classes +to which they can be referred. + +Another road through this chaos is provided by the physiology of +speech. The organs of language are the same in all mankind, and are +only capable of uttering a certain number of sounds. Every man has +tongue, teeth, lips, palate, throat, mouth, which he may close or open, +and adapt in various ways; making, first, vowels and consonants; and +secondly, other classes of letters. The elements of all speech, like +the elements of the musical scale, are few and simple, though admitting +of infinite gradations and combinations. Whatever slight differences +exist in the use or formation of these organs, owing to climate or the +sense of euphony or other causes, they are as nothing compared with +their agreement. Here then is a real basis of unity in the study of +philology, unlike that imaginary abstract unity of which we were just +now speaking. + +Whether we regard language from the psychological, or historical, or +physiological point of view, the materials of our knowledge are +inexhaustible. The comparisons of children learning to speak, of +barbarous nations, of musical notes, of the cries of animals, of the +song of birds, increase our insight into the nature of human speech. +Many observations which would otherwise have escaped us are suggested +by them. But they do not explain why, in man and in man only, the +speaker met with a response from the hearer, and the half articulate +sound gradually developed into Sanscrit and Greek. They hardly enable +us to approach any nearer the secret of the origin of language, which, +like some of the other great secrets of nature,—the origin of birth and +death, or of animal life,—remains inviolable. That problem is +indissolubly bound up with the origin of man; and if we ever know more +of the one, we may expect to know more of the other.[1] + + [1] Compare W. Humboldt, _Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen + Sprachbaues_, and M. Müller, _Lectures on the Science of Language_. + + + +It is more than sixteen years since the preceding remarks were written, +which with a few alterations have now been reprinted. During the +interval the progress of philology has been very great. More languages +have been compared; the inner structure of language has been laid bare; +the relations of sounds have been more accurately discriminated; the +manner in which dialects affect or are affected by the literary or +principal form of a language is better understood. Many merely verbal +questions have been eliminated; the remains of the old traditional +methods have died away. The study has passed from the metaphysical into +an historical stage. Grammar is no longer confused with language, nor +the anatomy of words and sentences with their life and use. Figures of +speech, by which the vagueness of theories is often concealed, have +been stripped off; and we see language more as it truly was. The +immensity of the subject is gradually revealed to us, and the reign of +law becomes apparent. Yet the law is but partially seen; the traces of +it are often lost in the distance. For languages have a natural but not +a perfect growth; like other creations of nature into which the will of +man enters, they are full of what we term accident and irregularity. +And the difficulties of the subject become not less, but greater, as we +proceed—it is one of those studies in which we seem to know less as we +know more; partly because we are no longer satisfied with the vague and +superficial ideas of it which prevailed fifty years ago; partly also +because the remains of the languages with which we are acquainted +always were, and if they are still living, are, in a state of +transition; and thirdly, because there are lacunae in our knowledge of +them which can never be filled up. Not a tenth, not a hundredth part of +them has been preserved. Yet the materials at our disposal are far +greater than any individual can use. Such are a few of the general +reflections which the present state of philology calls up. + +(1) Language seems to be composite, but into its first elements the +philologer has never been able to penetrate. However far he goes back, +he never arrives at the beginning; or rather, as in Geology or in +Astronomy, there is no beginning. He is too apt to suppose that by +breaking up the existing forms of language into their parts he will +arrive at a previous stage of it, but he is merely analyzing what never +existed, or is never known to have existed, except in a composite form. +He may divide nouns and verbs into roots and inflexions, but he has no +evidence which will show that the omega of tupto or the mu of tithemi, +though analogous to ego, me, either became pronouns or were generated +out of pronouns. To say that “pronouns, like ripe fruit, dropped out of +verbs,” is a misleading figure of speech. Although all languages have +some common principles, there is no primitive form or forms of language +known to us, or to be reasonably imagined, from which they are all +descended. No inference can be drawn from language, either for or +against the unity of the human race. Nor is there any proof that words +were ever used without any relation to each other. Whatever may be the +meaning of a sentence or a word when applied to primitive language, it +is probable that the sentence is more akin to the original form than +the word, and that the later stage of language is the result rather of +analysis than of synthesis, or possibly is a combination of the two. +Nor, again, are we sure that the original process of learning to speak +was the same in different places or among different races of men. It +may have been slower with some, quicker with others. Some tribes may +have used shorter, others longer words or cries: they may have been +more or less inclined to agglutinate or to decompose them: they may +have modified them by the use of prefixes, suffixes, infixes; by the +lengthening and strengthening of vowels or by the shortening and +weakening of them, by the condensation or rarefaction of consonants. +But who gave to language these primeval laws; or why one race has +triliteral, another biliteral roots; or why in some members of a group +of languages b becomes p, or d, t, or ch, k; or why two languages +resemble one another in certain parts of their structure and differ in +others; or why in one language there is a greater development of +vowels, in another of consonants, and the like—are questions of which +we only “entertain conjecture.” We must remember the length of time +that has elapsed since man first walked upon the earth, and that in +this vast but unknown period every variety of language may have been in +process of formation and decay, many times over. + +(Compare Plato, Laws):— + +“ATHENIAN STRANGER: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of +government? Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view +in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to +good and evil? + +CLEINIAS: What do you mean? + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: I mean that he might watch them from the point of +view of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during +infinite ages. + +CLEINIAS: How so? + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which +has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them? + +CLEINIAS: Hardly. + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and +incalculable? + +CLEINIAS: No doubt. + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: And have there not been thousands and thousands of +cities which have come into being and perished during this period? And +has not every place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes +rising, and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?” + +Aristot. Metaph.:— + +“And if a person should conceive the tales of mythology to mean only +that men thought the gods to be the first essences of things, he would +deem the reflection to have been inspired and would consider that, +whereas probably every art and part of wisdom had been DISCOVERED AND +LOST MANY TIMES OVER, such notions were but a remnant of the past which +has survived to our day.”) + +It can hardly be supposed that any traces of an original language still +survive, any more than of the first huts or buildings which were +constructed by man. Nor are we at all certain of the relation, if any, +in which the greater families of languages stand to each other. The +influence of individuals must always have been a disturbing element. +Like great writers in later times, there may have been many a barbaric +genius who taught the men of his tribe to sing or speak, showing them +by example how to continue or divide their words, charming their souls +with rhythm and accent and intonation, finding in familiar objects the +expression of their confused fancies—to whom the whole of language +might in truth be said to be a figure of speech. One person may have +introduced a new custom into the formation or pronunciation of a word; +he may have been imitated by others, and the custom, or form, or +accent, or quantity, or rhyme which he introduced in a single word may +have become the type on which many other words or inflexions of words +were framed, and may have quickly ran through a whole language. For +like the other gifts which nature has bestowed upon man, that of speech +has been conveyed to him through the medium, not of the many, but of +the few, who were his “law-givers”—“the legislator with the +dialectician standing on his right hand,” in Plato’s striking image, +who formed the manners of men and gave them customs, whose voice and +look and behaviour, whose gesticulations and other peculiarities were +instinctively imitated by them,—the “king of men” who was their priest, +almost their God...But these are conjectures only: so little do we know +of the origin of language that the real scholar is indisposed to touch +the subject at all. + +(2) There are other errors besides the figment of a primitive or +original language which it is time to leave behind us. We no longer +divide languages into synthetical and analytical, or suppose similarity +of structure to be the safe or only guide to the affinities of them. We +do not confuse the parts of speech with the categories of Logic. Nor do +we conceive languages any more than civilisations to be in a state of +dissolution; they do not easily pass away, but are far more tenacious +of life than the tribes by whom they are spoken. “Where two or three +are gathered together,” they survive. As in the human frame, as in the +state, there is a principle of renovation as well as of decay which is +at work in all of them. Neither do we suppose them to be invented by +the wit of man. With few exceptions, e.g. technical words or words +newly imported from a foreign language, and the like, in which art has +imitated nature, “words are not made but grow.” Nor do we attribute to +them a supernatural origin. The law which regulates them is like the +law which governs the circulation of the blood, or the rising of the +sap in trees; the action of it is uniform, but the result, which +appears in the superficial forms of men and animals or in the leaves of +trees, is an endless profusion and variety. The laws of vegetation are +invariable, but no two plants, no two leaves of the forest are +precisely the same. The laws of language are invariable, but no two +languages are alike, no two words have exactly the same meaning. No two +sounds are exactly of the same quality, or give precisely the same +impression. + +It would be well if there were a similar consensus about some other +points which appear to be still in dispute. Is language conscious or +unconscious? In speaking or writing have we present to our minds the +meaning or the sound or the construction of the words which we are +using?—No more than the separate drops of water with which we quench +our thirst are present: the whole draught may be conscious, but not the +minute particles of which it is made up: So the whole sentence may be +conscious, but the several words, syllables, letters are not thought of +separately when we are uttering them. Like other natural operations, +the process of speech, when most perfect, is least observed by us. We +do not pause at each mouthful to dwell upon the taste of it: nor has +the speaker time to ask himself the comparative merits of different +modes of expression while he is uttering them. There are many things in +the use of language which may be observed from without, but which +cannot be explained from within. Consciousness carries us but a little +way in the investigation of the mind; it is not the faculty of internal +observation, but only the dim light which makes such observation +possible. What is supposed to be our consciousness of language is +really only the analysis of it, and this analysis admits of innumerable +degrees. But would it not be better if this term, which is so +misleading, and yet has played so great a part in mental science, were +either banished or used only with the distinct meaning of “attention to +our own minds,” such as is called forth, not by familiar mental +processes, but by the interruption of them? Now in this sense we may +truly say that we are not conscious of ordinary speech, though we are +commonly roused to attention by the misuse or mispronunciation of a +word. Still less, even in schools and academies, do we ever attempt to +invent new words or to alter the meaning of old ones, except in the +case, mentioned above, of technical or borrowed words which are +artificially made or imported because a need of them is felt. Neither +in our own nor in any other age has the conscious effort of reflection +in man contributed in an appreciable degree to the formation of +language. “Which of us by taking thought” can make new words or +constructions? Reflection is the least of the causes by which language +is affected, and is likely to have the least power, when the linguistic +instinct is greatest, as in young children and in the infancy of +nations. + +A kindred error is the separation of the phonetic from the mental +element of language; they are really inseparable—no definite line can +be drawn between them, any more than in any other common act of mind +and body. It is true that within certain limits we possess the power of +varying sounds by opening and closing the mouth, by touching the palate +or the teeth with the tongue, by lengthening or shortening the vocal +instrument, by greater or less stress, by a higher or lower pitch of +the voice, and we can substitute one note or accent for another. But +behind the organs of speech and their action there remains the +informing mind, which sets them in motion and works together with them. +And behind the great structure of human speech and the lesser varieties +of language which arise out of the many degrees and kinds of human +intercourse, there is also the unknown or over-ruling law of God or +nature which gives order to it in its infinite greatness, and variety +in its infinitesimal minuteness—both equally inscrutable to us. We need +no longer discuss whether philology is to be classed with the Natural +or the Mental sciences, if we frankly recognize that, like all the +sciences which are concerned with man, it has a double aspect,—inward +and outward; and that the inward can only be known through the outward. +Neither need we raise the question whether the laws of language, like +the other laws of human action, admit of exceptions. The answer in all +cases is the same—that the laws of nature are uniform, though the +consistency or continuity of them is not always perceptible to us. The +superficial appearances of language, as of nature, are irregular, but +we do not therefore deny their deeper uniformity. The comparison of the +growth of language in the individual and in the nation cannot be wholly +discarded, for nations are made up of individuals. But in this, as in +the other political sciences, we must distinguish between collective +and individual actions or processes, and not attribute to the one what +belongs to the other. Again, when we speak of the hereditary or +paternity of a language, we must remember that the parents are alive as +well as the children, and that all the preceding generations survive +(after a manner) in the latest form of it. And when, for the purposes +of comparison, we form into groups the roots or terminations of words, +we should not forget how casual is the manner in which their +resemblances have arisen—they were not first written down by a +grammarian in the paradigms of a grammar and learned out of a book, but +were due to many chance attractions of sound or of meaning, or of both +combined. So many cautions have to be borne in mind, and so many first +thoughts to be dismissed, before we can proceed safely in the path of +philological enquiry. It might be well sometimes to lay aside figures +of speech, such as the “root” and the “branches,” the “stem,” the +“strata” of Geology, the “compounds” of Chemistry, “the ripe fruit of +pronouns dropping from verbs” (see above), and the like, which are +always interesting, but are apt to be delusive. Yet such figures of +speech are far nearer the truth than the theories which attribute the +invention and improvement of language to the conscious action of the +human mind...Lastly, it is doubted by recent philologians whether +climate can be supposed to have exercised any influence worth speaking +of on a language: such a view is said to be unproven: it had better +therefore not be silently assumed. + +“Natural selection” and the “survival of the fittest” have been applied +in the field of philology, as well as in the other sciences which are +concerned with animal and vegetable life. And a Darwinian school of +philologists has sprung up, who are sometimes accused of putting words +in the place of things. It seems to be true, that whether applied to +language or to other branches of knowledge, the Darwinian theory, +unless very precisely defined, hardly escapes from being a truism. If +by “the natural selection” of words or meanings of words or by the +“persistence and survival of the fittest” the maintainer of the theory +intends to affirm nothing more than this—that the word “fittest to +survive” survives, he adds not much to the knowledge of language. But +if he means that the word or the meaning of the word or some portion of +the word which comes into use or drops out of use is selected or +rejected on the ground of economy or parsimony or ease to the speaker +or clearness or euphony or expressiveness, or greater or less demand +for it, or anything of this sort, he is affirming a proposition which +has several senses, and in none of these senses can be assisted to be +uniformly true. For the laws of language are precarious, and can only +act uniformly when there is such frequency of intercourse among +neighbours as is sufficient to enforce them. And there are many reasons +why a man should prefer his own way of speaking to that of others, +unless by so doing he becomes unintelligible. The struggle for +existence among words is not of that fierce and irresistible kind in +which birds, beasts and fishes devour one another, but of a milder +sort, allowing one usage to be substituted for another, not by force, +but by the persuasion, or rather by the prevailing habit, of a +majority. The favourite figure, in this, as in some other uses of it, +has tended rather to obscure than explain the subject to which it has +been applied. Nor in any case can the struggle for existence be deemed +to be the sole or principal cause of changes in language, but only one +among many, and one of which we cannot easily measure the importance. +There is a further objection which may be urged equally against all +applications of the Darwinian theory. As in animal life and likewise in +vegetable, so in languages, the process of change is said to be +insensible: sounds, like animals, are supposed to pass into one another +by imperceptible gradation. But in both cases the newly-created forms +soon become fixed; there are few if any vestiges of the intermediate +links, and so the better half of the evidence of the change is wanting. + +(3) Among the incumbrances or illusions of language may be reckoned +many of the rules and traditions of grammar, whether ancient grammar or +the corrections of it which modern philology has introduced. Grammar, +like law, delights in definition: human speech, like human action, +though very far from being a mere chaos, is indefinite, admits of +degrees, and is always in a state of change or transition. Grammar +gives an erroneous conception of language: for it reduces to a system +that which is not a system. Its figures of speech, pleonasms, ellipses, +anacolutha, pros to semainomenon, and the like have no reality; they do +not either make conscious expressions more intelligible or show the way +in which they have arisen; they are chiefly designed to bring an +earlier use of language into conformity with the later. Often they seem +intended only to remind us that great poets like Aeschylus or Sophocles +or Pindar or a great prose writer like Thucydides are guilty of taking +unwarrantable liberties with grammatical rules; it appears never to +have occurred to the inventors of them that these real “conditores +linguae Graecae” lived in an age before grammar, when “Greece also was +living Greece.” It is the anatomy, not the physiology of language, +which grammar seeks to describe: into the idiom and higher life of +words it does not enter. The ordinary Greek grammar gives a complete +paradigm of the verb, without suggesting that the double or treble +forms of Perfects, Aorists, etc. are hardly ever contemporaneous. It +distinguishes Moods and Tenses, without observing how much of the +nature of one passes into the other. It makes three Voices, Active, +Passive, and Middle, but takes no notice of the precarious existence +and uncertain character of the last of the three. Language is a thing +of degrees and relations and associations and exceptions: grammar ties +it up in fixed rules. Language has many varieties of usage: grammar +tries to reduce them to a single one. Grammar divides verbs into +regular and irregular: it does not recognize that the irregular, +equally with the regular, are subject to law, and that a language which +had no exceptions would not be a natural growth: for it could not have +been subjected to the influences by which language is ordinarily +affected. It is always wanting to describe ancient languages in the +terms of a modern one. It has a favourite fiction that one word is put +in the place of another; the truth is that no word is ever put for +another. It has another fiction, that a word has been omitted: words +are omitted because they are no longer needed; and the omission has +ceased to be observed. The common explanation of kata or some other +preposition “being understood” in a Greek sentence is another fiction +of the same kind, which tends to disguise the fact that under cases +were comprehended originally many more relations, and that prepositions +are used only to define the meaning of them with greater precision. +These instances are sufficient to show the sort of errors which grammar +introduces into language. We are not considering the question of its +utility to the beginner in the study. Even to him the best grammar is +the shortest and that in which he will have least to unlearn. It may be +said that the explanations here referred to are already out of date, +and that the study of Greek grammar has received a new character from +comparative philology. This is true; but it is also true that the +traditional grammar has still a great hold on the mind of the student. + +Metaphysics are even more troublesome than the figments of grammar, +because they wear the appearance of philosophy and there is no test to +which they can be subjected. They are useful in so far as they give us +an insight into the history of the human mind and the modes of thought +which have existed in former ages; or in so far as they furnish wider +conceptions of the different branches of knowledge and of their +relation to one another. But they are worse than useless when they +outrun experience and abstract the mind from the observation of facts, +only to envelope it in a mist of words. Some philologers, like +Schleicher, have been greatly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel; +nearly all of them to a certain extent have fallen under the dominion +of physical science. Even Kant himself thought that the first +principles of philosophy could be elicited from the analysis of the +proposition, in this respect falling short of Plato. Westphal holds +that there are three stages of language: (1) in which things were +characterized independently, (2) in which they were regarded in +relation to human thought, and (3) in relation to one another. But are +not such distinctions an anachronism? for they imply a growth of +abstract ideas which never existed in early times. Language cannot be +explained by Metaphysics; for it is prior to them and much more nearly +allied to sense. It is not likely that the meaning of the cases is +ultimately resolvable into relations of space and time. Nor can we +suppose the conception of cause and effect or of the finite and +infinite or of the same and other to be latent in language at a time +when in their abstract form they had never entered into the mind of +man...If the science of Comparative Philology had possessed “enough of +Metaphysics to get rid of Metaphysics,” it would have made far greater +progress. + +(4) Our knowledge of language is almost confined to languages which are +fully developed. They are of several patterns; and these become altered +by admixture in various degrees,—they may only borrow a few words from +one another and retain their life comparatively unaltered, or they may +meet in a struggle for existence until one of the two is overpowered +and retires from the field. They attain the full rights and dignity of +language when they acquire the use of writing and have a literature of +their own; they pass into dialects and grow out of them, in proportion +as men are isolated or united by locality or occupation. The common +language sometimes reacts upon the dialects and imparts to them also a +literary character. The laws of language can be best discerned in the +great crises of language, especially in the transitions from ancient to +modern forms of them, whether in Europe or Asia. Such changes are the +silent notes of the world’s history; they mark periods of unknown +length in which war and conquest were running riot over whole +continents, times of suffering too great to be endured by the human +race, in which the masters became subjects and the subject races +masters, in which driven by necessity or impelled by some instinct, +tribes or nations left their original homes and but slowly found a +resting-place. Language would be the greatest of all historical +monuments, if it could only tell us the history of itself. + +(5) There are many ways in which we may approach this study. The +simplest of all is to observe our own use of language in conversation +or in writing, how we put words together, how we construct and connect +sentences, what are the rules of accent and rhythm in verse or prose, +the formation and composition of words, the laws of euphony and sound, +the affinities of letters, the mistakes to which we are ourselves most +liable of spelling or pronunciation. We may compare with our own +language some other, even when we have only a slight knowledge of it, +such as French or German. Even a little Latin will enable us to +appreciate the grand difference between ancient and modern European +languages. In the child learning to speak we may note the inherent +strength of language, which like “a mountain river” is always forcing +its way out. We may witness the delight in imitation and repetition, +and some of the laws by which sounds pass into one another. We may +learn something also from the falterings of old age, the searching for +words, and the confusion of them with one another, the forgetfulness of +proper names (more commonly than of other words because they are more +isolated), aphasia, and the like. There are philological lessons also +to be gathered from nicknames, from provincialisms, from the slang of +great cities, from the argot of Paris (that language of suffering and +crime, so pathetically described by Victor Hugo), from the imperfect +articulation of the deaf and dumb, from the jabbering of animals, from +the analysis of sounds in relation to the organs of speech. The +phonograph affords a visible evidence of the nature and divisions of +sound; we may be truly said to know what we can manufacture. Artificial +languages, such as that of Bishop Wilkins, are chiefly useful in +showing what language is not. The study of any foreign language may be +made also a study of Comparative Philology. There are several points, +such as the nature of irregular verbs, of indeclinable parts of speech, +the influence of euphony, the decay or loss of inflections, the +elements of syntax, which may be examined as well in the history of our +own language as of any other. A few well-selected questions may lead +the student at once into the heart of the mystery: such as, Why are the +pronouns and the verb of existence generally more irregular than any +other parts of speech? Why is the number of words so small in which the +sound is an echo of the sense? Why does the meaning of words depart so +widely from their etymology? Why do substantives often differ in +meaning from the verbs to which they are related, adverbs from +adjectives? Why do words differing in origin coalesce in the same sound +though retaining their differences of meaning? Why are some verbs +impersonal? Why are there only so many parts of speech, and on what +principle are they divided? These are a few crucial questions which +give us an insight from different points of view into the true nature +of language. + +(6) Thus far we have been endeavouring to strip off from language the +false appearances in which grammar and philology, or the love of system +generally, have clothed it. We have also sought to indicate the sources +of our knowledge of it and the spirit in which we should approach it, +we may now proceed to consider some of the principles or natural laws +which have created or modified it. + +i. The first and simplest of all the principles of language, common +also to the animals, is imitation. The lion roars, the wolf howls in +the solitude of the forest: they are answered by similar cries heard +from a distance. The bird, too, mimics the voice of man and makes +answer to him. Man tells to man the secret place in which he is hiding +himself; he remembers and repeats the sound which he has heard. The +love of imitation becomes a passion and an instinct to him. Primitive +men learnt to speak from one another, like a child from its mother or +nurse. They learnt of course a rudimentary, half-articulate language, +the cry or song or speech which was the expression of what we now call +human thoughts and feelings. We may still remark how much greater and +more natural the exercise of the power is in the use of language than +in any other process or action of the human mind. + +ii. Imitation provided the first material of language: but it was +“without form and void.” During how many years or hundreds or thousands +of years the imitative or half-articulate stage continued there is no +possibility of determining. But we may reasonably conjecture that there +was a time when the vocal utterance of man was intermediate between +what we now call language and the cry of a bird or animal. Speech +before language was a rudis indigestaque materies, not yet distributed +into words and sentences, in which the cry of fear or joy mingled with +more definite sounds recognized by custom as the expressions of things +or events. It was the principle of analogy which introduced into this +“indigesta moles” order and measure. It was Anaxagoras’ omou panta +chremata, eita nous elthon diekosmese: the light of reason lighted up +all things and at once began to arrange them. In every sentence, in +every word and every termination of a word, this power of forming +relations to one another was contained. There was a proportion of sound +to sound, of meaning to meaning, of meaning to sound. The cases and +numbers of nouns, the persons, tenses, numbers of verbs, were generally +on the same or nearly the same pattern and had the same meaning. The +sounds by which they were expressed were rough-hewn at first; after a +while they grew more refined—the natural laws of euphony began to +affect them. The rules of syntax are likewise based upon analogy. Time +has an analogy with space, arithmetic with geometry. Not only in +musical notes, but in the quantity, quality, accent, rhythm of human +speech, trivial or serious, there is a law of proportion. As in things +of beauty, as in all nature, in the composition as well as in the +motion of all things, there is a similarity of relations by which they +are held together. + +It would be a mistake to suppose that the analogies of language are +always uniform: there may be often a choice between several, and +sometimes one and sometimes another will prevail. In Greek there are +three declensions of nouns; the forms of cases in one of them may +intrude upon another. Similarly verbs in -omega and -mu iota +interchange forms of tenses, and the completed paradigm of the verb is +often made up of both. The same nouns may be partly declinable and +partly indeclinable, and in some of their cases may have fallen out of +use. Here are rules with exceptions; they are not however really +exceptions, but contain in themselves indications of other rules. Many +of these interruptions or variations of analogy occur in pronouns or in +the verb of existence of which the forms were too common and therefore +too deeply imbedded in language entirely to drop out. The same verbs in +the same meaning may sometimes take one case, sometimes another. The +participle may also have the character of an adjective, the adverb +either of an adjective or of a preposition. These exceptions are as +regular as the rules, but the causes of them are seldom known to us. + +Language, like the animal and vegetable worlds, is everywhere +intersected by the lines of analogy. Like number from which it seems to +be derived, the principle of analogy opens the eyes of men to discern +the similarities and differences of things, and their relations to one +another. At first these are such as lie on the surface only; after a +time they are seen by men to reach farther down into the nature of +things. Gradually in language they arrange themselves into a sort of +imperfect system; groups of personal and case endings are placed side +by side. The fertility of language produces many more than are wanted; +and the superfluous ones are utilized by the assignment to them of new +meanings. The vacuity and the superfluity are thus partially +compensated by each other. It must be remembered that in all the +languages which have a literature, certainly in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, +we are not at the beginning but almost at the end of the linguistic +process; we have reached a time when the verb and the noun are nearly +perfected, though in no language did they completely perfect +themselves, because for some unknown reason the motive powers of +languages seem to have ceased when they were on the eve of completion: +they became fixed or crystallized in an imperfect form either from the +influence of writing and literature, or because no further +differentiation of them was required for the intelligibility of +language. So not without admixture and confusion and displacement and +contamination of sounds and the meanings of words, a lower stage of +language passes into a higher. Thus far we can see and no further. When +we ask the reason why this principle of analogy prevails in all the +vast domain of language, there is no answer to the question; or no +other answer but this, that there are innumerable ways in which, like +number, analogy permeates, not only language, but the whole world, both +visible and intellectual. We know from experience that it does not (a) +arise from any conscious act of reflection that the accusative of a +Latin noun in “us” should end in “um;” nor (b) from any necessity of +being understood,—much less articulation would suffice for this; nor +(c) from greater convenience or expressiveness of particular sounds. +Such notions were certainly far enough away from the mind of primitive +man. We may speak of a latent instinct, of a survival of the fittest, +easiest, most euphonic, most economical of breath, in the case of one +of two competing sounds; but these expressions do not add anything to +our knowledge. We may try to grasp the infinity of language either +under the figure of a limitless plain divided into countries and +districts by natural boundaries, or of a vast river eternally flowing +whose origin is concealed from us; we may apprehend partially the laws +by which speech is regulated: but we do not know, and we seem as if we +should never know, any more than in the parallel case of the origin of +species, how vocal sounds received life and grew, and in the form of +languages came to be distributed over the earth. + +iii. Next in order to analogy in the formation of language or even +prior to it comes the principle of onomatopea, which is itself a kind +of analogy or similarity of sound and meaning. In by far the greater +number of words it has become disguised and has disappeared; but in no +stage of language is it entirely lost. It belongs chiefly to early +language, in which words were few; and its influence grew less and less +as time went on. To the ear which had a sense of harmony it became a +barbarism which disturbed the flow and equilibrium of discourse; it was +an excrescence which had to be cut out, a survival which needed to be +got rid of, because it was out of keeping with the rest. It remained +for the most part only as a formative principle, which used words and +letters not as crude imitations of other natural sounds, but as symbols +of ideas which were naturally associated with them. It received in +another way a new character; it affected not so much single words, as +larger portions of human speech. It regulated the juxtaposition of +sounds and the cadence of sentences. It was the music, not of song, but +of speech, in prose as well as verse. The old onomatopea of primitive +language was refined into an onomatopea of a higher kind, in which it +is no longer true to say that a particular sound corresponds to a +motion or action of man or beast or movement of nature, but that in all +the higher uses of language the sound is the echo of the sense, +especially in poetry, in which beauty and expressiveness are given to +human thoughts by the harmonious composition of the words, syllables, +letters, accents, quantities, rhythms, rhymes, varieties and contrasts +of all sorts. The poet with his “Break, break, break” or his e pasin +nekuessi kataphthimenoisin anassein or his “longius ex altoque sinum +trahit,” can produce a far finer music than any crude imitations of +things or actions in sound, although a letter or two having this +imitative power may be a lesser element of beauty in such passages. The +same subtle sensibility, which adapts the word to the thing, adapts the +sentence or cadence to the general meaning or spirit of the passage. +This is the higher onomatopea which has banished the cruder sort as +unworthy to have a place in great languages and literatures. + +We can see clearly enough that letters or collocations of letters do by +various degrees of strength or weakness, length or shortness, emphasis +or pitch, become the natural expressions of the finer parts of human +feeling or thought. And not only so, but letters themselves have a +significance; as Plato observes that the letter rho accent is +expressive of motion, the letters delta and tau of binding and rest, +the letter lambda of smoothness, nu of inwardness, the letter eta of +length, the letter omicron of roundness. These were often combined so +as to form composite notions, as for example in tromos (trembling), +trachus (rugged), thrauein (crush), krouein (strike), thruptein +(break), pumbein (whirl),—in all which words we notice a parallel +composition of sounds in their English equivalents. Plato also remarks, +as we remark, that the onomatopoetic principle is far from prevailing +uniformly, and further that no explanation of language consistently +corresponds with any system of philosophy, however great may be the +light which language throws upon the nature of the mind. Both in Greek +and English we find groups of words such as string, swing, sling, +spring, sting, which are parallel to one another and may be said to +derive their vocal effect partly from contrast of letters, but in which +it is impossible to assign a precise amount of meaning to each of the +expressive and onomatopoetic letters. A few of them are directly +imitative, as for example the omega in oon, which represents the round +form of the egg by the figure of the mouth: or bronte (thunder), in +which the fulness of the sound of the word corresponds to the thing +signified by it; or bombos (buzzing), of which the first syllable, as +in its English equivalent, has the meaning of a deep sound. We may +observe also (as we see in the case of the poor stammerer) that speech +has the co-operation of the whole body and may be often assisted or +half expressed by gesticulation. A sound or word is not the work of the +vocal organs only; nearly the whole of the upper part of the human +frame, including head, chest, lungs, have a share in creating it; and +it may be accompanied by a movement of the eyes, nose, fingers, hands, +feet which contributes to the effect of it. + +The principle of onomatopea has fallen into discredit, partly because +it has been supposed to imply an actual manufacture of words out of +syllables and letters, like a piece of joiner’s work,—a theory of +language which is more and more refuted by facts, and more and more +going out of fashion with philologians; and partly also because the +traces of onomatopea in separate words become almost obliterated in the +course of ages. The poet of language cannot put in and pull out +letters, as a painter might insert or blot out a shade of colour to +give effect to his picture. It would be ridiculous for him to alter any +received form of a word in order to render it more expressive of the +sense. He can only select, perhaps out of some dialect, the form which +is already best adapted to his purpose. The true onomatopea is not a +creative, but a formative principle, which in the later stage of the +history of language ceases to act upon individual words; but still +works through the collocation of them in the sentence or paragraph, and +the adaptation of every word, syllable, letter to one another and to +the rhythm of the whole passage. + +iv. Next, under a distinct head, although not separable from the +preceding, may be considered the differentiation of languages, i.e. the +manner in which differences of meaning and form have arisen in them. +Into their first creation we have ceased to enquire: it is their +aftergrowth with which we are now concerned. How did the roots or +substantial portions of words become modified or inflected? and how did +they receive separate meanings? First we remark that words are +attracted by the sounds and senses of other words, so that they form +groups of nouns and verbs analogous in sound and sense to one another, +each noun or verb putting forth inflexions, generally of two or three +patterns, and with exceptions. We do not say that we know how sense +became first allied to sound; but we have no difficulty in ascertaining +how the sounds and meanings of words were in time parted off or +differentiated. (1) The chief causes which regulate the variations of +sound are (a) double or differing analogies, which lead sometimes to +one form, sometimes to another (b) euphony, by which is meant chiefly +the greater pleasure to the ear and the greater facility to the organs +of speech which is given by a new formation or pronunciation of a word +(c) the necessity of finding new expressions for new classes or +processes of things. We are told that changes of sound take place by +innumerable gradations until a whole tribe or community or society find +themselves acquiescing in a new pronunciation or use of language. Yet +no one observes the change, or is at all aware that in the course of a +lifetime he and his contemporaries have appreciably varied their +intonation or use of words. On the other hand, the necessities of +language seem to require that the intermediate sounds or meanings of +words should quickly become fixed or set and not continue in a state of +transition. The process of settling down is aided by the organs of +speech and by the use of writing and printing. (2) The meaning of words +varies because ideas vary or the number of things which is included +under them or with which they are associated is increased. A single +word is thus made to do duty for many more things than were formerly +expressed by it; and it parts into different senses when the classes of +things or ideas which are represented by it are themselves different +and distinct. A figurative use of a word may easily pass into a new +sense: a new meaning caught up by association may become more important +than all the rest. The good or neutral sense of a word, such as Jesuit, +Puritan, Methodist, Heretic, has been often converted into a bad one by +the malevolence of party spirit. Double forms suggest different +meanings and are often used to express them; and the form or accent of +a word has been not unfrequently altered when there is a difference of +meaning. The difference of gender in nouns is utilized for the same +reason. New meanings of words push themselves into the vacant spaces of +language and retire when they are no longer needed. Language equally +abhors vacancy and superfluity. But the remedial measures by which both +are eliminated are not due to any conscious action of the human mind; +nor is the force exerted by them constraining or necessary. + +(7) We have shown that language, although subject to laws, is far from +being of an exact and uniform nature. We may now speak briefly of the +faults of language. They may be compared to the faults of Geology, in +which different strata cross one another or meet at an angle, or mix +with one another either by slow transitions or by violent convulsions, +leaving many lacunae which can be no longer filled up, and often +becoming so complex that no true explanation of them can be given. So +in language there are the cross influences of meaning and sound, of +logic and grammar, of differing analogies, of words and the inflexions +of words, which often come into conflict with each other. The +grammarian, if he were to form new words, would make them all of the +same pattern according to what he conceives to be the rule, that is, +the more common usage of language. The subtlety of nature goes far +beyond art, and it is complicated by irregularity, so that often we can +hardly say that there is a right or wrong in the formation of words. +For almost any formation which is not at variance with the first +principles of language is possible and may be defended. + +The imperfection of language is really due to the formation and +correlation of words by accident, that is to say, by principles which +are unknown to us. Hence we see why Plato, like ourselves unable to +comprehend the whole of language, was constrained to “supplement the +poor creature imitation by another poor creature convention.” But the +poor creature convention in the end proves too much for all the rest: +for we do not ask what is the origin of words or whether they are +formed according to a correct analogy, but what is the usage of them; +and we are compelled to admit with Hermogenes in Plato and with Horace +that usage is the ruling principle, “quem penes arbitrium est, et jus +et norma loquendi.” + +(8) There are two ways in which a language may attain permanence or +fixity. First, it may have been embodied in poems or hymns or laws, +which may be repeated for hundreds, perhaps for thousands of years with +a religious accuracy, so that to the priests or rhapsodists of a nation +the whole or the greater part of a language is literally preserved; +secondly, it may be written down and in a written form distributed more +or less widely among the whole nation. In either case the language +which is familiarly spoken may have grown up wholly or in a great +measure independently of them. (1) The first of these processes has +been sometimes attended by the result that the sound of the words has +been carefully preserved and that the meaning of them has either +perished wholly, or is only doubtfully recovered by the efforts of +modern philology. The verses have been repeated as a chant or part of a +ritual, but they have had no relation to ordinary life or speech. (2) +The invention of writing again is commonly attributed to a particular +epoch, and we are apt to think that such an inestimable gift would have +immediately been diffused over a whole country. But it may have taken a +long time to perfect the art of writing, and another long period may +have elapsed before it came into common use. Its influence on language +has been increased ten, twenty or one hundred fold by the invention of +printing. + +Before the growth of poetry or the invention of writing, languages were +only dialects. So they continued to be in parts of the country in which +writing was not used or in which there was no diffusion of literature. +In most of the counties of England there is still a provincial style, +which has been sometimes made by a great poet the vehicle of his +fancies. When a book sinks into the mind of a nation, such as Luther’s +Bible or the Authorized English Translation of the Bible, or again +great classical works like Shakspere or Milton, not only have new +powers of expression been diffused through a whole nation, but a great +step towards uniformity has been made. The instinct of language demands +regular grammar and correct spelling: these are imprinted deeply on the +tablets of a nation’s memory by a common use of classical and popular +writers. In our own day we have attained to a point at which nearly +every printed book is spelt correctly and written grammatically. + +(9) Proceeding further to trace the influence of literature on language +we note some other causes which have affected the higher use of it: +such as (1) the necessity of clearness and connexion; (2) the fear of +tautology; (3) the influence of metre, rhythm, rhyme, and of the +language of prose and verse upon one another; (4) the power of idiom +and quotation; (5) the relativeness of words to one another. + +It has been usual to depreciate modern languages when compared with +ancient. The latter are regarded as furnishing a type of excellence to +which the former cannot attain. But the truth seems to be that modern +languages, if through the loss of inflections and genders they lack +some power or beauty or expressiveness or precision which is possessed +by the ancient, are in many other respects superior to them: the +thought is generally clearer, the connexion closer, the sentence and +paragraph are better distributed. The best modern languages, for +example English or French, possess as great a power of self-improvement +as the Latin, if not as the Greek. Nor does there seem to be any reason +why they should ever decline or decay. It is a popular remark that our +great writers are beginning to disappear: it may also be remarked that +whenever a great writer appears in the future he will find the English +language as perfect and as ready for use as in the days of Shakspere or +Milton. There is no reason to suppose that English or French will ever +be reduced to the low level of Modern Greek or of Mediaeval Latin. The +wide diffusion of great authors would make such a decline impossible. +Nor will modern languages be easily broken up by amalgamation with each +other. The distance between them is too wide to be spanned, the +differences are too great to be overcome, and the use of printing makes +it impossible that one of them should ever be lost in another. + +The structure of the English language differs greatly from that of +either Latin or Greek. In the two latter, especially in Greek, +sentences are joined together by connecting particles. They are +distributed on the right hand and on the left by men, de, alla, kaitoi, +kai de and the like, or deduced from one another by ara, de, oun, +toinun and the like. In English the majority of sentences are +independent and in apposition to one another; they are laid side by +side or slightly connected by the copula. But within the sentence the +expression of the logical relations of the clauses is closer and more +exact: there is less of apposition and participial structure. The +sentences thus laid side by side are also constructed into paragraphs; +these again are less distinctly marked in Greek and Latin than in +English. Generally French, German, and English have an advantage over +the classical languages in point of accuracy. The three concords are +more accurately observed in English than in either Greek or Latin. On +the other hand, the extension of the familiar use of the masculine and +feminine gender to objects of sense and abstract ideas as well as to +men and animals no doubt lends a nameless grace to style which we have +a difficulty in appreciating, and the possible variety in the order of +words gives more flexibility and also a kind of dignity to the period. +Of the comparative effect of accent and quantity and of the relation +between them in ancient and modern languages we are not able to judge. + +Another quality in which modern are superior to ancient languages is +freedom from tautology. No English style is thought tolerable in which, +except for the sake of emphasis, the same words are repeated at short +intervals. Of course the length of the interval must depend on the +character of the word. Striking words and expressions cannot be allowed +to reappear, if at all, except at the distance of a page or more. +Pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions may or rather must recur in +successive lines. It seems to be a kind of impertinence to the reader +and strikes unpleasantly both on the mind and on the ear that the same +sounds should be used twice over, when another word or turn of +expression would have given a new shade of meaning to the thought and +would have added a pleasing variety to the sound. And the mind equally +rejects the repetition of the word and the use of a mere synonym for +it,—e.g. felicity and happiness. The cultivated mind desires something +more, which a skilful writer is easily able to supply out of his +treasure-house. + +The fear of tautology has doubtless led to the multiplications of words +and the meanings of words, and generally to an enlargement of the +vocabulary. It is a very early instinct of language; for ancient poetry +is almost as free from tautology as the best modern writings. The +speech of young children, except in so far as they are compelled to +repeat themselves by the fewness of their words, also escapes from it. +When they grow up and have ideas which are beyond their powers of +expression, especially in writing, tautology begins to appear. In like +manner when language is “contaminated” by philosophy it is apt to +become awkward, to stammer and repeat itself, to lose its flow and +freedom. No philosophical writer with the exception of Plato, who is +himself not free from tautology, and perhaps Bacon, has attained to any +high degree of literary excellence. + +To poetry the form and polish of language is chiefly to be attributed; +and the most critical period in the history of language is the +transition from verse to prose. At first mankind were contented to +express their thoughts in a set form of words having a kind of rhythm; +to which regularity was given by accent and quantity. But after a time +they demanded a greater degree of freedom, and to those who had all +their life been hearing poetry the first introduction of prose had the +charm of novelty. The prose romances into which the Homeric Poems were +converted, for a while probably gave more delight to the hearers or +readers of them than the Poems themselves, and in time the relation of +the two was reversed: the poems which had once been a necessity of the +human mind became a luxury: they were now superseded by prose, which in +all succeeding ages became the natural vehicle of expression to all +mankind. Henceforward prose and poetry formed each other. A +comparatively slender link between them was also furnished by proverbs. +We may trace in poetry how the simple succession of lines, not without +monotony, has passed into a complicated period, and how in prose, +rhythm and accent and the order of words and the balance of clauses, +sometimes not without a slight admixture of rhyme, make up a new kind +of harmony, swelling into strains not less majestic than those of +Homer, Virgil, or Dante. + +One of the most curious and characteristic features of language, +affecting both syntax and style, is idiom. The meaning of the word +“idiom” is that which is peculiar, that which is familiar, the word or +expression which strikes us or comes home to us, which is more readily +understood or more easily remembered. It is a quality which really +exists in infinite degrees, which we turn into differences of kind by +applying the term only to conspicuous and striking examples of words or +phrases which have this quality. It often supersedes the laws of +language or the rules of grammar, or rather is to be regarded as +another law of language which is natural and necessary. The word or +phrase which has been repeated many times over is more intelligible and +familiar to us than one which is rare, and our familiarity with it more +than compensates for incorrectness or inaccuracy in the use of it. +Striking expressions also which have moved the hearts of nations or are +the precious stones and jewels of great authors partake of the nature +of idioms: they are taken out of the sphere of grammar and are exempt +from the proprieties of language. Every one knows that we often put +words together in a manner which would be intolerable if it were not +idiomatic. We cannot argue either about the meaning of words or the use +of constructions that because they are used in one connexion they will +be legitimate in another, unless we allow for this principle. We can +bear to have words and sentences used in new senses or in a new order +or even a little perverted in meaning when we are quite familiar with +them. Quotations are as often applied in a sense which the author did +not intend as in that which he did. The parody of the words of +Shakspere or of the Bible, which has in it something of the nature of a +lie, is far from unpleasing to us. The better known words, even if +their meaning be perverted, are more agreeable to us and have a greater +power over us. Most of us have experienced a sort of delight and +feeling of curiosity when we first came across or when we first used +for ourselves a new word or phrase or figure of speech. + +There are associations of sound and of sense by which every word is +linked to every other. One letter harmonizes with another; every verb +or noun derives its meaning, not only from itself, but from the words +with which it is associated. Some reflection of them near or distant is +embodied in it. In any new use of a word all the existing uses of it +have to be considered. Upon these depends the question whether it will +bear the proposed extension of meaning or not. According to the famous +expression of Luther, “Words are living creatures, having hands and +feet.” When they cease to retain this living power of adaptation, when +they are only put together like the parts of a piece of furniture, +language becomes unpoetical, inexpressive, dead. + +Grammars would lead us to suppose that words have a fixed form and +sound. Lexicons assign to each word a definite meaning or meanings. +They both tend to obscure the fact that the sentence precedes the word +and that all language is relative. (1) It is relative to its own +context. Its meaning is modified by what has been said before and after +in the same or in some other passage: without comparing the context we +are not sure whether it is used in the same sense even in two +successive sentences. (2) It is relative to facts, to time, place, and +occasion: when they are already known to the hearer or reader, they may +be presupposed; there is no need to allude to them further. (3) It is +relative to the knowledge of the writer and reader or of the speaker +and hearer. Except for the sake of order and consecutiveness nothing +ought to be expressed which is already commonly or universally known. A +word or two may be sufficient to give an intimation to a friend; a long +or elaborate speech or composition is required to explain some new idea +to a popular audience or to the ordinary reader or to a young pupil. +Grammars and dictionaries are not to be despised; for in teaching we +need clearness rather than subtlety. But we must not therefore forget +that there is also a higher ideal of language in which all is +relative—sounds to sounds, words to words, the parts to the whole—in +which besides the lesser context of the book or speech, there is also +the larger context of history and circumstances. + +The study of Comparative Philology has introduced into the world a new +science which more than any other binds up man with nature, and distant +ages and countries with one another. It may be said to have thrown a +light upon all other sciences and upon the nature of the human mind +itself. The true conception of it dispels many errors, not only of +metaphysics and theology, but also of natural knowledge. Yet it is far +from certain that this newly-found science will continue to progress in +the same surprising manner as heretofore; or that even if our materials +are largely increased, we shall arrive at much more definite +conclusions than at present. Like some other branches of knowledge, it +may be approaching a point at which it can no longer be profitably +studied. But at any rate it has brought back the philosophy of language +from theory to fact; it has passed out of the region of guesses and +hypotheses, and has attained the dignity of an Inductive Science. And +it is not without practical and political importance. It gives a new +interest to distant and subject countries; it brings back the dawning +light from one end of the earth to the other. Nations, like +individuals, are better understood by us when we know something of +their early life; and when they are better understood by us, we feel +more kindly towards them. Lastly, we may remember that all knowledge is +valuable for its own sake; and we may also hope that a deeper insight +into the nature of human speech will give us a greater command of it +and enable us to make a nobler use of it.[2] + + [2] Compare again W. Humboldt, _Ueber die Verschiedenheit des + menschlichen Sprachbaues_; M. Müller, _Lectures on the Science of + Language_; Steinthal, _Einleitung in die Psychologie und + Sprachwissenschaft_: and for the latter part of the Essay, Delbruck, + _Study of Language_; Paul’s _Principles of the History of Language_: + to the latter work the author of this Essay is largely indebted. + + + + +CRATYLUS + +By Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Hermogenes, Cratylus. + + +HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument? + +CRATYLUS: If you please. + +HERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus +has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not +conventional; not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use; +but that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for +Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name +of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers “Yes.” And Socrates? +“Yes.” Then every man’s name, as I tell him, is that which he is +called. To this he replies—“If all the world were to call you +Hermogenes, that would not be your name.” And when I am anxious to have +a further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply +that he has a notion of his own about the matter, if he would only +tell, and could entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. +Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means; or rather tell me, if you +will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or correctness of +names, which I would far sooner hear. + +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that “hard is +the knowledge of the good.” And the knowledge of names is a great part +of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the +fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete +education in grammar and language—these are his own words—and then I +should have been at once able to answer your question about the +correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma +course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters; I +will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of +them. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I +suspect that he is only making fun of you;—he means to say that you are +no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune +and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of +difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave +the question open until we have heard both sides. + +HERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus +and others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of +correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name +which you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that +and give another, the new name is as correct as the old—we frequently +change the names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good +as the old: for there is no name given to anything by nature; all is +convention and habit of the users;—such is my view. But if I am +mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one +else. + +SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us +see;—Your meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which +anybody agrees to call it? + +HERMOGENES: That is my notion. + +SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;—suppose that I call a man +a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly +called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest +of the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and +a horse by the world:—that is your meaning? + +HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view. + +SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there +is in words a true and a false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false +proposition says that which is not? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible? + +SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts +untrue? + +HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole. + +SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or +every part? + +HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true. + +SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a +name? + +HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest. + +SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be +true and false? + +HERMOGENES: So we must infer. + +SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be +the name? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody +says that there are? and will they be true names at the time of +uttering them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other +than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities +and countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes +differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic +tribes from one another. + +SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the +names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells +us? For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things +are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear +to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a +permanent essence of their own? + +HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in +my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him +at all. + +SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no +such thing as a bad man? + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there +are very bad men, and a good many of them. + +SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones? + +HERMOGENES: Not many. + +SOCRATES: Still you have found them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and +the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view? + +HERMOGENES: It would. + +SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are +as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us +foolish? + +HERMOGENES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really +distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of +Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is +true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another. + +HERMOGENES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all +things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for +neither on his view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue +and vice are always equally to be attributed to all. + +HERMOGENES: There cannot. + +SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to +individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same +moment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and +permanent essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, +fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent, and +maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth. + +SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or +equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a +class of being? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things. + +SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper +nature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for +example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; +but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the +natural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will +succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all. + +HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way. + +SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the +right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural +instrument. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will +not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way +of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural +instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and +failure. + +HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you. + +SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men +speak. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to +acts, is not naming also a sort of action? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but +had a special nature of their own? + +HERMOGENES: Precisely. + +SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to +be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, +and not at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with +success. + +HERMOGENES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with +something? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or +pierced with something? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with +something? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce? + +HERMOGENES: An awl. + +SOCRATES: And with which we weave? + +HERMOGENES: A shuttle. + +SOCRATES: And with which we name? + +HERMOGENES: A name. + +SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, “What sort of instrument is a shuttle?” +And you answer, “A weaving instrument.” + +HERMOGENES: Well. + +SOCRATES: And I ask again, “What do we do when we weave?”—The answer +is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of +instruments in general? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: +will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do +when we name? + +HERMOGENES: I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish +things according to their natures? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly we do. + +SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of +distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads +of the web. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver? + +HERMOGENES: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well—and well means like +a weaver? and the teacher will use the name well—and well means like a +teacher? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be +using well? + +HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only? + +HERMOGENES: Only the skilled. + +SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be +using well? + +HERMOGENES: That of the smith. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled? + +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. + +SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be +using? + +HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled. + +SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use? + +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of +the legislator? + +HERMOGENES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only? + +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. + +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but +only a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled +artisans in the world is the rarest. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he +look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what +does the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that +which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make +another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form +according to which he made the other? + +HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine. + +SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle? + +HERMOGENES: I think so. + +SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of +garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought +all of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the +shuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form +which the maker produces in each case. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has +discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he +must express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the +material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought +to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to +their several uses? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature +to their uses? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the +several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how +to put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, +and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is +to be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different +legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every +smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same +purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but +the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of +whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country;—there is +no difference. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is +not therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives +the true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or +that country makes no matter. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given +to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who +makes, or the weaver who is to use them? + +HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the +man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also +whether the work is being well done or not? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And who is he? + +HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre. + +SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright? + +HERMOGENES: The pilot. + +SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his +work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other +country? Will not the user be the man? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how to answer them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a +dialectician? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name. + +SOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the +pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the +dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given? + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can +be no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance +persons; and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by +nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, but he only +who looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is able to +express the true forms of things in letters and syllables. + +HERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in +changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more +readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the +natural fitness of names. + +SOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling +you just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and +proposing to share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have +talked over the matter, a step has been gained; for we have discovered +that names have by nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to +give a thing a name. + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? +That, if you care to know, is the next question. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know. + +SOCRATES: Then reflect. + +HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect? + +SOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and +you must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the +Sophists, of whom your brother, Callias, has—rather dearly—bought the +reputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, +and therefore you had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell +you what he has learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names. + +HERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating +Protagoras and his truth (“Truth” was the title of the book of +Protagoras; compare Theaet.), I were to attach any value to what he and +his book affirm! + +SOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the +poets. + +HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what +does he say? + +SOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places +where he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to +the same things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable +statement about the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be +supposed to call things by their right and natural names; do you not +think so? + +HERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at +all. But to what are you referring? + +SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had +a single combat with Hephaestus? + +“Whom,” as he says, “the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.” + +HERMOGENES: I remember. + +SOCRATES: Well, and about this river—to know that he ought to be called +Xanthus and not Scamander—is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the +bird which, as he says, + +“The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:” + +to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name +Cymindis—do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina? +(Compare Il. “The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the +tomb of the sportive Myrina.”) And there are many other observations of +the same kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is +beyond the understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius +and Astyanax, which he affirms to have been the names of Hector’s son, +are more within the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to +think; and what the poet means by correctness may be more readily +apprehended in that instance: you will remember I dare say the lines to +which I refer? (Il.) + +HERMOGENES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct +of the names given to Hector’s son—Astyanax or Scamandrius? + +HERMOGENES: I do not know. + +SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or +the unwise are more likely to give correct names? + +HERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course. + +SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the +wiser? + +HERMOGENES: I should say, the men. + +SOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him +Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the +other name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the +women. + +HERMOGENES: That may be inferred. + +SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than +their wives? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name +for the boy than Scamandrius? + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:—does he not +himself suggest a very good reason, when he says, + +“For he alone defended their city and long walls”? + +This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour +king of the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes. + +HERMOGENES: I see. + +SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you? + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I. + +SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector +his name? + +HERMOGENES: What of that? + +SOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name +of Astyanax—both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) +have nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a +man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and +owns, and holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking +nonsense; and indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant +when I imagined that I had found some indication of the opinion of +Homer about the correctness of names. + +HERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to +be on the right track. + +SOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion’s whelp a lion, +and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary +course of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of +extraordinary births;—if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I +should not call that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth +a man, but only a natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and +other things. Do you agree with me? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I agree. + +SOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not +play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to +be called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or +not the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; +nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so +long as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and +appears in it. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the +names of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters +themselves with the exception of the four epsilon, upsilon, omicron, +omega; the names of the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up +of other letters which we add to them; but so long as we introduce the +meaning, and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is quite +correct. Take, for example, the letter beta—the addition of eta, tau, +alpha, gives no offence, and does not prevent the whole name from +having the value which the legislator intended—so well did he know how +to give the letters names. + +HERMOGENES: I believe you are right. + +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be +the son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble +sire; and similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course +of nature, is like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the +syllables may be disguised until they appear different to the ignorant +person, and he may not recognize them, although they are the same, just +as any one of us would not recognize the same drugs under different +disguises of colour and smell, although to the physician, who regards +the power of them, they are the same, and he is not put out by the +addition; and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the +addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed +by the change of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the +meaning. As was just now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have +only one letter alike, which is tau, and yet they have the same +meaning. And how little in common with the letters of their names has +Archepolis (ruler of the city)—and yet the meaning is the same. And +there are many other names which just mean “king.” Again, there are +several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and +Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others +which denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus +(curer of mortals); and there are many others which might be cited, +differing in their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. +Would you not say so? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who +follow in the course of nature? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and +are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an +irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of +the class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before +supposed of a horse foaling a calf. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be +called irreligious? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or +Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are +correctly given, his should have an opposite meaning. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the +mountains) who appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the +name, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and +fierceness and mountain wildness of his hero’s nature. + +HERMOGENES: That is very likely, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And his father’s name is also according to nature. + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon +(admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the +accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his +continuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that admirable +endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon. I also think +that Atreus is rightly called; for his murder of Chrysippus and his +exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his +reputation—the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be +intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no +difficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as +ateires the stubborn, or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the +destructive one, the name is perfectly correct in every point of view. +And I think that Pelops is also named appropriately; for, as the name +implies, he is rightly called Pelops who sees what is near only (o ta +pelas oron). + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or +foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail +upon his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and +immediate,—or in other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win +Hippodamia by all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the +name of Tantalus is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the +traditions about him are true. + +HERMOGENES: And what are the traditions? + +SOCRATES: Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in +his life—last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his +death he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in the world +below—all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine +that some person who wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted +down by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; +and into this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been +transmuted. The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an +excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because really like +a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for some call him Zena, +and use the one half, and others who use the other half call him Dia; +the two together signify the nature of the God, and the business of a +name, as we were saying, is to express the nature. For there is none +who is more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king +of all. Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and Dia, which are +one name, although divided, meaning the God through whom all creatures +always have life (di on zen aei pasi tois zosin uparchei). There is an +irreverence, at first sight, in calling him son of Cronos (who is a +proverb for stupidity), and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child +of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact; for this is the meaning of +his father’s name: Kronos quasi Koros (Choreo, to sweep), not in the +sense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon chai acheraton tou nou, +the pure and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He, as we are +informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo +tou oran ta ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, +is the way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore +correct. If I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone +on and tried more conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors +of the Gods,—then I might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come +to me all in an instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good +to the end. + +HERMOGENES: You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly +inspired, and to be uttering oracles. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration +from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long +lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his +wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken +possession of my soul, and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work +and finish the investigation of names—that will be the way; but +to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a +purgation of him, if we can only find some priest or sophist who is +skilled in purifications of this sort. + +HERMOGENES: With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of +the enquiry about names. + +SOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now +that we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names +which witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but +have a natural fitness? The names of heroes and of men in general are +apt to be deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with +whose names, as we were saying, they may have no business; or they are +the expression of a wish like Eutychides (the son of good fortune), or +Sosias (the Saviour), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others. +But I think that we had better leave these, for there will be more +chance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences;—there +ought to have been more care taken about them when they were named, and +perhaps there may have been some more than human power at work +occasionally in giving them names. + +HERMOGENES: I think so, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and +show that they are rightly named Gods? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be well. + +SOCRATES: My notion would be something of this sort:—I suspect that the +sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many +barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing +that they were always moving and running, from their running nature +they were called Gods or runners (Theous, Theontas); and when men +became acquainted with the other Gods, they proceeded to apply the same +name to them all. Do you think that likely? + +HERMOGENES: I think it very likely indeed. + +SOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods? + +HERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next? + +SOCRATES: Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this +word? Tell me if my view is right. + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word? + +HERMOGENES: I do not. + +SOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men +who came first? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: He says of them— + +“But now that fate has closed over this race They are holy demons upon +the earth, Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.” +(Hesiod, Works and Days.) + +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? + +SOCRATES: What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the +golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I +am convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron +race. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by +him be said to be of golden race? + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: And are not the good wise? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, they are wise. + +SOCRATES: And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he +called them demons, because they were daemones (knowing or wise), and +in our older Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other +poets say truly, that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty +portion among the dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name given to +him signifying wisdom. And I say too, that every wise man who happens +to be a good man is more than human (daimonion) both in life and death, +and is rightly called a demon. + +HERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but +what is the meaning of the word “hero”? (Eros with an eta, in the old +writing eros with an epsilon.) + +SOCRATES: I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the +name is not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods? + +HERMOGENES: What then? + +SOCRATES: All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal +woman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old +Attic, and you will see better that the name heros is only a slight +alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang: either this is the +meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as +rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the question (erotan), +for eirein is equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was saying, in +the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and +questioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are a +tribe of sophists and rhetors. But can you tell me why men are called +anthropoi?—that is more difficult. + +HERMOGENES: No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because +I think that you are the more likely to succeed. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro. + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and +ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before +to-morrow’s dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to +me; and first, remember that we often put in and pull out letters in +words, and give names as we please and change the accents. Take, for +example, the word Dii Philos; in order to convert this from a sentence +into a noun, we omit one of the iotas and sound the middle syllable +grave instead of acute; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes +inserted in words instead of being omitted, and the acute takes the +place of the grave. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: The name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a +noun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is +the alpha, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has +been changed to a grave. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that the word “man” implies that other animals +never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man +not only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, +and hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, meaning +anathron a opopen. + +HERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am +curious? + +SOCRATES: Certainly. + +HERMOGENES: I will take that which appears to me to follow next in +order. You know the distinction of soul and body? + +SOCRATES: Of course. + +HERMOGENES: Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words. + +SOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of +the word psuche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should +imagine that those who first used the name psuche meant to express that +the soul when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of +breath and revival (anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails +then the body perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they +called psyche. But please stay a moment; I fancy that I can discover +something which will be more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, +for I am afraid that they will scorn this explanation. What do you say +to another? + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and +motion to the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul? + +HERMOGENES: Just that. + +SOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is +the ordering and containing principle of all things? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; I do. + +SOCRATES: Then you may well call that power phuseche which carries and +holds nature (e phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away +into psuche. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific +than the other. + +SOCRATES: It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that +this was the true meaning of the name. + +HERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word? + +SOCRATES: You mean soma (the body). + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if +a little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the +grave (sema) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our +present life; or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives +indications to (semainei) the body; probably the Orphic poets were the +inventors of the name, and they were under the impression that the soul +is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure +or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe (soma, sozetai), +as the name soma implies, until the penalty is paid; according to this +view, not even a letter of the word need be changed. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class +of words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, +like that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether +any similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them. + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle +which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,—that of the Gods we know +nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give +themselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call +themselves, whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all +principles; and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will +call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like, +because we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is a very good +custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if +you please, in the first place announce to them that we are not +enquiring about them; we do not presume that we are able to do so; but +we are enquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these +names,—in this there can be small blame. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would +like to do as you say. + +SOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be very proper. + +SOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name +Hestia? + +HERMOGENES: That is another and certainly a most difficult question. + +SOCRATES: My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely +have been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good +deal to say. + +HERMOGENES: Well, and what of them? + +SOCRATES: They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of +names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still +discernible. For example, that which we term ousia is by some called +esia, and by others again osia. Now that the essence of things should +be called estia, which is akin to the first of these (esia = estia), is +rational enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that +estia which participates in ousia. For in ancient times we too seem to +have said esia for ousia, and this you may note to have been the idea +of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to +estia, which was natural enough if they meant that estia was the +essence of things. Those again who read osia seem to have inclined to +the opinion of Heracleitus, that all things flow and nothing stands; +with them the pushing principle (othoun) is the cause and ruling power +of all things, and is therefore rightly called osia. Enough of this, +which is all that we who know nothing can affirm. Next in order after +Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of +Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare say that I am talking +great nonsense. + +HERMOGENES: Why, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom. + +HERMOGENES: Of what nature? + +SOCRATES: Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible. + +HERMOGENES: How plausible? + +SOCRATES: I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of +antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer +also spoke. + +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion +and nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and +says that you cannot go into the same water twice. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the +names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty +much in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of +streams to both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which +Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod also, tells of + +“Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys (Il.—the line is not +found in the extant works of Hesiod.).” + +And again, Orpheus says, that + +“The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his +sister Tethys, who was his mother’s daughter.” + +You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction +of Heracleitus. + +HERMOGENES: I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; +but I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys. + +SOCRATES: Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a +spring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered +(diattomenon, ethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name +Tethys is made up of these two words. + +HERMOGENES: The idea is ingenious, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?—of Zeus we have spoken. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, +whether the latter is called by that or by his other name. + +HERMOGENES: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original +inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his +walks, and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of +this element Poseidon; the epsilon was probably inserted as an +ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so; but the name may have been originally +written with a double lamda and not with a sigma, meaning that the God +knew many things (Polla eidos). And perhaps also he being the shaker of +the earth, has been named from shaking (seiein), and then pi and delta +have been added. Pluto gives wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the +giver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in +general appear to imagine that the term Hades is connected with the +invisible (aeides) and so they are led by their fears to call the God +Pluto instead. + +HERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation? + +SOCRATES: In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of +this deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the +fear of always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of +the body going to him (compare Rep.), my belief is that all is quite +consistent, and that the office and name of the God really correspond. + +HERMOGENES: Why, how is that? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to +ask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which +confines him more to the same spot,—desire or necessity? + +HERMOGENES: Desire, Socrates, is stronger far. + +SOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, +if he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains? + +HERMOGENES: Assuredly they would. + +SOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I +should certainly infer, and not by necessity? + +HERMOGENES: That is clear. + +SOCRATES: And there are many desires? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be +the greatest? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be +made better by associating with another? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has +been to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all +the rest of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, +as I imagine, is the God able to infuse into his words. And, according +to this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great +benefactor of the inhabitants of the other world; and even to us who +are upon earth he sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has much +more than he wants down there; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the +rich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men while they +are in the body, but only when the soul is liberated from the desires +and evils of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and +reflection in that; for in their liberated state he can bind them with +the desire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the +body, not even father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with +him in his own far-famed chains. + +HERMOGENES: There is a deal of truth in what you say. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not +from the unseen (aeides)—far otherwise, but from his knowledge +(eidenai) of all noble things. + +HERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and +Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities? + +SOCRATES: Demeter is e didousa meter, who gives food like a mother; +Here is the lovely one (erate)—for Zeus, according to tradition, loved +and married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the +legislator was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of +the air (aer), putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will +recognize the truth of this if you repeat the letters of Here several +times over. People dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name +of Apollo,—and with as little reason; the fear, if I am not mistaken, +only arises from their ignorance of the nature of names. But they go +changing the name into Phersephone, and they are terrified at this; +whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise (sophe); for +seeing that all things in the world are in motion (pheromenon), that +principle which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, is +wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly called Pherepaphe +(Pherepapha), or some name like it, because she touches that which is +in motion (tou pheromenon ephaptomene), herein showing her wisdom. And +Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is wise. They alter +her name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the present generation +care for euphony more than truth. There is the other name, Apollo, +which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some terrible +signification. Have you remarked this fact? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure I have, and what you say is true. + +SOCRATES: But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the +power of the God. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any +single name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of +the God, embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,—music, +and prophecy, and medicine, and archery. + +HERMOGENES: That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the +explanation. + +SOCRATES: Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. +In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and +diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as +well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the +same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the +absolver from all impurities? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being +the physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon +(purifier); or in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth +and sincerity, which is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called +Aplos, from aplous (sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the +Thessalians call him Aplos; also he is aei Ballon (always shooting), +because he is a master archer who never misses; or again, the name may +refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in akolouthos, and +akoitis, and in many other words the alpha is supposed to mean +“together,” so the meaning of the name Apollo will be “moving +together,” whether in the poles of heaven as they are called, or in the +harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he moves all together +by an harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously +declare. And he is the God who presides over harmony, and makes all +things move together, both among Gods and among men. And as in the +words akolouthos and akoitis the alpha is substituted for an omicron, +so the name Apollon is equivalent to omopolon; only the second lambda +is added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction +(apolon). Now the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts the +minds of some who do not consider the true value of the name, which, as +I was saying just now, has reference to all the powers of the God, who +is the single one, the everdarting, the purifier, the mover together +(aplous, aei Ballon, apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses and of +music would seem to be derived from their making philosophical +enquiries (mosthai); and Leto is called by this name, because she is +such a gentle Goddess, and so willing (ethelemon) to grant our +requests; or her name may be Letho, as she is often called by +strangers—they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her smooth and +easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy +(artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity, +perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (arete), and perhaps also +as hating intercourse of the sexes (ton aroton misesasa). He who gave +the Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons. + +HERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite? + +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a +serious and also a facetious explanation of both these names; the +serious explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objection +to your hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a joke. +Dionusos is simply didous oinon (giver of wine), Didoinusos, as he +might be called in fun,—and oinos is properly oionous, because wine +makes those who drink, think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (noun) +when they have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam +(aphros), may be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod. + +HERMOGENES: Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an +Athenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares. + +SOCRATES: I am not likely to forget them. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of +Athene. + +HERMOGENES: What other appellation? + +SOCRATES: We call her Pallas. + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from +armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the +earth, or by the use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or +dancing. + +HERMOGENES: That is quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name? + +SOCRATES: Athene? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern +interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of +the ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, +assert that he meant by Athene “mind” (nous) and “intelligence” +(dianoia), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion +about her; and indeed calls her by a still higher title, “divine +intelligence” (Thou noesis), as though he would say: This is she who +has the mind of God (Theonoa);—using alpha as a dialectical variety for +eta, and taking away iota and sigma (There seems to be some error in +the MSS. The meaning is that the word theonoa = theounoa is a curtailed +form of theou noesis, but the omitted letters do not agree.). Perhaps, +however, the name Theonoe may mean “she who knows divine things” (Theia +noousa) better than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that +the author of it wished to identify this Goddess with moral +intelligence (en ethei noesin), and therefore gave her the name +ethonoe; which, however, either he or his successors have altered into +what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene. + +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus? + +SOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light (Phaeos istora)? + +HERMOGENES: Surely. + +SOCRATES: Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the eta by attraction; +that is obvious to anybody. + +HERMOGENES: That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets +into your head. + +SOCRATES: To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of +Ares. + +HERMOGENES: What is Ares? + +SOCRATES: Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and +manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, +which is the meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every +way appropriate to the God of war. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I +am afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how +the steeds of Euthyphro can prance. + +HERMOGENES: Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of +whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I +shall know whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says. + +SOCRATES: I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, +and signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or +thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal +to do with language; as I was telling you, the word eirein is +expressive of the use of speech, and there is an often-recurring +Homeric word emesato, which means “he contrived”—out of these two +words, eirein and mesasthai, the legislator formed the name of the God +who invented language and speech; and we may imagine him dictating to +us the use of this name: “O my friends,” says he to us, “seeing that he +is the contriver of tales or speeches, you may rightly call him +Eirhemes.” And this has been improved by us, as we think, into Hermes. +Iris also appears to have been called from the verb “to tell” (eirein), +because she was a messenger. + +HERMOGENES: Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying +that I was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand +at speeches. + +SOCRATES: There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the +double-formed son of Hermes. + +HERMOGENES: How do you make that out? + +SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is +always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form +which dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men +below, and is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods +have generally to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is +the place of them? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and +the perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called +aipolos (goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in +his upper part, and rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as +the son of Hermes, he is speech or the brother of speech, and that +brother should be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was saying, my +dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the Gods. + +HERMOGENES: From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why +should we not discuss another kind of Gods—the sun, moon, stars, earth, +aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year? + +SOCRATES: You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I +will not refuse. + +HERMOGENES: You will oblige me. + +SOCRATES: How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him +whom you mentioned first—the sun? + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric +form, for the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him +because when he rises he gathers (alizoi) men together or because he is +always rolling in his course (aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from +aiolein, of which the meaning is the same as poikillein (to variegate), +because he variegates the productions of the earth. + +HERMOGENES: But what is selene (the moon)? + +SOCRATES: That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the +moon receives her light from the sun. + +HERMOGENES: Why do you say so? + +SOCRATES: The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much +the same meaning? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old +(enon), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his +revolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the +previous month. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And as she has a light which is always old and always new +(enon neon aei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and +this when hammered into shape becomes selanaia. + +HERMOGENES: A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do +you say of the month and the stars? + +SOCRATES: Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because +suffering diminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived +from astrape, which is an improvement on anastrope, signifying the +upsetting of the eyes (anastrephein opa). + +HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)? + +SOCRATES: I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of +Euthyphro has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in +the word. Please, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt +whenever I am in a difficulty of this sort. + +HERMOGENES: What is it? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you +can tell me what is the meaning of the pur? + +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of +this and several other words?—My belief is that they are of foreign +origin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion +of the barbarians, often borrowed from them. + +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? + +SOCRATES: Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the +fitness of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not +according to the language from which the words are derived, is rather +likely to be at fault. + +HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the +word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and +the Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly changed, +just as they have udor (water) and kunes (dogs), and many other words. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; +for something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid +of pur and udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element +which raises (airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei +rei), or because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the +winds “air-blasts,” (aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to +speak, air-flux (aetorroun), in the sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun); +and because this moving wind may be expressed by either term he employs +the word air (aer = aetes rheo). Aither (aether) I should interpret as +aeitheer; this may be correctly said, because this element is always +running in a flux about the air (aei thei peri tou aera reon). The +meaning of the word ge (earth) comes out better when in the form of +gaia, for the earth may be truly called “mother” (gaia, genneteira), as +in the language of Homer (Od.) gegaasi means gegennesthai. + +HERMOGENES: Good. + +SOCRATES: What shall we take next? + +HERMOGENES: There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the +year, eniautos and etos. + +SOCRATES: The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire +to know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai +because they divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and +the fruits of the earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the +same,—“that which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth +in their turn, and passes them in review within itself (en eauto +exetazei)”: this is broken up into two words, eniautos from en eauto, +and etos from etazei, just as the original name of Zeus was divided +into Zena and Dia; and the whole proposition means that his power of +reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two words etos and +eniautos being thus formed out of a single proposition. + +HERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress. + +SOCRATES: I am run away with. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But am not yet at my utmost speed. + +HERMOGENES: I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you +would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in +those charming words—wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of +them? + +SOCRATES: That is a tremendous class of names which you are +disinterring; still, as I have put on the lion’s skin, I must not be +faint of heart; and I suppose that I must consider the meaning of +wisdom (phronesis) and understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), +and knowledge (episteme), and all those other charming words, as you +call them? + +HERMOGENES: Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their +meaning. + +SOCRATES: By the dog of Egypt I have a not bad notion which came into +my head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names +were undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in +their search after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from +constantly going round and round, and then they imagine that the world +is going round and round and moving in all directions; and this +appearance, which arises out of their own internal condition, they +suppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is nothing +stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is +always full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of +the names which I mentioned has led me into making this reflection. + +HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been +just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely +indicated. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed, I never thought of it. + +SOCRATES: Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is +a name indicative of motion. + +HERMOGENES: What was the name? + +SOCRATES: Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify phoras kai rhou noesis +(perception of motion and flux), or perhaps phoras onesis (the blessing +of motion), but is at any rate connected with pheresthai (motion); +gnome (judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or +consideration (nomesis) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to +consider; or, if you would rather, here is noesis, the very word just +now mentioned, which is neou esis (the desire of the new); the word +neos implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver +of the name wanted to express this longing of the soul, for the +original name was neoesis, and not noesis; but eta took the place of a +double epsilon. The word sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of that +wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now considering. Epioteme +(knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good +for anything follows (epetai) the motion of things, neither +anticipating them nor falling behind them; wherefore the word should +rather be read as epistemene, inserting epsilon nu. Sunesis +(understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion; +the word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), and, like +epistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company +with the nature of things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears +not to be of native growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or +stream of things. You must remember that the poets, when they speak of +the commencement of any rapid motion, often use the word esuthe (he +rushed); and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named Sous +(Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and +the touching (epaphe) of motion is expressed by sophia, for all things +are supposed to be in motion. Good (agathon) is the name which is given +to the admirable (agasto) in nature; for, although all things move, +still there are degrees of motion; some are swifter, some slower; but +there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this +admirable part of nature is called agathon. Dikaiosune (justice) is +clearly dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the just); but the actual +word dikaion is more difficult: men are only agreed to a certain extent +about justice, and then they begin to disagree. For those who suppose +all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a +mere receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating power which +passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in all, and +is the subtlest and swiftest element; for if it were not the subtlest, +and a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, passing by +other things as if they were standing still, it could not penetrate +through the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all +things and pierces (diaion) all, is rightly called dikaion; the letter +k is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, +there is a general agreement about the nature of justice; but I, +Hermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery +that the justice of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world: +now a cause is that because of which anything is created; and some one +comes and whispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because +partaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what +he has said, to interrogate him gently: “Well, my excellent friend,” +say I, “but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.” +Thereupon they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over +the barriers, and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try +to satisfy me with one derivation after another, and at length they +quarrel. For one of them says that justice is the sun, and that he only +is the piercing (diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element which is the +guardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I +am answered by the satirical remark, “What, is there no justice in the +world when the sun is down?” And when I earnestly beg my questioner to +tell me his own honest opinion, he says, “Fire in the abstract”; but +this is not very intelligible. Another says, “No, not fire in the +abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire.” Another man +professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that +justice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes +with nothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things. At +last, my friend, I find myself in far greater perplexity about the +nature of justice than I was before I began to learn. But still I am of +opinion that the name, which has led me into this digression, was given +to justice for the reasons which I have mentioned. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you +must have heard this from some one else. + +SOCRATES: And not the rest? + +HERMOGENES: Hardly. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in +the originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think +that we have as yet discussed courage (andreia),—injustice (adikia), +which is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating +principle (diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of +andreia seems to imply a battle;—this battle is in the world of +existence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only the +counterflux (enantia rhon): if you extract the delta from andreia, the +name at once signifies the thing, and you may clearly understand that +andreia is not the stream opposed to every stream, but only to that +which is contrary to justice, for otherwise courage would not have been +praised. The words arren (male) and aner (man) also contain a similar +allusion to the same principle of the upward flux (te ano rhon). Gune +(woman) I suspect to be the same word as goun (birth): thelu (female) +appears to be partly derived from thele (the teat), because the teat is +like rain, and makes things flourish (tethelenai). + +HERMOGENES: That is surely probable. + +SOCRATES: Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure +the growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is +expressed by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of thein +(running), and allesthai (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when +I get on smooth ground. There are a good many names generally thought +to be of importance, which have still to be explained. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the +possession of mind: you have only to take away the tau and insert two +omichrons, one between the chi and nu, and another between the nu and +eta. + +HERMOGENES: That is a very shabby etymology. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original +names have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and +stripping off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and +bedizening them in all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share +in the change. Take, for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter +rho inserted? This must surely be the addition of some one who cares +nothing about the truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into +shape. And the additions are often such that at last no human being can +possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another example is +the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought properly to be phigx, phiggos, +and there are other examples. + +HERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any +letters which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name +may be adapted to any object. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like +yourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability. + +HERMOGENES: Such is my desire. + +SOCRATES: And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a +precisian, or “you will unnerve me of my strength (Iliad.).” When you +have allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be +at the top of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great +accomplishment—anein; for mekos has the meaning of greatness, and these +two, mekos and anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying, +being now at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning +of the two words arete (virtue) and kakia (vice); arete I do not as yet +understand, but kakia is transparent, and agrees with the principles +which preceded, for all things being in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos +ion (going badly); and this evil motion when existing in the soul has +the general name of kakia, or vice, specially appropriated to it. The +meaning of kakos ienai may be further illustrated by the use of deilia +(cowardice), which ought to have come after andreia, but was forgotten, +and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been passed over. Deilia +signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain (desmos), for lian +means strength, and therefore deilia expresses the greatest and +strongest bond of the soul; and aporia (difficulty) is an evil of the +same nature (from a (alpha) not, and poreuesthai to go), like anything +else which is an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word kakia +appears to mean kakos ienai, or going badly, or limping and halting; of +which the consequence is, that the soul becomes filled with vice. And +if kakia is the name of this sort of thing, arete will be the opposite +of it, signifying in the first place ease of motion, then that the +stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute +of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called +arete, or, more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps +have had another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is +more eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I +daresay that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I +think that if the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also +right. + +HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great +a part in your previous discourse? + +SOCRATES: That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an +opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device. + +HERMOGENES: What device? + +SOCRATES: The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this +word also. + +HERMOGENES: Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these +words and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron. + +SOCRATES: The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon +roes (always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with +our former derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to +stagnation of all sorts, and hence he gave the name aeischoroun to that +which hindered the flux (aei ischon roun), and that is now beaten +together into aischron. + +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon? + +SOCRATES: That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the +quantity, and has been changed by altering omicron upsilon into +omicron. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: This name appears to denote mind. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is +not the principle which imposes the name the cause? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their +names, and is not mind the beautiful (kalon)? + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of +praise, and are not other works worthy of blame? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does +the works of a carpenter? + +HERMOGENES: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty? + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works +which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful? + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: What more names remain to us? + +HERMOGENES: There are the words which are connected with agathon and +kalon, such as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and +their opposites. + +SOCRATES: The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may +discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,—for it is +a sister word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the soul +accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle +are called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried round with +the world. + +HERMOGENES: That is probable. + +SOCRATES: Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain), +but you must alter the delta into nu if you want to get at the meaning; +for this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the +name intended to express the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and +universal penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he +inserted a delta instead of a nu, and so made kerdos. + +HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)? + +SOCRATES: I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the +profitable the gainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but they +use the word in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable +(lusiteloun), as that which being the swiftest thing in existence, +allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion, but always, +if there begins to be any end, lets things go again (luei), and makes +motion immortal and unceasing: and in this point of view, as appears to +me, the good is happily denominated lusiteloun—being that which looses +(luon) the end (telos) of motion. Ophelimon (the advantageous) is +derived from ophellein, meaning that which creates and increases; this +latter is a common Homeric word, and has a foreign character. + +HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites? + +SOCRATES: Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need +speak. + +HERMOGENES: Which are they? + +SOCRATES: The words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable), +alusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful). + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes +(hurtful). + +HERMOGENES: Good. + +SOCRATES: The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm +(blaptein) the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to +hold or bind); for aptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a +term of censure; boulomenon aptein roun (wanting to bind the stream) +would properly be boulapteroun, and this, as I imagine, is improved +into blaberon. + +HERMOGENES: You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of +names; and when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining +that you are making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some +prelude to Athene. + +SOCRATES: That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not +mine. + +HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes? + +SOCRATES: What is the meaning of zemiodes?—let me remark, Hermogenes, +how right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of +words by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight +permutation will sometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may +instance the word deon, which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds +me of what I was going to say to you, that the fine fashionable +language of modern times has twisted and disguised and entirely altered +the original meaning both of deon, and also of zemiodes, which in the +old language is clearly indicated. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers +loved the sounds iota and delta, especially the women, who are most +conservative of the ancient language, but now they change iota into eta +or epsilon, and delta into zeta; this is supposed to increase the +grandeur of the sound. + +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: For example, in very ancient times they called the day either +imera or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e). + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention +of the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for +(imeirousi) and love the light which comes after the darkness, and is +therefore called imera, from imeros, desire. + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the +meaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be called emera +because it makes things gentle (emera different accents). + +HERMOGENES: Such is my view. + +SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon? + +HERMOGENES: They did so. + +SOCRATES: And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,—it ought to be duogon, which +word expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the +purpose of drawing;—this has been changed into zugon, and there are +many other examples of similar changes. + +HERMOGENES: There are. + +SOCRATES: Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the +word deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the +other appellations of good; for deon is here a species of good, and is, +nevertheless, the chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and therefore +own brother of blaberon. + +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain. + +SOCRATES: Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to +be the correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the +epsilon into an iota after the old fashion, this word will then agree +with other words meaning good; for dion, not deon, signifies the good, +and is a term of praise; and the author of names has not contradicted +himself, but in all these various appellations, deon (obligatory), +ophelimon (advantageous), lusiteloun (profitable), kerdaleon (gainful), +agathon (good), sumpheron (expedient), euporon (plenteous), the same +conception is implied of the ordering or all-pervading principle which +is praised, and the restraining and binding principle which is +censured. And this is further illustrated by the word zemiodes +(hurtful), which if the zeta is only changed into delta as in the +ancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as you will +perceive, is given to that which binds motion (dounti ion). + +HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia +(desire), and the like, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great +difficulty about them—edone is e (eta) onesis, the action which tends +to advantage; and the original form may be supposed to have been eone, +but this has been altered by the insertion of the delta. Lupe appears +to be derived from the relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in +sorrow; ania (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (alpha and ienai); +algedon (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which is +derived from aleinos (grievous); odune (grief) is called from the +putting on (endusis) sorrow; in achthedon (vexation) “the word too +labours,” as any one may see; chara (joy) is the very expression of the +fluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis (delight) is so +called from the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul, which may +be likened to a breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has been +altered by time into terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia +explain themselves; the former, which ought to be eupherosune and has +been changed euphrosune, is named, as every one may see, from the soul +moving (pheresthai) in harmony with nature; epithumia is really e epi +ton thumon iousa dunamis, the power which enters into the soul; thumos +(passion) is called from the rushing (thuseos) and boiling of the soul; +imeros (desire) denotes the stream (rous) which most draws the soul dia +ten esin tes roes—because flowing with desire (iemenos), and expresses +a longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to them, and +is termed imeros from possessing this power; pothos (longing) is +expressive of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and +in another place (pou); this is the reason why the name pothos is +applied to things absent, as imeros is to things present; eros (love) +is so called because flowing in (esron) from without; the stream is not +inherent, but is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from +flowing in was called esros (influx) in the old time when they used +omicron for omega, and is called eros, now that omega is substituted +for omicron. But why do you not give me another word? + +HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of +words? + +SOCRATES: Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses +the march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting +of a bow (toxon); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis +(thinking), which is only oisis (moving), and implies the movement of +the soul to the essential nature of each thing—just as boule (counsel) +has to do with shooting (bole); and boulesthai (to wish) combines the +notion of aiming and deliberating—all these words seem to follow doxa, +and all involve the idea of shooting, just as aboulia, absence of +counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of +the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object. + +HERMOGENES: You are quickening your pace now, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I +have explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and +ekousion (the voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon) +and unresisting—the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, +yielding, as I was just now saying, to that motion which is in +accordance with our will; but the necessary and resistant being +contrary to our will, implies error and ignorance; the idea is taken +from walking through a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and +overgrown, and impedes motion—and this is the derivation of the word +anagkaion (necessary) an agke ion, going through a ravine. But while my +strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere +with your questions. + +HERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such +as aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not +forgetting to enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of +our discussion, has this name of onoma. + +SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai (to seek)? + +HERMOGENES: Yes;—meaning the same as zetein (to enquire). + +SOCRATES: The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying +on ou zetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more +obvious in onomaston (notable), which states in so many words that real +existence is that for which there is a seeking (on ou masma); aletheia +is also an agglomeration of theia ale (divine wandering), implying the +divine motion of existence; pseudos (falsehood) is the opposite of +motion; here is another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation +and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep (eudein); but the +original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of psi; on +and ousia are ion with an iota broken off; this agrees with the true +principle, for being (on) is also moving (ion), and the same may be +said of not being, which is likewise called not going (oukion or ouki +on = ouk ion). + +HERMOGENES: You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that +some one were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon +and doun?—show me their fitness. + +SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been +already suggested. + +HERMOGENES: What way? + +SOCRATES: To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign +origin; and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this +kind may be true of them; but also the original forms of words may have +been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all +manner of ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language when +compared with that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous +tongue. + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest +attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a +person go on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the +elements out of which the words are formed, and keeps on always +repeating this process, he who has to answer him must at last give up +the enquiry in despair. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the +enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the +elements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed +to be made up of other names? The word agathon (good), for example, is, +as we were saying, a compound of agastos (admirable) and thoos (swift). +And probably thoos is made up of other elements, and these again of +others. But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, +then we shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary +element, which need not be resolved any further. + +HERMOGENES: I believe you to be in the right. + +SOCRATES: And suppose the names about which you are now asking should +turn out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be +examined according to some new method? + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to +this conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I +shall again say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some +absurdity in stating the principle of primary names. + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you. + +SOCRATES: I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle +is applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary—when they are +regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: All the names that we have been explaining were intended to +indicate the nature of things. + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the +secondary names, is implied in their being names. + +HERMOGENES: Surely. + +SOCRATES: But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance +from the primary. + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede +analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which +they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a +question: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to +communicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and dumb, +make signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body? + +HERMOGENES: There would be no choice, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of +our hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and +downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if +we were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we +should make our bodies and their gestures as like as we could to them. + +HERMOGENES: I do not see that we could do anything else. + +SOCRATES: We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever +express anything. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, +or tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that +which we want to express. + +HERMOGENES: It must be so, I think. + +SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal +imitator names or imitates? + +HERMOGENES: I think so. + +SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not +reached the truth as yet. + +HERMOGENES: Why not? + +SOCRATES: Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the +people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which +they imitate. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying? + +HERMOGENES: In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, +Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, +although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music +imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the +matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have +colour? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with +imitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music +and drawing? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there +is a colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound +as well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence? + +HERMOGENES: I should think so. + +SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing +in letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each +thing? + +HERMOGENES: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: The musician and the painter were the two names which you +gave to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called? + +HERMOGENES: I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or +name-giver, of whom we are in search. + +SOCRATES: If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to +consider the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention), +about which you were asking; and we may see whether the namer has +grasped the nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as +to imitate the essence or not. + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others? + +HERMOGENES: There must be others. + +SOCRATES: So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them, +and where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by +syllables and letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the +letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the +powers of elementary, and then of compound sounds, and when they have +done so, but not before, they proceed to the consideration of rhythms? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first +separating the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes (letters which +are neither vowels nor semivowels), into classes, according to the +received distinctions of the learned; also the semivowels, which are +neither vowels, nor yet mutes; and distinguishing into classes the +vowels themselves? And when we have perfected the classification of +things, we shall give them names, and see whether, as in the case of +letters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred (cf. +Phaedrus); and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether +they have in them classes as there are in the letters; and when we have +well considered all this, we shall know how to apply them to what they +resemble—whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether +there is to be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting, +the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or +any other colour, and sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method +is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that kind—he uses +his colours as his figures appear to require them; and so, too, we +shall apply letters to the expression of objects, either single letters +when required, or several letters; and so we shall form syllables, as +they are called, and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at +last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, +large and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so +shall we make speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by +some other art. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I +was carried away—meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we +but) the ancients formed language, and what they put together we must +take to pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of +the whole subject, and we must see whether the primary, and also +whether the secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they +are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry +piece of work, and in the wrong direction. + +HERMOGENES: That, Socrates, I can quite believe. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse +them in this way? for I am certain that I should not. + +HERMOGENES: Much less am I likely to be able. + +SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if +we can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, +saying by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the +truth about them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of +them. And in this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we +proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or others who would +analyse language to any good purpose must follow; but under the +circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can. What do you +think? + +HERMOGENES: I very much approve. + +SOCRATES: That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and +so find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be +avoided—there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth +of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, +like the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in +the air; and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying +that “the Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.” +This will be the best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be +even better still, of deriving them from some barbarous people, for the +barbarians are older than we are; or we may say that antiquity has cast +a veil over them, which is the same sort of excuse as the last; for all +these are not reasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons +concerning the truth of words. And yet any sort of ignorance of first +or primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary words; for they +can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of +languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first +names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. +Do you not suppose this to be true? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: My first notions of original names are truly wild and +ridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you +desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything +better which you may have. + +HERMOGENES: Fear not; I will do my best. + +SOCRATES: In the first place, the letter rho appears to me to be the +general instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet +explained the meaning of this latter word, which is just iesis (going); +for the letter eta was not in use among the ancients, who only employed +epsilon; and the root is kiein, which is a foreign form, the same as +ienai. And the old word kinesis will be correctly given as iesis in +corresponding modern letters. Assuming this foreign root kiein, and +allowing for the change of the eta and the insertion of the nu, we have +kinesis, which should have been kieinsis or eisis; and stasis is the +negative of ienai (or eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now +the letter rho, as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an +excellent instrument for the expression of motion; and he frequently +uses the letter for this purpose: for example, in the actual words rein +and roe he represents motion by rho; also in the words tromos +(trembling), trachus (rugged); and again, in words such as krouein +(strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), thruptein (break), +kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts of movements +he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I +imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at +rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in +order to express motion, just as by the letter iota he expresses the +subtle elements which pass through all things. This is why he uses the +letter iota as imitative of motion, ienai, iesthai. And there is +another class of letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi, of which the +pronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of breath; these are +used in the imitation of such notions as psuchron (shivering), xeon +(seething), seiesthai, (to be shaken), seismos (shock), and are always +introduced by the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is +phusodes (windy). He seems to have thought that the closing and +pressure of the tongue in the utterance of delta and tau was expressive +of binding and rest in a place: he further observed the liquid movement +of lambda, in the pronunciation of which the tongue slips, and in this +he found the expression of smoothness, as in leios (level), and in the +word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon (sleek), in the word +kollodes (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of gamma detained the +slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a +glutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes. The nu he +observed to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of +inwardness; hence he introduced the sound in endos and entos: alpha he +assigned to the expression of size, and nu of length, because they are +great letters: omicron was the sign of roundness, and therefore there +is plenty of omicron mixed up in the word goggulon (round). Thus did +the legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and +impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation +compounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of +names; but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say. + +HERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus +mystifies me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never +explains what is this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his +obscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the +presence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying +about names, or have you something better of your own? and if you have, +tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates, +or Socrates and I will learn of you. + +CRATYLUS: Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can +learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any +rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very +greatest of all. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, “to +add little to little” is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that +you can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a +little trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a +claim upon you. + +SOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which +Hermogenes and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to +say what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall +gladly accept. And I should not be at all surprized to find that you +have found some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on +these matters and have had teachers, and if you have really a better +theory of the truth of names, you may count me in the number of your +disciples. + +CRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study +of these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But +I fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself +moved to say to you what Achilles in the “Prayers” says to Ajax,— + +“Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people, You appear to +have spoken in all things much to my mind.” + +And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers +much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some +Muse may have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to +yourself. + +SOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own +wisdom; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask +myself What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than +self-deception—when the deceiver is always at home and always with +you—it is quite terrible, and therefore I ought often to retrace my +steps and endeavour to “look fore and aft,” in the words of the +aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are we? Have we not been +saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:—has +this proposition been sufficiently proven? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is +quite true. + +SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And who are they? + +CRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first. + +SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me +explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I mean their +figures, better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders +also, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them +worse. + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work +better and some worse? + +CRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you. + +SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others +worse? + +CRATYLUS: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all. + +SOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, +which was mentioned before:—assuming that he has nothing of the nature +of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his +name at all? + +CRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but +only appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who +has the nature which corresponds to it. + +SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be +even speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call +him Hermogenes, if he is not. + +CRATYLUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this +is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars +in all ages. + +CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?—say +something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing +which is not? + +SOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But +I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who +think that falsehood may be spoken but not said? + +CRATYLUS: Neither spoken nor said. + +SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting +you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: “Hail, +Athenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion”—these words, whether +spoken, said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you +but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all? + +CRATYLUS: In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking +nonsense. + +SOCRATES: Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell +me whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and +partly false:—which is all that I want to know. + +CRATYLUS: I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no +purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise +of hammering at a brazen pot. + +SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a +meeting-point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with +the thing named? + +CRATYLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an +imitation of the thing? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of +things, but in another way? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand +you. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both +pictures or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the +things of which they are the imitation. + +CRATYLUS: They are. + +SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness +of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to +the woman, and of the woman to the man? + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the +first? + +CRATYLUS: Only the first. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to +each that which belongs to them and is like them? + +CRATYLUS: That is my view. + +SOCRATES: Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have +a good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you: +the first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I +call right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and +the other mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call +wrong, and in the case of names, false as well as wrong. + +CRATYLUS: That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may +be wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names—they must be always +right. + +SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to +him, “This is your picture,” showing him his own likeness, or perhaps +the likeness of a woman; and when I say “show,” I mean bring before the +sense of sight. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And may I not go to him again, and say, “This is your +name”?—for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say +to him—“This is your name”? and may I not then bring to his sense of +hearing the imitation of himself, when I say, “This is a man”; or of a +female of the human species, when I say, “This is a woman,” as the case +may be? Is not all that quite possible? + +CRATYLUS: I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say, +Granted. + +SOCRATES: That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be +disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to +objects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong +assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment +of names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of +verbs; and if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made +up of them. What do you say, Cratylus? + +CRATYLUS: I agree; and think that what you say is very true. + +SOCRATES: And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and +in pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and +figures, or you may not give them all—some may be wanting; or there may +be too many or too much of them—may there not? + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and +he who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a +good one. + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the +nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a +good image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps +adds a little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer +that some names are well and others ill made. + +CRATYLUS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be +bad? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may +be bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good? + +CRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is +different; for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters alpha +or beta, or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or +subtract, or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only +written wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases +becomes other than a name. + +SOCRATES: But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, +Cratylus. + +CRATYLUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which +must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number +ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, +and so of any other number: but this does not apply to that which is +qualitative or to anything which is represented under an image. I +should say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the +entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the +existence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other +the image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God +makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your +outward form and colour, but also creates an inward organization like +yours, having the same warmth and softness; and into this infuses +motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all +your qualities, and places them by you in another form; would you say +that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were +two Cratyluses? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that there were two Cratyluses. + +SOCRATES: Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other +principle of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an +image is no longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do +you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which +are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I see. + +SOCRATES: But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on +things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the +doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the +names and which were the realities. + +CRATYLUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name +may be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that +the name shall be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the +occasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a +noun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence +which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing +may be named, and described, so long as the general character of the +thing which you are describing is retained; and this, as you will +remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular +instance of the names of the letters. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I remember. + +SOCRATES: Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if +some of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is +signified;—well, if all the letters are given; not well, when only a +few of them are given. I think that we had better admit this, lest we +be punished like travellers in Aegina who wander about the street late +at night: and be likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived +too late; or if not, you must find out some new notion of correctness +of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a +thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be +inconsistent with yourself. + +CRATYLUS: I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very +reasonable. + +SOCRATES: Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether +a name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters. + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names +which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be +made up of proper and similar letters, or there would be no likeness; +but there will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the +beauty and formation of the word: you would admit that? + +CRATYLUS: There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, +since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a +name at all. + +SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some +derived? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are +representations of things, is there any better way of framing +representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you +can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who +say that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have +agreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things +intended by them, and that convention is the only principle; and +whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and opposite +one, according to which you call small great and great small—that, they +would say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these +two notions do you prefer? + +CRATYLUS: Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better +than representation by any chance sign. + +SOCRATES: Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the +letters out of which the first names are composed must also be like +things. Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could +any one ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if +there were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, +and out of which the picture is composed? + +CRATYLUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: No more could names ever resemble any actually existing +thing, unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore +some degree of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the +imitation: And the original elements are letters? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were +saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter rho is +expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in +saying so? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that you were right. + +SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, +and the like? + +CRATYLUS: There again you were right. + +SOCRATES: And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us +sklerotes, is by the Eretrians called skleroter. + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there +the same significance to them in the termination rho, which there is to +us in sigma, or is there no significance to one of us? + +CRATYLUS: Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us. + +SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike? + +CRATYLUS: In as far as they are like. + +SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike? + +CRATYLUS: Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that +is expressive not of hardness but of softness. + +CRATYLUS: Why, perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted, Socrates, +and should be altered into rho, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in +my opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters +upon occasion. + +SOCRATES: Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when +I say skleros (hard), you know what I mean. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom. + +SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I +understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: +this is what you are saying? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an +indication given by me to you? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well +as from like, for example in the lamda of sklerotes. But if this is +true, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the +correctness of a name turns out to be convention, since letters which +are unlike are indicative equally with those which are like, if they +are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even supposing that you +distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you must say +that the signification of words is given by custom and not by likeness, +for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as we +are agreed thus far, Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence +gives consent), then custom and convention must be supposed to +contribute to the indication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the +instance of number, how can you ever imagine, my good friend, that you +will find names resembling every individual number, unless you allow +that which you term convention and agreement to have authority in +determining the correctness of names? I quite agree with you that words +should as far as possible resemble things; but I fear that this +dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing, +which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a +view to correctness; for I believe that if we could always, or almost +always, use likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate, this would be +the most perfect state of language; as the opposite is the most +imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is +the use of them? + +CRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to +inform: the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the +things which are expressed by them. + +SOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so +also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the +other, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same +art or science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names +will also know things. + +CRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean. + +SOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of this information +about things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the +best sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say? + +CRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of +information about them; there can be no other. + +SOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who +discovers the names discovers also the things; or is this only the +method of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and +discovery. + +CRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery +are of the same nature as instruction. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names +in the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great +danger of being deceived? + +CRATYLUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to +his conception of the things which they signified—did he not? + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names +according to his conception, in what position shall we who are his +followers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him? + +CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely +have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at +all? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and +the proof is—that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in +speaking that all the words which you utter have a common character and +purpose? + +SOCRATES: But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin +in error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the +original error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in +this, any more than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight +and invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and are +consistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is +the reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention +on the consideration of his first principles:—are they or are they not +rightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest will +follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really +consistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion: Were we +not saying that all things are in motion and progress and flux, and +that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive +that to be the meaning of them? + +CRATYLUS: Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning. + +SOCRATES: Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how +ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at +things than going round with them; and therefore we should leave the +beginning as at present, and not reject the epsilon, but make an +insertion of an iota instead of an epsilon (not pioteme, but +epiisteme). Take another example: bebaion (sure) is clearly the +expression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word +istoria (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (istanai) of +the stream; and the word piston (faithful) certainly indicates +cessation of motion; then, again, mneme (memory), as any one may see, +expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as +amartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of +their etymologies will be the same as sunesis and episteme and other +words which have a good sense (compare omartein, sunienai, epesthai, +sumpheresthai); and much the same may be said of amathia and akolasia, +for amathia may be explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia +as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the names which in these instances +we find to have the worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the same +principle as those which have the best. And any one I believe who would +take the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of +names indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that +they are at rest; which is the opposite of motion. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express +motion. + +SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and +is correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of +whichever sort there are most, those are the true ones? + +CRATYLUS: No; that is not reasonable. + +SOCRATES: Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and +proceed to another, about which I should like to know whether you think +with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of +names in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and +that the art which gave names was the art of the legislator? + +CRATYLUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers +of the first names, know or not know the things which they named? + +CRATYLUS: They must have known, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been +ignorant. + +CRATYLUS: I should say not. + +SOCRATES: Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were +saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the +things which he named; are you still of that opinion? + +CRATYLUS: I am. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also +a knowledge of the things which he named? + +CRATYLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names +if the primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in +our view, the only way of learning and discovering things, is either to +discover names for ourselves or to learn them from others. + +CRATYLUS: I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if things are only to be known through names, how can we +suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators +before there were names at all, and therefore before they could have +known them? + +CRATYLUS: I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, +that a power more than human gave things their first names, and that +the names which are thus given are necessarily their true names. + +SOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired +being or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now +that he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were +we mistaken? + +CRATYLUS: But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all. + +SOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are +expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a +point which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them. + +CRATYLUS: No; not in that way, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that +they are like the truth, others contending that THEY are, how or by +what criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other +names to which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had +to another standard which, without employing names, will make clear +which of the two are right; and this must be a standard which shows the +truth of things. + +CRATYLUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may +be known without names? + +CRATYLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them? What other way can +there be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through +their affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through +themselves? For that which is other and different from them must +signify something other and different from them. + +CRATYLUS: What you are saying is, I think, true. + +SOCRATES: Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged +that names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things +which they name? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn +things through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn +them from the things themselves—which is likely to be the nobler and +clearer way; to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of +which the image is the expression have been rightly conceived, or to +learn of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly +executed? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that we must learn of the truth. + +SOCRATES: How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I +suspect, beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the +knowledge of things is not to be derived from names. No; they must be +studied and investigated in themselves. + +CRATYLUS: Clearly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed +upon by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the +same direction. I myself do not deny that the givers of names did +really give them under the idea that all things were in motion and +flux; which was their sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion. And +having fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried +round, and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter, master +Cratylus, about which I often dream, and should like to ask your +opinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or +good, or any other absolute existence? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly, Socrates, I think so. + +SOCRATES: Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face +is fair, or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in +a flux; but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing +away, and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born +and retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths? + +CRATYLUS: Undoubtedly. + +SOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same +state? for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they +remain the same; and if they are always the same and in the same state, +and never depart from their original form, they can never change or be +moved. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly they cannot. + +SOCRATES: Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the moment that +the observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, +so that you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, +for you cannot know that which has no state. + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge +at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing +abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless +continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of +knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no +knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always +be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will be no one to +know and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that which is +known exists ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other thing +also exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a process or +flux, as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal +nature in things, or whether the truth is what Heracleitus and his +followers and many others say, is a question hard to determine; and no +man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in +the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers of +names as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and +other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he will not +believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world is a +man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is +also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would not have you be +too easily persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and do not +easily accept such a doctrine; for you are young and of an age to +learn. And when you have found the truth, come and tell me. + +CRATYLUS: I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that +I have been considering the matter already, and the result of a great +deal of trouble and consideration is that I incline to Heracleitus. + +SOCRATES: Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall +give me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are +intending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your way. + +CRATYLUS: Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue +to think about these things yourself. + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CRATYLUS *** + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will +be renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the +United States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Cratylus</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Plato</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: B. Jowett</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: January, 1999 [eBook #1616]<br /> +[Most recently updated: April 27, 2022]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Sue Asscher</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CRATYLUS ***</div> + +<h1>CRATYLUS</h1> + +<h2 class="no-break">By Plato</h2> + +<h3>Translated by Benjamin Jowett</h3> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto"> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">INTRODUCTION</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">CRATYLUS</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<hr /> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<p> +The Cratylus has always been a source of perplexity to the student of Plato. +While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and metaphysical +originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of the Platonic +writings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive of the piece, which +interpreters have hitherto not succeeded in dispelling. We need not suppose +that Plato used words in order to conceal his thoughts, or that he would have +been unintelligible to an educated contemporary. In the Phaedrus and Euthydemus +we also find a difficulty in determining the precise aim of the author. Plato +wrote satires in the form of dialogues, and his meaning, like that of other +satirical writers, has often slept in the ear of posterity. Two causes may be +assigned for this obscurity: 1st, the subtlety and allusiveness of this species +of composition; 2nd, the difficulty of reproducing a state of life and +literature which has passed away. A satire is unmeaning unless we can place +ourselves back among the persons and thoughts of the age in which it was +written. Had the treatise of Antisthenes upon words, or the speculations of +Cratylus, or some other Heracleitean of the fourth century B.C., on the nature +of language been preserved to us; or if we had lived at the time, and been +“rich enough to attend the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus,” we +should have understood Plato better, and many points which are now attributed +to the extravagance of Socrates’ humour would have been found, like the +allusions of Aristophanes in the Clouds, to have gone home to the sophists and +grammarians of the day. +</p> + +<p> +For the age was very busy with philological speculation; and many questions +were beginning to be asked about language which were parallel to other +questions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were illustrated in a similar +manner by the analogy of the arts. Was there a correctness in words, and were +they given by nature or convention? In the presocratic philosophy mankind had +been striving to attain an expression of their ideas, and now they were +beginning to ask themselves whether the expression might not be distinguished +from the idea? They were also seeking to distinguish the parts of speech and to +enquire into the relation of subject and predicate. Grammar and logic were +moving about somewhere in the depths of the human soul, but they were not yet +awakened into consciousness and had not found names for themselves, or terms by +which they might be expressed. Of these beginnings of the study of language we +know little, and there necessarily arises an obscurity when the surroundings of +such a work as the Cratylus are taken away. Moreover, in this, as in most of +the dialogues of Plato, allowance has to be made for the character of Socrates. +For the theory of language can only be propounded by him in a manner which is +consistent with his own profession of ignorance. Hence his ridicule of the new +school of etymology is interspersed with many declarations “that he knows +nothing,” “that he has learned from Euthyphro,” and the like. +Even the truest things which he says are depreciated by himself. He professes +to be guessing, but the guesses of Plato are better than all the other theories +of the ancients respecting language put together. +</p> + +<p> +The dialogue hardly derives any light from Plato’s other writings, and +still less from Scholiasts and Neoplatonist writers. Socrates must be +interpreted from himself, and on first reading we certainly have a difficulty +in understanding his drift, or his relation to the two other interlocutors in +the dialogue. Does he agree with Cratylus or with Hermogenes, and is he serious +in those fanciful etymologies, extending over more than half the dialogue, +which he seems so greatly to relish? Or is he serious in part only; and can we +separate his jest from his earnest?—<i>Sunt bona, sunt quaedum mediocria, +sunt mala plura</i>. Most of them are ridiculously bad, and yet among them are +found, as if by accident, principles of philology which are unsurpassed in any +ancient writer, and even in advance of any philologer of the last century. May +we suppose that Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by writing a +comedy in the form of a prose dialogue? And what is the final result of the +enquiry? Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory of language, which he +acknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to imply that a perfect language +can only be based on his own theory of ideas? Or if this latter explanation is +refuted by his silence, then in what relation does his account of language +stand to the rest of his philosophy? Or may we be so bold as to deny the +connexion between them? (For the allusion to the ideas at the end of the +dialogue is merely intended to show that we must not put words in the place of +things or realities, which is a thesis strongly insisted on by Plato in many +other passages)...These are some of the first thoughts which arise in the mind +of the reader of the Cratylus. And the consideration of them may form a +convenient introduction to the general subject of the dialogue. +</p> + +<p> +We must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally to some +clearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the absolute proportion of +the whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek temple or statue; nor should +his works be tried by any such standard. They have often the beauty of poetry, +but they have also the freedom of conversation. “Words are more plastic +than wax” (Rep.), and may be moulded into any form. He wanders on from +one topic to another, careless of the unity of his work, not fearing any +“judge, or spectator, who may recall him to the point” (Theat.), +“whither the argument blows we follow” (Rep.). To have determined +beforehand, as in a modern didactic treatise, the nature and limits of the +subject, would have been fatal to the spirit of enquiry or discovery, which is +the soul of the dialogue...These remarks are applicable to nearly all the works +of Plato, but to the Cratylus and Phaedrus more than any others. See Phaedrus, +Introduction. +</p> + +<p> +There is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may be more +truly viewed:—they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We have found +that in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, we arrived at no +conclusion—the different sides of the argument were personified in the +different speakers; but the victory was not distinctly attributed to any of +them, nor the truth wholly the property of any. And in the Cratylus we have no +reason to assume that Socrates is either wholly right or wholly wrong, or that +Plato, though he evidently inclines to him, had any other aim than that of +personifying, in the characters of Hermogenes, Socrates, and Cratylus, the +three theories of language which are respectively maintained by them. +</p> + +<p> +The two subordinate persons of the dialogue, Hermogenes and Cratylus, are at +the opposite poles of the argument. But after a while the disciple of the +Sophist and the follower of Heracleitus are found to be not so far removed from +one another as at first sight appeared; and both show an inclination to accept +the third view which Socrates interposes between them. First, Hermogenes, the +poor brother of the rich Callias, expounds the doctrine that names are +conventional; like the names of slaves, they may be given and altered at +pleasure. This is one of those principles which, whether applied to society or +language, explains everything and nothing. For in all things there is an +element of convention; but the admission of this does not help us to understand +the rational ground or basis in human nature on which the convention proceeds. +Socrates first of all intimates to Hermogenes that his view of language is only +a part of a sophistical whole, and ultimately tends to abolish the distinction +between truth and falsehood. Hermogenes is very ready to throw aside the +sophistical tenet, and listens with a sort of half admiration, half belief, to +the speculations of Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +Cratylus is of opinion that a name is either a true name or not a name at all. +He is unable to conceive of degrees of imitation; a word is either the perfect +expression of a thing, or a mere inarticulate sound (a fallacy which is still +prevalent among theorizers about the origin of language). He is at once a +philosopher and a sophist; for while wanting to rest language on an immutable +basis, he would deny the possibility of falsehood. He is inclined to derive all +truth from language, and in language he sees reflected the philosophy of +Heracleitus. His views are not like those of Hermogenes, hastily taken up, but +are said to be the result of mature consideration, although he is described as +still a young man. With a tenacity characteristic of the Heracleitean +philosophers, he clings to the doctrine of the flux. (Compare Theaet.) Of the +real Cratylus we know nothing, except that he is recorded by Aristotle to have +been the friend or teacher of Plato; nor have we any proof that he resembled +the likeness of him in Plato any more than the Critias of Plato is like the +real Critias, or the Euthyphro in this dialogue like the other Euthyphro, the +diviner, in the dialogue which is called after him. +</p> + +<p> +Between these two extremes, which have both of them a sophistical character, +the view of Socrates is introduced, which is in a manner the union of the two. +Language is conventional and also natural, and the true conventional-natural is +the rational. It is a work not of chance, but of art; the dialectician is the +artificer of words, and the legislator gives authority to them. They are the +expressions or imitations in sound of things. In a sense, Cratylus is right in +saying that things have by nature names; for nature is not opposed either to +art or to law. But vocal imitation, like any other copy, may be imperfectly +executed; and in this way an element of chance or convention enters in. There +is much which is accidental or exceptional in language. Some words have had +their original meaning so obscured, that they require to be helped out by +convention. But still the true name is that which has a natural meaning. Thus +nature, art, chance, all combine in the formation of language. And the three +views respectively propounded by Hermogenes, Socrates, Cratylus, may be +described as the conventional, the artificial or rational, and the natural. The +view of Socrates is the meeting-point of the other two, just as conceptualism +is the meeting-point of nominalism and realism. +</p> + +<p> +We can hardly say that Plato was aware of the truth, that “languages are +not made, but grow.” But still, when he says that “the legislator +made language with the dialectician standing on his right hand,” we need +not infer from this that he conceived words, like coins, to be issued from the +mint of the State. The creator of laws and of social life is naturally regarded +as the creator of language, according to Hellenic notions, and the philosopher +is his natural advisor. We are not to suppose that the legislator is performing +any extraordinary function; he is merely the Eponymus of the State, who +prescribes rules for the dialectician and for all other artists. According to a +truly Platonic mode of approaching the subject, language, like virtue in the +Republic, is examined by the analogy of the arts. Words are works of art which +may be equally made in different materials, and are well made when they have a +meaning. Of the process which he thus describes, Plato had probably no very +definite notion. But he means to express generally that language is the product +of intelligence, and that languages belong to States and not to individuals. +</p> + +<p> +A better conception of language could not have been formed in Plato’s +age, than that which he attributes to Socrates. Yet many persons have thought +that the mind of Plato is more truly seen in the vague realism of Cratylus. +This misconception has probably arisen from two causes: first, the desire to +bring Plato’s theory of language into accordance with the received +doctrine of the Platonic ideas; secondly, the impression created by Socrates +himself, that he is not in earnest, and is only indulging the fancy of the +hour. +</p> + +<p> +1. We shall have occasion to show more at length, in the Introduction to future +dialogues, that the so-called Platonic ideas are only a semi-mythical form, in +which he attempts to realize abstractions, and that they are replaced in his +later writings by a rational theory of psychology. (See introductions to the +Meno and the Sophist.) And in the Cratylus he gives a general account of the +nature and origin of language, in which Adam Smith, Rousseau, and other writers +of the last century, would have substantially agreed. At the end of the +dialogue, he speaks as in the Symposium and Republic of absolute beauty and +good; but he never supposed that they were capable of being embodied in words. +Of the names of the ideas, he would have said, as he says of the names of the +Gods, that we know nothing. Even the realism of Cratylus is not based upon the +ideas of Plato, but upon the flux of Heracleitus. Here, as in the Sophist and +Politicus, Plato expressly draws attention to the want of agreement in words +and things. Hence we are led to infer, that the view of Socrates is not the +less Plato’s own, because not based upon the ideas; 2nd, that +Plato’s theory of language is not inconsistent with the rest of his +philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +2. We do not deny that Socrates is partly in jest and partly in earnest. He is +discoursing in a high-flown vein, which may be compared to the +“dithyrambics of the Phaedrus.” They are mysteries of which he is +speaking, and he professes a kind of ludicrous fear of his imaginary wisdom. +When he is arguing out of Homer, about the names of Hector’s son, or when +he describes himself as inspired or maddened by Euthyphro, with whom he has +been sitting from the early dawn (compare Phaedrus and Lysias; Phaedr.) and +expresses his intention of yielding to the illusion to-day, and to-morrow he +will go to a priest and be purified, we easily see that his words are not to be +taken seriously. In this part of the dialogue his dread of committing impiety, +the pretended derivation of his wisdom from another, the extravagance of some +of his etymologies, and, in general, the manner in which the fun, fast and +furious, <i>vires acquirit eundo</i>, remind us strongly of the Phaedrus. The +jest is a long one, extending over more than half the dialogue. But then, we +remember that the Euthydemus is a still longer jest, in which the irony is +preserved to the very end. There he is parodying the ingenious follies of early +logic; in the Cratylus he is ridiculing the fancies of a new school of sophists +and grammarians. The fallacies of the Euthydemus are still retained at the end +of our logic books; and the etymologies of the Cratylus have also found their +way into later writers. Some of these are not much worse than the conjectures +of Hemsterhuis, and other critics of the last century; but this does not prove +that they are serious. For Plato is in advance of his age in his conception of +language, as much as he is in his conception of mythology. (Compare Phaedrus.) +</p> + +<p> +When the fervour of his etymological enthusiasm has abated, Socrates ends, as +he has begun, with a rational explanation of language. Still he preserves his +“know nothing” disguise, and himself declares his first notions +about names to be reckless and ridiculous. Having explained compound words by +resolving them into their original elements, he now proceeds to analyse simple +words into the letters of which they are composed. The Socrates who +“knows nothing,” here passes into the teacher, the dialectician, +the arranger of species. There is nothing in this part of the dialogue which is +either weak or extravagant. Plato is a supporter of the Onomatopoetic theory of +language; that is to say, he supposes words to be formed by the imitation of +ideas in sounds; he also recognises the effect of time, the influence of +foreign languages, the desire of euphony, to be formative principles; and he +admits a certain element of chance. But he gives no imitation in all this that +he is preparing the way for the construction of an ideal language. Or that he +has any Eleatic speculation to oppose to the Heracleiteanism of Cratylus. +</p> + +<p> +The theory of language which is propounded in the Cratylus is in accordance +with the later phase of the philosophy of Plato, and would have been regarded +by him as in the main true. The dialogue is also a satire on the philological +fancies of the day. Socrates in pursuit of his vocation as a detector of false +knowledge, lights by accident on the truth. He is guessing, he is dreaming; he +has heard, as he says in the Phaedrus, from another: no one is more surprised +than himself at his own discoveries. And yet some of his best remarks, as for +example his view of the derivation of Greek words from other languages, or of +the permutations of letters, or again, his observation that in speaking of the +Gods we are only speaking of our names of them, occur among these flights of +humour. +</p> + +<p> +We can imagine a character having a profound insight into the nature of men and +things, and yet hardly dwelling upon them seriously; blending inextricably +sense and nonsense; sometimes enveloping in a blaze of jests the most serious +matters, and then again allowing the truth to peer through; enjoying the flow +of his own humour, and puzzling mankind by an ironical exaggeration of their +absurdities. Such were Aristophanes and Rabelais; such, in a different style, +were Sterne, Jean Paul, Hamann,—writers who sometimes become +unintelligible through the extravagance of their fancies. Such is the character +which Plato intends to depict in some of his dialogues as the Silenus Socrates; +and through this medium we have to receive our theory of language. +</p> + +<p> +There remains a difficulty which seems to demand a more exact answer: In what +relation does the satirical or etymological portion of the dialogue stand to +the serious? Granting all that can be said about the provoking irony of +Socrates, about the parody of Euthyphro, or Prodicus, or Antisthenes, how does +the long catalogue of etymologies furnish any answer to the question of +Hermogenes, which is evidently the main thesis of the dialogue: What is the +truth, or correctness, or principle of names? +</p> + +<p> +After illustrating the nature of correctness by the analogy of the arts, and +then, as in the Republic, ironically appealing to the authority of the Homeric +poems, Socrates shows that the truth or correctness of names can only be +ascertained by an appeal to etymology. The truth of names is to be found in the +analysis of their elements. But why does he admit etymologies which are absurd, +based on Heracleitean fancies, fourfold interpretations of words, impossible +unions and separations of syllables and letters? +</p> + +<p> +1. The answer to this difficulty has been already anticipated in part: Socrates +is not a dogmatic teacher, and therefore he puts on this wild and fanciful +disguise, in order that the truth may be permitted to appear: 2. as Benfey +remarks, an erroneous example may illustrate a principle of language as well as +a true one: 3. many of these etymologies, as, for example, that of dikaion, are +indicated, by the manner in which Socrates speaks of them, to have been current +in his own age: 4. the philosophy of language had not made such progress as +would have justified Plato in propounding real derivations. Like his master +Socrates, he saw through the hollowness of the incipient sciences of the day, +and tries to move in a circle apart from them, laying down the conditions under +which they are to be pursued, but, as in the Timaeus, cautious and tentative, +when he is speaking of actual phenomena. To have made etymologies seriously, +would have seemed to him like the interpretation of the myths in the Phaedrus, +the task “of a not very fortunate individual, who had a great deal of +time on his hands.” The irony of Socrates places him above and beyond the +errors of his contemporaries. +</p> + +<p> +The Cratylus is full of humour and satirical touches: the inspiration which +comes from Euthyphro, and his prancing steeds, the light admixture of +quotations from Homer, and the spurious dialectic which is applied to them; the +jest about the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus, which is declared on the best +authority, viz. his own, to be a complete education in grammar and rhetoric; +the double explanation of the name Hermogenes, either as “not being in +luck,” or “being no speaker;” the dearly-bought wisdom of +Callias, the Lacedaemonian whose name was “Rush,” and, above all, +the pleasure which Socrates expresses in his own dangerous discoveries, which +“to-morrow he will purge away,” are truly humorous. While +delivering a lecture on the philosophy of language, Socrates is also satirizing +the endless fertility of the human mind in spinning arguments out of nothing, +and employing the most trifling and fanciful analogies in support of a theory. +Etymology in ancient as in modern times was a favourite recreation; and +Socrates makes merry at the expense of the etymologists. The simplicity of +Hermogenes, who is ready to believe anything that he is told, heightens the +effect. Socrates in his genial and ironical mood hits right and left at his +adversaries: Ouranos is so called apo tou oran ta ano, which, as some +philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind; the sophists are by a +fanciful explanation converted into heroes; “the givers of names were +like some philosophers who fancy that the earth goes round because their heads +are always going round.” There is a great deal of “mischief” +lurking in the following: “I found myself in greater perplexity about +justice than I was before I began to learn;” “The rho in katoptron +must be the addition of some one who cares nothing about truth, but thinks only +of putting the mouth into shape;” “Tales and falsehoods have +generally to do with the Tragic and goatish life, and tragedy is the place of +them.” Several philosophers and sophists are mentioned by name: first, +Protagoras and Euthydemus are assailed; then the interpreters of Homer, oi +palaioi Omerikoi (compare Arist. Met.) and the Orphic poets are alluded to by +the way; then he discovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of +Heracleitus;—the doctrine of the flux is contained in the word ousia (= +osia the pushing principle), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in psuche +and selene. Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling out and +putting in letters which were in vogue among the philologers of his time; or +slightly scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, he is impatient of +hearing from the half-converted Cratylus the doctrine that falsehood can +neither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed; a piece of sophistry attributed +to Gorgias, which reappears in the Sophist. And he proceeds to demolish, with +no less delight than he had set up, the Heracleitean theory of language. +</p> + +<p> +In the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious, though he +does not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the Heracleiteans, whom +here, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to ridicule. What was the origin of +this enmity we can hardly determine:—was it due to the natural dislike +which may be supposed to exist between the “patrons of the flux” +and the “friends of the ideas” (Soph.)? or is it to be attributed +to the indignation which Plato felt at having wasted his time upon +“Cratylus and the doctrines of Heracleitus” in the days of his +youth? Socrates, touching on some of the characteristic difficulties of early +Greek philosophy, endeavours to show Cratylus that imitation may be partial or +imperfect, that a knowledge of things is higher than a knowledge of names, and +that there can be no knowledge if all things are in a state of transition. But +Cratylus, who does not easily apprehend the argument from common sense, remains +unconvinced, and on the whole inclines to his former opinion. Some profound +philosophical remarks are scattered up and down, admitting of an application +not only to language but to knowledge generally; such as the assertion that +“consistency is no test of truth:” or again, “If we are +over-precise about words, truth will say ‘too late’ to us as to the +belated traveller in Aegina.” +</p> + +<p> +The place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with certainty. +The style and subject, and the treatment of the character of Socrates, have a +close resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially to the Phaedrus and +Euthydemus. The manner in which the ideas are spoken of at the end of the +dialogue, also indicates a comparatively early date. The imaginative element is +still in full vigour; the Socrates of the Cratylus is the Socrates of the +Apology and Symposium, not yet Platonized; and he describes, as in the +Theaetetus, the philosophy of Heracleitus by “unsavoury” +similes—he cannot believe that the world is like “a leaky +vessel,” or “a man who has a running at the nose”; he +attributes the flux of the world to the swimming in some folks’ heads. On +the other hand, the relation of thought to language is omitted here, but is +treated of in the Sophist. These grounds are not sufficient to enable us to +arrive at a precise conclusion. But we shall not be far wrong in placing the +Cratylus about the middle, or at any rate in the first half, of the series. +</p> + +<p> +Cratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the brother of Callias, +have been arguing about names; the former maintaining that they are natural, +the latter that they are conventional. Cratylus affirms that his own is a true +name, but will not allow that the name of Hermogenes is equally true. +Hermogenes asks Socrates to explain to him what Cratylus means; or, far rather, +he would like to know, What Socrates himself thinks about the truth or +correctness of names? Socrates replies, that hard is knowledge, and the nature +of names is a considerable part of knowledge: he has never been to hear the +fifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having only attended the single-drachma +course, he is not competent to give an opinion on such matters. When Cratylus +denies that Hermogenes is a true name, he supposes him to mean that he is not a +true son of Hermes, because he is never in luck. But he would like to have an +open council and to hear both sides. +</p> + +<p> +Hermogenes is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may be +changed, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please, and the altered +name is as good as the original one. +</p> + +<p> +You mean to say, for instance, rejoins Socrates, that if I agree to call a man +a horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me, and a man by the rest +of the world? But, surely, there is in words a true and a false, as there are +true and false propositions. If a whole proposition be true or false, then the +parts of a proposition may be true or false, and the least parts as well as the +greatest; and the least parts are names, and therefore names may be true or +false. Would Hermogenes maintain that anybody may give a name to anything, and +as many names as he pleases; and would all these names be always true at the +time of giving them? Hermogenes replies that this is the only way in which he +can conceive that names are correct; and he appeals to the practice of +different nations, and of the different Hellenic tribes, in confirmation of his +view. Socrates asks, whether the things differ as the words which represent +them differ:—Are we to maintain with Protagoras, that what appears is? +Hermogenes has always been puzzled about this, but acknowledges, when he is +pressed by Socrates, that there are a few very good men in the world, and a +great many very bad; and the very good are the wise, and the very bad are the +foolish; and this is not mere appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say +with Euthydemus, that all things equally and always belong to all men; in that +case, again, there would be no distinction between bad and good men. But then, +the only remaining possibility is, that all things have their several distinct +natures, and are independent of our notions about them. And not only things, +but actions, have distinct natures, and are done by different processes. There +is a natural way of cutting or burning, and a natural instrument with which men +cut or burn, and any other way will fail;—this is true of all actions. +And speaking is a kind of action, and naming is a kind of speaking, and we must +name according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument. We cut with +a knife, we pierce with an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name with a name. +And as a shuttle separates the warp from the woof, so a name distinguishes the +natures of things. The weaver will use the shuttle well,—that is, like a +weaver; and the teacher will use the name well,—that is, like a teacher. +The shuttle will be made by the carpenter; the awl by the smith or skilled +person. But who makes a name? Does not the law give names, and does not the +teacher receive them from the legislator? He is the skilled person who makes +them, and of all skilled workmen he is the rarest. But how does the carpenter +make or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? Will he not look at the +ideal which he has in his mind? And as the different kinds of work differ, so +ought the instruments which make them to differ. The several kinds of shuttles +ought to answer in material and form to the several kinds of webs. And the +legislator ought to know the different materials and forms of which names are +made in Hellas and other countries. But who is to be the judge of the proper +form? The judge of shuttles is the weaver who uses them; the judge of lyres is +the player of the lyre; the judge of ships is the pilot. And will not the judge +who is able to direct the legislator in his work of naming, be he who knows how +to use the names—he who can ask and answer questions—in short, the +dialectician? The pilot directs the carpenter how to make the rudder, and the +dialectician directs the legislator how he is to impose names; for to express +the ideal forms of things in syllables and letters is not the easy task, +Hermogenes, which you imagine. +</p> + +<p> +“I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me this natural +correctness of names.” +</p> + +<p> +Indeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit that there +is a correctness of names, and that not every one can give a name. But what is +the nature of this correctness or truth, you must learn from the Sophists, of +whom your brother Callias has bought his reputation for wisdom rather dearly; +and since they require to be paid, you, having no money, had better learn from +him at second-hand. “Well, but I have just given up Protagoras, and I +should be inconsistent in going to learn of him.” Then if you reject him +you may learn of the poets, and in particular of Homer, who distinguishes the +names given by Gods and men to the same things, as in the verse about the river +God who fought with Hephaestus, “whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call +Scamander;” or in the lines in which he mentions the bird which the Gods +call “Chalcis,” and men “Cymindis;” or the hill which +men call “Batieia,” and the Gods “Myrinna’s +Tomb.” Here is an important lesson; for the Gods must of course be right +in their use of names. And this is not the only truth about philology which may +be learnt from Homer. Does he not say that Hector’s son had two +names— +</p> + +<p> +“Hector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax”? +</p> + +<p> +Now, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the other name was +conferred by the women? And which are more likely to be right—the wiser +or the less wise, the men or the women? Homer evidently agreed with the men: +and of the name given by them he offers an explanation;—the boy was +called Astyanax (“king of the city”), because his father saved the +city. The names Astyanax and Hector, moreover, are really the same,—the +one means a king, and the other is “a holder or possessor.” For as +the lion’s whelp may be called a lion, or the horse’s foal a foal, +so the son of a king may be called a king. But if the horse had produced a +calf, then that would be called a calf. Whether the syllables of a name are the +same or not makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained. For example; +the names of letters, whether vowels or consonants, do not correspond to their +sounds, with the exception of epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega. The name Beta +has three letters added to the sound—and yet this does not alter the +sense of the word, or prevent the whole name having the value which the +legislator intended. And the same may be said of a king and the son of a king, +who like other animals resemble each other in the course of nature; the words +by which they are signified may be disguised, and yet amid differences of sound +the etymologist may recognise the same notion, just as the physician recognises +the power of the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell. +Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, but they have the same meaning; +and Agis (leader) is altogether different in sound from Polemarchus (chief in +war), or Eupolemus (good warrior); but the two words present the same idea of +leader or general, like the words Iatrocles and Acesimbrotus, which equally +denote a physician. The son succeeds the father as the foal succeeds the horse, +but when, out of the course of nature, a prodigy occurs, and the offspring no +longer resembles the parent, then the names no longer agree. This may be +illustrated by the case of Agamemnon and his son Orestes, of whom the former +has a name significant of his patience at the siege of Troy; while the name of +the latter indicates his savage, man-of-the-mountain nature. Atreus again, for +his murder of Chrysippus, and his cruelty to Thyestes, is rightly named Atreus, +which, to the eye of the etymologist, is ateros (destructive), ateires +(stubborn), atreotos (fearless); and Pelops is o ta pelas oron (he who sees +what is near only), because in his eagerness to win Hippodamia, he was +unconscious of the remoter consequences which the murder of Myrtilus would +entail upon his race. The name Tantalus, if slightly changed, offers two +etymologies; either apo tes tou lithou talanteias, or apo tou talantaton einai, +signifying at once the hanging of the stone over his head in the world below, +and the misery which he brought upon his country. And the name of his father, +Zeus, Dios, Zenos, has an excellent meaning, though hard to be understood, +because really a sentence which is divided into two parts (Zeus, Dios). For he, +being the lord and king of all, is the author of our being, and in him all +live: this is implied in the double form, Dios, Zenos, which being put together +and interpreted is di on ze panta. There may, at first sight, appear to be some +irreverence in calling him the son of Cronos, who is a proverb for stupidity; +but the meaning is that Zeus himself is the son of a mighty intellect; Kronos, +quasi koros, not in the sense of a youth, but quasi to katharon kai akeraton +tou nou—the pure and garnished mind, which in turn is begotten of Uranus, +who is so called apo tou oran ta ano, from looking upwards; which, as +philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind. The earlier portion of +Hesiod’s genealogy has escaped my memory, or I would try more conclusions +of the same sort. “You talk like an oracle.” I caught the infection +from Euthyphro, who gave me a long lecture which began at dawn, and has not +only entered into my ears, but filled my soul, and my intention is to yield to +the inspiration to-day; and to-morrow I will be exorcised by some priest or +sophist. “Go on; I am anxious to hear the rest.” Now that we have a +general notion, how shall we proceed? What names will afford the most crucial +test of natural fitness? Those of heroes and ordinary men are often deceptive, +because they are patronymics or expressions of a wish; let us try gods and +demi-gods. Gods are so called, apo tou thein, from the verb “to +run;” because the sun, moon, and stars run about the heaven; and they +being the original gods of the Hellenes, as they still are of the Barbarians, +their name is given to all Gods. The demons are the golden race of Hesiod, and +by golden he means not literally golden, but good; and they are called demons, +quasi daemones, which in old Attic was used for daimones—good men are +well said to become daimones when they die, because they are knowing. Eros +(with an epsilon) is the same word as eros (with an eta): “the sons of +God saw the daughters of men that they were fair;” or perhaps they were a +species of sophists or rhetoricians, and so called apo tou erotan, or eirein, +from their habit of spinning questions; for eirein is equivalent to legein. I +get all this from Euthyphro; and now a new and ingenious idea comes into my +mind, and, if I am not careful, I shall be wiser than I ought to be by +to-morrow’s dawn. My idea is, that we may put in and pull out letters at +pleasure and alter the accents (as, for example, Dii philos may be turned into +Diphilos), and we may make words into sentences and sentences into words. The +name anthrotos is a case in point, for a letter has been omitted and the accent +changed; the original meaning being o anathron a opopen—he who looks up +at what he sees. Psuche may be thought to be the reviving, or refreshing, or +animating principle—e anapsuchousa to soma; but I am afraid that +Euthyphro and his disciples will scorn this derivation, and I must find +another: shall we identify the soul with the “ordering mind” of +Anaxagoras, and say that psuche, quasi phuseche = e phusin echei or +ochei?—this might easily be refined into psyche. “That is a more +artistic etymology.” +</p> + +<p> +After psuche follows soma; this, by a slight permutation, may be either = (1) +the “grave” of the soul, or (2) may mean “that by which the +soul signifies (semainei) her wishes.” But more probably, the word is +Orphic, and simply denotes that the body is the place of ward in which the soul +suffers the penalty of sin,—en o sozetai. “I should like to hear +some more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that excellent one of +Zeus.” The truest names of the Gods are those which they give themselves; +but these are unknown to us. Less true are those by which we propitiate them, +as men say in prayers, “May he graciously receive any name by which I +call him.” And to avoid offence, I should like to let them know +beforehand that we are not presuming to enquire about them, but only about the +names which they usually bear. Let us begin with Hestia. What did he mean who +gave the name Hestia? “That is a very difficult question.” O, my +dear Hermogenes, I believe that there was a power of philosophy and talk among +the first inventors of names, both in our own and in other languages; for even +in foreign words a principle is discernible. Hestia is the same with esia, +which is an old form of ousia, and means the first principle of things: this +agrees with the fact that to Hestia the first sacrifices are offered. There is +also another reading—osia, which implies that “pushing” +(othoun) is the first principle of all things. And here I seem to discover a +delicate allusion to the flux of Heracleitus—that antediluvian +philosopher who cannot walk twice in the same stream; and this flux of his may +accomplish yet greater marvels. For the names Cronos and Rhea cannot have been +accidental; the giver of them must have known something about the doctrine of +Heracleitus. Moreover, there is a remarkable coincidence in the words of +Hesiod, when he speaks of Oceanus, “the origin of Gods;” and in the +verse of Orpheus, in which he describes Oceanus espousing his sister Tethys. +Tethys is nothing more than the name of a spring—to diattomenon kai +ethoumenon. Poseidon is posidesmos, the chain of the feet, because you cannot +walk on the sea—the epsilon is inserted by way of ornament; or perhaps +the name may have been originally polleidon, meaning, that the God knew many +things (polla eidos): he may also be the shaker, apo tou seiein,—in this +case, pi and delta have been added. Pluto is connected with ploutos, because +wealth comes out of the earth; or the word may be a euphemism for Hades, which +is usually derived apo tou aeidous, because the God is concerned with the +invisible. But the name Hades was really given him from his knowing (eidenai) +all good things. Men in general are foolishly afraid of him, and talk with +horror of the world below from which no one may return. The reason why his +subjects never wish to come back, even if they could, is that the God enchains +them by the strongest of spells, namely by the desire of virtue, which they +hope to obtain by constant association with him. He is the perfect and +accomplished Sophist and the great benefactor of the other world; for he has +much more than he wants there, and hence he is called Pluto or the rich. He +will have nothing to do with the souls of men while in the body, because he +cannot work his will with them so long as they are confused and entangled by +fleshly lusts. Demeter is the mother and giver of food—e didousa meter +tes edodes. Here is erate tis, or perhaps the legislator may have been thinking +of the weather, and has merely transposed the letters of the word aer. +Pherephatta, that word of awe, is pheretapha, which is only an euphonious +contraction of e tou pheromenou ephaptomene,—all things are in motion, +and she in her wisdom moves with them, and the wise God Hades consorts with +her—there is nothing very terrible in this, any more than in the her +other appellation Persephone, which is also significant of her wisdom (sophe). +Apollo is another name, which is supposed to have some dreadful meaning, but is +susceptible of at least four perfectly innocent explanations. First, he is the +purifier or purger or absolver (apolouon); secondly, he is the true diviner, +Aplos, as he is called in the Thessalian dialect (aplos = aplous, sincere); +thirdly, he is the archer (aei ballon), always shooting; or again, supposing +alpha to mean ama or omou, Apollo becomes equivalent to ama polon, which points +to both his musical and his heavenly attributes; for there is a “moving +together” alike in music and in the harmony of the spheres. The second +lambda is inserted in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction. The +Muses are so called—apo tou mosthai. The gentle Leto or Letho is named +from her willingness (ethelemon), or because she is ready to forgive and forget +(lethe). Artemis is so called from her healthy well-balanced nature, dia to +artemes, or as aretes istor; or as a lover of virginity, aroton misesasa. One +of these explanations is probably true,—perhaps all of them. Dionysus is +o didous ton oinon, and oinos is quasi oionous because wine makes those think +(oiesthai) that they have a mind (nous) who have none. The established +derivation of Aphrodite dia ten tou athrou genesin may be accepted on the +authority of Hesiod. Again, there is the name of Pallas, or Athene, which we, +who are Athenians, must not forget. Pallas is derived from armed +dances—apo tou pallein ta opla. For Athene we must turn to the +allegorical interpreters of Homer, who make the name equivalent to theonoe, or +possibly the word was originally ethonoe and signified moral intelligence (en +ethei noesis). Hephaestus, again, is the lord of light—o tou phaeos +istor. This is a good notion; and, to prevent any other getting into our heads, +let us go on to Ares. He is the manly one (arren), or the unchangeable one +(arratos). Enough of the Gods; for, by the Gods, I am afraid of them; but if +you suggest other words, you will see how the horses of Euthyphro prance. +“Only one more God; tell me about my godfather Hermes.” He is +ermeneus, the messenger or cheater or thief or bargainer; or o eirein momenos, +that is, eiremes or ermes—the speaker or contriver of speeches. +“Well said Cratylus, then, that I am no son of Hermes.” Pan, as the +son of Hermes, is speech or the brother of speech, and is called Pan because +speech indicates everything—o pan menuon. He has two forms, a true and a +false; and is in the upper part smooth, and in the lower part shaggy. He is the +goat of Tragedy, in which there are plenty of falsehoods. +</p> + +<p> +“Will you go on to the elements—sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, +air, fire, water, seasons, years?” Very good: and which shall I take +first? Let us begin with elios, or the sun. The Doric form elios helps us to +see that he is so called because at his rising he gathers (alizei) men +together, or because he rolls about (eilei) the earth, or because he variegates +(aiolei = poikillei) the earth. Selene is an anticipation of Anaxagoras, being +a contraction of selaenoneoaeia, the light (selas) which is ever old and new, +and which, as Anaxagoras says, is borrowed from the sun; the name was +harmonized into selanaia, a form which is still in use. “That is a true +dithyrambic name.” Meis is so called apo tou meiousthai, from suffering +diminution, and astron is from astrape (lightning), which is an improvement of +anastrope, that which turns the eyes inside out. “How do you explain pur +n udor?” I suspect that pur, which, like udor n kuon, is found in +Phrygian, is a foreign word; for the Hellenes have borrowed much from the +barbarians, and I always resort to this theory of a foreign origin when I am at +a loss. Aer may be explained, oti airei ta apo tes ges; or, oti aei rei; or, +oti pneuma ex autou ginetai (compare the poetic word aetai). So aither quasi +aeitheer oti aei thei peri ton aera: ge, gaia quasi genneteira (compare the +Homeric form gegaasi); ora (with an omega), or, according to the old Attic form +ora (with an omicron), is derived apo tou orizein, because it divides the year; +eniautos and etos are the same thought—o en eauto etazon, cut into two +parts, en eauto and etazon, like di on ze into Dios and Zenos. +</p> + +<p> +“You make surprising progress.” True; I am run away with, and am +not even yet at my utmost speed. “I should like very much to hear your +account of the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those +charming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?” To explain +all that will be a serious business; still, as I have put on the lion’s +skin, appearances must be maintained. My opinion is, that primitive men were +like some modern philosophers, who, by always going round in their search after +the nature of things, become dizzy; and this phenomenon, which was really in +themselves, they imagined to take place in the external world. You have no +doubt remarked, that the doctrine of the universal flux, or generation of +things, is indicated in names. “No, I never did.” Phronesis is only +phoras kai rou noesis, or perhaps phoras onesis, and in any case is connected +with pheresthai; gnome is gones skepsis kai nomesis; noesis is neou or +gignomenon esis; the word neos implies that creation is always going +on—the original form was neoesis; sophrosune is soteria phroneseos; +episteme is e epomene tois pragmasin—the faculty which keeps close, +neither anticipating nor lagging behind; sunesis is equivalent to sunienai, +sumporeuesthai ten psuche, and is a kind of conclusion—sullogismos tis, +akin therefore in idea to episteme; sophia is very difficult, and has a foreign +look—the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things, and may be +illustrated by the poetical esuthe and the Lacedaemonian proper name Sous, or +Rush; agathon is ro agaston en te tachuteti,—for all things are in +motion, and some are swifter than others: dikaiosune is clearly e tou dikaiou +sunesis. The word dikaion is more troublesome, and appears to mean the subtle +penetrating power which, as the lovers of motion say, preserves all things, and +is the cause of all things, quasi diaion going through—the letter kappa +being inserted for the sake of euphony. This is a great mystery which has been +confided to me; but when I ask for an explanation I am thought obtrusive, and +another derivation is proposed to me. Justice is said to be o kaion, or the +sun; and when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered, +“What, is there no justice when the sun is down?” And when I +entreat my questioner to tell me his own opinion, he replies, that justice is +fire in the abstract, or heat in the abstract; which is not very intelligible. +Others laugh at such notions, and say with Anaxagoras, that justice is the +ordering mind. “I think that some one must have told you this.” And +not the rest? Let me proceed then, in the hope of proving to you my +originality. Andreia is quasi anpeia quasi e ano roe, the stream which flows +upwards, and is opposed to injustice, which clearly hinders the principle of +penetration; arren and aner have a similar derivation; gune is the same as +gone; thelu is derived apo tes theles, because the teat makes things flourish +(tethelenai), and the word thallein itself implies increase of youth, which is +swift and sudden ever (thein and allesthai). I am getting over the ground fast: +but much has still to be explained. There is techne, for instance. This, by an +aphaeresis of tau and an epenthesis of omicron in two places, may be identified +with echonoe, and signifies “that which has mind.” +</p> + +<p> +“A very poor etymology.” Yes; but you must remember that all +language is in process of change; letters are taken in and put out for the sake +of euphony, and time is also a great alterer of words. For example, what +business has the letter rho in the word katoptron, or the letter sigma in the +word sphigx? The additions are often such that it is impossible to make out the +original word; and yet, if you may put in and pull out, as you like, any name +is equally good for any object. The fact is, that great dictators of literature +like yourself should observe the rules of moderation. “I will do my +best.” But do not be too much of a precisian, or you will paralyze me. If +you will let me add mechane, apo tou mekous, which means polu, and anein, I +shall be at the summit of my powers, from which elevation I will examine the +two words kakia and arete. The first is easily explained in accordance with +what has preceded; for all things being in a flux, kakia is to kakos ion. This +derivation is illustrated by the word deilia, which ought to have come after +andreia, and may be regarded as o lian desmos tes psuches, just as aporia +signifies an impediment to motion (from alpha not, and poreuesthai to go), and +arete is euporia, which is the opposite of this—the everflowing (aei +reousa or aeireite), or the eligible, quasi airete. You will think that I am +inventing, but I say that if kakia is right, then arete is also right. But what +is kakon? That is a very obscure word, to which I can only apply my old notion +and declare that kakon is a foreign word. Next, let us proceed to kalon, +aischron. The latter is doubtless contracted from aeischoroun, quasi aei ischon +roun. The inventor of words being a patron of the flux, was a great enemy to +stagnation. Kalon is to kaloun ta pragmata—this is mind (nous or +dianoia); which is also the principle of beauty; and which doing the works of +beauty, is therefore rightly called the beautiful. The meaning of sumpheron is +explained by previous examples;—like episteme, signifying that the soul +moves in harmony with the world (sumphora, sumpheronta). Kerdos is to pasi +kerannumenon—that which mingles with all things: lusiteloun is equivalent +to to tes phoras luon to telos, and is not to be taken in the vulgar sense of +gainful, but rather in that of swift, being the principle which makes motion +immortal and unceasing; ophelimon is apo tou ophellein—that which gives +increase: this word, which is Homeric, is of foreign origin. Blaberon is to +blamton or boulomenon aptein tou rou—that which injures or seeks to bind +the stream. The proper word would be boulapteroun, but this is too much of a +mouthful—like a prelude on the flute in honour of Athene. The word +zemiodes is difficult; great changes, as I was saying, have been made in words, +and even a small change will alter their meaning very much. The word deon is +one of these disguised words. You know that according to the old pronunciation, +which is especially affected by the women, who are great conservatives, iota +and delta were used where we should now use eta and zeta: for example, what we +now call emera was formerly called imera; and this shows the meaning of the +word to have been “the desired one coming after night,” and not, as +is often supposed, “that which makes things gentle” (emera). So +again, zugon is duogon, quasi desis duein eis agogen—(the binding of two +together for the purpose of drawing.) Deon, as ordinarily written, has an evil +sense, signifying the chain (desmos) or hindrance of motion; but in its ancient +form dion is expressive of good, quasi diion, that which penetrates or goes +through all. Zemiodes is really demiodes, and means that which binds motion +(dounti to ion): edone is e pros ten onrsin teinousa praxis—the delta is +an insertion: lupe is derived apo tes dialuseos tou somatos: ania is from alpha +and ienai, to go: algedon is a foreign word, and is so called apo tou algeinou: +odune is apo tes enduseos tes lupes: achthedon is in its very sound a burden: +chapa expresses the flow of soul: terpsis is apo tou terpnou, and terpnon is +properly erpnon, because the sensation of pleasure is likened to a breath +(pnoe) which creeps (erpei) through the soul: euphrosune is named from +pheresthai, because the soul moves in harmony with nature: epithumia is e epi +ton thumon iousa dunamis: thumos is apo tes thuseos tes psuches: +imeros—oti eimenos pei e psuche: pothos, the desire which is in another +place, allothi pou: eros was anciently esros, and so called because it flows +into (esrei) the soul from without: doxa is e dioxis tou eidenai, or expresses +the shooting from a bow (toxon). The latter etymology is confirmed by the words +boulesthai, boule, aboulia, which all have to do with shooting (bole): and +similarly oiesis is nothing but the movement (oisis) of the soul towards +essence. Ekousion is to eikon—the yielding—anagke is e an agke +iousa, the passage through ravines which impede motion: aletheia is theia ale, +divine motion. Pseudos is the opposite of this, implying the principle of +constraint and forced repose, which is expressed under the figure of sleep, to +eudon; the psi is an addition. Onoma, a name, affirms the real existence of +that which is sought after—on ou masma estin. On and ousia are only ion +with an iota broken off; and ouk on is ouk ion. “And what are ion, reon, +doun?” One way of explaining them has been already suggested—they +may be of foreign origin; and possibly this is the true answer. But mere +antiquity may often prevent our recognizing words, after all the complications +which they have undergone; and we must remember that however far we carry back +our analysis some ultimate elements or roots will remain which can be no +further analyzed. For example; the word agathos was supposed by us to be a +compound of agastos and thoos, and probably thoos may be further resolvable. +But if we take a word of which no further resolution seems attainable, we may +fairly conclude that we have reached one of these original elements, and the +truth of such a word must be tested by some new method. Will you help me in the +search? +</p> + +<p> +All names, whether primary or secondary, are intended to show the nature of +things; and the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the +primary. But then, how do the primary names indicate anything? And let me ask +another question,—If we had no faculty of speech, how should we +communicate with one another? Should we not use signs, like the deaf and dumb? +The elevation of our hands would mean lightness—heaviness would be +expressed by letting them drop. The running of any animal would be described by +a similar movement of our own frames. The body can only express anything by +imitation; and the tongue or mouth can imitate as well as the rest of the body. +But this imitation of the tongue or voice is not yet a name, because people may +imitate sheep or goats without naming them. What, then, is a name? In the first +place, a name is not a musical, or, secondly, a pictorial imitation, but an +imitation of that kind which expresses the nature of a thing; and is the +invention not of a musician, or of a painter, but of a namer. +</p> + +<p> +And now, I think that we may consider the names about which you were asking. +The way to analyze them will be by going back to the letters, or primary +elements of which they are composed. First, we separate the alphabet into +classes of letters, distinguishing the consonants, mutes, vowels, and +semivowels; and when we have learnt them singly, we shall learn to know them in +their various combinations of two or more letters; just as the painter knows +how to use either a single colour, or a combination of colours. And like the +painter, we may apply letters to the expression of objects, and form them into +syllables; and these again into words, until the picture or figure—that +is, language—is completed. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, +but I mean to say that this was the way in which the ancients framed language. +And this leads me to consider whether the primary as well as the secondary +elements are rightly given. I may remark, as I was saying about the Gods, that +we can only attain to conjecture of them. But still we insist that ours is the +true and only method of discovery; otherwise we must have recourse, like the +tragic poets, to a Deus ex machina, and say that God gave the first names, and +therefore they are right; or that the barbarians are older than we are, and +that we learnt of them; or that antiquity has cast a veil over the truth. Yet +all these are not reasons; they are only ingenious excuses for having no +reasons. +</p> + +<p> +I will freely impart to you my own notions, though they are somewhat +crude:—the letter rho appears to me to be the general instrument which +the legislator has employed to express all motion or kinesis. (I ought to +explain that kinesis is just iesis (going), for the letter eta was unknown to +the ancients; and the root, kiein, is a foreign form of ienai: of kinesis or +eisis, the opposite is stasis). This use of rho is evident in the words +tremble, break, crush, crumble, and the like; the imposer of names perceived +that the tongue is most agitated in the pronunciation of this letter, just as +he used iota to express the subtle power which penetrates through all things. +The letters phi, psi, sigma, zeta, which require a great deal of wind, are +employed in the imitation of such notions as shivering, seething, shaking, and +in general of what is windy. The letters delta and tau convey the idea of +binding and rest in a place: the lambda denotes smoothness, as in the words +slip, sleek, sleep, and the like. But when the slipping tongue is detained by +the heavier sound of gamma, then arises the notion of a glutinous clammy +nature: nu is sounded from within, and has a notion of inwardness: alpha is the +expression of size; eta of length; omicron of roundness, and therefore there is +plenty of omicron in the word goggulon. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the +correctness of names; and I should like to hear what Cratylus would say. +“But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus mystifies me; I should +like to ask him, in your presence, what he means by the fitness of +names?” To this appeal, Cratylus replies “that he cannot explain so +important a subject all in a moment.” “No, but you may ‘add +little to little,’ as Hesiod says.” Socrates here interposes his +own request, that Cratylus will give some account of his theory. Hermogenes and +himself are mere sciolists, but Cratylus has reflected on these matters, and +has had teachers. Cratylus replies in the words of Achilles: +“‘Illustrious Ajax, you have spoken in all things much to my +mind,’ whether Euthyphro, or some Muse inhabiting your own breast, was +the inspirer.” Socrates replies, that he is afraid of being +self-deceived, and therefore he must “look fore and aft,” as Homer +remarks. Does not Cratylus agree with him that names teach us the nature of +things? “Yes.” And naming is an art, and the artists are +legislators, and like artists in general, some of them are better and some of +them are worse than others, and give better or worse laws, and make better or +worse names. Cratylus cannot admit that one name is better than another; they +are either true names, or they are not names at all; and when he is asked about +the name of Hermogenes, who is acknowledged to have no luck in him, he affirms +this to be the name of somebody else. Socrates supposes him to mean that +falsehood is impossible, to which his own answer would be, that there has never +been a lack of liars. Cratylus presses him with the old sophistical argument, +that falsehood is saying that which is not, and therefore saying +nothing;—you cannot utter the word which is not. Socrates complains that +this argument is too subtle for an old man to understand: Suppose a person +addressing Cratylus were to say, Hail, Athenian Stranger, Hermogenes! would +these words be true or false? “I should say that they would be mere +unmeaning sounds, like the hammering of a brass pot.” But you would +acknowledge that names, as well as pictures, are imitations, and also that +pictures may give a right or wrong representation of a man or woman:—why +may not names then equally give a representation true and right or false and +wrong? Cratylus admits that pictures may give a true or false representation, +but denies that names can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man and say +“this is year picture,” and again, he may go and say to him +“this is your name”—in the one case appealing to his sense of +sight, and in the other to his sense of hearing;—may he not? +“Yes.” Then you will admit that there is a right or a wrong +assignment of names, and if of names, then of verbs and nouns; and if of verbs +and nouns, then of the sentences which are made up of them; and comparing nouns +to pictures, you may give them all the appropriate sounds, or only some of +them. And as he who gives all the colours makes a good picture, and he who +gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but still a picture; so he who +gives all the sounds makes a good name, and he who gives only some of them, a +bad or imperfect one, but a name still. The artist of names, that is, the +legislator, may be a good or he may be a bad artist. “Yes, Socrates, but +the cases are not parallel; for if you subtract or misplace a letter, the name +ceases to be a name.” Socrates admits that the number 10, if an unit is +subtracted, would cease to be 10, but denies that names are of this purely +quantitative nature. Suppose that there are two objects—Cratylus and the +image of Cratylus; and let us imagine that some God makes them perfectly alike, +both in their outward form and in their inner nature and qualities: then there +will be two Cratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of Cratylus. But +an image in fact always falls short in some degree of the original, and if +images are not exact counterparts, why should names be? if they were, they +would be the doubles of their originals, and indistinguishable from them; and +how ridiculous would this be! Cratylus admits the truth of Socrates’ +remark. But then Socrates rejoins, he should have the courage to acknowledge +that letters may be wrongly inserted in a noun, or a noun in a sentence; and +yet the noun or the sentence may retain a meaning. Better to admit this, that +we may not be punished like the traveller in Egina who goes about at night, and +that Truth herself may not say to us, “Too late.” And, errors +excepted, we may still affirm that a name to be correct must have proper +letters, which bear a resemblance to the thing signified. I must remind you of +what Hermogenes and I were saying about the letter rho accent, which was held +to be expressive of motion and hardness, as lambda is of smoothness;—and +this you will admit to be their natural meaning. But then, why do the Eritreans +call that skleroter which we call sklerotes? We can understand one another, +although the letter rho accent is not equivalent to the letter s: why is this? +You reply, because the two letters are sufficiently alike for the purpose of +expressing motion. Well, then, there is the letter lambda; what business has +this in a word meaning hardness? “Why, Socrates, I retort upon you, that +we put in and pull out letters at pleasure.” And the explanation of this +is custom or agreement: we have made a convention that the rho shall mean s and +a convention may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. How could there +be names for all the numbers unless you allow that convention is used? +Imitation is a poor thing, and has to be supplemented by convention, which is +another poor thing; although I agree with you in thinking that the most perfect +form of language is found only where there is a perfect correspondence of sound +and meaning. But let me ask you what is the use and force of names? “The +use of names, Socrates, is to inform, and he who knows names knows +things.” Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the +discovery of things? “Yes.” But do you not see that there is a +degree of deception about names? He who first gave names, gave them according +to his conception, and that may have been erroneous. “But then, why, +Socrates, is language so consistent? all words have the same laws.” Mere +consistency is no test of truth. In geometrical problems, for example, there +may be a flaw at the beginning, and yet the conclusion may follow consistently. +And, therefore, a wise man will take especial care of first principles. But are +words really consistent; are there not as many terms of praise which signify +rest as which signify motion? There is episteme, which is connected with +stasis, as mneme is with meno. Bebaion, again, is the expression of station and +position; istoria is clearly descriptive of the stopping istanai of the stream; +piston indicates the cessation of motion; and there are many words having a bad +sense, which are connected with ideas of motion, such as sumphora, amartia, +etc.: amathia, again, might be explained, as e ama theo iontos poreia, and +akolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the bad names are framed on the +same principle as the good, and other examples might be given, which would +favour a theory of rest rather than of motion. “Yes; but the greater +number of words express motion.” Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is +correctness of names to be determined by the voice of a majority? +</p> + +<p> +Here is another point: we were saying that the legislator gives names; and +therefore we must suppose that he knows the things which he names: but how can +he have learnt things from names before there were any names? “I believe, +Socrates, that some power more than human first gave things their names, and +that these were necessarily true names.” Then how came the giver of names +to contradict himself, and to make some names expressive of rest, and others of +motion? “I do not suppose that he did make them both.” Then which +did he make—those which are expressive of rest, or those which are +expressive of motion?...But if some names are true and others false, we can +only decide between them, not by counting words, but by appealing to things. +And, if so, we must allow that things may be known without names; for names, as +we have several times admitted, are the images of things; and the higher +knowledge is of things, and is not to be derived from names; and though I do +not doubt that the inventors of language gave names, under the idea that all +things are in a state of motion and flux, I believe that they were mistaken; +and that having fallen into a whirlpool themselves, they are trying to drag us +after them. For is there not a true beauty and a true good, which is always +beautiful and always good? Can the thing beauty be vanishing away from us while +the words are yet in our mouths? And they could not be known by any one if they +are always passing away—for if they are always passing away, the observer +has no opportunity of observing their state. Whether the doctrine of the flux +or of the eternal nature be the truer, is hard to determine. But no man of +sense will put himself, or the education of his mind, in the power of names: he +will not condemn himself to be an unreal thing, nor will he believe that +everything is in a flux like the water in a leaky vessel, or that the world is +a man who has a running at the nose. This doctrine may be true, Cratylus, but +is also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would have you reflect while +you are young, and find out the truth, and when you know come and tell me. +“I have thought, Socrates, and after a good deal of thinking I incline to +Heracleitus.” Then another day, my friend, you shall give me a lesson. +“Very good, Socrates, and I hope that you will continue to study these +things yourself.” +</p> + +<hr /> + +<p> +We may now consider (I) how far Plato in the Cratylus has discovered the true +principles of language, and then (II) proceed to compare modern speculations +respecting the origin and nature of language with the anticipations of his +genius. +</p> + +<p> +I. (1) Plato is aware that language is not the work of chance; nor does he deny +that there is a natural fitness in names. He only insists that this natural +fitness shall be intelligibly explained. But he has no idea that language is a +natural organism. He would have heard with surprise that languages are the +common work of whole nations in a primitive or semi-barbarous age. How, he +would probably have argued, could men devoid of art have contrived a structure +of such complexity? No answer could have been given to this question, either in +ancient or in modern times, until the nature of primitive antiquity had been +thoroughly studied, and the instincts of man had been shown to exist in greater +force, when his state approaches more nearly to that of children or animals. +The philosophers of the last century, after their manner, would have vainly +endeavoured to trace the process by which proper names were converted into +common, and would have shown how the last effort of abstraction invented +prepositions and auxiliaries. The theologian would have proved that language +must have had a divine origin, because in childhood, while the organs are +pliable, the intelligence is wanting, and when the intelligence is able to +frame conceptions, the organs are no longer able to express them. Or, as others +have said: Man is man because he has the gift of speech; and he could not have +invented that which he is. But this would have been an “argument too +subtle” for Socrates, who rejects the theological account of the origin +of language “as an excuse for not giving a reason,” which he +compares to the introduction of the “Deus ex machina” by the tragic +poets when they have to solve a difficulty; thus anticipating many modern +controversies in which the primary agency of the divine Being is confused with +the secondary cause; and God is assumed to have worked a miracle in order to +fill up a lacuna in human knowledge. (Compare Timaeus.) +</p> + +<p> +Neither is Plato wrong in supposing that an element of design and art enters +into language. The creative power abating is supplemented by a mechanical +process. “Languages are not made but grow,” but they are made as +well as grow; bursting into life like a plant or a flower, they are also +capable of being trained and improved and engrafted upon one another. The +change in them is effected in earlier ages by musical and euphonic +improvements, at a later stage by the influence of grammar and logic, and by +the poetical and literary use of words. They develope rapidly in childhood, and +when they are full grown and set they may still put forth intellectual powers, +like the mind in the body, or rather we may say that the nobler use of language +only begins when the frame-work is complete. The savage or primitive man, in +whom the natural instinct is strongest, is also the greatest improver of the +forms of language. He is the poet or maker of words, as in civilised ages the +dialectician is the definer or distinguisher of them. The latter calls the +second world of abstract terms into existence, as the former has created the +picture sounds which represent natural objects or processes. Poetry and +philosophy—these two, are the two great formative principles of language, +when they have passed their first stage, of which, as of the first invention of +the arts in general, we only entertain conjecture. And mythology is a link +between them, connecting the visible and invisible, until at length the +sensuous exterior falls away, and the severance of the inner and outer world, +of the idea and the object of sense, becomes complete. At a later period, logic +and grammar, sister arts, preserve and enlarge the decaying instinct of +language, by rule and method, which they gather from analysis and observation. +</p> + +<p> +(2) There is no trace in any of Plato’s writings that he was acquainted +with any language but Greek. Yet he has conceived very truly the relation of +Greek to foreign languages, which he is led to consider, because he finds that +many Greek words are incapable of explanation. Allowing a good deal for +accident, and also for the fancies of the conditores linguae Graecae, there is +an element of which he is unable to give an account. These unintelligible words +he supposes to be of foreign origin, and to have been derived from a time when +the Greeks were either barbarians, or in close relations to the barbarians. +Socrates is aware that this principle is liable to great abuse; and, like the +“Deus ex machina,” explains nothing. Hence he excuses himself for +the employment of such a device, and remarks that in foreign words there is +still a principle of correctness, which applies equally both to Greeks and +barbarians. +</p> + +<p> +(3) But the greater number of primary words do not admit of derivation from +foreign languages; they must be resolved into the letters out of which they are +composed, and therefore the letters must have a meaning. The framers of +language were aware of this; they observed that alpha was adapted to express +size; eta length; omicron roundness; nu inwardness; rho accent rush or roar; +lambda liquidity; gamma lambda the detention of the liquid or slippery element; +delta and tau binding; phi, psi, sigma, xi, wind and cold, and so on. +Plato’s analysis of the letters of the alphabet shows a wonderful insight +into the nature of language. He does not expressively distinguish between mere +imitation and the symbolical use of sound to express thought, but he recognises +in the examples which he gives both modes of imitation. Gesture is the mode +which a deaf and dumb person would take of indicating his meaning. And language +is the gesture of the tongue; in the use of the letter rho accent, to express a +rushing or roaring, or of omicron to express roundness, there is a direct +imitation; while in the use of the letter alpha to express size, or of eta to +express length, the imitation is symbolical. The use of analogous or similar +sounds, in order to express similar analogous ideas, seems to have escaped him. +</p> + +<p> +In passing from the gesture of the body to the movement of the tongue, Plato +makes a great step in the physiology of language. He was probably the first who +said that “language is imitative sound,” which is the greatest and +deepest truth of philology; although he is not aware of the laws of euphony and +association by which imitation must be regulated. He was probably also the +first who made a distinction between simple and compound words, a truth second +only in importance to that which has just been mentioned. His great insight in +one direction curiously contrasts with his blindness in another; for he appears +to be wholly unaware (compare his derivation of agathos from agastos and thoos) +of the difference between the root and termination. But we must recollect that +he was necessarily more ignorant than any schoolboy of Greek grammar, and had +no table of the inflexions of verbs and nouns before his eyes, which might have +suggested to him the distinction. +</p> + +<p> +(4) Plato distinctly affirms that language is not truth, or “philosophie +une langue bien faite.” At first, Socrates has delighted himself with +discovering the flux of Heracleitus in language. But he is covertly satirising +the pretence of that or any other age to find philosophy in words; and he +afterwards corrects any erroneous inference which might be gathered from his +experiment. For he finds as many, or almost as many, words expressive of rest, +as he had previously found expressive of motion. And even if this had been +otherwise, who would learn of words when he might learn of things? There is a +great controversy and high argument between Heracleiteans and Eleatics, but no +man of sense would commit his soul in such enquiries to the imposers of +names...In this and other passages Plato shows that he is as completely +emancipated from the influence of “Idols of the tribe” as Bacon +himself. +</p> + +<p> +The lesson which may be gathered from words is not metaphysical or moral, but +historical. They teach us the affinity of races, they tell us something about +the association of ideas, they occasionally preserve the memory of a disused +custom; but we cannot safely argue from them about right and wrong, matter and +mind, freedom and necessity, or the other problems of moral and metaphysical +philosophy. For the use of words on such subjects may often be metaphorical, +accidental, derived from other languages, and may have no relation to the +contemporary state of thought and feeling. Nor in any case is the invention of +them the result of philosophical reflection; they have been commonly +transferred from matter to mind, and their meaning is the very reverse of their +etymology. Because there is or is not a name for a thing, we cannot argue that +the thing has or has not an actual existence; or that the antitheses, +parallels, conjugates, correlatives of language have anything corresponding to +them in nature. There are too many words as well as too few; and they +generalize the objects or ideas which they represent. The greatest lesson which +the philosophical analysis of language teaches us is, that we should be above +language, making words our servants, and not allowing them to be our masters. +</p> + +<p> +Plato does not add the further observation, that the etymological meaning of +words is in process of being lost. If at first framed on a principle of +intelligibility, they would gradually cease to be intelligible, like those of a +foreign language, he is willing to admit that they are subject to many changes, +and put on many disguises. He acknowledges that the “poor creature” +imitation is supplemented by another “poor +creature,”—convention. But he does not see that “habit and +repute,” and their relation to other words, are always exercising an +influence over them. Words appear to be isolated, but they are really the parts +of an organism which is always being reproduced. They are refined by +civilization, harmonized by poetry, emphasized by literature, technically +applied in philosophy and art; they are used as symbols on the border-ground of +human knowledge; they receive a fresh impress from individual genius, and come +with a new force and association to every lively-minded person. They are fixed +by the simultaneous utterance of millions, and yet are always imperceptibly +changing;—not the inventors of language, but writing and speaking, and +particularly great writers, or works which pass into the hearts of nations, +Homer, Shakespear, Dante, the German or English Bible, Kant and Hegel, are the +makers of them in later ages. They carry with them the faded recollection of +their own past history; the use of a word in a striking and familiar passage +gives a complexion to its use everywhere else, and the new use of an old and +familiar phrase has also a peculiar power over us. But these and other +subtleties of language escaped the observation of Plato. He is not aware that +the languages of the world are organic structures, and that every word in them +is related to every other; nor does he conceive of language as the joint work +of the speaker and the hearer, requiring in man a faculty not only of +expressing his thoughts but of understanding those of others. +</p> + +<p> +On the other hand, he cannot be justly charged with a desire to frame language +on artificial principles. Philosophers have sometimes dreamed of a technical or +scientific language, in words which should have fixed meanings, and stand in +the same relation to one another as the substances which they denote. But there +is no more trace of this in Plato than there is of a language corresponding to +the ideas; nor, indeed, could the want of such a language be felt until the +sciences were far more developed. Those who would extend the use of technical +phraseology beyond the limits of science or of custom, seem to forget that +freedom and suggestiveness and the play of association are essential +characteristics of language. The great master has shown how he regarded +pedantic distinctions of words or attempts to confine their meaning in the +satire on Prodicus in the Protagoras. +</p> + +<p> +(5) In addition to these anticipations of the general principles of philology, +we may note also a few curious observations on words and sounds. “The +Eretrians say sklerotes for skleroter;” “the Thessalians call +Apollo Amlos;” “The Phrygians have the words pur, udor, kunes +slightly changed;” “there is an old Homeric word emesato, meaning +‘he contrived’;” “our forefathers, and especially the +women, who are most conservative of the ancient language, loved the letters +iota and delta; but now iota is changed into eta and epsilon, and delta into +zeta; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.” Plato was +very willing to use inductive arguments, so far as they were within his reach; +but he would also have assigned a large influence to chance. Nor indeed is +induction applicable to philology in the same degree as to most of the physical +sciences. For after we have pushed our researches to the furthest point, in +language as in all the other creations of the human mind, there will always +remain an element of exception or accident or free-will, which cannot be +eliminated. +</p> + +<p> +The question, “whether falsehood is impossible,” which Socrates +characteristically sets aside as too subtle for an old man (compare Euthyd.), +could only have arisen in an age of imperfect consciousness, which had not yet +learned to distinguish words from things. Socrates replies in effect that words +have an independent existence; thus anticipating the solution of the mediaeval +controversy of Nominalism and Realism. He is aware too that languages exist in +various degrees of perfection, and that the analysis of them can only be +carried to a certain point. “If we could always, or almost always, use +likenesses, which are the appropriate expressions, that would be the most +perfect state of language.” These words suggest a question of deeper +interest than the origin of language; viz. what is the ideal of language, how +far by any correction of their usages existing languages might become clearer +and more expressive than they are, more poetical, and also more logical; or +whether they are now finally fixed and have received their last impress from +time and authority. +</p> + +<p> +On the whole, the Cratylus seems to contain deeper truths about language than +any other ancient writing. But feeling the uncertain ground upon which he is +walking, and partly in order to preserve the character of Socrates, Plato +envelopes the whole subject in a robe of fancy, and allows his principles to +drop out as if by accident. +</p> + +<p> +II. What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and nature of +language? Like other modern metaphysical enquiries, they end at last in a +statement of facts. But, in order to state or understand the facts, a +metaphysical insight seems to be required. There are more things in language +than the human mind easily conceives. And many fallacies have to be dispelled, +as well as observations made. The true spirit of philosophy or metaphysics can +alone charm away metaphysical illusions, which are always reappearing, formerly +in the fancies of neoplatonist writers, now in the disguise of experience and +common sense. An analogy, a figure of speech, an intelligible theory, a +superficial observation of the individual, have often been mistaken for a true +account of the origin of language. +</p> + +<p> +Speaking is one of the simplest natural operations, and also the most complex. +Nothing would seem to be easier or more trivial than a few words uttered by a +child in any language. Yet into the formation of those words have entered +causes which the human mind is not capable of calculating. They are a drop or +two of the great stream or ocean of speech which has been flowing in all ages. +They have been transmitted from one language to another; like the child +himself, they go back to the beginnings of the human race. How they originated, +who can tell? Nevertheless we can imagine a stage of human society in which the +circle of men’s minds was narrower and their sympathies and instincts +stronger; in which their organs of speech were more flexible, and the sense of +hearing finer and more discerning; in which they lived more in company, and +after the manner of children were more given to express their feelings; in +which “they moved all together,” like a herd of wild animals, +“when they moved at all.” Among them, as in every society, a +particular person would be more sensitive and intelligent than the rest. +Suddenly, on some occasion of interest (at the approach of a wild beast, shall +we say?), he first, they following him, utter a cry which resounds through the +forest. The cry is almost or quite involuntary, and may be an imitation of the +roar of the animal. Thus far we have not speech, but only the inarticulate +expression of feeling or emotion in no respect differing from the cries of +animals; for they too call to one another and are answered. But now suppose +that some one at a distance not only hears the sound, but apprehends the +meaning: or we may imagine that the cry is repeated to a member of the society +who had been absent; the others act the scene over again when he returns home +in the evening. And so the cry becomes a word. The hearer in turn gives back +the word to the speaker, who is now aware that he has acquired a new power. +Many thousand times he exercises this power; like a child learning to talk, he +repeats the same cry again, and again he is answered; he tries experiments with +a like result, and the speaker and the hearer rejoice together in their +newly-discovered faculty. At first there would be few such cries, and little +danger of mistaking or confusing them. For the mind of primitive man had a +narrow range of perceptions and feelings; his senses were microscopic; twenty +or thirty sounds or gestures would be enough for him, nor would he have any +difficulty in finding them. Naturally he broke out into speech—like the +young infant he laughed and babbled; but not until there were hearers as well +as speakers did language begin. Not the interjection or the vocal imitation of +the object, but the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object +understood, is the first rudiment of human speech. +</p> + +<p> +After a while the word gathers associations, and has an independent existence. +The imitation of the lion’s roar calls up the fears and hopes of the +chase, which are excited by his appearance. In the moment of hearing the sound, +without any appreciable interval, these and other latent experiences wake up in +the mind of the hearer. Not only does he receive an impression, but he brings +previous knowledge to bear upon that impression. Necessarily the pictorial +image becomes less vivid, while the association of the nature and habits of the +animal is more distinctly perceived. The picture passes into a symbol, for +there would be too many of them and they would crowd the mind; the vocal +imitation, too, is always in process of being lost and being renewed, just as +the picture is brought back again in the description of the poet. Words now can +be used more freely because there are more of them. What was once an +involuntary expression becomes voluntary. Not only can men utter a cry or call, +but they can communicate and converse; they can not only use words, but they +can even play with them. The word is separated both from the object and from +the mind; and slowly nations and individuals attain to a fuller consciousness +of themselves. +</p> + +<p> +Parallel with this mental process the articulation of sounds is gradually +becoming perfected. The finer sense detects the differences of them, and +begins, first to agglomerate, then to distinguish them. Times, persons, places, +relations of all kinds, are expressed by modifications of them. The earliest +parts of speech, as we may call them by anticipation, like the first utterances +of children, probably partook of the nature of interjections and nouns; then +came verbs; at length the whole sentence appeared, and rhythm and metre +followed. Each stage in the progress of language was accompanied by some +corresponding stage in the mind and civilisation of man. In time, when the +family became a nation, the wild growth of dialects passed into a language. +Then arose poetry and literature. We can hardly realize to ourselves how much +with each improvement of language the powers of the human mind were enlarged; +how the inner world took the place of outer; how the pictorial or symbolical or +analogical word was refined into a notion; how language, fair and large and +free, was at last complete. +</p> + +<p> +So we may imagine the speech of man to have begun as with the cries of animals, +or the stammering lips of children, and to have attained by degrees the +perfection of Homer and Plato. Yet we are far from saying that this or any +other theory of language is proved by facts. It is not difficult to form an +hypothesis which by a series of imaginary transitions will bridge over the +chasm which separates man from the animals. Differences of kind may often be +thus resolved into differences of degree. But we must not assume that we have +in this way discovered the true account of them. Through what struggles the +harmonious use of the organs of speech was acquired; to what extent the +conditions of human life were different; how far the genius of individuals may +have contributed to the discovery of this as of the other arts, we cannot say: +Only we seem to see that language is as much the creation of the ear as of the +tongue, and the expression of a movement stirring the hearts not of one man +only but of many, “as the trees of the wood are stirred by the +wind.” The theory is consistent or not inconsistent with our own mental +experience, and throws some degree of light upon a dark corner of the human +mind. +</p> + +<p> +In the later analysis of language, we trace the opposite and contrasted +elements of the individual and nation, of the past and present, of the inward +and outward, of the subject and object, of the notional and relational, of the +root or unchanging part of the word and of the changing inflexion, if such a +distinction be admitted, of the vowel and the consonant, of quantity and +accent, of speech and writing, of poetry and prose. We observe also the +reciprocal influence of sounds and conceptions on each other, like the +connexion of body and mind; and further remark that although the names of +objects were originally proper names, as the grammarian or logician might call +them, yet at a later stage they become universal notions, which combine into +particulars and individuals, and are taken out of the first rude agglomeration +of sounds that they may be replaced in a higher and more logical order. We see +that in the simplest sentences are contained grammar and logic—the parts +of speech, the Eleatic philosophy and the Kantian categories. So complex is +language, and so expressive not only of the meanest wants of man, but of his +highest thoughts; so various are the aspects in which it is regarded by us. +Then again, when we follow the history of languages, we observe that they are +always slowly moving, half dead, half alive, half solid, half fluid; the breath +of a moment, yet like the air, continuous in all ages and countries,—like +the glacier, too, containing within them a trickling stream which deposits +debris of the rocks over which it passes. There were happy moments, as we may +conjecture, in the lives of nations, at which they came to the birth—as +in the golden age of literature, the man and the time seem to conspire; the +eloquence of the bard or chief, as in later times the creations of the great +writer who is the expression of his age, became impressed on the minds of their +countrymen, perhaps in the hour of some crisis of national development—a +migration, a conquest, or the like. The picture of the word which was beginning +to be lost, is now revived; the sound again echoes to the sense; men find +themselves capable not only of expressing more feelings, and describing more +objects, but of expressing and describing them better. The world before the +flood, that is to say, the world of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand years ago, +has passed away and left no sign. But the best conception that we can form of +it, though imperfect and uncertain, is gained from the analogy of causes still +in action, some powerful and sudden, others working slowly in the course of +infinite ages. Something too may be allowed to “the persistency of the +strongest,” to “the survival of the fittest,” in this as in +the other realms of nature. +</p> + +<p> +These are some of the reflections which the modern philosophy of language +suggests to us about the powers of the human mind and the forces and influences +by which the efforts of men to utter articulate sounds were inspired. Yet in +making these and similar generalizations we may note also dangers to which we +are exposed. (1) There is the confusion of ideas with facts—of mere +possibilities, and generalities, and modes of conception with actual and +definite knowledge. The words “evolution,” “birth,” +“law,” development,” “instinct,” +“implicit,” “explicit,” and the like, have a false +clearness or comprehensiveness, which adds nothing to our knowledge. The +metaphor of a flower or a tree, or some other work of nature or art, is often +in like manner only a pleasing picture. (2) There is the fallacy of resolving +the languages which we know into their parts, and then imagining that we can +discover the nature of language by reconstructing them. (3) There is the danger +of identifying language, not with thoughts but with ideas. (4) There is the +error of supposing that the analysis of grammar and logic has always existed, +or that their distinctions were familiar to Socrates and Plato. (5) There is +the fallacy of exaggerating, and also of diminishing the interval which +separates articulate from inarticulate language—the cries of animals from +the speech of man—the instincts of animals from the reason of man. (6) +There is the danger which besets all enquiries into the early history of +man—of interpreting the past by the present, and of substituting the +definite and intelligible for the true but dim outline which is the horizon of +human knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +The greatest light is thrown upon the nature of language by analogy. We have +the analogy of the cries of animals, of the songs of birds (“man, like +the nightingale, is a singing bird, but is ever binding up thoughts with +musical notes”), of music, of children learning to speak, of barbarous +nations in which the linguistic instinct is still undecayed, of ourselves +learning to think and speak a new language, of the deaf and dumb who have words +without sounds, of the various disorders of speech; and we have the +after-growth of mythology, which, like language, is an unconscious creation of +the human mind. We can observe the social and collective instincts of animals, +and may remark how, when domesticated, they have the power of understanding but +not of speaking, while on the other hand, some birds which are comparatively +devoid of intelligence, make a nearer approach to articulate speech. We may +note how in the animals there is a want of that sympathy with one another which +appears to be the soul of language. We can compare the use of speech with other +mental and bodily operations; for speech too is a kind of gesture, and in the +child or savage accompanied with gesture. We may observe that the child learns +to speak, as he learns to walk or to eat, by a natural impulse; yet in either +case not without a power of imitation which is also natural to him—he is +taught to read, but he breaks forth spontaneously in speech. We can trace the +impulse to bind together the world in ideas beginning in the first efforts to +speak and culminating in philosophy. But there remains an element which cannot +be explained, or even adequately described. We can understand how man creates +or constructs consciously and by design; and see, if we do not understand, how +nature, by a law, calls into being an organised structure. But the intermediate +organism which stands between man and nature, which is the work of mind yet +unconscious, and in which mind and matter seem to meet, and mind unperceived to +herself is really limited by all other minds, is neither understood nor seen by +us, and is with reluctance admitted to be a fact. +</p> + +<p> +Language is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations, the transfiguration of +the world in thought, the meeting-point of the physical and mental sciences, +and also the mirror in which they are reflected, present at every moment to the +individual, and yet having a sort of eternal or universal nature. When we +analyze our own mental processes, we find words everywhere in every degree of +clearness and consistency, fading away in dreams and more like pictures, +rapidly succeeding one another in our waking thoughts, attaining a greater +distinctness and consecutiveness in speech, and a greater still in writing, +taking the place of one another when we try to become emancipated from their +influence. For in all processes of the mind which are conscious we are talking +to ourselves; the attempt to think without words is a mere illusion,—they +are always reappearing when we fix our thoughts. And speech is not a separate +faculty, but the expression of all our faculties, to which all our other powers +of expression, signs, looks, gestures, lend their aid, of which the instrument +is not the tongue only, but more than half the human frame. +</p> + +<p> +The minds of men are sometimes carried on to think of their lives and of their +actions as links in a chain of causes and effects going back to the beginning +of time. A few have seemed to lose the sense of their own individuality in the +universal cause or nature. In like manner we might think of the words which we +daily use, as derived from the first speech of man, and of all the languages in +the world, as the expressions or varieties of a single force or life of +language of which the thoughts of men are the accident. Such a conception +enables us to grasp the power and wonder of languages, and is very natural to +the scientific philologist. For he, like the metaphysician, believes in the +reality of that which absorbs his own mind. Nor do we deny the enormous +influence which language has exercised over thought. Fixed words, like fixed +ideas, have often governed the world. But in such representations we attribute +to language too much the nature of a cause, and too little of an +effect,—too much of an absolute, too little of a relative +character,—too much of an ideal, too little of a matter-of-fact +existence. +</p> + +<p> +Or again, we may frame a single abstract notion of language of which all +existent languages may be supposed to be the perversion. But we must not +conceive that this logical figment had ever a real existence, or is anything +more than an effort of the mind to give unity to infinitely various phenomena. +There is no abstract language “in rerum natura,” any more than +there is an abstract tree, but only languages in various stages of growth, +maturity, and decay. Nor do other logical distinctions or even grammatical +exactly correspond to the facts of language; for they too are attempts to give +unity and regularity to a subject which is partly irregular. +</p> + +<p> +We find, however, that there are distinctions of another kind by which this +vast field of language admits of being mapped out. There is the distinction +between biliteral and triliteral roots, and the various inflexions which +accompany them; between the mere mechanical cohesion of sounds or words, and +the “chemical” combination of them into a new word; there is the +distinction between languages which have had a free and full development of +their organisms, and languages which have been stunted in their +growth,—lamed in their hands or feet, and never able to acquire +afterwards the powers in which they are deficient; there is the distinction +between synthetical languages like Greek and Latin, which have retained their +inflexions, and analytical languages like English or French, which have lost +them. Innumerable as are the languages and dialects of mankind, there are +comparatively few classes to which they can be referred. +</p> + +<p> +Another road through this chaos is provided by the physiology of speech. The +organs of language are the same in all mankind, and are only capable of +uttering a certain number of sounds. Every man has tongue, teeth, lips, palate, +throat, mouth, which he may close or open, and adapt in various ways; making, +first, vowels and consonants; and secondly, other classes of letters. The +elements of all speech, like the elements of the musical scale, are few and +simple, though admitting of infinite gradations and combinations. Whatever +slight differences exist in the use or formation of these organs, owing to +climate or the sense of euphony or other causes, they are as nothing compared +with their agreement. Here then is a real basis of unity in the study of +philology, unlike that imaginary abstract unity of which we were just now +speaking. +</p> + +<p> +Whether we regard language from the psychological, or historical, or +physiological point of view, the materials of our knowledge are inexhaustible. +The comparisons of children learning to speak, of barbarous nations, of musical +notes, of the cries of animals, of the song of birds, increase our insight into +the nature of human speech. Many observations which would otherwise have +escaped us are suggested by them. But they do not explain why, in man and in +man only, the speaker met with a response from the hearer, and the half +articulate sound gradually developed into Sanscrit and Greek. They hardly +enable us to approach any nearer the secret of the origin of language, which, +like some of the other great secrets of nature,—the origin of birth and +death, or of animal life,—remains inviolable. That problem is +indissolubly bound up with the origin of man; and if we ever know more of the +one, we may expect to know more of the other.<a href="#fn1" name="fnref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn1"></a> <a href="#fnref1">[1]</a> +Compare W. Humboldt, <i>Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen +Sprachbaues</i>, and M. Müller, <i>Lectures on the Science of Language</i>. +</p> + +<hr /> + +<p> +It is more than sixteen years since the preceding remarks were written, which +with a few alterations have now been reprinted. During the interval the +progress of philology has been very great. More languages have been compared; +the inner structure of language has been laid bare; the relations of sounds +have been more accurately discriminated; the manner in which dialects affect or +are affected by the literary or principal form of a language is better +understood. Many merely verbal questions have been eliminated; the remains of +the old traditional methods have died away. The study has passed from the +metaphysical into an historical stage. Grammar is no longer confused with +language, nor the anatomy of words and sentences with their life and use. +Figures of speech, by which the vagueness of theories is often concealed, have +been stripped off; and we see language more as it truly was. The immensity of +the subject is gradually revealed to us, and the reign of law becomes apparent. +Yet the law is but partially seen; the traces of it are often lost in the +distance. For languages have a natural but not a perfect growth; like other +creations of nature into which the will of man enters, they are full of what we +term accident and irregularity. And the difficulties of the subject become not +less, but greater, as we proceed—it is one of those studies in which we +seem to know less as we know more; partly because we are no longer satisfied +with the vague and superficial ideas of it which prevailed fifty years ago; +partly also because the remains of the languages with which we are acquainted +always were, and if they are still living, are, in a state of transition; and +thirdly, because there are lacunae in our knowledge of them which can never be +filled up. Not a tenth, not a hundredth part of them has been preserved. Yet +the materials at our disposal are far greater than any individual can use. Such +are a few of the general reflections which the present state of philology calls +up. +</p> + +<p> +(1) Language seems to be composite, but into its first elements the philologer +has never been able to penetrate. However far he goes back, he never arrives at +the beginning; or rather, as in Geology or in Astronomy, there is no beginning. +He is too apt to suppose that by breaking up the existing forms of language +into their parts he will arrive at a previous stage of it, but he is merely +analyzing what never existed, or is never known to have existed, except in a +composite form. He may divide nouns and verbs into roots and inflexions, but he +has no evidence which will show that the omega of tupto or the mu of tithemi, +though analogous to ego, me, either became pronouns or were generated out of +pronouns. To say that “pronouns, like ripe fruit, dropped out of +verbs,” is a misleading figure of speech. Although all languages have +some common principles, there is no primitive form or forms of language known +to us, or to be reasonably imagined, from which they are all descended. No +inference can be drawn from language, either for or against the unity of the +human race. Nor is there any proof that words were ever used without any +relation to each other. Whatever may be the meaning of a sentence or a word +when applied to primitive language, it is probable that the sentence is more +akin to the original form than the word, and that the later stage of language +is the result rather of analysis than of synthesis, or possibly is a +combination of the two. Nor, again, are we sure that the original process of +learning to speak was the same in different places or among different races of +men. It may have been slower with some, quicker with others. Some tribes may +have used shorter, others longer words or cries: they may have been more or +less inclined to agglutinate or to decompose them: they may have modified them +by the use of prefixes, suffixes, infixes; by the lengthening and strengthening +of vowels or by the shortening and weakening of them, by the condensation or +rarefaction of consonants. But who gave to language these primeval laws; or why +one race has triliteral, another biliteral roots; or why in some members of a +group of languages b becomes p, or d, t, or ch, k; or why two languages +resemble one another in certain parts of their structure and differ in others; +or why in one language there is a greater development of vowels, in another of +consonants, and the like—are questions of which we only “entertain +conjecture.” We must remember the length of time that has elapsed since +man first walked upon the earth, and that in this vast but unknown period every +variety of language may have been in process of formation and decay, many times +over. +</p> + +<p> +(Compare Plato, Laws):— +</p> + +<p> +“ATHENIAN STRANGER: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of +government? Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in which +he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good and evil? +</p> + +<p> +CLEINIAS: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +ATHENIAN STRANGER: I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of +time, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite ages. +</p> + +<p> +CLEINIAS: How so? +</p> + +<p> +ATHENIAN STRANGER: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has +elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them? +</p> + +<p> +CLEINIAS: Hardly. +</p> + +<p> +ATHENIAN STRANGER: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and +incalculable? +</p> + +<p> +CLEINIAS: No doubt. +</p> + +<p> +ATHENIAN STRANGER: And have there not been thousands and thousands of cities +which have come into being and perished during this period? And has not every +place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising, and at other +times falling, and again improving or waning?” +</p> + +<p> +Aristot. Metaph.:— +</p> + +<p> +“And if a person should conceive the tales of mythology to mean only that +men thought the gods to be the first essences of things, he would deem the +reflection to have been inspired and would consider that, whereas probably +every art and part of wisdom had been DISCOVERED AND LOST MANY TIMES OVER, such +notions were but a remnant of the past which has survived to our day.”) +</p> + +<p> +It can hardly be supposed that any traces of an original language still +survive, any more than of the first huts or buildings which were constructed by +man. Nor are we at all certain of the relation, if any, in which the greater +families of languages stand to each other. The influence of individuals must +always have been a disturbing element. Like great writers in later times, there +may have been many a barbaric genius who taught the men of his tribe to sing or +speak, showing them by example how to continue or divide their words, charming +their souls with rhythm and accent and intonation, finding in familiar objects +the expression of their confused fancies—to whom the whole of language +might in truth be said to be a figure of speech. One person may have introduced +a new custom into the formation or pronunciation of a word; he may have been +imitated by others, and the custom, or form, or accent, or quantity, or rhyme +which he introduced in a single word may have become the type on which many +other words or inflexions of words were framed, and may have quickly ran +through a whole language. For like the other gifts which nature has bestowed +upon man, that of speech has been conveyed to him through the medium, not of +the many, but of the few, who were his +“law-givers”—“the legislator with the dialectician +standing on his right hand,” in Plato’s striking image, who formed +the manners of men and gave them customs, whose voice and look and behaviour, +whose gesticulations and other peculiarities were instinctively imitated by +them,—the “king of men” who was their priest, almost their +God...But these are conjectures only: so little do we know of the origin of +language that the real scholar is indisposed to touch the subject at all. +</p> + +<p> +(2) There are other errors besides the figment of a primitive or original +language which it is time to leave behind us. We no longer divide languages +into synthetical and analytical, or suppose similarity of structure to be the +safe or only guide to the affinities of them. We do not confuse the parts of +speech with the categories of Logic. Nor do we conceive languages any more than +civilisations to be in a state of dissolution; they do not easily pass away, +but are far more tenacious of life than the tribes by whom they are spoken. +“Where two or three are gathered together,” they survive. As in the +human frame, as in the state, there is a principle of renovation as well as of +decay which is at work in all of them. Neither do we suppose them to be +invented by the wit of man. With few exceptions, e.g. technical words or words +newly imported from a foreign language, and the like, in which art has imitated +nature, “words are not made but grow.” Nor do we attribute to them +a supernatural origin. The law which regulates them is like the law which +governs the circulation of the blood, or the rising of the sap in trees; the +action of it is uniform, but the result, which appears in the superficial forms +of men and animals or in the leaves of trees, is an endless profusion and +variety. The laws of vegetation are invariable, but no two plants, no two +leaves of the forest are precisely the same. The laws of language are +invariable, but no two languages are alike, no two words have exactly the same +meaning. No two sounds are exactly of the same quality, or give precisely the +same impression. +</p> + +<p> +It would be well if there were a similar consensus about some other points +which appear to be still in dispute. Is language conscious or unconscious? In +speaking or writing have we present to our minds the meaning or the sound or +the construction of the words which we are using?—No more than the +separate drops of water with which we quench our thirst are present: the whole +draught may be conscious, but not the minute particles of which it is made up: +So the whole sentence may be conscious, but the several words, syllables, +letters are not thought of separately when we are uttering them. Like other +natural operations, the process of speech, when most perfect, is least observed +by us. We do not pause at each mouthful to dwell upon the taste of it: nor has +the speaker time to ask himself the comparative merits of different modes of +expression while he is uttering them. There are many things in the use of +language which may be observed from without, but which cannot be explained from +within. Consciousness carries us but a little way in the investigation of the +mind; it is not the faculty of internal observation, but only the dim light +which makes such observation possible. What is supposed to be our consciousness +of language is really only the analysis of it, and this analysis admits of +innumerable degrees. But would it not be better if this term, which is so +misleading, and yet has played so great a part in mental science, were either +banished or used only with the distinct meaning of “attention to our own +minds,” such as is called forth, not by familiar mental processes, but by +the interruption of them? Now in this sense we may truly say that we are not +conscious of ordinary speech, though we are commonly roused to attention by the +misuse or mispronunciation of a word. Still less, even in schools and +academies, do we ever attempt to invent new words or to alter the meaning of +old ones, except in the case, mentioned above, of technical or borrowed words +which are artificially made or imported because a need of them is felt. Neither +in our own nor in any other age has the conscious effort of reflection in man +contributed in an appreciable degree to the formation of language. “Which +of us by taking thought” can make new words or constructions? Reflection +is the least of the causes by which language is affected, and is likely to have +the least power, when the linguistic instinct is greatest, as in young children +and in the infancy of nations. +</p> + +<p> +A kindred error is the separation of the phonetic from the mental element of +language; they are really inseparable—no definite line can be drawn +between them, any more than in any other common act of mind and body. It is +true that within certain limits we possess the power of varying sounds by +opening and closing the mouth, by touching the palate or the teeth with the +tongue, by lengthening or shortening the vocal instrument, by greater or less +stress, by a higher or lower pitch of the voice, and we can substitute one note +or accent for another. But behind the organs of speech and their action there +remains the informing mind, which sets them in motion and works together with +them. And behind the great structure of human speech and the lesser varieties +of language which arise out of the many degrees and kinds of human intercourse, +there is also the unknown or over-ruling law of God or nature which gives order +to it in its infinite greatness, and variety in its infinitesimal +minuteness—both equally inscrutable to us. We need no longer discuss +whether philology is to be classed with the Natural or the Mental sciences, if +we frankly recognize that, like all the sciences which are concerned with man, +it has a double aspect,—inward and outward; and that the inward can only +be known through the outward. Neither need we raise the question whether the +laws of language, like the other laws of human action, admit of exceptions. The +answer in all cases is the same—that the laws of nature are uniform, +though the consistency or continuity of them is not always perceptible to us. +The superficial appearances of language, as of nature, are irregular, but we do +not therefore deny their deeper uniformity. The comparison of the growth of +language in the individual and in the nation cannot be wholly discarded, for +nations are made up of individuals. But in this, as in the other political +sciences, we must distinguish between collective and individual actions or +processes, and not attribute to the one what belongs to the other. Again, when +we speak of the hereditary or paternity of a language, we must remember that +the parents are alive as well as the children, and that all the preceding +generations survive (after a manner) in the latest form of it. And when, for +the purposes of comparison, we form into groups the roots or terminations of +words, we should not forget how casual is the manner in which their +resemblances have arisen—they were not first written down by a grammarian +in the paradigms of a grammar and learned out of a book, but were due to many +chance attractions of sound or of meaning, or of both combined. So many +cautions have to be borne in mind, and so many first thoughts to be dismissed, +before we can proceed safely in the path of philological enquiry. It might be +well sometimes to lay aside figures of speech, such as the “root” +and the “branches,” the “stem,” the +“strata” of Geology, the “compounds” of Chemistry, +“the ripe fruit of pronouns dropping from verbs” (see above), and +the like, which are always interesting, but are apt to be delusive. Yet such +figures of speech are far nearer the truth than the theories which attribute +the invention and improvement of language to the conscious action of the human +mind...Lastly, it is doubted by recent philologians whether climate can be +supposed to have exercised any influence worth speaking of on a language: such +a view is said to be unproven: it had better therefore not be silently assumed. +</p> + +<p> +“Natural selection” and the “survival of the fittest” +have been applied in the field of philology, as well as in the other sciences +which are concerned with animal and vegetable life. And a Darwinian school of +philologists has sprung up, who are sometimes accused of putting words in the +place of things. It seems to be true, that whether applied to language or to +other branches of knowledge, the Darwinian theory, unless very precisely +defined, hardly escapes from being a truism. If by “the natural +selection” of words or meanings of words or by the “persistence and +survival of the fittest” the maintainer of the theory intends to affirm +nothing more than this—that the word “fittest to survive” +survives, he adds not much to the knowledge of language. But if he means that +the word or the meaning of the word or some portion of the word which comes +into use or drops out of use is selected or rejected on the ground of economy +or parsimony or ease to the speaker or clearness or euphony or expressiveness, +or greater or less demand for it, or anything of this sort, he is affirming a +proposition which has several senses, and in none of these senses can be +assisted to be uniformly true. For the laws of language are precarious, and can +only act uniformly when there is such frequency of intercourse among neighbours +as is sufficient to enforce them. And there are many reasons why a man should +prefer his own way of speaking to that of others, unless by so doing he becomes +unintelligible. The struggle for existence among words is not of that fierce +and irresistible kind in which birds, beasts and fishes devour one another, but +of a milder sort, allowing one usage to be substituted for another, not by +force, but by the persuasion, or rather by the prevailing habit, of a majority. +The favourite figure, in this, as in some other uses of it, has tended rather +to obscure than explain the subject to which it has been applied. Nor in any +case can the struggle for existence be deemed to be the sole or principal cause +of changes in language, but only one among many, and one of which we cannot +easily measure the importance. There is a further objection which may be urged +equally against all applications of the Darwinian theory. As in animal life and +likewise in vegetable, so in languages, the process of change is said to be +insensible: sounds, like animals, are supposed to pass into one another by +imperceptible gradation. But in both cases the newly-created forms soon become +fixed; there are few if any vestiges of the intermediate links, and so the +better half of the evidence of the change is wanting. +</p> + +<p> +(3) Among the incumbrances or illusions of language may be reckoned many of the +rules and traditions of grammar, whether ancient grammar or the corrections of +it which modern philology has introduced. Grammar, like law, delights in +definition: human speech, like human action, though very far from being a mere +chaos, is indefinite, admits of degrees, and is always in a state of change or +transition. Grammar gives an erroneous conception of language: for it reduces +to a system that which is not a system. Its figures of speech, pleonasms, +ellipses, anacolutha, pros to semainomenon, and the like have no reality; they +do not either make conscious expressions more intelligible or show the way in +which they have arisen; they are chiefly designed to bring an earlier use of +language into conformity with the later. Often they seem intended only to +remind us that great poets like Aeschylus or Sophocles or Pindar or a great +prose writer like Thucydides are guilty of taking unwarrantable liberties with +grammatical rules; it appears never to have occurred to the inventors of them +that these real “conditores linguae Graecae” lived in an age before +grammar, when “Greece also was living Greece.” It is the anatomy, +not the physiology of language, which grammar seeks to describe: into the idiom +and higher life of words it does not enter. The ordinary Greek grammar gives a +complete paradigm of the verb, without suggesting that the double or treble +forms of Perfects, Aorists, etc. are hardly ever contemporaneous. It +distinguishes Moods and Tenses, without observing how much of the nature of one +passes into the other. It makes three Voices, Active, Passive, and Middle, but +takes no notice of the precarious existence and uncertain character of the last +of the three. Language is a thing of degrees and relations and associations and +exceptions: grammar ties it up in fixed rules. Language has many varieties of +usage: grammar tries to reduce them to a single one. Grammar divides verbs into +regular and irregular: it does not recognize that the irregular, equally with +the regular, are subject to law, and that a language which had no exceptions +would not be a natural growth: for it could not have been subjected to the +influences by which language is ordinarily affected. It is always wanting to +describe ancient languages in the terms of a modern one. It has a favourite +fiction that one word is put in the place of another; the truth is that no word +is ever put for another. It has another fiction, that a word has been omitted: +words are omitted because they are no longer needed; and the omission has +ceased to be observed. The common explanation of kata or some other preposition +“being understood” in a Greek sentence is another fiction of the +same kind, which tends to disguise the fact that under cases were comprehended +originally many more relations, and that prepositions are used only to define +the meaning of them with greater precision. These instances are sufficient to +show the sort of errors which grammar introduces into language. We are not +considering the question of its utility to the beginner in the study. Even to +him the best grammar is the shortest and that in which he will have least to +unlearn. It may be said that the explanations here referred to are already out +of date, and that the study of Greek grammar has received a new character from +comparative philology. This is true; but it is also true that the traditional +grammar has still a great hold on the mind of the student. +</p> + +<p> +Metaphysics are even more troublesome than the figments of grammar, because +they wear the appearance of philosophy and there is no test to which they can +be subjected. They are useful in so far as they give us an insight into the +history of the human mind and the modes of thought which have existed in former +ages; or in so far as they furnish wider conceptions of the different branches +of knowledge and of their relation to one another. But they are worse than +useless when they outrun experience and abstract the mind from the observation +of facts, only to envelope it in a mist of words. Some philologers, like +Schleicher, have been greatly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel; nearly all +of them to a certain extent have fallen under the dominion of physical science. +Even Kant himself thought that the first principles of philosophy could be +elicited from the analysis of the proposition, in this respect falling short of +Plato. Westphal holds that there are three stages of language: (1) in which +things were characterized independently, (2) in which they were regarded in +relation to human thought, and (3) in relation to one another. But are not such +distinctions an anachronism? for they imply a growth of abstract ideas which +never existed in early times. Language cannot be explained by Metaphysics; for +it is prior to them and much more nearly allied to sense. It is not likely that +the meaning of the cases is ultimately resolvable into relations of space and +time. Nor can we suppose the conception of cause and effect or of the finite +and infinite or of the same and other to be latent in language at a time when +in their abstract form they had never entered into the mind of man...If the +science of Comparative Philology had possessed “enough of Metaphysics to +get rid of Metaphysics,” it would have made far greater progress. +</p> + +<p> +(4) Our knowledge of language is almost confined to languages which are fully +developed. They are of several patterns; and these become altered by admixture +in various degrees,—they may only borrow a few words from one another and +retain their life comparatively unaltered, or they may meet in a struggle for +existence until one of the two is overpowered and retires from the field. They +attain the full rights and dignity of language when they acquire the use of +writing and have a literature of their own; they pass into dialects and grow +out of them, in proportion as men are isolated or united by locality or +occupation. The common language sometimes reacts upon the dialects and imparts +to them also a literary character. The laws of language can be best discerned +in the great crises of language, especially in the transitions from ancient to +modern forms of them, whether in Europe or Asia. Such changes are the silent +notes of the world’s history; they mark periods of unknown length in +which war and conquest were running riot over whole continents, times of +suffering too great to be endured by the human race, in which the masters +became subjects and the subject races masters, in which driven by necessity or +impelled by some instinct, tribes or nations left their original homes and but +slowly found a resting-place. Language would be the greatest of all historical +monuments, if it could only tell us the history of itself. +</p> + +<p> +(5) There are many ways in which we may approach this study. The simplest of +all is to observe our own use of language in conversation or in writing, how we +put words together, how we construct and connect sentences, what are the rules +of accent and rhythm in verse or prose, the formation and composition of words, +the laws of euphony and sound, the affinities of letters, the mistakes to which +we are ourselves most liable of spelling or pronunciation. We may compare with +our own language some other, even when we have only a slight knowledge of it, +such as French or German. Even a little Latin will enable us to appreciate the +grand difference between ancient and modern European languages. In the child +learning to speak we may note the inherent strength of language, which like +“a mountain river” is always forcing its way out. We may witness +the delight in imitation and repetition, and some of the laws by which sounds +pass into one another. We may learn something also from the falterings of old +age, the searching for words, and the confusion of them with one another, the +forgetfulness of proper names (more commonly than of other words because they +are more isolated), aphasia, and the like. There are philological lessons also +to be gathered from nicknames, from provincialisms, from the slang of great +cities, from the argot of Paris (that language of suffering and crime, so +pathetically described by Victor Hugo), from the imperfect articulation of the +deaf and dumb, from the jabbering of animals, from the analysis of sounds in +relation to the organs of speech. The phonograph affords a visible evidence of +the nature and divisions of sound; we may be truly said to know what we can +manufacture. Artificial languages, such as that of Bishop Wilkins, are chiefly +useful in showing what language is not. The study of any foreign language may +be made also a study of Comparative Philology. There are several points, such +as the nature of irregular verbs, of indeclinable parts of speech, the +influence of euphony, the decay or loss of inflections, the elements of syntax, +which may be examined as well in the history of our own language as of any +other. A few well-selected questions may lead the student at once into the +heart of the mystery: such as, Why are the pronouns and the verb of existence +generally more irregular than any other parts of speech? Why is the number of +words so small in which the sound is an echo of the sense? Why does the meaning +of words depart so widely from their etymology? Why do substantives often +differ in meaning from the verbs to which they are related, adverbs from +adjectives? Why do words differing in origin coalesce in the same sound though +retaining their differences of meaning? Why are some verbs impersonal? Why are +there only so many parts of speech, and on what principle are they divided? +These are a few crucial questions which give us an insight from different +points of view into the true nature of language. +</p> + +<p> +(6) Thus far we have been endeavouring to strip off from language the false +appearances in which grammar and philology, or the love of system generally, +have clothed it. We have also sought to indicate the sources of our knowledge +of it and the spirit in which we should approach it, we may now proceed to +consider some of the principles or natural laws which have created or modified +it. +</p> + +<p> +i. The first and simplest of all the principles of language, common also to the +animals, is imitation. The lion roars, the wolf howls in the solitude of the +forest: they are answered by similar cries heard from a distance. The bird, +too, mimics the voice of man and makes answer to him. Man tells to man the +secret place in which he is hiding himself; he remembers and repeats the sound +which he has heard. The love of imitation becomes a passion and an instinct to +him. Primitive men learnt to speak from one another, like a child from its +mother or nurse. They learnt of course a rudimentary, half-articulate language, +the cry or song or speech which was the expression of what we now call human +thoughts and feelings. We may still remark how much greater and more natural +the exercise of the power is in the use of language than in any other process +or action of the human mind. +</p> + +<p> +ii. Imitation provided the first material of language: but it was +“without form and void.” During how many years or hundreds or +thousands of years the imitative or half-articulate stage continued there is no +possibility of determining. But we may reasonably conjecture that there was a +time when the vocal utterance of man was intermediate between what we now call +language and the cry of a bird or animal. Speech before language was a rudis +indigestaque materies, not yet distributed into words and sentences, in which +the cry of fear or joy mingled with more definite sounds recognized by custom +as the expressions of things or events. It was the principle of analogy which +introduced into this “indigesta moles” order and measure. It was +Anaxagoras’ omou panta chremata, eita nous elthon diekosmese: the light +of reason lighted up all things and at once began to arrange them. In every +sentence, in every word and every termination of a word, this power of forming +relations to one another was contained. There was a proportion of sound to +sound, of meaning to meaning, of meaning to sound. The cases and numbers of +nouns, the persons, tenses, numbers of verbs, were generally on the same or +nearly the same pattern and had the same meaning. The sounds by which they were +expressed were rough-hewn at first; after a while they grew more +refined—the natural laws of euphony began to affect them. The rules of +syntax are likewise based upon analogy. Time has an analogy with space, +arithmetic with geometry. Not only in musical notes, but in the quantity, +quality, accent, rhythm of human speech, trivial or serious, there is a law of +proportion. As in things of beauty, as in all nature, in the composition as +well as in the motion of all things, there is a similarity of relations by +which they are held together. +</p> + +<p> +It would be a mistake to suppose that the analogies of language are always +uniform: there may be often a choice between several, and sometimes one and +sometimes another will prevail. In Greek there are three declensions of nouns; +the forms of cases in one of them may intrude upon another. Similarly verbs in +-omega and -mu iota interchange forms of tenses, and the completed paradigm of +the verb is often made up of both. The same nouns may be partly declinable and +partly indeclinable, and in some of their cases may have fallen out of use. +Here are rules with exceptions; they are not however really exceptions, but +contain in themselves indications of other rules. Many of these interruptions +or variations of analogy occur in pronouns or in the verb of existence of which +the forms were too common and therefore too deeply imbedded in language +entirely to drop out. The same verbs in the same meaning may sometimes take one +case, sometimes another. The participle may also have the character of an +adjective, the adverb either of an adjective or of a preposition. These +exceptions are as regular as the rules, but the causes of them are seldom known +to us. +</p> + +<p> +Language, like the animal and vegetable worlds, is everywhere intersected by +the lines of analogy. Like number from which it seems to be derived, the +principle of analogy opens the eyes of men to discern the similarities and +differences of things, and their relations to one another. At first these are +such as lie on the surface only; after a time they are seen by men to reach +farther down into the nature of things. Gradually in language they arrange +themselves into a sort of imperfect system; groups of personal and case endings +are placed side by side. The fertility of language produces many more than are +wanted; and the superfluous ones are utilized by the assignment to them of new +meanings. The vacuity and the superfluity are thus partially compensated by +each other. It must be remembered that in all the languages which have a +literature, certainly in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, we are not at the beginning +but almost at the end of the linguistic process; we have reached a time when +the verb and the noun are nearly perfected, though in no language did they +completely perfect themselves, because for some unknown reason the motive +powers of languages seem to have ceased when they were on the eve of +completion: they became fixed or crystallized in an imperfect form either from +the influence of writing and literature, or because no further differentiation +of them was required for the intelligibility of language. So not without +admixture and confusion and displacement and contamination of sounds and the +meanings of words, a lower stage of language passes into a higher. Thus far we +can see and no further. When we ask the reason why this principle of analogy +prevails in all the vast domain of language, there is no answer to the +question; or no other answer but this, that there are innumerable ways in +which, like number, analogy permeates, not only language, but the whole world, +both visible and intellectual. We know from experience that it does not (a) +arise from any conscious act of reflection that the accusative of a Latin noun +in “us” should end in “um;” nor (b) from any necessity +of being understood,—much less articulation would suffice for this; nor +(c) from greater convenience or expressiveness of particular sounds. Such +notions were certainly far enough away from the mind of primitive man. We may +speak of a latent instinct, of a survival of the fittest, easiest, most +euphonic, most economical of breath, in the case of one of two competing +sounds; but these expressions do not add anything to our knowledge. We may try +to grasp the infinity of language either under the figure of a limitless plain +divided into countries and districts by natural boundaries, or of a vast river +eternally flowing whose origin is concealed from us; we may apprehend partially +the laws by which speech is regulated: but we do not know, and we seem as if we +should never know, any more than in the parallel case of the origin of species, +how vocal sounds received life and grew, and in the form of languages came to +be distributed over the earth. +</p> + +<p> +iii. Next in order to analogy in the formation of language or even prior to it +comes the principle of onomatopea, which is itself a kind of analogy or +similarity of sound and meaning. In by far the greater number of words it has +become disguised and has disappeared; but in no stage of language is it +entirely lost. It belongs chiefly to early language, in which words were few; +and its influence grew less and less as time went on. To the ear which had a +sense of harmony it became a barbarism which disturbed the flow and equilibrium +of discourse; it was an excrescence which had to be cut out, a survival which +needed to be got rid of, because it was out of keeping with the rest. It +remained for the most part only as a formative principle, which used words and +letters not as crude imitations of other natural sounds, but as symbols of +ideas which were naturally associated with them. It received in another way a +new character; it affected not so much single words, as larger portions of +human speech. It regulated the juxtaposition of sounds and the cadence of +sentences. It was the music, not of song, but of speech, in prose as well as +verse. The old onomatopea of primitive language was refined into an onomatopea +of a higher kind, in which it is no longer true to say that a particular sound +corresponds to a motion or action of man or beast or movement of nature, but +that in all the higher uses of language the sound is the echo of the sense, +especially in poetry, in which beauty and expressiveness are given to human +thoughts by the harmonious composition of the words, syllables, letters, +accents, quantities, rhythms, rhymes, varieties and contrasts of all sorts. The +poet with his “Break, break, break” or his e pasin nekuessi +kataphthimenoisin anassein or his “longius ex altoque sinum +trahit,” can produce a far finer music than any crude imitations of +things or actions in sound, although a letter or two having this imitative +power may be a lesser element of beauty in such passages. The same subtle +sensibility, which adapts the word to the thing, adapts the sentence or cadence +to the general meaning or spirit of the passage. This is the higher onomatopea +which has banished the cruder sort as unworthy to have a place in great +languages and literatures. +</p> + +<p> +We can see clearly enough that letters or collocations of letters do by various +degrees of strength or weakness, length or shortness, emphasis or pitch, become +the natural expressions of the finer parts of human feeling or thought. And not +only so, but letters themselves have a significance; as Plato observes that the +letter rho accent is expressive of motion, the letters delta and tau of binding +and rest, the letter lambda of smoothness, nu of inwardness, the letter eta of +length, the letter omicron of roundness. These were often combined so as to +form composite notions, as for example in tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged), +thrauein (crush), krouein (strike), thruptein (break), pumbein +(whirl),—in all which words we notice a parallel composition of sounds in +their English equivalents. Plato also remarks, as we remark, that the +onomatopoetic principle is far from prevailing uniformly, and further that no +explanation of language consistently corresponds with any system of philosophy, +however great may be the light which language throws upon the nature of the +mind. Both in Greek and English we find groups of words such as string, swing, +sling, spring, sting, which are parallel to one another and may be said to +derive their vocal effect partly from contrast of letters, but in which it is +impossible to assign a precise amount of meaning to each of the expressive and +onomatopoetic letters. A few of them are directly imitative, as for example the +omega in oon, which represents the round form of the egg by the figure of the +mouth: or bronte (thunder), in which the fulness of the sound of the word +corresponds to the thing signified by it; or bombos (buzzing), of which the +first syllable, as in its English equivalent, has the meaning of a deep sound. +We may observe also (as we see in the case of the poor stammerer) that speech +has the co-operation of the whole body and may be often assisted or half +expressed by gesticulation. A sound or word is not the work of the vocal organs +only; nearly the whole of the upper part of the human frame, including head, +chest, lungs, have a share in creating it; and it may be accompanied by a +movement of the eyes, nose, fingers, hands, feet which contributes to the +effect of it. +</p> + +<p> +The principle of onomatopea has fallen into discredit, partly because it has +been supposed to imply an actual manufacture of words out of syllables and +letters, like a piece of joiner’s work,—a theory of language which +is more and more refuted by facts, and more and more going out of fashion with +philologians; and partly also because the traces of onomatopea in separate +words become almost obliterated in the course of ages. The poet of language +cannot put in and pull out letters, as a painter might insert or blot out a +shade of colour to give effect to his picture. It would be ridiculous for him +to alter any received form of a word in order to render it more expressive of +the sense. He can only select, perhaps out of some dialect, the form which is +already best adapted to his purpose. The true onomatopea is not a creative, but +a formative principle, which in the later stage of the history of language +ceases to act upon individual words; but still works through the collocation of +them in the sentence or paragraph, and the adaptation of every word, syllable, +letter to one another and to the rhythm of the whole passage. +</p> + +<p> +iv. Next, under a distinct head, although not separable from the preceding, may +be considered the differentiation of languages, i.e. the manner in which +differences of meaning and form have arisen in them. Into their first creation +we have ceased to enquire: it is their aftergrowth with which we are now +concerned. How did the roots or substantial portions of words become modified +or inflected? and how did they receive separate meanings? First we remark that +words are attracted by the sounds and senses of other words, so that they form +groups of nouns and verbs analogous in sound and sense to one another, each +noun or verb putting forth inflexions, generally of two or three patterns, and +with exceptions. We do not say that we know how sense became first allied to +sound; but we have no difficulty in ascertaining how the sounds and meanings of +words were in time parted off or differentiated. (1) The chief causes which +regulate the variations of sound are (a) double or differing analogies, which +lead sometimes to one form, sometimes to another (b) euphony, by which is meant +chiefly the greater pleasure to the ear and the greater facility to the organs +of speech which is given by a new formation or pronunciation of a word (c) the +necessity of finding new expressions for new classes or processes of things. We +are told that changes of sound take place by innumerable gradations until a +whole tribe or community or society find themselves acquiescing in a new +pronunciation or use of language. Yet no one observes the change, or is at all +aware that in the course of a lifetime he and his contemporaries have +appreciably varied their intonation or use of words. On the other hand, the +necessities of language seem to require that the intermediate sounds or +meanings of words should quickly become fixed or set and not continue in a +state of transition. The process of settling down is aided by the organs of +speech and by the use of writing and printing. (2) The meaning of words varies +because ideas vary or the number of things which is included under them or with +which they are associated is increased. A single word is thus made to do duty +for many more things than were formerly expressed by it; and it parts into +different senses when the classes of things or ideas which are represented by +it are themselves different and distinct. A figurative use of a word may easily +pass into a new sense: a new meaning caught up by association may become more +important than all the rest. The good or neutral sense of a word, such as +Jesuit, Puritan, Methodist, Heretic, has been often converted into a bad one by +the malevolence of party spirit. Double forms suggest different meanings and +are often used to express them; and the form or accent of a word has been not +unfrequently altered when there is a difference of meaning. The difference of +gender in nouns is utilized for the same reason. New meanings of words push +themselves into the vacant spaces of language and retire when they are no +longer needed. Language equally abhors vacancy and superfluity. But the +remedial measures by which both are eliminated are not due to any conscious +action of the human mind; nor is the force exerted by them constraining or +necessary. +</p> + +<p> +(7) We have shown that language, although subject to laws, is far from being of +an exact and uniform nature. We may now speak briefly of the faults of +language. They may be compared to the faults of Geology, in which different +strata cross one another or meet at an angle, or mix with one another either by +slow transitions or by violent convulsions, leaving many lacunae which can be +no longer filled up, and often becoming so complex that no true explanation of +them can be given. So in language there are the cross influences of meaning and +sound, of logic and grammar, of differing analogies, of words and the +inflexions of words, which often come into conflict with each other. The +grammarian, if he were to form new words, would make them all of the same +pattern according to what he conceives to be the rule, that is, the more common +usage of language. The subtlety of nature goes far beyond art, and it is +complicated by irregularity, so that often we can hardly say that there is a +right or wrong in the formation of words. For almost any formation which is not +at variance with the first principles of language is possible and may be +defended. +</p> + +<p> +The imperfection of language is really due to the formation and correlation of +words by accident, that is to say, by principles which are unknown to us. Hence +we see why Plato, like ourselves unable to comprehend the whole of language, +was constrained to “supplement the poor creature imitation by another +poor creature convention.” But the poor creature convention in the end +proves too much for all the rest: for we do not ask what is the origin of words +or whether they are formed according to a correct analogy, but what is the +usage of them; and we are compelled to admit with Hermogenes in Plato and with +Horace that usage is the ruling principle, “quem penes arbitrium est, et +jus et norma loquendi.” +</p> + +<p> +(8) There are two ways in which a language may attain permanence or fixity. +First, it may have been embodied in poems or hymns or laws, which may be +repeated for hundreds, perhaps for thousands of years with a religious +accuracy, so that to the priests or rhapsodists of a nation the whole or the +greater part of a language is literally preserved; secondly, it may be written +down and in a written form distributed more or less widely among the whole +nation. In either case the language which is familiarly spoken may have grown +up wholly or in a great measure independently of them. (1) The first of these +processes has been sometimes attended by the result that the sound of the words +has been carefully preserved and that the meaning of them has either perished +wholly, or is only doubtfully recovered by the efforts of modern philology. The +verses have been repeated as a chant or part of a ritual, but they have had no +relation to ordinary life or speech. (2) The invention of writing again is +commonly attributed to a particular epoch, and we are apt to think that such an +inestimable gift would have immediately been diffused over a whole country. But +it may have taken a long time to perfect the art of writing, and another long +period may have elapsed before it came into common use. Its influence on +language has been increased ten, twenty or one hundred fold by the invention of +printing. +</p> + +<p> +Before the growth of poetry or the invention of writing, languages were only +dialects. So they continued to be in parts of the country in which writing was +not used or in which there was no diffusion of literature. In most of the +counties of England there is still a provincial style, which has been sometimes +made by a great poet the vehicle of his fancies. When a book sinks into the +mind of a nation, such as Luther’s Bible or the Authorized English +Translation of the Bible, or again great classical works like Shakspere or +Milton, not only have new powers of expression been diffused through a whole +nation, but a great step towards uniformity has been made. The instinct of +language demands regular grammar and correct spelling: these are imprinted +deeply on the tablets of a nation’s memory by a common use of classical +and popular writers. In our own day we have attained to a point at which nearly +every printed book is spelt correctly and written grammatically. +</p> + +<p> +(9) Proceeding further to trace the influence of literature on language we note +some other causes which have affected the higher use of it: such as (1) the +necessity of clearness and connexion; (2) the fear of tautology; (3) the +influence of metre, rhythm, rhyme, and of the language of prose and verse upon +one another; (4) the power of idiom and quotation; (5) the relativeness of +words to one another. +</p> + +<p> +It has been usual to depreciate modern languages when compared with ancient. +The latter are regarded as furnishing a type of excellence to which the former +cannot attain. But the truth seems to be that modern languages, if through the +loss of inflections and genders they lack some power or beauty or +expressiveness or precision which is possessed by the ancient, are in many +other respects superior to them: the thought is generally clearer, the +connexion closer, the sentence and paragraph are better distributed. The best +modern languages, for example English or French, possess as great a power of +self-improvement as the Latin, if not as the Greek. Nor does there seem to be +any reason why they should ever decline or decay. It is a popular remark that +our great writers are beginning to disappear: it may also be remarked that +whenever a great writer appears in the future he will find the English language +as perfect and as ready for use as in the days of Shakspere or Milton. There is +no reason to suppose that English or French will ever be reduced to the low +level of Modern Greek or of Mediaeval Latin. The wide diffusion of great +authors would make such a decline impossible. Nor will modern languages be +easily broken up by amalgamation with each other. The distance between them is +too wide to be spanned, the differences are too great to be overcome, and the +use of printing makes it impossible that one of them should ever be lost in +another. +</p> + +<p> +The structure of the English language differs greatly from that of either Latin +or Greek. In the two latter, especially in Greek, sentences are joined together +by connecting particles. They are distributed on the right hand and on the left +by men, de, alla, kaitoi, kai de and the like, or deduced from one another by +ara, de, oun, toinun and the like. In English the majority of sentences are +independent and in apposition to one another; they are laid side by side or +slightly connected by the copula. But within the sentence the expression of the +logical relations of the clauses is closer and more exact: there is less of +apposition and participial structure. The sentences thus laid side by side are +also constructed into paragraphs; these again are less distinctly marked in +Greek and Latin than in English. Generally French, German, and English have an +advantage over the classical languages in point of accuracy. The three concords +are more accurately observed in English than in either Greek or Latin. On the +other hand, the extension of the familiar use of the masculine and feminine +gender to objects of sense and abstract ideas as well as to men and animals no +doubt lends a nameless grace to style which we have a difficulty in +appreciating, and the possible variety in the order of words gives more +flexibility and also a kind of dignity to the period. Of the comparative effect +of accent and quantity and of the relation between them in ancient and modern +languages we are not able to judge. +</p> + +<p> +Another quality in which modern are superior to ancient languages is freedom +from tautology. No English style is thought tolerable in which, except for the +sake of emphasis, the same words are repeated at short intervals. Of course the +length of the interval must depend on the character of the word. Striking words +and expressions cannot be allowed to reappear, if at all, except at the +distance of a page or more. Pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions may or rather +must recur in successive lines. It seems to be a kind of impertinence to the +reader and strikes unpleasantly both on the mind and on the ear that the same +sounds should be used twice over, when another word or turn of expression would +have given a new shade of meaning to the thought and would have added a +pleasing variety to the sound. And the mind equally rejects the repetition of +the word and the use of a mere synonym for it,—e.g. felicity and +happiness. The cultivated mind desires something more, which a skilful writer +is easily able to supply out of his treasure-house. +</p> + +<p> +The fear of tautology has doubtless led to the multiplications of words and the +meanings of words, and generally to an enlargement of the vocabulary. It is a +very early instinct of language; for ancient poetry is almost as free from +tautology as the best modern writings. The speech of young children, except in +so far as they are compelled to repeat themselves by the fewness of their +words, also escapes from it. When they grow up and have ideas which are beyond +their powers of expression, especially in writing, tautology begins to appear. +In like manner when language is “contaminated” by philosophy it is +apt to become awkward, to stammer and repeat itself, to lose its flow and +freedom. No philosophical writer with the exception of Plato, who is himself +not free from tautology, and perhaps Bacon, has attained to any high degree of +literary excellence. +</p> + +<p> +To poetry the form and polish of language is chiefly to be attributed; and the +most critical period in the history of language is the transition from verse to +prose. At first mankind were contented to express their thoughts in a set form +of words having a kind of rhythm; to which regularity was given by accent and +quantity. But after a time they demanded a greater degree of freedom, and to +those who had all their life been hearing poetry the first introduction of +prose had the charm of novelty. The prose romances into which the Homeric Poems +were converted, for a while probably gave more delight to the hearers or +readers of them than the Poems themselves, and in time the relation of the two +was reversed: the poems which had once been a necessity of the human mind +became a luxury: they were now superseded by prose, which in all succeeding +ages became the natural vehicle of expression to all mankind. Henceforward +prose and poetry formed each other. A comparatively slender link between them +was also furnished by proverbs. We may trace in poetry how the simple +succession of lines, not without monotony, has passed into a complicated +period, and how in prose, rhythm and accent and the order of words and the +balance of clauses, sometimes not without a slight admixture of rhyme, make up +a new kind of harmony, swelling into strains not less majestic than those of +Homer, Virgil, or Dante. +</p> + +<p> +One of the most curious and characteristic features of language, affecting both +syntax and style, is idiom. The meaning of the word “idiom” is that +which is peculiar, that which is familiar, the word or expression which strikes +us or comes home to us, which is more readily understood or more easily +remembered. It is a quality which really exists in infinite degrees, which we +turn into differences of kind by applying the term only to conspicuous and +striking examples of words or phrases which have this quality. It often +supersedes the laws of language or the rules of grammar, or rather is to be +regarded as another law of language which is natural and necessary. The word or +phrase which has been repeated many times over is more intelligible and +familiar to us than one which is rare, and our familiarity with it more than +compensates for incorrectness or inaccuracy in the use of it. Striking +expressions also which have moved the hearts of nations or are the precious +stones and jewels of great authors partake of the nature of idioms: they are +taken out of the sphere of grammar and are exempt from the proprieties of +language. Every one knows that we often put words together in a manner which +would be intolerable if it were not idiomatic. We cannot argue either about the +meaning of words or the use of constructions that because they are used in one +connexion they will be legitimate in another, unless we allow for this +principle. We can bear to have words and sentences used in new senses or in a +new order or even a little perverted in meaning when we are quite familiar with +them. Quotations are as often applied in a sense which the author did not +intend as in that which he did. The parody of the words of Shakspere or of the +Bible, which has in it something of the nature of a lie, is far from unpleasing +to us. The better known words, even if their meaning be perverted, are more +agreeable to us and have a greater power over us. Most of us have experienced a +sort of delight and feeling of curiosity when we first came across or when we +first used for ourselves a new word or phrase or figure of speech. +</p> + +<p> +There are associations of sound and of sense by which every word is linked to +every other. One letter harmonizes with another; every verb or noun derives its +meaning, not only from itself, but from the words with which it is associated. +Some reflection of them near or distant is embodied in it. In any new use of a +word all the existing uses of it have to be considered. Upon these depends the +question whether it will bear the proposed extension of meaning or not. +According to the famous expression of Luther, “Words are living +creatures, having hands and feet.” When they cease to retain this living +power of adaptation, when they are only put together like the parts of a piece +of furniture, language becomes unpoetical, inexpressive, dead. +</p> + +<p> +Grammars would lead us to suppose that words have a fixed form and sound. +Lexicons assign to each word a definite meaning or meanings. They both tend to +obscure the fact that the sentence precedes the word and that all language is +relative. (1) It is relative to its own context. Its meaning is modified by +what has been said before and after in the same or in some other passage: +without comparing the context we are not sure whether it is used in the same +sense even in two successive sentences. (2) It is relative to facts, to time, +place, and occasion: when they are already known to the hearer or reader, they +may be presupposed; there is no need to allude to them further. (3) It is +relative to the knowledge of the writer and reader or of the speaker and +hearer. Except for the sake of order and consecutiveness nothing ought to be +expressed which is already commonly or universally known. A word or two may be +sufficient to give an intimation to a friend; a long or elaborate speech or +composition is required to explain some new idea to a popular audience or to +the ordinary reader or to a young pupil. Grammars and dictionaries are not to +be despised; for in teaching we need clearness rather than subtlety. But we +must not therefore forget that there is also a higher ideal of language in +which all is relative—sounds to sounds, words to words, the parts to the +whole—in which besides the lesser context of the book or speech, there is +also the larger context of history and circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +The study of Comparative Philology has introduced into the world a new science +which more than any other binds up man with nature, and distant ages and +countries with one another. It may be said to have thrown a light upon all +other sciences and upon the nature of the human mind itself. The true +conception of it dispels many errors, not only of metaphysics and theology, but +also of natural knowledge. Yet it is far from certain that this newly-found +science will continue to progress in the same surprising manner as heretofore; +or that even if our materials are largely increased, we shall arrive at much +more definite conclusions than at present. Like some other branches of +knowledge, it may be approaching a point at which it can no longer be +profitably studied. But at any rate it has brought back the philosophy of +language from theory to fact; it has passed out of the region of guesses and +hypotheses, and has attained the dignity of an Inductive Science. And it is not +without practical and political importance. It gives a new interest to distant +and subject countries; it brings back the dawning light from one end of the +earth to the other. Nations, like individuals, are better understood by us when +we know something of their early life; and when they are better understood by +us, we feel more kindly towards them. Lastly, we may remember that all +knowledge is valuable for its own sake; and we may also hope that a deeper +insight into the nature of human speech will give us a greater command of it +and enable us to make a nobler use of it.<a href="#fn2" name="fnref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn2"></a> <a href="#fnref2">[2]</a> +Compare again W. Humboldt, <i>Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen +Sprachbaues</i>; M. Müller, <i>Lectures on the Science of Language</i>; +Steinthal, <i>Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft</i>: and for +the latter part of the Essay, Delbruck, <i>Study of Language</i>; Paul’s +<i>Principles of the History of Language</i>: to the latter work the author of +this Essay is largely indebted. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>CRATYLUS</h2> + +<h3>By Plato</h3> + +<p class="center"> +Translated by Benjamin Jowett +</p> + +<p class="center"> +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Hermogenes, Cratylus. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: If you please. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has +been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not conventional; +not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use; but that there is a +truth or correctness in them, which is the same for Hellenes as for barbarians. +Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name of Cratylus is a true name or not, +and he answers “Yes.” And Socrates? “Yes.” Then every +man’s name, as I tell him, is that which he is called. To this he +replies—“If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that would +not be your name.” And when I am anxious to have a further explanation he +is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a notion of his own +about the matter, if he would only tell, and could entirely convince me, if he +chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means; or rather +tell me, if you will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or +correctness of names, which I would far sooner hear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that “hard is +the knowledge of the good.” And the knowledge of names is a great part of +knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course +of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and +language—these are his own words—and then I should have been at +once able to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, +I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the +truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in +the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really +Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;—he means to say +that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a +fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of +difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the +question open until we have heard both sides. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and +others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness +in names other than convention and agreement; any name which you give, in my +opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the new +name is as correct as the old—we frequently change the names of our +slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for there is no name +given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit of the +users;—such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and +learn of Cratylus, or of any one else. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us see;—Your +meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to +call it? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is my notion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;—suppose that I call a man a +horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a +horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world; +and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the +world:—that is your meaning? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is in +words a true and a false? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition +says that which is not? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every +part? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and +false? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: So we must infer. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the +name? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that +there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other than +this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and countries +there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ from barbarians +in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names +differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? For he +says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they +appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with +him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my +perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at all. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing +as a bad man? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are +very bad men, and a good many of them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Not many. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Still you have found them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the +very evil very foolish? Would that be your view? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: It would. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they +appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Impossible. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really +distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can +hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man +cannot in reality be wiser than another. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: He cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things +equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his +view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always +equally to be attributed to all. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to individuals, +and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they +must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence: they are not +in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but +they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed +by nature. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally +to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and +not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as +we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper +instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the +natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no +use at all. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way +is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the +successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and +as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode +of speaking will result in error and failure. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is +not naming also a sort of action? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a +special nature of their own? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Precisely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given +according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our +pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced +with something? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: An awl. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And with which we weave? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: A shuttle. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And with which we name? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: A name. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, “What sort of instrument is a +shuttle?” And you answer, “A weaving instrument.” +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Well. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And I ask again, “What do we do when we weave?”—The +answer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of +instruments in general? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will you +answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I cannot say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things +according to their natures? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly we do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing +natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Assuredly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well—and well means like a +weaver? and the teacher will use the name well—and well means like a +teacher? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using +well? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Only the skilled. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That of the smith. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the +legislator? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only a +maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the +world is the rarest. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he look? +Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the +carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which is +naturally fitted to act as a shuttle? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, +looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he +made the other? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, +thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all of them to have +the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each +kind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has discovered +the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must express this +natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may +be, which he employs; for example, he ought to know how to put into iron the +forms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their +uses? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several +kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to put +the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and +give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any +true sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the +same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the +same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form +must be the same, but the material may vary, and still the instrument may be +equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign +country;—there is no difference. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not +therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true +and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that country makes +no matter. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the +shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or the +weaver who is to use them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man who +knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work +is being well done or not? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And who is he? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: The pilot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and +will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? Will not +the user be the man? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And how to answer them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a +dialectician? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the pilot has +to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician +must be his director if the names are to be rightly given? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be no +such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons; and +Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that not +every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name which +each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms of things in +letters and syllables. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in changing +my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more readily +persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the natural fitness +of names. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you just +now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to share the +enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the matter, a step +has been gained; for we have discovered that names have by nature a truth, and +that not every man knows how to give a thing a name. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? That, +if you care to know, is the next question. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then reflect. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and you +must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the Sophists, of whom +your brother, Callias, has—rather dearly—bought the reputation of +wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you had +better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has learnt from +Protagoras about the fitness of names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating Protagoras +and his truth (“Truth” was the title of the book of Protagoras; +compare Theaet.), I were to attach any value to what he and his book affirm! +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he +say? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where he +distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same things. +Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness +of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right +and natural names; do you not think so? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at all. +But to what are you referring? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single +combat with Hephaestus? +</p> + +<p> +“Whom,” as he says, “the Gods call Xanthus, and men call +Scamander.” +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I remember. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, and about this river—to know that he ought to be called +Xanthus and not Scamander—is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird +which, as he says, +</p> + +<p> +“The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:” +</p> + +<p> +to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name +Cymindis—do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina? +(Compare Il. “The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb +of the sportive Myrina.”) And there are many other observations of the +same kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the +understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, which +he affirms to have been the names of Hector’s son, are more within the +range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet means by +correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: you will remember +I dare say the lines to which I refer? (Il.) +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the +names given to Hector’s son—Astyanax or Scamandrius? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I do not know. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the +unwise are more likely to give correct names? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should say, the men. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him Astyanax +(king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other name of +Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That may be inferred. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their +wives? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for the +boy than Scamandrius? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:—does he not +himself suggest a very good reason, when he says, +</p> + +<p> +“For he alone defended their city and long walls”? +</p> + +<p> +This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of the +city which his father was saving, as Homer observes. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I see. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What of that? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of +Astyanax—both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) have +nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is +clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and holds +it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense; and indeed I +believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined that I had +found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the correctness of names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be on the +right track. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion’s whelp a lion, +and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary course of +nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary +births;—if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call +that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a +natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you agree +with me? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not play +tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be called a +king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not the same, makes +no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does the addition or +subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the essence of the thing +remains in possession of the name and appears in it. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names of +letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves with the +exception of the four epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega; the names of the rest, +whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other letters which we add to +them; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be no mistake, the +name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example, the letter +beta—the addition of eta, tau, alpha, gives no offence, and does not +prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator +intended—so well did he know how to give the letters names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I believe you are right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the son +of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire; and similarly +the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is like the +parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be disguised +until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may not recognize +them, although they are the same, just as any one of us would not recognize the +same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell, although to the +physician, who regards the power of them, they are the same, and he is not put +out by the addition; and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the +addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed by the +change of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the meaning. As was +just now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, +which is tau, and yet they have the same meaning. And how little in common with +the letters of their names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)—and yet the +meaning is the same. And there are many other names which just mean +“king.” Again, there are several names for a general, as, for +example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good +warrior); and others which denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and +Acesimbrotus (curer of mortals); and there are many others which might be +cited, differing in their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. +Would you not say so? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the +course of nature? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are +prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an irreligious son, +he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the class to which he +belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of a horse foaling a +calf. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called +irreligious? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus +(mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are correctly given, his +should have an opposite meaning. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains) who +appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some +poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wildness of +his hero’s nature. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is very likely, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And his father’s name is also according to nature. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon (admirable for +remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the accomplishment of his +resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his continuance at Troy with all +the vast army is a proof of that admirable endurance in him which is signified +by the name Agamemnon. I also think that Atreus is rightly called; for his +murder of Chrysippus and his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and +destructive to his reputation—the name is a little altered and disguised +so as not to be intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no +difficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ateires the +stubborn, or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the destructive one, the +name is perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is +also named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops +who sees what is near only (o ta pelas oron). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or +foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon his +whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and immediate,—or +in other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by all means +for his bride. Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus is rightly given +and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him are true. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: And what are the traditions? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his +life—last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his death +he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in the world +below—all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine +that some person who wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted down by +misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; and into this +form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmuted. The name +of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning, although +hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is divided into +two parts, for some call him Zena, and use the one half, and others who use the +other half call him Dia; the two together signify the nature of the God, and +the business of a name, as we were saying, is to express the nature. For there +is none who is more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king +of all. Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, +although divided, meaning the God through whom all creatures always have life +(di on zen aei pasi tois zosin uparchei). There is an irreverence, at first +sight, in calling him son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity), and we +might rather expect Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the +fact; for this is the meaning of his father’s name: Kronos quasi Koros +(Choreo, to sweep), not in the sense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon +chai acheraton tou nou, the pure and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He, +as we are informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo +tou oran ta ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the +way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I could +remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more +conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,—then I +might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an instant, I +know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly +inspired, and to be uttering oracles. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the +great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long lecture which +commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting +ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul, and +to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the investigation of +names—that will be the way; but to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we +will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can only find some +priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this sort. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of the +enquiry about names. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that we +have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names which witness of +themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness? The +names of heroes and of men in general are apt to be deceptive because they are +often called after ancestors with whose names, as we were saying, they may have +no business; or they are the expression of a wish like Eutychides (the son of +good fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and +others. But I think that we had better leave these, for there will be more +chance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences;—there +ought to have been more care taken about them when they were named, and perhaps +there may have been some more than human power at work occasionally in giving +them names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think so, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and show +that they are rightly named Gods? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be well. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: My notion would be something of this sort:—I suspect that the +sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many +barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing that +they were always moving and running, from their running nature they were called +Gods or runners (Theous, Theontas); and when men became acquainted with the +other Gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to them all. Do you think +that likely? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think it very likely indeed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this word? Tell +me if my view is right. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I do not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came +first? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He says of them— +</p> + +<p> +“But now that fate has closed over this race They are holy demons upon +the earth, Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.” +(Hesiod, Works and Days.) +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the golden +men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I am convinced of +this, because he further says that we are the iron race. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him be +said to be of golden race? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very likely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not the good wise? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, they are wise. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called them +demons, because they were daemones (knowing or wise), and in our older Attic +dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say truly, that when a +good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion among the dead, and becomes a +demon; which is a name given to him signifying wisdom. And I say too, that +every wise man who happens to be a good man is more than human (daimonion) both +in life and death, and is rightly called a demon. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what is the +meaning of the word “hero”? (Eros with an eta, in the old writing +eros with an epsilon.) +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the name is +not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What then? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal woman, +or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old Attic, and you +will see better that the name heros is only a slight alteration of Eros, from +whom the heroes sprang: either this is the meaning, or, if not this, then they +must have been skilful as rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the +question (erotan), for eirein is equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was +saying, in the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and +questioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of +sophists and rhetors. But can you tell me why men are called +anthropoi?—that is more difficult. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I think +that you are the more likely to succeed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and ingenious +thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before to-morrow’s dawn I +shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me; and first, remember that +we often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names as we please and +change the accents. Take, for example, the word Dii Philos; in order to convert +this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one of the iotas and sound the middle +syllable grave instead of acute; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes +inserted in words instead of being omitted, and the acute takes the place of +the grave. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a noun, +appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the alpha, has +been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been changed to a grave. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean to say that the word “man” implies that other +animals never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man +not only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and +hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, meaning anathron a opopen. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order. You +know the distinction of soul and body? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word +psuche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine that +those who first used the name psuche meant to express that the soul when in the +body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and revival +(anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails then the body perishes and +dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But please stay a +moment; I fancy that I can discover something which will be more acceptable to +the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that they will scorn this +explanation. What do you say to another? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the +entire nature of the body? What else but the soul? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Just that. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the +ordering and containing principle of all things? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes; I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then you may well call that power phuseche which carries and holds +nature (e phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away into psuche. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific than +the other. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that this +was the true meaning of the name. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You mean soma (the body). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if a little +permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave (sema) of the +soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life; or again the index +of the soul, because the soul gives indications to (semainei) the body; +probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were under +the impression that the soul is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the +body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe +(soma, sozetai), as the name soma implies, until the penalty is paid; according +to this view, not even a letter of the word need be changed. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of words. +But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that which you +were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any similar principle of +correctness is to be applied to them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle which, +as men of sense, we must acknowledge,—that of the Gods we know nothing, +either of their natures or of the names which they give themselves; but we are +sure that the names by which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are +true. And this is the best of all principles; and the next best is to say, as +in prayers, that we will call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics +which they like, because we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is a +very good custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if +you please, in the first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about +them; we do not presume that we are able to do so; but we are enquiring about +the meaning of men in giving them these names,—in this there can be small +blame. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like to do +as you say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be very proper. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is another and certainly a most difficult question. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have been +considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to say. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Well, and what of them? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of names. +Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still discernible. For +example, that which we term ousia is by some called esia, and by others again +osia. Now that the essence of things should be called estia, which is akin to +the first of these (esia = estia), is rational enough. And there is reason in +the Athenians calling that estia which participates in ousia. For in ancient +times we too seem to have said esia for ousia, and this you may note to have +been the idea of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to +estia, which was natural enough if they meant that estia was the essence of +things. Those again who read osia seem to have inclined to the opinion of +Heracleitus, that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing +principle (othoun) is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is +therefore rightly called osia. Enough of this, which is all that we who know +nothing can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and +Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare say +that I am talking great nonsense. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Why, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Of what nature? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How plausible? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of antiquity +as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also spoke. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and +nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you +cannot go into the same water twice. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the names of +Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty much in the +doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them +purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod +also, tells of +</p> + +<p> +“Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys (Il.—the line is not +found in the extant works of Hesiod.).” +</p> + +<p> +And again, Orpheus says, that +</p> + +<p> +“The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his +sister Tethys, who was his mother’s daughter.” +</p> + +<p> +You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of +Heracleitus. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but I do +not understand the meaning of the name Tethys. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a spring, +a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered (diattomenon, +ethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys is made up of these +two words. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: The idea is ingenious, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?—of Zeus we have spoken. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, whether +the latter is called by that or by his other name. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: By all means. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original inventor +of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks, and not +allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element Poseidon; +the epsilon was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so; but the +name may have been originally written with a double lamda and not with a sigma, +meaning that the God knew many things (Polla eidos). And perhaps also he being +the shaker of the earth, has been named from shaking (seiein), and then pi and +delta have been added. Pluto gives wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the +giver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in general appear +to imagine that the term Hades is connected with the invisible (aeides) and so +they are led by their fears to call the God Pluto instead. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this +deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of +always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body going to +him (compare Rep.), my belief is that all is quite consistent, and that the +office and name of the God really correspond. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Why, how is that? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask you +which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which confines him +more to the same spot,—desire or necessity? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Desire, Socrates, is stronger far. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if he +did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Assuredly they would. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should +certainly infer, and not by necessity? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is clear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And there are many desires? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the +greatest? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be made +better by associating with another? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to +him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the +world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the God +able to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he is the perfect +and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the +other world; and even to us who are upon earth he sends from below exceeding +blessings. For he has much more than he wants down there; wherefore he is +called Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men +while they are in the body, but only when the soul is liberated from the +desires and evils of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and +reflection in that; for in their liberated state he can bind them with the +desire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the body, not +even father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own +far-famed chains. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There is a deal of truth in what you say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from the +unseen (aeides)—far otherwise, but from his knowledge (eidenai) of all +noble things. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and Apollo, and +Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Demeter is e didousa meter, who gives food like a mother; Here is the +lovely one (erate)—for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and married +her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator was +thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (aer), putting +the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the truth of this if +you repeat the letters of Here several times over. People dread the name of +Pherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo,—and with as little reason; +the fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from their ignorance of the nature +of names. But they go changing the name into Phersephone, and they are +terrified at this; whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise +(sophe); for seeing that all things in the world are in motion (pheromenon), +that principle which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, is +wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly called Pherepaphe (Pherepapha), +or some name like it, because she touches that which is in motion (tou +pheromenon ephaptomene), herein showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, +consorts with her, because she is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta +now-a-days, because the present generation care for euphony more than truth. +There is the other name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed +to have some terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To be sure I have, and what you say is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the power +of the God. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any single +name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of the God, +embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,—music, and +prophecy, and medicine, and archery. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the +explanation. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. In the +first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, +and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their +washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to +make a man pure both in body and soul. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from +all impurities? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the +physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon (purifier); or in +respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which is the +same as truth, he may be most fitly called Aplos, from aplous (sincere), as in +the Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him Aplos; also he is aei +Ballon (always shooting), because he is a master archer who never misses; or +again, the name may refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in +akolouthos, and akoitis, and in many other words the alpha is supposed to mean +“together,” so the meaning of the name Apollo will be “moving +together,” whether in the poles of heaven as they are called, or in the +harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he moves all together by an +harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously declare. And he is +the God who presides over harmony, and makes all things move together, both +among Gods and among men. And as in the words akolouthos and akoitis the alpha +is substituted for an omicron, so the name Apollon is equivalent to omopolon; +only the second lambda is added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of +destruction (apolon). Now the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts +the minds of some who do not consider the true value of the name, which, as I +was saying just now, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the +single one, the everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (aplous, aei +Ballon, apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to +be derived from their making philosophical enquiries (mosthai); and Leto is +called by this name, because she is such a gentle Goddess, and so willing +(ethelemon) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, as she is often +called by strangers—they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her +smooth and easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy +(artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity, perhaps +because she is a proficient in virtue (arete), and perhaps also as hating +intercourse of the sexes (ton aroton misesasa). He who gave the Goddess her +name may have had any or all of these reasons. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a serious and +also a facetious explanation of both these names; the serious explanation is +not to be had from me, but there is no objection to your hearing the facetious +one; for the Gods too love a joke. Dionusos is simply didous oinon (giver of +wine), Didoinusos, as he might be called in fun,—and oinos is properly +oionous, because wine makes those who drink, think (oiesthai) that they have a +mind (noun) when they have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam +(aphros), may be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an Athenian, +will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am not likely to forget them. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, indeed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of Athene. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What other appellation? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: We call her Pallas. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from armed +dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the earth, or by +the use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or dancing. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Athene? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern +interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the +ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that he +meant by Athene “mind” (nous) and “intelligence” +(dianoia), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about +her; and indeed calls her by a still higher title, “divine +intelligence” (Thou noesis), as though he would say: This is she who has +the mind of God (Theonoa);—using alpha as a dialectical variety for eta, +and taking away iota and sigma (There seems to be some error in the MSS. The +meaning is that the word theonoa = theounoa is a curtailed form of theou +noesis, but the omitted letters do not agree.). Perhaps, however, the name +Theonoe may mean “she who knows divine things” (Theia noousa) +better than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that the author of +it wished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence (en ethei noesin), +and therefore gave her the name ethonoe; which, however, either he or his +successors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her +Athene. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light (Phaeos istora)? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Surely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the eta by attraction; that is +obvious to anybody. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets into +your head. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of Ares. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What is Ares? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and +manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which is +the meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every way appropriate to +the God of war. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am +afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the steeds +of Euthyphro can prance. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of whom I am +said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall know whether +there is any meaning in what Cratylus says. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and +signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or thief, or +liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with +language; as I was telling you, the word eirein is expressive of the use of +speech, and there is an often-recurring Homeric word emesato, which means +“he contrived”—out of these two words, eirein and mesasthai, +the legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech; and +we may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name: “O my +friends,” says he to us, “seeing that he is the contriver of tales +or speeches, you may rightly call him Eirhemes.” And this has been +improved by us, as we think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called +from the verb “to tell” (eirein), because she was a messenger. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying that I +was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand at speeches. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed son +of Hermes. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How do you make that out? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is always +turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which +dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and is +rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have generally to do +with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and the +perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called aipolos +(goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, +and rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is +speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is no +marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the +Gods. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why should we +not discuss another kind of Gods—the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, +air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I will not +refuse. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: You will oblige me. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom you +mentioned first—the sun? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric form, for +the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him because when he rises +he gathers (alizoi) men together or because he is always rolling in his course +(aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from aiolein, of which the meaning is the +same as poikillein (to variegate), because he variegates the productions of the +earth. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But what is selene (the moon)? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon +receives her light from the sun. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Why do you say so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much the same +meaning? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old (enon), +if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his revolution always +adds new light, and there is the old light of the previous month. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And as she has a light which is always old and always new (enon neon +aei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and this when hammered +into shape becomes selanaia. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do you say +of the month and the stars? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because suffering +diminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived from astrape, which +is an improvement on anastrope, signifying the upsetting of the eyes +(anastrephein opa). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of Euthyphro has +deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word. Please, +however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a difficulty of +this sort. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What is it? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can tell +me what is the meaning of the pur? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of this +and several other words?—My belief is that they are of foreign origin. +For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion of the +barbarians, often borrowed from them. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness of +these names according to the Hellenic language, and not according to the +language from which the words are derived, is rather likely to be at fault. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the word is +not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the Phrygians +may be observed to have the same word slightly changed, just as they have udor +(water) and kunes (dogs), and many other words. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; for +something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of pur and +udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which raises +(airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei rei), or because the +flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the winds “air-blasts,” +(aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to speak, air-flux (aetorroun), in +the sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun); and because this moving wind may be +expressed by either term he employs the word air (aer = aetes rheo). Aither +(aether) I should interpret as aeitheer; this may be correctly said, because +this element is always running in a flux about the air (aei thei peri tou aera +reon). The meaning of the word ge (earth) comes out better when in the form of +gaia, for the earth may be truly called “mother” (gaia, +genneteira), as in the language of Homer (Od.) gegaasi means gegennesthai. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What shall we take next? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the year, +eniautos and etos. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to know +the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai because they +divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and the fruits of the +earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the same,—“that +which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth in their turn, and +passes them in review within itself (en eauto exetazei)”: this is broken +up into two words, eniautos from en eauto, and etos from etazei, just as the +original name of Zeus was divided into Zena and Dia; and the whole proposition +means that his power of reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two +words etos and eniautos being thus formed out of a single proposition. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am run away with. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But am not yet at my utmost speed. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you would +explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those charming +words—wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring; +still, as I have put on the lion’s skin, I must not be faint of heart; +and I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (phronesis) and +understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), and knowledge (episteme), and +all those other charming words, as you call them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: By the dog of Egypt I have a not bad notion which came into my head +only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names were undoubtedly +like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their search after the nature +of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly going round and round, and +then they imagine that the world is going round and round and moving in all +directions; and this appearance, which arises out of their own internal +condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is +nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is +always full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of the names +which I mentioned has led me into making this reflection. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been just +cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely indicated. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, indeed, I never thought of it. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a name +indicative of motion. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What was the name? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify phoras kai rhou noesis +(perception of motion and flux), or perhaps phoras onesis (the blessing of +motion), but is at any rate connected with pheresthai (motion); gnome +(judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration (nomesis) +of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider; or, if you would +rather, here is noesis, the very word just now mentioned, which is neou esis +(the desire of the new); the word neos implies that the world is always in +process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express this longing of +the soul, for the original name was neoesis, and not noesis; but eta took the +place of a double epsilon. The word sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of +that wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now considering. Epioteme +(knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good for +anything follows (epetai) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor +falling behind them; wherefore the word should rather be read as epistemene, +inserting epsilon nu. Sunesis (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as +a kind of conclusion; the word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), +and, like epistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company +with the nature of things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be +of native growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You +must remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid +motion, often use the word esuthe (he rushed); and there was a famous +Lacedaemonian who was named Sous (Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians +signify rapid motion, and the touching (epaphe) of motion is expressed by +sophia, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good (agathon) is the name +which is given to the admirable (agasto) in nature; for, although all things +move, still there are degrees of motion; some are swifter, some slower; but +there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this +admirable part of nature is called agathon. Dikaiosune (justice) is clearly +dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the just); but the actual word dikaion is +more difficult: men are only agreed to a certain extent about justice, and then +they begin to disagree. For those who suppose all things to be in motion +conceive the greater part of nature to be a mere receptacle; and they say that +there is a penetrating power which passes through all this, and is the +instrument of creation in all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element; for if +it were not the subtlest, and a power which none can keep out, and also the +swiftest, passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not +penetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all +things and pierces (diaion) all, is rightly called dikaion; the letter k is +only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, there is a +general agreement about the nature of justice; but I, Hermogenes, being an +enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery that the justice of which I +am speaking is also the cause of the world: now a cause is that because of +which anything is created; and some one comes and whispers in my ear that +justice is rightly so called because partaking of the nature of the cause, and +I begin, after hearing what he has said, to interrogate him gently: +“Well, my excellent friend,” say I, “but if all this be true, +I still want to know what is justice.” Thereupon they think that I ask +tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers, and have been already +sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me with one derivation after +another, and at length they quarrel. For one of them says that justice is the +sun, and that he only is the piercing (diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element +which is the guardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful +notion, I am answered by the satirical remark, “What, is there no justice +in the world when the sun is down?” And when I earnestly beg my +questioner to tell me his own honest opinion, he says, “Fire in the +abstract”; but this is not very intelligible. Another says, “No, +not fire in the abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire.” +Another man professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that +justice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes with +nothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things. At last, my +friend, I find myself in far greater perplexity about the nature of justice +than I was before I began to learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, +which has led me into this digression, was given to justice for the reasons +which I have mentioned. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you must have +heard this from some one else. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And not the rest? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Hardly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in the +originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think that we +have as yet discussed courage (andreia),—injustice (adikia), which is +obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle +(diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of andreia seems to +imply a battle;—this battle is in the world of existence, and according +to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (enantia rhon): if you extract +the delta from andreia, the name at once signifies the thing, and you may +clearly understand that andreia is not the stream opposed to every stream, but +only to that which is contrary to justice, for otherwise courage would not have +been praised. The words arren (male) and aner (man) also contain a similar +allusion to the same principle of the upward flux (te ano rhon). Gune (woman) I +suspect to be the same word as goun (birth): thelu (female) appears to be +partly derived from thele (the teat), because the teat is like rain, and makes +things flourish (tethelenai). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is surely probable. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure the +growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed by the +legislator in the name, which is a compound of thein (running), and allesthai +(leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth ground. There +are a good many names generally thought to be of importance, which have still +to be explained. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the possession of +mind: you have only to take away the tau and insert two omichrons, one between +the chi and nu, and another between the nu and eta. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is a very shabby etymology. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original names have +been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping off +letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in all sorts +of ways: and time too may have had a share in the change. Take, for example, +the word katoptron; why is the letter rho inserted? This must surely be the +addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth, but thinks only of +putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often such that at last no +human being can possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another +example is the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought properly to be phigx, +phiggos, and there are other examples. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters +which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be adapted to +any object. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like yourself, +should observe the laws of moderation and probability. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Such is my desire. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a precisian, or +“you will unnerve me of my strength (Iliad.).” When you have +allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be at the top +of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great +accomplishment—anein; for mekos has the meaning of greatness, and these +two, mekos and anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying, being now +at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words +arete (virtue) and kakia (vice); arete I do not as yet understand, but kakia is +transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for all things +being in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos ion (going badly); and this evil +motion when existing in the soul has the general name of kakia, or vice, +specially appropriated to it. The meaning of kakos ienai may be further +illustrated by the use of deilia (cowardice), which ought to have come after +andreia, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been +passed over. Deilia signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain +(desmos), for lian means strength, and therefore deilia expresses the greatest +and strongest bond of the soul; and aporia (difficulty) is an evil of the same +nature (from a (alpha) not, and poreuesthai to go), like anything else which is +an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word kakia appears to mean kakos +ienai, or going badly, or limping and halting; of which the consequence is, +that the soul becomes filled with vice. And if kakia is the name of this sort +of thing, arete will be the opposite of it, signifying in the first place ease +of motion, then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has +therefore the attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is +therefore called arete, or, more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may +perhaps have had another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is +more eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I daresay +that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that if +the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also right. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a part +in your previous discourse? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an +opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What device? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word also. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these words +and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon roes +(always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our former +derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all sorts, +and hence he gave the name aeischoroun to that which hindered the flux (aei +ischon roun), and that is now beaten together into aischron. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity, and +has been changed by altering omicron upsilon into omicron. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: This name appears to denote mind. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not the +principle which imposes the name the cause? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their names, and is +not mind the beautiful (kalon)? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and +are not other works worthy of blame? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the works +of a carpenter? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Exactly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which +we recognize and speak of as the beautiful? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What more names remain to us? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There are the words which are connected with agathon and kalon, +such as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and their opposites. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may discover +for yourself by the light of the previous examples,—for it is a sister +word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the soul accompanying the +world, and things which are done upon this principle are called sumphora or +sumpheronta, because they are carried round with the world. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is probable. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain), but you +must alter the delta into nu if you want to get at the meaning; for this word +also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name intended to +express the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and universal penetration in the +good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a delta instead of a nu, and so +made kerdos. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable the +gainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but they use the word in the +sense of swift. You regard the profitable (lusiteloun), as that which being the +swiftest thing in existence, allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of +motion, but always, if there begins to be any end, lets things go again (luei), +and makes motion immortal and unceasing: and in this point of view, as appears +to me, the good is happily denominated lusiteloun—being that which looses +(luon) the end (telos) of motion. Ophelimon (the advantageous) is derived from +ophellein, meaning that which creates and increases; this latter is a common +Homeric word, and has a foreign character. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Which are they? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable), +alusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes (hurtful). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm (blaptein) +the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to hold or bind); for +aptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a term of censure; boulomenon +aptein roun (wanting to bind the stream) would properly be boulapteroun, and +this, as I imagine, is improved into blaberon. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names; and +when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining that you are making +your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some prelude to Athene. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not mine. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What is the meaning of zemiodes?—let me remark, Hermogenes, how +right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words by +putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight permutation will +sometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may instance the word deon, which +occurs to me at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say to you, +that the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and disguised +and entirely altered the original meaning both of deon, and also of zemiodes, +which in the old language is clearly indicated. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved the +sounds iota and delta, especially the women, who are most conservative of the +ancient language, but now they change iota into eta or epsilon, and delta into +zeta; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: For example, in very ancient times they called the day either imera +or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of the +giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for (imeirousi) and +love the light which comes after the darkness, and is therefore called imera, +from imeros, desire. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the meaning, +although there are some who imagine the day to be called emera because it makes +things gentle (emera different accents). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Such is my view. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: They did so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,—it ought to be duogon, which +word expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the purpose of +drawing;—this has been changed into zugon, and there are many other +examples of similar changes. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There are. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the word +deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other +appellations of good; for deon is here a species of good, and is, nevertheless, +the chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and therefore own brother of +blaberon. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be the +correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the epsilon into an +iota after the old fashion, this word will then agree with other words meaning +good; for dion, not deon, signifies the good, and is a term of praise; and the +author of names has not contradicted himself, but in all these various +appellations, deon (obligatory), ophelimon (advantageous), lusiteloun +(profitable), kerdaleon (gainful), agathon (good), sumpheron (expedient), +euporon (plenteous), the same conception is implied of the ordering or +all-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining and binding +principle which is censured. And this is further illustrated by the word +zemiodes (hurtful), which if the zeta is only changed into delta as in the +ancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as you will perceive, is +given to that which binds motion (dounti ion). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia +(desire), and the like, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty about +them—edone is e (eta) onesis, the action which tends to advantage; and +the original form may be supposed to have been eone, but this has been altered +by the insertion of the delta. Lupe appears to be derived from the relaxation +(luein) which the body feels when in sorrow; ania (trouble) is the hindrance of +motion (alpha and ienai); algedon (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a +foreign word, which is derived from aleinos (grievous); odune (grief) is called +from the putting on (endusis) sorrow; in achthedon (vexation) “the word +too labours,” as any one may see; chara (joy) is the very expression of +the fluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis (delight) is so called +from the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul, which may be likened to a +breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has been altered by time into +terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia explain themselves; the +former, which ought to be eupherosune and has been changed euphrosune, is +named, as every one may see, from the soul moving (pheresthai) in harmony with +nature; epithumia is really e epi ton thumon iousa dunamis, the power which +enters into the soul; thumos (passion) is called from the rushing (thuseos) and +boiling of the soul; imeros (desire) denotes the stream (rous) which most draws +the soul dia ten esin tes roes—because flowing with desire (iemenos), and +expresses a longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to them, +and is termed imeros from possessing this power; pothos (longing) is expressive +of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and in another place +(pou); this is the reason why the name pothos is applied to things absent, as +imeros is to things present; eros (love) is so called because flowing in +(esron) from without; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence +introduced through the eyes, and from flowing in was called esros (influx) in +the old time when they used omicron for omega, and is called eros, now that +omega is substituted for omicron. But why do you not give me another word? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of words? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses the march +of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a bow (toxon); +the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis (thinking), which is only +oisis (moving), and implies the movement of the soul to the essential nature of +each thing—just as boule (counsel) has to do with shooting (bole); and +boulesthai (to wish) combines the notion of aiming and deliberating—all +these words seem to follow doxa, and all involve the idea of shooting, just as +aboulia, absence of counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or +mistaking of the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: You are quickening your pace now, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I have +explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and ekousion (the +voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon) and +unresisting—the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as +I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will; but +the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, implies error and +ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is impassable, +and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion—and this is the derivation +of the word anagkaion (necessary) an agke ion, going through a ravine. But +while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere +with your questions. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such as +aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not forgetting to +enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of our discussion, has +this name of onoma. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai (to seek)? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes;—meaning the same as zetein (to enquire). +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying on ou +zetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more obvious in +onomaston (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is that +for which there is a seeking (on ou masma); aletheia is also an agglomeration +of theia ale (divine wandering), implying the divine motion of existence; +pseudos (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is another ill name given +by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep +(eudein); but the original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of +psi; on and ousia are ion with an iota broken off; this agrees with the true +principle, for being (on) is also moving (ion), and the same may be said of not +being, which is likewise called not going (oukion or ouki on = ouk ion). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that some one +were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon and +doun?—show me their fitness. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already +suggested. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What way? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign origin; +and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this kind may be +true of them; but also the original forms of words may have been lost in the +lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of ways, that I should +not be surprised if the old language when compared with that now in use would +appear to us to be a barbarous tongue. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very likely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest attention +and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person go on +analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the elements out of which +the words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this process, he who has to +answer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the enquiry? +Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the elements of all other +names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed to be made up of other names? +The word agathon (good), for example, is, as we were saying, a compound of +agastos (admirable) and thoos (swift). And probably thoos is made up of other +elements, and these again of others. But if we take a word which is incapable +of further resolution, then we shall be right in saying that we have at last +reached a primary element, which need not be resolved any further. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I believe you to be in the right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn out +to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be examined according to +some new method? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very likely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to this +conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again say +to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in stating +the principle of primary names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle is +applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary—when they are +regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: All the names that we have been explaining were intended to indicate +the nature of things. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the +secondary names, is implied in their being names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Surely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the +primary. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede analysis +show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which they must do, if +they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a question: Suppose that we +had no voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with one another, should we +not, like the deaf and dumb, make signs with the hands and head and the rest of +the body? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There would be no choice, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of our hands +to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and downwardness would +be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if we were describing the +running of a horse, or any other animal, we should make our bodies and their +gestures as like as we could to them. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I do not see that we could do anything else. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever express +anything. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or +tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we +want to express. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: It must be so, I think. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator +names or imitates? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached the +truth as yet. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Why not? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people who +imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they imitate. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates, +what sort of an imitation is a name? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, although +that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music imitates; these, in +my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter as follows: All objects +have sound and figure, and many have colour? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with imitations of +this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music and drawing? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a +colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well as of +anything else which may be said to have an essence? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should think so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in +letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Quite so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave to the +two other imitators. What will this imitator be called? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver, of +whom we are in search. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to consider +the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention), about which you +were asking; and we may see whether the namer has grasped the nature of them in +letters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the essence or not. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There must be others. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them, and where +does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by syllables and +letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the letters, just as those +who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the powers of elementary, and then +of compound sounds, and when they have done so, but not before, they proceed to +the consideration of rhythms? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first separating the +vowels, and then the consonants and mutes (letters which are neither vowels nor +semivowels), into classes, according to the received distinctions of the +learned; also the semivowels, which are neither vowels, nor yet mutes; and +distinguishing into classes the vowels themselves? And when we have perfected +the classification of things, we shall give them names, and see whether, as in +the case of letters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred +(cf. Phaedrus); and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether +they have in them classes as there are in the letters; and when we have well +considered all this, we shall know how to apply them to what they +resemble—whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there +is to be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting, the painter who +wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or any other colour, and +sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method is when he has to paint flesh +colour or anything of that kind—he uses his colours as his figures appear +to require them; and so, too, we shall apply letters to the expression of +objects, either single letters when required, or several letters; and so we +shall form syllables, as they are called, and from syllables make nouns and +verbs; and thus, at last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at +language, large and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so +shall we make speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some +other art. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried +away—meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we but) the +ancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in +like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject, and we +must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are +rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear +Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That, Socrates, I can quite believe. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them in +this way? for I am certain that I should not. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Much less am I likely to be able. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if we can, +something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying by way of +preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the truth about them we know +nothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in this present +enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the higher method is +the one which we or others who would analyse language to any good purpose must +follow; but under the circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can. +What do you think? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I very much approve. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find +expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be +avoided—there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth +of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like +the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in the air; and +must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that “the Gods +gave the first names, and therefore they are right.” This will be the +best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be even better still, of +deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than we +are; or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is the same +sort of excuse as the last; for all these are not reasons but only ingenious +excuses for having no reasons concerning the truth of words. And yet any sort +of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary +words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the +professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first +names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you +not suppose this to be true? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: My first notions of original names are truly wild and ridiculous, +though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire, and I hope that +you will communicate to me in return anything better which you may have. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Fear not; I will do my best. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In the first place, the letter rho appears to me to be the general +instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet explained the +meaning of this latter word, which is just iesis (going); for the letter eta +was not in use among the ancients, who only employed epsilon; and the root is +kiein, which is a foreign form, the same as ienai. And the old word kinesis +will be correctly given as iesis in corresponding modern letters. Assuming this +foreign root kiein, and allowing for the change of the eta and the insertion of +the nu, we have kinesis, which should have been kieinsis or eisis; and stasis +is the negative of ienai (or eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now the +letter rho, as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent +instrument for the expression of motion; and he frequently uses the letter for +this purpose: for example, in the actual words rein and roe he represents +motion by rho; also in the words tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged); and +again, in words such as krouein (strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), +thruptein (break), kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts +of movements he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I +imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in +the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order to express +motion, just as by the letter iota he expresses the subtle elements which pass +through all things. This is why he uses the letter iota as imitative of motion, +ienai, iesthai. And there is another class of letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi, +of which the pronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of breath; these +are used in the imitation of such notions as psuchron (shivering), xeon +(seething), seiesthai, (to be shaken), seismos (shock), and are always +introduced by the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is phusodes +(windy). He seems to have thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue +in the utterance of delta and tau was expressive of binding and rest in a +place: he further observed the liquid movement of lambda, in the pronunciation +of which the tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, +as in leios (level), and in the word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon +(sleek), in the word kollodes (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of gamma +detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a +glutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes. The nu he observed +to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of inwardness; hence +he introduced the sound in endos and entos: alpha he assigned to the expression +of size, and nu of length, because they are great letters: omicron was the sign +of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of omicron mixed up in the word +goggulon (round). Thus did the legislator, reducing all things into letters and +syllables, and impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation +compounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names; +but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies me; +he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what is this +fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or not. Tell +me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree in what +Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better of your own? +and if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of +Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can learn, +or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any rate, not such +a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest of all. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, “to +add little to little” is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that +you can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little +trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which Hermogenes and +myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to say what you think, +which if it be better than my own view I shall gladly accept. And I should not +be at all surprized to find that you have found some better notion. For you +have evidently reflected on these matters and have had teachers, and if you +have really a better theory of the truth of names, you may count me in the +number of your disciples. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of these +matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I fear that the +opposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved to say to you what +Achilles in the “Prayers” says to Ajax,— +</p> + +<p> +“Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people, You appear to have +spoken in all things much to my mind.” +</p> + +<p> +And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers much to my +mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may have long +been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom; I +cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I +saying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception—when the deceiver +is always at home and always with you—it is quite terrible, and therefore +I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to “look fore and +aft,” in the words of the aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are +we? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the +thing:—has this proposition been sufficiently proven? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite +true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And who are they? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me explain +what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, +better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders also, the better sort +build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and +some worse? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: No, indeed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was +mentioned before:—assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in +him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at all? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only +appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the nature +which corresponds to it. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even +speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, +if he is not. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this is your +meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all ages. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?—say +something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is +not? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I +should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that +falsehood may be spoken but not said? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Neither spoken nor said. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting you in +a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: “Hail, Athenian +stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion”—these words, whether spoken, +said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our +friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking nonsense. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me +whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly +false:—which is all that I want to know. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no +purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of +hammering at a brazen pot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting-point, for +you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing named? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of +the thing? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in +another way? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand you. +Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures or +words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the things of which they +are the imitation. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: They are. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness of the +man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the +woman, and of the woman to the man? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Only the first. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each that +which belongs to them and is like them? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: That is my view. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a good +understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you: the first mode +of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call right, and when +applied to names only, true as well as right; and the other mode of giving and +assigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in the case of names, +false as well as wrong. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may be +wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names—they must be always right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to him, +“This is your picture,” showing him his own likeness, or perhaps +the likeness of a woman; and when I say “show,” I mean bring before +the sense of sight. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And may I not go to him again, and say, “This is your +name”?—for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not +say to him—“This is your name”? and may I not then bring to +his sense of hearing the imitation of himself, when I say, “This is a +man”; or of a female of the human species, when I say, “This is a +woman,” as the case may be? Is not all that quite possible? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say, Granted. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be +disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to objects, +the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong assignment of +them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of names, there may +also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and if of names and verbs +then of the sentences, which are made up of them. What do you say, Cratylus? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I agree; and think that what you say is very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in +pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or you +may not give them all—some may be wanting; or there may be too many or +too much of them—may there not? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he who +takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the nature +of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good image, or in +other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make +an image but not a good one; whence I infer that some names are well and others +ill made. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad; +it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is different; +for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters alpha or beta, or any +other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a +letter, the name which is written is not only written wrongly, but not written +at all; and in any of these cases becomes other than a name. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which must be +just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once +becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other +number: but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or to anything +which is represented under an image. I should say rather that the image, if +expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let +us suppose the existence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the +other the image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God makes +not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and +colour, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same +warmth and softness; and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as +you have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in +another form; would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, +or that there were two Cratyluses? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should say that there were two Cratyluses. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle of +truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is no longer +an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that images +are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the +realities which they represent? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, I see. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if +they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, +and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which were the +realities. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may be +correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the name shall +be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the occasional substitution of a +wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun +in a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and +acknowledge that the thing may be named, and described, so long as the general +character of the thing which you are describing is retained; and this, as you +will remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance +of the names of the letters. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, I remember. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some of +the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified;—well, if +all the letters are given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I think +that we had better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in Aegina +who wander about the street late at night: and be likewise told by truth +herself that we have arrived too late; or if not, you must find out some new +notion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the +expression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be +inconsistent with yourself. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very reasonable. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a name +rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names which are +incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper and +similar letters, or there would be no likeness; but there will be likewise a +part which is improper and spoils the beauty and formation of the word: you +would admit that? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, since I +cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a name at all. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are representations +of things, is there any better way of framing representations than by +assimilating them to the objects as much as you can; or do you prefer the +notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say that names are conventional, +and have a meaning to those who have agreed about them, and who have previous +knowledge of the things intended by them, and that convention is the only +principle; and whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and +opposite one, according to which you call small great and great +small—that, they would say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed. +Which of these two notions do you prefer? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than +representation by any chance sign. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters out +of which the first names are composed must also be like things. Returning to +the image of the picture, I would ask, How could any one ever compose a picture +which would be like anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which +resembled the things imitated, and out of which the picture is composed? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Impossible. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, unless +the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree of +resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And the +original elements are letters? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying +about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter rho is expressive of +rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in saying so? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should say that you were right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the +like? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: There again you were right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us sklerotes, is +by the Eretrians called skleroter. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there the same +significance to them in the termination rho, which there is to us in sigma, or +is there no significance to one of us? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: In as far as they are like. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that is +expressive not of hardness but of softness. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Why, perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and +should be altered into rho, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in my opinion +rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon occasion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when I say +skleros (hard), you know what I mean. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I +understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this is +what you are saying? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication given +by me to you? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as from +like, for example in the lamda of sklerotes. But if this is true, then you have +made a convention with yourself, and the correctness of a name turns out to be +convention, since letters which are unlike are indicative equally with those +which are like, if they are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even +supposing that you distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you +must say that the signification of words is given by custom and not by +likeness, for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as +we are agreed thus far, Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence gives +consent), then custom and convention must be supposed to contribute to the +indication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the instance of number, how can +you ever imagine, my good friend, that you will find names resembling every +individual number, unless you allow that which you term convention and +agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names? I quite +agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things; but I fear +that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing, +which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a view to +correctness; for I believe that if we could always, or almost always, use +likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate, this would be the most perfect +state of language; as the opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you, +what is the force of names, and what is the use of them? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform: the +simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which are +expressed by them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so also is +the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other, because they +are similars, and all similars fall under the same art or science; and +therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know things. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of this information about +things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort of +information? or is there any other? What do you say? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of information +about them; there can be no other. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who discovers +the names discovers also the things; or is this only the method of instruction, +and is there some other method of enquiry and discovery. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery are of +the same nature as instruction. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the +search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of being +deceived? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his +conception of the things which they signified—did he not? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to +his conception, in what position shall we who are his followers find ourselves? +Shall we not be deceived by him? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely have +known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all? And you +have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof +is—that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that +all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in +error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original error +and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, any more than in +geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw in the first +part of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the long deductions which +follow. And this is the reason why every man should expend his chief thought +and attention on the consideration of his first principles:—are they or +are they not rightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest +will follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really +consistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion: Were we not saying +that all things are in motion and progress and flux, and that this idea of +motion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of +them? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous this +word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than going round +with them; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at present, and not +reject the epsilon, but make an insertion of an iota instead of an epsilon (not +pioteme, but epiisteme). Take another example: bebaion (sure) is clearly the +expression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word istoria +(enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (istanai) of the stream; and +the word piston (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion; then, +again, mneme (memory), as any one may see, expresses rest in the soul, and not +motion. Moreover, words such as amartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense, +viewed in the light of their etymologies will be the same as sunesis and +episteme and other words which have a good sense (compare omartein, sunienai, +epesthai, sumpheresthai); and much the same may be said of amathia and +akolasia, for amathia may be explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and +akolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the names which in these +instances we find to have the worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the +same principle as those which have the best. And any one I believe who would +take the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of names +indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at +rest; which is the opposite of motion. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express motion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is +correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever sort +there are most, those are the true ones? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: No; that is not reasonable. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and proceed to +another, about which I should like to know whether you think with me. Were we +not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names in states, both +Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the art which gave names +was the art of the legislator? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of the +first names, know or not know the things which they named? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: They must have known, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should say not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were saying, +if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he +named; are you still of that opinion? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I am. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a +knowledge of the things which he named? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the +primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in our view, the +only way of learning and discovering things, is either to discover names for +ourselves or to learn them from others. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if things are only to be known through names, how can we suppose +that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before there were +names at all, and therefore before they could have known them? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that a +power more than human gave things their first names, and that the names which +are thus given are necessarily their true names. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired being or +God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now that he made some +names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we mistaken? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are +expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a point +which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: No; not in that way, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that they +are like the truth, others contending that THEY are, how or by what criterion +are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to which appeal can +be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without +employing names, will make clear which of the two are right; and this must be a +standard which shows the truth of things. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be +known without names? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there be of +knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their affinities, when +they are akin to each other, and through themselves? For that which is other +and different from them must signify something other and different from them. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: What you are saying is, I think, true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that names +rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they name? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn things +through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn them from the +things themselves—which is likely to be the nobler and clearer way; to +learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of which the image is the +expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn of the truth whether the +truth and the image of it have been duly executed? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should say that we must learn of the truth. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, +beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things is +not to be derived from names. No; they must be studied and investigated in +themselves. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Clearly, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon by +the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the same direction. +I myself do not deny that the givers of names did really give them under the +idea that all things were in motion and flux; which was their sincere but, I +think, mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves, +they are carried round, and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter, +master Cratylus, about which I often dream, and should like to ask your +opinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or good, or +any other absolute existence? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly, Socrates, I think so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face is fair, +or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in a flux; but let +us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing away, +and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born and retire and +vanish while the word is in our mouths? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Undoubtedly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? +for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they remain the +same; and if they are always the same and in the same state, and never depart +from their original form, they can never change or be moved. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly they cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the moment that the +observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you +cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot know +that which has no state. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, +if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding; for +knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide +and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the +change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going +on, there will always be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will +be no one to know and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that +which is known exists ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other +thing also exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a process or flux, +as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, +or whether the truth is what Heracleitus and his followers and many others say, +is a question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself +or the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far +trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge which +condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he +will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world is +a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is also +very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would not have you be too easily +persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and do not easily accept such a +doctrine; for you are young and of an age to learn. And when you have found the +truth, come and tell me. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that I have +been considering the matter already, and the result of a great deal of trouble +and consideration is that I incline to Heracleitus. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall give me a +lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are intending, and +Hermogenes shall set you on your way. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue to think +about these things yourself. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CRATYLUS ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cee10a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #1616 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1616) diff --git a/old/1616.txt b/old/1616.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d02d0af --- /dev/null +++ b/old/1616.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6041 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Cratylus, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Cratylus + +Author: Plato + +Translator: B. Jowett + +Posting Date: September 26, 2008 [EBook #1616] +Release Date: January, 1999 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CRATYLUS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +CRATYLUS + +By Plato + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +The Cratylus has always been a source of perplexity to the student +of Plato. While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and +metaphysical originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of +the Platonic writings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive of +the piece, which interpreters have hitherto not succeeded in dispelling. +We need not suppose that Plato used words in order to conceal his +thoughts, or that he would have been unintelligible to an educated +contemporary. In the Phaedrus and Euthydemus we also find a difficulty +in determining the precise aim of the author. Plato wrote satires in +the form of dialogues, and his meaning, like that of other satirical +writers, has often slept in the ear of posterity. Two causes may be +assigned for this obscurity: 1st, the subtlety and allusiveness of this +species of composition; 2nd, the difficulty of reproducing a state of +life and literature which has passed away. A satire is unmeaning unless +we can place ourselves back among the persons and thoughts of the age in +which it was written. Had the treatise of Antisthenes upon words, or +the speculations of Cratylus, or some other Heracleitean of the fourth +century B.C., on the nature of language been preserved to us; or if we +had lived at the time, and been 'rich enough to attend the fifty-drachma +course of Prodicus,' we should have understood Plato better, and many +points which are now attributed to the extravagance of Socrates' humour +would have been found, like the allusions of Aristophanes in the Clouds, +to have gone home to the sophists and grammarians of the day. + +For the age was very busy with philological speculation; and many +questions were beginning to be asked about language which were +parallel to other questions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were +illustrated in a similar manner by the analogy of the arts. Was there +a correctness in words, and were they given by nature or convention? +In the presocratic philosophy mankind had been striving to attain an +expression of their ideas, and now they were beginning to ask themselves +whether the expression might not be distinguished from the idea? They +were also seeking to distinguish the parts of speech and to enquire into +the relation of subject and predicate. Grammar and logic were moving +about somewhere in the depths of the human soul, but they were not yet +awakened into consciousness and had not found names for themselves, or +terms by which they might be expressed. Of these beginnings of the study +of language we know little, and there necessarily arises an obscurity +when the surroundings of such a work as the Cratylus are taken away. +Moreover, in this, as in most of the dialogues of Plato, allowance has +to be made for the character of Socrates. For the theory of language can +only be propounded by him in a manner which is consistent with his +own profession of ignorance. Hence his ridicule of the new school +of etymology is interspersed with many declarations 'that he knows +nothing,' 'that he has learned from Euthyphro,' and the like. Even the +truest things which he says are depreciated by himself. He professes +to be guessing, but the guesses of Plato are better than all the other +theories of the ancients respecting language put together. + +The dialogue hardly derives any light from Plato's other writings, and +still less from Scholiasts and Neoplatonist writers. Socrates must +be interpreted from himself, and on first reading we certainly have a +difficulty in understanding his drift, or his relation to the two other +interlocutors in the dialogue. Does he agree with Cratylus or with +Hermogenes, and is he serious in those fanciful etymologies, extending +over more than half the dialogue, which he seems so greatly to relish? +Or is he serious in part only; and can we separate his jest from his +earnest?--Sunt bona, sunt quaedum mediocria, sunt mala plura. Most +of them are ridiculously bad, and yet among them are found, as if by +accident, principles of philology which are unsurpassed in any ancient +writer, and even in advance of any philologer of the last century. +May we suppose that Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by +writing a comedy in the form of a prose dialogue? And what is the final +result of the enquiry? Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory +of language, which he acknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to +imply that a perfect language can only be based on his own theory of +ideas? Or if this latter explanation is refuted by his silence, then +in what relation does his account of language stand to the rest of his +philosophy? Or may we be so bold as to deny the connexion between them? +(For the allusion to the ideas at the end of the dialogue is merely +intended to show that we must not put words in the place of things or +realities, which is a thesis strongly insisted on by Plato in many other +passages)...These are some of the first thoughts which arise in the mind +of the reader of the Cratylus. And the consideration of them may form a +convenient introduction to the general subject of the dialogue. + +We must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally +to some clearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the +absolute proportion of the whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek +temple or statue; nor should his works be tried by any such standard. +They have often the beauty of poetry, but they have also the freedom +of conversation. 'Words are more plastic than wax' (Rep.), and may be +moulded into any form. He wanders on from one topic to another, careless +of the unity of his work, not fearing any 'judge, or spectator, who +may recall him to the point' (Theat.), 'whither the argument blows we +follow' (Rep.). To have determined beforehand, as in a modern didactic +treatise, the nature and limits of the subject, would have been fatal +to the spirit of enquiry or discovery, which is the soul of the +dialogue...These remarks are applicable to nearly all the works of +Plato, but to the Cratylus and Phaedrus more than any others. See +Phaedrus, Introduction. + +There is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may +be more truly viewed:--they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We +have found that in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, +we arrived at no conclusion--the different sides of the argument +were personified in the different speakers; but the victory was not +distinctly attributed to any of them, nor the truth wholly the property +of any. And in the Cratylus we have no reason to assume that Socrates is +either wholly right or wholly wrong, or that Plato, though he evidently +inclines to him, had any other aim than that of personifying, in the +characters of Hermogenes, Socrates, and Cratylus, the three theories of +language which are respectively maintained by them. + +The two subordinate persons of the dialogue, Hermogenes and Cratylus, +are at the opposite poles of the argument. But after a while the +disciple of the Sophist and the follower of Heracleitus are found to be +not so far removed from one another as at first sight appeared; and both +show an inclination to accept the third view which Socrates interposes +between them. First, Hermogenes, the poor brother of the rich Callias, +expounds the doctrine that names are conventional; like the names of +slaves, they may be given and altered at pleasure. This is one of those +principles which, whether applied to society or language, explains +everything and nothing. For in all things there is an element of +convention; but the admission of this does not help us to understand +the rational ground or basis in human nature on which the convention +proceeds. Socrates first of all intimates to Hermogenes that his view of +language is only a part of a sophistical whole, and ultimately tends to +abolish the distinction between truth and falsehood. Hermogenes is very +ready to throw aside the sophistical tenet, and listens with a sort of +half admiration, half belief, to the speculations of Socrates. + +Cratylus is of opinion that a name is either a true name or not a name +at all. He is unable to conceive of degrees of imitation; a word is +either the perfect expression of a thing, or a mere inarticulate sound +(a fallacy which is still prevalent among theorizers about the origin of +language). He is at once a philosopher and a sophist; for while wanting +to rest language on an immutable basis, he would deny the possibility +of falsehood. He is inclined to derive all truth from language, and in +language he sees reflected the philosophy of Heracleitus. His views are +not like those of Hermogenes, hastily taken up, but are said to be the +result of mature consideration, although he is described as still +a young man. With a tenacity characteristic of the Heracleitean +philosophers, he clings to the doctrine of the flux. (Compare Theaet.) +Of the real Cratylus we know nothing, except that he is recorded by +Aristotle to have been the friend or teacher of Plato; nor have we any +proof that he resembled the likeness of him in Plato any more than the +Critias of Plato is like the real Critias, or the Euthyphro in this +dialogue like the other Euthyphro, the diviner, in the dialogue which is +called after him. + +Between these two extremes, which have both of them a sophistical +character, the view of Socrates is introduced, which is in a manner the +union of the two. Language is conventional and also natural, and the +true conventional-natural is the rational. It is a work not of chance, +but of art; the dialectician is the artificer of words, and the +legislator gives authority to them. They are the expressions or +imitations in sound of things. In a sense, Cratylus is right in saying +that things have by nature names; for nature is not opposed either +to art or to law. But vocal imitation, like any other copy, may be +imperfectly executed; and in this way an element of chance or convention +enters in. There is much which is accidental or exceptional in language. +Some words have had their original meaning so obscured, that they +require to be helped out by convention. But still the true name is that +which has a natural meaning. Thus nature, art, chance, all combine in +the formation of language. And the three views respectively propounded +by Hermogenes, Socrates, Cratylus, may be described as the conventional, +the artificial or rational, and the natural. The view of Socrates is +the meeting-point of the other two, just as conceptualism is the +meeting-point of nominalism and realism. + +We can hardly say that Plato was aware of the truth, that 'languages are +not made, but grow.' But still, when he says that 'the legislator made +language with the dialectician standing on his right hand,' we need not +infer from this that he conceived words, like coins, to be issued +from the mint of the State. The creator of laws and of social life is +naturally regarded as the creator of language, according to Hellenic +notions, and the philosopher is his natural advisor. We are not to +suppose that the legislator is performing any extraordinary function; +he is merely the Eponymus of the State, who prescribes rules for the +dialectician and for all other artists. According to a truly Platonic +mode of approaching the subject, language, like virtue in the Republic, +is examined by the analogy of the arts. Words are works of art which may +be equally made in different materials, and are well made when they have +a meaning. Of the process which he thus describes, Plato had probably no +very definite notion. But he means to express generally that language is +the product of intelligence, and that languages belong to States and not +to individuals. + +A better conception of language could not have been formed in Plato's +age, than that which he attributes to Socrates. Yet many persons have +thought that the mind of Plato is more truly seen in the vague realism +of Cratylus. This misconception has probably arisen from two causes: +first, the desire to bring Plato's theory of language into accordance +with the received doctrine of the Platonic ideas; secondly, the +impression created by Socrates himself, that he is not in earnest, and +is only indulging the fancy of the hour. + +1. We shall have occasion to show more at length, in the Introduction +to future dialogues, that the so-called Platonic ideas are only a +semi-mythical form, in which he attempts to realize abstractions, and +that they are replaced in his later writings by a rational theory of +psychology. (See introductions to the Meno and the Sophist.) And in +the Cratylus he gives a general account of the nature and origin of +language, in which Adam Smith, Rousseau, and other writers of the last +century, would have substantially agreed. At the end of the dialogue, he +speaks as in the Symposium and Republic of absolute beauty and good; but +he never supposed that they were capable of being embodied in words. Of +the names of the ideas, he would have said, as he says of the names +of the Gods, that we know nothing. Even the realism of Cratylus is not +based upon the ideas of Plato, but upon the flux of Heracleitus. Here, +as in the Sophist and Politicus, Plato expressly draws attention to the +want of agreement in words and things. Hence we are led to infer, that +the view of Socrates is not the less Plato's own, because not based upon +the ideas; 2nd, that Plato's theory of language is not inconsistent with +the rest of his philosophy. + +2. We do not deny that Socrates is partly in jest and partly in earnest. +He is discoursing in a high-flown vein, which may be compared to the +'dithyrambics of the Phaedrus.' They are mysteries of which he is +speaking, and he professes a kind of ludicrous fear of his imaginary +wisdom. When he is arguing out of Homer, about the names of Hector's +son, or when he describes himself as inspired or maddened by Euthyphro, +with whom he has been sitting from the early dawn (compare Phaedrus and +Lysias; Phaedr.) and expresses his intention of yielding to the illusion +to-day, and to-morrow he will go to a priest and be purified, we easily +see that his words are not to be taken seriously. In this part of the +dialogue his dread of committing impiety, the pretended derivation of +his wisdom from another, the extravagance of some of his etymologies, +and, in general, the manner in which the fun, fast and furious, vires +acquirit eundo, remind us strongly of the Phaedrus. The jest is a long +one, extending over more than half the dialogue. But then, we remember +that the Euthydemus is a still longer jest, in which the irony is +preserved to the very end. There he is parodying the ingenious follies +of early logic; in the Cratylus he is ridiculing the fancies of a new +school of sophists and grammarians. The fallacies of the Euthydemus are +still retained at the end of our logic books; and the etymologies of the +Cratylus have also found their way into later writers. Some of these are +not much worse than the conjectures of Hemsterhuis, and other critics +of the last century; but this does not prove that they are serious. For +Plato is in advance of his age in his conception of language, as much as +he is in his conception of mythology. (Compare Phaedrus.) + +When the fervour of his etymological enthusiasm has abated, Socrates +ends, as he has begun, with a rational explanation of language. Still +he preserves his 'know nothing' disguise, and himself declares his first +notions about names to be reckless and ridiculous. Having explained +compound words by resolving them into their original elements, he now +proceeds to analyse simple words into the letters of which they are +composed. The Socrates who 'knows nothing,' here passes into the +teacher, the dialectician, the arranger of species. There is nothing in +this part of the dialogue which is either weak or extravagant. Plato is +a supporter of the Onomatopoetic theory of language; that is to say, he +supposes words to be formed by the imitation of ideas in sounds; he also +recognises the effect of time, the influence of foreign languages, the +desire of euphony, to be formative principles; and he admits a certain +element of chance. But he gives no imitation in all this that he is +preparing the way for the construction of an ideal language. Or that +he has any Eleatic speculation to oppose to the Heracleiteanism of +Cratylus. + +The theory of language which is propounded in the Cratylus is in +accordance with the later phase of the philosophy of Plato, and would +have been regarded by him as in the main true. The dialogue is also a +satire on the philological fancies of the day. Socrates in pursuit of +his vocation as a detector of false knowledge, lights by accident on the +truth. He is guessing, he is dreaming; he has heard, as he says in the +Phaedrus, from another: no one is more surprised than himself at his own +discoveries. And yet some of his best remarks, as for example his +view of the derivation of Greek words from other languages, or of the +permutations of letters, or again, his observation that in speaking of +the Gods we are only speaking of our names of them, occur among these +flights of humour. + +We can imagine a character having a profound insight into the nature of +men and things, and yet hardly dwelling upon them seriously; blending +inextricably sense and nonsense; sometimes enveloping in a blaze of +jests the most serious matters, and then again allowing the truth to +peer through; enjoying the flow of his own humour, and puzzling mankind +by an ironical exaggeration of their absurdities. Such were Aristophanes +and Rabelais; such, in a different style, were Sterne, Jean Paul, +Hamann,--writers who sometimes become unintelligible through the +extravagance of their fancies. Such is the character which Plato intends +to depict in some of his dialogues as the Silenus Socrates; and through +this medium we have to receive our theory of language. + +There remains a difficulty which seems to demand a more exact answer: In +what relation does the satirical or etymological portion of the dialogue +stand to the serious? Granting all that can be said about the provoking +irony of Socrates, about the parody of Euthyphro, or Prodicus, or +Antisthenes, how does the long catalogue of etymologies furnish any +answer to the question of Hermogenes, which is evidently the main thesis +of the dialogue: What is the truth, or correctness, or principle of +names? + +After illustrating the nature of correctness by the analogy of the arts, +and then, as in the Republic, ironically appealing to the authority of +the Homeric poems, Socrates shows that the truth or correctness of names +can only be ascertained by an appeal to etymology. The truth of names +is to be found in the analysis of their elements. But why does he admit +etymologies which are absurd, based on Heracleitean fancies, fourfold +interpretations of words, impossible unions and separations of syllables +and letters? + +1. The answer to this difficulty has been already anticipated in part: +Socrates is not a dogmatic teacher, and therefore he puts on this wild +and fanciful disguise, in order that the truth may be permitted to +appear: 2. as Benfey remarks, an erroneous example may illustrate +a principle of language as well as a true one: 3. many of these +etymologies, as, for example, that of dikaion, are indicated, by the +manner in which Socrates speaks of them, to have been current in his own +age: 4. the philosophy of language had not made such progress as would +have justified Plato in propounding real derivations. Like his master +Socrates, he saw through the hollowness of the incipient sciences of +the day, and tries to move in a circle apart from them, laying down the +conditions under which they are to be pursued, but, as in the Timaeus, +cautious and tentative, when he is speaking of actual phenomena. To +have made etymologies seriously, would have seemed to him like the +interpretation of the myths in the Phaedrus, the task 'of a not very +fortunate individual, who had a great deal of time on his hands.' +The irony of Socrates places him above and beyond the errors of his +contemporaries. + +The Cratylus is full of humour and satirical touches: the inspiration +which comes from Euthyphro, and his prancing steeds, the light admixture +of quotations from Homer, and the spurious dialectic which is applied +to them; the jest about the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus, which is +declared on the best authority, viz. his own, to be a complete education +in grammar and rhetoric; the double explanation of the name Hermogenes, +either as 'not being in luck,' or 'being no speaker;' the dearly-bought +wisdom of Callias, the Lacedaemonian whose name was 'Rush,' and, +above all, the pleasure which Socrates expresses in his own dangerous +discoveries, which 'to-morrow he will purge away,' are truly humorous. +While delivering a lecture on the philosophy of language, Socrates is +also satirizing the endless fertility of the human mind in spinning +arguments out of nothing, and employing the most trifling and fanciful +analogies in support of a theory. Etymology in ancient as in modern +times was a favourite recreation; and Socrates makes merry at the +expense of the etymologists. The simplicity of Hermogenes, who is ready +to believe anything that he is told, heightens the effect. Socrates in +his genial and ironical mood hits right and left at his adversaries: +Ouranos is so called apo tou oran ta ano, which, as some philosophers +say, is the way to have a pure mind; the sophists are by a fanciful +explanation converted into heroes; 'the givers of names were like some +philosophers who fancy that the earth goes round because their heads are +always going round.' There is a great deal of 'mischief' lurking in the +following: 'I found myself in greater perplexity about justice than I +was before I began to learn;' 'The rho in katoptron must be the addition +of some one who cares nothing about truth, but thinks only of putting +the mouth into shape;' 'Tales and falsehoods have generally to do with +the Tragic and goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them.' Several +philosophers and sophists are mentioned by name: first, Protagoras and +Euthydemus are assailed; then the interpreters of Homer, oi palaioi +Omerikoi (compare Arist. Met.) and the Orphic poets are alluded to +by the way; then he discovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of +Heracleitus;--the doctrine of the flux is contained in the word ousia (= +osia the pushing principle), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in +psuche and selene. Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling +out and putting in letters which were in vogue among the philologers of +his time; or slightly scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, +he is impatient of hearing from the half-converted Cratylus the doctrine +that falsehood can neither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed; +a piece of sophistry attributed to Gorgias, which reappears in the +Sophist. And he proceeds to demolish, with no less delight than he had +set up, the Heracleitean theory of language. + +In the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious, +though he does not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the +Heracleiteans, whom here, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to ridicule. +What was the origin of this enmity we can hardly determine:--was it +due to the natural dislike which may be supposed to exist between the +'patrons of the flux' and the 'friends of the ideas' (Soph.)? or is it +to be attributed to the indignation which Plato felt at having wasted +his time upon 'Cratylus and the doctrines of Heracleitus' in the days of +his youth? Socrates, touching on some of the characteristic difficulties +of early Greek philosophy, endeavours to show Cratylus that imitation +may be partial or imperfect, that a knowledge of things is higher than a +knowledge of names, and that there can be no knowledge if all things are +in a state of transition. But Cratylus, who does not easily apprehend +the argument from common sense, remains unconvinced, and on the whole +inclines to his former opinion. Some profound philosophical remarks are +scattered up and down, admitting of an application not only to language +but to knowledge generally; such as the assertion that 'consistency is +no test of truth:' or again, 'If we are over-precise about words, truth +will say "too late" to us as to the belated traveller in Aegina.' + +The place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with +certainty. The style and subject, and the treatment of the character of +Socrates, have a close resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially +to the Phaedrus and Euthydemus. The manner in which the ideas are spoken +of at the end of the dialogue, also indicates a comparatively early +date. The imaginative element is still in full vigour; the Socrates +of the Cratylus is the Socrates of the Apology and Symposium, not yet +Platonized; and he describes, as in the Theaetetus, the philosophy of +Heracleitus by 'unsavoury' similes--he cannot believe that the world +is like 'a leaky vessel,' or 'a man who has a running at the nose'; he +attributes the flux of the world to the swimming in some folks' heads. +On the other hand, the relation of thought to language is omitted here, +but is treated of in the Sophist. These grounds are not sufficient to +enable us to arrive at a precise conclusion. But we shall not be far +wrong in placing the Cratylus about the middle, or at any rate in the +first half, of the series. + +Cratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the brother of +Callias, have been arguing about names; the former maintaining that they +are natural, the latter that they are conventional. Cratylus affirms +that his own is a true name, but will not allow that the name of +Hermogenes is equally true. Hermogenes asks Socrates to explain to +him what Cratylus means; or, far rather, he would like to know, What +Socrates himself thinks about the truth or correctness of names? +Socrates replies, that hard is knowledge, and the nature of names is +a considerable part of knowledge: he has never been to hear the +fifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having only attended the +single-drachma course, he is not competent to give an opinion on +such matters. When Cratylus denies that Hermogenes is a true name, he +supposes him to mean that he is not a true son of Hermes, because he +is never in luck. But he would like to have an open council and to hear +both sides. + +Hermogenes is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may +be changed, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please, and +the altered name is as good as the original one. + +You mean to say, for instance, rejoins Socrates, that if I agree to call +a man a horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me, and a +man by the rest of the world? But, surely, there is in words a true +and a false, as there are true and false propositions. If a whole +proposition be true or false, then the parts of a proposition may be +true or false, and the least parts as well as the greatest; and the +least parts are names, and therefore names may be true or false. Would +Hermogenes maintain that anybody may give a name to anything, and as +many names as he pleases; and would all these names be always true at +the time of giving them? Hermogenes replies that this is the only way +in which he can conceive that names are correct; and he appeals to the +practice of different nations, and of the different Hellenic tribes, in +confirmation of his view. Socrates asks, whether the things differ +as the words which represent them differ:--Are we to maintain with +Protagoras, that what appears is? Hermogenes has always been puzzled +about this, but acknowledges, when he is pressed by Socrates, that there +are a few very good men in the world, and a great many very bad; and the +very good are the wise, and the very bad are the foolish; and this +is not mere appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say with +Euthydemus, that all things equally and always belong to all men; in +that case, again, there would be no distinction between bad and good +men. But then, the only remaining possibility is, that all things have +their several distinct natures, and are independent of our notions about +them. And not only things, but actions, have distinct natures, and +are done by different processes. There is a natural way of cutting or +burning, and a natural instrument with which men cut or burn, and any +other way will fail;--this is true of all actions. And speaking is +a kind of action, and naming is a kind of speaking, and we must name +according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument. We cut +with a knife, we pierce with an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name +with a name. And as a shuttle separates the warp from the woof, so +a name distinguishes the natures of things. The weaver will use the +shuttle well,--that is, like a weaver; and the teacher will use the +name well,--that is, like a teacher. The shuttle will be made by the +carpenter; the awl by the smith or skilled person. But who makes a name? +Does not the law give names, and does not the teacher receive them from +the legislator? He is the skilled person who makes them, and of all +skilled workmen he is the rarest. But how does the carpenter make or +repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? Will he not look at the +ideal which he has in his mind? And as the different kinds of work +differ, so ought the instruments which make them to differ. The several +kinds of shuttles ought to answer in material and form to the several +kinds of webs. And the legislator ought to know the different materials +and forms of which names are made in Hellas and other countries. But +who is to be the judge of the proper form? The judge of shuttles is the +weaver who uses them; the judge of lyres is the player of the lyre; +the judge of ships is the pilot. And will not the judge who is able to +direct the legislator in his work of naming, be he who knows how to +use the names--he who can ask and answer questions--in short, the +dialectician? The pilot directs the carpenter how to make the rudder, +and the dialectician directs the legislator how he is to impose names; +for to express the ideal forms of things in syllables and letters is not +the easy task, Hermogenes, which you imagine. + +'I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me this natural +correctness of names.' + +Indeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit +that there is a correctness of names, and that not every one can give +a name. But what is the nature of this correctness or truth, you must +learn from the Sophists, of whom your brother Callias has bought his +reputation for wisdom rather dearly; and since they require to be paid, +you, having no money, had better learn from him at second-hand. 'Well, +but I have just given up Protagoras, and I should be inconsistent in +going to learn of him.' Then if you reject him you may learn of the +poets, and in particular of Homer, who distinguishes the names given by +Gods and men to the same things, as in the verse about the river God +who fought with Hephaestus, 'whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call +Scamander;' or in the lines in which he mentions the bird which the +Gods call 'Chalcis,' and men 'Cymindis;' or the hill which men call +'Batieia,' and the Gods 'Myrinna's Tomb.' Here is an important lesson; +for the Gods must of course be right in their use of names. And this is +not the only truth about philology which may be learnt from Homer. Does +he not say that Hector's son had two names-- + +'Hector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax'? + +Now, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the +other name was conferred by the women? And which are more likely to be +right--the wiser or the less wise, the men or the women? Homer evidently +agreed with the men: and of the name given by them he offers an +explanation;--the boy was called Astyanax ('king of the city'), because +his father saved the city. The names Astyanax and Hector, moreover, are +really the same,--the one means a king, and the other is 'a holder or +possessor.' For as the lion's whelp may be called a lion, or the horse's +foal a foal, so the son of a king may be called a king. But if the +horse had produced a calf, then that would be called a calf. Whether the +syllables of a name are the same or not makes no difference, provided +the meaning is retained. For example; the names of letters, whether +vowels or consonants, do not correspond to their sounds, with the +exception of epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega. The name Beta has three +letters added to the sound--and yet this does not alter the sense of the +word, or prevent the whole name having the value which the legislator +intended. And the same may be said of a king and the son of a king, +who like other animals resemble each other in the course of nature; +the words by which they are signified may be disguised, and yet amid +differences of sound the etymologist may recognise the same notion, just +as the physician recognises the power of the same drugs under different +disguises of colour and smell. Hector and Astyanax have only one letter +alike, but they have the same meaning; and Agis (leader) is altogether +different in sound from Polemarchus (chief in war), or Eupolemus (good +warrior); but the two words present the same idea of leader or general, +like the words Iatrocles and Acesimbrotus, which equally denote a +physician. The son succeeds the father as the foal succeeds the horse, +but when, out of the course of nature, a prodigy occurs, and the +offspring no longer resembles the parent, then the names no longer +agree. This may be illustrated by the case of Agamemnon and his son +Orestes, of whom the former has a name significant of his patience at +the siege of Troy; while the name of the latter indicates his savage, +man-of-the-mountain nature. Atreus again, for his murder of Chrysippus, +and his cruelty to Thyestes, is rightly named Atreus, which, to the +eye of the etymologist, is ateros (destructive), ateires (stubborn), +atreotos (fearless); and Pelops is o ta pelas oron (he who sees what +is near only), because in his eagerness to win Hippodamia, he was +unconscious of the remoter consequences which the murder of Myrtilus +would entail upon his race. The name Tantalus, if slightly changed, +offers two etymologies; either apo tes tou lithou talanteias, or apo tou +talantaton einai, signifying at once the hanging of the stone over +his head in the world below, and the misery which he brought upon his +country. And the name of his father, Zeus, Dios, Zenos, has an excellent +meaning, though hard to be understood, because really a sentence which +is divided into two parts (Zeus, Dios). For he, being the lord and king +of all, is the author of our being, and in him all live: this is +implied in the double form, Dios, Zenos, which being put together and +interpreted is di on ze panta. There may, at first sight, appear to be +some irreverence in calling him the son of Cronos, who is a proverb for +stupidity; but the meaning is that Zeus himself is the son of a mighty +intellect; Kronos, quasi koros, not in the sense of a youth, but quasi +to katharon kai akeraton tou nou--the pure and garnished mind, which in +turn is begotten of Uranus, who is so called apo tou oran ta ano, from +looking upwards; which, as philosophers say, is the way to have a pure +mind. The earlier portion of Hesiod's genealogy has escaped my memory, +or I would try more conclusions of the same sort. 'You talk like an +oracle.' I caught the infection from Euthyphro, who gave me a long +lecture which began at dawn, and has not only entered into my ears, but +filled my soul, and my intention is to yield to the inspiration to-day; +and to-morrow I will be exorcised by some priest or sophist. 'Go on; +I am anxious to hear the rest.' Now that we have a general notion, +how shall we proceed? What names will afford the most crucial test of +natural fitness? Those of heroes and ordinary men are often deceptive, +because they are patronymics or expressions of a wish; let us try gods +and demi-gods. Gods are so called, apo tou thein, from the verb 'to +run;' because the sun, moon, and stars run about the heaven; and they +being the original gods of the Hellenes, as they still are of the +Barbarians, their name is given to all Gods. The demons are the golden +race of Hesiod, and by golden he means not literally golden, but good; +and they are called demons, quasi daemones, which in old Attic was used +for daimones--good men are well said to become daimones when they die, +because they are knowing. Eros (with an epsilon) is the same word as +eros (with an eta): 'the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they +were fair;' or perhaps they were a species of sophists or rhetoricians, +and so called apo tou erotan, or eirein, from their habit of spinning +questions; for eirein is equivalent to legein. I get all this from +Euthyphro; and now a new and ingenious idea comes into my mind, and, +if I am not careful, I shall be wiser than I ought to be by to-morrow's +dawn. My idea is, that we may put in and pull out letters at pleasure +and alter the accents (as, for example, Dii philos may be turned into +Diphilos), and we may make words into sentences and sentences into +words. The name anthrotos is a case in point, for a letter has been +omitted and the accent changed; the original meaning being o anathron a +opopen--he who looks up at what he sees. Psuche may be thought to be the +reviving, or refreshing, or animating principle--e anapsuchousa to +soma; but I am afraid that Euthyphro and his disciples will scorn this +derivation, and I must find another: shall we identify the soul with the +'ordering mind' of Anaxagoras, and say that psuche, quasi phuseche = e +phusin echei or ochei?--this might easily be refined into psyche. 'That +is a more artistic etymology.' + +After psuche follows soma; this, by a slight permutation, may be either += (1) the 'grave' of the soul, or (2) may mean 'that by which the soul +signifies (semainei) her wishes.' But more probably, the word is Orphic, +and simply denotes that the body is the place of ward in which the soul +suffers the penalty of sin,--en o sozetai. 'I should like to hear some +more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that excellent one +of Zeus.' The truest names of the Gods are those which they give +themselves; but these are unknown to us. Less true are those by which we +propitiate them, as men say in prayers, 'May he graciously receive any +name by which I call him.' And to avoid offence, I should like to let +them know beforehand that we are not presuming to enquire about them, +but only about the names which they usually bear. Let us begin with +Hestia. What did he mean who gave the name Hestia? 'That is a very +difficult question.' O, my dear Hermogenes, I believe that there was a +power of philosophy and talk among the first inventors of names, both in +our own and in other languages; for even in foreign words a principle +is discernible. Hestia is the same with esia, which is an old form of +ousia, and means the first principle of things: this agrees with the +fact that to Hestia the first sacrifices are offered. There is also +another reading--osia, which implies that 'pushing' (othoun) is the +first principle of all things. And here I seem to discover a delicate +allusion to the flux of Heracleitus--that antediluvian philosopher +who cannot walk twice in the same stream; and this flux of his may +accomplish yet greater marvels. For the names Cronos and Rhea cannot +have been accidental; the giver of them must have known something about +the doctrine of Heracleitus. Moreover, there is a remarkable coincidence +in the words of Hesiod, when he speaks of Oceanus, 'the origin of Gods;' +and in the verse of Orpheus, in which he describes Oceanus espousing +his sister Tethys. Tethys is nothing more than the name of a spring--to +diattomenon kai ethoumenon. Poseidon is posidesmos, the chain of the +feet, because you cannot walk on the sea--the epsilon is inserted by +way of ornament; or perhaps the name may have been originally polleidon, +meaning, that the God knew many things (polla eidos): he may also be +the shaker, apo tou seiein,--in this case, pi and delta have been added. +Pluto is connected with ploutos, because wealth comes out of the earth; +or the word may be a euphemism for Hades, which is usually derived apo +tou aeidous, because the God is concerned with the invisible. But the +name Hades was really given him from his knowing (eidenai) all good +things. Men in general are foolishly afraid of him, and talk with horror +of the world below from which no one may return. The reason why his +subjects never wish to come back, even if they could, is that the +God enchains them by the strongest of spells, namely by the desire of +virtue, which they hope to obtain by constant association with him. He +is the perfect and accomplished Sophist and the great benefactor of the +other world; for he has much more than he wants there, and hence he is +called Pluto or the rich. He will have nothing to do with the souls of +men while in the body, because he cannot work his will with them so +long as they are confused and entangled by fleshly lusts. Demeter is the +mother and giver of food--e didousa meter tes edodes. Here is erate tis, +or perhaps the legislator may have been thinking of the weather, and has +merely transposed the letters of the word aer. Pherephatta, that word +of awe, is pheretapha, which is only an euphonious contraction of e tou +pheromenou ephaptomene,--all things are in motion, and she in her wisdom +moves with them, and the wise God Hades consorts with her--there +is nothing very terrible in this, any more than in the her other +appellation Persephone, which is also significant of her wisdom (sophe). +Apollo is another name, which is supposed to have some dreadful meaning, +but is susceptible of at least four perfectly innocent explanations. +First, he is the purifier or purger or absolver (apolouon); secondly, +he is the true diviner, Aplos, as he is called in the Thessalian dialect +(aplos = aplous, sincere); thirdly, he is the archer (aei ballon), +always shooting; or again, supposing alpha to mean ama or omou, Apollo +becomes equivalent to ama polon, which points to both his musical and +his heavenly attributes; for there is a 'moving together' alike in music +and in the harmony of the spheres. The second lambda is inserted in +order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction. The Muses are so +called--apo tou mosthai. The gentle Leto or Letho is named from her +willingness (ethelemon), or because she is ready to forgive and forget +(lethe). Artemis is so called from her healthy well-balanced nature, +dia to artemes, or as aretes istor; or as a lover of virginity, aroton +misesasa. One of these explanations is probably true,--perhaps all of +them. Dionysus is o didous ton oinon, and oinos is quasi oionous because +wine makes those think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (nous) who have +none. The established derivation of Aphrodite dia ten tou athrou genesin +may be accepted on the authority of Hesiod. Again, there is the name of +Pallas, or Athene, which we, who are Athenians, must not forget. Pallas +is derived from armed dances--apo tou pallein ta opla. For Athene we +must turn to the allegorical interpreters of Homer, who make the name +equivalent to theonoe, or possibly the word was originally ethonoe and +signified moral intelligence (en ethei noesis). Hephaestus, again, is +the lord of light--o tou phaeos istor. This is a good notion; and, to +prevent any other getting into our heads, let us go on to Ares. He is +the manly one (arren), or the unchangeable one (arratos). Enough of the +Gods; for, by the Gods, I am afraid of them; but if you suggest other +words, you will see how the horses of Euthyphro prance. 'Only one more +God; tell me about my godfather Hermes.' He is ermeneus, the messenger +or cheater or thief or bargainer; or o eirein momenos, that is, eiremes +or ermes--the speaker or contriver of speeches. 'Well said Cratylus, +then, that I am no son of Hermes.' Pan, as the son of Hermes, is speech +or the brother of speech, and is called Pan because speech indicates +everything--o pan menuon. He has two forms, a true and a false; and is +in the upper part smooth, and in the lower part shaggy. He is the goat +of Tragedy, in which there are plenty of falsehoods. + +'Will you go on to the elements--sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, +fire, water, seasons, years?' Very good: and which shall I take first? +Let us begin with elios, or the sun. The Doric form elios helps us to +see that he is so called because at his rising he gathers (alizei) men +together, or because he rolls about (eilei) the earth, or because he +variegates (aiolei = poikillei) the earth. Selene is an anticipation +of Anaxagoras, being a contraction of selaenoneoaeia, the light (selas) +which is ever old and new, and which, as Anaxagoras says, is borrowed +from the sun; the name was harmonized into selanaia, a form which is +still in use. 'That is a true dithyrambic name.' Meis is so called apo +tou meiousthai, from suffering diminution, and astron is from astrape +(lightning), which is an improvement of anastrope, that which turns the +eyes inside out. 'How do you explain pur n udor?' I suspect that pur, +which, like udor n kuon, is found in Phrygian, is a foreign word; for +the Hellenes have borrowed much from the barbarians, and I always resort +to this theory of a foreign origin when I am at a loss. Aer may be +explained, oti airei ta apo tes ges; or, oti aei rei; or, oti pneuma ex +autou ginetai (compare the poetic word aetai). So aither quasi aeitheer +oti aei thei peri ton aera: ge, gaia quasi genneteira (compare the +Homeric form gegaasi); ora (with an omega), or, according to the old +Attic form ora (with an omicron), is derived apo tou orizein, because +it divides the year; eniautos and etos are the same thought--o en eauto +etazon, cut into two parts, en eauto and etazon, like di on ze into Dios +and Zenos. + +'You make surprising progress.' True; I am run away with, and am not +even yet at my utmost speed. 'I should like very much to hear your +account of the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in +those charming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?' To +explain all that will be a serious business; still, as I have put on +the lion's skin, appearances must be maintained. My opinion is, that +primitive men were like some modern philosophers, who, by always going +round in their search after the nature of things, become dizzy; and this +phenomenon, which was really in themselves, they imagined to take place +in the external world. You have no doubt remarked, that the doctrine of +the universal flux, or generation of things, is indicated in names. 'No, +I never did.' Phronesis is only phoras kai rou noesis, or perhaps phoras +onesis, and in any case is connected with pheresthai; gnome is gones +skepsis kai nomesis; noesis is neou or gignomenon esis; the word neos +implies that creation is always going on--the original form was +neoesis; sophrosune is soteria phroneseos; episteme is e epomene tois +pragmasin--the faculty which keeps close, neither anticipating nor +lagging behind; sunesis is equivalent to sunienai, sumporeuesthai ten +psuche, and is a kind of conclusion--sullogismos tis, akin therefore in +idea to episteme; sophia is very difficult, and has a foreign look--the +meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things, and may be +illustrated by the poetical esuthe and the Lacedaemonian proper name +Sous, or Rush; agathon is ro agaston en te tachuteti,--for all things +are in motion, and some are swifter than others: dikaiosune is clearly +e tou dikaiou sunesis. The word dikaion is more troublesome, and appears +to mean the subtle penetrating power which, as the lovers of motion say, +preserves all things, and is the cause of all things, quasi diaion going +through--the letter kappa being inserted for the sake of euphony. This +is a great mystery which has been confided to me; but when I ask for an +explanation I am thought obtrusive, and another derivation is proposed +to me. Justice is said to be o kaion, or the sun; and when I joyfully +repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered, 'What, is there no justice +when the sun is down?' And when I entreat my questioner to tell me his +own opinion, he replies, that justice is fire in the abstract, or heat +in the abstract; which is not very intelligible. Others laugh at such +notions, and say with Anaxagoras, that justice is the ordering mind. 'I +think that some one must have told you this.' And not the rest? Let me +proceed then, in the hope of proving to you my originality. Andreia is +quasi anpeia quasi e ano roe, the stream which flows upwards, and +is opposed to injustice, which clearly hinders the principle of +penetration; arren and aner have a similar derivation; gune is the same +as gone; thelu is derived apo tes theles, because the teat makes things +flourish (tethelenai), and the word thallein itself implies increase +of youth, which is swift and sudden ever (thein and allesthai). I am +getting over the ground fast: but much has still to be explained. There +is techne, for instance. This, by an aphaeresis of tau and an epenthesis +of omicron in two places, may be identified with echonoe, and signifies +'that which has mind.' + +'A very poor etymology.' Yes; but you must remember that all language is +in process of change; letters are taken in and put out for the sake of +euphony, and time is also a great alterer of words. For example, what +business has the letter rho in the word katoptron, or the letter sigma +in the word sphigx? The additions are often such that it is impossible +to make out the original word; and yet, if you may put in and pull out, +as you like, any name is equally good for any object. The fact is, that +great dictators of literature like yourself should observe the rules of +moderation. 