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While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and metaphysical +originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of the Platonic +writings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive of the piece, +which interpreters have hitherto not succeeded in dispelling. We need not +suppose that Plato used words in order to conceal his thoughts, or that he +would have been unintelligible to an educated contemporary. In the +Phaedrus and Euthydemus we also find a difficulty in determining the +precise aim of the author. Plato wrote satires in the form of dialogues, +and his meaning, like that of other satirical writers, has often slept in +the ear of posterity. Two causes may be assigned for this obscurity: 1st, +the subtlety and allusiveness of this species of composition; 2nd, the +difficulty of reproducing a state of life and literature which has passed +away. A satire is unmeaning unless we can place ourselves back among the +persons and thoughts of the age in which it was written. Had the treatise +of Antisthenes upon words, or the speculations of Cratylus, or some other +Heracleitean of the fourth century B.C., on the nature of language been +preserved to us; or if we had lived at the time, and been 'rich enough to +attend the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus,' we should have understood +Plato better, and many points which are now attributed to the extravagance +of Socrates' humour would have been found, like the allusions of +Aristophanes in the Clouds, to have gone home to the sophists and +grammarians of the day. + +For the age was very busy with philological speculation; and many questions +were beginning to be asked about language which were parallel to other +questions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were illustrated in a +similar manner by the analogy of the arts. Was there a correctness in +words, and were they given by nature or convention? In the presocratic +philosophy mankind had been striving to attain an expression of their +ideas, and now they were beginning to ask themselves whether the expression +might not be distinguished from the idea? They were also seeking to +distinguish the parts of speech and to enquire into the relation of subject +and predicate. Grammar and logic were moving about somewhere in the depths +of the human soul, but they were not yet awakened into consciousness and +had not found names for themselves, or terms by which they might be +expressed. Of these beginnings of the study of language we know little, +and there necessarily arises an obscurity when the surroundings of such a +work as the Cratylus are taken away. Moreover, in this, as in most of the +dialogues of Plato, allowance has to be made for the character of Socrates. +For the theory of language can only be propounded by him in a manner which +is consistent with his own profession of ignorance. Hence his ridicule of +the new school of etymology is interspersed with many declarations 'that he +knows nothing,' 'that he has learned from Euthyphro,' and the like. Even +the truest things which he says are depreciated by himself. He professes +to be guessing, but the guesses of Plato are better than all the other +theories of the ancients respecting language put together. + +The dialogue hardly derives any light from Plato's other writings, and +still less from Scholiasts and Neoplatonist writers. Socrates must be +interpreted from himself, and on first reading we certainly have a +difficulty in understanding his drift, or his relation to the two other +interlocutors in the dialogue. Does he agree with Cratylus or with +Hermogenes, and is he serious in those fanciful etymologies, extending over +more than half the dialogue, which he seems so greatly to relish? Or is he +serious in part only; and can we separate his jest from his earnest?--Sunt +bona, sunt quaedum mediocria, sunt mala plura. Most of them are +ridiculously bad, and yet among them are found, as if by accident, +principles of philology which are unsurpassed in any ancient writer, and +even in advance of any philologer of the last century. May we suppose that +Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by writing a comedy in the +form of a prose dialogue? And what is the final result of the enquiry? Is +Plato an upholder of the conventional theory of language, which he +acknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to imply that a perfect +language can only be based on his own theory of ideas? Or if this latter +explanation is refuted by his silence, then in what relation does his +account of language stand to the rest of his philosophy? Or may we be so +bold as to deny the connexion between them? (For the allusion to the ideas +at the end of the dialogue is merely intended to show that we must not put +words in the place of things or realities, which is a thesis strongly +insisted on by Plato in many other passages)...These are some of the first +thoughts which arise in the mind of the reader of the Cratylus. And the +consideration of them may form a convenient introduction to the general +subject of the dialogue. + +We must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally to +some clearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the absolute +proportion of the whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek temple or +statue; nor should his works be tried by any such standard. They have +often the beauty of poetry, but they have also the freedom of conversation. +'Words are more plastic than wax' (Rep.), and may be moulded into any form. +He wanders on from one topic to another, careless of the unity of his work, +not fearing any 'judge, or spectator, who may recall him to the point' +(Theat.), 'whither the argument blows we follow' (Rep.). To have +determined beforehand, as in a modern didactic treatise, the nature and +limits of the subject, would have been fatal to the spirit of enquiry or +discovery, which is the soul of the dialogue...These remarks are applicable +to nearly all the works of Plato, but to the Cratylus and Phaedrus more +than any others. See Phaedrus, Introduction. + +There is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may be +more truly viewed:--they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We have +found that in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, we arrived at +no conclusion--the different sides of the argument were personified in the +different speakers; but the victory was not distinctly attributed to any of +them, nor the truth wholly the property of any. And in the Cratylus we +have no reason to assume that Socrates is either wholly right or wholly +wrong, or that Plato, though he evidently inclines to him, had any other +aim than that of personifying, in the characters of Hermogenes, Socrates, +and Cratylus, the three theories of language which are respectively +maintained by them. + +The two subordinate persons of the dialogue, Hermogenes and Cratylus, are +at the opposite poles of the argument. But after a while the disciple of +the Sophist and the follower of Heracleitus are found to be not so far +removed from one another as at first sight appeared; and both show an +inclination to accept the third view which Socrates interposes between +them. First, Hermogenes, the poor brother of the rich Callias, expounds +the doctrine that names are conventional; like the names of slaves, they +may be given and altered at pleasure. This is one of those principles +which, whether applied to society or language, explains everything and +nothing. For in all things there is an element of convention; but the +admission of this does not help us to understand the rational ground or +basis in human nature on which the convention proceeds. Socrates first of +all intimates to Hermogenes that his view of language is only a part of a +sophistical whole, and ultimately tends to abolish the distinction between +truth and falsehood. Hermogenes is very ready to throw aside the +sophistical tenet, and listens with a sort of half admiration, half belief, +to the speculations of Socrates. + +Cratylus is of opinion that a name is either a true name or not a name at +all. He is unable to conceive of degrees of imitation; a word is either +the perfect expression of a thing, or a mere inarticulate sound (a fallacy +which is still prevalent among theorizers about the origin of language). +He is at once a philosopher and a sophist; for while wanting to rest +language on an immutable basis, he would deny the possibility of falsehood. +He is inclined to derive all truth from language, and in language he sees +reflected the philosophy of Heracleitus. His views are not like those of +Hermogenes, hastily taken up, but are said to be the result of mature +consideration, although he is described as still a young man. With a +tenacity characteristic of the Heracleitean philosophers, he clings to the +doctrine of the flux. (Compare Theaet.) Of the real Cratylus we know +nothing, except that he is recorded by Aristotle to have been the friend or +teacher of Plato; nor have we any proof that he resembled the likeness of +him in Plato any more than the Critias of Plato is like the real Critias, +or the Euthyphro in this dialogue like the other Euthyphro, the diviner, in +the dialogue which is called after him. + +Between these two extremes, which have both of them a sophistical +character, the view of Socrates is introduced, which is in a manner the +union of the two. Language is conventional and also natural, and the true +conventional-natural is the rational. It is a work not of chance, but of +art; the dialectician is the artificer of words, and the legislator gives +authority to them. They are the expressions or imitations in sound of +things. In a sense, Cratylus is right in saying that things have by nature +names; for nature is not opposed either to art or to law. But vocal +imitation, like any other copy, may be imperfectly executed; and in this +way an element of chance or convention enters in. There is much which is +accidental or exceptional in language. Some words have had their original +meaning so obscured, that they require to be helped out by convention. But +still the true name is that which has a natural meaning. Thus nature, art, +chance, all combine in the formation of language. And the three views +respectively propounded by Hermogenes, Socrates, Cratylus, may be described +as the conventional, the artificial or rational, and the natural. The view +of Socrates is the meeting-point of the other two, just as conceptualism is +the meeting-point of nominalism and realism. + +We can hardly say that Plato was aware of the truth, that 'languages are +not made, but grow.' But still, when he says that 'the legislator made +language with the dialectician standing on his right hand,' we need not +infer from this that he conceived words, like coins, to be issued from the +mint of the State. The creator of laws and of social life is naturally +regarded as the creator of language, according to Hellenic notions, and the +philosopher is his natural advisor. We are not to suppose that the +legislator is performing any extraordinary function; he is merely the +Eponymus of the State, who prescribes rules for the dialectician and for +all other artists. According to a truly Platonic mode of approaching the +subject, language, like virtue in the Republic, is examined by the analogy +of the arts. Words are works of art which may be equally made in different +materials, and are well made when they have a meaning. Of the process +which he thus describes, Plato had probably no very definite notion. But +he means to express generally that language is the product of intelligence, +and that languages belong to States and not to individuals. + +A better conception of language could not have been formed in Plato's age, +than that which he attributes to Socrates. Yet many persons have thought +that the mind of Plato is more truly seen in the vague realism of Cratylus. +This misconception has probably arisen from two causes: first, the desire +to bring Plato's theory of language into accordance with the received +doctrine of the Platonic ideas; secondly, the impression created by +Socrates himself, that he is not in earnest, and is only indulging the +fancy of the hour. + +1. We shall have occasion to show more at length, in the Introduction to +future dialogues, that the so-called Platonic ideas are only a semi- +mythical form, in which he attempts to realize abstractions, and that they +are replaced in his later writings by a rational theory of psychology. +(See introductions to the Meno and the Sophist.) And in the Cratylus he +gives a general account of the nature and origin of language, in which Adam +Smith, Rousseau, and other writers of the last century, would have +substantially agreed. At the end of the dialogue, he speaks as in the +Symposium and Republic of absolute beauty and good; but he never supposed +that they were capable of being embodied in words. Of the names of the +ideas, he would have said, as he says of the names of the Gods, that we +know nothing. Even the realism of Cratylus is not based upon the ideas of +Plato, but upon the flux of Heracleitus. Here, as in the Sophist and +Politicus, Plato expressly draws attention to the want of agreement in +words and things. Hence we are led to infer, that the view of Socrates is +not the less Plato's own, because not based upon the ideas; 2nd, that +Plato's theory of language is not inconsistent with the rest of his +philosophy. + +2. We do not deny that Socrates is partly in jest and partly in earnest. +He is discoursing in a high-flown vein, which may be compared to the +'dithyrambics of the Phaedrus.' They are mysteries of which he is +speaking, and he professes a kind of ludicrous fear of his imaginary +wisdom. When he is arguing out of Homer, about the names of Hector's son, +or when he describes himself as inspired or maddened by Euthyphro, with +whom he has been sitting from the early dawn (compare Phaedrus and Lysias; +Phaedr.) and expresses his intention of yielding to the illusion to-day, +and to-morrow he will go to a priest and be purified, we easily see that +his words are not to be taken seriously. In this part of the dialogue his +dread of committing impiety, the pretended derivation of his wisdom from +another, the extravagance of some of his etymologies, and, in general, the +manner in which the fun, fast and furious, vires acquirit eundo, remind us +strongly of the Phaedrus. The jest is a long one, extending over more than +half the dialogue. But then, we remember that the Euthydemus is a still +longer jest, in which the irony is preserved to the very end. There he is +parodying the ingenious follies of early logic; in the Cratylus he is +ridiculing the fancies of a new school of sophists and grammarians. The +fallacies of the Euthydemus are still retained at the end of our logic +books; and the etymologies of the Cratylus have also found their way into +later writers. Some of these are not much worse than the conjectures of +Hemsterhuis, and other critics of the last century; but this does not prove +that they are serious. For Plato is in advance of his age in his +conception of language, as much as he is in his conception of mythology. +(Compare Phaedrus.) + +When the fervour of his etymological enthusiasm has abated, Socrates ends, +as he has begun, with a rational explanation of language. Still he +preserves his 'know nothing' disguise, and himself declares his first +notions about names to be reckless and ridiculous. Having explained +compound words by resolving them into their original elements, he now +proceeds to analyse simple words into the letters of which they are +composed. The Socrates who 'knows nothing,' here passes into the teacher, +the dialectician, the arranger of species. There is nothing in this part +of the dialogue which is either weak or extravagant. Plato is a supporter +of the Onomatopoetic theory of language; that is to say, he supposes words +to be formed by the imitation of ideas in sounds; he also recognises the +effect of time, the influence of foreign languages, the desire of euphony, +to be formative principles; and he admits a certain element of chance. But +he gives no imitation in all this that he is preparing the way for the +construction of an ideal language. Or that he has any Eleatic speculation +to oppose to the Heracleiteanism of Cratylus. + +The theory of language which is propounded in the Cratylus is in accordance +with the later phase of the philosophy of Plato, and would have been +regarded by him as in the main true. The dialogue is also a satire on the +philological fancies of the day. Socrates in pursuit of his vocation as a +detector of false knowledge, lights by accident on the truth. He is +guessing, he is dreaming; he has heard, as he says in the Phaedrus, from +another: no one is more surprised than himself at his own discoveries. +And yet some of his best remarks, as for example his view of the derivation +of Greek words from