'I will do my best.' But do not be too much of a precisian, +or you will paralyze me. If you will let me add mechane, apo tou mekous, +which means polu, and anein, I shall be at the summit of my powers, from +which elevation I will examine the two words kakia and arete. The first +is easily explained in accordance with what has preceded; for all things +being in a flux, kakia is to kakos ion. This derivation is illustrated +by the word deilia, which ought to have come after andreia, and may +be regarded as o lian desmos tes psuches, just as aporia signifies an +impediment to motion (from alpha not, and poreuesthai to go), and arete +is euporia, which is the opposite of this--the everflowing (aei reousa +or aeireite), or the eligible, quasi airete. You will think that I am +inventing, but I say that if kakia is right, then arete is also right. +But what is kakon? That is a very obscure word, to which I can only +apply my old notion and declare that kakon is a foreign word. Next, let +us proceed to kalon, aischron. The latter is doubtless contracted from +aeischoroun, quasi aei ischon roun. The inventor of words being a patron +of the flux, was a great enemy to stagnation. Kalon is to kaloun ta +pragmata--this is mind (nous or dianoia); which is also the principle of +beauty; and which doing the works of beauty, is therefore rightly +called the beautiful. The meaning of sumpheron is explained by previous +examples;--like episteme, signifying that the soul moves in harmony with +the world (sumphora, sumpheronta). Kerdos is to pasi kerannumenon--that +which mingles with all things: lusiteloun is equivalent to to tes phoras +luon to telos, and is not to be taken in the vulgar sense of gainful, +but rather in that of swift, being the principle which makes motion +immortal and unceasing; ophelimon is apo tou ophellein--that which gives +increase: this word, which is Homeric, is of foreign origin. Blaberon is +to blamton or boulomenon aptein tou rou--that which injures or seeks to +bind the stream. The proper word would be boulapteroun, but this is too +much of a mouthful--like a prelude on the flute in honour of Athene. The +word zemiodes is difficult; great changes, as I was saying, have been +made in words, and even a small change will alter their meaning very +much. The word deon is one of these disguised words. You know that +according to the old pronunciation, which is especially affected by the +women, who are great conservatives, iota and delta were used where we +should now use eta and zeta: for example, what we now call emera was +formerly called imera; and this shows the meaning of the word to +have been 'the desired one coming after night,' and not, as is often +supposed, 'that which makes things gentle' (emera). So again, zugon is +duogon, quasi desis duein eis agogen--(the binding of two together for +the purpose of drawing.) Deon, as ordinarily written, has an evil sense, +signifying the chain (desmos) or hindrance of motion; but in its ancient +form dion is expressive of good, quasi diion, that which penetrates +or goes through all. Zemiodes is really demiodes, and means that which +binds motion (dounti to ion): edone is e pros ten onrsin teinousa +praxis--the delta is an insertion: lupe is derived apo tes dialuseos tou +somatos: ania is from alpha and ienai, to go: algedon is a foreign word, +and is so called apo tou algeinou: odune is apo tes enduseos tes lupes: +achthedon is in its very sound a burden: chapa expresses the flow +of soul: terpsis is apo tou terpnou, and terpnon is properly erpnon, +because the sensation of pleasure is likened to a breath (pnoe) which +creeps (erpei) through the soul: euphrosune is named from pheresthai, +because the soul moves in harmony with nature: epithumia is e epi ton +thumon iousa dunamis: thumos is apo tes thuseos tes psuches: imeros--oti +eimenos pei e psuche: pothos, the desire which is in another place, +allothi pou: eros was anciently esros, and so called because it flows +into (esrei) the soul from without: doxa is e dioxis tou eidenai, or +expresses the shooting from a bow (toxon). The latter etymology is +confirmed by the words boulesthai, boule, aboulia, which all have to do +with shooting (bole): and similarly oiesis is nothing but the movement +(oisis) of the soul towards essence. Ekousion is to eikon--the +yielding--anagke is e an agke iousa, the passage through ravines which +impede motion: aletheia is theia ale, divine motion. Pseudos is the +opposite of this, implying the principle of constraint and forced +repose, which is expressed under the figure of sleep, to eudon; the psi +is an addition. Onoma, a name, affirms the real existence of that which +is sought after--on ou masma estin. On and ousia are only ion with an +iota broken off; and ouk on is ouk ion. 'And what are ion, reon, doun?' +One way of explaining them has been already suggested--they may be of +foreign origin; and possibly this is the true answer. But mere antiquity +may often prevent our recognizing words, after all the complications +which they have undergone; and we must remember that however far we +carry back our analysis some ultimate elements or roots will remain +which can be no further analyzed. For example; the word agathos was +supposed by us to be a compound of agastos and thoos, and probably thoos +may be further resolvable. But if we take a word of which no further +resolution seems attainable, we may fairly conclude that we have reached +one of these original elements, and the truth of such a word must be +tested by some new method. Will you help me in the search? + +All names, whether primary or secondary, are intended to show the nature +of things; and the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance +from the primary. But then, how do the primary names indicate anything? +And let me ask another question,--If we had no faculty of speech, how +should we communicate with one another? Should we not use signs, +like the deaf and dumb? The elevation of our hands would mean +lightness--heaviness would be expressed by letting them drop. The +running of any animal would be described by a similar movement of our +own frames. The body can only express anything by imitation; and the +tongue or mouth can imitate as well as the rest of the body. But this +imitation of the tongue or voice is not yet a name, because people may +imitate sheep or goats without naming them. What, then, is a name? In +the first place, a name is not a musical, or, secondly, a pictorial +imitation, but an imitation of that kind which expresses the nature of a +thing; and is the invention not of a musician, or of a painter, but of a +namer. + +And now, I think that we may consider the names about which you were +asking. The way to analyze them will be by going back to the letters, +or primary elements of which they are composed. First, we separate the +alphabet into classes of letters, distinguishing the consonants, mutes, +vowels, and semivowels; and when we have learnt them singly, we shall +learn to know them in their various combinations of two or more letters; +just as the painter knows how to use either a single colour, or a +combination of colours. And like the painter, we may apply letters to +the expression of objects, and form them into syllables; and these +again into words, until the picture or figure--that is, language--is +completed. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I mean +to say that this was the way in which the ancients framed language. And +this leads me to consider whether the primary as well as the secondary +elements are rightly given. I may remark, as I was saying about the +Gods, that we can only attain to conjecture of them. But still we insist +that ours is the true and only method of discovery; otherwise we must +have recourse, like the tragic poets, to a Deus ex machina, and say +that God gave the first names, and therefore they are right; or that the +barbarians are older than we are, and that we learnt of them; or that +antiquity has cast a veil over the truth. Yet all these are not reasons; +they are only ingenious excuses for having no reasons. + +I will freely impart to you my own notions, though they are somewhat +crude:--the letter rho appears to me to be the general instrument which +the legislator has employed to express all motion or kinesis. (I ought +to explain that kinesis is just iesis (going), for the letter eta was +unknown to the ancients; and the root, kiein, is a foreign form of +ienai: of kinesis or eisis, the opposite is stasis). This use of rho is +evident in the words tremble, break, crush, crumble, and the like; +the imposer of names perceived that the tongue is most agitated in the +pronunciation of this letter, just as he used iota to express the subtle +power which penetrates through all things. The letters phi, psi, sigma, +zeta, which require a great deal of wind, are employed in the imitation +of such notions as shivering, seething, shaking, and in general of what +is windy. The letters delta and tau convey the idea of binding and rest +in a place: the lambda denotes smoothness, as in the words slip, sleek, +sleep, and the like. But when the slipping tongue is detained by the +heavier sound of gamma, then arises the notion of a glutinous clammy +nature: nu is sounded from within, and has a notion of inwardness: alpha +is the expression of size; eta of length; omicron of roundness, and +therefore there is plenty of omicron in the word goggulon. That is my +view, Hermogenes, of the correctness of names; and I should like to hear +what Cratylus would say. 'But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus +mystifies me; I should like to ask him, in your presence, what he means +by the fitness of names?' To this appeal, Cratylus replies 'that he +cannot explain so important a subject all in a moment.' 'No, but you may +"add little to little," as Hesiod says.' Socrates here interposes +his own request, that Cratylus will give some account of his theory. +Hermogenes and himself are mere sciolists, but Cratylus has reflected +on these matters, and has had teachers. Cratylus replies in the words of +Achilles: '"Illustrious Ajax, you have spoken in all things much to my +mind," whether Euthyphro, or some Muse inhabiting your own breast, +was the inspirer.' Socrates replies, that he is afraid of being +self-deceived, and therefore he must 'look fore and aft,' as Homer +remarks. Does not Cratylus agree with him that names teach us the nature +of things? 'Yes.' And naming is an art, and the artists are legislators, +and like artists in general, some of them are better and some of them +are worse than others, and give better or worse laws, and make better or +worse names. Cratylus cannot admit that one name is better than another; +they are either true names, or they are not names at all; and when he is +asked about the name of Hermogenes, who is acknowledged to have no +luck in him, he affirms this to be the name of somebody else. Socrates +supposes him to mean that falsehood is impossible, to which his own +answer would be, that there has never been a lack of liars. Cratylus +presses him with the old sophistical argument, that falsehood is saying +that which is not, and therefore saying nothing;--you cannot utter the +word which is not. Socrates complains that this argument is too subtle +for an old man to understand: Suppose a person addressing Cratylus were +to say, Hail, Athenian Stranger, Hermogenes! would these words be true +or false? 'I should say that they would be mere unmeaning sounds, like +the hammering of a brass pot.' But you would acknowledge that names, +as well as pictures, are imitations, and also that pictures may give a +right or wrong representation of a man or woman:--why may not names +then equally give a representation true and right or false and wrong? +Cratylus admits that pictures may give a true or false representation, +but denies that names can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man +and say 'this is year picture,' and again, he may go and say to him +'this is your name'--in the one case appealing to his sense of sight, +and in the other to his sense of hearing;--may he not? 'Yes.' Then you +will admit that there is a right or a wrong assignment of names, and if +of names, then of verbs and nouns; and if of verbs and nouns, then +of the sentences which are made up of them; and comparing nouns to +pictures, you may give them all the appropriate sounds, or only some of +them. And as he who gives all the colours makes a good picture, and +he who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but still a +picture; so he who gives all the sounds makes a good name, and he who +gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but a name still. The +artist of names, that is, the legislator, may be a good or he may be a +bad artist. 'Yes, Socrates, but the cases are not parallel; for if you +subtract or misplace a letter, the name ceases to be a name.' Socrates +admits that the number 10, if an unit is subtracted, would cease to +be 10, but denies that names are of this purely quantitative nature. +Suppose that there are two objects--Cratylus and the image of Cratylus; +and let us imagine that some God makes them perfectly alike, both in +their outward form and in their inner nature and qualities: then +there will be two Cratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of +Cratylus. But an image in fact always falls short in some degree of the +original, and if images are not exact counterparts, why should names +be? if they were, they would be the doubles of their originals, and +indistinguishable from them; and how ridiculous would this be! Cratylus +admits the truth of Socrates' remark. But then Socrates rejoins, he +should have the courage to acknowledge that letters may be wrongly +inserted in a noun, or a noun in a sentence; and yet the noun or the +sentence may retain a meaning. Better to admit this, that we may not be +punished like the traveller in Egina who goes about at night, and that +Truth herself may not say to us, 'Too late.' And, errors excepted, we +may still affirm that a name to be correct must have proper letters, +which bear a resemblance to the thing signified. I must remind you of +what Hermogenes and I were saying about the letter rho accent, which +was held to be expressive of motion and hardness, as lambda is of +smoothness;--and this you will admit to be their natural meaning. But +then, why do the Eritreans call that skleroter which we call sklerotes? +We can understand one another, although the letter rho accent is not +equivalent to the letter s: why is this? You reply, because the two +letters are sufficiently alike for the purpose of expressing motion. +Well, then, there is the letter lambda; what business has this in a word +meaning hardness? 'Why, Socrates, I retort upon you, that we put in and +pull out letters at pleasure.' And the explanation of this is custom +or agreement: we have made a convention that the rho shall mean s and a +convention may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. How could +there be names for all the numbers unless you allow that convention +is used? Imitation is a poor thing, and has to be supplemented by +convention, which is another poor thing; although I agree with you in +thinking that the most perfect form of language is found only where +there is a perfect correspondence of sound and meaning. But let me ask +you what is the use and force of names? 'The use of names, Socrates, is +to inform, and he who knows names knows things.' Do you mean that the +discovery of names is the same as the discovery of things? 'Yes.' But +do you not see that there is a degree of deception about names? He who +first gave names, gave them according to his conception, and that +may have been erroneous. 'But then, why, Socrates, is language so +consistent? all words have the same laws.' Mere consistency is no test +of truth. In geometrical problems, for example, there may be a flaw +at the beginning, and yet the conclusion may follow consistently. And, +therefore, a wise man will take especial care of first principles. But +are words really consistent; are there not as many terms of praise +which signify rest as which signify motion? There is episteme, which +is connected with stasis, as mneme is with meno. Bebaion, again, is the +expression of station and position; istoria is clearly descriptive of +the stopping istanai of the stream; piston indicates the cessation of +motion; and there are many words having a bad sense, which are connected +with ideas of motion, such as sumphora, amartia, etc.: amathia, again, +might be explained, as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e +akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the bad names are framed on the same +principle as the good, and other examples might be given, which would +favour a theory of rest rather than of motion. 'Yes; but the greater +number of words express motion.' Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is +correctness of names to be determined by the voice of a majority? + +Here is another point: we were saying that the legislator gives names; +and therefore we must suppose that he knows the things which he names: +but how can he have learnt things from names before there were any +names? 'I believe, Socrates, that some power more than human first gave +things their names, and that these were necessarily true names.' Then +how came the giver of names to contradict himself, and to make some +names expressive of rest, and others of motion? 'I do not suppose +that he did make them both.' Then which did he make--those which are +expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion?...But if +some names are true and others false, we can only decide between them, +not by counting words, but by appealing to things. And, if so, we must +allow that things may be known without names; for names, as we have +several times admitted, are the images of things; and the higher +knowledge is of things, and is not to be derived from names; and though +I do not doubt that the inventors of language gave names, under the idea +that all things are in a state of motion and flux, I believe that they +were mistaken; and that having fallen into a whirlpool themselves, they +are trying to drag us after them. For is there not a true beauty and +a true good, which is always beautiful and always good? Can the thing +beauty be vanishing away from us while the words are yet in our mouths? +And they could not be known by any one if they are always passing +away--for if they are always passing away, the observer has no +opportunity of observing their state. Whether the doctrine of the flux +or of the eternal nature be the truer, is hard to determine. But no man +of sense will put himself, or the education of his mind, in the power +of names: he will not condemn himself to be an unreal thing, nor will he +believe that everything is in a flux like the water in a leaky vessel, +or that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This doctrine +may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue; and +therefore I would have you reflect while you are young, and find out the +truth, and when you know come and tell me. 'I have thought, Socrates, +and after a good deal of thinking I incline to Heracleitus.' Then +another day, my friend, you shall give me a lesson. 'Very good, +Socrates, and I hope that you will continue to study these things +yourself.' + + +***** + + +We may now consider (I) how far Plato in the Cratylus has discovered +the true principles of language, and then (II) proceed to compare modern +speculations respecting the origin and nature of language with the +anticipations of his genius. + +I. (1) Plato is aware that language is not the work of chance; nor does +he deny that there is a natural fitness in names. He only insists that +this natural fitness shall be intelligibly explained. But he has no idea +that language is a natural organism. He would have heard with surprise +that languages are the common work of whole nations in a primitive or +semi-barbarous age. How, he would probably have argued, could men devoid +of art have contrived a structure of such complexity? No answer could +have been given to this question, either in ancient or in modern times, +until the nature of primitive antiquity had been thoroughly studied, and +the instincts of man had been shown to exist in greater force, when +his state approaches more nearly to that of children or animals. The +philosophers of the last century, after their manner, would have vainly +endeavoured to trace the process by which proper names were converted +into common, and would have shown how the last effort of abstraction +invented prepositions and auxiliaries. The theologian would have proved +that language must have had a divine origin, because in childhood, +while the organs are pliable, the intelligence is wanting, and when the +intelligence is able to frame conceptions, the organs are no longer able +to express them. Or, as others have said: Man is man because he has the +gift of speech; and he could not have invented that which he is. But +this would have been an 'argument too subtle' for Socrates, who rejects +the theological account of the origin of language 'as an excuse for not +giving a reason,' which he compares to the introduction of the 'Deus ex +machina' by the tragic poets when they have to solve a difficulty; thus +anticipating many modern controversies in which the primary agency +of the divine Being is confused with the secondary cause; and God is +assumed to have worked a miracle in order to fill up a lacuna in human +knowledge. (Compare Timaeus.) + +Neither is Plato wrong in supposing that an element of design and art +enters into language. The creative power abating is supplemented by a +mechanical process. 'Languages are not made but grow,' but they are made +as well as grow; bursting into life like a plant or a flower, they +are also capable of being trained and improved and engrafted upon one +another. The change in them is effected in earlier ages by musical and +euphonic improvements, at a later stage by the influence of grammar +and logic, and by the poetical and literary use of words. They develope +rapidly in childhood, and when they are full grown and set they may +still put forth intellectual powers, like the mind in the body, or +rather we may say that the nobler use of language only begins when the +frame-work is complete. The savage or primitive man, in whom the natural +instinct is strongest, is also the greatest improver of the forms of +language. He is the poet or maker of words, as in civilised ages the +dialectician is the definer or distinguisher of them. The latter calls +the second world of abstract terms into existence, as the former has +created the picture sounds which represent natural objects or processes. +Poetry and philosophy--these two, are the two great formative principles +of language, when they have passed their first stage, of which, as +of the first invention of the arts in general, we only entertain +conjecture. And mythology is a link between them, connecting the visible +and invisible, until at length the sensuous exterior falls away, and the +severance of the inner and outer world, of the idea and the object of +sense, becomes complete. At a later period, logic and grammar, sister +arts, preserve and enlarge the decaying instinct of language, by rule +and method, which they gather from analysis and observation. + +(2) There is no trace in any of Plato's writings that he was acquainted +with any language but Greek. Yet he has conceived very truly the +relation of Greek to foreign languages, which he is led to consider, +because he finds that many Greek words are incapable of explanation. +Allowing a good deal for accident, and also for the fancies of the +conditores linguae Graecae, there is an element of which he is unable to +give an account. These unintelligible words he supposes to be of foreign +origin, and to have been derived from a time when the Greeks were either +barbarians, or in close relations to the barbarians. Socrates is aware +that this principle is liable to great abuse; and, like the 'Deus ex +machina,' explains nothing. Hence he excuses himself for the employment +of such a device, and remarks that in foreign words there is still +a principle of correctness, which applies equally both to Greeks and +barbarians. + +(3) But the greater number of primary words do not admit of derivation +from foreign languages; they must be resolved into the letters out of +which they are composed, and therefore the letters must have a meaning. +The framers of language were aware of this; they observed that alpha was +adapted to express size; eta length; omicron roundness; nu inwardness; +rho accent rush or roar; lambda liquidity; gamma lambda the detention of +the liquid or slippery element; delta and tau binding; phi, psi, sigma, +xi, wind and cold, and so on. Plato's analysis of the letters of the +alphabet shows a wonderful insight into the nature of language. He does +not expressively distinguish between mere imitation and the symbolical +use of sound to express thought, but he recognises in the examples which +he gives both modes of imitation. Gesture is the mode which a deaf and +dumb person would take of indicating his meaning. And language is the +gesture of the tongue; in the use of the letter rho accent, to express +a rushing or roaring, or of omicron to express roundness, there is a +direct imitation; while in the use of the letter alpha to express size, +or of eta to express length, the imitation is symbolical. The use of +analogous or similar sounds, in order to express similar analogous +ideas, seems to have escaped him. + +In passing from the gesture of the body to the movement of the tongue, +Plato makes a great step in the physiology of language. He was probably +the first who said that 'language is imitative sound,' which is the +greatest and deepest truth of philology; although he is not aware of the +laws of euphony and association by which imitation must be regulated. +He was probably also the first who made a distinction between simple and +compound words, a truth second only in importance to that which has just +been mentioned. His great insight in one direction curiously contrasts +with his blindness in another; for he appears to be wholly unaware +(compare his derivation of agathos from agastos and thoos) of the +difference between the root and termination. But we must recollect that +he was necessarily more ignorant than any schoolboy of Greek grammar, +and had no table of the inflexions of verbs and nouns before his eyes, +which might have suggested to him the distinction. + +(4) Plato distinctly affirms that language is not truth, or 'philosophie +une langue bien faite.' At first, Socrates has delighted himself with +discovering the flux of Heracleitus in language. But he is covertly +satirising the pretence of that or any other age to find philosophy in +words; and he afterwards corrects any erroneous inference which might be +gathered from his experiment. For he finds as many, or almost as many, +words expressive of rest, as he had previously found expressive of +motion. And even if this had been otherwise, who would learn of words +when he might learn of things? There is a great controversy and high +argument between Heracleiteans and Eleatics, but no man of sense would +commit his soul in such enquiries to the imposers of names...In this and +other passages Plato shows that he is as completely emancipated from the +influence of 'Idols of the tribe' as Bacon himself. + +The lesson which may be gathered from words is not metaphysical or +moral, but historical. They teach us the affinity of races, they tell us +something about the association of ideas, they occasionally preserve the +memory of a disused custom; but we cannot safely argue from them about +right and wrong, matter and mind, freedom and necessity, or the other +problems of moral and metaphysical philosophy. For the use of words on +such subjects may often be metaphorical, accidental, derived from other +languages, and may have no relation to the contemporary state of thought +and feeling. Nor in any case is the invention of them the result of +philosophical reflection; they have been commonly transferred from +matter to mind, and their meaning is the very reverse of their +etymology. Because there is or is not a name for a thing, we cannot +argue that the thing has or has not an actual existence; or that +the antitheses, parallels, conjugates, correlatives of language have +anything corresponding to them in nature. There are too many words as +well as too few; and they generalize the objects or ideas which they +represent. The greatest lesson which the philosophical analysis of +language teaches us is, that we should be above language, making words +our servants, and not allowing them to be our masters. + +Plato does not add the further observation, that the etymological +meaning of words is in process of being lost. If at first framed on +a principle of intelligibility, they would gradually cease to be +intelligible, like those of a foreign language, he is willing to admit +that they are subject to many changes, and put on many disguises. He +acknowledges that the 'poor creature' imitation is supplemented by +another 'poor creature,'--convention. But he does not see that 'habit +and repute,' and their relation to other words, are always exercising +an influence over them. Words appear to be isolated, but they are really +the parts of an organism which is always being reproduced. They are +refined by civilization, harmonized by poetry, emphasized by literature, +technically applied in philosophy and art; they are used as symbols on +the border-ground of human knowledge; they receive a fresh impress from +individual genius, and come with a new force and association to every +lively-minded person. They are fixed by the simultaneous utterance of +millions, and yet are always imperceptibly changing;--not the inventors +of language, but writing and speaking, and particularly great writers, +or works which pass into the hearts of nations, Homer, Shakespear, +Dante, the German or English Bible, Kant and Hegel, are the makers of +them in later ages. They carry with them the faded recollection of their +own past history; the use of a word in a striking and familiar passage +gives a complexion to its use everywhere else, and the new use of an +old and familiar phrase has also a peculiar power over us. But these and +other subtleties of language escaped the observation of Plato. He is not +aware that the languages of the world are organic structures, and that +every word in them is related to every other; nor does he conceive of +language as the joint work of the speaker and the hearer, requiring in +man a faculty not only of expressing his thoughts but of understanding +those of others. + +On the other hand, he cannot be justly charged with a desire to frame +language on artificial principles. Philosophers have sometimes dreamed +of a technical or scientific language, in words which should have +fixed meanings, and stand in the same relation to one another as the +substances which they denote. But there is no more trace of this in +Plato than there is of a language corresponding to the ideas; nor, +indeed, could the want of such a language be felt until the sciences +were far more developed. Those who would extend the use of technical +phraseology beyond the limits of science or of custom, seem to forget +that freedom and suggestiveness and the play of association are +essential characteristics of language. The great master has shown how +he regarded pedantic distinctions of words or attempts to confine their +meaning in the satire on Prodicus in the Protagoras. + +(5) In addition to these anticipations of the general principles of +philology, we may note also a few curious observations on words and +sounds. 'The Eretrians say sklerotes for skleroter;' 'the Thessalians +call Apollo Amlos;' 'The Phrygians have the words pur, udor, kunes +slightly changed;' 'there is an old Homeric word emesato, meaning "he +contrived";' 'our forefathers, and especially the women, who are most +conservative of the ancient language, loved the letters iota and delta; +but now iota is changed into eta and epsilon, and delta into zeta; +this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.' Plato was +very willing to use inductive arguments, so far as they were within his +reach; but he would also have assigned a large influence to chance. Nor +indeed is induction applicable to philology in the same degree as to +most of the physical sciences. For after we have pushed our researches +to the furthest point, in language as in all the other creations of the +human mind, there will always remain an element of exception or accident +or free-will, which cannot be eliminated. + +The question, 'whether falsehood is impossible,' which Socrates +characteristically sets aside as too subtle for an old man (compare +Euthyd.), could only have arisen in an age of imperfect consciousness, +which had not yet learned to distinguish words from things. Socrates +replies in effect that words have an independent existence; thus +anticipating the solution of the mediaeval controversy of Nominalism +and Realism. He is aware too that languages exist in various degrees +of perfection, and that the analysis of them can only be carried to a +certain point. 'If we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, +which are the appropriate expressions, that would be the most perfect +state of language.' These words suggest a question of deeper interest +than the origin of language; viz. what is the ideal of language, how +far by any correction of their usages existing languages might become +clearer and more expressive than they are, more poetical, and also more +logical; or whether they are now finally fixed and have received their +last impress from time and authority. + +On the whole, the Cratylus seems to contain deeper truths about language +than any other ancient writing. But feeling the uncertain ground upon +which he is walking, and partly in order to preserve the character of +Socrates, Plato envelopes the whole subject in a robe of fancy, and +allows his principles to drop out as if by accident. + +II. What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and +nature of language? Like other modern metaphysical enquiries, they end +at last in a statement of facts. But, in order to state or understand +the facts, a metaphysical insight seems to be required. There are +more things in language than the human mind easily conceives. And many +fallacies have to be dispelled, as well as observations made. The true +spirit of philosophy or metaphysics can alone charm away metaphysical +illusions, which are always reappearing, formerly in the fancies of +neoplatonist writers, now in the disguise of experience and common +sense. An analogy, a figure of speech, an intelligible theory, a +superficial observation of the individual, have often been mistaken for +a true account of the origin of language. + +Speaking is one of the simplest natural operations, and also the most +complex. Nothing would seem to be easier or more trivial than a few +words uttered by a child in any language. Yet into the formation of +those words have entered causes which the human mind is not capable +of calculating. They are a drop or two of the great stream or ocean of +speech which has been flowing in all ages. They have been transmitted +from one language to another; like the child himself, they go back to +the beginnings of the human race. How they originated, who can tell? +Nevertheless we can imagine a stage of human society in which the circle +of men's minds was narrower and their sympathies and instincts stronger; +in which their organs of speech were more flexible, and the sense of +hearing finer and more discerning; in which they lived more in company, +and after the manner of children were more given to express their +feelings; in which 'they moved all together,' like a herd of wild +animals, 'when they moved at all.' Among them, as in every society, a +particular person would be more sensitive and intelligent than the rest. +Suddenly, on some occasion of interest (at the approach of a wild beast, +shall we say?), he first, they following him, utter a cry which resounds +through the forest. The cry is almost or quite involuntary, and may be +an imitation of the roar of the animal. Thus far we have not speech, +but only the inarticulate expression of feeling or emotion in no respect +differing from the cries of animals; for they too call to one another +and are answered. But now suppose that some one at a distance not only +hears the sound, but apprehends the meaning: or we may imagine that +the cry is repeated to a member of the society who had been absent; the +others act the scene over again when he returns home in the evening. And +so the cry becomes a word. The hearer in turn gives back the word to +the speaker, who is now aware that he has acquired a new power. Many +thousand times he exercises this power; like a child learning to talk, +he repeats the same cry again, and again he is answered; he tries +experiments with a like result, and the speaker and the hearer rejoice +together in their newly-discovered faculty. At first there would be few +such cries, and little danger of mistaking or confusing them. For the +mind of primitive man had a narrow range of perceptions and feelings; +his senses were microscopic; twenty or thirty sounds or gestures would +be enough for him, nor would he have any difficulty in finding them. +Naturally he broke out into speech--like the young infant he laughed +and babbled; but not until there were hearers as well as speakers did +language begin. Not the interjection or the vocal imitation of the +object, but the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object +understood, is the first rudiment of human speech. + +After a while the word gathers associations, and has an independent +existence. The imitation of the lion's roar calls up the fears and hopes +of the chase, which are excited by his appearance. In the moment of +hearing the sound, without any appreciable interval, these and other +latent experiences wake up in the mind of the hearer. Not only does he +receive an impression, but he brings previous knowledge to bear upon +that impression. Necessarily the pictorial image becomes less vivid, +while the association of the nature and habits of the animal is more +distinctly perceived. The picture passes into a symbol, for there would +be too many of them and they would crowd the mind; the vocal imitation, +too, is always in process of being lost and being renewed, just as the +picture is brought back again in the description of the poet. Words now +can be used more freely because there are more of them. What was once an +involuntary expression becomes voluntary. Not only can men utter a cry +or call, but they can communicate and converse; they can not only use +words, but they can even play with them. The word is separated both from +the object and from the mind; and slowly nations and individuals attain +to a fuller consciousness of themselves. + +Parallel with this mental process the articulation of sounds is +gradually becoming perfected. The finer sense detects the differences of +them, and begins, first to agglomerate, then to distinguish them. Times, +persons, places, relations of all kinds, are expressed by modifications +of them. The earliest parts of speech, as we may call them by +anticipation, like the first utterances of children, probably partook +of the nature of interjections and nouns; then came verbs; at length the +whole sentence appeared, and rhythm and metre followed. Each stage in +the progress of language was accompanied by some corresponding stage +in the mind and civilisation of man. In time, when the family became a +nation, the wild growth of dialects passed into a language. Then arose +poetry and literature. We can hardly realize to ourselves how much with +each improvement of language the powers of the human mind were enlarged; +how the inner world took the place of outer; how the pictorial or +symbolical or analogical word was refined into a notion; how language, +fair and large and free, was at last complete. + +So we may imagine the speech of man to have begun as with the cries of +animals, or the stammering lips of children, and to have attained by +degrees the perfection of Homer and Plato. Yet we are far from saying +that this or any other theory of language is proved by facts. It is +not difficult to form an hypothesis which by a series of imaginary +transitions will bridge over the chasm which separates man from the +animals. Differences of kind may often be thus resolved into differences +of degree. But we must not assume that we have in this way discovered +the true account of them. Through what struggles the harmonious use +of the organs of speech was acquired; to what extent the conditions of +human life were different; how far the genius of individuals may have +contributed to the discovery of this as of the other arts, we cannot +say: Only we seem to see that language is as much the creation of the +ear as of the tongue, and the expression of a movement stirring the +hearts not of one man only but of many, 'as the trees of the wood are +stirred by the wind.' The theory is consistent or not inconsistent with +our own mental experience, and throws some degree of light upon a dark +corner of the human mind. + +In the later analysis of language, we trace the opposite and contrasted +elements of the individual and nation, of the past and present, of +the inward and outward, of the subject and object, of the notional +and relational, of the root or unchanging part of the word and of the +changing inflexion, if such a distinction be admitted, of the vowel and +the consonant, of quantity and accent, of speech and writing, of poetry +and prose. We observe also the reciprocal influence of sounds and +conceptions on each other, like the connexion of body and mind; and +further remark that although the names of objects were originally proper +names, as the grammarian or logician might call them, yet at a later +stage they become universal notions, which combine into particulars and +individuals, and are taken out of the first rude agglomeration of sounds +that they may be replaced in a higher and more logical order. We see +that in the simplest sentences are contained grammar and logic--the +parts of speech, the Eleatic philosophy and the Kantian categories. So +complex is language, and so expressive not only of the meanest wants of +man, but of his highest thoughts; so various are the aspects in which it +is regarded by us. Then again, when we follow the history of languages, +we observe that they are always slowly moving, half dead, half alive, +half solid, half fluid; the breath of a moment, yet like the air, +continuous in all ages and countries,--like the glacier, too, containing +within them a trickling stream which deposits debris of the rocks over +which it passes. There were happy moments, as we may conjecture, in the +lives of nations, at which they came to the birth--as in the golden age +of literature, the man and the time seem to conspire; the eloquence of +the bard or chief, as in later times the creations of the great writer +who is the expression of his age, became impressed on the minds of +their countrymen, perhaps in the hour of some crisis of national +development--a migration, a conquest, or the like. The picture of the +word which was beginning to be lost, is now revived; the sound again +echoes to the sense; men find themselves capable not only of expressing +more feelings, and describing more objects, but of expressing and +describing them better. The world before the flood, that is to say, the +world of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand years ago, has passed away and +left no sign. But the best conception that we can form of it, though +imperfect and uncertain, is gained from the analogy of causes still in +action, some powerful and sudden, others working slowly in the course of +infinite ages. Something too may be allowed to 'the persistency of the +strongest,' to 'the survival of the fittest,' in this as in the other +realms of nature. + +These are some of the reflections which the modern philosophy of +language suggests to us about the powers of the human mind and the +forces and influences by which the efforts of men to utter articulate +sounds were inspired. Yet in making these and similar generalizations +we may note also dangers to which we are exposed. (1) There is the +confusion of ideas with facts--of mere possibilities, and generalities, +and modes of conception with actual and definite knowledge. The words +'evolution,' 'birth,' 'law,' development,' 'instinct,' 'implicit,' +'explicit,' and the like, have a false clearness or comprehensiveness, +which adds nothing to our knowledge. The metaphor of a flower or a tree, +or some other work of nature or art, is often in like manner only a +pleasing picture. (2) There is the fallacy of resolving the languages +which we know into their parts, and then imagining that we can discover +the nature of language by reconstructing them. (3) There is the danger +of identifying language, not with thoughts but with ideas. (4) There is +the error of supposing that the analysis of grammar and logic has always +existed, or that their distinctions were familiar to Socrates and Plato. +(5) There is the fallacy of exaggerating, and also of diminishing the +interval which separates articulate from inarticulate language--the +cries of animals from the speech of man--the instincts of animals from +the reason of man. (6) There is the danger which besets all enquiries +into the early history of man--of interpreting the past by the present, +and of substituting the definite and intelligible for the true but dim +outline which is the horizon of human knowledge. + +The greatest light is thrown upon the nature of language by analogy. We +have the analogy of the cries of animals, of the songs of birds ('man, +like the nightingale, is a singing bird, but is ever binding up thoughts +with musical notes'), of music, of children learning to speak, of +barbarous nations in which the linguistic instinct is still undecayed, +of ourselves learning to think and speak a new language, of the deaf and +dumb who have words without sounds, of the various disorders of speech; +and we have the after-growth of mythology, which, like language, is an +unconscious creation of the human mind. We can observe the social and +collective instincts of animals, and may remark how, when domesticated, +they have the power of understanding but not of speaking, while on the +other hand, some birds which are comparatively devoid of intelligence, +make a nearer approach to articulate speech. We may note how in the +animals there is a want of that sympathy with one another which appears +to be the soul of language. We can compare the use of speech with other +mental and bodily operations; for speech too is a kind of gesture, and +in the child or savage accompanied with gesture. We may observe that +the child learns to speak, as he learns to walk or to eat, by a natural +impulse; yet in either case not without a power of imitation which +is also natural to him--he is taught to read, but he breaks forth +spontaneously in speech. We can trace the impulse to bind together the +world in ideas beginning in the first efforts to speak and culminating +in philosophy. But there remains an element which cannot be explained, +or even adequately described. We can understand how man creates or +constructs consciously and by design; and see, if we do not understand, +how nature, by a law, calls into being an organised structure. But the +intermediate organism which stands between man and nature, which is the +work of mind yet unconscious, and in which mind and matter seem to meet, +and mind unperceived to herself is really limited by all other minds, is +neither understood nor seen by us, and is with reluctance admitted to be +a fact. + +Language is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations, the +transfiguration of the world in thought, the meeting-point of the +physical and mental sciences, and also the mirror in which they are +reflected, present at every moment to the individual, and yet having +a sort of eternal or universal nature. When we analyze our own mental +processes, we find words everywhere in every degree of clearness and +consistency, fading away in dreams and more like pictures, rapidly +succeeding one another in our waking thoughts, attaining a greater +distinctness and consecutiveness in speech, and a greater still +in writing, taking the place of one another when we try to become +emancipated from their influence. For in all processes of the mind which +are conscious we are talking to ourselves; the attempt to think without +words is a mere illusion,--they are always reappearing when we fix our +thoughts. And speech is not a separate faculty, but the expression of +all our faculties, to which all our other powers of expression, signs, +looks, gestures, lend their aid, of which the instrument is not the +tongue only, but more than half the human frame. + +The minds of men are sometimes carried on to think of their lives and +of their actions as links in a chain of causes and effects going back to +the beginning of time. A few have seemed to lose the sense of their own +individuality in the universal cause or nature. In like manner we might +think of the words which we daily use, as derived from the first speech +of man, and of all the languages in the world, as the expressions or +varieties of a single force or life of language of which the thoughts +of men are the accident. Such a conception enables us to grasp the +power and wonder of languages, and is very natural to the scientific +philologist. For he, like the metaphysician, believes in the reality of +that which absorbs his own mind. Nor do we deny the enormous influence +which language has exercised over thought. Fixed words, like fixed +ideas, have often governed the world. But in such representations we +attribute to language too much the nature of a cause, and too little +of an effect,--too much of an absolute, too little of a relative +character,--too much of an ideal, too little of a matter-of-fact +existence. + +Or again, we may frame a single abstract notion of language of which all +existent languages may be supposed to be the perversion. But we must +not conceive that this logical figment had ever a real existence, or +is anything more than an effort of the mind to give unity to infinitely +various phenomena. There is no abstract language 'in rerum natura,' +any more than there is an abstract tree, but only languages in various +stages of growth, maturity, and decay. Nor do other logical distinctions +or even grammatical exactly correspond to the facts of language; for +they too are attempts to give unity and regularity to a subject which is +partly irregular. + +We find, however, that there are distinctions of another kind by which +this vast field of language admits of being mapped out. There is the +distinction between biliteral and triliteral roots, and the various +inflexions which accompany them; between the mere mechanical cohesion of +sounds or words, and the 'chemical' combination of them into a new word; +there is the distinction between languages which have had a free and +full development of their organisms, and languages which have been +stunted in their growth,--lamed in their hands or feet, and never able +to acquire afterwards the powers in which they are deficient; there +is the distinction between synthetical languages like Greek and Latin, +which have retained their inflexions, and analytical languages like +English or French, which have lost them. Innumerable as are the +languages and dialects of mankind, there are comparatively few classes +to which they can be referred. + +Another road through this chaos is provided by the physiology of speech. +The organs of language are the same in all mankind, and are only capable +of uttering a certain number of sounds. Every man has tongue, teeth, +lips, palate, throat, mouth, which he may close or open, and adapt in +various ways; making, first, vowels and consonants; and secondly, other +classes of letters. The elements of all speech, like the elements of +the musical scale, are few and simple, though admitting of infinite +gradations and combinations. Whatever slight differences exist in the +use or formation of these organs, owing to climate or the sense of +euphony or other causes, they are as nothing compared with their +agreement. Here then is a real basis of unity in the study of philology, +unlike that imaginary abstract unity of which we were just now speaking. + +Whether we regard language from the psychological, or historical, +or physiological point of view, the materials of our knowledge are +inexhaustible. The comparisons of children learning to speak, of +barbarous nations, of musical notes, of the cries of animals, of the +song of birds, increase our insight into the nature of human speech. +Many observations which would otherwise have escaped us are suggested by +them. But they do not explain why, in man and in man only, the speaker +met with a response from the hearer, and the half articulate sound +gradually developed into Sanscrit and Greek. They hardly enable us to +approach any nearer the secret of the origin of language, which, like +some of the other great secrets of nature,--the origin of birth +and death, or of animal life,--remains inviolable. That problem is +indissolubly bound up with the origin of man; and if we ever know +more of the one, we may expect to know more of the other. (Compare W. +Humboldt, 'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues;' M. +Muller, 'Lectures on the Science of Language;' Steinthal, 'Einleitung in +die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft.') + + +***** + + +It is more than sixteen years since the preceding remarks were written, +which with a few alterations have now been reprinted. During the +interval the progress of philology has been very great. More languages +have been compared; the inner structure of language has been laid bare; +the relations of sounds have been more accurately discriminated; the +manner in which dialects affect or are affected by the literary or +principal form of a language is better understood. Many merely verbal +questions have been eliminated; the remains of the old traditional +methods have died away. The study has passed from the metaphysical into +an historical stage. Grammar is no longer confused with language, nor +the anatomy of words and sentences with their life and use. Figures of +speech, by which the vagueness of theories is often concealed, have been +stripped off; and we see language more as it truly was. The immensity +of the subject is gradually revealed to us, and the reign of law becomes +apparent. Yet the law is but partially seen; the traces of it are often +lost in the distance. For languages have a natural but not a perfect +growth; like other creations of nature into which the will of man +enters, they are full of what we term accident and irregularity. And +the difficulties of the subject become not less, but greater, as we +proceed--it is one of those studies in which we seem to know less as we +know more; partly because we are no longer satisfied with the vague and +superficial ideas of it which prevailed fifty years ago; partly also +because the remains of the languages with which we are acquainted always +were, and if they are still living, are, in a state of transition; and +thirdly, because there are lacunae in our knowledge of them which can +never be filled up. Not a tenth, not a hundredth part of them has been +preserved. Yet the materials at our disposal are far greater than any +individual can use. Such are a few of the general reflections which the +present state of philology calls up. + +(1) Language seems to be composite, but into its first elements the +philologer has never been able to penetrate. However far he goes back, +he never arrives at the beginning; or rather, as in Geology or in +Astronomy, there is no beginning. He is too apt to suppose that by +breaking up the existing forms of language into their parts he will +arrive at a previous stage of it, but he is merely analyzing what never +existed, or is never known to have existed, except in a composite form. +He may divide nouns and verbs into roots and inflexions, but he has no +evidence which will show that the omega of tupto or the mu of tithemi, +though analogous to ego, me, either became pronouns or were generated +out of pronouns. To say that 'pronouns, like ripe fruit, dropped out of +verbs,' is a misleading figure of speech. Although all languages have +some common principles, there is no primitive form or forms of language +known to us, or to be reasonably imagined, from which they are all +descended. No inference can be drawn from language, either for or +against the unity of the human race. Nor is there any proof that words +were ever used without any relation to each other. Whatever may be the +meaning of a sentence or a word when applied to primitive language, it +is probable that the sentence is more akin to the original form than +the word, and that the later stage of language is the result rather of +analysis than of synthesis, or possibly is a combination of the two. +Nor, again, are we sure that the original process of learning to speak +was the same in different places or among different races of men. It may +have been slower with some, quicker with others. Some tribes may have +used shorter, others longer words or cries: they may have been more +or less inclined to agglutinate or to decompose them: they may have +modified them by the use of prefixes, suffixes, infixes; by the +lengthening and strengthening of vowels or by the shortening and +weakening of them, by the condensation or rarefaction of consonants. +But who gave to language these primeval laws; or why one race has +triliteral, another biliteral roots; or why in some members of a group +of languages b becomes p, or d, t, or ch, k; or why two languages +resemble one another in certain parts of their structure and differ in +others; or why in one language there is a greater development of vowels, +in another of consonants, and the like--are questions of which we only +'entertain conjecture.' We must remember the length of time that has +elapsed since man first walked upon the earth, and that in this vast +but unknown period every variety of language may have been in process of +formation and decay, many times over. + +(Compare Plato, Laws):-- + +'ATHENIAN STRANGER: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of +government? Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in +which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good +and evil? + +CLEINIAS: What do you mean? + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: I mean that he might watch them from the point of +view of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during +infinite ages. + +CLEINIAS: How so? + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which +has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them? + +CLEINIAS: Hardly. + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and +incalculable? + +CLEINIAS: No doubt. + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: And have there not been thousands and thousands of +cities which have come into being and perished during this period? And +has not every place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes +rising, and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?' + +Aristot. Metaph.:-- + +'And if a person should conceive the tales of mythology to mean only +that men thought the gods to be the first essences of things, he would +deem the reflection to have been inspired and would consider that, +whereas probably every art and part of wisdom had been DISCOVERED AND +LOST MANY TIMES OVER, such notions were but a remnant of the past which +has survived to our day.') + +It can hardly be supposed that any traces of an original language +still survive, any more than of the first huts or buildings which were +constructed by man. Nor are we at all certain of the relation, if any, +in which the greater families of languages stand to each other. The +influence of individuals must always have been a disturbing element. +Like great writers in later times, there may have been many a barbaric +genius who taught the men of his tribe to sing or speak, showing them by +example how to continue or divide their words, charming their souls +with rhythm and accent and intonation, finding in familiar objects the +expression of their confused fancies--to whom the whole of language +might in truth be said to be a figure of speech. One person may have +introduced a new custom into the formation or pronunciation of a word; +he may have been imitated by others, and the custom, or form, or accent, +or quantity, or rhyme which he introduced in a single word may have +become the type on which many other words or inflexions of words were +framed, and may have quickly ran through a whole language. For like the +other gifts which nature has bestowed upon man, that of speech has been +conveyed to him through the medium, not of the many, but of the few, who +were his 'law-givers'--'the legislator with the dialectician standing +on his right hand,' in Plato's striking image, who formed the manners +of men and gave them customs, whose voice and look and behaviour, whose +gesticulations and other peculiarities were instinctively imitated by +them,--the 'king of men' who was their priest, almost their God...But +these are conjectures only: so little do we know of the origin of +language that the real scholar is indisposed to touch the subject at +all. + +(2) There are other errors besides the figment of a primitive or +original language which it is time to leave behind us. We no longer +divide languages into synthetical and analytical, or suppose similarity +of structure to be the safe or only guide to the affinities of them. We +do not confuse the parts of speech with the categories of Logic. Nor do +we conceive languages any more than civilisations to be in a state of +dissolution; they do not easily pass away, but are far more tenacious +of life than the tribes by whom they are spoken. 'Where two or three +are gathered together,' they survive. As in the human frame, as in the +state, there is a principle of renovation as well as of decay which is +at work in all of them. Neither do we suppose them to be invented by +the wit of man. With few exceptions, e.g. technical words or words +newly imported from a foreign language, and the like, in which art has +imitated nature, 'words are not made but grow.' Nor do we attribute to +them a supernatural origin. The law which regulates them is like the law +which governs the circulation of the blood, or the rising of the sap in +trees; the action of it is uniform, but the result, which appears in the +superficial forms of men and animals or in the leaves of trees, is an +endless profusion and variety. The laws of vegetation are invariable, +but no two plants, no two leaves of the forest are precisely the same. +The laws of language are invariable, but no two languages are alike, no +two words have exactly the same meaning. No two sounds are exactly of +the same quality, or give precisely the same impression. + +It would be well if there were a similar consensus about some other +points which appear to be still in dispute. Is language conscious or +unconscious? In speaking or writing have we present to our minds the +meaning or the sound or the construction of the words which we are +using?--No more than the separate drops of water with which we quench +our thirst are present: the whole draught may be conscious, but not the +minute particles of which it is made up: So the whole sentence may be +conscious, but the several words, syllables, letters are not thought of +separately when we are uttering them. Like other natural operations, the +process of speech, when most perfect, is least observed by us. We do +not pause at each mouthful to dwell upon the taste of it: nor has the +speaker time to ask himself the comparative merits of different modes of +expression while he is uttering them. There are many things in the use +of language which may be observed from without, but which cannot be +explained from within. Consciousness carries us but a little way in +the investigation of the mind; it is not the faculty of internal +observation, but only the dim light which makes such observation +possible. What is supposed to be our consciousness of language is +really only the analysis of it, and this analysis admits of innumerable +degrees. But would it not be better if this term, which is so +misleading, and yet has played so great a part in mental science, were +either banished or used only with the distinct meaning of 'attention +to our own minds,' such as is called forth, not by familiar mental +processes, but by the interruption of them? Now in this sense we may +truly say that we are not conscious of ordinary speech, though we are +commonly roused to attention by the misuse or mispronunciation of a +word. Still less, even in schools and academies, do we ever attempt +to invent new words or to alter the meaning of old ones, except in +the case, mentioned above, of technical or borrowed words which are +artificially made or imported because a need of them is felt. Neither in +our own nor in any other age has the conscious effort of reflection in +man contributed in an appreciable degree to the formation of language. +'Which of us by taking thought' can make new words or constructions? +Reflection is the least of the causes by which language is affected, +and is likely to have the least power, when the linguistic instinct is +greatest, as in young children and in the infancy of nations. + +A kindred error is the separation of the phonetic from the mental +element of language; they are really inseparable--no definite line can +be drawn between them, any more than in any other common act of mind +and body. It is true that within certain limits we possess the power of +varying sounds by opening and closing the mouth, by touching the palate +or the teeth with the tongue, by lengthening or shortening the vocal +instrument, by greater or less stress, by a higher or lower pitch of the +voice, and we can substitute one note or accent for another. But behind +the organs of speech and their action there remains the informing mind, +which sets them in motion and works together with them. And behind the +great structure of human speech and the lesser varieties of language +which arise out of the many degrees and kinds of human intercourse, +there is also the unknown or over-ruling law of God or nature which +gives order to it in its infinite greatness, and variety in its +infinitesimal minuteness--both equally inscrutable to us. We need no +longer discuss whether philology is to be classed with the Natural or +the Mental sciences, if we frankly recognize that, like all the sciences +which are concerned with man, it has a double aspect,--inward and +outward; and that the inward can only be known through the outward. +Neither need we raise the question whether the laws of language, like +the other laws of human action, admit of exceptions. The answer in +all cases is the same--that the laws of nature are uniform, though the +consistency or continuity of them is not always perceptible to us. The +superficial appearances of language, as of nature, are irregular, but +we do not therefore deny their deeper uniformity. The comparison of the +growth of language in the individual and in the nation cannot be wholly +discarded, for nations are made up of individuals. But in this, as in +the other political sciences, we must distinguish between collective +and individual actions or processes, and not attribute to the one +what belongs to the other. Again, when we speak of the hereditary or +paternity of a language, we must remember that the parents are alive +as well as the children, and that all the preceding generations survive +(after a manner) in the latest form of it. And when, for the purposes of +comparison, we form into groups the roots or terminations of words, we +should not forget how casual is the manner in which their resemblances +have arisen--they were not first written down by a grammarian in the +paradigms of a grammar and learned out of a book, but were due to many +chance attractions of sound or of meaning, or of both combined. So many +cautions have to be borne in mind, and so many first thoughts to be +dismissed, before we can proceed safely in the path of philological +enquiry. It might be well sometimes to lay aside figures of speech, such +as the 'root' and the 'branches,' the 'stem,' the 'strata' of Geology, +the 'compounds' of Chemistry, 'the ripe fruit of pronouns dropping from +verbs' (see above), and the like, which are always interesting, but are +apt to be delusive. Yet such figures of speech are far nearer the truth +than the theories which attribute the invention and improvement of +language to the conscious action of the human mind...Lastly, it is +doubted by recent philologians whether climate can be supposed to have +exercised any influence worth speaking of on a language: such a view is +said to be unproven: it had better therefore not be silently assumed. + +'Natural selection' and the 'survival of the fittest' have been applied +in the field of philology, as well as in the other sciences which are +concerned with animal and vegetable life. And a Darwinian school of +philologists has sprung up, who are sometimes accused of putting words +in the place of things. It seems to be true, that whether applied to +language or to other branches of knowledge, the Darwinian theory, unless +very precisely defined, hardly escapes from being a truism. If by 'the +natural selection' of words or meanings of words or by the 'persistence +and survival of the fittest' the maintainer of the theory intends +to affirm nothing more than this--that the word 'fittest to survive' +survives, he adds not much to the knowledge of language. But if he means +that the word or the meaning of the word or some portion of the word +which comes into use or drops out of use is selected or rejected on the +ground of economy or parsimony or ease to the speaker or clearness or +euphony or expressiveness, or greater or less demand for it, or anything +of this sort, he is affirming a proposition which has several senses, +and in none of these senses can be assisted to be uniformly true. For +the laws of language are precarious, and can only act uniformly when +there is such frequency of intercourse among neighbours as is sufficient +to enforce them. And there are many reasons why a man should prefer his +own way of speaking to that of others, unless by so doing he becomes +unintelligible. The struggle for existence among words is not of that +fierce and irresistible kind in which birds, beasts and fishes devour +one another, but of a milder sort, allowing one usage to be substituted +for another, not by force, but by the persuasion, or rather by the +prevailing habit, of a majority. The favourite figure, in this, as in +some other uses of it, has tended rather to obscure than explain the +subject to which it has been applied. Nor in any case can the struggle +for existence be deemed to be the sole or principal cause of changes +in language, but only one among many, and one of which we cannot easily +measure the importance. There is a further objection which may be urged +equally against all applications of the Darwinian theory. As in animal +life and likewise in vegetable, so in languages, the process of change +is said to be insensible: sounds, like animals, are supposed to pass +into one another by imperceptible gradation. But in both cases the +newly-created forms soon become fixed; there are few if any vestiges of +the intermediate links, and so the better half of the evidence of the +change is wanting. + +(3) Among the incumbrances or illusions of language may be reckoned many +of the rules and traditions of grammar, whether ancient grammar or the +corrections of it which modern philology has introduced. Grammar, like +law, delights in definition: human speech, like human action, though +very far from being a mere chaos, is indefinite, admits of degrees, and +is always in a state of change or transition. Grammar gives an erroneous +conception of language: for it reduces to a system that which is not a +system. Its figures of speech, pleonasms, ellipses, anacolutha, pros +to semainomenon, and the like have no reality; they do not either make +conscious expressions more intelligible or show the way in which they +have arisen; they are chiefly designed to bring an earlier use of +language into conformity with the later. Often they seem intended only +to remind us that great poets like Aeschylus or Sophocles or Pindar or +a great prose writer like Thucydides are guilty of taking unwarrantable +liberties with grammatical rules; it appears never to have occurred to +the inventors of them that these real 'conditores linguae Graecae' lived +in an age before grammar, when 'Greece also was living Greece.' It is +the anatomy, not the physiology of language, which grammar seeks to +describe: into the idiom and higher life of words it does not enter. The +ordinary Greek grammar gives a complete paradigm of the verb, without +suggesting that the double or treble forms of Perfects, Aorists, etc. +are hardly ever contemporaneous. It distinguishes Moods and Tenses, +without observing how much of the nature of one passes into the other. +It makes three Voices, Active, Passive, and Middle, but takes no notice +of the precarious existence and uncertain character of the last of the +three. Language is a thing of degrees and relations and associations +and exceptions: grammar ties it up in fixed rules. Language has many +varieties of usage: grammar tries to reduce them to a single one. +Grammar divides verbs into regular and irregular: it does not recognize +that the irregular, equally with the regular, are subject to law, and +that a language which had no exceptions would not be a natural growth: +for it could not have been subjected to the influences by which language +is ordinarily affected. It is always wanting to describe ancient +languages in the terms of a modern one. It has a favourite fiction that +one word is put in the place of another; the truth is that no word +is ever put for another. It has another fiction, that a word has been +omitted: words are omitted because they are no longer needed; and the +omission has ceased to be observed. The common explanation of kata or +some other preposition 'being understood' in a Greek sentence is another +fiction of the same kind, which tends to disguise the fact that under +cases were comprehended originally many more relations, and that +prepositions are used only to define the meaning of them with greater +precision. These instances are sufficient to show the sort of errors +which grammar introduces into language. We are not considering the +question of its utility to the beginner in the study. Even to him the +best grammar is the shortest and that in which he will have least to +unlearn. It may be said that the explanations here referred to are +already out of date, and that the study of Greek grammar has received a +new character from comparative philology. This is true; but it is also +true that the traditional grammar has still a great hold on the mind of +the student. + +Metaphysics are even more troublesome than the figments of grammar, +because they wear the appearance of philosophy and there is no test to +which they can be subjected. They are useful in so far as they give us +an insight into the history of the human mind and the modes of thought +which have existed in former ages; or in so far as they furnish wider +conceptions of the different branches of knowledge and of their relation +to one another. But they are worse than useless when they outrun +experience and abstract the mind from the observation of facts, only to +envelope it in a mist of words. Some philologers, like Schleicher, have +been greatly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel; nearly all of them +to a certain extent have fallen under the dominion of physical science. +Even Kant himself thought that the first principles of philosophy +could be elicited from the analysis of the proposition, in this respect +falling short of Plato. Westphal holds that there are three stages of +language: (1) in which things were characterized independently, (2) +in which they were regarded in relation to human thought, and (3) in +relation to one another. But are not such distinctions an anachronism? +for they imply a growth of abstract ideas which never existed in early +times. Language cannot be explained by Metaphysics; for it is prior to +them and much more nearly allied to sense. It is not likely that the +meaning of the cases is ultimately resolvable into relations of space +and time. Nor can we suppose the conception of cause and effect or +of the finite and infinite or of the same and other to be latent in +language at a time when in their abstract form they had never entered +into the mind of man...If the science of Comparative Philology had +possessed 'enough of Metaphysics to get rid of Metaphysics,' it would +have made far greater progress. + +(4) Our knowledge of language is almost confined to languages which are +fully developed. They are of several patterns; and these become altered +by admixture in various degrees,--they may only borrow a few words from +one another and retain their life comparatively unaltered, or they may +meet in a struggle for existence until one of the two is overpowered +and retires from the field. They attain the full rights and dignity of +language when they acquire the use of writing and have a literature of +their own; they pass into dialects and grow out of them, in proportion +as men are isolated or united by locality or occupation. The common +language sometimes reacts upon the dialects and imparts to them also a +literary character. The laws of language can be best discerned in the +great crises of language, especially in the transitions from ancient to +modern forms of them, whether in Europe or Asia. Such changes are the +silent notes of the world's history; they mark periods of unknown length +in which war and conquest were running riot over whole continents, times +of suffering too great to be endured by the human race, in which the +masters became subjects and the subject races masters, in which driven +by necessity or impelled by some instinct, tribes or nations left their +original homes and but slowly found a resting-place. Language would be +the greatest of all historical monuments, if it could only tell us the +history of itself. + +(5) There are many ways in which we may approach this study. The +simplest of all is to observe our own use of language in conversation +or in writing, how we put words together, how we construct and connect +sentences, what are the rules of accent and rhythm in verse or prose, +the formation and composition of words, the laws of euphony and sound, +the affinities of letters, the mistakes to which we are ourselves +most liable of spelling or pronunciation. We may compare with our own +language some other, even when we have only a slight knowledge of +it, such as French or German. Even a little Latin will enable us to +appreciate the grand difference between ancient and modern European +languages. In the child learning to speak we may note the inherent +strength of language, which like 'a mountain river' is always forcing +its way out. We may witness the delight in imitation and repetition, +and some of the laws by which sounds pass into one another. We may learn +something also from the falterings of old age, the searching for words, +and the confusion of them with one another, the forgetfulness of +proper names (more commonly than of other words because they are more +isolated), aphasia, and the like. There are philological lessons also to +be gathered from nicknames, from provincialisms, from the slang of great +cities, from the argot of Paris (that language of suffering and +crime, so pathetically described by Victor Hugo), from the imperfect +articulation of the deaf and dumb, from the jabbering of animals, +from the analysis of sounds in relation to the organs of speech. The +phonograph affords a visible evidence of the nature and divisions of +sound; we may be truly said to know what we can manufacture. Artificial +languages, such as that of Bishop Wilkins, are chiefly useful in showing +what language is not. The study of any foreign language may be made also +a study of Comparative Philology. There are several points, such as +the nature of irregular verbs, of indeclinable parts of speech, the +influence of euphony, the decay or loss of inflections, the elements of +syntax, which may be examined as well in the history of our own language +as of any other. A few well-selected questions may lead the student at +once into the heart of the mystery: such as, Why are the pronouns and +the verb of existence generally more irregular than any other parts of +speech? Why is the number of words so small in which the sound is an +echo of the sense? Why does the meaning of words depart so widely from +their etymology? Why do substantives often differ in meaning from the +verbs to which they are related, adverbs from adjectives? Why do words +differing in origin coalesce in the same sound though retaining their +differences of meaning? Why are some verbs impersonal? Why are there +only so many parts of speech, and on what principle are they divided? +These are a few crucial questions which give us an insight from +different points of view into the true nature of language. + +(6) Thus far we have been endeavouring to strip off from language the +false appearances in which grammar and philology, or the love of system +generally, have clothed it. We have also sought to indicate the sources +of our knowledge of it and the spirit in which we should approach it, we +may now proceed to consider some of the principles or natural laws which +have created or modified it. + +i. The first and simplest of all the principles of language, common +also to the animals, is imitation. The lion roars, the wolf howls in the +solitude of the forest: they are answered by similar cries heard from +a distance. The bird, too, mimics the voice of man and makes answer to +him. Man tells to man the secret place in which he is hiding himself; +he remembers and repeats the sound which he has heard. The love of +imitation becomes a passion and an instinct to him. Primitive men learnt +to speak from one another, like a child from its mother or nurse. They +learnt of course a rudimentary, half-articulate language, the cry +or song or speech which was the expression of what we now call human +thoughts and feelings. We may still remark how much greater and more +natural the exercise of the power is in the use of language than in any +other process or action of the human mind. + +ii. Imitation provided the first material of language: but it was +'without form and void.' During how many years or hundreds or thousands +of years the imitative or half-articulate stage continued there is no +possibility of determining. But we may reasonably conjecture that there +was a time when the vocal utterance of man was intermediate between +what we now call language and the cry of a bird or animal. Speech before +language was a rudis indigestaque materies, not yet distributed into +words and sentences, in which the cry of fear or joy mingled with more +definite sounds recognized by custom as the expressions of things or +events. It was the principle of analogy which introduced into this +'indigesta moles' order and measure. It was Anaxagoras' omou panta +chremata, eita nous elthon diekosmese: the light of reason lighted up +all things and at once began to arrange them. In every sentence, in +every word and every termination of a word, this power of forming +relations to one another was contained. There was a proportion of sound +to sound, of meaning to meaning, of meaning to sound. The cases and +numbers of nouns, the persons, tenses, numbers of verbs, were generally +on the same or nearly the same pattern and had the same meaning. The +sounds by which they were expressed were rough-hewn at first; after +a while they grew more refined--the natural laws of euphony began to +affect them. The rules of syntax are likewise based upon analogy. Time +has an analogy with space, arithmetic with geometry. Not only in musical +notes, but in the quantity, quality, accent, rhythm of human speech, +trivial or serious, there is a law of proportion. As in things of +beauty, as in all nature, in the composition as well as in the motion +of all things, there is a similarity of relations by which they are held +together. + +It would be a mistake to suppose that the analogies of language are +always uniform: there may be often a choice between several, and +sometimes one and sometimes another will prevail. In Greek there are +three declensions of nouns; the forms of cases in one of them may +intrude upon another. Similarly verbs in -omega and -mu iota interchange +forms of tenses, and the completed paradigm of the verb is often made +up of both. The same nouns may be partly declinable and partly +indeclinable, and in some of their cases may have fallen out of use. +Here are rules with exceptions; they are not however really exceptions, +but contain in themselves indications of other rules. Many of these +interruptions or variations of analogy occur in pronouns or in the verb +of existence of which the forms were too common and therefore too deeply +imbedded in language entirely to drop out. The same verbs in the same +meaning may sometimes take one case, sometimes another. The participle +may also have the character of an adjective, the adverb either of an +adjective or of a preposition. These exceptions are as regular as the +rules, but the causes of them are seldom known to us. + +Language, like the animal and vegetable worlds, is everywhere +intersected by the lines of analogy. Like number from which it seems to +be derived, the principle of analogy opens the eyes of men to discern +the similarities and differences of things, and their relations to one +another. At first these are such as lie on the surface only; after +a time they are seen by men to reach farther down into the nature of +things. Gradually in language they arrange themselves into a sort of +imperfect system; groups of personal and case endings are placed side by +side. The fertility of language produces many more than are wanted; +and the superfluous ones are utilized by the assignment to them of new +meanings. The vacuity and the superfluity are thus partially compensated +by each other. It must be remembered that in all the languages which +have a literature, certainly in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, we are not at +the beginning but almost at the end of the linguistic process; we have +reached a time when the verb and the noun are nearly perfected, though +in no language did they completely perfect themselves, because for some +unknown reason the motive powers of languages seem to have ceased when +they were on the eve of completion: they became fixed or crystallized in +an imperfect form either from the influence of writing and literature, +or because no further differentiation of them was required for the +intelligibility of language. So not without admixture and confusion and +displacement and contamination of sounds and the meanings of words, a +lower stage of language passes into a higher. Thus far we can see and no +further. When we ask the reason why this principle of analogy prevails +in all the vast domain of language, there is no answer to the question; +or no other answer but this, that there are innumerable ways in which, +like number, analogy permeates, not only language, but the whole world, +both visible and intellectual. We know from experience that it does not +(a) arise from any conscious act of reflection that the accusative of +a Latin noun in 'us' should end in 'um;' nor (b) from any necessity of +being understood,--much less articulation would suffice for this; nor +(c) from greater convenience or expressiveness of particular sounds. +Such notions were certainly far enough away from the mind of primitive +man. We may speak of a latent instinct, of a survival of the fittest, +easiest, most euphonic, most economical of breath, in the case of one of +two competing sounds; but these expressions do not add anything to our +knowledge. We may try to grasp the infinity of language either under +the figure of a limitless plain divided into countries and districts by +natural boundaries, or of a vast river eternally flowing whose origin is +concealed from us; we may apprehend partially the laws by which speech +is regulated: but we do not know, and we seem as if we should never +know, any more than in the parallel case of the origin of species, how +vocal sounds received life and grew, and in the form of languages came +to be distributed over the earth. + +iii. Next in order to analogy in the formation of language or even +prior to it comes the principle of onomatopea, which is itself a kind of +analogy or similarity of sound and meaning. In by far the greater number +of words it has become disguised and has disappeared; but in no stage of +language is it entirely lost. It belongs chiefly to early language, in +which words were few; and its influence grew less and less as time went +on. To the ear which had a sense of harmony it became a barbarism which +disturbed the flow and equilibrium of discourse; it was an excrescence +which had to be cut out, a survival which needed to be got rid of, +because it was out of keeping with the rest. It remained for the most +part only as a formative principle, which used words and letters not as +crude imitations of other natural sounds, but as symbols of ideas which +were naturally associated with them. It received in another way a new +character; it affected not so much single words, as larger portions of +human speech. It regulated the juxtaposition of sounds and the cadence +of sentences. It was the music, not of song, but of speech, in prose as +well as verse. The old onomatopea of primitive language was refined into +an onomatopea of a higher kind, in which it is no longer true to say +that a particular sound corresponds to a motion or action of man or +beast or movement of nature, but that in all the higher uses of language +the sound is the echo of the sense, especially in poetry, in which +beauty and expressiveness are given to human thoughts by the harmonious +composition of the words, syllables, letters, accents, quantities, +rhythms, rhymes, varieties and contrasts of all sorts. The poet with his +'Break, break, break' or his e pasin nekuessi kataphthimenoisin anassein +or his 'longius ex altoque sinum trahit,' can produce a far finer music +than any crude imitations of things or actions in sound, although a +letter or two having this imitative power may be a lesser element of +beauty in such passages. The same subtle sensibility, which adapts the +word to the thing, adapts the sentence or cadence to the general meaning +or spirit of the passage. This is the higher onomatopea which has +banished the cruder sort as unworthy to have a place in great languages +and literatures. + +We can see clearly enough that letters or collocations of letters do by +various degrees of strength or weakness, length or shortness, emphasis +or pitch, become the natural expressions of the finer parts of human +feeling or thought. And not only so, but letters themselves have a +significance; as Plato observes that the letter rho accent is expressive +of motion, the letters delta and tau of binding and rest, the letter +lambda of smoothness, nu of inwardness, the letter eta of length, the +letter omicron of roundness. These were often combined so as to form +composite notions, as for example in tromos (trembling), trachus +(rugged), thrauein (crush), krouein (strike), thruptein (break), pumbein +(whirl),--in all which words we notice a parallel composition of sounds +in their English equivalents. Plato also remarks, as we remark, that the +onomatopoetic principle is far from prevailing uniformly, and further +that no explanation of language consistently corresponds with any system +of philosophy, however great may be the light which language throws +upon the nature of the mind. Both in Greek and English we find groups of +words such as string, swing, sling, spring, sting, which are parallel +to one another and may be said to derive their vocal effect partly from +contrast of letters, but in which it is impossible to assign a precise +amount of meaning to each of the expressive and onomatopoetic letters. +A few of them are directly imitative, as for example the omega in oon, +which represents the round form of the egg by the figure of the mouth: +or bronte (thunder), in which the fulness of the sound of the word +corresponds to the thing signified by it; or bombos (buzzing), of which +the first syllable, as in its English equivalent, has the meaning of +a deep sound. We may observe also (as we see in the case of the poor +stammerer) that speech has the co-operation of the whole body and may +be often assisted or half expressed by gesticulation. A sound or word +is not the work of the vocal organs only; nearly the whole of the upper +part of the human frame, including head, chest, lungs, have a share in +creating it; and it may be accompanied by a movement of the eyes, nose, +fingers, hands, feet which contributes to the effect of it. + +The principle of onomatopea has fallen into discredit, partly because +it has been supposed to imply an actual manufacture of words out of +syllables and letters, like a piece of joiner's work,--a theory of +language which is more and more refuted by facts, and more and more +going out of fashion with philologians; and partly also because the +traces of onomatopea in separate words become almost obliterated in the +course of ages. The poet of language cannot put in and pull out letters, +as a painter might insert or blot out a shade of colour to give effect +to his picture. It would be ridiculous for him to alter any received +form of a word in order to render it more expressive of the sense. He +can only select, perhaps out of some dialect, the form which is already +best adapted to his purpose. The true onomatopea is not a creative, +but a formative principle, which in the later stage of the history of +language ceases to act upon individual words; but still works through +the collocation of them in the sentence or paragraph, and the adaptation +of every word, syllable, letter to one another and to the rhythm of the +whole passage. + +iv. Next, under a distinct head, although not separable from the +preceding, may be considered the differentiation of languages, i.e. the +manner in which differences of meaning and form have arisen in them. +Into their first creation we have ceased to enquire: it is their +aftergrowth with which we are now concerned. How did the roots or +substantial portions of words become modified or inflected? and how did +they receive separate meanings? First we remark that words are attracted +by the sounds and senses of other words, so that they form groups of +nouns and verbs analogous in sound and sense to one another, each noun +or verb putting forth inflexions, generally of two or three patterns, +and with exceptions. We do not say that we know how sense became first +allied to sound; but we have no difficulty in ascertaining how the +sounds and meanings of words were in time parted off or differentiated. +(1) The chief causes which regulate the variations of sound are (a) +double or differing analogies, which lead sometimes to one form, +sometimes to another (b) euphony, by which is meant chiefly the greater +pleasure to the ear and the greater facility to the organs of speech +which is given by a new formation or pronunciation of a word (c) the +necessity of finding new expressions for new classes or processes of +things. We are told that changes of sound take place by innumerable +gradations until a whole tribe or community or society find themselves +acquiescing in a new pronunciation or use of language. Yet no one +observes the change, or is at all aware that in the course of a lifetime +he and his contemporaries have appreciably varied their intonation or +use of words. On the other hand, the necessities of language seem to +require that the intermediate sounds or meanings of words should quickly +become fixed or set and not continue in a state of transition. The +process of settling down is aided by the organs of speech and by the use +of writing and printing. (2) The meaning of words varies because ideas +vary or the number of things which is included under them or with which +they are associated is increased. A single word is thus made to do duty +for many more things than were formerly expressed by it; and it parts +into different senses when the classes of things or ideas which are +represented by it are themselves different and distinct. A figurative +use of a word may easily pass into a new sense: a new meaning caught up +by association may become more important than all the rest. The good or +neutral sense of a word, such as Jesuit, Puritan, Methodist, Heretic, +has been often converted into a bad one by the malevolence of party +spirit. Double forms suggest different meanings and are often used to +express them; and the form or accent of a word has been not unfrequently +altered when there is a difference of meaning. The difference of gender +in nouns is utilized for the same reason. New meanings of words push +themselves into the vacant spaces of language and retire when they are +no longer needed. Language equally abhors vacancy and superfluity. But +the remedial measures by which both are eliminated are not due to any +conscious action of the human mind; nor is the force exerted by them +constraining or necessary. + +(7) We have shown that language, although subject to laws, is far from +being of an exact and uniform nature. We may now speak briefly of the +faults of language. They may be compared to the faults of Geology, in +which different strata cross one another or meet at an angle, or mix +with one another either by slow transitions or by violent convulsions, +leaving many lacunae which can be no longer filled up, and often +becoming so complex that no true explanation of them can be given. So in +language there are the cross influences of meaning and sound, of logic +and grammar, of differing analogies, of words and the inflexions of +words, which often come into conflict with each other. The grammarian, +if he were to form new words, would make them all of the same pattern +according to what he conceives to be the rule, that is, the more common +usage of language. The subtlety of nature goes far beyond art, and it is +complicated by irregularity, so that often we can hardly say that there +is a right or wrong in the formation of words. For almost any formation +which is not at variance with the first principles of language is +possible and may be defended. + +The imperfection of language is really due to the formation and +correlation of words by accident, that is to say, by principles which +are unknown to us. Hence we see why Plato, like ourselves unable to +comprehend the whole of language, was constrained to 'supplement the +poor creature imitation by another poor creature convention.' But the +poor creature convention in the end proves too much for all the rest: +for we do not ask what is the origin of words or whether they are formed +according to a correct analogy, but what is the usage of them; and we +are compelled to admit with Hermogenes in Plato and with Horace that +usage is the ruling principle, 'quem penes arbitrium est, et jus et +norma loquendi.' + +(8) There are two ways in which a language may attain permanence or +fixity. First, it may have been embodied in poems or hymns or laws, +which may be repeated for hundreds, perhaps for thousands of years with +a religious accuracy, so that to the priests or rhapsodists of a nation +the whole or the greater part of a language is literally preserved; +secondly, it may be written down and in a written form distributed more +or less widely among the whole nation. In either case the language which +is familiarly spoken may have grown up wholly or in a great measure +independently of them. (1) The first of these processes has been +sometimes attended by the result that the sound of the words has been +carefully preserved and that the meaning of them has either perished +wholly, or is only doubtfully recovered by the efforts of modern +philology. The verses have been repeated as a chant or part of a ritual, +but they have had no relation to ordinary life or speech. (2) The +invention of writing again is commonly attributed to a particular +epoch, and we are apt to think that such an inestimable gift would have +immediately been diffused over a whole country. But it may have taken +a long time to perfect the art of writing, and another long period may +have elapsed before it came into common use. Its influence on language +has been increased ten, twenty or one hundred fold by the invention of +printing. + +Before the growth of poetry or the invention of writing, languages were +only dialects. So they continued to be in parts of the country in which +writing was not used or in which there was no diffusion of literature. +In most of the counties of England there is still a provincial style, +which has been sometimes made by a great poet the vehicle of his +fancies. When a book sinks into the mind of a nation, such as Luther's +Bible or the Authorized English Translation of the Bible, or again great +classical works like Shakspere or Milton, not only have new powers +of expression been diffused through a whole nation, but a great step +towards uniformity has been made. The instinct of language demands +regular grammar and correct spelling: these are imprinted deeply on the +tablets of a nation's memory by a common use of classical and popular +writers. In our own day we have attained to a point at which nearly +every printed book is spelt correctly and written grammatically. + +(9) Proceeding further to trace the influence of literature on language +we note some other causes which have affected the higher use of it: +such as (1) the necessity of clearness and connexion; (2) the fear +of tautology; (3) the influence of metre, rhythm, rhyme, and of the +language of prose and verse upon one another; (4) the power of idiom and +quotation; (5) the relativeness of words to one another. + +It has been usual to depreciate modern languages when compared with +ancient. The latter are regarded as furnishing a type of excellence to +which the former cannot attain. But the truth seems to be that modern +languages, if through the loss of inflections and genders they lack some +power or beauty or expressiveness or precision which is possessed by +the ancient, are in many other respects superior to them: the thought is +generally clearer, the connexion closer, the sentence and paragraph are +better distributed. The best modern languages, for example English or +French, possess as great a power of self-improvement as the Latin, if +not as the Greek. Nor does there seem to be any reason why they should +ever decline or decay. It is a popular remark that our great writers are +beginning to disappear: it may also be remarked that whenever a great +writer appears in the future he will find the English language as +perfect and as ready for use as in the days of Shakspere or Milton. +There is no reason to suppose that English or French will ever be +reduced to the low level of Modern Greek or of Mediaeval Latin. The wide +diffusion of great authors would make such a decline impossible. Nor +will modern languages be easily broken up by amalgamation with each +other. The distance between them is too wide to be spanned, the +differences are too great to be overcome, and the use of printing makes +it impossible that one of them should ever be lost in another. + +The structure of the English language differs greatly from that of +either Latin or Greek. In the two latter, especially in Greek, sentences +are joined together by connecting particles. They are distributed on +the right hand and on the left by men, de, alla, kaitoi, kai de and the +like, or deduced from one another by ara, de, oun, toinun and the like. +In English the majority of sentences are independent and in apposition +to one another; they are laid side by side or slightly connected by the +copula. But within the sentence the expression of the logical relations +of the clauses is closer and more exact: there is less of apposition +and participial structure. The sentences thus laid side by side are also +constructed into paragraphs; these again are less distinctly marked in +Greek and Latin than in English. Generally French, German, and English +have an advantage over the classical languages in point of accuracy. The +three concords are more accurately observed in English than in either +Greek or Latin. On the other hand, the extension of the familiar use of +the masculine and feminine gender to objects of sense and abstract ideas +as well as to men and animals no doubt lends a nameless grace to style +which we have a difficulty in appreciating, and the possible variety in +the order of words gives more flexibility and also a kind of dignity to +the period. Of the comparative effect of accent and quantity and of the +relation between them in ancient and modern languages we are not able to +judge. + +Another quality in which modern are superior to ancient languages is +freedom from tautology. No English style is thought tolerable in which, +except for the sake of emphasis, the same words are repeated at short +intervals. Of course the length of the interval must depend on the +character of the word. Striking words and expressions cannot be allowed +to reappear, if at all, except at the distance of a page or more. +Pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions may or rather must recur in +successive lines. It seems to be a kind of impertinence to the reader +and strikes unpleasantly both on the mind and on the ear that the +same sounds should be used twice over, when another word or turn of +expression would have given a new shade of meaning to the thought and +would have added a pleasing variety to the sound. And the mind equally +rejects the repetition of the word and the use of a mere synonym for +it,--e.g. felicity and happiness. The cultivated mind desires something +more, which a skilful writer is easily able to supply out of his +treasure-house. + +The fear of tautology has doubtless led to the multiplications of +words and the meanings of words, and generally to an enlargement of the +vocabulary. It is a very early instinct of language; for ancient poetry +is almost as free from tautology as the best modern writings. The speech +of young children, except in so far as they are compelled to repeat +themselves by the fewness of their words, also escapes from it. When +they grow up and have ideas which are beyond their powers of expression, +especially in writing, tautology begins to appear. In like manner when +language is 'contaminated' by philosophy it is apt to become awkward, +to stammer and repeat itself, to lose its flow and freedom. No +philosophical writer with the exception of Plato, who is himself not +free from tautology, and perhaps Bacon, has attained to any high degree +of literary excellence. + +To poetry the form and polish of language is chiefly to be attributed; +and the most critical period in the history of language is the +transition from verse to prose. At first mankind were contented to +express their thoughts in a set form of words having a kind of rhythm; +to which regularity was given by accent and quantity. But after a time +they demanded a greater degree of freedom, and to those who had all +their life been hearing poetry the first introduction of prose had the +charm of novelty. The prose romances into which the Homeric Poems were +converted, for a while probably gave more delight to the hearers or +readers of them than the Poems themselves, and in time the relation of +the two was reversed: the poems which had once been a necessity of the +human mind became a luxury: they were now superseded by prose, which +in all succeeding ages became the natural vehicle of expression to +all mankind. Henceforward prose and poetry formed each other. A +comparatively slender link between them was also furnished by proverbs. +We may trace in poetry how the simple succession of lines, not without +monotony, has passed into a complicated period, and how in prose, rhythm +and accent and the order of words and the balance of clauses, sometimes +not without a slight admixture of rhyme, make up a new kind of harmony, +swelling into strains not less majestic than those of Homer, Virgil, or +Dante. + +One of the most curious and characteristic features of language, +affecting both syntax and style, is idiom. The meaning of the word +'idiom' is that which is peculiar, that which is familiar, the word or +expression which strikes us or comes home to us, which is more readily +understood or more easily remembered. It is a quality which really +exists in infinite degrees, which we turn into differences of kind by +applying the term only to conspicuous and striking examples of words +or phrases which have this quality. It often supersedes the laws of +language or the rules of grammar, or rather is to be regarded as another +law of language which is natural and necessary. The word or phrase which +has been repeated many times over is more intelligible and familiar +to us than one which is rare, and our familiarity with it more than +compensates for incorrectness or inaccuracy in the use of it. Striking +expressions also which have moved the hearts of nations or are the +precious stones and jewels of great authors partake of the nature of +idioms: they are taken out of the sphere of grammar and are exempt from +the proprieties of language. Every one knows that we often put +words together in a manner which would be intolerable if it were not +idiomatic. We cannot argue either about the meaning of words or the use +of constructions that because they are used in one connexion they will +be legitimate in another, unless we allow for this principle. We can +bear to have words and sentences used in new senses or in a new order or +even a little perverted in meaning when we are quite familiar with them. +Quotations are as often applied in a sense which the author did not +intend as in that which he did. The parody of the words of Shakspere or +of the Bible, which has in it something of the nature of a lie, is far +from unpleasing to us. The better known words, even if their meaning be +perverted, are more agreeable to us and have a greater power over us. +Most of us have experienced a sort of delight and feeling of curiosity +when we first came across or when we first used for ourselves a new word +or phrase or figure of speech. + +There are associations of sound and of sense by which every word is +linked to every other. One letter harmonizes with another; every verb or +noun derives its meaning, not only from itself, but from the words +with which it is associated. Some reflection of them near or distant +is embodied in it. In any new use of a word all the existing uses of it +have to be considered. Upon these depends the question whether it will +bear the proposed extension of meaning or not. According to the famous +expression of Luther, 'Words are living creatures, having hands and +feet.' When they cease to retain this living power of adaptation, when +they are only put together like the parts of a piece of furniture, +language becomes unpoetical, in expressive, dead. + +Grammars would lead us to suppose that words have a fixed form and +sound. Lexicons assign to each word a definite meaning or meanings. They +both tend to obscure the fact that the sentence precedes the word and +that all language is relative. (1) It is relative to its own context. +Its meaning is modified by what has been said before and after in the +same or in some other passage: without comparing the context we are +not sure whether it is used in the same sense even in two successive +sentences. (2) It is relative to facts, to time, place, and occasion: +when they are already known to the hearer or reader, they may be +presupposed; there is no need to allude to them further. (3) It is +relative to the knowledge of the writer and reader or of the speaker and +hearer. Except for the sake of order and consecutiveness nothing ought +to be expressed which is already commonly or universally known. A word +or two may be sufficient to give an intimation to a friend; a long or +elaborate speech or composition is required to explain some new idea +to a popular audience or to the ordinary reader or to a young pupil. +Grammars and dictionaries are not to be despised; for in teaching we +need clearness rather than subtlety. But we must not therefore +forget that there is also a higher ideal of language in which all is +relative--sounds to sounds, words to words, the parts to the whole--in +which besides the lesser context of the book or speech, there is also +the larger context of history and circumstances. + +The study of Comparative Philology has introduced into the world a new +science which more than any other binds up man with nature, and distant +ages and countries with one another. It may be said to have thrown a +light upon all other sciences and upon the nature of the human mind +itself. The true conception of it dispels many errors, not only of +metaphysics and theology, but also of natural knowledge. Yet it is far +from certain that this newly-found science will continue to progress in +the same surprising manner as heretofore; or that even if our materials +are largely increased, we shall arrive at much more definite conclusions +than at present. Like some other branches of knowledge, it may be +approaching a point at which it can no longer be profitably studied. But +at any rate it has brought back the philosophy of language from theory +to fact; it has passed out of the region of guesses and hypotheses, and +has attained the dignity of an Inductive Science. And it is not without +practical and political importance. It gives a new interest to distant +and subject countries; it brings back the dawning light from one end of +the earth to the other. Nations, like individuals, are better understood +by us when we know something of their early life; and when they are +better understood by us, we feel more kindly towards them. Lastly, we +may remember that all knowledge is valuable for its own sake; and we +may also hope that a deeper insight into the nature of human speech will +give us a greater command of it and enable us to make a nobler use +of it. (Compare again W. Humboldt, 'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des +menschlichen Sprachbaues;' M. Muller, 'Lectures on the Science +of Language;' Steinthal, 'Einleitung in die Psychologie und +Sprachwissenschaft:' and for the latter part of the Essay, Delbruck, +'Study of Language;' Paul's 'Principles of the History of Language:' to +the latter work the author of this Essay is largely indebted.) + + + + +CRATYLUS + +By Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Hermogenes, Cratylus. + + +HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument? + +CRATYLUS: If you please. + +HERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus +has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not +conventional; not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use; +but that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for +Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name +of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers 'Yes.' And Socrates? +'Yes.' Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which he is called. +To this he replies--'If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, +that would not be your name.' And when I am anxious to have a further +explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he +has a notion of his own about the matter, if he would only tell, and +could entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, +Socrates, what this oracle means; or rather tell me, if you will be so +good, what is your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which +I would far sooner hear. + +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that 'hard is +the knowledge of the good.' And the knowledge of names is a great +part of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the +fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete +education in grammar and language--these are his own words--and then +I should have been at once able to answer your question about the +correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma +course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters; I +will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation +of them. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I +suspect that he is only making fun of you;--he means to say that you are +no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune +and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of +difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave +the question open until we have heard both sides. + +HERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus +and others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of +correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name which +you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and +give another, the new name is as correct as the old--we frequently +change the names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good +as the old: for there is no name given to anything by nature; all +is convention and habit of the users;--such is my view. But if I am +mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one +else. + +SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us +see;--Your meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which +anybody agrees to call it? + +HERMOGENES: That is my notion. + +SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;--suppose that I call a +man a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly +called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest +of the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and +a horse by the world:--that is your meaning? + +HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view. + +SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is +in words a true and a false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false +proposition says that which is not? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible? + +SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts +untrue? + +HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole. + +SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or +every part? + +HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true. + +SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name? + +HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest. + +SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true +and false? + +HERMOGENES: So we must infer. + +SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be +the name? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody +says that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering +them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other +than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and +countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ +from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes +from one another. + +SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the +names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells +us? For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things +are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear +to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a +permanent essence of their own? + +HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in +my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him +at all. + +SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no +such thing as a bad man? + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there +are very bad men, and a good many of them. + +SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones? + +HERMOGENES: Not many. + +SOCRATES: Still you have found them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and +the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view? + +HERMOGENES: It would. + +SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are +as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us +foolish? + +HERMOGENES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really +distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of +Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is +true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another. + +HERMOGENES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all +things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for +neither on his view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and +vice are always equally to be attributed to all. + +HERMOGENES: There cannot. + +SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to +individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same +moment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and +permanent essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by +us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent, and +maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth. + +SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or +equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a +class of being? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things. + +SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper +nature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for +example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; +but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural +process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, +but any other will fail and be of no use at all. + +HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way. + +SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the +right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural +instrument. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will +not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way +of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural +instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure. + +HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you. + +SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men +speak. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to +acts, is not naming also a sort of action? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but +had a special nature of their own? + +HERMOGENES: Precisely. + +SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to +be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, +and not at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with +success. + +HERMOGENES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with +something? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or +pierced with something? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce? + +HERMOGENES: An awl. + +SOCRATES: And with which we weave? + +HERMOGENES: A shuttle. + +SOCRATES: And with which we name? + +HERMOGENES: A name. + +SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, 'What sort of instrument is a shuttle?' +And you answer, 'A weaving instrument.' + +HERMOGENES: Well. + +SOCRATES: And I ask again, 'What do we do when we weave?'--The answer +is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of +instruments in general? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: +will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do +when we name? + +HERMOGENES: I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish +things according to their natures? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly we do. + +SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing +natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver? + +HERMOGENES: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well--and well means like +a weaver? and the teacher will use the name well--and well means like a +teacher? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be +using well? + +HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only? + +HERMOGENES: Only the skilled. + +SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using +well? + +HERMOGENES: That of the smith. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled? + +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. + +SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be +using? + +HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled. + +SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use? + +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of +the legislator? + +HERMOGENES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only? + +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. + +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but +only a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled +artisans in the world is the rarest. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he +look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does +the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which +is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he +make another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form +according to which he made the other? + +HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine. + +SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle? + +HERMOGENES: I think so. + +SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of +garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought +all of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the +shuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form +which the maker produces in each case. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has +discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he +must express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the +material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought to +know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their +several uses? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature +to their uses? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the +several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how +to put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, +and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is +to be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different +legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every +smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same +purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but +the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of +whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country;--there is +no difference. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not +therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the +true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that +country makes no matter. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given +to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who +makes, or the weaver who is to use them? + +HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the +man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also +whether the work is being well done or not? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And who is he? + +HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre. + +SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright? + +HERMOGENES: The pilot. + +SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his +work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other +country? Will not the user be the man? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how to answer them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a +dialectician? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name. + +SOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the +pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the +dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given? + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can +be no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance +persons; and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by +nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who +looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is able to express +the true forms of things in letters and syllables. + +HERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in +changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more +readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the +natural fitness of names. + +SOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you +just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to +share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the +matter, a step has been gained; for we have discovered that names have +by nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a +name. + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? +That, if you care to know, is the next question. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know. + +SOCRATES: Then reflect. + +HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect? + +SOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, +and you must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the +Sophists, of whom your brother, Callias, has--rather dearly--bought the +reputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, +and therefore you had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell +you what he has learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names. + +HERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating +Protagoras and his truth ('Truth' was the title of the book of +Protagoras; compare Theaet.), I were to attach any value to what he and +his book affirm! + +SOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the +poets. + +HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does +he say? + +SOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where +he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same +things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about +the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call +things by their right and natural names; do you not think so? + +HERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at +all. But to what are you referring? + +SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a +single combat with Hephaestus? + +'Whom,' as he says, 'the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.' + +HERMOGENES: I remember. + +SOCRATES: Well, and about this river--to know that he ought to be called +Xanthus and not Scamander--is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the +bird which, as he says, + +'The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:' + +to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name +Cymindis--do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina? +(Compare Il. 'The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb +of the sportive Myrina.') And there are many other observations of the +same kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the +understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, +which he affirms to have been the names of Hector's son, are more within +the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what +the poet means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that +instance: you will remember I dare say the lines to which I refer? (Il.) + +HERMOGENES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct +of the names given to Hector's son--Astyanax or Scamandrius? + +HERMOGENES: I do not know. + +SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or +the unwise are more likely to give correct names? + +HERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course. + +SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the +wiser? + +HERMOGENES: I should say, the men. + +SOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him +Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the +other name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the +women. + +HERMOGENES: That may be inferred. + +SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than +their wives? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name +for the boy than Scamandrius? + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:--does he not +himself suggest a very good reason, when he says, + +'For he alone defended their city and long walls'? + +This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king +of the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes. + +HERMOGENES: I see. + +SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you? + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I. + +SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector +his name? + +HERMOGENES: What of that? + +SOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name +of Astyanax--both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) +have nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for +a man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, +and owns, and holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking +nonsense; and indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant +when I imagined that I had found some indication of the opinion of Homer +about the correctness of names. + +HERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be +on the right track. + +SOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a lion, +and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary +course of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of +extraordinary births;--if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I +should not call that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth +a man, but only a natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and +other things. Do you agree with me? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I agree. + +SOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not +play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to +be called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or +not the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor +does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so +long as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and +appears in it. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names +of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves +with the exception of the four epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega; the +names of the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other +letters which we add to them; but so long as we introduce the meaning, +and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. +Take, for example, the letter beta--the addition of eta, tau, alpha, +gives no offence, and does not prevent the whole name from having the +value which the legislator intended--so well did he know how to give the +letters names. + +HERMOGENES: I believe you are right. + +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often +be the son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble +sire; and similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course +of nature, is like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the +syllables may be disguised until they appear different to the ignorant +person, and he may not recognize them, although they are the same, just +as any one of us would not recognize the same drugs under different +disguises of colour and smell, although to the physician, who regards +the power of them, they are the same, and he is not put out by the +addition; and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the +addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed +by the change of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the +meaning. As was just now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have +only one letter alike, which is tau, and yet they have the same meaning. +And how little in common with the letters of their names has Archepolis +(ruler of the city)--and yet the meaning is the same. And there are many +other names which just mean 'king.' Again, there are several names for +a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) +and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others which denote a physician, as +Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of mortals); and there +are many others which might be cited, differing in their syllables and +letters, but having the same meaning. Would you not say so? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow +in the course of nature? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, +and are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an +irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the +class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed +of a horse foaling a calf. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be +called irreligious? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or +Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are +correctly given, his should have an opposite meaning. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains) +who appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or +perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and +mountain wildness of his hero's nature. + +HERMOGENES: That is very likely, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And his father's name is also according to nature. + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon +(admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the +accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his +continuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that admirable +endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon. I also think +that Atreus is rightly called; for his murder of Chrysippus and his +exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his +reputation--the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be +intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty +in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ateires the +stubborn, or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the destructive one, +the name is perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that +Pelops is also named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is +rightly called Pelops who sees what is near only (o ta pelas oron). + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or +foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail +upon his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and +immediate,--or in other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win +Hippodamia by all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the +name of Tantalus is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the +traditions about him are true. + +HERMOGENES: And what are the traditions? + +SOCRATES: Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in +his life--last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his +death he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in the world +below--all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine +that some person who wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted +down by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; +and into this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been +transmuted. The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an +excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because really like +a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for some call him Zena, and +use the one half, and others who use the other half call him Dia; the +two together signify the nature of the God, and the business of a name, +as we were saying, is to express the nature. For there is none who is +more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king of all. +Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, +although divided, meaning the God through whom all creatures always have +life (di on zen aei pasi tois zosin uparchei). There is an irreverence, +at first sight, in calling him son of Cronos (who is a proverb for +stupidity), and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child of a mighty +intellect. Which is the fact; for this is the meaning of his father's +name: Kronos quasi Koros (Choreo, to sweep), not in the sense of a +youth, but signifying to chatharon chai acheraton tou nou, the pure +and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He, as we are informed by +tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo tou oran ta +ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the way to +have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I could +remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more +conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,--then +I might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an +instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end. + +HERMOGENES: You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly +inspired, and to be uttering oracles. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration +from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long +lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his +wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken +possession of my soul, and to-day I shall let his superhuman power +work and finish the investigation of names--that will be the way; but +to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away, and make +a purgation of him, if we can only find some priest or sophist who is +skilled in purifications of this sort. + +HERMOGENES: With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of +the enquiry about names. + +SOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now +that we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names +which witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but +have a natural fitness? The names of heroes and of men in general are +apt to be deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with +whose names, as we were saying, they may have no business; or they are +the expression of a wish like Eutychides (the son of good fortune), or +Sosias (the Saviour), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others. +But I think that we had better leave these, for there will be more +chance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences;--there +ought to have been more care taken about them when they were named, +and perhaps there may have been some more than human power at work +occasionally in giving them names. + +HERMOGENES: I think so, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and +show that they are rightly named Gods? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be well. + +SOCRATES: My notion would be something of this sort:--I suspect that the +sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many +barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing +that they were always moving and running, from their running nature +they were called Gods or runners (Theous, Theontas); and when men became +acquainted with the other Gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to +them all. Do you think that likely? + +HERMOGENES: I think it very likely indeed. + +SOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods? + +HERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next? + +SOCRATES: Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this +word? Tell me if my view is right. + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word? + +HERMOGENES: I do not. + +SOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who +came first? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: He says of them-- + +'But now that fate has closed over this race They are holy demons upon +the earth, Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.' +(Hesiod, Works and Days.) + +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? + +SOCRATES: What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the +golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I am +convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron race. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by +him be said to be of golden race? + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: And are not the good wise? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, they are wise. + +SOCRATES: And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called +them demons, because they were daemones (knowing or wise), and in our +older Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say +truly, that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion +among the dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name given to him +signifying wisdom. And I say too, that every wise man who happens to be +a good man is more than human (daimonion) both in life and death, and is +rightly called a demon. + +HERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what +is the meaning of the word 'hero'? (Eros with an eta, in the old writing +eros with an epsilon.) + +SOCRATES: I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the +name is not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods? + +HERMOGENES: What then? + +SOCRATES: All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal +woman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old +Attic, and you will see better that the name heros is only a slight +alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang: either this is +the meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as +rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the question (erotan), +for eirein is equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was saying, +in the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and +questioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are a +tribe of sophists and rhetors. But can you tell me why men are called +anthropoi?--that is more difficult. + +HERMOGENES: No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I +think that you are the more likely to succeed. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro. + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new +and ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before +to-morrow's dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me; +and first, remember that we often put in and pull out letters in words, +and give names as we please and change the accents. Take, for example, +the word Dii Philos; in order to convert this from a sentence into +a noun, we omit one of the iotas and sound the middle syllable grave +instead of acute; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes inserted +in words instead of being omitted, and the acute takes the place of the +grave. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: The name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a +noun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is +the alpha, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been +changed to a grave. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that the word 'man' implies that other animals +never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man +not only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, +and hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, meaning anathron +a opopen. + +HERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am +curious? + +SOCRATES: Certainly. + +HERMOGENES: I will take that which appears to me to follow next in +order. You know the distinction of soul and body? + +SOCRATES: Of course. + +HERMOGENES: Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words. + +SOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the +word psuche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should +imagine that those who first used the name psuche meant to express that +the soul when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of +breath and revival (anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails then +the body perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called +psyche. But please stay a moment; I fancy that I can discover something +which will be more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I +am afraid that they will scorn this explanation. What do you say to +another? + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion +to the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul? + +HERMOGENES: Just that. + +SOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is +the ordering and containing principle of all things? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; I do. + +SOCRATES: Then you may well call that power phuseche which carries and +holds nature (e phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away +into psuche. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific +than the other. + +SOCRATES: It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that +this was the true meaning of the name. + +HERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word? + +SOCRATES: You mean soma (the body). + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if +a little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave +(sema) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present +life; or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives indications +to (semainei) the body; probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of +the name, and they were under the impression that the soul is suffering +the punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in +which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe (soma, sozetai), as the name +soma implies, until the penalty is paid; according to this view, not +even a letter of the word need be changed. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of +words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like +that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any +similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them. + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle +which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,--that of the Gods we +know nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they +give themselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call +themselves, whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all +principles; and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will +call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like, +because we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is a very good +custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, +if you please, in the first place announce to them that we are not +enquiring about them; we do not presume that we are able to do so; +but we are enquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these +names,--in this there can be small blame. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would +like to do as you say. + +SOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be very proper. + +SOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name +Hestia? + +HERMOGENES: That is another and certainly a most difficult question. + +SOCRATES: My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely +have been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good +deal to say. + +HERMOGENES: Well, and what of them? + +SOCRATES: They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of +names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still +discernible. For example, that which we term ousia is by some called +esia, and by others again osia. Now that the essence of things should +be called estia, which is akin to the first of these (esia = estia), is +rational enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that estia +which participates in ousia. For in ancient times we too seem to have +said esia for ousia, and this you may note to have been the idea of +those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to estia, +which was natural enough if they meant that estia was the essence of +things. Those again who read osia seem to have inclined to the opinion +of Heracleitus, that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the +pushing principle (othoun) is the cause and ruling power of all things, +and is therefore rightly called osia. Enough of this, which is all that +we who know nothing can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to +consider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already +discussed. But I dare say that I am talking great nonsense. + +HERMOGENES: Why, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom. + +HERMOGENES: Of what nature? + +SOCRATES: Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible. + +HERMOGENES: How plausible? + +SOCRATES: I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of +antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also +spoke. + +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion +and nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says +that you cannot go into the same water twice. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the +names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty +much in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of +streams to both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which +Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod also, tells of + +'Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys (Il.--the line is not +found in the extant works of Hesiod.).' + +And again, Orpheus says, that + +'The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his +sister Tethys, who was his mother's daughter.' + +You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction +of Heracleitus. + +HERMOGENES: I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; +but I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys. + +SOCRATES: Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of +a spring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered +(diattomenon, ethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name +Tethys is made up of these two words. + +HERMOGENES: The idea is ingenious, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?--of Zeus we have spoken. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, +whether the latter is called by that or by his other name. + +HERMOGENES: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original +inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his +walks, and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of +this element Poseidon; the epsilon was probably inserted as an ornament. +Yet, perhaps, not so; but the name may have been originally written +with a double lamda and not with a sigma, meaning that the God knew many +things (Polla eidos). And perhaps also he being the shaker of the earth, +has been named from shaking (seiein), and then pi and delta have been +added. Pluto gives wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the giver of +wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in general appear +to imagine that the term Hades is connected with the invisible (aeides) +and so they are led by their fears to call the God Pluto instead. + +HERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation? + +SOCRATES: In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of +this deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the +fear of always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of +the body going to him (compare Rep.), my belief is that all is quite +consistent, and that the office and name of the God really correspond. + +HERMOGENES: Why, how is that? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to +ask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which +confines him more to the same spot,--desire or necessity? + +HERMOGENES: Desire, Socrates, is stronger far. + +SOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, +if he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains? + +HERMOGENES: Assuredly they would. + +SOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I +should certainly infer, and not by necessity? + +HERMOGENES: That is clear. + +SOCRATES: And there are many desires? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be +the greatest? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be +made better by associating with another? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has +been to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all +the rest of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as +I imagine, is the God able to infuse into his words. And, according to +this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great +benefactor of the inhabitants of the other world; and even to us who are +upon earth he sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more +than he wants down there; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the rich). +Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men while they are in +the body, but only when the soul is liberated from the desires and evils +of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and reflection in +that; for in their liberated state he can bind them with the desire of +virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the body, not even +father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own +far-famed chains. + +HERMOGENES: There is a deal of truth in what you say. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from +the unseen (aeides)--far otherwise, but from his knowledge (eidenai) of +all noble things. + +HERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and +Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities? + +SOCRATES: Demeter is e didousa meter, who gives food like a mother; Here +is the lovely one (erate)--for Zeus, according to tradition, loved +and married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the +legislator was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of +the air (aer), putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will +recognize the truth of this if you repeat the letters of Here several +times over. People dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name +of Apollo,--and with as little reason; the fear, if I am not mistaken, +only arises from their ignorance of the nature of names. But they go +changing the name into Phersephone, and they are terrified at this; +whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise (sophe); for +seeing that all things in the world are in motion (pheromenon), that +principle which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, +is wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly called Pherepaphe +(Pherepapha), or some name like it, because she touches that which is +in motion (tou pheromenon ephaptomene), herein showing her wisdom. And +Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is wise. They alter +her name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the present generation +care for euphony more than truth. There is the other name, Apollo, +which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some terrible +signification. Have you remarked this fact? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure I have, and what you say is true. + +SOCRATES: But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the +power of the God. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any +single name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of +the God, embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,--music, +and prophecy, and medicine, and archery. + +HERMOGENES: That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the +explanation. + +SOCRATES: Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. +In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and +diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, +as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the +same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the +absolver from all impurities? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as +being the physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon +(purifier); or in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth +and sincerity, which is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called +Aplos, from aplous (sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the +Thessalians call him Aplos; also he is aei Ballon (always shooting), +because he is a master archer who never misses; or again, the name +may refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in akolouthos, +and akoitis, and in many other words the alpha is supposed to mean +'together,' so the meaning of the name Apollo will be 'moving together,' +whether in the poles of heaven as they are called, or in the harmony +of song, which is termed concord, because he moves all together by an +harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously declare. +And he is the God who presides over harmony, and makes all things move +together, both among Gods and among men. And as in the words akolouthos +and akoitis the alpha is substituted for an omicron, so the name Apollon +is equivalent to omopolon; only the second lambda is added in order to +avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (apolon). Now the suspicion +of this destructive power still haunts the minds of some who do not +consider the true value of the name, which, as I was saying just now, +has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the single one, +the everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (aplous, aei Ballon, +apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to be +derived from their making philosophical enquiries (mosthai); and Leto +is called by this name, because she is such a gentle Goddess, and so +willing (ethelemon) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, +as she is often called by strangers--they seem to imply by it her +amiability, and her smooth and easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is +named from her healthy (artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of +her love of virginity, perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue +(arete), and perhaps also as hating intercourse of the sexes (ton aroton +misesasa). He who gave the Goddess her name may have had any or all of +these reasons. + +HERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite? + +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a +serious and also a facetious explanation of both these names; the +serious explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objection +to your hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a joke. +Dionusos is simply didous oinon (giver of wine), Didoinusos, as he might +be called in fun,--and oinos is properly oionous, because wine makes +those who drink, think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (noun) when they +have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam (aphros), may +be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod. + +HERMOGENES: Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an +Athenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares. + +SOCRATES: I am not likely to forget them. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of +Athene. + +HERMOGENES: What other appellation? + +SOCRATES: We call her Pallas. + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from +armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above +the earth, or by the use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or +dancing. + +HERMOGENES: That is quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name? + +SOCRATES: Athene? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern +interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the +ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert +that he meant by Athene 'mind' (nous) and 'intelligence' (dianoia), and +the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her; and +indeed calls her by a still higher title, 'divine intelligence' (Thou +noesis), as though he would say: This is she who has the mind of God +(Theonoa);--using alpha as a dialectical variety for eta, and taking +away iota and sigma (There seems to be some error in the MSS. The +meaning is that the word theonoa = theounoa is a curtailed form of theou +noesis, but the omitted letters do not agree.). Perhaps, however, the +name Theonoe may mean 'she who knows divine things' (Theia noousa) +better than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that the +author of it wished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence (en +ethei noesin), and therefore gave her the name ethonoe; which, however, +either he or his successors have altered into what they thought a nicer +form, and called her Athene. + +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus? + +SOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light (Phaeos istora)? + +HERMOGENES: Surely. + +SOCRATES: Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the eta by attraction; +that is obvious to anybody. + +HERMOGENES: That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets +into your head. + +SOCRATES: To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of +Ares. + +HERMOGENES: What is Ares? + +SOCRATES: Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) +and manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, +which is the meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every way +appropriate to the God of war. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I +am afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how +the steeds of Euthyphro can prance. + +HERMOGENES: Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of +whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I +shall know whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says. + +SOCRATES: I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, +and signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or +thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to +do with language; as I was telling you, the word eirein is expressive of +the use of speech, and there is an often-recurring Homeric word +emesato, which means 'he contrived'--out of these two words, eirein +and mesasthai, the legislator formed the name of the God who invented +language and speech; and we may imagine him dictating to us the use +of this name: 'O my friends,' says he to us, 'seeing that he is the +contriver of tales or speeches, you may rightly call him Eirhemes.' +And this has been improved by us, as we think, into Hermes. Iris also +appears to have been called from the verb 'to tell' (eirein), because +she was a messenger. + +HERMOGENES: Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying +that I was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand +at speeches. + +SOCRATES: There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the +double-formed son of Hermes. + +HERMOGENES: How do you make that out? + +SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is +always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form +which dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men +below, and is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods +have generally to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the +place of them? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and +the perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called aipolos +(goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper +part, and rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of +Hermes, he is speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should +be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, +let us get away from the Gods. + +HERMOGENES: From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why +should we not discuss another kind of Gods--the sun, moon, stars, earth, +aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year? + +SOCRATES: You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I +will not refuse. + +HERMOGENES: You will oblige me. + +SOCRATES: How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him +whom you mentioned first--the sun? + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric +form, for the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him +because when he rises he gathers (alizoi) men together or because he is +always rolling in his course (aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from +aiolein, of which the meaning is the same as poikillein (to variegate), +because he variegates the productions of the earth. + +HERMOGENES: But what is selene (the moon)? + +SOCRATES: That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the +moon receives her light from the sun. + +HERMOGENES: Why do you say so? + +SOCRATES: The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much +the same meaning? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old +(enon), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his +revolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the +previous month. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And as she has a light which is always old and always new +(enon neon aei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and +this when hammered into shape becomes selanaia. + +HERMOGENES: A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do +you say of the month and the stars? + +SOCRATES: Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because +suffering diminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived from +astrape, which is an improvement on anastrope, signifying the upsetting +of the eyes (anastrephein opa). + +HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)? + +SOCRATES: I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of +Euthyphro has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the +word. Please, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I +am in a difficulty of this sort. + +HERMOGENES: What is it? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you +can tell me what is the meaning of the pur? + +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation +of this and several other words?--My belief is that they are of foreign +origin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion +of the barbarians, often borrowed from them. + +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? + +SOCRATES: Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the +fitness of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not +according to the language from which the words are derived, is rather +likely to be at fault. + +HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the +word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and +the Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly changed, +just as they have udor (water) and kunes (dogs), and many other words. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; +for something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid +of pur and udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element +which raises (airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei +rei), or because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the +winds 'air-blasts,' (aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to speak, +air-flux (aetorroun), in the sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun); and +because this moving wind may be expressed by either term he employs +the word air (aer = aetes rheo). Aither (aether) I should interpret as +aeitheer; this may be correctly said, because this element is always +running in a flux about the air (aei thei peri tou aera reon). The +meaning of the word ge (earth) comes out better when in the form of +gaia, for the earth may be truly called 'mother' (gaia, genneteira), as +in the language of Homer (Od.) gegaasi means gegennesthai. + +HERMOGENES: Good. + +SOCRATES: What shall we take next? + +HERMOGENES: There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the year, +eniautos and etos. + +SOCRATES: The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire +to know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai +because they divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and +the fruits of the earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the +same,--'that which brings to light the plants and growths of the +earth in their turn, and passes them in review within itself (en eauto +exetazei)': this is broken up into two words, eniautos from en eauto, +and etos from etazei, just as the original name of Zeus was divided +into Zena and Dia; and the whole proposition means that his power of +reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two words etos and +eniautos being thus formed out of a single proposition. + +HERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress. + +SOCRATES: I am run away with. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But am not yet at my utmost speed. + +HERMOGENES: I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you +would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in +those charming words--wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of +them? + +SOCRATES: That is a tremendous class of names which you are +disinterring; still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be +faint of heart; and I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom +(phronesis) and understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), and +knowledge (episteme), and all those other charming words, as you call +them? + +HERMOGENES: Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their +meaning. + +SOCRATES: By the dog of Egypt I have a not bad notion which came into my +head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names were +undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their +search after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from +constantly going round and round, and then they imagine that the +world is going round and round and moving in all directions; and this +appearance, which arises out of their own internal condition, they +suppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is nothing +stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is +always full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of the +names which I mentioned has led me into making this reflection. + +HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been +just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely +indicated. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed, I never thought of it. + +SOCRATES: Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a +name indicative of motion. + +HERMOGENES: What was the name? + +SOCRATES: Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify phoras kai rhou noesis +(perception of motion and flux), or perhaps phoras onesis (the blessing +of motion), but is at any rate connected with pheresthai (motion); gnome +(judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration +(nomesis) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider; or, +if you would rather, here is noesis, the very word just now mentioned, +which is neou esis (the desire of the new); the word neos implies that +the world is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted +to express this longing of the soul, for the original name was neoesis, +and not noesis; but eta took the place of a double epsilon. The word +sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of that wisdom (phronesis) which +we were just now considering. Epioteme (knowledge) is akin to this, and +indicates that the soul which is good for anything follows (epetai) the +motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them; +wherefore the word should rather be read as epistemene, inserting +epsilon nu. Sunesis (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as +a kind of conclusion; the word is derived from sunienai (to go along +with), and, like epistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the +soul in company with the nature of things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, +and appears not to be of native growth; the meaning is, touching the +motion or stream of things. You must remember that the poets, when they +speak of the commencement of any rapid motion, often use the word esuthe +(he rushed); and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named Sous +(Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and +the touching (epaphe) of motion is expressed by sophia, for all things +are supposed to be in motion. Good (agathon) is the name which is given +to the admirable (agasto) in nature; for, although all things move, +still there are degrees of motion; some are swifter, some slower; but +there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this +admirable part of nature is called agathon. Dikaiosune (justice) is +clearly dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the just); but the actual word +dikaion is more difficult: men are only agreed to a certain extent about +justice, and then they begin to disagree. For those who suppose all +things to be in motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a mere +receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating power which passes +through all this, and is the instrument of creation in all, and is the +subtlest and swiftest element; for if it were not the subtlest, and a +power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, passing by other +things as if they were standing still, it could not penetrate through +the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all things and +pierces (diaion) all, is rightly called dikaion; the letter k is only +added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, there is a +general agreement about the nature of justice; but I, Hermogenes, being +an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery that the justice +of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world: now a cause +is that because of which anything is created; and some one comes and +whispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because partaking +of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what he has said, +to interrogate him gently: 'Well, my excellent friend,' say I, 'but if +all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.' Thereupon they +think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers, +and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me +with one derivation after another, and at length they quarrel. For one +of them says that justice is the sun, and that he only is the piercing +(diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element which is the guardian of nature. +And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered by the +satirical remark, 'What, is there no justice in the world when the sun +is down?' And when I earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own +honest opinion, he says, 'Fire in the abstract'; but this is not very +intelligible. Another says, 'No, not fire in the abstract, but the +abstraction of heat in the fire.' Another man professes to laugh at all +this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that justice is mind, for mind, as +they say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and orders all +things, and passes through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself +in far greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was before +I began to learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, which has led +me into this digression, was given to justice for the reasons which I +have mentioned. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you +must have heard this from some one else. + +SOCRATES: And not the rest? + +HERMOGENES: Hardly. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in +the originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think +that we have as yet discussed courage (andreia),--injustice (adikia), +which is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating +principle (diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name +of andreia seems to imply a battle;--this battle is in the world of +existence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux +(enantia rhon): if you extract the delta from andreia, the name at once +signifies the thing, and you may clearly understand that andreia is not +the stream opposed to every stream, but only to that which is contrary +to justice, for otherwise courage would not have been praised. The words +arren (male) and aner (man) also contain a similar allusion to the same +principle of the upward flux (te ano rhon). Gune (woman) I suspect to +be the same word as goun (birth): thelu (female) appears to be partly +derived from thele (the teat), because the teat is like rain, and makes +things flourish (tethelenai). + +HERMOGENES: That is surely probable. + +SOCRATES: Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to +figure the growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is +expressed by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of thein +(running), and allesthai (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when +I get on smooth ground. There are a good many names generally thought to +be of importance, which have still to be explained. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the +possession of mind: you have only to take away the tau and insert two +omichrons, one between the chi and nu, and another between the nu and +eta. + +HERMOGENES: That is a very shabby etymology. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original +names have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on +and stripping off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and +bedizening them in all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share +in the change. Take, for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter +rho inserted? This must surely be the addition of some one who cares +nothing about the truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into +shape. And the additions are often such that at last no human being can +possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another example is +the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought properly to be phigx, phiggos, +and there are other examples. + +HERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any +letters which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name +may be adapted to any object. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like +yourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability. + +HERMOGENES: Such is my desire. + +SOCRATES: And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a +precisian, or 'you will unnerve me of my strength (Iliad.).' When you +have allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall +be at the top of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great +accomplishment--anein; for mekos has the meaning of greatness, and these +two, mekos and anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying, +being now at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning +of the two words arete (virtue) and kakia (vice); arete I do not as yet +understand, but kakia is transparent, and agrees with the principles +which preceded, for all things being in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos +ion (going badly); and this evil motion when existing in the soul has +the general name of kakia, or vice, specially appropriated to it. The +meaning of kakos ienai may be further illustrated by the use of deilia +(cowardice), which ought to have come after andreia, but was forgotten, +and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been passed over. Deilia +signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain (desmos), for +lian means strength, and therefore deilia expresses the greatest and +strongest bond of the soul; and aporia (difficulty) is an evil of the +same nature (from a (alpha) not, and poreuesthai to go), like anything +else which is an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word kakia +appears to mean kakos ienai, or going badly, or limping and halting; of +which the consequence is, that the soul becomes filled with vice. And if +kakia is the name of this sort of thing, arete will be the opposite of +it, signifying in the first place ease of motion, then that the stream +of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever +flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called arete, or, +more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have had +another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is more +eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I daresay +that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think +that if the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also right. + +HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great +a part in your previous discourse? + +SOCRATES: That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an +opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device. + +HERMOGENES: What device? + +SOCRATES: The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this +word also. + +HERMOGENES: Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these +words and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron. + +SOCRATES: The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon roes +(always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our +former derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation +of all sorts, and hence he gave the name aeischoroun to that which +hindered the flux (aei ischon roun), and that is now beaten together +into aischron. + +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon? + +SOCRATES: That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the +quantity, and has been changed by altering omicron upsilon into omicron. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: This name appears to denote mind. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is +not the principle which imposes the name the cause? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their names, +and is not mind the beautiful (kalon)? + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of +praise, and are not other works worthy of blame? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the +works of a carpenter? + +HERMOGENES: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty? + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works +which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful? + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: What more names remain to us? + +HERMOGENES: There are the words which are connected with agathon and +kalon, such as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and their +opposites. + +SOCRATES: The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may +discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,--for it is +a sister word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the soul +accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle +are called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried round with +the world. + +HERMOGENES: That is probable. + +SOCRATES: Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain), but +you must alter the delta into nu if you want to get at the meaning; for +this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name +intended to express the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and universal +penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a +delta instead of a nu, and so made kerdos. + +HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)? + +SOCRATES: I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the +profitable the gainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but +they use the word in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable +(lusiteloun), as that which being the swiftest thing in existence, +allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion, but always, +if there begins to be any end, lets things go again (luei), and makes +motion immortal and unceasing: and in this point of view, as appears to +me, the good is happily denominated lusiteloun--being that which looses +(luon) the end (telos) of motion. Ophelimon (the advantageous) is +derived from ophellein, meaning that which creates and increases; this +latter is a common Homeric word, and has a foreign character. + +HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites? + +SOCRATES: Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need +speak. + +HERMOGENES: Which are they? + +SOCRATES: The words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable), +alusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful). + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes +(hurtful). + +HERMOGENES: Good. + +SOCRATES: The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm +(blaptein) the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to +hold or bind); for aptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a term +of censure; boulomenon aptein roun (wanting to bind the stream) would +properly be boulapteroun, and this, as I imagine, is improved into +blaberon. + +HERMOGENES: You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of +names; and when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining +that you are making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some +prelude to Athene. + +SOCRATES: That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not +mine. + +HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes? + +SOCRATES: What is the meaning of zemiodes?--let me remark, Hermogenes, +how right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning +of words by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight +permutation will sometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may +instance the word deon, which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds me +of what I was going to say to you, that the fine fashionable language of +modern times has twisted and disguised and entirely altered the original +meaning both of deon, and also of zemiodes, which in the old language is +clearly indicated. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers +loved the sounds iota and delta, especially the women, who are most +conservative of the ancient language, but now they change iota into +eta or epsilon, and delta into zeta; this is supposed to increase the +grandeur of the sound. + +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: For example, in very ancient times they called the day either +imera or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e). + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention +of the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for +(imeirousi) and love the light which comes after the darkness, and is +therefore called imera, from imeros, desire. + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the +meaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be called emera +because it makes things gentle (emera different accents). + +HERMOGENES: Such is my view. + +SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon? + +HERMOGENES: They did so. + +SOCRATES: And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,--it ought to be duogon, which +word expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the purpose +of drawing;--this has been changed into zugon, and there are many other +examples of similar changes. + +HERMOGENES: There are. + +SOCRATES: Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the +word deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the +other appellations of good; for deon is here a species of good, and is, +nevertheless, the chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and therefore +own brother of blaberon. + +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain. + +SOCRATES: Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to +be the correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the +epsilon into an iota after the old fashion, this word will then agree +with other words meaning good; for dion, not deon, signifies the good, +and is a term of praise; and the author of names has not contradicted +himself, but in all these various appellations, deon (obligatory), +ophelimon (advantageous), lusiteloun (profitable), kerdaleon (gainful), +agathon (good), sumpheron (expedient), euporon (plenteous), the same +conception is implied of the ordering or all-pervading principle which +is praised, and the restraining and binding principle which is censured. +And this is further illustrated by the word zemiodes (hurtful), which if +the zeta is only changed into delta as in the ancient language, becomes +demiodes; and this name, as you will perceive, is given to that which +binds motion (dounti ion). + +HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia +(desire), and the like, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty +about them--edone is e (eta) onesis, the action which tends to +advantage; and the original form may be supposed to have been eone, but +this has been altered by the insertion of the delta. Lupe appears to be +derived from the relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in sorrow; +ania (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (alpha and ienai); algedon +(distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which is derived +from aleinos (grievous); odune (grief) is called from the putting on +(endusis) sorrow; in achthedon (vexation) 'the word too labours,' as +any one may see; chara (joy) is the very expression of the fluency and +diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis (delight) is so called from the +pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul, which may be likened to a +breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has been altered by time into +terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia explain themselves; +the former, which ought to be eupherosune and has been changed +euphrosune, is named, as every one may see, from the soul moving +(pheresthai) in harmony with nature; epithumia is really e epi ton +thumon iousa dunamis, the power which enters into the soul; thumos +(passion) is called from the rushing (thuseos) and boiling of the soul; +imeros (desire) denotes the stream (rous) which most draws the soul dia +ten esin tes roes--because flowing with desire (iemenos), and expresses +a longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to them, +and is termed imeros from possessing this power; pothos (longing) is +expressive of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and in +another place (pou); this is the reason why the name pothos is applied +to things absent, as imeros is to things present; eros (love) is so +called because flowing in (esron) from without; the stream is not +inherent, but is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from +flowing in was called esros (influx) in the old time when they used +omicron for omega, and is called eros, now that omega is substituted for +omicron. But why do you not give me another word? + +HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of +words? + +SOCRATES: Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses +the march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting +of a bow (toxon); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis +(thinking), which is only oisis (moving), and implies the movement of +the soul to the essential nature of each thing--just as boule (counsel) +has to do with shooting (bole); and boulesthai (to wish) combines the +notion of aiming and deliberating--all these words seem to follow +doxa, and all involve the idea of shooting, just as aboulia, absence of +counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the +mark, or aim, or proposal, or object. + +HERMOGENES: You are quickening your pace now, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until +I have explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and +ekousion (the voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon) and +unresisting--the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, +as I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with +our will; but the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, +implies error and ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through +a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes +motion--and this is the derivation of the word anagkaion (necessary) +an agke ion, going through a ravine. But while my strength lasts let us +persevere, and I hope that you will persevere with your questions. + +HERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, +such as aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not +forgetting to enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of +our discussion, has this name of onoma. + +SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai (to seek)? + +HERMOGENES: Yes;--meaning the same as zetein (to enquire). + +SOCRATES: The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying +on ou zetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more +obvious in onomaston (notable), which states in so many words that real +existence is that for which there is a seeking (on ou masma); aletheia +is also an agglomeration of theia ale (divine wandering), implying +the divine motion of existence; pseudos (falsehood) is the opposite of +motion; here is another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation +and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep (eudein); but the +original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of psi; on +and ousia are ion with an iota broken off; this agrees with the true +principle, for being (on) is also moving (ion), and the same may be said +of not being, which is likewise called not going (oukion or ouki on = +ouk ion). + +HERMOGENES: You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that +some one were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon and +doun?--show me their fitness. + +SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already +suggested. + +HERMOGENES: What way? + +SOCRATES: To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign +origin; and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this +kind may be true of them; but also the original forms of words may have +been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all +manner of ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language +when compared with that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous +tongue. + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest +attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a +person go on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into +the elements out of which the words are formed, and keeps on always +repeating this process, he who has to answer him must at last give up +the enquiry in despair. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the +enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the +elements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed +to be made up of other names? The word agathon (good), for example, is, +as we were saying, a compound of agastos (admirable) and thoos (swift). +And probably thoos is made up of other elements, and these again of +others. But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, +then we shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary +element, which need not be resolved any further. + +HERMOGENES: I believe you to be in the right. + +SOCRATES: And suppose the names about which you are now asking should +turn out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be examined +according to some new method? + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to this +conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall +again say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some +absurdity in stating the principle of primary names. + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you. + +SOCRATES: I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle +is applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary--when they are +regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: All the names that we have been explaining were intended to +indicate the nature of things. + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the +secondary names, is implied in their being names. + +HERMOGENES: Surely. + +SOCRATES: But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance +from the primary. + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede +analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which +they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you +a question: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to +communicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and dumb, +make signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body? + +HERMOGENES: There would be no choice, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of +our hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and +downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; +if we were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we +should make our bodies and their gestures as like as we could to them. + +HERMOGENES: I do not see that we could do anything else. + +SOCRATES: We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever +express anything. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, +or tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that +which we want to express. + +HERMOGENES: It must be so, I think. + +SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal +imitator names or imitates? + +HERMOGENES: I think so. + +SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not +reached the truth as yet. + +HERMOGENES: Why not? + +SOCRATES: Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the +people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which +they imitate. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying? + +HERMOGENES: In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, +Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, +although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music +imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the +matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have +colour? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with +imitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music +and drawing? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is +a colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as +well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence? + +HERMOGENES: I should think so. + +SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing +in letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing? + +HERMOGENES: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave +to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called? + +HERMOGENES: I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or +name-giver, of whom we are in search. + +SOCRATES: If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to +consider the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention), +about which you were asking; and we may see whether the namer has +grasped the nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as +to imitate the essence or not. + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others? + +HERMOGENES: There must be others. + +SOCRATES: So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them, +and where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by +syllables and letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the +letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the +powers of elementary, and then of compound sounds, and when they have +done so, but not before, they proceed to the consideration of rhythms? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first +separating the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes (letters which +are neither vowels nor semivowels), into classes, according to the +received distinctions of the learned; also the semivowels, which are +neither vowels, nor yet mutes; and distinguishing into classes the +vowels themselves? And when we have perfected the classification of +things, we shall give them names, and see whether, as in the case of +letters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred (cf. +Phaedrus); and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether +they have in them classes as there are in the letters; and when we have +well considered all this, we shall know how to apply them to what they +resemble--whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether +there is to be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting, +the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or +any other colour, and sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method +is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that kind--he uses +his colours as his figures appear to require them; and so, too, we shall +apply letters to the expression of objects, either single letters when +required, or several letters; and so we shall form syllables, as they +are called, and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at last, +from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large and +fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so shall we make +speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some other +art. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried +away--meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we but) the +ancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to +pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the +whole subject, and we must see whether the primary, and also whether the +secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they are not, the +composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, +and in the wrong direction. + +HERMOGENES: That, Socrates, I can quite believe. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them +in this way? for I am certain that I should not. + +HERMOGENES: Much less am I likely to be able. + +SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if +we can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, +saying by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the +truth about them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of +them. And in this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we +proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or others who +would analyse language to any good purpose must follow; but under the +circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can. What do you +think? + +HERMOGENES: I very much approve. + +SOCRATES: That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and +so find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be +avoided--there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth +of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, +like the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in +the air; and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying +that 'the Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.' This +will be the best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be even +better still, of deriving them from some barbarous people, for the +barbarians are older than we are; or we may say that antiquity has cast +a veil over them, which is the same sort of excuse as the last; for all +these are not reasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons +concerning the truth of words. And yet any sort of ignorance of first or +primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary words; for they +can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of +languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first +names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. +Do you not suppose this to be true? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: My first notions of original names are truly wild and +ridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you +desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything +better which you may have. + +HERMOGENES: Fear not; I will do my best. + +SOCRATES: In the first place, the letter rho appears to me to be the +general instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet +explained the meaning of this latter word, which is just iesis (going); +for the letter eta was not in use among the ancients, who only employed +epsilon; and the root is kiein, which is a foreign form, the same as +ienai. And the old word kinesis will be correctly given as iesis in +corresponding modern letters. Assuming this foreign root kiein, and +allowing for the change of the eta and the insertion of the nu, we have +kinesis, which should have been kieinsis or eisis; and stasis is the +negative of ienai (or eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now +the letter rho, as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an +excellent instrument for the expression of motion; and he frequently +uses the letter for this purpose: for example, in the actual words +rein and roe he represents motion by rho; also in the words tromos +(trembling), trachus (rugged); and again, in words such as krouein +(strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), thruptein (break), +kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts of movements +he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I imagine, +he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in +the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order +to express motion, just as by the letter iota he expresses the subtle +elements which pass through all things. This is why he uses the letter +iota as imitative of motion, ienai, iesthai. And there is another class +of letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi, of which the pronunciation is +accompanied by great expenditure of breath; these are used in the +imitation of such notions as psuchron (shivering), xeon (seething), +seiesthai, (to be shaken), seismos (shock), and are always introduced by +the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is phusodes (windy). He +seems to have thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue in +the utterance of delta and tau was expressive of binding and rest in +a place: he further observed the liquid movement of lambda, in the +pronunciation of which the tongue slips, and in this he found the +expression of smoothness, as in leios (level), and in the word +oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon (sleek), in the word kollodes +(gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of gamma detained the slipping +tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a glutinous clammy +nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes. The nu he observed to be +sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of inwardness; hence +he introduced the sound in endos and entos: alpha he assigned to the +expression of size, and nu of length, because they are great letters: +omicron was the sign of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of +omicron mixed up in the word goggulon (round). Thus did the legislator, +reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing on them +names and signs, and out of them by imitation compounding other signs. +That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names; but I should like to +hear what Cratylus has more to say. + +HERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus +mystifies me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never +explains what is this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his +obscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the +presence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying +about names, or have you something better of your own? and if you have, +tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates, +or Socrates and I will learn of you. + +CRATYLUS: Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can +learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at +any rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very +greatest of all. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, 'to +add little to little' is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that +you can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a +little trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a +claim upon you. + +SOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which +Hermogenes and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate +to say what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall +gladly accept. And I should not be at all surprized to find that you +have found some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on these +matters and have had teachers, and if you have really a better theory of +the truth of names, you may count me in the number of your disciples. + +CRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of +these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I +fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved +to say to you what Achilles in the 'Prayers' says to Ajax,-- + +'Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people, You appear to +have spoken in all things much to my mind.' + +And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers +much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some +Muse may have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to +yourself. + +SOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own +wisdom; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and +ask myself What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than +self-deception--when the deceiver is always at home and always with +you--it is quite terrible, and therefore I ought often to retrace +my steps and endeavour to 'look fore and aft,' in the words of the +aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are we? Have we not been +saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:--has +this proposition been sufficiently proven? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is +quite true. + +SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And who are they? + +CRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first. + +SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me +explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, +better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders also, the +better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse. + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work better +and some worse? + +CRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you. + +SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others +worse? + +CRATYLUS: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all. + +SOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, +which was mentioned before:--assuming that he has nothing of the nature +of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his +name at all? + +CRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but +only appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has +the nature which corresponds to it. + +SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be +even speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him +Hermogenes, if he is not. + +CRATYLUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this +is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in +all ages. + +CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?--say +something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing +which is not? + +SOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. +But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who +think that falsehood may be spoken but not said? + +CRATYLUS: Neither spoken nor said. + +SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting +you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: 'Hail, +Athenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion'--these words, whether +spoken, said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you +but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all? + +CRATYLUS: In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking +nonsense. + +SOCRATES: Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell +me whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and +partly false:--which is all that I want to know. + +CRATYLUS: I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no +purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise +of hammering at a brazen pot. + +SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a +meeting-point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with +the thing named? + +CRATYLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an +imitation of the thing? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, +but in another way? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand +you. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both +pictures or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the +things of which they are the imitation. + +CRATYLUS: They are. + +SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness +of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to +the woman, and of the woman to the man? + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first? + +CRATYLUS: Only the first. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to +each that which belongs to them and is like them? + +CRATYLUS: That is my view. + +SOCRATES: Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a +good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you: the +first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call +right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and the +other mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call +wrong, and in the case of names, false as well as wrong. + +CRATYLUS: That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may +be wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names--they must be always +right. + +SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to +him, 'This is your picture,' showing him his own likeness, or perhaps +the likeness of a woman; and when I say 'show,' I mean bring before the +sense of sight. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And may I not go to him again, and say, 'This is your +name'?--for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say +to him--'This is your name'? and may I not then bring to his sense of +hearing the imitation of himself, when I say, 'This is a man'; or of a +female of the human species, when I say, 'This is a woman,' as the case +may be? Is not all that quite possible? + +CRATYLUS: I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say, +Granted. + +SOCRATES: That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be +disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to +objects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong +assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of +names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; +and if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of +them. What do you say, Cratylus? + +CRATYLUS: I agree; and think that what you say is very true. + +SOCRATES: And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and +in pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, +or you may not give them all--some may be wanting; or there may be too +many or too much of them--may there not? + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and +he who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good +one. + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the +nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a +good image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps +adds a little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer +that some names are well and others ill made. + +CRATYLUS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be +bad? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may +be bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good? + +CRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is +different; for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters alpha +or beta, or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or +subtract, or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only +written wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases +becomes other than a name. + +SOCRATES: But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus. + +CRATYLUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which +must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number +ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, +and so of any other number: but this does not apply to that which is +qualitative or to anything which is represented under an image. I should +say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the entire +reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the existence of +two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of +Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God makes not only +a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and +colour, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the +same warmth and softness; and into this infuses motion, and soul, and +mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and +places them by you in another form; would you say that this was Cratylus +and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that there were two Cratyluses. + +SOCRATES: Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other +principle of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an +image is no longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do +you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which +are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I see. + +SOCRATES: But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on +things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the +doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the +names and which were the realities. + +CRATYLUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may +be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the +name shall be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the occasional +substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a +sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not +appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, +and described, so long as the general character of the thing which you +are describing is retained; and this, as you will remember, was remarked +by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of the +letters. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I remember. + +SOCRATES: Good; and when the general character is preserved, even +if some of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is +signified;--well, if all the letters are given; not well, when only a +few of them are given. I think that we had better admit this, lest we be +punished like travellers in Aegina who wander about the street late at +night: and be likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived too +late; or if not, you must find out some new notion of correctness of +names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a thing +in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be inconsistent +with yourself. + +CRATYLUS: I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very +reasonable. + +SOCRATES: Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a +name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters. + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names +which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made +up of proper and similar letters, or there would be no likeness; but +there will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the beauty +and formation of the word: you would admit that? + +CRATYLUS: There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, +since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a +name at all. + +SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some +derived? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are +representations of things, is there any better way of framing +representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you +can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who +say that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who +have agreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things +intended by them, and that convention is the only principle; and whether +you abide by our present convention, or make a new and opposite one, +according to which you call small great and great small--that, they +would say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these +two notions do you prefer? + +CRATYLUS: Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better +than representation by any chance sign. + +SOCRATES: Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the +letters out of which the first names are composed must also be like +things. Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could +any one ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if +there were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, +and out of which the picture is composed? + +CRATYLUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, +unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore some +degree of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the +imitation: And the original elements are letters? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I +were saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter rho is +expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in +saying so? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that you were right. + +SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and +the like? + +CRATYLUS: There again you were right. + +SOCRATES: And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us +sklerotes, is by the Eretrians called skleroter. + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there +the same significance to them in the termination rho, which there is to +us in sigma, or is there no significance to one of us? + +CRATYLUS: Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us. + +SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike? + +CRATYLUS: In as far as they are like. + +SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike? + +CRATYLUS: Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that is +expressive not of hardness but of softness. + +CRATYLUS: Why, perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted, Socrates, +and should be altered into rho, as you were saying to Hermogenes and +in my opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters +upon occasion. + +SOCRATES: Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when I +say skleros (hard), you know what I mean. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom. + +SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I +understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: +this is what you are saying? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an +indication given by me to you? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well +as from like, for example in the lamda of sklerotes. But if this is +true, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the correctness +of a name turns out to be convention, since letters which are unlike are +indicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanctioned by +custom and convention. And even supposing that you distinguish custom +from convention ever so much, still you must say that the signification +of words is given by custom and not by likeness, for custom may indicate +by the unlike as well as by the like. But as we are agreed thus far, +Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence gives consent), then +custom and convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication +of our thoughts; for suppose we take the instance of number, how can you +ever imagine, my good friend, that you will find names resembling every +individual number, unless you allow that which you term convention and +agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names? +I quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble +things; but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes +says, is a shabby thing, which has to be supplemented by the mechanical +aid of convention with a view to correctness; for I believe that if +we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are perfectly +appropriate, this would be the most perfect state of language; as the +opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of +names, and what is the use of them? + +CRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform: +the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which +are expressed by them. + +SOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, +so also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the +other, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same +art or science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names will +also know things. + +CRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean. + +SOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of this information +about things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the +best sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say? + +CRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of +information about them; there can be no other. + +SOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who +discovers the names discovers also the things; or is this only the +method of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and +discovery. + +CRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery +are of the same nature as instruction. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names +in the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great +danger of being deceived? + +CRATYLUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his +conception of the things which they signified--did he not? + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names +according to his conception, in what position shall we who are his +followers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him? + +CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely +have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at +all? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and +the proof is--that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in +speaking that all the words which you utter have a common character and +purpose? + +SOCRATES: But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin +in error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the +original error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, +any more than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and +invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and are consistently +mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is the reason +why every man should expend his chief thought and attention on the +consideration of his first principles:--are they or are they not rightly +laid down? and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest will follow. +Now I should be astonished to find that names are really consistent. And +here let us revert to our former discussion: Were we not saying that all +things are in motion and progress and flux, and that this idea of motion +is expressed by names? Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of +them? + +CRATYLUS: Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning. + +SOCRATES: Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how +ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at +things than going round with them; and therefore we should leave +the beginning as at present, and not reject the epsilon, but make an +insertion of an iota instead of an epsilon (not pioteme, but epiisteme). +Take another example: bebaion (sure) is clearly the expression of +station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word istoria +(enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (istanai) of the +stream; and the word piston (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of +motion; then, again, mneme (memory), as any one may see, expresses +rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as amartia +and sumphora, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their +etymologies will be the same as sunesis and episteme and other +words which have a good sense (compare omartein, sunienai, epesthai, +sumpheresthai); and much the same may be said of amathia and akolasia, +for amathia may be explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia +as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the names which in these instances +we find to have the worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the same +principle as those which have the best. And any one I believe who would +take the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of +names indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that +they are at rest; which is the opposite of motion. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express motion. + +SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and +is correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of +whichever sort there are most, those are the true ones? + +CRATYLUS: No; that is not reasonable. + +SOCRATES: Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and +proceed to another, about which I should like to know whether you think +with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names +in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that +the art which gave names was the art of the legislator? + +CRATYLUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers +of the first names, know or not know the things which they named? + +CRATYLUS: They must have known, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been +ignorant. + +CRATYLUS: I should say not. + +SOCRATES: Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were +saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the +things which he named; are you still of that opinion? + +CRATYLUS: I am. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a +knowledge of the things which he named? + +CRATYLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names +if the primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in +our view, the only way of learning and discovering things, is either to +discover names for ourselves or to learn them from others. + +CRATYLUS: I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if things are only to be known through names, how can +we suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators +before there were names at all, and therefore before they could have +known them? + +CRATYLUS: I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, +that a power more than human gave things their first names, and that the +names which are thus given are necessarily their true names. + +SOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired +being or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now +that he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we +mistaken? + +CRATYLUS: But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all. + +SOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are +expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a +point which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them. + +CRATYLUS: No; not in that way, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that +they are like the truth, others contending that THEY are, how or by what +criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to +which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another +standard which, without employing names, will make clear which of the +two are right; and this must be a standard which shows the truth of +things. + +CRATYLUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may +be known without names? + +CRATYLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them? What other way can +there be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their +affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through themselves? +For that which is other and different from them must signify something +other and different from them. + +CRATYLUS: What you are saying is, I think, true. + +SOCRATES: Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that +names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which +they name? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn +things through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn +them from the things themselves--which is likely to be the nobler and +clearer way; to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of +which the image is the expression have been rightly conceived, or to +learn of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly +executed? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that we must learn of the truth. + +SOCRATES: How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I +suspect, beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge +of things is not to be derived from names. No; they must be studied and +investigated in themselves. + +CRATYLUS: Clearly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed +upon by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the +same direction. I myself do not deny that the givers of names did really +give them under the idea that all things were in motion and flux; which +was their sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion. And having fallen into +a kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried round, and want to +drag us in after them. There is a matter, master Cratylus, about which I +often dream, and should like to ask your opinion: Tell me, whether +there is or is not any absolute beauty or good, or any other absolute +existence? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly, Socrates, I think so. + +SOCRATES: Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face +is fair, or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in a +flux; but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing +away, and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born +and retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths? + +CRATYLUS: Undoubtedly. + +SOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same +state? for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they +remain the same; and if they are always the same and in the same state, +and never depart from their original form, they can never change or be +moved. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly they cannot. + +SOCRATES: Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the moment that +the observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, +so that you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for +you cannot know that which has no state. + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge +at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing +abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless +continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of +knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no +knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always +be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will be no one to +know and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that which is +known exists ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other thing +also exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a process or +flux, as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal +nature in things, or whether the truth is what Heracleitus and his +followers and many others say, is a question hard to determine; and no +man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in +the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers +of names as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and +other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he will not believe +that all things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world is a man who +has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is also very +likely to be untrue; and therefore I would not have you be too easily +persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and do not easily accept +such a doctrine; for you are young and of an age to learn. And when you +have found the truth, come and tell me. + +CRATYLUS: I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that +I have been considering the matter already, and the result of a great +deal of trouble and consideration is that I incline to Heracleitus. + +SOCRATES: Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall +give me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are +intending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your way. + +CRATYLUS: Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue +to think about these things yourself. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Cratylus, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CRATYLUS *** + +***** This file should be named 1616.txt or 1616.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/1/1616/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and metaphysical +originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of the Platonic +writings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive of the piece, +which interpreters have hitherto not succeeded in dispelling. We need not +suppose that Plato used words in order to conceal his thoughts, or that he +would have been unintelligible to an educated contemporary. In the +Phaedrus and Euthydemus we also find a difficulty in determining the +precise aim of the author. Plato wrote satires in the form of dialogues, +and his meaning, like that of other satirical writers, has often slept in +the ear of posterity. Two causes may be assigned for this obscurity: 1st, +the subtlety and allusiveness of this species of composition; 2nd, the +difficulty of reproducing a state of life and literature which has passed +away. A satire is unmeaning unless we can place ourselves back among the +persons and thoughts of the age in which it was written. Had the treatise +of Antisthenes upon words, or the speculations of Cratylus, or some other +Heracleitean of the fourth century B.C., on the nature of language been +preserved to us; or if we had lived at the time, and been 'rich enough to +attend the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus,' we should have understood +Plato better, and many points which are now attributed to the extravagance +of Socrates' humour would have been found, like the allusions of +Aristophanes in the Clouds, to have gone home to the sophists and +grammarians of the day. + +For the age was very busy with philological speculation; and many questions +were beginning to be asked about language which were parallel to other +questions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were illustrated in a +similar manner by the analogy of the arts. Was there a correctness in +words, and were they given by nature or convention? In the presocratic +philosophy mankind had been striving to attain an expression of their +ideas, and now they were beginning to ask themselves whether the expression +might not be distinguished from the idea? They were also seeking to +distinguish the parts of speech and to enquire into the relation of subject +and predicate. Grammar and logic were moving about somewhere in the depths +of the human soul, but they were not yet awakened into consciousness and +had not found names for themselves, or terms by which they might be +expressed. Of these beginnings of the study of language we know little, +and there necessarily arises an obscurity when the surroundings of such a +work as the Cratylus are taken away. Moreover, in this, as in most of the +dialogues of Plato, allowance has to be made for the character of Socrates. +For the theory of language can only be propounded by him in a manner which +is consistent with his own profession of ignorance. Hence his ridicule of +the new school of etymology is interspersed with many declarations 'that he +knows nothing,' 'that he has learned from Euthyphro,' and the like. Even +the truest things which he says are depreciated by himself. He professes +to be guessing, but the guesses of Plato are better than all the other +theories of the ancients respecting language put together. + +The dialogue hardly derives any light from Plato's other writings, and +still less from Scholiasts and Neoplatonist writers. Socrates must be +interpreted from himself, and on first reading we certainly have a +difficulty in understanding his drift, or his relation to the two other +interlocutors in the dialogue. Does he agree with Cratylus or with +Hermogenes, and is he serious in those fanciful etymologies, extending over +more than half the dialogue, which he seems so greatly to relish? Or is he +serious in part only; and can we separate his jest from his earnest?--Sunt +bona, sunt quaedum mediocria, sunt mala plura. Most of them are +ridiculously bad, and yet among them are found, as if by accident, +principles of philology which are unsurpassed in any ancient writer, and +even in advance of any philologer of the last century. May we suppose that +Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by writing a comedy in the +form of a prose dialogue? And what is the final result of the enquiry? Is +Plato an upholder of the conventional theory of language, which he +acknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to imply that a perfect +language can only be based on his own theory of ideas? Or if this latter +explanation is refuted by his silence, then in what relation does his +account of language stand to the rest of his philosophy? Or may we be so +bold as to deny the connexion between them? (For the allusion to the ideas +at the end of the dialogue is merely intended to show that we must not put +words in the place of things or realities, which is a thesis strongly +insisted on by Plato in many other passages)...These are some of the first +thoughts which arise in the mind of the reader of the Cratylus. And the +consideration of them may form a convenient introduction to the general +subject of the dialogue. + +We must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally to +some clearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the absolute +proportion of the whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek temple or +statue; nor should his works be tried by any such standard. They have +often the beauty of poetry, but they have also the freedom of conversation. +'Words are more plastic than wax' (Rep.), and may be moulded into any form. +He wanders on from one topic to another, careless of the unity of his work, +not fearing any 'judge, or spectator, who may recall him to the point' +(Theat.), 'whither the argument blows we follow' (Rep.). To have +determined beforehand, as in a modern didactic treatise, the nature and +limits of the subject, would have been fatal to the spirit of enquiry or +discovery, which is the soul of the dialogue...These remarks are applicable +to nearly all the works of Plato, but to the Cratylus and Phaedrus more +than any others. See Phaedrus, Introduction. + +There is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may be +more truly viewed:--they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We have +found that in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, we arrived at +no conclusion--the different sides of the argument were personified in the +different speakers; but the victory was not distinctly attributed to any of +them, nor the truth wholly the property of any. And in the Cratylus we +have no reason to assume that Socrates is either wholly right or wholly +wrong, or that Plato, though he evidently inclines to him, had any other +aim than that of personifying, in the characters of Hermogenes, Socrates, +and Cratylus, the three theories of language which are respectively +maintained by them. + +The two subordinate persons of the dialogue, Hermogenes and Cratylus, are +at the opposite poles of the argument. But after a while the disciple of +the Sophist and the follower of Heracleitus are found to be not so far +removed from one another as at first sight appeared; and both show an +inclination to accept the third view which Socrates interposes between +them. First, Hermogenes, the poor brother of the rich Callias, expounds +the doctrine that names are conventional; like the names of slaves, they +may be given and altered at pleasure. This is one of those principles +which, whether applied to society or language, explains everything and +nothing. For in all things there is an element of convention; but the +admission of this does not help us to understand the rational ground or +basis in human nature on which the convention proceeds. Socrates first of +all intimates to Hermogenes that his view of language is only a part of a +sophistical whole, and ultimately tends to abolish the distinction between +truth and falsehood. Hermogenes is very ready to throw aside the +sophistical tenet, and listens with a sort of half admiration, half belief, +to the speculations of Socrates. + +Cratylus is of opinion that a name is either a true name or not a name at +all. He is unable to conceive of degrees of imitation; a word is either +the perfect expression of a thing, or a mere inarticulate sound (a fallacy +which is still prevalent among theorizers about the origin of language). +He is at once a philosopher and a sophist; for while wanting to rest +language on an immutable basis, he would deny the possibility of falsehood. +He is inclined to derive all truth from language, and in language he sees +reflected the philosophy of Heracleitus. His views are not like those of +Hermogenes, hastily taken up, but are said to be the result of mature +consideration, although he is described as still a young man. With a +tenacity characteristic of the Heracleitean philosophers, he clings to the +doctrine of the flux. (Compare Theaet.) Of the real Cratylus we know +nothing, except that he is recorded by Aristotle to have been the friend or +teacher of Plato; nor have we any proof that he resembled the likeness of +him in Plato any more than the Critias of Plato is like the real Critias, +or the Euthyphro in this dialogue like the other Euthyphro, the diviner, in +the dialogue which is called after him. + +Between these two extremes, which have both of them a sophistical +character, the view of Socrates is introduced, which is in a manner the +union of the two. Language is conventional and also natural, and the true +conventional-natural is the rational. It is a work not of chance, but of +art; the dialectician is the artificer of words, and the legislator gives +authority to them. They are the expressions or imitations in sound of +things. In a sense, Cratylus is right in saying that things have by nature +names; for nature is not opposed either to art or to law. But vocal +imitation, like any other copy, may be imperfectly executed; and in this +way an element of chance or convention enters in. There is much which is +accidental or exceptional in language. Some words have had their original +meaning so obscured, that they require to be helped out by convention. But +still the true name is that which has a natural meaning. Thus nature, art, +chance, all combine in the formation of language. And the three views +respectively propounded by Hermogenes, Socrates, Cratylus, may be described +as the conventional, the artificial or rational, and the natural. The view +of Socrates is the meeting-point of the other two, just as conceptualism is +the meeting-point of nominalism and realism. + +We can hardly say that Plato was aware of the truth, that 'languages are +not made, but grow.' But still, when he says that 'the legislator made +language with the dialectician standing on his right hand,' we need not +infer from this that he conceived words, like coins, to be issued from the +mint of the State. The creator of laws and of social life is naturally +regarded as the creator of language, according to Hellenic notions, and the +philosopher is his natural advisor. We are not to suppose that the +legislator is performing any extraordinary function; he is merely the +Eponymus of the State, who prescribes rules for the dialectician and for +all other artists. According to a truly Platonic mode of approaching the +subject, language, like virtue in the Republic, is examined by the analogy +of the arts. Words are works of art which may be equally made in different +materials, and are well made when they have a meaning. Of the process +which he thus describes, Plato had probably no very definite notion. But +he means to express generally that language is the product of intelligence, +and that languages belong to States and not to individuals. + +A better conception of language could not have been formed in Plato's age, +than that which he attributes to Socrates. Yet many persons have thought +that the mind of Plato is more truly seen in the vague realism of Cratylus. +This misconception has probably arisen from two causes: first, the desire +to bring Plato's theory of language into accordance with the received +doctrine of the Platonic ideas; secondly, the impression created by +Socrates himself, that he is not in earnest, and is only indulging the +fancy of the hour. + +1. We shall have occasion to show more at length, in the Introduction to +future dialogues, that the so-called Platonic ideas are only a semi- +mythical form, in which he attempts to realize abstractions, and that they +are replaced in his later writings by a rational theory of psychology. +(See introductions to the Meno and the Sophist.) And in the Cratylus he +gives a general account of the nature and origin of language, in which Adam +Smith, Rousseau, and other writers of the last century, would have +substantially agreed. At the end of the dialogue, he speaks as in the +Symposium and Republic of absolute beauty and good; but he never supposed +that they were capable of being embodied in words. Of the names of the +ideas, he would have said, as he says of the names of the Gods, that we +know nothing. Even the realism of Cratylus is not based upon the ideas of +Plato, but upon the flux of Heracleitus. Here, as in the Sophist and +Politicus, Plato expressly draws attention to the want of agreement in +words and things. Hence we are led to infer, that the view of Socrates is +not the less Plato's own, because not based upon the ideas; 2nd, that +Plato's theory of language is not inconsistent with the rest of his +philosophy. + +2. We do not deny that Socrates is partly in jest and partly in earnest. +He is discoursing in a high-flown vein, which may be compared to the +'dithyrambics of the Phaedrus.' They are mysteries of which he is +speaking, and he professes a kind of ludicrous fear of his imaginary +wisdom. When he is arguing out of Homer, about the names of Hector's son, +or when he describes himself as inspired or maddened by Euthyphro, with +whom he has been sitting from the early dawn (compare Phaedrus and Lysias; +Phaedr.) and expresses his intention of yielding to the illusion to-day, +and to-morrow he will go to a priest and be purified, we easily see that +his words are not to be taken seriously. In this part of the dialogue his +dread of committing impiety, the pretended derivation of his wisdom from +another, the extravagance of some of his etymologies, and, in general, the +manner in which the fun, fast and furious, vires acquirit eundo, remind us +strongly of the Phaedrus. The jest is a long one, extending over more than +half the dialogue. But then, we remember that the Euthydemus is a still +longer jest, in which the irony is preserved to the very end. There he is +parodying the ingenious follies of early logic; in the Cratylus he is +ridiculing the fancies of a new school of sophists and grammarians. The +fallacies of the Euthydemus are still retained at the end of our logic +books; and the etymologies of the Cratylus have also found their way into +later writers. Some of these are not much worse than the conjectures of +Hemsterhuis, and other critics of the last century; but this does not prove +that they are serious. For Plato is in advance of his age in his +conception of language, as much as he is in his conception of mythology. +(Compare Phaedrus.) + +When the fervour of his etymological enthusiasm has abated, Socrates ends, +as he has begun, with a rational explanation of language. Still he +preserves his 'know nothing' disguise, and himself declares his first +notions about names to be reckless and ridiculous. Having explained +compound words by resolving them into their original elements, he now +proceeds to analyse simple words into the letters of which they are +composed. The Socrates who 'knows nothing,' here passes into the teacher, +the dialectician, the arranger of species. There is nothing in this part +of the dialogue which is either weak or extravagant. Plato is a supporter +of the Onomatopoetic theory of language; that is to say, he supposes words +to be formed by the imitation of ideas in sounds; he also recognises the +effect of time, the influence of foreign languages, the desire of euphony, +to be formative principles; and he admits a certain element of chance. But +he gives no imitation in all this that he is preparing the way for the +construction of an ideal language. Or that he has any Eleatic speculation +to oppose to the Heracleiteanism of Cratylus. + +The theory of language which is propounded in the Cratylus is in accordance +with the later phase of the philosophy of Plato, and would have been +regarded by him as in the main true. The dialogue is also a satire on the +philological fancies of the day. Socrates in pursuit of his vocation as a +detector of false knowledge, lights by accident on the truth. He is +guessing, he is dreaming; he has heard, as he says in the Phaedrus, from +another: no one is more surprised than himself at his own discoveries. +And yet some of his best remarks, as for example his view of the derivation +of Greek words from other languages, or of the permutations of letters, or +again, his observation that in speaking of the Gods we are only speaking of +our names of them, occur among these flights of humour. + +We can imagine a character having a profound insight into the nature of men +and things, and yet hardly dwelling upon them seriously; blending +inextricably sense and nonsense; sometimes enveloping in a blaze of jests +the most serious matters, and then again allowing the truth to peer +through; enjoying the flow of his own humour, and puzzling mankind by an +ironical exaggeration of their absurdities. Such were Aristophanes and +Rabelais; such, in a different style, were Sterne, Jean Paul, Hamann,-- +writers who sometimes become unintelligible through the extravagance of +their fancies. Such is the character which Plato intends to depict in some +of his dialogues as the Silenus Socrates; and through this medium we have +to receive our theory of language. + +There remains a difficulty which seems to demand a more exact answer: In +what relation does the satirical or etymological portion of the dialogue +stand to the serious? Granting all that can be said about the provoking +irony of Socrates, about the parody of Euthyphro, or Prodicus, or +Antisthenes, how does the long catalogue of etymologies furnish any answer +to the question of Hermogenes, which is evidently the main thesis of the +dialogue: What is the truth, or correctness, or principle of names? + +After illustrating the nature of correctness by the analogy of the arts, +and then, as in the Republic, ironically appealing to the authority of the +Homeric poems, Socrates shows that the truth or correctness of names can +only be ascertained by an appeal to etymology. The truth of names is to be +found in the analysis of their elements. But why does he admit etymologies +which are absurd, based on Heracleitean fancies, fourfold interpretations +of words, impossible unions and separations of syllables and letters? + +1. The answer to this difficulty has been already anticipated in part: +Socrates is not a dogmatic teacher, and therefore he puts on this wild and +fanciful disguise, in order that the truth may be permitted to appear: 2. +as Benfey remarks, an erroneous example may illustrate a principle of +language as well as a true one: 3. many of these etymologies, as, for +example, that of dikaion, are indicated, by the manner in which Socrates +speaks of them, to have been current in his own age: 4. the philosophy of +language had not made such progress as would have justified Plato in +propounding real derivations. Like his master Socrates, he saw through the +hollowness of the incipient sciences of the day, and tries to move in a +circle apart from them, laying down the conditions under which they are to +be pursued, but, as in the Timaeus, cautious and tentative, when he is +speaking of actual phenomena. To have made etymologies seriously, would +have seemed to him like the interpretation of the myths in the Phaedrus, +the task 'of a not very fortunate individual, who had a great deal of time +on his hands.' The irony of Socrates places him above and beyond the +errors of his contemporaries. + +The Cratylus is full of humour and satirical touches: the inspiration +which comes from Euthyphro, and his prancing steeds, the light admixture of +quotations from Homer, and the spurious dialectic which is applied to them; +the jest about the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus, which is declared on +the best authority, viz. his own, to be a complete education in grammar and +rhetoric; the double explanation of the name Hermogenes, either as 'not +being in luck,' or 'being no speaker;' the dearly-bought wisdom of Callias, +the Lacedaemonian whose name was 'Rush,' and, above all, the pleasure which +Socrates expresses in his own dangerous discoveries, which 'to-morrow he +will purge away,' are truly humorous. While delivering a lecture on the +philosophy of language, Socrates is also satirizing the endless fertility +of the human mind in spinning arguments out of nothing, and employing the +most trifling and fanciful analogies in support of a theory. Etymology in +ancient as in modern times was a favourite recreation; and Socrates makes +merry at the expense of the etymologists. The simplicity of Hermogenes, +who is ready to believe anything that he is told, heightens the effect. +Socrates in his genial and ironical mood hits right and left at his +adversaries: Ouranos is so called apo tou oran ta ano, which, as some +philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind; the sophists are by a +fanciful explanation converted into heroes; 'the givers of names were like +some philosophers who fancy that the earth goes round because their heads +are always going round.' There is a great deal of 'mischief' lurking in +the following: 'I found myself in greater perplexity about justice than I +was before I began to learn;' 'The rho in katoptron must be the addition +of some one who cares nothing about truth, but thinks only of putting the +mouth into shape;' 'Tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the +Tragic and goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them.' Several +philosophers and sophists are mentioned by name: first, Protagoras and +Euthydemus are assailed; then the interpreters of Homer, oi palaioi +Omerikoi (compare Arist. Met.) and the Orphic poets are alluded to by the +way; then he discovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of Heracleitus;-- +the doctrine of the flux is contained in the word ousia (= osia the pushing +principle), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in psuche and selene. +Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling out and putting in +letters which were in vogue among the philologers of his time; or slightly +scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, he is impatient of +hearing from the half-converted Cratylus the doctrine that falsehood can +neither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed; a piece of sophistry +attributed to Gorgias, which reappears in the Sophist. And he proceeds to +demolish, with no less delight than he had set up, the Heracleitean theory +of language. + +In the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious, though he +does not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the Heracleiteans, +whom here, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to ridicule. What was the +origin of this enmity we can hardly determine:--was it due to the natural +dislike which may be supposed to exist between the 'patrons of the flux' +and the 'friends of the ideas' (Soph.)