other languages, or of the permutations of letters, or +again, his observation that in speaking of the Gods we are only speaking of +our names of them, occur among these flights of humour. + +We can imagine a character having a profound insight into the nature of men +and things, and yet hardly dwelling upon them seriously; blending +inextricably sense and nonsense; sometimes enveloping in a blaze of jests +the most serious matters, and then again allowing the truth to peer +through; enjoying the flow of his own humour, and puzzling mankind by an +ironical exaggeration of their absurdities. Such were Aristophanes and +Rabelais; such, in a different style, were Sterne, Jean Paul, Hamann,-- +writers who sometimes become unintelligible through the extravagance of +their fancies. Such is the character which Plato intends to depict in some +of his dialogues as the Silenus Socrates; and through this medium we have +to receive our theory of language. + +There remains a difficulty which seems to demand a more exact answer: In +what relation does the satirical or etymological portion of the dialogue +stand to the serious? Granting all that can be said about the provoking +irony of Socrates, about the parody of Euthyphro, or Prodicus, or +Antisthenes, how does the long catalogue of etymologies furnish any answer +to the question of Hermogenes, which is evidently the main thesis of the +dialogue: What is the truth, or correctness, or principle of names? + +After illustrating the nature of correctness by the analogy of the arts, +and then, as in the Republic, ironically appealing to the authority of the +Homeric poems, Socrates shows that the truth or correctness of names can +only be ascertained by an appeal to etymology. The truth of names is to be +found in the analysis of their elements. But why does he admit etymologies +which are absurd, based on Heracleitean fancies, fourfold interpretations +of words, impossible unions and separations of syllables and letters? + +1. The answer to this difficulty has been already anticipated in part: +Socrates is not a dogmatic teacher, and therefore he puts on this wild and +fanciful disguise, in order that the truth may be permitted to appear: 2. +as Benfey remarks, an erroneous example may illustrate a principle of +language as well as a true one: 3. many of these etymologies, as, for +example, that of dikaion, are indicated, by the manner in which Socrates +speaks of them, to have been current in his own age: 4. the philosophy of +language had not made such progress as would have justified Plato in +propounding real derivations. Like his master Socrates, he saw through the +hollowness of the incipient sciences of the day, and tries to move in a +circle apart from them, laying down the conditions under which they are to +be pursued, but, as in the Timaeus, cautious and tentative, when he is +speaking of actual phenomena. To have made etymologies seriously, would +have seemed to him like the interpretation of the myths in the Phaedrus, +the task 'of a not very fortunate individual, who had a great deal of time +on his hands.' The irony of Socrates places him above and beyond the +errors of his contemporaries. + +The Cratylus is full of humour and satirical touches: the inspiration +which comes from Euthyphro, and his prancing steeds, the light admixture of +quotations from Homer, and the spurious dialectic which is applied to them; +the jest about the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus, which is declared on +the best authority, viz. his own, to be a complete education in grammar and +rhetoric; the double explanation of the name Hermogenes, either as 'not +being in luck,' or 'being no speaker;' the dearly-bought wisdom of Callias, +the Lacedaemonian whose name was 'Rush,' and, above all, the pleasure which +Socrates expresses in his own dangerous discoveries, which 'to-morrow he +will purge away,' are truly humorous. While delivering a lecture on the +philosophy of language, Socrates is also satirizing the endless fertility +of the human mind in spinning arguments out of nothing, and employing the +most trifling and fanciful analogies in support of a theory. Etymology in +ancient as in modern times was a favourite recreation; and Socrates makes +merry at the expense of the etymologists. The simplicity of Hermogenes, +who is ready to believe anything that he is told, heightens the effect. +Socrates in his genial and ironical mood hits right and left at his +adversaries: Ouranos is so called apo tou oran ta ano, which, as some +philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind; the sophists are by a +fanciful explanation converted into heroes; 'the givers of names were like +some philosophers who fancy that the earth goes round because their heads +are always going round.' There is a great deal of 'mischief' lurking in +the following: 'I found myself in greater perplexity about justice than I +was before I began to learn;' 'The rho in katoptron must be the addition +of some one who cares nothing about truth, but thinks only of putting the +mouth into shape;' 'Tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the +Tragic and goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them.' Several +philosophers and sophists are mentioned by name: first, Protagoras and +Euthydemus are assailed; then the interpreters of Homer, oi palaioi +Omerikoi (compare Arist. Met.) and the Orphic poets are alluded to by the +way; then he discovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of Heracleitus;-- +the doctrine of the flux is contained in the word ousia (= osia the pushing +principle), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in psuche and selene. +Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling out and putting in +letters which were in vogue among the philologers of his time; or slightly +scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, he is impatient of +hearing from the half-converted Cratylus the doctrine that falsehood can +neither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed; a piece of sophistry +attributed to Gorgias, which reappears in the Sophist. And he proceeds to +demolish, with no less delight than he had set up, the Heracleitean theory +of language. + +In the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious, though he +does not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the Heracleiteans, +whom here, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to ridicule. What was the +origin of this enmity we can hardly determine:--was it due to the natural +dislike which may be supposed to exist between the 'patrons of the flux' +and the 'friends of the ideas' (Soph.)? or is it to be attributed to the +indignation which Plato felt at having wasted his time upon 'Cratylus and +the doctrines of Heracleitus' in the days of his youth? Socrates, touching +on some of the characteristic difficulties of early Greek philosophy, +endeavours to show Cratylus that imitation may be partial or imperfect, +that a knowledge of things is higher than a knowledge of names, and that +there can be no knowledge if all things are in a state of transition. But +Cratylus, who does not easily apprehend the argument from common sense, +remains unconvinced, and on the whole inclines to his former opinion. Some +profound philosophical remarks are scattered up and down, admitting of an +application not only to language but to knowledge generally; such as the +assertion that 'consistency is no test of truth:' or again, 'If we are +over-precise about words, truth will say "too late" to us as to the belated +traveller in Aegina.' + +The place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with +certainty. The style and subject, and the treatment of the character of +Socrates, have a close resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially to +the Phaedrus and Euthydemus. The manner in which the ideas are spoken of +at the end of the dialogue, also indicates a comparatively early date. The +imaginative element is still in full vigour; the Socrates of the Cratylus +is the Socrates of the Apology and Symposium, not yet Platonized; and he +describes, as in the Theaetetus, the philosophy of Heracleitus by +'unsavoury' similes--he cannot believe that the world is like 'a leaky +vessel,' or 'a man who has a running at the nose'; he attributes the flux +of the world to the swimming in some folks' heads. On the other hand, the +relation of thought to language is omitted here, but is treated of in the +Sophist. These grounds are not sufficient to enable us to arrive at a +precise conclusion. But we shall not be far wrong in placing the Cratylus +about the middle, or at any rate in the first half, of the series. + +Cratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the brother of +Callias, have been arguing about names; the former maintaining that they +are natural, the latter that they are conventional. Cratylus affirms that +his own is a true name, but will not allow that the name of Hermogenes is +equally true. Hermogenes asks Socrates to explain to him what Cratylus +means; or, far rather, he would like to know, What Socrates himself thinks +about the truth or correctness of names? Socrates replies, that hard is +knowledge, and the nature of names is a considerable part of knowledge: he +has never been to hear the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having +only attended the single-drachma course, he is not competent to give an +opinion on such matters. When Cratylus denies that Hermogenes is a true +name, he supposes him to mean that he is not a true son of Hermes, because +he is never in luck. But he would like to have an open council and to hear +both sides. + +Hermogenes is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may be +changed, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please, and the +altered name is as good as the original one. + +You mean to say, for instance, rejoins Socrates, that if I agree to call a +man a horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me, and a man by +the rest of the world? But, surely, there is in words a true and a false, +as there are true and false propositions. If a whole proposition be true +or false, then the parts of a proposition may be true or false, and the +least parts as well as the greatest; and the least parts are names, and +therefore names may be true or false. Would Hermogenes maintain that +anybody may give a name to anything, and as many names as he pleases; and +would all these names be always true at the time of giving them? +Hermogenes replies that this is the only way in which he can conceive that +names are correct; and he appeals to the practice of different nations, and +of the different Hellenic tribes, in confirmation of his view. Socrates +asks, whether the things differ as the words which represent them differ:-- +Are we to maintain with Protagoras, that what appears is? Hermogenes has +always been puzzled about this, but acknowledges, when he is pressed by +Socrates, that there are a few very good men in the world, and a great many +very bad; and the very good are the wise, and the very bad are the foolish; +and this is not mere appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say +with Euthydemus, that all things equally and always belong to all men; in +that case, again, there would be no distinction between bad and good men. +But then, the only remaining possibility is, that all things have their +several distinct natures, and are independent of our notions about them. +And not only things, but actions, have distinct natures, and are done by +different processes. There is a natural way of cutting or burning, and a +natural instrument with which men cut or burn, and any other way will +fail;--this is true of all actions. And speaking is a kind of action, and +naming is a kind of speaking, and we must name according to a natural +process, and with a proper instrument. We cut with a knife, we pierce with +an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name with a name. And as a shuttle +separates the warp from the woof, so a name distinguishes the natures of +things. The weaver will use the shuttle well,--that is, like a weaver; and +the teacher will use the name well,--that is, like a teacher. The shuttle +will be made by the carpenter; the awl by the smith or skilled person. But +who makes a name? Does not the law give names, and does not the teacher +receive them from the legislator? He is the skilled person who makes them, +and of all skilled workmen he is the rarest. But how does the carpenter +make or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? Will he not look at +the ideal which he has in his mind? And as the different kinds of work +differ, so ought the instruments which make them to differ. The several +kinds of shuttles ought to answer in material and form to the several kinds +of webs. And the legislator ought to know the different materials and +forms of which names are made in Hellas and other countries. But who is to +be the judge of the proper form? The judge of shuttles is the weaver who +uses them; the judge of lyres is the player of the lyre; the judge of ships +is the pilot. And will not the judge who is able to direct the legislator +in his work of naming, be he who knows how to use the names--he who can ask +and answer questions--in short, the dialectician? The pilot directs the +carpenter how to make the rudder, and the dialectician directs the +legislator how he is to impose names; for to express the ideal forms of +things in syllables and letters is not the easy task, Hermogenes, which you +imagine. + +'I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me this natural +correctness of names.' + +Indeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit that +there is a correctness of names, and that not every one can give a name. +But what is the nature of this correctness or truth, you must learn from +the Sophists, of whom your brother Callias has bought his reputation for +wisdom rather dearly; and since they require to be paid, you, having no +money, had better learn from him at second-hand. 'Well, but I have just +given up Protagoras, and I should be inconsistent in going to learn of +him.' Then if you reject him you may learn of the poets, and in particular +of Homer, who distinguishes the names given by Gods and men to the same +things, as in the verse about the river God who fought with Hephaestus, +'whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander;' or in the lines in +which he mentions the bird which the Gods call 'Chalcis,' and men +'Cymindis;' or the hill which men call 'Batieia,' and the Gods 'Myrinna's +Tomb.' Here is an important lesson; for the Gods must of course be right +in their use of names. And this is not the only truth about philology +which may be learnt from Homer. Does he not say that Hector's son had two +names-- + +'Hector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax'? + +Now, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the other name +was conferred by the women? And which are more likely to be right--the +wiser or the less wise, the men or the women? Homer evidently agreed with +the men: and of the name given by them he offers an explanation;--the boy +was called Astyanax ('king of the city'), because his father saved the +city. The names Astyanax and Hector, moreover, are really the same,--the +one means a king, and the other is 'a holder or possessor.' For as the +lion's whelp may be called a lion, or the horse's foal a foal, so the son +of a king may be called a king. But if the horse had produced a calf, then +that would be called a calf. Whether the syllables of a name are the same +or not makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained. For example; +the names of letters, whether vowels or consonants, do not correspond to +their sounds, with the exception of epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega. The +name Beta has three letters added to the sound--and yet this does not alter +the sense of the word, or prevent the whole name having the value which the +legislator intended. And the same may be said of a king and the son of a +king, who like other animals resemble each other in the course of nature; +the words by which they are signified may be disguised, and yet amid +differences of sound the etymologist may recognise the same notion, just as +the physician recognises the power of the same drugs under different +disguises of colour and smell. Hector and Astyanax have only one letter +alike, but they have the same meaning; and Agis (leader) is altogether +different in sound from Polemarchus (chief in war), or Eupolemus (good +warrior); but the two words present the same idea of leader or general, +like the words Iatrocles and Acesimbrotus, which equally denote a +physician. The son succeeds the father as the foal succeeds the horse, but +when, out of the course of nature, a prodigy occurs, and the offspring no +longer resembles the parent, then the names no longer agree. This may be +illustrated by the case of Agamemnon and his