? or is it to be attributed to the +indignation which Plato felt at having wasted his time upon 'Cratylus and +the doctrines of Heracleitus' in the days of his youth? Socrates, touching +on some of the characteristic difficulties of early Greek philosophy, +endeavours to show Cratylus that imitation may be partial or imperfect, +that a knowledge of things is higher than a knowledge of names, and that +there can be no knowledge if all things are in a state of transition. But +Cratylus, who does not easily apprehend the argument from common sense, +remains unconvinced, and on the whole inclines to his former opinion. Some +profound philosophical remarks are scattered up and down, admitting of an +application not only to language but to knowledge generally; such as the +assertion that 'consistency is no test of truth:' or again, 'If we are +over-precise about words, truth will say "too late" to us as to the belated +traveller in Aegina.' + +The place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with +certainty. The style and subject, and the treatment of the character of +Socrates, have a close resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially to +the Phaedrus and Euthydemus. The manner in which the ideas are spoken of +at the end of the dialogue, also indicates a comparatively early date. The +imaginative element is still in full vigour; the Socrates of the Cratylus +is the Socrates of the Apology and Symposium, not yet Platonized; and he +describes, as in the Theaetetus, the philosophy of Heracleitus by +'unsavoury' similes--he cannot believe that the world is like 'a leaky +vessel,' or 'a man who has a running at the nose'; he attributes the flux +of the world to the swimming in some folks' heads. On the other hand, the +relation of thought to language is omitted here, but is treated of in the +Sophist. These grounds are not sufficient to enable us to arrive at a +precise conclusion. But we shall not be far wrong in placing the Cratylus +about the middle, or at any rate in the first half, of the series. + +Cratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the brother of +Callias, have been arguing about names; the former maintaining that they +are natural, the latter that they are conventional. Cratylus affirms that +his own is a true name, but will not allow that the name of Hermogenes is +equally true. Hermogenes asks Socrates to explain to him what Cratylus +means; or, far rather, he would like to know, What Socrates himself thinks +about the truth or correctness of names? Socrates replies, that hard is +knowledge, and the nature of names is a considerable part of knowledge: he +has never been to hear the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having +only attended the single-drachma course, he is not competent to give an +opinion on such matters. When Cratylus denies that Hermogenes is a true +name, he supposes him to mean that he is not a true son of Hermes, because +he is never in luck. But he would like to have an open council and to hear +both sides. + +Hermogenes is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may be +changed, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please, and the +altered name is as good as the original one. + +You mean to say, for instance, rejoins Socrates, that if I agree to call a +man a horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me, and a man by +the rest of the world? But, surely, there is in words a true and a false, +as there are true and false propositions. If a whole proposition be true +or false, then the parts of a proposition may be true or false, and the +least parts as well as the greatest; and the least parts are names, and +therefore names may be true or false. Would Hermogenes maintain that +anybody may give a name to anything, and as many names as he pleases; and +would all these names be always true at the time of giving them? +Hermogenes replies that this is the only way in which he can conceive that +names are correct; and he appeals to the practice of different nations, and +of the different Hellenic tribes, in confirmation of his view. Socrates +asks, whether the things differ as the words which represent them differ:-- +Are we to maintain with Protagoras, that what appears is? Hermogenes has +always been puzzled about this, but acknowledges, when he is pressed by +Socrates, that there are a few very good men in the world, and a great many +very bad; and the very good are the wise, and the very bad are the foolish; +and this is not mere appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say +with Euthydemus, that all things equally and always belong to all men; in +that case, again, there would be no distinction between bad and good men. +But then, the only remaining possibility is, that all things have their +several distinct natures, and are independent of our notions about them. +And not only things, but actions, have distinct natures, and are done by +different processes. There is a natural way of cutting or burning, and a +natural instrument with which men cut or burn, and any other way will +fail;--this is true of all actions. And speaking is a kind of action, and +naming is a kind of speaking, and we must name according to a natural +process, and with a proper instrument. We cut with a knife, we pierce with +an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name with a name. And as a shuttle +separates the warp from the woof, so a name distinguishes the natures of +things. The weaver will use the shuttle well,--that is, like a weaver; and +the teacher will use the name well,--that is, like a teacher. The shuttle +will be made by the carpenter; the awl by the smith or skilled person. But +who makes a name? Does not the law give names, and does not the teacher +receive them from the legislator? He is the skilled person who makes them, +and of all skilled workmen he is the rarest. But how does the carpenter +make or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? Will he not look at +the ideal which he has in his mind? And as the different kinds of work +differ, so ought the instruments which make them to differ. The several +kinds of shuttles ought to answer in material and form to the several kinds +of webs. And the legislator ought to know the different materials and +forms of which names are made in Hellas and other countries. But who is to +be the judge of the proper form? The judge of shuttles is the weaver who +uses them; the judge of lyres is the player of the lyre; the judge of ships +is the pilot. And will not the judge who is able to direct the legislator +in his work of naming, be he who knows how to use the names--he who can ask +and answer questions--in short, the dialectician? The pilot directs the +carpenter how to make the rudder, and the dialectician directs the +legislator how he is to impose names; for to express the ideal forms of +things in syllables and letters is not the easy task, Hermogenes, which you +imagine. + +'I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me this natural +correctness of names.' + +Indeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit that +there is a correctness of names, and that not every one can give a name. +But what is the nature of this correctness or truth, you must learn from +the Sophists, of whom your brother Callias has bought his reputation for +wisdom rather dearly; and since they require to be paid, you, having no +money, had better learn from him at second-hand. 'Well, but I have just +given up Protagoras, and I should be inconsistent in going to learn of +him.' Then if you reject him you may learn of the poets, and in particular +of Homer, who distinguishes the names given by Gods and men to the same +things, as in the verse about the river God who fought with Hephaestus, +'whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander;' or in the lines in +which he mentions the bird which the Gods call 'Chalcis,' and men +'Cymindis;' or the hill which men call 'Batieia,' and the Gods 'Myrinna's +Tomb.' Here is an important lesson; for the Gods must of course be right +in their use of names. And this is not the only truth about philology +which may be learnt from Homer. Does he not say that Hector's son had two +names-- + +'Hector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax'? + +Now, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the other name +was conferred by the women? And which are more likely to be right--the +wiser or the less wise, the men or the women? Homer evidently agreed with +the men: and of the name given by them he offers an explanation;--the boy +was called Astyanax ('king of the city'), because his father saved the +city. The names Astyanax and Hector, moreover, are really the same,--the +one means a king, and the other is 'a holder or possessor.' For as the +lion's whelp may be called a lion, or the horse's foal a foal, so the son +of a king may be called a king. But if the horse had produced a calf, then +that would be called a calf. Whether the syllables of a name are the same +or not makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained. For example; +the names of letters, whether vowels or consonants, do not correspond to +their sounds, with the exception of epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega. The +name Beta has three letters added to the sound--and yet this does not alter +the sense of the word, or prevent the whole name having the value which the +legislator intended. And the same may be said of a king and the son of a +king, who like other animals resemble each other in the course of nature; +the words by which they are signified may be disguised, and yet amid +differences of sound the etymologist may recognise the same notion, just as +the physician recognises the power of the same drugs under different +disguises of colour and smell. Hector and Astyanax have only one letter +alike, but they have the same meaning; and Agis (leader) is altogether +different in sound from Polemarchus (chief in war), or Eupolemus (good +warrior); but the two words present the same idea of leader or general, +like the words Iatrocles and Acesimbrotus, which equally denote a +physician. The son succeeds the father as the foal succeeds the horse, but +when, out of the course of nature, a prodigy occurs, and the offspring no +longer resembles the parent, then the names no longer agree. This may be +illustrated by the case of Agamemnon and his son Orestes, of whom the +former has a name significant of his patience at the siege of Troy; while +the name of the latter indicates his savage, man-of-the-mountain nature. +Atreus again, for his murder of Chrysippus, and his cruelty to Thyestes, is +rightly named Atreus, which, to the eye of the etymologist, is ateros +(destructive), ateires (stubborn), atreotos (fearless); and Pelops is o ta +pelas oron (he who sees what is near only), because in his eagerness to win +Hippodamia, he was unconscious of the remoter consequences which the murder +of Myrtilus would entail upon his race. The name Tantalus, if slightly +changed, offers two etymologies; either apo tes tou lithou talanteias, or +apo tou talantaton einai, signifying at once the hanging of the stone over +his head in the world below, and the misery which he brought upon his +country. And the name of his father, Zeus, Dios, Zenos, has an excellent +meaning, though hard to be understood, because really a sentence which is +divided into two parts (Zeus, Dios). For he, being the lord and king of +all, is the author of our being, and in him all live: this is implied in +the double form, Dios, Zenos, which being put together and interpreted is +di on ze panta. There may, at first sight, appear to be some irreverence +in calling him the son of Cronos, who is a proverb for stupidity; but the +meaning is that Zeus himself is the son of a mighty intellect; Kronos, +quasi koros, not in the sense of a youth, but quasi to katharon kai +akeraton tou nou--the pure and garnished mind, which in turn is begotten of +Uranus, who is so called apo tou oran ta ano, from looking upwards; which, +as philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind. The earlier portion +of Hesiod's genealogy has escaped my memory, or I would try more +conclusions of the same sort. 'You talk like an oracle.' I caught the +infection from Euthyphro, who gave me a long lecture which began at dawn, +and has not only entered into my ears, but filled my soul, and my intention +is to yield to the inspiration to-day; and to-morrow I will be exorcised by +some priest or sophist. 'Go on; I am anxious to hear the rest.' Now that +we have a general notion, how shall we proceed? What names will afford the +most crucial test of natural fitness? Those of heroes and ordinary men are +often deceptive, because they are patronymics or expressions of a wish; let +us try gods and demi-gods. Gods are so called, apo tou thein, from the +verb 'to run;' because the sun, moon, and stars run about the heaven; and +they being the original gods of the Hellenes, as they still are of the +Barbarians, their name is given to all Gods. The demons are the golden +race of Hesiod, and by golden he means not literally golden, but good; and +they are called demons, quasi daemones, which in old Attic was used for +daimones--good men are well said to become daimones when they die, because +they are knowing. Eros (with an epsilon) is the same word as eros (with an +eta): 'the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair;' or +perhaps they were a species of sophists or rhetoricians, and so called apo +tou erotan, or eirein, from their habit of spinning questions; for eirein +is equivalent to legein. I get all this from Euthyphro; and now a new and +ingenious idea comes into my mind, and, if I am not careful, I shall be +wiser than I ought to be by to-morrow's dawn. My idea is, that we may put +in and pull out letters at pleasure and alter the accents (as, for example, +Dii philos may be turned into Diphilos), and we may make words into +sentences and sentences into words. The name anthrotos is a case in point, +for a letter has been omitted and the accent changed; the original meaning +being o anathron a opopen--he who looks up at what he sees. Psuche may be +thought to be the reviving, or refreshing, or animating principle--e +anapsuchousa to soma; but I am afraid that Euthyphro and his disciples will +scorn this derivation, and I must find another: shall we identify the soul +with the 'ordering mind' of Anaxagoras, and say that psuche, quasi phuseche += e phusin echei or ochei?--this might easily be refined into psyche. +'That is a more artistic etymology.' + +After psuche follows soma; this, by a slight permutation, may be either = +(1) the 'grave' of the soul, or (2) may mean 'that by which the soul +signifies (semainei) her wishes.' But more probably, the word is Orphic, +and simply denotes that the body is the place of ward in which the soul +suffers the penalty of sin,--en o sozetai. 'I should like to hear some +more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that excellent one of +Zeus.' The truest names of the Gods are those which they give themselves; +but these are unknown to us. Less true are those by which we propitiate +them, as men say in prayers, 'May he graciously receive any name by which I +call him.' And to avoid offence, I should like to let them know beforehand +that we are not presuming to enquire about them, but only about the names +which they usually bear. Let us begin with Hestia. What did he mean who +gave the name Hestia? 'That is a very difficult question.' O, my dear +Hermogenes, I believe that there was a power of philosophy and talk among +the first inventors of names, both in our own and in other languages; for +even in foreign words a principle is discernible. Hestia is the same with +esia, which is an old form of ousia, and means the first principle of +things: this agrees with the fact that to Hestia the first sacrifices are +offered. There is also another reading--osia, which implies that 'pushing' +(othoun) is the first principle of all things. And here I seem to discover +a delicate allusion to the flux of Heracleitus--that antediluvian +philosopher who cannot walk twice in the same stream; and this flux of his +may accomplish yet greater marvels. For the names Cronos and Rhea cannot +have been accidental; the giver of them must have known something about the +doctrine of Heracleitus. Moreover, there is a remarkable coincidence in +the words of Hesiod, when he speaks of Oceanus, 'the origin of Gods;' and +in the verse of Orpheus, in which he describes Oceanus espousing his sister +Tethys. Tethys is nothing more than the name of a spring--to diattomenon +kai ethoumenon. Poseidon is posidesmos, the chain of the feet, because you +cannot walk on the sea--the epsilon is inserted by way of ornament; or +perhaps the name may have been originally polleidon, meaning, that the God +knew many things (polla eidos): he may also be the shaker, apo tou +seiein,--in this case, pi and delta have been added. Pluto is connected +with ploutos, because wealth comes out of the earth; or the word may be a +euphemism for Hades, which is usually derived apo tou aeidous, because the +God is concerned with the invisible. But the name Hades was really given +him from his knowing (eidenai) all good things. Men in general are +foolishly afraid of him, and talk with horror of the world below from which +no one may return. The reason why his subjects never wish to come back, +even if they could, is that the God enchains them by the strongest of +spells, namely by the desire of virtue, which they hope to obtain by +constant association with him. He is the perfect and accomplished Sophist +and the great benefactor of the other world; for he has much more than he +wants there, and hence he is called Pluto or the rich. He will have +nothing to do with the souls of men while in the body, because he cannot +work his will with them so long as they are confused and entangled by +fleshly lusts. Demeter is the mother and giver of food--e didousa meter +tes edodes. Here is erate tis, or perhaps the legislator may have been +thinking of the weather, and has merely transposed the letters of the word +aer. Pherephatta, that word of awe, is pheretapha, which is only an +euphonious contraction of e tou pheromenou ephaptomene,--all things are in +motion, and she in her wisdom moves with them, and the wise God Hades +consorts with her--there is nothing very terrible in this, any more than in +the her other appellation Persephone, which is also significant of her +wisdom (sophe). Apollo is another name, which is supposed to have some +dreadful meaning, but is susceptible of at least four perfectly innocent +explanations. First, he is the purifier or purger or absolver (apolouon); +secondly, he is the true diviner, Aplos, as he is called in the Thessalian +dialect (aplos = aplous, sincere); thirdly, he is the archer (aei ballon), +always shooting; or again, supposing alpha to mean ama or omou, Apollo +becomes equivalent to ama polon, which points to both his musical and his +heavenly attributes; for there is a 'moving together' alike in music and in +the harmony of the spheres. The second lambda is inserted in order to +avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction. The Muses are so called--apo +tou mosthai. The gentle Leto or Letho is named from her willingness +(ethelemon), or because she is ready to forgive and forget (lethe). +Artemis is so called from her healthy well-balanced nature, dia to artemes, +or as aretes istor; or as a lover of virginity, aroton misesasa. One of +these explanations is probably true,--perhaps all of them. Dionysus is o +didous ton oinon, and oinos is quasi oionous because wine makes those think +(oiesthai) that they have a mind (nous) who have none. The established +derivation of Aphrodite dia ten tou athrou genesin may be accepted on the +authority of Hesiod. Again, there is the name of Pallas, or Athene, which +we, who are Athenians, must not forget. Pallas is derived from armed +dances--apo tou pallein ta opla. For Athene we must turn to the +allegorical interpreters of Homer, who make the name equivalent to theonoe, +or possibly the word was originally ethonoe and signified moral +intelligence (en ethei noesis). Hephaestus, again, is the lord of light--o +tou phaeos istor. This is a good notion; and, to prevent any other getting +into our heads, let us go on to Ares. He is the manly one (arren), or the +unchangeable one (arratos). Enough of the Gods; for, by the Gods, I am +afraid of them; but if you suggest other words, you will see how the horses +of Euthyphro prance. 'Only one more God; tell me about my godfather +Hermes.' He is ermeneus, the messenger or cheater or thief or bargainer; +or o eirein momenos, that is, eiremes or ermes--the speaker or contriver of +speeches. 'Well said Cratylus, then, that I am no son of Hermes.' Pan, as +the son of Hermes, is speech or the brother of speech, and is called Pan +because speech indicates everything--o pan menuon. He has two forms, a +true and a false; and is in the upper part smooth, and in the lower part +shaggy. He is the goat of Tragedy, in which there are plenty of +falsehoods. + +'Will you go on to the elements--sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, +fire, water, seasons, years?' Very good: and which shall I take first? +Let us begin with elios, or the sun. The Doric form elios helps us to see +that he is so called because at his rising he gathers (alizei) men +together, or because he rolls about (eilei) the earth, or because he +variegates (aiolei = poikillei) the earth. Selene is an anticipation of +Anaxagoras, being a contraction of selaenoneoaeia, the light (selas) which +is ever old and new, and which, as Anaxagoras says, is borrowed from the +sun; the name was harmonized into selanaia, a form which is still in use. +'That is a true dithyrambic name.' Meis is so called apo tou meiousthai, +from suffering diminution, and astron is from astrape (lightning), which is +an improvement of anastrope, that which turns the eyes inside out. 'How do +you explain pur n udor?' I suspect that pur, which, like udor n kuon, is +found in Phrygian, is a foreign word; for the Hellenes have borrowed much +from the barbarians, and I always resort to this theory of a foreign origin +when I am at a loss. Aer may be explained, oti airei ta apo tes ges; or, +oti aei rei; or, oti pneuma ex autou ginetai (compare the poetic word +aetai). So aither quasi aeitheer oti aei thei peri ton aera: ge, gaia +quasi genneteira (compare the Homeric form gegaasi); ora (with an omega), +or, according to the old Attic form ora (with an omicron), is derived apo +tou orizein, because it divides the year; eniautos and etos are the same +thought--o en eauto etazon, cut into two parts, en eauto and etazon, like +di on ze into Dios and Zenos. + +'You make surprising progress.' True; I am run away with, and am not even +yet at my utmost speed. 'I should like very much to hear your account of +the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those charming +words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?' To explain all that +will be a serious business; still, as I have put on the lion's skin, +appearances must be maintained. My opinion is, that primitive men were +like some modern philosophers, who, by always going round in their search +after the nature of things, become dizzy; and this phenomenon, which was +really in themselves, they imagined to take place in the external world. +You have no doubt remarked, that the doctrine of the universal flux, or +generation of things, is indicated in names. 'No, I never did.' Phronesis +is only phoras kai rou noesis, or perhaps phoras onesis, and in any case is +connected with pheresthai; gnome is gones skepsis kai nomesis; noesis is +neou or gignomenon esis; the word neos implies that creation is always +going on--the original form was neoesis; sophrosune is soteria phroneseos; +episteme is e epomene tois pragmasin--the faculty which keeps close, +neither anticipating nor lagging behind; sunesis is equivalent to sunienai, +sumporeuesthai ten psuche, and is a kind of conclusion--sullogismos tis, +akin therefore in idea to episteme; sophia is very difficult, and has a +foreign look--the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things, and +may be illustrated by the poetical esuthe and the Lacedaemonian proper name +Sous, or Rush; agathon is ro agaston en te tachuteti,--for all things are +in motion, and some are swifter than others: dikaiosune is clearly e tou +dikaiou sunesis. The word dikaion is more troublesome, and appears to mean +the subtle penetrating power which, as the lovers of motion say, preserves +all things, and is the cause of all things, quasi diaion going through--the +letter kappa being inserted for the sake of euphony. This is a great +mystery which has been confided to me; but when I ask for an explanation I +am thought obtrusive, and another derivation is proposed to me. Justice is +said to be o kaion, or the sun; and when I joyfully repeat this beautiful +notion, I am answered, 'What, is there no justice when the sun is down?' +And when I entreat my questioner to tell me his own opinion, he replies, +that justice is fire in the abstract, or heat in the abstract; which is not +very intelligible. Others laugh at such notions, and say with Anaxagoras, +that justice is the ordering mind. 'I think that some one must have told +you this.' And not the rest? Let me proceed then, in the hope of proving +to you my originality. Andreia is quasi anpeia quasi e ano roe, the stream +which flows upwards, and is opposed to injustice, which clearly hinders the +principle of penetration; arren and aner have a similar derivation; gune is +the same as gone; thelu is derived apo tes theles, because the teat makes +things flourish (tethelenai), and the word thallein itself implies increase +of youth, which is swift and sudden ever (thein and allesthai). I am +getting over the ground fast: but much has still to be explained. There +is techne, for instance. This, by an aphaeresis of tau and an epenthesis +of omicron in two places, may be identified with echonoe, and signifies +'that which has mind.' + +'A very poor etymology.' Yes; but you must remember that all language is +in process of change; letters are taken in and put out for the sake of +euphony, and time is also a great alterer of words. For example, what +business has the letter rho in the word katoptron, or the letter sigma in +the word sphigx? The additions are often such that it is impossible to +make out the original word; and yet, if you may put in and pull out, as you +like, any name is equally good for any object. The fact is, that great +dictators of literature like yourself should observe the rules of +moderation. 'I will do my best.' But do not be too much of a precisian, +or you will paralyze me. If you will let me add mechane, apo tou mekous, +which means polu, and anein, I shall be at the summit of my powers, from +which elevation I will examine the two words kakia and arete. The first is +easily explained in accordance with what has preceded; for all things being +in a flux, kakia is to kakos ion. This derivation is illustrated by the +word deilia, which ought to have come after andreia, and may be regarded as +o lian desmos tes psuches, just as aporia signifies an impediment to motion +(from alpha not, and poreuesthai to go), and arete is euporia, which is the +opposite of this--the everflowing (aei reousa or aeireite), or the +eligible, quasi airete. You will think that I am inventing, but I say that +if kakia is right, then arete is also right. But what is kakon? That is a +very obscure word, to which I can only apply my old notion and declare that +kakon is a foreign word. Next, let us proceed to kalon, aischron. The +latter is doubtless contracted from aeischoroun, quasi aei ischon roun. +The inventor of words being a patron of the flux, was a great enemy to +stagnation. Kalon is to kaloun ta pragmata--this is mind (nous or +dianoia); which is also the principle of beauty; and which doing the works +of beauty, is therefore rightly called the beautiful. The meaning of +sumpheron is explained by previous examples;--like episteme, signifying +that the soul moves in harmony with the world (sumphora, sumpheronta). +Kerdos is to pasi kerannumenon--that which mingles with all things: +lusiteloun is equivalent to to tes phoras luon to telos, and is not to be +taken in the vulgar sense of gainful, but rather in that of swift, being +the principle which makes motion immortal and unceasing; ophelimon is apo +tou ophellein--that which gives increase: this word, which is Homeric, is +of foreign origin. Blaberon is to blamton or boulomenon aptein tou rou-- +that which injures or seeks to bind the stream. The proper word would be +boulapteroun, but this is too much of a mouthful--like a prelude on the +flute in honour of Athene. The word zemiodes is difficult; great changes, +as I was saying, have been made in words, and even a small change will +alter their meaning very much. The word deon is one of these disguised +words. You know that according to the old pronunciation, which is +especially affected by the women, who are great conservatives, iota and +delta were used where we should now use eta and zeta: for example, what we +now call emera was formerly called imera; and this shows the meaning of the +word to have been 'the desired one coming after night,' and not, as is +often supposed, 'that which makes things gentle' (emera). So again, zugon +is duogon, quasi desis duein eis agogen--(the binding of two together for +the purpose of drawing. Deon, as ordinarily written, has an evil sense, +signifying the chain (desmos) or hindrance of motion; but in its ancient +form dion is expressive of good, quasi diion, that which penetrates or goes +through all. Zemiodes is really demiodes, and means that which binds +motion (dounti to ion): edone is e pros ten onrsin teinousa praxis--the +delta is an insertion: lupe is derived apo tes dialuseos tou somatos: ania +is from alpha and ienai, to go: algedon is a foreign word, and is so +called apo tou algeinou: odune is apo tes enduseos tes lupes: achthedon +is in its very sound a burden: chapa expresses the flow of soul: terpsis +is apo tou terpnou, and terpnon is properly erpnon, because the sensation +of pleasure is likened to a breath (pnoe) which creeps (erpei) through the +soul: euphrosune is named from pheresthai, because the soul moves in +harmony with nature: epithumia is e epi ton thumon iousa dunamis: thumos +is apo tes thuseos tes psuches: imeros--oti eimenos pei e psuche: pothos, +the desire which is in another place, allothi pou: eros was anciently +esros, and so called because it flows into (esrei) the soul from without: +doxa is e dioxis tou eidenai, or expresses the shooting from a bow (toxon). +The latter etymology is confirmed by the words boulesthai, boule, aboulia, +which all have to do with shooting (bole): and similarly oiesis is nothing +but the movement (oisis) of the soul towards essence. Ekousion is to +eikon--the yielding--anagke is e an agke iousa, the passage through ravines +which impede motion: aletheia is theia ale, divine motion. Pseudos is the +opposite of this, implying the principle of constraint and forced repose, +which is expressed under the figure of sleep, to eudon; the psi is an +addition. Onoma, a name, affirms the real existence of that which is +sought after--on ou masma estin. On and ousia are only ion with an iota +broken off; and ouk on is ouk ion. 'And what are ion, reon, doun?' One +way of explaining them has been already suggested--they may be of foreign +origin; and possibly this is the true answer. But mere antiquity may often +prevent our recognizing words, after all the complications which they have +undergone; and we must remember that however far we carry back our analysis +some ultimate elements or roots will remain which can be no further +analyzed. For example; the word agathos was supposed by us to be a +compound of agastos and thoos, and probably thoos may be further +resolvable. But if we take a word of which no further resolution seems +attainable, we may fairly conclude that we have reached one of these +original elements, and the truth of such a word must be tested by some new +method. Will you help me in the search? + +All names, whether primary or secondary, are intended to show the nature of +things; and the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from +the primary. But then, how do the primary names indicate anything? And +let me ask another question,--If we had no faculty of speech, how should we +communicate with one another? Should we not use signs, like the deaf and +dumb? The elevation of our hands would mean lightness--heaviness would be +expressed by letting them drop. The running of any animal would be +described by a similar movement of our own frames. The body can only +express anything by imitation; and the tongue or mouth can imitate as well +as the rest of the body. But this imitation of the tongue or voice is not +yet a name, because people may imitate sheep or goats without naming them. +What, then, is a name? In the first place, a name is not a musical, or, +secondly, a pictorial imitation, but an imitation of that kind which +expresses the nature of a thing; and is the invention not of a musician, or +of a painter, but of a namer. + +And now, I think that we may consider the names about which you were +asking. The way to analyze them will be by going back to the letters, or +primary elements of which they are composed. First, we separate the +alphabet into classes of letters, distinguishing the consonants, mutes, +vowels, and semivowels; and when we have learnt them singly, we shall learn +to know them in their various combinations of two or more letters; just as +the painter knows how to use either a single colour, or a combination of +colours. And like the painter, we may apply letters to the expression of +objects, and form them into syllables; and these again into words, until +the picture or figure--that is, language--is completed. Not that I am +literally speaking of ourselves, but I mean to say that this was the way in +which the ancients framed language. And this leads me to consider whether +the primary as well as the secondary elements are rightly given. I may +remark, as I was saying about the Gods, that we can only attain to +conjecture of them. But still we insist that ours is the true and only +method of discovery; otherwise we must have recourse, like the tragic +poets, to a Deus ex machina, and say that God gave the first names, and +therefore they are right; or that the barbarians are older than we are, and +that we learnt of them; or that antiquity has cast a veil over the truth. +Yet all these are not reasons; they are only ingenious excuses for having +no reasons. + +I will freely impart to you my own notions, though they are somewhat +crude:--the letter rho appears to me to be the general instrument which the +legislator has employed to express all motion or kinesis. (I ought to +explain that kinesis is just iesis (going), for the letter eta was unknown +to the ancients; and the root, kiein, is a foreign form of ienai: of +kinesis or eisis, the opposite is stasis). This use of rho is evident in +the words tremble, break, crush, crumble, and the like; the imposer of +names perceived that the tongue is most agitated in the pronunciation of +this letter, just as he used iota to express the subtle power which +penetrates through all things. The letters phi, psi, sigma, zeta, which +require a great deal of wind, are employed in the imitation of such notions +as shivering, seething, shaking, and in general of what is windy. The +letters delta and tau convey the idea of binding and rest in a place: the +lambda denotes smoothness, as in the words slip, sleek, sleep, and the +like. But when the slipping tongue is detained by the heavier sound of +gamma, then arises the notion of a glutinous clammy nature: nu is sounded +from within, and has a notion of inwardness: alpha is the expression of +size; eta of length; omicron of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of +omicron in the word goggulon. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the +correctness of names; and I should like to hear what Cratylus would say. +'But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus mystifies me; I should like +to ask him, in your presence, what he means by the fitness of names?' To +this appeal, Cratylus replies 'that he cannot explain so important a +subject all in a moment.' 'No, but you may "add little to little," as +Hesiod says.' Socrates here interposes his own request, that Cratylus will +give some account of his theory. Hermogenes and himself are mere +sciolists, but Cratylus has reflected on these matters, and has had +teachers. Cratylus replies in the words of Achilles: '"Illustrious Ajax, +you have spoken in all things much to my mind," whether Euthyphro, or some +Muse inhabiting your own breast, was the inspirer.' Socrates replies, that +he is afraid of being self-deceived, and therefore he must 'look fore and +aft,' as Homer remarks. Does not Cratylus agree with him that names teach +us the nature of things? 'Yes.' And naming is an art, and the artists are +legislators, and like artists in general, some of them are better and some +of them are worse than others, and give better or worse laws, and make +better or worse names. Cratylus cannot admit that one name is better than +another; they are either true names, or they are not names at all; and when +he is asked about the name of Hermogenes, who is acknowledged to have no +luck in him, he affirms this to be the name of somebody else. Socrates +supposes him to mean that falsehood is impossible, to which his own answer +would be, that there has never been a lack of liars. Cratylus presses him +with the old sophistical argument, that falsehood is saying that which is +not, and therefore saying nothing;--you cannot utter the word which is not. +Socrates complains that this argument is too subtle for an old man to +understand: Suppose a person addressing Cratylus were to say, Hail, +Athenian Stranger, Hermogenes! would these words be true or false? 'I +should say that they would be mere unmeaning sounds, like the hammering of +a brass pot.' But you would acknowledge that names, as well as pictures, +are imitations, and also that pictures may give a right or wrong +representation of a man or woman:--why may not names then equally give a +representation true and right or false and wrong? Cratylus admits that +pictures may give a true or false representation, but denies that names +can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man and say 'this is year +picture,' and again, he may go and say to him 'this is your name'--in the +one case appealing to his sense of sight, and in the other to his sense of +hearing;--may he not? 'Yes.' Then you will admit that there is a right or +a wrong assignment of names, and if of names, then of verbs and nouns; and +if of verbs and nouns, then of the sentences which are made up of them; and +comparing nouns to pictures, you may give them all the appropriate sounds, +or only some of them. And as he who gives all the colours makes a good +picture, and he who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but +still a picture; so he who gives all the sounds makes a good name, and he +who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but a name still. The +artist of names, that is, the legislator, may be a good or he may be a bad +artist. 'Yes, Socrates, but the cases are not parallel; for if you +subtract or misplace a letter, the name ceases to be a name.' Socrates +admits that the number 10, if an unit is subtracted, would cease to be 10, +but denies that names are of this purely quantitative nature. Suppose that +there are two objects--Cratylus and the image of Cratylus; and let us +imagine that some God makes them perfectly alike, both in their outward +form and in their inner nature and qualities: then there will be two +Cratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of Cratylus. But an +image in fact always falls short in some degree of the original, and if +images are not exact counterparts, why should names be? if they were, they +would be the doubles of their originals, and indistinguishable from them; +and how ridiculous would this be! Cratylus admits the truth of Socrates' +remark. But then Socrates rejoins, he should have the courage to +acknowledge that letters may be wrongly inserted in a noun, or a noun in a +sentence; and yet the noun or the sentence may retain a meaning. Better to +admit this, that we may not be punished like the traveller in Egina who +goes about at night, and that Truth herself may not say to us, 'Too late.' +And, errors excepted, we may still affirm that a name to be correct must +have proper letters, which bear a resemblance to the thing signified. I +must remind you of what Hermogenes and I were saying about the letter rho +accent, which was held to be expressive of motion and hardness, as lambda +is of smoothness;--and this you will admit to be their natural meaning. +But then, why do the Eritreans call that skleroter which we call sklerotes? +We can understand one another, although the letter rho accent is not +equivalent to the letter s: why is this? You reply, because the two +letters are sufficiently alike for the purpose of expressing motion. Well, +then, there is the letter lambda; what business has this in a word meaning +hardness? 'Why, Socrates, I retort upon you, that we put in and pull out +letters at pleasure.' And the explanation of this is custom or agreement: +we have made a convention that the rho shall mean s and a convention may +indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. How could there be names +for all the numbers unless you allow that convention is used? Imitation is +a poor thing, and has to be supplemented by convention, which is another +poor thing; although I agree with you in thinking that the most perfect +form of language is found only where there is a perfect correspondence of +sound and meaning. But let me ask you what is the use and force of names? +'The use of names, Socrates, is to inform, and he who knows names knows +things.' Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the +discovery of things? 'Yes.' But do you not see that there is a degree of +deception about names? He who first gave names, gave them according to his +conception, and that may have been erroneous. 'But then, why, Socrates, is +language so consistent? all words have the same laws.' Mere consistency is +no test of truth. In geometrical problems, for example, there may be a +flaw at the beginning, and yet the conclusion may follow consistently. +And, therefore, a wise man will take especial care of first principles. +But are words really consistent; are there not as many terms of praise +which signify rest as which signify motion? There is episteme, which is +connected with stasis, as mneme is with meno. Bebaion, again, is the +expression of station and position; istoria is clearly descriptive of the +stopping istanai of the stream; piston indicates the cessation of motion; +and there are many words having a bad sense, which are connected with ideas +of motion, such as sumphora, amartia, etc.: amathia, again, might be +explained, as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois +pragmasin. Thus the bad names are framed on the same principle as the +good, and other examples might be given, which would favour a theory of +rest rather than of motion. 'Yes; but the greater number of words express +motion.' Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is correctness of names to be +determined by the voice of a majority? + +Here is another point: we were saying that the legislator gives names; and +therefore we must suppose that he knows the things which he names: but how +can he have learnt things from names before there were any names? 'I +believe, Socrates, that some power more than human first gave things their +names, and that these were necessarily true names.' Then how came the +giver of names to contradict himself, and to make some names expressive of +rest, and others of motion? 'I do not suppose that he did make them both.' +Then which did he make--those which are expressive of rest, or those which +are expressive of motion?...But if some names are true and others false, we +can only decide between them, not by counting words, but by appealing to +things. And, if so, we must allow that things may be known without names; +for names, as we have several times admitted, are the images of things; and +the higher knowledge is of things, and is not to be derived from names; and +though I do not doubt that the inventors of language gave names, under the +idea that all things are in a state of motion and flux, I believe that they +were mistaken; and that having fallen into a whirlpool themselves, they are +trying to drag us after them. For is there not a true beauty and a true +good, which is always beautiful and always good? Can the thing beauty be +vanishing away from us while the words are yet in our mouths? And they +could not be known by any one if they are always passing away--for if they +are always passing away, the observer has no opportunity of observing their +state. Whether the doctrine of the flux or of the eternal nature be the +truer, is hard to determine. But no man of sense will put himself, or the +education of his mind, in the power of names: he will not condemn himself +to be an unreal thing, nor will he believe that everything is in a flux +like the water in a leaky vessel, or that the world is a man who has a +running at the nose. This doctrine may be true, Cratylus, but is also very +likely to be untrue; and therefore I would have you reflect while you are +young, and find out the truth, and when you know come and tell me. 'I have +thought, Socrates, and after a good deal of thinking I incline to +Heracleitus.' Then another day, my friend, you shall give me a lesson. +'Very good, Socrates, and I hope that you will continue to study these +things yourself.' + +... + +We may now consider (I) how far Plato in the Cratylus has discovered the +true principles of language, and then (II) proceed to compare modern +speculations respecting the origin and nature of language with the +anticipations of his genius. + +I. (1) Plato is aware that language is not the work of chance; nor does he +deny that there is a natural fitness in names. He only insists that this +natural fitness shall be intelligibly explained. But he has no idea that +language is a natural organism. He would have heard with surprise that +languages are the common work of whole nations in a primitive or semi- +barbarous age. How, he would probably have argued, could men devoid of art +have contrived a structure of such complexity? No answer could have been +given to this question, either in ancient or in modern times, until the +nature of primitive antiquity had been thoroughly studied, and the +instincts of man had been shown to exist in greater force, when his state +approaches more nearly to that of children or animals. The philosophers of +the last century, after their manner, would have vainly endeavoured to +trace the process by which proper names were converted into common, and +would have shown how the last effort of abstraction invented prepositions +and auxiliaries. The theologian would have proved that language must have +had a divine origin, because in childhood, while the organs are pliable, +the intelligence is wanting, and when the intelligence is able to frame +conceptions, the organs are no longer able to express them. Or, as others +have said: Man is man because he has the gift of speech; and he could not +have invented that which he is. But this would have been an 'argument too +subtle' for Socrates, who rejects the theological account of the origin of +language 'as an excuse for not giving a reason,' which he compares to the +introduction of the 'Deus ex machina' by the tragic poets when they have to +solve a difficulty; thus anticipating many modern controversies in which +the primary agency of the divine Being is confused with the secondary +cause; and God is assumed to have worked a miracle in order to fill up a +lacuna in human knowledge. (Compare Timaeus.) + +Neither is Plato wrong in supposing that an element of design and art +enters into language. The creative power abating is supplemented by a +mechanical process. 'Languages are not made but grow,' but they are made +as well as grow; bursting into life like a plant or a flower, they are also +capable of being trained and improved and engrafted upon one another. The +change in them is effected in earlier ages by musical and euphonic +improvements, at a later stage by the influence of grammar and logic, and +by the poetical and literary use of words. They develope rapidly in +childhood, and when they are full grown and set they may still put forth +intellectual powers, like the mind in the body, or rather we may say that +the nobler use of language only begins when the frame-work is complete. +The savage or primitive man, in whom the natural instinct is strongest, is +also the greatest improver of the forms of language. He is the poet or +maker of words, as in civilised ages the dialectician is the definer or +distinguisher of them. The latter calls the second world of abstract terms +into existence, as the former has created the picture sounds which +represent natural objects or processes. Poetry and philosophy--these two, +are the two great formative principles of language, when they have passed +their first stage, of which, as of the first invention of the arts in +general, we only entertain conjecture. And mythology is a link between +them, connecting the visible and invisible, until at length the sensuous +exterior falls away, and the severance of the inner and outer world, of the +idea and the object of sense, becomes complete. At a later period, logic +and grammar, sister arts, preserve and enlarge the decaying instinct of +language, by rule and method, which they gather from analysis and +observation. + +(2) There is no trace in any of Plato's writings that he was acquainted +with any language but Greek. Yet he has conceived very truly the relation +of Greek to foreign languages, which he is led to consider, because he +finds that many Greek words are incapable of explanation. Allowing a good +deal for accident, and also for the fancies of the conditores linguae +Graecae, there is an element of which he is unable to give an account. +These unintelligible words he supposes to be of foreign origin, and to have +been derived from a time when the Greeks were either barbarians, or in +close relations to the barbarians. Socrates is aware that this principle +is liable to great abuse; and, like the 'Deus ex machina,' explains +nothing. Hence he excuses himself for the employment of such a device, +and remarks that in foreign words there is still a principle of +correctness, which applies equally both to Greeks and barbarians. + +(3) But the greater number of primary words do not admit of derivation +from foreign languages; they must be resolved into the letters out of which +they are composed, and therefore the letters must have a meaning. The +framers of language were aware of this; they observed that alpha was +adapted to express size; eta length; omicron roundness; nu inwardness; rho +accent rush or roar; lambda liquidity; gamma lambda the detention of the +liquid or slippery element; delta and tau binding; phi, psi, sigma, xi, +wind and cold, and so on. Plato's analysis of the letters of the alphabet +shows a wonderful insight into the nature of language. He does not +expressively distinguish between mere imitation and the symbolical use of +sound to express thought, but he recognises in the examples which he gives +both modes of imitation. Gesture is the mode which a deaf and dumb person +would take of indicating his meaning. And language is the gesture of the +tongue; in the use of the letter rho accent, to express a rushing or +roaring, or of omicron to express roundness, there is a direct imitation; +while in the use of the letter alpha to express size, or of eta to express +length, the imitation is symbolical. The use of analogous or similar +sounds, in order to express similar analogous ideas, seems to have escaped +him. + +In passing from the gesture of the body to the movement of the tongue, +Plato makes a great step in the physiology of language. He was probably +the first who said that 'language is imitative sound,' which is the +greatest and deepest truth of philology; although he is not aware of the +laws of euphony and association by which imitation must be regulated. He +was probably also the first who made a distinction between simple and +compound words, a truth second only in importance to that which has just +been mentioned. His great insight in one direction curiously contrasts +with his blindness in another; for he appears to be wholly unaware (compare +his derivation of agathos from agastos and thoos) of the difference between +the root and termination. But we must recollect that he was necessarily +more ignorant than any schoolboy of Greek grammar, and had no table of the +inflexions of verbs and nouns before his eyes, which might have suggested +to him the distinction. + +(4) Plato distinctly affirms that language is not truth, or 'philosophie +une langue bien faite.' At first, Socrates has delighted himself with +discovering the flux of Heracleitus in language. But he is covertly +satirising the pretence of that or any other age to find philosophy in +words; and he afterwards corrects any erroneous inference which might be +gathered from his experiment. For he finds as many, or almost as many, +words expressive of rest, as he had previously found expressive of motion. +And even if this had been otherwise, who would learn of words when he might +learn of things? There is a great controversy and high argument between +Heracleiteans and Eleatics, but no man of sense would commit his soul in +such enquiries to the imposers of names...In this and other passages Plato +shows that he is as completely emancipated from the influence of 'Idols of +the tribe' as Bacon himself. + +The lesson which may be gathered from words is not metaphysical or moral, +but historical. They teach us the affinity of races, they tell us +something about the association of ideas, they occasionally preserve the +memory of a disused custom; but we cannot safely argue from them about +right and wrong, matter and mind, freedom and necessity, or the other +problems of moral and metaphysical philosophy. For the use of words on +such subjects may often be metaphorical, accidental, derived from other +languages, and may have no relation to the contemporary state of thought +and feeling. Nor in any case is the invention of them the result of +philosophical reflection; they have been commonly transferred from matter +to mind, and their meaning is the very reverse of their etymology. Because +there is or is not a name for a thing, we cannot argue that the thing has +or has not an actual existence; or that the antitheses, parallels, +conjugates, correlatives of language have anything corresponding to them in +nature. There are too many words as well as too few; and they generalize +the objects or ideas which they represent. The greatest lesson which the +philosophical analysis of language teaches us is, that we should be above +language, making words our servants, and not allowing them to be our +masters. + +Plato does not add the further observation, that the etymological meaning +of words is in process of being lost. If at first framed on a principle of +intelligibility, they would gradually cease to be intelligible, like those +of a foreign language, he is willing to admit that they are subject to many +changes, and put on many disguises. He acknowledges that the 'poor +creature' imitation is supplemented by another 'poor creature,'-- +convention. But he does not see that 'habit and repute,' and their +relation to other words, are always exercising an influence over them. +Words appear to be isolated, but they are really the parts of an organism +which is always being reproduced. They are refined by civilization, +harmonized by poetry, emphasized by literature, technically applied in +philosophy and art; they are used as symbols on the border-ground of human +knowledge; they receive a fresh impress from individual genius, and come +with a new force and association to every lively-minded person. They are +fixed by the simultaneous utterance of millions, and yet are always +imperceptibly changing;--not the inventors of language, but writing and +speaking, and particularly great writers, or works which pass into the +hearts of nations, Homer, Shakespear, Dante, the German or English Bible, +Kant and Hegel, are the makers of them in later ages. They carry with them +the faded recollection of their own past history; the use of a word in a +striking and familiar passage gives a complexion to its use everywhere +else, and the new use of an old and familiar phrase has also a peculiar +power over us. But these and other subtleties of language escaped the +observation of Plato. He is not aware that the languages of the world are +organic structures, and that every word in them is related to every other; +nor does he conceive of language as the joint work of the speaker and the +hearer, requiring in man a faculty not only of expressing his thoughts but +of understanding those of others. + +On the other hand, he cannot be justly charged with a desire to frame +language on artificial principles. Philosophers have sometimes dreamed of +a technical or scientific language, in words which should have fixed +meanings, and stand in the same relation to one another as the substances +which they denote. But there is no more trace of this in Plato than there +is of a language corresponding to the ideas; nor, indeed, could the want of +such a language be felt until the sciences were far more developed. Those +who would extend the use of technical phraseology beyond the limits of +science or of custom, seem to forget that freedom and suggestiveness and +the play of association are essential characteristics of language. The +great master has shown how he regarded pedantic distinctions of words or +attempts to confine their meaning in the satire on Prodicus in the +Protagoras. + +(5) In addition to these anticipations of the general principles of +philology, we may note also a few curious observations on words and sounds. +'The Eretrians say sklerotes for skleroter;' 'the Thessalians call Apollo +Amlos;' 'The Phrygians have the words pur, udor, kunes slightly changed;' +'there is an old Homeric word emesato, meaning "he contrived";' 'our +forefathers, and especially the women, who are most conservative of the +ancient language, loved the letters iota and delta; but now iota is changed +into eta and epsilon, and delta into zeta; this is supposed to increase the +grandeur of the sound.' Plato was very willing to use inductive arguments, +so far as they were within his reach; but he would also have assigned a +large influence to chance. Nor indeed is induction applicable to philology +in the same degree as to most of the physical sciences. For after we have +pushed our researches to the furthest point, in language as in all the +other creations of the human mind, there will always remain an element of +exception or accident or free-will, which cannot be eliminated. + +The question, 'whether falsehood is impossible,' which Socrates +characteristically sets aside as too subtle for an old man (compare +Euthyd.), could only have arisen in an age of imperfect consciousness, +which had not yet learned to distinguish words from things. Socrates +replies in effect that words have an independent existence; thus +anticipating the solution of the mediaeval controversy of Nominalism and +Realism. He is aware too that languages exist in various degrees of +perfection, and that the analysis of them can only be carried to a certain +point. 'If we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are +the appropriate expressions, that would be the most perfect state of +language.' These words suggest a question of deeper interest than the +origin of language; viz. what is the ideal of language, how far by any +correction of their usages existing languages might become clearer and more +expressive than they are, more poetical, and also more logical; or whether +they are now finally fixed and have received their last impress from time +and authority. + +On the whole, the Cratylus seems to contain deeper truths about language +than any other ancient writing. But feeling the uncertain ground upon +which he is walking, and partly in order to preserve the character of +Socrates, Plato envelopes the whole subject in a robe of fancy, and allows +his principles to drop out as if by accident. + +II. What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and nature +of language? Like other modern metaphysical enquiries, they end at last in +a statement of facts. But, in order to state or understand the facts, a +metaphysical insight seems to be required. There are more things in +language than the human mind easily conceives. And many fallacies have to +be dispelled, as well as observations made. The true spirit of philosophy +or metaphysics can alone charm away metaphysical illusions, which are +always reappearing, formerly in the fancies of neoplatonist writers, now in +the disguise of experience and common sense. An analogy, a figure of +speech, an intelligible theory, a superficial observation of the +individual, have often been mistaken for a true account of the origin of +language. + +Speaking is one of the simplest natural operations, and also the most +complex. Nothing would seem to be easier or more trivial than a few words +uttered by a child in any language. Yet into the formation of those words +have entered causes which the human mind is not capable of calculating. +They are a drop or two of the great stream or ocean of speech which has +been flowing in all ages. They have been transmitted from one language to +another; like the child himself, they go back to the beginnings of the +human race. How they originated, who can tell? Nevertheless we can +imagine a stage of human society in which the circle of men's minds was +narrower and their sympathies and instincts stronger; in which their organs +of speech were more flexible, and the sense of hearing finer and more +discerning; in which they lived more in company, and after the manner of +children were more given to express their feelings; in which 'they moved +all together,' like a herd of wild animals, 'when they moved at all.' +Among them, as in every society, a particular person would be more +sensitive and intelligent than the rest. Suddenly, on some occasion of +interest (at the approach of a wild beast, shall we say?), he first, they +following him, utter a cry which resounds through the forest. The cry is +almost or quite involuntary, and may be an imitation of the roar of the +animal. Thus far we have not speech, but only the inarticulate expression +of feeling or emotion in no respect differing from the cries of animals; +for they too call to one another and are answered. But now suppose that +some one at a distance not only hears the sound, but apprehends the +meaning: or we may imagine that the cry is repeated to a member of the +society who had been absent; the others act the scene over again when he +returns home in the evening. And so the cry becomes a word. The hearer in +turn gives back the word to the speaker, who is now aware that he has +acquired a new power. Many thousand times he exercises this power; like a +child learning to talk, he repeats the same cry again, and again he is +answered; he tries experiments with a like result, and the speaker and the +hearer rejoice together in their newly-discovered faculty. At first there +would be few such cries, and little danger of mistaking or confusing them. +For the mind of primitive man had a narrow range of perceptions and +feelings; his senses were microscopic; twenty or thirty sounds or gestures +would be enough for him, nor would he have any difficulty in finding them. +Naturally he broke out into speech--like the young infant he laughed and +babbled; but not until there were hearers as well as speakers did language +begin. Not the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object, but the +interjection or the vocal imitation of the object understood, is the first +rudiment of human speech. + +After a while the word gathers associations, and has an independent +existence. The imitation of the lion's roar calls up the fears and hopes +of the chase, which are excited by his appearance. In the moment of +hearing the sound, without any appreciable interval, these and other latent +experiences wake up in the mind of the hearer. Not only does he receive an +impression, but he brings previous knowledge to bear upon that impression. +Necessarily the pictorial image becomes less vivid, while the association +of the nature and habits of the animal is more distinctly perceived. The +picture passes into a symbol, for there would be too many of them and they +would crowd the mind; the vocal imitation, too, is always in process of +being lost and being renewed, just as the picture is brought back again in +the description of the poet. Words now can be used more freely because +there are more of them. What was once an involuntary expression becomes +voluntary. Not only can men utter a cry or call, but they can communicate +and converse; they can not only use words, but they can even play with +them. The word is separated both from the object and from the mind; and +slowly nations and individuals attain to a fuller consciousness of +themselves. + +Parallel with this mental process the articulation of sounds is gradually +becoming perfected. The finer sense detects the differences of them, and +begins, first to agglomerate, then to distinguish them. Times, persons, +places, relations of all kinds, are expressed by modifications of them. +The earliest parts of speech, as we may call them by anticipation, like the +first utterances of children, probably partook of the nature of +interjections and nouns; then came verbs; at length the whole sentence +appeared, and rhythm and metre followed. Each stage in the progress of +language was accompanied by some corresponding stage in the mind and +civilisation of man. In time, when the family became a nation, the wild +growth of dialects passed into a language. Then arose poetry and +literature. We can hardly realize to ourselves how much with each +improvement of language the powers of the human mind were enlarged; how the +inner world took the place of outer; how the pictorial or symbolical or +analogical word was refined into a notion; how language, fair and large and +free, was at last complete. + +So we may imagine the speech of man to have begun as with the cries of +animals, or the stammering lips of children, and to have attained by +degrees the perfection of Homer and Plato. Yet we are far from saying that +this or any other theory of language is proved by facts. It is not +difficult to form an hypothesis which by a series of imaginary transitions +will bridge over the chasm which separates man from the animals. +Differences of kind may often be thus resolved into differences of degree. +But we must not assume that we have in this way discovered the true account +of them. Through what struggles the harmonious use of the organs of speech +was acquired; to what extent the conditions of human life were different; +how far the genius of individuals may have contributed to the discovery of +this as of the other arts, we cannot say: Only we seem to see that +language is as much the creation of the ear as of the tongue, and the +expression of a movement stirring the hearts not of one man only but of +many, 'as the trees of the wood are stirred by the wind.' The theory is +consistent or not inconsistent with our own mental experience, and throws +some degree of light upon a dark corner of the human mind. + +In the later analysis of language, we trace the opposite and contrasted +elements of the individual and nation, of the past and present, of the +inward and outward, of the subject and object, of the notional and +relational, of the root or unchanging part of the word and of the changing +inflexion, if such a distinction be admitted, of the vowel and the +consonant, of quantity and accent, of speech and writing, of poetry and +prose. We observe also the reciprocal influence of sounds and conceptions +on each other, like the connexion of body and mind; and further remark that +although the names of objects were originally proper names, as the +grammarian or logician might call them, yet at a later stage they become +universal notions, which combine into particulars and individuals, and are +taken out of the first rude agglomeration of sounds that they may be +replaced in a higher and more logical order. We see that in the simplest +sentences are contained grammar and logic--the parts of speech, the Eleatic +philosophy and the Kantian categories. So complex is language, and so +expressive not only of the meanest wants of man, but of his highest +thoughts; so various are the aspects in which it is regarded by us. Then +again, when we follow the history of languages, we observe that they are +always slowly moving, half dead, half alive, half solid, half fluid; the +breath of a moment, yet like the air, continuous in all ages and +countries,--like the glacier, too, containing within them a trickling +stream which deposits debris of the rocks over which it passes. There were +happy moments, as we may conjecture, in the lives of nations, at which they +came to the birth--as in the golden age of literature, the man and the time +seem to conspire; the eloquence of the bard or chief, as in later times the +creations of the great writer who is the expression of his age, became +impressed on the minds of their countrymen, perhaps in the hour of some +crisis of national development--a migration, a conquest, or the like. The +picture of the word which was beginning to be lost, is now revived; the +sound again echoes to the sense; men find themselves capable not only of +expressing more feelings, and describing more objects, but of expressing +and describing them better. The world before the flood, that is to say, +the world of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand years ago, has passed away and +left no sign. But the best conception that we can form of it, though +imperfect and uncertain, is gained from the analogy of causes still in +action, some powerful and sudden, others working slowly in the course of +infinite ages. Something too may be allowed to 'the persistency of the +strongest,' to 'the survival of the fittest,' in this as in the other +realms of nature. + +These are some of the reflections which the modern philosophy of language +suggests to us about the powers of the human mind and the forces and +influences by which the efforts of men to utter articulate sounds were +inspired. Yet in making these and similar generalizations we may note also +dangers to which we are exposed. (1) There is the confusion of ideas with +facts--of mere possibilities, and generalities, and modes of conception +with actual and definite knowledge. The words 'evolution,' 'birth,' 'law,' +development,' 'instinct,' 'implicit,' 'explicit,' and the like, have a +false clearness or comprehensiveness, which adds nothing to our knowledge. +The metaphor of a flower or a tree, or some other work of nature or art, is +often in like manner only a pleasing picture. (2) There is the fallacy of +resolving the languages which we know into their parts, and then imagining +that we can discover the nature of language by reconstructing them. (3) +There is the danger of identifying language, not with thoughts but with +ideas. (4) There is the error of supposing that the analysis of grammar +and logic has always existed, or that their distinctions were familiar to +Socrates and Plato. (5) There is the fallacy of exaggerating, and also of +diminishing the interval which separates articulate from inarticulate +language--the cries of animals from the speech of man--the instincts of +animals from the reason of man. (6) There is the danger which besets all +enquiries into the early history of man--of interpreting the past by the +present, and of substituting the definite and intelligible for the true but +dim outline which is the horizon of human knowledge. + +The greatest light is thrown upon the nature of language by analogy. We +have the analogy of the cries of animals, of the songs of birds ('man, like +the nightingale, is a singing bird, but is ever binding up thoughts with +musical notes'), of music, of children learning to speak, of barbarous +nations in which the linguistic instinct is still undecayed, of ourselves +learning to think and speak a new language, of the deaf and dumb who have +words without sounds, of the various disorders of speech; and we have the +after-growth of mythology, which, like language, is an unconscious creation +of the human mind. We can observe the social and collective instincts of +animals, and may remark how, when domesticated, they have the power of +understanding but not of speaking, while on the other hand, some birds +which are comparatively devoid of intelligence, make a nearer approach to +articulate speech. We may note how in the animals there is a want of that +sympathy with one another which appears to be the soul of language. We can +compare the use of speech with other mental and bodily operations; for +speech too is a kind of gesture, and in the child or savage accompanied +with gesture. We may observe that the child learns to speak, as he learns +to walk or to eat, by a natural impulse; yet in either case not without a +power of imitation which is also natural to him--he is taught to read, but +he breaks forth spontaneously in speech. We can trace the impulse to bind +together the world in ideas beginning in the first efforts to speak and +culminating in philosophy. But there remains an element which cannot be +explained, or even adequately described. We can understand how man creates +or constructs consciously and by design; and see, if we do not understand, +how nature, by a law, calls into being an organised structure. But the +intermediate organism which stands between man and nature, which is the +work of mind yet unconscious, and in which mind and matter seem to meet, +and mind unperceived to herself is really limited by all other minds, is +neither understood nor seen by us, and is with reluctance admitted to be a +fact. + +Language is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations, the +transfiguration of the world in thought, the meeting-point of the physical +and mental sciences, and also the mirror in which they are reflected, +present at every moment to the individual, and yet having a sort of eternal +or universal nature. When we analyze our own mental processes, we find +words everywhere in every degree of clearness and consistency, fading away +in dreams and more like pictures, rapidly succeeding one another in our +waking thoughts, attaining a greater distinctness and consecutiveness in +speech, and a greater still in writing, taking the place of one another +when we try to become emancipated from their influence. For in all +processes of the mind which are conscious we are talking to ourselves; the +attempt to think without words is a mere illusion,--they are always +reappearing when we fix our thoughts. And speech is not a separate +faculty, but the expression of all our faculties, to which all our other +powers of expression, signs, looks, gestures, lend their aid, of which the +instrument is not the tongue only, but more than half the human frame. + +The minds of men are sometimes carried on to think of their lives and of +their actions as links in a chain of causes and effects going back to the +beginning of time. A few have seemed to lose the sense of their own +individuality in the universal cause or nature. In like manner we might +think of the words which we daily use, as derived from the first speech of +man, and of all the languages in the world, as the expressions or varieties +of a single force or life of language of which the thoughts of men are the +accident. Such a conception enables us to grasp the power and wonder of +languages, and is very natural to the scientific philologist. For he, like +the metaphysician, believes in the reality of that which absorbs his own +mind. Nor do we deny the enormous influence which language has exercised +over thought. Fixed words, like fixed ideas, have often governed the +world. But in such representations we attribute to language too much the +nature of a cause, and too little of an effect,--too much of an absolute, +too little of a relative character,--too much of an ideal, too little of a +matter-of-fact existence. + +Or again, we may frame a single abstract notion of language of which all +existent languages may be supposed to be the perversion. But we must not +conceive that this logical figment had ever a real existence, or is +anything more than an effort of the mind to give unity to infinitely +various phenomena. There is no abstract language 'in rerum natura,' any +more than there is an abstract tree, but only languages in various stages +of growth, maturity, and decay. Nor do other logical distinctions or even +grammatical exactly correspond to the facts of language; for they too are +attempts to give unity and regularity to a subject which is partly +irregular. + +We find, however, that there are distinctions of another kind by which this +vast field of language admits of being mapped out. There is the +distinction between biliteral and triliteral roots, and the various +inflexions which accompany them; between the mere mechanical cohesion of +sounds or words, and the 'chemical' combination of them into a new word; +there is the distinction between languages which have had a free and full +development of their organisms, and languages which have been stunted in +their growth,--lamed in their hands or feet, and never able to acquire +afterwards the powers in which they are deficient; there is the distinction +between synthetical languages like Greek and Latin, which have retained +their inflexions, and analytical languages like English or French, which +have lost them. Innumerable as are the languages and dialects of mankind, +there are comparatively few classes to which they can be referred. + +Another road through this chaos is provided by the physiology of speech. +The organs of language are the same in all mankind, and are only capable of +uttering a certain number of sounds. Every man has tongue, teeth, lips, +palate, throat, mouth, which he may close or open, and adapt in various +ways; making, first, vowels and consonants; and secondly, other classes of +letters. The elements of all speech, like the elements of the musical +scale, are few and simple, though admitting of infinite gradations and +combinations. Whatever slight differences exist in the use or formation of +these organs, owing to climate or the sense of euphony or other causes, +they are as nothing compared with their agreement. Here then is a real +basis of unity in the study of philology, unlike that imaginary abstract +unity of which we were just now speaking. + +Whether we regard language from the psychological, or historical, or +physiological point of view, the materials of our knowledge are +inexhaustible. The comparisons of children learning to speak, of barbarous +nations, of musical notes, of the cries of animals, of the song of birds, +increase our insight into the nature of human speech. Many observations +which would otherwise have escaped us are suggested by them. But they do +not explain why, in man and in man only, the speaker met with a response +from the hearer, and the half articulate sound gradually developed into +Sanscrit and Greek. They hardly enable us to approach any nearer the +secret of the origin of language, which, like some of the other great +secrets of nature,--the origin of birth and death, or of animal life,-- +remains inviolable. That problem is indissolubly bound up with the origin +of man; and if we ever know more of the one, we may expect to know more of +the other. (Compare W. Humboldt, 'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des +menschlichen Sprachbaues;' M. Muller, 'Lectures on the Science of +Language;' Steinthal, 'Einleitung in die Psychologie und +Sprachwissenschaft.' + +... + +It is more than sixteen years since the preceding remarks were written, +which with a few alterations have now been reprinted. During the interval +the progress of philology has been very great. More languages have been +compared; the inner structure of language has been laid bare; the relations +of sounds have been more accurately discriminated; the manner in which +dialects affect or are affected by the literary or principal form of a +language is better understood. Many merely verbal questions have been +eliminated; the remains of the old traditional methods have died away. The +study has passed from the metaphysical into an historical stage. Grammar +is no longer confused with language, nor the anatomy of words and sentences +with their life and use. Figures of speech, by which the vagueness of +theories is often concealed, have been stripped off; and we see language +more as it truly was. The immensity of the subject is gradually revealed +to us, and the reign of law becomes apparent. Yet the law is but partially +seen; the traces of it are often lost in the distance. For languages have +a natural but not a perfect growth; like other creations of nature into +which the will of man enters, they are full of what we term accident and +irregularity. And the difficulties of the subject become not less, but +greater, as we proceed--it is one of those studies in which we seem to know +less as we know more; partly because we are no longer satisfied with the +vague and superficial ideas of it which prevailed fifty years ago; partly +also because the remains of the languages with which we are acquainted +always were, and if they are still living, are, in a state of transition; +and thirdly, because there are lacunae in our knowledge of them which can +never be filled up. Not a tenth, not a hundredth part of them has been +preserved. Yet the materials at our disposal are far greater than any +individual can use. Such are a few of the general reflections which the +present state of philology calls up. + +(1) Language seems to be composite, but into its first elements the +philologer has never been able to penetrate. However far he goes back, he +never arrives at the beginning; or rather, as in Geology or in Astronomy, +there is no beginning. He is too apt to suppose that by breaking up the +existing forms of language into their parts he will arrive at a previous +stage of it, but he is merely analyzing what never existed, or is never +known to have existed, except in a composite form. He may divide nouns and +verbs into roots and inflexions, but he has no evidence which will show +that the omega of tupto or the mu of tithemi, though analogous to ego, me, +either became pronouns or were generated out of pronouns. To say that +'pronouns, like ripe fruit, dropped out of verbs,' is a misleading figure +of speech. Although all languages have some common principles, there is no +primitive form or forms of language known to us, or to be reasonably +imagined, from which they are all descended. No inference can be drawn +from language, either for or against the unity of the human race. Nor is +there any proof that words were ever used without any relation to each +other. Whatever may be the meaning of a sentence or a word when applied to +primitive language, it is probable that the sentence is more akin to the +original form than the word, and that the later stage of language is the +result rather of analysis than of synthesis, or possibly is a combination +of the two. Nor, again, are we sure that the original process of learning +to speak was the same in different places or among different races of men. +It may have been slower with some, quicker with others. Some tribes may +have used shorter, others longer words or cries: they may have been more +or less inclined to agglutinate or to decompose them: they may have +modified them by the use of prefixes, suffixes, infixes; by the lengthening +and strengthening of vowels or by the shortening and weakening of them, by +the condensation or rarefaction of consonants. But who gave to language +these primeval laws; or why one race has triliteral, another biliteral +roots; or why in some members of a group of languages b becomes p, or d, t, +or ch, k; or why two languages resemble one another in certain parts of +their structure and differ in others; or why in one language there is a +greater development of vowels, in another of consonants, and the like--are +questions of which we only 'entertain conjecture.' We must remember the +length of time that has elapsed since man first walked upon the earth, and +that in this vast but unknown period every variety of language may have +been in process of formation and decay, many times over. + +(Compare Plato, Laws):-- + +'ATHENIAN STRANGER: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of +government? Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in +which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good +and evil? + +CLEINIAS: What do you mean? + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: I mean that he might watch them from the point of view +of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite +ages. + +CLEINIAS: How so? + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which +has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them? + +CLEINIAS: Hardly. + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and +incalculable? + +CLEINIAS: No doubt. + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: And have there not been thousands and thousands of +cities which have come into being and perished during this period? And has +not every place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising, +and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?' + +Aristot. Metaph.:-- + +'And if a person should conceive the tales of mythology to mean only that +men thought the gods to be the first essences of things, he would deem the +reflection to have been inspired and would consider that, whereas probably +every art and part of wisdom had been DISCOVERED AND LOST MANY TIMES OVER, +such notions were but a remnant of the past which has survived to our +day.') + +It can hardly be supposed that any traces of an original language still +survive, any more than of the first huts or buildings which were +constructed by man. Nor are we at all certain of the relation, if any, in +which the greater families of languages stand to each other. The influence +of individuals must always have been a disturbing element. Like great +writers in later times, there may have been many a barbaric genius who +taught the men of his tribe to sing or speak, showing them by example how +to continue or divide their words, charming their souls with rhythm and +accent and intonation, finding in familiar objects the expression of their +confused fancies--to whom the whole of language might in truth be said to +be a figure of speech. One person may have introduced a new custom into +the formation or pronunciation of a word; he may have been imitated by +others, and the custom, or form, or accent, or quantity, or rhyme which he +introduced in a single word may have become the type on which many other +words or inflexions of words were framed, and may have quickly ran through +a whole language. For like the other gifts which nature has bestowed upon +man, that of speech has been conveyed to him through the medium, not of the +many, but of the few, who were his 'law-givers'--'the legislator with the +dialectician standing on his right hand,' in Plato's striking image, who +formed the manners of men and gave them customs, whose voice and look and +behaviour, whose gesticulations and other peculiarities were instinctively +imitated by them,--the 'king of men' who was their priest, almost their +God...But these are conjectures only: so little do we know of the origin +of language that the real scholar is indisposed to touch the subject at +all. + +(2) There are other errors besides the figment of a primitive or original +language which it is time to leave behind us. We no longer divide +languages into synthetical and analytical, or suppose similarity of +structure to be the safe or only guide to the affinities of them. We do +not confuse the parts of speech with the categories of Logic. Nor do we +conceive languages any more than civilisations to be in a state of +dissolution; they do not easily pass away, but are far more tenacious of +life than the tribes by whom they are spoken. 'Where two or three are +gathered together,' they survive. As in the human frame, as in the state, +there is a principle of renovation as well as of decay which is at work in +all of them. Neither do we suppose them to be invented by the wit of man. +With few exceptions, e.g. technical words or words newly imported from a +foreign language, and the like, in which art has imitated nature, 'words +are not made but grow.' Nor do we attribute to them a supernatural origin. +The law which regulates them is like the law which governs the circulation +of the blood, or the rising of the sap in trees; the action of it is +uniform, but the result, which appears in the superficial forms of men and +animals or in the leaves of trees, is an endless profusion and variety. +The laws of vegetation are invariable, but no two plants, no two leaves of +the forest are precisely the same. The laws of language are invariable, +but no two languages are alike, no two words have exactly the same meaning. +No two sounds are exactly of the same quality, or give precisely the same +impression. + +It would be well if there were a similar consensus about some other points +which appear to be still in dispute. Is language conscious or unconscious? +In speaking or writing have we present to our minds the meaning or the +sound or the construction of the words which we are using?--No more than +the separate drops of water with which we quench our thirst are present: +the whole draught may be conscious, but not the minute particles of which +it is made up: So the whole sentence may be conscious, but the several +words, syllables, letters are not thought of separately when we are +uttering them. Like other natural operations, the process of speech, when +most perfect, is least observed by us. We do not pause at each mouthful to +dwell upon the taste of it: nor has the speaker time to ask himself the +comparative merits of different modes of expression while he is uttering +them. There are many things in the use of language which may be observed +from without, but which cannot be explained from within. Consciousness +carries us but a little way in the investigation of the mind; it is not the +faculty of internal observation, but only the dim light which makes such +observation possible. What is supposed to be our consciousness of language +is really only the analysis of it, and this analysis admits of innumerable +degrees. But would it not be better if this term, which is so misleading, +and yet has played so great a part in mental science, were either banished +or used only with the distinct meaning of 'attention to our own minds,' +such as is called forth, not by familiar mental processes, but by the +interruption of them? Now in this sense we may truly say that we are not +conscious of ordinary speech, though we are commonly roused to attention by +the misuse or mispronunciation of a word. Still less, even in schools and +academies, do we ever attempt to invent new words or to alter the meaning +of old ones, except in the case, mentioned above, of technical or borrowed +words which are artificially made or imported because a need of them is +felt. Neither in our own nor in any other age has the conscious effort of +reflection in man contributed in an appreciable degree to the formation of +language. 'Which of us by taking thought' can make new words or +constructions? Reflection is the least of the causes by which language is +affected, and is likely to have the least power, when the linguistic +instinct is greatest, as in young children and in the infancy of nations. + +A kindred error is the separation of the phonetic from the mental element +of language; they are really inseparable--no definite line can be drawn +between them, any more than in any other common act of mind and body. It +is true that within certain limits we possess the power of varying sounds +by opening and closing the mouth, by touching the palate or the teeth with +the tongue, by lengthening or shortening the vocal instrument, by greater +or less stress, by a higher or lower pitch of the voice, and we can +substitute one note or accent for another. But behind the organs of speech +and their action there remains the informing mind, which sets them in +motion and works together with them. And behind the great structure of +human speech and the lesser varieties of language which arise out of the +many degrees and kinds of human intercourse, there is also the unknown or +over-ruling law of God or nature which gives order to it in its infinite +greatness, and variety in its infinitesimal minuteness--both equally +inscrutable to us. We need no longer discuss whether philology is to be +classed with the Natural or the Mental sciences, if we frankly recognize +that, like all the sciences which are concerned with man, it has a double +aspect,--inward and outward; and that the inward can only be known through +the outward. Neither need we raise the question whether the laws of +language, like the other laws of human action, admit of exceptions. The +answer in all cases is the same--that the laws of nature are uniform, +though the consistency or continuity of them is not always perceptible to +us. The superficial appearances of language, as of nature, are irregular, +but we do not therefore deny their deeper uniformity. The comparison of +the growth of language in the individual and in the nation cannot be wholly +discarded, for nations are made up of individuals. But in this, as in the +other political sciences, we must distinguish between collective and +individual actions or processes, and not attribute to the one what belongs +to the other. Again, when we speak of the hereditary or paternity of a +language, we must remember that the parents are alive as well as the +children, and that all the preceding generations survive (after a manner) +in the latest form of it. And when, for the purposes of comparison, we +form into groups the roots or terminations of words, we should not forget +how casual is the manner in which their resemblances have arisen--they were +not first written down by a grammarian in the paradigms of a grammar and +learned out of a book, but were due to many chance attractions of sound or +of meaning, or of both combined. So many cautions have to be borne in +mind, and so many first thoughts to be dismissed, before we can proceed +safely in the path of philological enquiry. It might be well sometimes to +lay aside figures of speech, such as the 'root' and the 'branches,' the +'stem,' the 'strata' of Geology, the 'compounds' of Chemistry, 'the ripe +fruit of pronouns dropping from verbs' (see above), and the like, which are +always interesting, but are apt to be delusive. Yet such figures of speech +are far nearer the truth than the theories which attribute the invention +and improvement of language to the conscious action of the human +mind...Lastly, it is doubted by recent philologians whether climate can be +supposed to have exercised any influence worth speaking of on a language: +such a view is said to be unproven: it had better therefore not be +silently assumed. + +'Natural selection' and the 'survival of the fittest' have been applied in +the field of philology, as well as in the other sciences which are +concerned with animal and vegetable life. And a Darwinian school of +philologists has sprung up, who are sometimes accused of putting words in +the place of things. It seems to be true, that whether applied to language +or to other branches of knowledge, the Darwinian theory, unless very +precisely defined, hardly escapes from being a truism. If by 'the natural +selection' of words or meanings of words or by the 'persistence and +survival of the fittest' the maintainer of the theory intends to affirm +nothing more than this--that the word 'fittest to survive' survives, he +adds not much to the knowledge of language. But if he means that the word +or the meaning of the word or some portion of the word which comes into use +or drops out of use is selected or rejected on the ground of economy or +parsimony or ease to the speaker or clearness or euphony or expressiveness, +or greater or less demand for it, or anything of this sort, he is affirming +a proposition which has several senses, and in none of these senses can be +assisted to be uniformly true. For the laws of language are precarious, +and can only act uniformly when there is such frequency of intercourse +among neighbours as is sufficient to enforce them. And there are many +reasons why a man should prefer his own way of speaking to that of others, +unless by so doing he becomes unintelligible. The struggle for existence +among words is not of that fierce and irresistible kind in which birds, +beasts and fishes devour one another, but of a milder sort, allowing one +usage to be substituted for another, not by force, but by the persuasion, +or rather by the prevailing habit, of a majority. The favourite figure, in +this, as in some other uses of it, has tended rather to obscure than +explain the subject to which it has been applied. Nor in any case can the +struggle for existence be deemed to be the sole or principal cause of +changes in language, but only one among many, and one of which we cannot +easily measure the importance. There is a further objection which may be +urged equally against all applications of the Darwinian theory. As in +animal life and likewise in vegetable, so in languages, the process of +change is said to be insensible: sounds, like animals, are supposed to +pass into one another by imperceptible gradation. But in both cases the +newly-created forms soon become fixed; there are few if any vestiges of the +intermediate links, and so the better half of the evidence of the change is +wanting. + +(3) Among the incumbrances or illusions of language may be reckoned many +of the rules and traditions of grammar, whether ancient grammar or the +corrections of it which modern philology has introduced. Grammar, like +law, delights in definition: human speech, like human action, though very +far from being a mere chaos, is indefinite, admits of degrees, and is +always in a state of change or transition. Grammar gives an erroneous +conception of language: for it reduces to a system that which is not a +system. Its figures of speech, pleonasms, ellipses, anacolutha, pros to +semainomenon, and the like have no reality; they do not either make +conscious expressions more intelligible or show the way in which they have +arisen; they are chiefly designed to bring an earlier use of language into +conformity with the later. Often they seem intended only to remind us that +great poets like Aeschylus or Sophocles or Pindar or a great prose writer +like Thucydides are guilty of taking unwarrantable liberties with +grammatical rules; it appears never to have occurred to the inventors of +them that these real 'conditores linguae Graecae' lived in an age before +grammar, when 'Greece also was living Greece.' It is the anatomy, not the +physiology of language, which grammar seeks to describe: into the idiom +and higher life of words it does not enter. The ordinary Greek grammar +gives a complete paradigm of the verb, without suggesting that the double +or treble forms of Perfects, Aorists, etc. are hardly ever contemporaneous. +It distinguishes Moods and Tenses, without observing how much of the nature +of one passes into the other. It makes three Voices, Active, Passive, and +Middle, but takes no notice of the precarious existence and uncertain +character of the last of the three. Language is a thing of degrees and +relations and associations and exceptions: grammar ties it up in fixed +rules. Language has many varieties of usage: grammar tries to reduce them +to a single one. Grammar divides verbs into regular and irregular: it +does not recognize that the irregular, equally with the regular, are +subject to law, and that a language which had no exceptions would not be a +natural growth: for it could not have been subjected to the influences by +which language is ordinarily affected. It is always wanting to describe +ancient languages in the terms of a modern one. It has a favourite fiction +that one word is put in the place of another; the truth is that no word is +ever put for another. It has another fiction, that a word has been +omitted: words are omitted because they are no longer needed; and the +omission has ceased to be observed. The common explanation of kata or some +other preposition 'being understood' in a Greek sentence is another fiction +of the same kind, which tends to disguise the fact that under cases were +comprehended originally many more relations, and that prepositions are used +only to define the meaning of them with greater precision. These instances +are sufficient to show the sort of errors which grammar introduces into +language. We are not considering the question of its utility to the +beginner in the study. Even to him the best grammar is the shortest and +that in which he will have least to unlearn. It may be said that the +explanations here referred to are already out of date, and that the study +of Greek grammar has received a new character from comparative philology. +This is true; but it is also true that the traditional grammar has still a +great hold on the mind of the student. + +Metaphysics are even more troublesome than the figments of grammar, because +they wear the appearance of philosophy and there is no test to which they +can be subjected. They are useful in so far as they give us an insight +into the history of the human mind and the modes of thought which have +existed in former ages; or in so far as they furnish wider conceptions of +the different branches of knowledge and of their relation to one another. +But they are worse than useless when they outrun experience and abstract +the mind from the observation of facts, only to envelope it in a mist of +words. Some philologers, like Schleicher, have been greatly influenced by +the philosophy of Hegel; nearly all of them to a certain extent have fallen +under the dominion of physical science. Even Kant himself thought that the +first principles of philosophy could be elicited from the analysis of the +proposition, in this respect falling short of Plato. Westphal holds that +there are three stages of language: (1) in which things were characterized +independently, (2) in which they were regarded in relation to human +thought, and (3) in relation to one another. But are not such distinctions +an anachronism? for they imply a growth of abstract ideas which never +existed in early times. Language cannot be explained by Metaphysics; for +it is prior to them and much more nearly allied to sense. It is not likely +that the meaning of the cases is ultimately resolvable into relations of +space and time. Nor can we suppose the conception of cause and effect or +of the finite and infinite or of the same and other to be latent in +language at a time when in their abstract form they had never entered into +the mind of man...If the science of Comparative Philology had possessed +'enough of Metaphysics to get rid of Metaphysics,' it would have made far +greater progress. + +(4) Our knowledge of language is almost confined to languages which are +fully developed. They are of several patterns; and these become altered by +admixture in various degrees,--they may only borrow a few words from one +another and retain their life comparatively unaltered, or they may meet in +a struggle for existence until one of the two is overpowered and retires +from the field. They attain the full rights and dignity of language when +they acquire the use of writing and have a literature of their own; they +pass into dialects and grow out of them, in proportion as men are isolated +or united by locality or occupation. The common language sometimes reacts +upon the dialects and imparts to them also a literary character. The laws +of language can be best discerned in the great crises of language, +especially in the transitions from ancient to modern forms of them, whether +in Europe or Asia. Such changes are the silent notes of the world's +history; they mark periods of unknown length in which war and conquest were +running riot over whole continents, times of suffering too great to be +endured by the human race, in which the masters became subjects and the +subject races masters, in which driven by necessity or impelled by some +instinct, tribes or nations left their original homes and but slowly found +a resting-place. Language would be the greatest of all historical +monuments, if it could only tell us the history of itself. + +(5) There are many ways in which we may approach this study. The simplest +of all is to observe our own use of language in conversation or in writing, +how we put words together, how we construct and connect sentences, what are +the rules of accent and rhythm in verse or prose, the formation and +composition of words, the laws of euphony and sound, the affinities of +letters, the mistakes to which we are ourselves most liable of spelling or +pronunciation. We may compare with our own language some other, even when +we have only a slight knowledge of it, such as French or German. Even a +little Latin will enable us to appreciate the grand difference between +ancient and modern European languages. In the child learning to speak we +may note the inherent strength of language, which like 'a mountain river' +is always forcing its way out. We may witness the delight in imitation and +repetition, and some of the laws by which sounds pass into one another. We +may learn something also from the falterings of old age, the searching for +words, and the confusion of them with one another, the forgetfulness of +proper names (more commonly than of other words because they are more +isolated), aphasia, and the like. There are philological lessons also to +be gathered from nicknames, from provincialisms, from the slang of great +cities, from the argot of Paris (that language of suffering and crime, so +pathetically described by Victor Hugo), from the imperfect articulation of +the deaf and dumb, from the jabbering of animals, from the analysis of +sounds in relation to the organs of speech. The phonograph affords a +visible evidence of the nature and divisions of sound; we may be truly said +to know what we can manufacture. Artificial languages, such as that of +Bishop Wilkins, are chiefly useful in showing what language is not. The +study of any foreign language may be made also a study of Comparative +Philology. There are several points, such as the nature of irregular +verbs, of indeclinable parts of speech, the influence of euphony, the decay +or loss of inflections, the elements of syntax, which may be examined as +well in the history of our own language as of any other. A few well- +selected questions may lead the student at once into the heart of the +mystery: such as, Why are the pronouns and the verb of existence generally +more irregular than any other parts of speech? Why is the number of words +so small in which the sound is an echo of the sense? Why does the meaning +of words depart so widely from their etymology? Why do substantives often +differ in meaning from the verbs to which they are related, adverbs from +adjectives? Why do words differing in origin coalesce in the same sound +though retaining their differences of meaning? Why are some verbs +impersonal? Why are there only so many parts of speech, and on what +principle are they divided? These are a few crucial questions which give +us an insight from different points of view into the true nature of +language. + +(6) Thus far we have been endeavouring to strip off from language the false +appearances in which grammar and philology, or the love of system +generally, have clothed it. We have also sought to indicate the sources of +our knowledge of it and the spirit in which we should approach it, we may +now proceed to consider some of the principles or natural laws which have +created or modified it. + +i. The first and simplest of all the principles of language, common also +to the animals, is imitation. The lion roars, the wolf howls in the +solitude of the forest: they are answered by similar cries heard from a +distance. The bird, too, mimics the voice of man and makes answer to him. +Man tells to man the secret place in which he is hiding himself; he +remembers and repeats the sound which he has heard. The love of imitation +becomes a passion and an instinct to him. Primitive men learnt to speak +from one another, like a child from its mother or nurse. They learnt of +course a rudimentary, half-articulate language, the cry or song or speech +which was the expression of what we now call human thoughts and feelings. +We may still remark how much greater and more natural the exercise of the +power is in the use of language than in any other process or action of the +human mind. + +ii. Imitation provided the first material of language: but it was +'without form and void.' During how many years or hundreds or thousands of +years the imitative or half-articulate stage continued there is no +possibility of determining. But we may reasonably conjecture that there +was a time when the vocal utterance of man was intermediate between what we +now call language and the cry of a bird or animal. Speech before language +was a rudis indigestaque materies, not yet distributed into words and +sentences, in which the cry of fear or joy mingled with more definite +sounds recognized by custom as the expressions of things or events. It was +the principle of analogy which introduced into this 'indigesta moles' order +and measure. It was Anaxagoras' omou panta chremata, eita nous elthon +diekosmese: the light of reason lighted up all things and at once began to +arrange them. In every sentence, in every word and every termination of a +word, this power of forming relations to one another was contained. There +was a proportion of sound to sound, of meaning to meaning, of meaning to +sound. The cases and numbers of nouns, the persons, tenses, numbers of +verbs, were generally on the same or nearly the same pattern and had the +same meaning. The sounds by which they were expressed were rough-hewn at +first; after a while they grew more refined--the natural laws of euphony +began to affect them. The rules of syntax are likewise based upon analogy. +Time has an analogy with space, arithmetic with geometry. Not only in +musical notes, but in the quantity, quality, accent, rhythm of human +speech, trivial or serious, there is a law of proportion. As in things of +beauty, as in all nature, in the composition as well as in the motion of +all things, there is a similarity of relations by which they are held +together. + +It would be a mistake to suppose that the analogies of language are always +uniform: there may be often a choice between several, and sometimes one +and sometimes another will prevail. In Greek there are three declensions +of nouns; the forms of cases in one of them may intrude upon another. +Similarly verbs in -omega and -mu iota interchange forms of tenses, and the +completed paradigm of the verb is often made up of both. The same nouns +may be partly declinable and partly indeclinable, and in some of their +cases may have fallen out of use. Here are rules with exceptions; they are +not however really exceptions, but contain in themselves indications of +other rules. Many of these interruptions or variations of analogy occur in +pronouns or in the verb of existence of which the forms were too common and +therefore too deeply imbedded in language entirely to drop out. The same +verbs in the same meaning may sometimes take one case, sometimes another. +The participle may also have the character of an adjective, the adverb +either of an adjective or of a preposition. These exceptions are as +regular as the rules, but the causes of them are seldom known to us. + +Language, like the animal and vegetable worlds, is everywhere intersected +by the lines of analogy. Like number from which it seems to be derived, +the principle of analogy opens the eyes of men to discern the similarities +and differences of things, and their relations to one another. At first +these are such as lie on the surface only; after a time they are seen by +men to reach farther down into the nature of things. Gradually in language +they arrange themselves into a sort of imperfect system; groups of personal +and case endings are placed side by side. The fertility of language +produces many more than are wanted; and the superfluous ones are utilized +by the assignment to them of new meanings. The vacuity and the superfluity +are thus partially compensated by each other. It must be remembered that +in all the languages which have a literature, certainly in Sanskrit, Greek, +Latin, we are not at the beginning but almost at the end of the linguistic +process; we have reached a time when the verb and the noun are nearly +perfected, though in no language did they completely perfect themselves, +because for some unknown reason the motive powers of languages seem to have +ceased when they were on the eve of completion: they became fixed or +crystallized in an imperfect form either from the influence of writing and +literature, or because no further differentiation of them was required for +the intelligibility of language. So not without admixture and confusion +and displacement and contamination of sounds and the meanings of words, a +lower stage of language passes into a higher. Thus far we can see and no +further. When we ask the reason why this principle of analogy prevails in +all the vast domain of language, there is no answer to the question; or no +other answer but this, that there are innumerable ways in which, like +number, analogy permeates, not only language, but the whole world, both +visible and intellectual. We know from experience that it does not (a) +arise from any conscious act of reflection that the accusative of a Latin +noun in 'us' should end in 'um;' nor (b) from any necessity of being +understood,--much less articulation would suffice for this; nor (c) from +greater convenience or expressiveness of particular sounds. Such notions +were certainly far enough away from the mind of primitive man. We may +speak of a latent instinct, of a survival of the fittest, easiest, most +euphonic, most economical of breath, in the case of one of two competing +sounds; but these expressions do not add anything to our knowledge. We may +try to grasp the infinity of language either under the figure of a +limitless plain divided into countries and districts by natural boundaries, +or of a vast river eternally flowing whose origin is concealed from us; we +may apprehend partially the laws by which speech is regulated: but we do +not know, and we seem as if we should never know, any more than in the +parallel case of the origin of species, how vocal sounds received life and +grew, and in the form of languages came to be distributed over the earth. + +iii. Next in order to analogy in the formation of language or even prior +to it comes the principle of onomatopea, which is itself a kind of analogy +or similarity of sound and meaning. In by far the greater number of words +it has become disguised and has disappeared; but in no stage of language is +it entirely lost. It belongs chiefly to early language, in which words +were few; and its influence grew less and less as time went on. To the ear +which had a sense of harmony it became a barbarism which disturbed the flow +and equilibrium of discourse; it was an excrescence which had to be cut +out, a survival which needed to be got rid of, because it was out of +keeping with the rest. It remained for the most part only as a formative +principle, which used words and letters not as crude imitations of other +natural sounds, but as symbols of ideas which were naturally associated +with them. It received in another way a new character; it affected not so +much single words, as larger portions of human speech. It regulated the +juxtaposition of sounds and the cadence of sentences. It was the music, +not of song, but of speech, in prose as well as verse. The old onomatopea +of primitive language was refined into an onomatopea of a higher kind, in +which it is no longer true to say that a particular sound corresponds to a +motion or action of man or beast or movement of nature, but that in all the +higher uses of language the sound is the echo of the sense, especially in +poetry, in which beauty and expressiveness are given to human thoughts by +the harmonious composition of the words, syllables, letters, accents, +quantities, rhythms, rhymes, varieties and contrasts of all sorts. The +poet with his 'Break, break, break' or his e pasin nekuessi +kataphthimenoisin anassein or his 'longius ex altoque sinum trahit,' can +produce a far finer music than any crude imitations of things or actions in +sound, although a letter or two having this imitative power may be a lesser +element of beauty in such passages. The same subtle sensibility, which +adapts the word to the thing, adapts the sentence or cadence to the general +meaning or spirit of the passage. This is the higher onomatopea which has +banished the cruder sort as unworthy to have a place in great languages and +literatures. + +We can see clearly enough that letters or collocations of letters do by +various degrees of strength or weakness, length or shortness, emphasis or +pitch, become the natural expressions of the finer parts of human feeling +or thought. And not only so, but letters themselves have a significance; +as Plato observes that the letter rho accent is expressive of motion, the +letters delta and tau of binding and rest, the letter lambda of smoothness, +nu of inwardness, the letter eta of length, the letter omicron of +roundness. These were often combined so as to form composite notions, as +for example in tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged), thrauein (crush), +krouein (strike), thruptein (break), pumbein (whirl),--in all which words +we notice a parallel composition of sounds in their English equivalents. +Plato also remarks, as we remark, that the onomatopoetic principle is far +from prevailing uniformly, and further that no explanation of language +consistently corresponds with any system of philosophy, however great may +be the light which language throws upon the nature of the mind. Both in +Greek and English we find groups of words such as string, swing, sling, +spring, sting, which are parallel to one another and may be said to derive +their vocal effect partly from contrast of letters, but in which it is +impossible to assign a precise amount of meaning to each of the expressive +and onomatopoetic letters. A few of them are directly imitative, as for +example the omega in oon, which represents the round form of the egg by the +figure of the mouth: or bronte (thunder), in which the fulness of the +sound of the word corresponds to the thing signified by it; or bombos +(buzzing), of which the first syllable, as in its English equivalent, has +the meaning of a deep sound. We may observe also (as we see in the case of +the poor stammerer) that speech has the co-operation of the whole body and +may be often assisted or half expressed by gesticulation. A sound or word +is not the work of the vocal organs only; nearly the whole of the upper +part of the human frame, including head, chest, lungs, have a share in +creating it; and it may be accompanied by a movement of the eyes, nose, +fingers, hands, feet which contributes to the effect of it. + +The principle of onomatopea has fallen into discredit, partly because it +has been supposed to imply an actual manufacture of words out of syllables +and letters, like a piece of joiner's work,--a theory of language which is +more and more refuted by facts, and more and more going out of fashion with +philologians; and partly also because the traces of onomatopea in separate +words become almost obliterated in the course of ages. The poet of +language cannot put in and pull out letters, as a painter might insert or +blot out a shade of colour to give effect to his picture. It would be +ridiculous for him to alter any received form of a word in order to render +it more expressive of the sense. He can only select, perhaps out of some +dialect, the form which is already best adapted to his purpose. The true +onomatopea is not a creative, but a formative principle, which in the later +stage of the history of language ceases to act upon individual words; but +still works through the collocation of them in the sentence or paragraph, +and the adaptation of every word, syllable, letter to one another and to +the rhythm of the whole passage. + +iv. Next, under a distinct head, although not separable from the +preceding, may be considered the differentiation of languages, i.e. the +manner in which differences of meaning and form have arisen in them. Into +their first creation we have ceased to enquire: it is their aftergrowth +with which we are now concerned. How did the roots or substantial portions +of words become modified or inflected? and how did they receive separate +meanings? First we remark that words are attracted by the sounds and +senses of other words, so that they form groups of nouns and verbs +analogous in sound and sense to one another, each noun or verb putting +forth inflexions, generally of two or three patterns, and with exceptions. +We do not say that we know how sense became first allied to sound; but we +have no difficulty in ascertaining how the sounds and meanings of words +were in time parted off or differentiated. (1) The chief causes which +regulate the variations of sound are (a) double or differing analogies, +which lead sometimes to one form, sometimes to another (b) euphony, by +which is meant chiefly the greater pleasure to the ear and the greater +facility to the organs of speech which is given by a new formation or +pronunciation of a word (c) the necessity of finding new expressions for +new classes or processes of things. We are told that changes of sound take +place by innumerable gradations until a whole tribe or community or society +find themselves acquiescing in a new pronunciation or use of language. Yet +no one observes the change, or is at all aware that in the course of a +lifetime he and his contemporaries have appreciably varied their intonation +or use of words. On the other hand, the necessities of language seem to +require that the intermediate sounds or meanings of words should quickly +become fixed or set and not continue in a state of transition. The process +of settling down is aided by the organs of speech and by the use of writing +and printing. (2) The meaning of words varies because ideas vary or the +number of things which is included under them or with which they are +associated is increased. A single word is thus made to do duty for many +more things than were formerly expressed by it; and it parts into different +senses when the classes of things or ideas which are represented by it are +themselves different and distinct. A figurative use of a word may easily +pass into a new sense: a new meaning caught up by association may become +more important than all the rest. The good or neutral sense of a word, +such as Jesuit, Puritan, Methodist, Heretic, has been often converted into +a bad one by the malevolence of party spirit. Double forms suggest +different meanings and are often used to express them; and the form or +accent of a word has been not unfrequently altered when there is a +difference of meaning. The difference of gender in nouns is utilized for +the same reason. New meanings of words push themselves into the vacant +spaces of language and retire when they are no longer needed. Language +equally abhors vacancy and superfluity. But the remedial measures by which +both are eliminated are not due to any conscious action of the human mind; +nor is the force exerted by them constraining or necessary. + +(7) We have shown that language, although subject to laws, is far from +being of an exact and uniform nature. We may now speak briefly of the +faults of language. They may be compared to the faults of Geology, in +which different strata cross one another or meet at an angle, or mix with +one another either by slow transitions or by violent convulsions, leaving +many lacunae which can be no longer filled up, and often becoming so +complex that no true explanation of them can be given. So in language +there are the cross influences of meaning and sound, of logic and grammar, +of differing analogies, of words and the inflexions of words, which often +come into conflict with each other. The grammarian, if he were to form new +words, would make them all of the same pattern according to what he +conceives to be the rule, that is, the more common usage of language. The +subtlety of nature goes far beyond art, and it is complicated by +irregularity, so that often we can hardly say that there is a right or +wrong in the formation of words. For almost any formation which is not at +variance with the first principles of language is possible and may be +defended. + +The imperfection of language is really due to the formation and correlation +of words by accident, that is to say, by principles which are unknown to +us. Hence we see why Plato, like ourselves unable to comprehend the whole +of language, was constrained to 'supplement the poor creature imitation by +another poor creature convention.' But the poor creature convention in the +end proves too much for all the rest: for we do not ask what is the origin +of words or whether they are formed according to a correct analogy, but +what is the usage of them; and we are compelled to admit with Hermogenes in +Plato and with Horace that usage is the ruling principle, 'quem penes +arbitrium est, et jus et norma loquendi.' + +(8) There are two ways in which a language may attain permanence or fixity. +First, it may have been embodied in poems or hymns or laws, which may be +repeated for hundreds, perhaps for thousands of years with a religious +accuracy, so that to the priests or rhapsodists of a nation the whole or +the greater part of a language is literally preserved; secondly, it may be +written down and in a written form distributed more or less widely among +the whole nation. In either case the language which is familiarly spoken +may have grown up wholly or in a great measure independently of them. (1) +The first of these processes has been sometimes attended by the result that +the sound of the words has been carefully preserved and that the meaning of +them has either perished wholly, or is only doubtfully recovered by the +efforts of modern philology. The verses have been repeated as a chant or +part of a ritual, but they have had no relation to ordinary life or speech. +(2) The invention of writing again is commonly attributed to a particular +epoch, and we are apt to think that such an inestimable gift would have +immediately been diffused over a whole country. But it may have taken a +long time to perfect the art of writing, and another long period may have +elapsed before it came into common use. Its influence on language has been +increased ten, twenty or one hundred fold by the invention of printing. + +Before the growth of poetry or the invention of writing, languages were +only dialects. So they continued to be in parts of the country in which +writing was not used or in which there was no diffusion of literature. In +most of the counties of England there is still a provincial style, which +has been sometimes made by a great poet the vehicle of his fancies. When a +book sinks into the mind of a nation, such as Luther's Bible or the +Authorized English Translation of the Bible, or again great classical works +like Shakspere or Milton, not only have new powers of expression been +diffused through a whole nation, but a great step towards uniformity has +been made. The instinct of language demands regular grammar and correct +spelling: these are imprinted deeply on the tablets of a nation's memory +by a common use of classical and popular writers. In our own day we have +attained to a point at which nearly every printed book is spelt correctly +and written grammatically. + +(9) Proceeding further to trace the influence of literature on language we +note some other causes which have affected the higher use of it: such as +(1) the necessity of clearness and connexion; (2) the fear of tautology; +(3) the influence of metre, rhythm, rhyme, and of the language of prose and +verse upon one another; (4) the power of idiom and quotation; (5) the +relativeness of words to one another. + +It has been usual to depreciate modern languages when compared with +ancient. The latter are regarded as furnishing a type of excellence to +which the former cannot attain. But the truth seems to be that modern +languages, if through the loss of inflections and genders they lack some +power or beauty or expressiveness or precision which is possessed by the +ancient, are in many other respects superior to them: the thought is +generally clearer, the connexion closer, the sentence and paragraph are +better distributed. The best modern languages, for example English or +French, possess as great a power of self-improvement as the Latin, if not +as the Greek. Nor does there seem to be any reason why they should ever +decline or decay. It is a popular remark that our great writers are +beginning to disappear: it may also be remarked that whenever a great +writer appears in the future he will find the English language as perfect +and as ready for use as in the days of Shakspere or Milton. There is no +reason to suppose that English or French will ever be reduced to the low +level of Modern Greek or of Mediaeval Latin. The wide diffusion of great +authors would make such a decline impossible. Nor will modern languages be +easily broken up by amalgamation with each other. The distance between +them is too wide to be spanned, the differences are too great to be +overcome, and the use of printing makes it impossible that one of them +should ever be lost in another. + +The structure of the English language differs greatly from that of either +Latin or Greek. In the two latter, especially in Greek, sentences are +joined together by connecting particles. They are distributed on the right +hand and on the left by men, de, alla, kaitoi, kai de and the like, or +deduced from one another by ara, de, oun, toinun and the like. In English +the majority of sentences are independent and in apposition to one another; +they are laid side by side or slightly connected by the copula. But within +the sentence the expression of the logical relations of the clauses is +closer and more exact: there is less of apposition and participial +structure. The sentences thus laid side by side are also constructed into +paragraphs; these again are less distinctly marked in Greek and Latin than +in English. Generally French, German, and English have an advantage over +the classical languages in point of accuracy. The three concords are more +accurately observed in English than in either Greek or Latin. On the other +hand, the extension of the familiar use of the masculine and feminine +gender to objects of sense and abstract ideas as well as to men and animals +no doubt lends a nameless grace to style which we have a difficulty in +appreciating, and the possible variety in the order of words gives more +flexibility and also a kind of dignity to the period. Of the comparative +effect of accent and quantity and of the relation between them in ancient +and modern languages we are not able to judge. + +Another quality in which modern are superior to ancient languages is +freedom from tautology. No English style is thought tolerable in which, +except for the sake of emphasis, the same words are repeated at short +intervals. Of course the length of the interval must depend on the +character of the word. Striking words and expressions cannot be allowed to +reappear, if at all, except at the distance of a page or more. Pronouns, +prepositions, conjunctions may or rather must recur in successive lines. +It seems to be a kind of impertinence to the reader and strikes +unpleasantly both on the mind and on the ear that the same sounds should be +used twice over, when another word or turn of expression would have given a +new shade of meaning to the thought and would have added a pleasing variety +to the sound. And the mind equally rejects the repetition of the word and +the use of a mere synonym for it,--e.g. felicity and happiness. The +cultivated mind desires something more, which a skilful writer is easily +able to supply out of his treasure-house. + +The fear of tautology has doubtless led to the multiplications of words and +the meanings of words, and generally to an enlargement of the vocabulary. +It is a very early instinct of language; for ancient poetry is almost as +free from tautology as the best modern writings. The speech of young +children, except in so far as they are compelled to repeat themselves by +the fewness of their words, also escapes from it. When they grow up and +have ideas which are beyond their powers of expression, especially in +writing, tautology begins to appear. In like manner when language is +'contaminated' by philosophy it is apt to become awkward, to stammer and +repeat itself, to lose its flow and freedom. No philosophical writer with +the exception of Plato, who is himself not free from tautology, and perhaps +Bacon, has attained to any high degree of literary excellence. + +To poetry the form and polish of language is chiefly to be attributed; and +the most critical period in the history of language is the transition from +verse to prose. At first mankind were contented to express their thoughts +in a set form of words having a kind of rhythm; to which regularity was +given by accent and quantity. But after a time they demanded a greater +degree of freedom, and to those who had all their life been hearing poetry +the first introduction of prose had the charm of novelty. The prose +romances into which the Homeric Poems were converted, for a while probably +gave more delight to the hearers or readers of them than the Poems +themselves, and in time the relation of the two was reversed: the poems +which had once been a necessity of the human mind became a luxury: they +were now superseded by prose, which in all succeeding ages became the +natural vehicle of expression to all mankind. Henceforward prose and +poetry formed each other. A comparatively slender link between them was +also furnished by proverbs. We may trace in poetry how the simple +succession of lines, not without monotony, has passed into a complicated +period, and how in prose, rhythm and accent and the order of words and the +balance of clauses, sometimes not without a slight admixture of rhyme, make +up a new kind of harmony, swelling into strains not less majestic than +those of Homer, Virgil, or Dante. + +One of the most curious and characteristic features of language, affecting +both syntax and style, is idiom. The meaning of the word 'idiom' is that +which is peculiar, that which is familiar, the word or expression which +strikes us or comes home to us, which is more readily understood or more +easily remembered. It is a quality which really exists in infinite +degrees, which we turn into differences of kind by applying the term only +to conspicuous and striking examples of words or phrases which have this +quality. It often supersedes the laws of language or the rules of grammar, +or rather is to be regarded as another law of language which is natural and +necessary. The word or phrase which has been repeated many times over is +more intelligible and familiar to us than one which is rare, and our +familiarity with it more than compensates for incorrectness or inaccuracy +in the use of it. Striking expressions also which have moved the hearts of +nations or are the precious stones and jewels of great authors partake of +the nature of idioms: they are taken out of the sphere of grammar and are +exempt from the proprieties of language. Every one knows that we often put +words together in a manner which would be intolerable if it were not +idiomatic. We cannot argue either about the meaning of words or the use of +constructions that because they are used in one connexion they will be +legitimate in another, unless we allow for this principle. We can bear to +have words and sentences used in new senses or in a new order or even a +little perverted in meaning when we are quite familiar with them. +Quotations are as often applied in a sense which the author did not intend +as in that which he did. The parody of the words of Shakspere or of the +Bible, which has in it something of the nature of a lie, is far from +unpleasing to us. The better known words, even if their meaning be +perverted, are more agreeable to us and have a greater power over us. Most +of us have experienced a sort of delight and feeling of curiosity when we +first came across or when we first used for ourselves a new word or phrase +or figure of speech. + +There are associations of sound and of sense by which every word is linked +to every other. One letter harmonizes with another; every verb or noun +derives its meaning, not only from itself, but from the words with which it +is associated. Some reflection of them near or distant is embodied in it. +In any new use of a word all the existing uses of it have to be considered. +Upon these depends the question whether it will bear the proposed extension +of meaning or not. According to the famous expression of Luther, 'Words +are living creatures, having hands and feet.' When they cease to retain +this living power of adaptation, when they are only put together like the +parts of a piece of furniture, language becomes unpoetical, in expressive, +dead. + +Grammars would lead us to suppose that words have a fixed form and sound. +Lexicons assign to each word a definite meaning or meanings. They both +tend to obscure the fact that the sentence precedes the word and that all +language is relative. (1) It is relative to its own context. Its meaning +is modified by what has been said before and after in the same or in some +other passage: without comparing the context we are not sure whether it is +used in the same sense even in two successive sentences. (2) It is +relative to facts, to time, place, and occasion: when they are already +known to the hearer or reader, they may be presupposed; there is no need to +allude to them further. (3) It is relative to the knowledge of the writer +and reader or of the speaker and hearer. Except for the sake of order and +consecutiveness nothing ought to be expressed which is already commonly or +universally known. A word or two may be sufficient to give an intimation +to a friend; a long or elaborate speech or composition is required to +explain some new idea to a popular audience or to the ordinary reader or to +a young pupil. Grammars and dictionaries are not to be despised; for in +teaching we need clearness rather than subtlety. But we must not therefore +forget that there is also a higher ideal of language in which all is +relative--sounds to sounds, words to words, the parts to the whole--in +which besides the lesser context of the book or speech, there is also the +larger context of history and circumstances. + +The study of Comparative Philology has introduced into the world a new +science which more than any other binds up man with nature, and distant +ages and countries with one another. It may be said to have thrown a light +upon all other sciences and upon the nature of the human mind itself. The +true conception of it dispels many errors, not only of metaphysics and +theology, but also of natural knowledge. Yet it is far from certain that +this newly-found science will continue to progress in the same surprising +manner as heretofore; or that even if our materials are largely increased, +we shall arrive at much more definite conclusions than at present. Like +some other branches of knowledge, it may be approaching a point at which it +can no longer be profitably studied. But at any rate it has brought back +the philosophy of language from theory to fact; it has passed out of the +region of guesses and hypotheses, and has attained the dignity of an +Inductive Science. And it is not without practical and political +importance. It gives a new interest to distant and subject countries; it +brings back the dawning light from one end of the earth to the other. +Nations, like individuals, are better understood by us when we know +something of their early life; and when they are better understood by us, +we feel more kindly towards them. Lastly, we may remember that all +knowledge is valuable for its own sake; and we may also hope that a deeper +insight into the nature of human speech will give us a greater command of +it and enable us to make a nobler use of it. (Compare again W. Humboldt, +'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues;' M. Muller, +'Lectures on the Science of Language;' Steinthal, 'Einleitung in die +Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft:' and for the latter part of the Essay, +Delbruck, 'Study of Language;' Paul's 'Principles of the History of +Language:' to the latter work the author of this Essay is largely +indebted.) + + +CRATYLUS + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Hermogenes, Cratylus. + + +HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument? + +CRATYLUS: If you please. + +HERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus +has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not +conventional; not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use; but +that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for +Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name of +Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers 'Yes.' And Socrates? +'Yes.' Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which he is called. +To this he replies--'If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that +would not be your name.' And when I am anxious to have a further +explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a +notion of his own about the matter, if he would only tell, and could +entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, +what this oracle means; or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is +your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far +sooner hear. + +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that 'hard is the +knowledge of the good.' And the knowledge of names is a great part of +knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma +course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and +language--these are his own words--and then I should have been at once able +to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I +have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the +truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus +in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not +really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;--he means +to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking +after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good +deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better +leave the question open until we have heard both sides. + +HERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and +others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of +correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name which +you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give +another, the new name is as correct as the old--we frequently change the +names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for +there is no name given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit +of the users;--such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to +hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one else. + +SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us see;--Your +meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees +to call it? + +HERMOGENES: That is my notion. + +SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;--suppose that I call a man a +horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a +horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the +world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by +the world:--that is your meaning? + +HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view. + +SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is +in words a true and a false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false +proposition says that which is not? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible? + +SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts +untrue? + +HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole. + +SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every +part? + +HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true. + +SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name? + +HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest. + +SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true +and false? + +HERMOGENES: So we must infer. + +SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the +name? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says +that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other +than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and +countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ +from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from +one another. + +SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the +names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? +For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to +me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. +Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent +essence of their own? + +HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my +perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at +all. + +SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such +thing as a bad man? + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there +are very bad men, and a good many of them. + +SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones? + +HERMOGENES: Not many. + +SOCRATES: Still you have found them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and +the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view? + +HERMOGENES: It would. + +SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as +they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish? + +HERMOGENES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really +distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras +can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one +man cannot in reality be wiser than another. + +HERMOGENES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things +equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his +view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always +equally to be attributed to all. + +HERMOGENES: There cannot. + +SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to +individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment +and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent +essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating +according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own +essence the relation prescribed by nature. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth. + +SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or +equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a +class of being? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things. + +SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, +and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do +not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the +proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; +and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail +and be of no use at all. + +HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way. + +SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right +way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will +not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of +speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural +instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure. + +HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you. + +SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men +speak. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, +is not naming also a sort of action? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had +a special nature of their own? + +HERMOGENES: Precisely. + +SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be +given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not +at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success. + +HERMOGENES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with +something? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or +pierced with something? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce? + +HERMOGENES: An awl. + +SOCRATES: And with which we weave? + +HERMOGENES: A shuttle. + +SOCRATES: And with which we name? + +HERMOGENES: A name. + +SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, 'What sort of instrument is a shuttle?' And +you answer, 'A weaving instrument.' + +HERMOGENES: Well. + +SOCRATES: And I ask again, 'What do we do when we weave?'--The answer is, +that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of +instruments in general? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will +you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we +name? + +HERMOGENES: I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish +things according to their natures? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly we do. + +SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing +natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver? + +HERMOGENES: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well--and well means like a +weaver? and the teacher will use the name well--and well means like a +teacher? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be +using well? + +HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only? + +HERMOGENES: Only the skilled. + +SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using +well? + +HERMOGENES: That of the smith. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled? + +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. + +SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using? + +HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled. + +SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use? + +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the +legislator? + +HERMOGENES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only? + +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. + +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only +a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans +in the world is the rarest. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he +look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does +the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which +is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make +another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according +to which he made the other? + +HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine. + +SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle? + +HERMOGENES: I think so. + +SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of +garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all +of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle +best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the +maker produces in each case. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has +discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must +express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the +material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought to +know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their +several uses? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to +their uses? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the +several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to +put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to +make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a +namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators +will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he +may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of +the same iron. The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and +still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in +Hellas or in a foreign country;--there is no difference. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not +therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the +true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that +country makes no matter. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to +the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or +the weaver who is to use them? + +HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man +who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether +the work is being well done or not? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And who is he? + +HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre. + +SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright? + +HERMOGENES: The pilot. + +SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, +and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? +Will not the user be the man? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how to answer them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a +dialectician? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name. + +SOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the +pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the +dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given? + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be +no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons; +and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that +not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name +which each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms of +things in letters and syllables. + +HERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in +changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more +readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the +natural fitness of names. + +SOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you +just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to +share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the +matter, a step has been gained; for we have discovered that names have by +nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name. + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? +That, if you care to know, is the next question. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know. + +SOCRATES: Then reflect. + +HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect? + +SOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and +you must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the Sophists, +of whom your brother, Callias, has--rather dearly--bought the reputation of +wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you +had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has +learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names. + +HERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating +Protagoras and his truth ('Truth' was the title of the book of Protagoras; +compare Theaet.), I were to attach any value to what he and his book +affirm! + +SOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets. + +HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does +he say? + +SOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where +he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same +things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about +the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call +things by their right and natural names; do you not think so? + +HERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at +all. But to what are you referring? + +SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a +single combat with Hephaestus? + +'Whom,' as he says, 'the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.' + +HERMOGENES: I remember. + +SOCRATES: Well, and about this river--to know that he ought to be called +Xanthus and not Scamander--is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird +which, as he says, + +'The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:' + +to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name +Cymindis--do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina? +(Compare Il. 'The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb of +the sportive Myrina.') And there are many other observations of the same +kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the +understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, +which he affirms to have been the names of Hector's son, are more within +the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet +means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: you +will remember I dare say the lines to which I refer? (Il.) + +HERMOGENES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of +the names given to Hector's son--Astyanax or Scamandrius? + +HERMOGENES: I do not know. + +SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the +unwise are more likely to give correct names? + +HERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course. + +SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the +wiser? + +HERMOGENES: I should say, the men. + +SOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him +Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other +name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women. + +HERMOGENES: That may be inferred. + +SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than +their wives? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for +the boy than Scamandrius? + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:--does he not +himself suggest a very good reason, when he says, + +'For he alone defended their city and long walls'? + +This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of +the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes. + +HERMOGENES: I see. + +SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you? + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I. + +SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his +name? + +HERMOGENES: What of that? + +SOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of +Astyanax--both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) have +nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is +clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and +holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense; and +indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined +that I had found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the +correctness of names. + +HERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be +on the right track. + +SOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a lion, +and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary course +of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary +births;--if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call +that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a +natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you +agree with me? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I agree. + +SOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not +play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be +called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not +the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does +the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the +essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names +of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves with +the exception of the four epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega; the names of +the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other letters which +we add to them; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be +no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example, +the letter beta--the addition of eta, tau, alpha, gives no offence, and +does not prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator +intended--so well did he know how to give the letters names. + +HERMOGENES: I believe you are right. + +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the +son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire; and +similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is +like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be +disguised until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may +not recognize them, although they are the same, just as any one of us would +not recognize the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell, +although to the physician, who regards the power of them, they are the +same, and he is not put out by the addition; and in like manner the +etymologist is not put out by the addition or transposition or subtraction +of a letter or two, or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this +need not interfere with the meaning. As was just now said, the names of +Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is tau, and yet they +have the same meaning. And how little in common with the letters of their +names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)--and yet the meaning is the same. +And there are many other names which just mean 'king.' Again, there are +several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus +(chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others which denote a +physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of +mortals); and there are many others which might be cited, differing in +their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. Would you not +say so? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow +in the course of nature? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and +are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an +irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the +class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of +a horse foaling a calf. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called +irreligious? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or +Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are correctly +given, his should have an opposite meaning. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains) +who appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps +some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain +wildness of his hero's nature. + +HERMOGENES: That is very likely, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And his father's name is also according to nature. + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon +(admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the +accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his +continuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that admirable +endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon. I also think +that Atreus is rightly called; for his murder of Chrysippus and his +exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his +reputation--the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be +intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty in +seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ateires the stubborn, +or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the destructive one, the name is +perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is also +named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops +who sees what is near only (o ta pelas oron). + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or +foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon +his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and immediate, +--or in other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by +all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus +is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him +are true. + +HERMOGENES: And what are the traditions? + +SOCRATES: Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in +his life--last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his +death he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in the world +below--all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine +that some person who wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted down +by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; and into +this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmuted. +The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning, +although hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is +divided into two parts, for some call him Zena, and use the one half, and +others who use the other half call him Dia; the two together signify the +nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is to +express the nature. For there is none who is more the author of life to us +and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we are right in +calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the +God through whom all creatures always have life (di on zen aei pasi tois +zosin uparchei). There is an irreverence, at first sight, in calling him +son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity), and we might rather expect +Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact; for this is +the meaning of his father's name: Kronos quasi Koros (Choreo, to sweep), +not in the sense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon chai acheraton tou +nou, the pure and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He, as we are +informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo tou +oran ta ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the +way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I +could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more +conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,--then I +might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an +instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end. + +HERMOGENES: You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly +inspired, and to be uttering oracles. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration +from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long +lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom +and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession +of my soul,and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the +investigation of names--that will be the way; but to-morrow, if you are so +disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can +only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this +sort. + +HERMOGENES: With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of the +enquiry about names. + +SOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that +we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names which +witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a +natural fitness? The names of heroes and of men in general are apt to be +deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with whose names, +as we were saying, they may have no business; or they are the expression of +a wish like Eutychides (the son of good fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour), +or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others. But I think that we had +better leave these, for there will be more chance of finding correctness in +the names of immutable essences;--there ought to have been more care taken +about them when they were named, and perhaps there may have been some more +than human power at work occasionally in giving them names. + +HERMOGENES: I think so, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and +show that they are rightly named Gods? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be well. + +SOCRATES: My notion would be something of this sort:--I suspect that the +sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many +barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing +that they were always moving and running, from their running nature they +were called Gods or runners (Theous, Theontas); and when men became +acquainted with the other Gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to +them all. Do you think that likely? + +HERMOGENES: I think it very likely indeed. + +SOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods? + +HERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next? + +SOCRATES: Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this +word? Tell me if my view is right. + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word? + +HERMOGENES: I do not. + +SOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who +came first? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: He says of them-- + +'But now that fate has closed over this race +They are holy demons upon the earth, +Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.' (Hesiod, Works and +Days.) + +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? + +SOCRATES: What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the +golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I am +convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron race. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him +be said to be of golden race? + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: And are not the good wise? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, they are wise. + +SOCRATES: And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called +them demons, because they were daemones (knowing or wise), and in our older +Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say truly, +that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion among the +dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name given to him signifying wisdom. +And I say too, that every wise man who happens to be a good man is more +than human (daimonion) both in life and death, and is rightly called a +demon. + +HERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what +is the meaning of the word 'hero'? (Eros with an eta, in the old writing +eros with an epsilon.) + +SOCRATES: I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the name +is not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods? + +HERMOGENES: What then? + +SOCRATES: All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal +woman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old +Attic, and you will see better that the name heros is only a slight +alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang: either this is the +meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as rhetoricians +and dialecticians, and able to put the question (erotan), for eirein is +equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was saying, in the Attic dialect +the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All this is easy +enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of sophists and rhetors. But +can you tell me why men are called anthropoi?--that is more difficult. + +HERMOGENES: No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I +think that you are the more likely to succeed. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro. + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and +ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before to-morrow's +dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me; and first, +remember that we often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names +as we please and change the accents. Take, for example, the word Dii +Philos; in order to convert this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one +of the iotas and sound the middle syllable grave instead of acute; as, on +the other hand, letters are sometimes inserted in words instead of being +omitted, and the acute takes the place of the grave. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: The name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a +noun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the +alpha, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been +changed to a grave. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that the word 'man' implies that other animals +never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man not +only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and +hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, meaning anathron a +opopen. + +HERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am +curious? + +SOCRATES: Certainly. + +HERMOGENES: I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order. +You know the distinction of soul and body? + +SOCRATES: Of course. + +HERMOGENES: Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words. + +SOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the +word psuche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine +that those who first used the name psuche meant to express that the soul +when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and +revival (anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails then the body +perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But +please stay a moment; I fancy that I can discover something which will be +more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that they +will scorn this explanation. What do you say to another? + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion +to the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul? + +HERMOGENES: Just that. + +SOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the +ordering and containing principle of all things? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; I do. + +SOCRATES: Then you may well call that power phuseche which carries and +holds nature (e phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away into +psuche. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific +than the other. + +SOCRATES: It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that +this was the true meaning of the name. + +HERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word? + +SOCRATES: You mean soma (the body). + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if a +little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave +(sema) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life; +or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives indications to +(semainei) the body; probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the +name, and they were under the impression that the soul is suffering the +punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the +soul is incarcerated, kept safe (soma, sozetai), as the name soma implies, +until the penalty is paid; according to this view, not even a letter of the +word need be changed. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of +words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like +that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any +similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them. + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle +which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,--that of the Gods we know +nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give +themselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves, +whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all principles; +and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will call them by any +sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like, because we do not +know of any other. That also, I think, is a very good custom, and one +which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if you please, in the +first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about them; we do +not presume that we are able to do so; but we are enquiring about the +meaning of men in giving them these names,--in this there can be small +blame. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like +to do as you say. + +SOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be very proper. + +SOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia? + +HERMOGENES: That is another and certainly a most difficult question. + +SOCRATES: My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have +been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to +say. + +HERMOGENES: Well, and what of them? + +SOCRATES: They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of +names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still +discernible. For example, that which we term ousia is by some called esia, +and by others again osia. Now that the essence of things should be called +estia, which is akin to the first of these (esia = estia), is rational +enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that estia which +participates in ousia. For in ancient times we too seem to have said esia +for ousia, and this you may note to have been the idea of those who +appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to estia, which was +natural enough if they meant that estia was the essence of things. Those +again who read osia seem to have inclined to the opinion of Heracleitus, +that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing principle +(othoun) is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is therefore +rightly called osia. Enough of this, which is all that we who know nothing +can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and +Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare +say that I am talking great nonsense. + +HERMOGENES: Why, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom. + +HERMOGENES: Of what nature? + +SOCRATES: Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible. + +HERMOGENES: How plausible? + +SOCRATES: I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of +antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also +spoke. + +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and +nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that +you cannot go into the same water twice. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the +names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty much +in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to +both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I +believe, Hesiod also, tells of + +'Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys (Il.--the line is not found +in the extant works of Hesiod.).' + +And again, Orpheus says, that + +'The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his sister +Tethys, who was his mother's daughter.' + +You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of +Heracleitus. + +HERMOGENES: I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but +I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys. + +SOCRATES: Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a +spring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered +(diattomenon, ethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys +is made up of these two words. + +HERMOGENES: The idea is ingenious, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?--of Zeus we have spoken. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, +whether the latter is called by that or by his other name. + +HERMOGENES: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original +inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks, +and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element +Poseidon; the epsilon was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, +not so; but the name may have been originally written with a double lamda +and not with a sigma, meaning that the God knew many things (Polla eidos). +And perhaps also he being the shaker of the earth, has been named from +shaking (seiein), and then pi and delta have been added. Pluto gives +wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the giver of wealth, which comes out +of the earth beneath. People in general appear to imagine that the term +Hades is connected with the invisible (aeides) and so they are led by their +fears to call the God Pluto instead. + +HERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation? + +SOCRATES: In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this +deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of +always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body +going to him (compare Rep.), my belief is that all is quite consistent, and +that the office and name of the God really correspond. + +HERMOGENES: Why, how is that? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask +you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which confines +him more to the same spot,--desire or necessity? + +HERMOGENES: Desire, Socrates, is stronger far. + +SOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if +he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains? + +HERMOGENES: Assuredly they would. + +SOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I +should certainly infer, and not by necessity? + +HERMOGENES: That is clear. + +SOCRATES: And there are many desires? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the +greatest? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be +made better by associating with another? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been +to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest +of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, +is the God able to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he +is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the +inhabitants of the other world; and even to us who are upon earth he sends +from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more than he wants down +there; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will +have nothing to do with men while they are in the body, but only when the +soul is liberated from the desires and evils of the body. Now there is a +great deal of philosophy and reflection in that; for in their liberated +state he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are +flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself would +suffice to keep them with him in his own far-famed chains. + +HERMOGENES: There is a deal of truth in what you say. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from +the unseen (aeides)--far otherwise, but from his knowledge (eidenai) of all +noble things. + +HERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and +Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities? + +SOCRATES: Demeter is e didousa meter, who gives food like a mother; Here +is the lovely one (erate)--for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and +married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator +was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (aer), +putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the +truth of this if you repeat the letters of Here several times over. People +dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo,--and with +as little reason; the fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from their +ignorance of the nature of names. But they go changing the name into +Phersephone, and they are terrified at this; whereas the new name means +only that the Goddess is wise (sophe); for seeing that all things in the +world are in motion (pheromenon), that principle which embraces and touches +and is able to follow them, is wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be +truly called Pherepaphe (Pherepapha), or some name like it, because she +touches that which is in motion (tou pheromenon ephaptomene), herein +showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she +is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the +present generation care for euphony more than truth. There is the other +name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some +terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure I have, and what you say is true. + +SOCRATES: But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the +power of the God. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any +single name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of the +God, embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,--music, and +prophecy, and medicine, and archery. + +HERMOGENES: That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the +explanation. + +SOCRATES: Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. +In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and +diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as +well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same +object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver +from all impurities? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the +physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon (purifier); or +in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which +is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called Aplos, from aplous +(sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him +Aplos; also he is aei Ballon (always shooting), because he is a master +archer who never misses; or again, the name may refer to his musical +attributes, and then, as in akolouthos, and akoitis, and in many other +words the alpha is supposed to mean 'together,' so the meaning of the name +Apollo will be 'moving together,' whether in the poles of heaven as they +are called, or in the harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he +moves all together by an harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians +ingeniously declare. And he is the God who presides over harmony, and +makes all things move together, both among Gods and among men. And as in +the words akolouthos and akoitis the alpha is substituted for an omicron, +so the name Apollon is equivalent to omopolon; only the second lambda is +added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (apolon). Now +the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts the minds of some who +do not consider the true value of the name, which, as I was saying just +now, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the single one, the +everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (aplous, aei Ballon, +apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to be +derived from their making philosophical enquiries (mosthai); and Leto is +called by this name, because she is such a gentle Goddess, and so willing +(ethelemon) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, as she is +often called by strangers--they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her +smooth and easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy +(artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity, +perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (arete), and perhaps also as +hating intercourse of the sexes (ton aroton misesasa). He who gave the +Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons. + +HERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite? + +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a serious +and also a facetious explanation of both these names; the serious +explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objection to your +hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a joke. Dionusos is +simply didous oinon (giver of wine), Didoinusos, as he might be called in +fun,--and oinos is properly oionous, because wine makes those who drink, +think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (noun) when they have none. The +derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam (aphros), may be fairly accepted +on the authority of Hesiod. + +HERMOGENES: Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an +Athenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares. + +SOCRATES: I am not likely to forget them. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of +Athene. + +HERMOGENES: What other appellation? + +SOCRATES: We call her Pallas. + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from +armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the +earth, or by the use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or dancing. + +HERMOGENES: That is quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name? + +SOCRATES: Athene? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern +interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the +ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that +he meant by Athene 'mind' (nous) and 'intelligence' (dianoia), and the +maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her; and indeed +calls her by a still higher title, 'divine intelligence' (Thou noesis), as +though he would say: This is she who has the mind of God (Theonoa);--using +alpha as a dialectical variety for eta, and taking away iota and sigma +(There seems to be some error in the MSS. The meaning is that the word +theonoa = theounoa is a curtailed form of theou noesis, but the omitted +letters do not agree.). Perhaps, however, the name Theonoe may mean 'she +who knows divine things' (Theia noousa) better than others. Nor shall we +be far wrong in supposing that the author of it wished to identify this +Goddess with moral intelligence (en ethei noesin), and therefore gave her +the name ethonoe; which, however, either he or his successors have altered +into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene. + +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus? + +SOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light (Phaeos istora)? + +HERMOGENES: Surely. + +SOCRATES: Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the eta by attraction; that +is obvious to anybody. + +HERMOGENES: That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets +into your head. + +SOCRATES: To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of +Ares. + +HERMOGENES: What is Ares? + +SOCRATES: Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and +manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which +is the meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every way +appropriate to the God of war. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am +afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the +steeds of Euthyphro can prance. + +HERMOGENES: Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of +whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall +know whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says. + +SOCRATES: I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and +signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or thief, or +liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with +language; as I was telling you, the word eirein is expressive of the use of +speech, and there is an often-recurring Homeric word emesato, which means +'he contrived'--out of these two words, eirein and mesasthai, the +legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech; and +we may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name: 'O my friends,' +says he to us, 'seeing that he is the contriver of tales or speeches, you +may rightly call him Eirhemes.' And this has been improved by us, as we +think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called from the verb +'to tell' (eirein), because she was a messenger. + +HERMOGENES: Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying +that I was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand at +speeches. + +SOCRATES: There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed +son of Hermes. + +HERMOGENES: How do you make that out? + +SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is +always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which +dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and +is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have generally +to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and the +perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called aipolos (goat- +herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, and +rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is +speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is +no marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from +the Gods. + +HERMOGENES: From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why +should we not discuss another kind of Gods--the sun, moon, stars, earth, +aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year? + +SOCRATES: You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I +will not refuse. + +HERMOGENES: You will oblige me. + +SOCRATES: How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom +you mentioned first--the sun? + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric +form, for the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him because +when he rises he gathers (alizoi) men together or because he is always +rolling in his course (aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from aiolein, of +which the meaning is the same as poikillein (to variegate), because he +variegates the productions of the earth. + +HERMOGENES: But what is selene (the moon)? + +SOCRATES: That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon +receives her light from the sun. + +HERMOGENES: Why do you say so? + +SOCRATES: The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much the +same meaning? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old +(enon), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his +revolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the +previous month. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And as she has a light which is always old and always new (enon +neon aei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and this when +hammered into shape becomes selanaia. + +HERMOGENES: A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do +you say of the month and the stars? + +SOCRATES: Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because +suffering diminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived from +astrape, which is an improvement on anastrope, signifying the upsetting of +the eyes (anastrephein opa). + +HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)? + +SOCRATES: I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of Euthyphro +has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word. +Please, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a +difficulty of this sort. + +HERMOGENES: What is it? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can +tell me what is the meaning of the pur? + +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of +this and several other words?--My belief is that they are of foreign +origin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion of +the barbarians, often borrowed from them. + +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? + +SOCRATES: Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness +of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not according to the +language from which the words are derived, is rather likely to be at fault. + +HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the +word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the +Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly changed, just as +they have udor (water) and kunes (dogs), and many other words. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; for +something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of pur +and udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which +raises (airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei rei), or +because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the winds 'air- +blasts,' (aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to speak, air-flux +(aetorroun), in the sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun); and because this +moving wind may be expressed by either term he employs the word air (aer = +aetes rheo). Aither (aether) I should interpret as aeitheer; this may be +correctly said, because this element is always running in a flux about the +air (aei thei peri tou aera reon). The meaning of the word ge (earth) +comes out better when in the form of gaia, for the earth may be truly +called 'mother' (gaia, genneteira), as in the language of Homer (Od.) +gegaasi means gegennesthai. + +HERMOGENES: Good. + +SOCRATES: What shall we take next? + +HERMOGENES: There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the year, +eniautos and etos. + +SOCRATES: The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to +know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai +because they divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and the +fruits of the earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the same,-- +'that which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth in their +turn, and passes them in review within itself (en eauto exetazei)': this +is broken up into two words, eniautos from en eauto, and etos from etazei, +just as the original name of Zeus was divided into Zena and Dia; and the +whole proposition means that his power of reviewing from within is one, but +has two names, two words etos and eniautos being thus formed out of a +single proposition. + +HERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress. + +SOCRATES: I am run away with. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But am not yet at my utmost speed. + +HERMOGENES: I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you +would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those +charming words--wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them? + +SOCRATES: That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring; +still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint of heart; and +I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (phronesis) and +understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), and knowledge (episteme), +and all those other charming words, as you call them? + +HERMOGENES: Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning. + +SOCRATES: By the dog of Egypt I have a not bad notion which came into my +head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names were +undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their search +after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly going +round and round, and then they imagine that the world is going round and +round and moving in all directions; and this appearance, which arises out +of their own internal condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; +they think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and +motion, and that the world is always full of every sort of motion and +change. The consideration of the names which I mentioned has led me into +making this reflection. + +HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been +just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely +indicated. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed, I never thought of it. + +SOCRATES: Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a +name indicative of motion. + +HERMOGENES: What was the name? + +SOCRATES: Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify phoras kai rhou noesis +(perception of motion and flux), or perhaps phoras onesis (the blessing of +motion), but is at any rate connected with pheresthai (motion); gnome +(judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration +(nomesis) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider; or, if +you would rather, here is noesis, the very word just now mentioned, which +is neou esis (the desire of the new); the word neos implies that the world +is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express +this longing of the soul, for the original name was neoesis, and not +noesis; but eta took the place of a double epsilon. The word sophrosune is +the salvation (soteria) of that wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now +considering. Epioteme (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the +soul which is good for anything follows (epetai) the motion of things, +neither anticipating them nor falling behind them; wherefore the word +should rather be read as epistemene, inserting epsilon nu. Sunesis +(understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion; the +word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), and, like epistasthai (to +know), implies the progression of the soul in company with the nature of +things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native +growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You must +remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid +motion, often use the word esuthe (he rushed); and there was a famous +Lacedaemonian who was named Sous (Rush), for by this word the +Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (epaphe) of motion is +expressed by sophia, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good +(agathon) is the name which is given to the admirable (agasto) in nature; +for, although all things move, still there are degrees of motion; some are +swifter, some slower; but there are some things which are admirable for +their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called agathon. +Dikaiosune (justice) is clearly dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the +just); but the actual word dikaion is more difficult: men are only agreed +to a certain extent about justice, and then they begin to disagree. For +those who suppose all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of +nature to be a mere receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating +power which passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in +all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element; for if it were not the +subtlest, and a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, +passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not +penetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which +superintends all things and pierces (diaion) all, is rightly called +dikaion; the letter k is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as +I was saying, there is a general agreement about the nature of justice; but +I, Hermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery +that the justice of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world: +now a cause is that because of which anything is created; and some one +comes and whispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because +partaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what he +has said, to interrogate him gently: 'Well, my excellent friend,' say I, +'but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.' Thereupon +they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers, +and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me +with one derivation after another, and at length they quarrel. For one of +them says that justice is the sun, and that he only is the piercing +(diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element which is the guardian of nature. +And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered by the +satirical remark, 'What, is there no justice in the world when the sun is +down?' And when I earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest +opinion, he says, 'Fire in the abstract'; but this is not very +intelligible. Another says, 'No, not fire in the abstract, but the +abstraction of heat in the fire.' Another man professes to laugh at all +this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that justice is mind, for mind, as they +say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and orders all things, and +passes through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself in far +greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was before I began to +learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, which has led me into this +digression, was given to justice for the reasons which I have mentioned. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you must +have heard this from some one else. + +SOCRATES: And not the rest? + +HERMOGENES: Hardly. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in +the originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think +that we have as yet discussed courage (andreia),--injustice (adikia), which +is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle +(diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of andreia seems +to imply a battle;--this battle is in the world of existence, and according +to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (enantia rhon): if you +extract the delta from andreia, the name at once signifies the thing, and +you may clearly understand that andreia is not the stream opposed to every +stream, but only to that which is contrary to justice, for otherwise +courage would not have been praised. The words arren (male) and aner (man) +also contain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward flux +(te ano rhon). Gune (woman) I suspect to be the same word as goun (birth): +thelu (female) appears to be partly derived from thele (the teat), because +the teat is like rain, and makes things flourish (tethelenai). + +HERMOGENES: That is surely probable. + +SOCRATES: Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure +the growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed +by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of thein (running), and +allesthai (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth +ground. There are a good many names generally thought to be of importance, +which have still to be explained. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the +possession of mind: you have only to take away the tau and insert two +omichrons, one between the chi and nu, and another between the nu and eta. + +HERMOGENES: That is a very shabby etymology. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original names +have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping +off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in +all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share in the change. Take, +for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter rho inserted? This must +surely be the addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth, but +thinks only of putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often +such that at last no human being can possibly make out the original meaning +of the word. Another example is the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought +properly to be phigx, phiggos, and there are other examples. + +HERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters +which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be +adapted to any object. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like +yourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability. + +HERMOGENES: Such is my desire. + +SOCRATES: And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a +precisian, or 'you will unnerve me of my strength (Iliad.).' When you have +allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be at the +top of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great accomplishment +--anein; for mekos has the meaning of greatness, and these two, mekos and +anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying, being now at the +top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words +arete (virtue) and kakia (vice); arete I do not as yet understand, but +kakia is transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for +all things being in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos ion (going badly); and +this evil motion when existing in the soul has the general name of kakia, +or vice, specially appropriated to it. The meaning of kakos ienai may be +further illustrated by the use of deilia (cowardice), which ought to have +come after andreia, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word +which has been passed over. Deilia signifies that the soul is bound with a +strong chain (desmos), for lian means strength, and therefore deilia +expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the soul; and aporia +(difficulty) is an evil of the same nature (from a (alpha) not, and +poreuesthai to go), like anything else which is an impediment to motion and +movement. Then the word kakia appears to mean kakos ienai, or going badly, +or limping and halting; of which the consequence is, that the soul becomes +filled with vice. And if kakia is the name of this sort of thing, arete +will be the opposite of it, signifying in the first place ease of motion, +then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the +attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called +arete, or, more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have +had another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is more +eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I daresay +that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that +if the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also right. + +HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a +part in your previous discourse? + +SOCRATES: That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an +opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device. + +HERMOGENES: What device? + +SOCRATES: The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word +also. + +HERMOGENES: Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these +words and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron. + +SOCRATES: The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon roes +(always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our former +derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all +sorts, and hence he gave the name aeischoroun to that which hindered the +flux (aei ischon roun), and that is now beaten together into aischron. + +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon? + +SOCRATES: That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity, +and has been changed by altering omicron upsilon into omicron. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: This name appears to denote mind. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not +the principle which imposes the name the cause? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their names, +and is not mind the beautiful (kalon)? + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, +and are not other works worthy of blame? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the +works of a carpenter? + +HERMOGENES: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty? + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works +which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful? + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: What more names remain to us? + +HERMOGENES: There are the words which are connected with agathon and +kalon, such as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and their +opposites. + +SOCRATES: The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may +discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,--for it is a +sister word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the soul +accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle are +called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried round with the +world. + +HERMOGENES: That is probable. + +SOCRATES: Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain), but +you must alter the delta into nu if you want to get at the meaning; for +this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name +intended to express the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and universal +penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a delta +instead of a nu, and so made kerdos. + +HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)? + +SOCRATES: I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable +the gainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but they use the word +in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable (lusiteloun), as that +which being the swiftest thing in existence, allows of no stay in things +and no pause or end of motion, but always, if there begins to be any end, +lets things go again (luei), and makes motion immortal and unceasing: and +in this point of view, as appears to me, the good is happily denominated +lusiteloun--being that which looses (luon) the end (telos) of motion. +Ophelimon (the advantageous) is derived from ophellein, meaning that which +creates and increases; this latter is a common Homeric word, and has a +foreign character. + +HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites? + +SOCRATES: Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak. + +HERMOGENES: Which are they? + +SOCRATES: The words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable), +alusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful). + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes +(hurtful). + +HERMOGENES: Good. + +SOCRATES: The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm +(blaptein) the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to hold +or bind); for aptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a term of +censure; boulomenon aptein roun (wanting to bind the stream) would properly +be boulapteroun, and this, as I imagine, is improved into blaberon. + +HERMOGENES: You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names; +and when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining that you are +making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some prelude to Athene. + +SOCRATES: That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not +mine. + +HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes? + +SOCRATES: What is the meaning of zemiodes?--let me remark, Hermogenes, how +right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words +by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight permutation will +sometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may instance the word deon, +which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say +to you, that the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and +disguised and entirely altered the original meaning both of deon, and also +of zemiodes, which in the old language is clearly indicated. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved +the sounds iota and delta, especially the women, who are most conservative +of the ancient language, but now they change iota into eta or epsilon, and +delta into zeta; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound. + +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: For example, in very ancient times they called the day either +imera or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e). + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of +the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for +(imeirousi) and love the light which comes after the darkness, and is +therefore called imera, from imeros, desire. + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the +meaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be called emera +because it makes things gentle (emera different accents). + +HERMOGENES: Such is my view. + +SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon? + +HERMOGENES: They did so. + +SOCRATES: And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,--it ought to be duogon, which +word expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the purpose of +drawing;--this has been changed into zugon, and there are many other +examples of similar changes. + +HERMOGENES: There are. + +SOCRATES: Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the +word deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other +appellations of good; for deon is here a species of good, and is, +nevertheless, the chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and therefore own +brother of blaberon. + +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain. + +SOCRATES: Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be +the correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the epsilon +into an iota after the old fashion, this word will then agree with other +words meaning good; for dion, not deon, signifies the good, and is a term +of praise; and the author of names has not contradicted himself, but in all +these various appellations, deon (obligatory), ophelimon (advantageous), +lusiteloun (profitable), kerdaleon (gainful), agathon (good), sumpheron +(expedient), euporon (plenteous), the same conception is implied of the +ordering or all-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining +and binding principle which is censured. And this is further illustrated +by the word zemiodes (hurtful), which if the zeta is only changed into +delta as in the ancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as you +will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (dounti ion). + +HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia +(desire), and the like, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty +about them--edone is e (eta) onesis, the action which tends to advantage; +and the original form may be supposed to have been eone, but this has been +altered by the insertion of the delta. Lupe appears to be derived from the +relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in sorrow; ania (trouble) is +the hindrance of motion (alpha and ienai); algedon (distress), if I am not +mistaken, is a foreign word, which is derived from aleinos (grievous); +odune (grief) is called from the putting on (endusis) sorrow; in achthedon +(vexation) 'the word too labours,' as any one may see; chara (joy) is the +very expression of the fluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis +(delight) is so called from the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul, +which may be likened to a breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has +been altered by time into terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia +explain themselves; the former, which ought to be eupherosune and has been +changed euphrosune, is named, as every one may see, from the soul moving +(pheresthai) in harmony with nature; epithumia is really e epi ton thumon +iousa dunamis, the power which enters into the soul; thumos (passion) is +called from the rushing (thuseos) and boiling of the soul; imeros (desire) +denotes the stream (rous) which most draws the soul dia ten esin tes roes-- +because flowing with desire (iemenos), and expresses a longing after things +and violent attraction of the soul to them, and is termed imeros from +possessing this power; pothos (longing) is expressive of the desire of that +which is not present but absent, and in another place (pou); this is the +reason why the name pothos is applied to things absent, as imeros is to +things present; eros (love) is so called because flowing in (esron) from +without; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence introduced through +the eyes, and from flowing in was called esros (influx) in the old time +when they used omicron for omega, and is called eros, now that omega is +substituted for omicron. But why do you not give me another word? + +HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of words? + +SOCRATES: Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses the +march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a +bow (toxon); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis +(thinking), which is only oisis (moving), and implies the movement of the +soul to the essential nature of each thing--just as boule (counsel) has to +do with shooting (bole); and boulesthai (to wish) combines the notion of +aiming and deliberating--all these words seem to follow doxa, and all +involve the idea of shooting, just as aboulia, absence of counsel, on the +other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the mark, or aim, or +proposal, or object. + +HERMOGENES: You are quickening your pace now, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I +have explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and ekousion +(the voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon) and +unresisting--the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as +I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will; +but the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, implies error +and ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is +impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion--and this is the +derivation of the word anagkaion (necessary) an agke ion, going through a +ravine. But while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you +will persevere with your questions. + +HERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such as +aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not forgetting to +enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of our discussion, +has this name of onoma. + +SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai (to seek)? + +HERMOGENES: Yes;--meaning the same as zetein (to enquire). + +SOCRATES: The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying on +ou zetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more obvious in +onomaston (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is +that for which there is a seeking (on ou masma); aletheia is also an +agglomeration of theia ale (divine wandering), implying the divine motion +of existence; pseudos (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is +another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction, +which he compares to sleep (eudein); but the original meaning of the word +is disguised by the addition of psi; on and ousia are ion with an iota +broken off; this agrees with the true principle, for being (on) is also +moving (ion), and the same may be said of not being, which is likewise +called not going (oukion or ouki on = ouk ion). + +HERMOGENES: You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that some +one were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon and doun?-- +show me their fitness. + +SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already +suggested. + +HERMOGENES: What way? + +SOCRATES: To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign +origin; and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this +kind may be true of them; but also the original forms of words may have +been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of +ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language when compared with +that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous tongue. + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest +attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person +go on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the elements out +of which the words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this process, +he who has to answer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the +enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the +elements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed to +be made up of other names? The word agathon (good), for example, is, as we +were saying, a compound of agastos (admirable) and thoos (swift). And +probably thoos is made up of other elements, and these again of others. +But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, then we +shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary element, +which need not be resolved any further. + +HERMOGENES: I believe you to be in the right. + +SOCRATES: And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn +out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be examined +according to some new method? + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to this +conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again +say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in +stating the principle of primary names. + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you. + +SOCRATES: I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle is +applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary--when they are +regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: All the names that we have been explaining were intended to +indicate the nature of things. + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the +secondary names, is implied in their being names. + +HERMOGENES: Surely. + +SOCRATES: But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from +the primary. + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede +analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which +they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a +question: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to +communicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and dumb, make +signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body? + +HERMOGENES: There would be no choice, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of our +hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and +downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if we +were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we should make +our bodies and their gestures as like as we could to them. + +HERMOGENES: I do not see that we could do anything else. + +SOCRATES: We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever +express anything. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or +tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we +want to express. + +HERMOGENES: It must be so, I think. + +SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal +imitator names or imitates? + +HERMOGENES: I think so. + +SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached +the truth as yet. + +HERMOGENES: Why not? + +SOCRATES: Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people +who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they +imitate. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying? + +HERMOGENES: In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, +Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, +although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music +imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the +matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have +colour? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with +imitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music and +drawing? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a +colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well +as of anything else which may be said to have an essence? + +HERMOGENES: I should think so. + +SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in +letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing? + +HERMOGENES: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave +to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called? + +HERMOGENES: I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver, +of whom we are in search. + +SOCRATES: If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to +consider the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention), about +which you were asking; and we may see whether the namer has grasped the +nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the +essence or not. + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others? + +HERMOGENES: There must be others. + +SOCRATES: So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them, and +where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by +syllables and letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the +letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the +powers of elementary, and then of compound sounds, and when they have done +so, but not before, they proceed to the consideration of rhythms? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first separating +the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes (letters which are neither +vowels nor semivowels), into classes, according to the received +distinctions of the learned; also the semivowels, which are neither vowels, +nor yet mutes; and distinguishing into classes the vowels themselves? And +when we have perfected the classification of things, we shall give them +names, and see whether, as in the case of letters, there are any classes to +which they may be all referred (cf. Phaedrus); and hence we shall see their +natures, and see, too, whether they have in them classes as there are in +the letters; and when we have well considered all this, we shall know how +to apply them to what they resemble--whether one letter is used to denote +one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them; just, +as in painting, the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses +purple only, or any other colour, and sometimes mixes up several colours, +as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that +kind--he uses his colours as his figures appear to require them; and so, +too, we shall apply letters to the expression of objects, either single +letters when required, or several letters; and so we shall form syllables, +as they are called, and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at +last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large +and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so shall we make +speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some other art. +Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried away-- +meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we but) the ancients +formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like +manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject, and we +must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are +rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear +Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction. + +HERMOGENES: That, Socrates, I can quite believe. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them +in this way? for I am certain that I should not. + +HERMOGENES: Much less am I likely to be able. + +SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if we +can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying +by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the truth about +them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in +this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the +higher method is the one which we or others who would analyse language to +any good purpose must follow; but under the circumstances, as men say, we +must do as well as we can. What do you think? + +HERMOGENES: I very much approve. + +SOCRATES: That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so +find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be +avoided--there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of +first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like +the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in the air; +and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that 'the +Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.' This will be the +best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be even better still, of +deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than +we are; or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is +the same sort of excuse as the last; for all these are not reasons but only +ingenious excuses for having no reasons concerning the truth of words. And +yet any sort of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance +of secondary words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly +then the professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid +explanation of first names, or let him be assured he will only talk +nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: My first notions of original names are truly wild and +ridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire, +and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which +you may have. + +HERMOGENES: Fear not; I will do my best. + +SOCRATES: In the first place, the letter rho appears to me to be the +general instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet +explained the meaning of this latter word, which is just iesis (going); for +the letter eta was not in use among the ancients, who only employed +epsilon; and the root is kiein, which is a foreign form, the same as ienai. +And the old word kinesis will be correctly given as iesis in corresponding +modern letters. Assuming this foreign root kiein, and allowing for the +change of the eta and the insertion of the nu, we have kinesis, which +should have been kieinsis or eisis; and stasis is the negative of ienai (or +eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now the letter rho, as I was +saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent instrument for the +expression of motion; and he frequently uses the letter for this purpose: +for example, in the actual words rein and roe he represents motion by rho; +also in the words tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged); and again, in words +such as krouein (strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), thruptein +(break), kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts of +movements he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I +imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at +rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order +to express motion, just as by the letter iota he expresses the subtle +elements which pass through all things. This is why he uses the letter +iota as imitative of motion, ienai, iesthai. And there is another class of +letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi, of which the pronunciation is accompanied +by great expenditure of breath; these are used in the imitation of such +notions as psuchron (shivering), xeon (seething), seiesthai, (to be +shaken), seismos (shock), and are always introduced by the giver of names +when he wants to imitate what is phusodes (windy). He seems to have +thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue in the utterance of +delta and tau was expressive of binding and rest in a place: he further +observed the liquid movement of lambda, in the pronunciation of which the +tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as in +leios (level), and in the word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon +(sleek), in the word kollodes (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of +gamma detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the +notion of a glutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes. +The nu he observed to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a +notion of inwardness; hence he introduced the sound in endos and entos: +alpha he assigned to the expression of size, and nu of length, because they +are great letters: omicron was the sign of roundness, and therefore there +is plenty of omicron mixed up in the word goggulon (round). Thus did the +legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing +on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation compounding other +signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names; but I should +like to hear what Cratylus has more to say. + +HERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies +me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what is +this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or +not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree +in what Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better +of your own? and if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will +either learn of Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you. + +CRATYLUS: Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can +learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any +rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest +of all. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, 'to add +little to little' is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that you +can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little +trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon +you. + +SOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which +Hermogenes and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to say +what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall gladly +accept. And I should not be at all surprized to find that you have found +some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on these matters and +have had teachers, and if you have really a better theory of the truth of +names, you may count me in the number of your disciples. + +CRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of +these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I +fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved to +say to you what Achilles in the 'Prayers' says to Ajax,-- + +'Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people, +You appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind.' + +And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers much +to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may +have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself. + +SOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom; +I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself +What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception--when the +deceiver is always at home and always with you--it is quite terrible, and +therefore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to 'look fore and +aft,' in the words of the aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are +we? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of +the thing:--has this proposition been sufficiently proven? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite +true. + +SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And who are they? + +CRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first. + +SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me +explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, +better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders also, the better +sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse. + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work better +and some worse? + +CRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you. + +SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others +worse? + +CRATYLUS: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all. + +SOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, +which was mentioned before:--assuming that he has nothing of the nature of +Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at +all? + +CRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only +appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the +nature which corresponds to it. + +SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even +speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him +Hermogenes, if he is not. + +CRATYLUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this +is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in +all ages. + +CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?--say +something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which +is not? + +SOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I +should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think +that falsehood may be spoken but not said? + +CRATYLUS: Neither spoken nor said. + +SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting +you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: 'Hail, Athenian +stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion'--these words, whether spoken, said, +uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our +friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all? + +CRATYLUS: In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking +nonsense. + +SOCRATES: Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me +whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly +false:--which is all that I want to know. + +CRATYLUS: I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no +purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of +hammering at a brazen pot. + +SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting- +point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing +named? + +CRATYLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation +of the thing? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, +but in another way? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand you. +Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures +or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the things of +which they are the imitation. + +CRATYLUS: They are. + +SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness +of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the +woman, and of the woman to the man? + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first? + +CRATYLUS: Only the first. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each +that which belongs to them and is like them? + +CRATYLUS: That is my view. + +SOCRATES: Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a +good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you: the +first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call +right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and the other +mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in +the case of names, false as well as wrong. + +CRATYLUS: That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may be +wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names--they must be always right. + +SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to +him, 'This is your picture,' showing him his own likeness, or perhaps the +likeness of a woman; and when I say 'show,' I mean bring before the sense +of sight. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And may I not go to him again, and say, 'This is your name'?-- +for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say to him-- +'This is your name'? and may I not then bring to his sense of hearing the +imitation of himself, when I say, 'This is a man'; or of a female of the +human species, when I say, 'This is a woman,' as the case may be? Is not +all that quite possible? + +CRATYLUS: I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say, +Granted. + +SOCRATES: That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be +disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to +objects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong +assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of +names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and +if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of them. +What do you say, Cratylus? + +CRATYLUS: I agree; and think that what you say is very true. + +SOCRATES: And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in +pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or +you may not give them all--some may be wanting; or there may be too many or +too much of them--may there not? + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he +who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one. + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the +nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good +image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a +little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer that some +names are well and others ill made. + +CRATYLUS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be +bad? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be +bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good? + +CRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is +different; for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters alpha or +beta, or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, +or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only written +wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases becomes other +than a name. + +SOCRATES: But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus. + +CRATYLUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which +must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten +at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of +any other number: but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or +to anything which is represented under an image. I should say rather that +the image, if expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer +be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two objects: one of them +shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus; and we will +suppose, further, that some God makes not only a representation such as a +painter would make of your outward form and colour, but also creates an +inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness; and +into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a +word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form; +would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that +there were two Cratyluses? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that there were two Cratyluses. + +SOCRATES: Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle +of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is no +longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive +that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact +counterpart of the realities which they represent? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I see. + +SOCRATES: But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, +if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of +them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which +were the realities. + +CRATYLUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may +be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the name +shall be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the occasional +substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a +sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not +appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, and +described, so long as the general character of the thing which you are +describing is retained; and this, as you will remember, was remarked by +Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of the +letters. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I remember. + +SOCRATES: Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some +of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified;--well, if +all the letters are given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I +think that we had better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in +Aegina who wander about the street late at night: and be likewise told by +truth herself that we have arrived too late; or if not, you must find out +some new notion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name +is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, +you will be inconsistent with yourself. + +CRATYLUS: I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very +reasonable. + +SOCRATES: Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a +name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters. + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names +which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up +of proper and similar letters, or there would be no likeness; but there +will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the beauty and +formation of the word: you would admit that? + +CRATYLUS: There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, +since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a +name at all. + +SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some +derived? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are +representations of things, is there any better way of framing +representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you +can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say +that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed +about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them, +and that convention is the only principle; and whether you abide by our +present convention, or make a new and opposite one, according to which you +call small great and great small--that, they would say, makes no +difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you +prefer? + +CRATYLUS: Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than +representation by any chance sign. + +SOCRATES: Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters +out of which the first names are composed must also be like things. +Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could any one ever +compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if there were not +pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, and out of which +the picture is composed? + +CRATYLUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, +unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree +of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And +the original elements are letters? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were +saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter rho is +expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in +saying so? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that you were right. + +SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and +the like? + +CRATYLUS: There again you were right. + +SOCRATES: And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us sklerotes, +is by the Eretrians called skleroter. + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there the +same significance to them in the termination rho, which there is to us in +sigma, or is there no significance to one of us? + +CRATYLUS: Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us. + +SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike? + +CRATYLUS: In as far as they are like. + +SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike? + +CRATYLUS: Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that is +expressive not of hardness but of softness. + +CRATYLUS: Why, perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and +should be altered into rho, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in my +opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon +occasion. + +SOCRATES: Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when I +say skleros (hard), you know what I mean. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom. + +SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I +understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this +is what you are saying? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication +given by me to you? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as +from like, for example in the lamda of sklerotes. But if this is true, +then you have made a convention with yourself, and the correctness of a +name turns out to be convention, since letters which are unlike are +indicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanctioned by +custom and convention. And even supposing that you distinguish custom from +convention ever so much, still you must say that the signification of words +is given by custom and not by likeness, for custom may indicate by the +unlike as well as by the like. But as we are agreed thus far, Cratylus +(for I shall assume that your silence gives consent), then custom and +convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication of our +thoughts; for suppose we take the instance of number, how can you ever +imagine, my good friend, that you will find names resembling every +individual number, unless you allow that which you term convention and +agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names? I +quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things; +but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a +shabby thing, which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of +convention with a view to correctness; for I believe that if we could +always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate, +this would be the most perfect state of language; as the opposite is the +most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what +is the use of them? + +CRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform: +the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which +are expressed by them. + +SOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so +also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other, +because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same art or +science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know +things. + +CRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean. + +SOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of this information about +things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort +of information? or is there any other? What do you say? + +CRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of +information about them; there can be no other. + +SOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who +discovers the names discovers also the things; or is this only the method +of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and discovery. + +CRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery +are of the same nature as instruction. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in +the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of +being deceived? + +CRATYLUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his +conception of the things which they signified--did he not? + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according +to his conception, in what position shall we who are his followers find +ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him? + +CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely +have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all? +And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof +is--that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that +all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose? + +SOCRATES: But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in +error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original +error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, any more +than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw +in the first part of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the long +deductions which follow. And this is the reason why every man should +expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of his first +principles:--are they or are they not rightly laid down? and when he has +duly sifted them, all the rest will follow. Now I should be astonished to +find that names are really consistent. And here let us revert to our +former discussion: Were we not saying that all things are in motion and +progress and flux, and that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do +you not conceive that to be the meaning of them? + +CRATYLUS: Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning. + +SOCRATES: Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous +this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than +going round with them; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at +present, and not reject the epsilon, but make an insertion of an iota +instead of an epsilon (not pioteme, but epiisteme). Take another example: +bebaion (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position, and not +of motion. Again, the word istoria (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the +stopping (istanai) of the stream; and the word piston (faithful) certainly +indicates cessation of motion; then, again, mneme (memory), as any one may +see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as +amartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their +etymologies will be the same as sunesis and episteme and other words which +have a good sense (compare omartein, sunienai, epesthai, sumpheresthai); +and much the same may be said of amathia and akolasia, for amathia may be +explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois +pragmasin. Thus the names which in these instances we find to have the +worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those +which have the best. And any one I believe who would take the trouble +might find many other examples in which the giver of names indicates, not +that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at rest; which is +the opposite of motion. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express motion. + +SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is +correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever +sort there are most, those are the true ones? + +CRATYLUS: No; that is not reasonable. + +SOCRATES: Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and +proceed to another, about which I should like to know whether you think +with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names +in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the +art which gave names was the art of the legislator? + +CRATYLUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of +the first names, know or not know the things which they named? + +CRATYLUS: They must have known, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant. + +CRATYLUS: I should say not. + +SOCRATES: Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were +saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things +which he named; are you still of that opinion? + +CRATYLUS: I am. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a +knowledge of the things which he named? + +CRATYLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if +the primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in our +view, the only way of learning and discovering things, is either to +discover names for ourselves or to learn them from others. + +CRATYLUS: I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if things are only to be known through names, how can we +suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before +there were names at all, and therefore before they could have known them? + +CRATYLUS: I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that +a power more than human gave things their first names, and that the names +which are thus given are necessarily their true names. + +SOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired +being or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now that +he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we +mistaken? + +CRATYLUS: But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all. + +SOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are +expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a +point which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them. + +CRATYLUS: No; not in that way, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that +they are like the truth, others contending that THEY are, how or by what +criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to +which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another +standard which, without employing names, will make clear which of the two +are right; and this must be a standard which shows the truth of things. + +CRATYLUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be +known without names? + +CRATYLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there +be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their +affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through themselves? For +that which is other and different from them must signify something other +and different from them. + +CRATYLUS: What you are saying is, I think, true. + +SOCRATES: Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that +names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they +name? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn +things through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn +them from the things themselves--which is likely to be the nobler and +clearer way; to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of +which the image is the expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn +of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly executed? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that we must learn of the truth. + +SOCRATES: How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, +beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things +is not to be derived from names. No; they must be studied and investigated +in themselves. + +CRATYLUS: Clearly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon +by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the same +direction. I myself do not deny that the givers of names did really give +them under the idea that all things were in motion and flux; which was +their sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a +kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried round, and want to drag us +in after them. There is a matter, master Cratylus, about which I often +dream, and should like to ask your opinion: Tell me, whether there is or +is not any absolute beauty or good, or any other absolute existence? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly, Socrates, I think so. + +SOCRATES: Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face is +fair, or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in a flux; +but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing +away, and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born and +retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths? + +CRATYLUS: Undoubtedly. + +SOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same +state? for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they +remain the same; and if they are always the same and in the same state, and +never depart from their original form, they can never change or be moved. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly they cannot. + +SOCRATES: Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the moment that the +observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that +you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot +know that which has no state. + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at +all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing +abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless +continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge +changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and +if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, +and, according to this view, there will be no one to know and nothing to be +known: but if that which knows and that which is known exists ever, and +the beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist, then I do not +think that they can resemble a process or flux, as we were just now +supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the +truth is what Heracleitus and his followers and many others say, is a +question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or +the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far +trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge +which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of +unreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine +that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, +Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would not +have you be too easily persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and +do not easily accept such a doctrine; for you are young and of an age to +learn. And when you have found the truth, come and tell me. + +CRATYLUS: I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that I +have been considering the matter already, and the result of a great deal of +trouble and consideration is that I incline to Heracleitus. + +SOCRATES: Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall give +me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are intending, and +Hermogenes shall set you on your way. + +CRATYLUS: Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue to +think about these things yourself. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Cratylus, by Plato + diff --git a/old/crtls10.zip b/old/crtls10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..8aaa7b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/crtls10.zip |