son Orestes, of whom the +former has a name significant of his patience at the siege of Troy; while +the name of the latter indicates his savage, man-of-the-mountain nature. +Atreus again, for his murder of Chrysippus, and his cruelty to Thyestes, is +rightly named Atreus, which, to the eye of the etymologist, is ateros +(destructive), ateires (stubborn), atreotos (fearless); and Pelops is o ta +pelas oron (he who sees what is near only), because in his eagerness to win +Hippodamia, he was unconscious of the remoter consequences which the murder +of Myrtilus would entail upon his race. The name Tantalus, if slightly +changed, offers two etymologies; either apo tes tou lithou talanteias, or +apo tou talantaton einai, signifying at once the hanging of the stone over +his head in the world below, and the misery which he brought upon his +country. And the name of his father, Zeus, Dios, Zenos, has an excellent +meaning, though hard to be understood, because really a sentence which is +divided into two parts (Zeus, Dios). For he, being the lord and king of +all, is the author of our being, and in him all live: this is implied in +the double form, Dios, Zenos, which being put together and interpreted is +di on ze panta. There may, at first sight, appear to be some irreverence +in calling him the son of Cronos, who is a proverb for stupidity; but the +meaning is that Zeus himself is the son of a mighty intellect; Kronos, +quasi koros, not in the sense of a youth, but quasi to katharon kai +akeraton tou nou--the pure and garnished mind, which in turn is begotten of +Uranus, who is so called apo tou oran ta ano, from looking upwards; which, +as philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind. The earlier portion +of Hesiod's genealogy has escaped my memory, or I would try more +conclusions of the same sort. 'You talk like an oracle.' I caught the +infection from Euthyphro, who gave me a long lecture which began at dawn, +and has not only entered into my ears, but filled my soul, and my intention +is to yield to the inspiration to-day; and to-morrow I will be exorcised by +some priest or sophist. 'Go on; I am anxious to hear the rest.' Now that +we have a general notion, how shall we proceed? What names will afford the +most crucial test of natural fitness? Those of heroes and ordinary men are +often deceptive, because they are patronymics or expressions of a wish; let +us try gods and demi-gods. Gods are so called, apo tou thein, from the +verb 'to run;' because the sun, moon, and stars run about the heaven; and +they being the original gods of the Hellenes, as they still are of the +Barbarians, their name is given to all Gods. The demons are the golden +race of Hesiod, and by golden he means not literally golden, but good; and +they are called demons, quasi daemones, which in old Attic was used for +daimones--good men are well said to become daimones when they die, because +they are knowing. Eros (with an epsilon) is the same word as eros (with an +eta): 'the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair;' or +perhaps they were a species of sophists or rhetoricians, and so called apo +tou erotan, or eirein, from their habit of spinning questions; for eirein +is equivalent to legein. I get all this from Euthyphro; and now a new and +ingenious idea comes into my mind, and, if I am not careful, I shall be +wiser than I ought to be by to-morrow's dawn. My idea is, that we may put +in and pull out letters at pleasure and alter the accents (as, for example, +Dii philos may be turned into Diphilos), and we may make words into +sentences and sentences into words. The name anthrotos is a case in point, +for a letter has been omitted and the accent changed; the original meaning +being o anathron a opopen--he who looks up at what he sees. Psuche may be +thought to be the reviving, or refreshing, or animating principle--e +anapsuchousa to soma; but I am afraid that Euthyphro and his disciples will +scorn this derivation, and I must find another: shall we identify the soul +with the 'ordering mind' of Anaxagoras, and say that psuche, quasi phuseche += e phusin echei or ochei?--this might easily be refined into psyche. +'That is a more artistic etymology.' + +After psuche follows soma; this, by a slight permutation, may be either = +(1) the 'grave' of the soul, or (2) may mean 'that by which the soul +signifies (semainei) her wishes.' But more probably, the word is Orphic, +and simply denotes that the body is the place of ward in which the soul +suffers the penalty of sin,--en o sozetai. 'I should like to hear some +more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that excellent one of +Zeus.' The truest names of the Gods are those which they give themselves; +but these are unknown to us. Less true are those by which we propitiate +them, as men say in prayers, 'May he graciously receive any name by which I +call him.' And to avoid offence, I should like to let them know beforehand +that we are not presuming to enquire about them, but only about the names +which they usually bear. Let us begin with Hestia. What did he mean who +gave the name Hestia? 'That is a very difficult question.' O, my dear +Hermogenes, I believe that there was a power of philosophy and talk among +the first inventors of names, both in our own and in other languages; for +even in foreign words a principle is discernible. Hestia is the same with +esia, which is an old form of ousia, and means the first principle of +things: this agrees with the fact that to Hestia the first sacrifices are +offered. There is also another reading--osia, which implies that 'pushing' +(othoun) is the first principle of all things. And here I seem to discover +a delicate allusion to the flux of Heracleitus--that antediluvian +philosopher who cannot walk twice in the same stream; and this flux of his +may accomplish yet greater marvels. For the names Cronos and Rhea cannot +have been accidental; the giver of them must have known something about the +doctrine of Heracleitus. Moreover, there is a remarkable coincidence in +the words of Hesiod, when he speaks of Oceanus, 'the origin of Gods;' and +in the verse of Orpheus, in which he describes Oceanus espousing his sister +Tethys. Tethys is nothing more than the name of a spring--to diattomenon +kai ethoumenon. Poseidon is posidesmos, the chain of the feet, because you +cannot walk on the sea--the epsilon is inserted by way of ornament; or +perhaps the name may have been originally polleidon, meaning, that the God +knew many things (polla eidos): he may also be the shaker, apo tou +seiein,--in this case, pi and delta have been added. Pluto is connected +with ploutos, because wealth comes out of the earth; or the word may be a +euphemism for Hades, which is usually derived apo tou aeidous, because the +God is concerned with the invisible. But the name Hades was really given +him from his knowing (eidenai) all good things. Men in general are +foolishly afraid of him, and talk with horror of the world below from which +no one may return. The reason why his subjects never wish to come back, +even if they could, is that the God enchains them by the strongest of +spells, namely by the desire of virtue, which they hope to obtain by +constant association with him. He is the perfect and accomplished Sophist +and the great benefactor of the other world; for he has much more than he +wants there, and hence he is called Pluto or the rich. He will have +nothing to do with the souls of men while in the body, because he cannot +work his will with them so long as they are confused and entangled by +fleshly lusts. Demeter is the mother and giver of food--e didousa meter +tes edodes. Here is erate tis, or perhaps the legislator may have been +thinking of the weather, and has merely transposed the letters of the word +aer. Pherephatta, that word of awe, is pheretapha, which is only an +euphonious contraction of e tou pheromenou ephaptomene,--all things are in +motion, and she in her wisdom moves with them, and the wise God Hades +consorts with her--there is nothing very terrible in this, any more than in +the her other appellation Persephone, which is also significant of her +wisdom (sophe). Apollo is another name, which is supposed to have some +dreadful meaning, but is susceptible of at least four perfectly innocent +explanations. First, he is the purifier or purger or absolver (apolouon); +secondly, he is the true diviner, Aplos, as he is called in the Thessalian +dialect (aplos = aplous, sincere); thirdly, he is the archer (aei ballon), +always shooting; or again, supposing alpha to mean ama or omou, Apollo +becomes equivalent to ama polon, which points to both his musical and his +heavenly attributes; for there is a 'moving together' alike in music and in +the harmony of the spheres. The second lambda is inserted in order to +avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction. The Muses are so called--apo +tou mosthai. The gentle Leto or Letho is named from her willingness +(ethelemon), or because she is ready to forgive and forget (lethe). +Artemis is so called from her healthy well-balanced nature, dia to artemes, +or as aretes istor; or as a lover of virginity, aroton misesasa. One of +these explanations is probably true,--perhaps all of them. Dionysus is o +didous ton oinon, and oinos is quasi oionous because wine makes those think +(oiesthai) that they have a mind (nous) who have none. The established +derivation of Aphrodite dia ten tou athrou genesin may be accepted on the +authority of Hesiod. Again, there is the name of Pallas, or Athene, which +we, who are Athenians, must not forget. Pallas is derived from armed +dances--apo tou pallein ta opla. For Athene we must turn to the +allegorical interpreters of Homer, who make the name equivalent to theonoe, +or possibly the word was originally ethonoe and signified moral +intelligence (en ethei noesis). Hephaestus, again, is the lord of light--o +tou phaeos istor. This is a good notion; and, to prevent any other getting +into our heads, let us go on to Ares. He is the manly one (arren), or the +unchangeable one (arratos). Enough of the Gods; for, by the Gods, I am +afraid of them; but if you suggest other words, you will see how the horses +of Euthyphro prance. 'Only one more God; tell me about my godfather +Hermes.' He is ermeneus, the messenger or cheater or thief or bargainer; +or o eirein momenos, that is, eiremes or ermes--the speaker or contriver of +speeches. 'Well said Cratylus, then, that I am no son of Hermes.' Pan, as +the son of Hermes, is speech or the brother of speech, and is called Pan +because speech indicates everything--o pan menuon. He has two forms, a +true and a false; and is in the upper part smooth, and in the lower part +shaggy. He is the goat of Tragedy, in which there are plenty of +falsehoods. + +'Will you go on to the elements--sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, +fire, water, seasons, years?' Very good: and which shall I take first? +Let us begin with elios, or the sun. The Doric form elios helps us to see +that he is so called because at his rising he gathers (alizei) men +together, or because he rolls about (eilei) the earth, or because he +variegates (aiolei = poikillei) the earth. Selene is an anticipation of +Anaxagoras, being a contraction of selaenoneoaeia, the light (selas) which +is ever old and new, and which, as Anaxagoras says, is borrowed from the +sun; the name was harmonized into selanaia, a form which is still in use. +'That is a true dithyrambic name.' Meis is so called apo tou meiousthai, +from suffering diminution, and astron is from astrape (lightning), which is +an improvement of anastrope, that which turns the eyes inside out. 'How do +you explain pur n udor?' I suspect that pur, which, like udor n kuon, is +found in Phrygian, is a foreign word; for the Hellenes have borrowed much +from the barbarians, and I always resort to this theory of a foreign origin +when I am at a loss. Aer may be explained, oti airei ta apo tes ges; or, +oti aei rei; or, oti pneuma ex autou ginetai (compare the poetic word +aetai). So aither quasi aeitheer oti aei thei peri ton aera: ge, gaia +quasi genneteira (compare the Homeric form gegaasi); ora (with an omega), +or, according to the old Attic form ora (with an omicron), is derived apo +tou orizein, because it divides the year; eniautos and etos are the same +thought--o en eauto etazon, cut into two parts, en eauto and etazon, like +di on ze into Dios and Zenos. + +'You make surprising progress.' True; I am run away with, and am not even +yet at my utmost speed. 'I should like very much to hear your account of +the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those charming +words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?' To explain all that +will be a serious business; still, as I have put on the lion's skin, +appearances must be maintained. My opinion is, that primitive men were +like some modern philosophers, who, by always going round in their search +after the nature of things, become dizzy; and this phenomenon, which was +really in themselves, they imagined to take place in the external world. +You have no doubt remarked, that the doctrine of the universal flux, or +generation of things, is indicated in names. 'No, I never did.' Phronesis +is only phoras kai rou noesis, or perhaps phoras onesis, and in any case is +connected with pheresthai; gnome is gones skepsis kai nomesis; noesis is +neou or gignomenon esis; the word neos implies that creation is always +going on--the original form was neoesis; sophrosune is soteria phroneseos; +episteme is e epomene tois pragmasin--the faculty which keeps close, +neither anticipating nor lagging behind; sunesis is equivalent to sunienai, +sumporeuesthai ten psuche, and is a kind of conclusion--sullogismos tis, +akin therefore in idea to episteme; sophia is very difficult, and has a +foreign look--the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things, and +may be illustrated by the poetical esuthe and the Lacedaemonian proper name +Sous, or Rush; agathon is ro agaston en te tachuteti,--for all things are +in motion, and some are swifter than others: dikaiosune is clearly e tou +dikaiou sunesis. The word dikaion is more troublesome, and appears to mean +the subtle penetrating power which, as the lovers of motion say, preserves +all things, and is the cause of all things, quasi diaion going through--the +letter kappa being inserted for the sake of euphony. This is a great +mystery which has been confided to me; but when I ask for an explanation I +am thought obtrusive, and another derivation is proposed to me. Justice is +said to be o kaion, or the sun; and when I joyfully repeat this beautiful +notion, I am answered, 'What, is there no justice when the sun is down?' +And when I entreat my questioner to tell me his own opinion, he replies, +that justice is fire in the abstract, or heat in the abstract; which is not +very intelligible. Others laugh at such notions, and say with Anaxagoras, +that justice is the ordering mind. 'I think that some one must have told +you this.' And not the rest? Let me proceed then, in the hope of proving +to you my originality. Andreia is quasi anpeia quasi e ano roe, the stream +which flows upwards, and is opposed to injustice, which clearly hinders the +principle of penetration; arren and aner have a similar derivation; gune is +the same as gone; thelu is derived apo tes theles, because the teat makes +things flourish (tethelenai), and the word thallein itself implies increase +of youth, which is swift and sudden ever (thein and allesthai). I am +getting over the ground fast: but much has still to be explained. There +is techne, for instance. This, by an aphaeresis of tau and an epenthesis +of omicron in two places, may be identified with echonoe, and signifies +'that which has mind.' + +'A very poor etymology.' Yes; but you must remember that all language is +in process of change; letters are taken in and put out for the sake of +euphony, and time is also a great alterer of words. For example, what +business has the letter rho in the word katoptron, or the letter sigma in +the word sphigx? The additions are often such that it is impossible to +make out the original word; and yet, if you may put in and pull out, as you +like, any name is equally good for any object. The fact is, that great +dictators of literature like yourself should observe the rules of +moderation. 'I will do my best.' But do not be too much of a precisian, +or you will paralyze me. If you will let me add mechane, apo tou mekous, +which means polu, and anein, I shall be at the summit of my powers, from +which elevation I will examine the two words kakia and arete. The first is +easily explained in accordance with what has preceded; for all things being +in a flux, kakia is to kakos ion. This derivation is illustrated by the +word deilia, which ought to have come after andreia, and may be regarded as +o lian desmos tes psuches, just as aporia signifies an impediment to motion +(from alpha not, and poreuesthai to go), and arete is euporia, which is the +opposite of this--the everflowing (aei reousa or aeireite), or the +eligible, quasi airete. You will think that I am inventing, but I say that +if kakia is right, then arete is also right. But what is kakon? That is a +very obscure word, to which I can only apply my old notion and declare that +kakon is a foreign word. Next, let us proceed to kalon, aischron. The +latter is doubtless contracted from aeischoroun, quasi aei ischon roun. +The inventor of words being a patron of the flux, was a great enemy to +stagnation. Kalon is to kaloun ta pragmata--this is mind (nous or +dianoia); which is also the principle of beauty; and which doing the works +of beauty, is therefore rightly called the beautiful. The meaning of +sumpheron is explained by previous examples;--like episteme, signifying +that the soul moves in harmony with the world (sumphora, sumpheronta). +Kerdos is to pasi kerannumenon--that which mingles with all things: +lusiteloun is equivalent to to tes phoras luon to telos, and is not to be +taken in the vulgar sense of gainful, but rather in that of swift, being +the principle which makes motion immortal and unceasing; ophelimon is apo +tou ophellein--that which gives increase: this word, which is Homeric, is +of foreign origin. Blaberon is to blamton or boulomenon aptein tou rou-- +that which injures or seeks to bind the stream. The proper word would be +boulapteroun, but this is too much of a mouthful--like a prelude on the +flute in honour of Athene. The word zemiodes is difficult; great changes, +as I was saying, have been made in words, and even a small change will +alter their meaning very much. The word deon is one of these disguised +words. You know that according to the old pronunciation, which is +especially affected by the women, who are great conservatives, iota and +delta were used where we should now use eta and zeta: for example, what we +now call emera was formerly called imera; and this shows the meaning of the +word to have been 'the desired one coming after night,' and not, as is +often supposed, 'that which makes things gentle' (emera). So again, zugon +is duogon, quasi desis duein eis agogen--(the binding of two together for +the purpose of drawing. Deon, as ordinarily written, has an evil sense, +signifying the chain (desmos) or hindrance of motion; but in its ancient +form dion is expressive of good, quasi diion, that which penetrates or goes +through all. Zemiodes is really demiodes, and means that which binds +motion (dounti to ion): edone is e pros ten onrsin teinousa praxis--the +delta is an insertion: lupe is derived apo tes dialuseos tou somatos: ania +is from alpha and ienai, to go: algedon is a foreign word, and is so +called apo tou algeinou: odune is apo tes enduseos tes lupes: achthedon +is in its very sound a burden: chapa expresses the flow of soul: terpsis +is apo tou terpnou, and terpnon is properly erpnon, because the sensation +of pleasure is likened to a breath (pnoe) which creeps (erpei) through the +soul: euphrosune is named from pheresthai, because the soul moves in +harmony with nature: epithumia is e epi ton thumon iousa dunamis: thumos +is apo tes thuseos tes psuches: imeros--oti eimenos pei e psuche: pothos, +the desire which is in another place, allothi pou: eros was anciently +esros, and so called because it flows into (esrei) the soul from without: +doxa is e dioxis tou eidenai, or expresses the shooting from a bow (toxon). +The latter etymology is confirmed by the words boulesthai, boule, aboulia, +which all have to do with shooting (bole): and similarly oiesis is nothing +but the movement (oisis) of the soul towards essence. Ekousion is to +eikon--the yielding--anagke is e an agke iousa, the passage through ravines +which impede motion: aletheia is theia ale, divine motion. Pseudos is the +opposite of this, implying the principle of constraint and forced repose, +which is expressed under the figure of sleep, to eudon; the psi is an +addition. Onoma, a name, affirms the real existence of that which is +sought after--on ou masma estin. On and ousia are only ion with an iota +broken off; and ouk on is ouk ion. 'And what are ion, reon, doun?' One +way of explaining them has been already suggested--they may be of foreign +origin; and possibly this is the true answer. But mere antiquity may often +prevent our recognizing words, after all the complications which they have +undergone; and we must remember that however far we carry back our analysis +some ultimate elements or roots will remain which can be no further +analyzed. For example; the word agathos was supposed by us to be a +compound of agastos and thoos, and probably thoos may be further +resolvable. But if we take a word of which no further resolution seems +attainable, we may fairly conclude that we have reached one of these +original elements, and the truth of such a word must be tested by some new +method. Will you help me in the search? + +All names, whether primary or secondary, are intended to show the nature of +things; and the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from +the primary. But then, how do the primary names indicate anything? And +let me ask another question,--If we had no faculty of speech, how should we +communicate with one another? Should we not use signs, like the deaf and +dumb? The elevation of our hands would mean lightness--heaviness would be +expressed by letting them drop. The running of any animal would be +described by a similar movement of our own frames. The body can only +express anything by imitation; and the tongue or mouth can imitate as well +as the rest of the body. But this imitation of the tongue or voice is not +yet a name, because people may imitate sheep or goats without naming them. +What, then, is a name? In the first place, a name is not a musical, or, +secondly, a pictorial imitation, but an imitation of that kind which +expresses the nature of a thing; and is the invention not of a musician, or +of a painter, but of a namer. + +And now, I think that we may consider the names about which you were +asking. The way to analyze them will be by going back to the letters, or +primary elements of which they are composed. First, we separate the +alphabet into classes of letters, distinguishing the consonants, mutes, +vowels, and semivowels; and when we have learnt them singly, we shall learn +to know them in their various combinations of two or more letters; just as +the painter knows how to use either a single colour, or a combination of +colours. And like the painter, we may apply letters to the expression of +objects, and form them into syllables; and these again into words, until +the picture or figure--that is, language--is completed. Not that I am +literally speaking of ourselves, but I mean to say that this was the way in +which the ancients framed language. And this leads me to consider whether +the primary as well as the secondary elements are rightly given. I may +remark, as I was saying about the Gods, that we can only attain to +conjecture of them. But still we insist that ours is the true and only +method of discovery; otherwise we must have recourse, like the tragic +poets, to a Deus ex machina, and say that God gave the first names, and +therefore they are right; or that the barbarians are older than we are, and +that we learnt of them; or that antiquity has cast a veil over the truth. +Yet all these are not reasons; they are only ingenious excuses for having +no reasons. + +I will freely impart to you my own notions, though they are somewhat +crude:--the letter rho appears to me to be the general instrument which the +legislator has employed to express all motion or kinesis. (I ought to +explain that kinesis is just iesis (going), for the letter eta was unknown +to the ancients; and the root, kiein, is a foreign form of ienai: of +kinesis or eisis, the opposite is stasis). This use of rho is evident in +the words tremble, break, crush, crumble, and the like; the imposer of +names perceived that the tongue is most agitated in the pronunciation of +this letter, just as he used iota to express the subtle power which +penetrates through all things. The letters phi, psi, sigma, zeta, which +require a great deal of wind, are employed in the imitation of such notions +as shivering, seething, shaking, and in general of what is windy. The +letters delta and tau convey the idea of binding and rest in a place: the +lambda denotes smoothness, as in the words slip, sleek, sleep, and the +like. But when the slipping tongue is detained by the heavier sound of +gamma, then arises the notion of a glutinous clammy nature: nu is sounded +from within, and has a notion of inwardness: alpha is the expression of +size; eta of length; omicron of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of +omicron in the word goggulon. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the +correctness of names; and I should like to hear what Cratylus would say. +'But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus mystifies me; I should like +to ask him, in your presence, what he means by the fitness of names?' To +this appeal, Cratylus replies 'that he cannot explain so important a +subject all in a moment.' 'No, but you may "add little to little," as +Hesiod says.' Socrates here interposes his own request, that Cratylus will +give some account of his theory. Hermogenes and himself are mere +sciolists, but Cratylus has reflected on these matters, and has had +teachers. Cratylus replies in the words of Achilles: '"Illustrious Ajax, +you have spoken in all things much to my mind," whether Euthyphro, or some +Muse inhabiting your own breast, was the inspirer.' Socrates replies, that +he is afraid of being self-deceived, and therefore he must 'look fore and +aft,' as Homer remarks. Does not Cratylus agree with him that names teach +us the nature of things? 'Yes.' And naming is an art, and the artists are +legislators, and like artists in general, some of them are better and some +of them are worse than others, and give better or worse laws, and make +better or worse names. Cratylus cannot admit that one name is better than +another; they are either true names, or they are not names at all; and when +he is asked about the name of Hermogenes, who is acknowledged to have no +luck in him, he affirms this to be the name of somebody else. Socrates +supposes him to mean that falsehood is impossible, to which his own answer +would be, that there has never been a lack of liars. Cratylus presses him +with the old sophistical argument, that falsehood is saying that which is +not, and therefore saying nothing;--you cannot utter the word which is not. +Socrates complains that this argument is too subtle for an old man to +understand: Suppose a person addressing Cratylus were to say, Hail, +Athenian Stranger, Hermogenes! would these words be true or false? 'I +should say that they would be mere unmeaning sounds, like the hammering of +a brass pot.' But you would acknowledge that names, as well as pictures, +are imitations, and also that pictures may give a right or wrong +representation of a man or woman:--why may not names then equally give a +representation true and right or false and wrong? Cratylus admits that +pictures may give a true or false representation, but denies that names +can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man and say 'this is year +picture,' and again, he may go and say to him 'this is your name'--in the +one case appealing to his sense of sight, and in the other to his sense of +hearing;--may he not? 'Yes.' Then you will admit that there is a right or +a wrong assignment of names, and if of names, then of verbs and nouns; and +if of verbs and nouns, then of the sentences which are made up of them; and +comparing nouns to pictures, you may give them all the appropriate sounds, +or only some of them. And as he who gives all the colours makes a good +picture, and he who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but +still a picture; so he who gives all the sounds makes a good name, and he +who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but a name still. The +artist of names, that is, the legislator, may be a good or he may be a bad +artist. 'Yes, Socrates, but the cases are not parallel; for if you +subtract or misplace a letter, the name ceases to be a name.' Socrates +admits that the number 10, if an unit is subtracted, would cease to be 10, +but denies that names are of this purely quantitative nature. Suppose that +there are two objects--Cratylus and the image of Cratylus; and let us +imagine that some God makes them perfectly alike, both in their outward +form and in their inner nature and qualities: then there will be two +Cratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of Cratylus. But an +image in fact always falls short in some degree of the original, and if +images are not exact counterparts, why should names be? if they were, they +would be the doubles of their originals, and indistinguishable from them; +and how ridiculous would this be! Cratylus admits the truth of Socrates' +remark. But then Socrates rejoins, he should have the courage to +acknowledge that letters may be wrongly inserted in a noun, or a noun in a +sentence; and yet the noun or the sentence may retain a meaning. Better to +admit this, that we may not be punished like the traveller in Egina who +goes about at night, and that Truth herself may not say to us, 'Too late.' +And, errors excepted, we may still affirm that a name to be correct must +have proper letters, which bear a resemblance to the thing signified. I +must remind you of what Hermogenes and I were saying about the letter rho +accent, which was held to be expressive of motion and hardness, as lambda +is of smoothness;--and this you will admit to be their natural meaning. +But then, why do the Eritreans call that skleroter which we call sklerotes? +We can understand one another, although the letter rho accent is not +equivalent to the letter s: why is this? You reply, because the two +letters are sufficiently alike for the purpose of expressing motion. Well, +then, there is the letter lambda; what business has this in a word meaning +hardness? 'Why, Socrates, I retort upon you, that we put in and pull out +letters at pleasure.' And the explanation of this is custom or agreement: +we have made a convention that the rho shall mean s and a convention may +indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. How could there be names +for all the numbers unless you allow that convention is used? Imitation is +a poor thing, and has to be supplemented by convention, which is another +poor thing; although I agree with you in thinking that the most perfect +form of language is found only where there is a perfect correspondence of +sound and meaning. But let me ask you what is the use and force of names? +'The use of names, Socrates, is to inform, and he who knows names knows +things.' Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the +discovery of things? 'Yes.' But do you not see that there is a degree of +deception about names? He who first gave names, gave them according to his +conception, and that may have been erroneous. 'But then, why, Socrates, is +language so consistent? all words have the same laws.' Mere consistency is +no test of truth. In geometrical problems, for example, there may be a +flaw at the beginning, and yet the conclusion may follow consistently. +And, therefore, a wise man will take especial care of first principles. +But are words really consistent; are there not as many terms of praise +which signify rest as which signify motion? There is episteme, which is +connected with stasis, as mneme is with meno. Bebaion, again, is the +expression of station and position; istoria is clearly descriptive of the +stopping istanai of the stream; piston indicates the cessation of motion; +and there are many words having a bad sense, which are connected with ideas +of motion, such as sumphora, amartia, etc.: amathia, again, might be +explained, as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois +pragmasin. Thus the bad names are framed on the same principle as the +good, and other examples might be given, which would favour a theory of +rest rather than of motion. 'Yes; but the greater number of words express +motion.' Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is correctness of names to be +determined by the voice of a majority? + +Here is another point: we were saying that the legislator gives names; and +therefore we must suppose that he knows the things which he names: but how +can he have learnt things from names before there were any names? 'I +believe, Socrates, that some power more than human first gave things their +names, and that these were necessarily true names.' Then how came the +giver of names to contradict himself, and to make some names expressive of +rest, and others of motion? 'I do not suppose that he did make them both.' +Then which did he make--those which are expressive of rest, or those which +are expressive of motion?...But if some names are true and others false, we +can only decide between them, not by counting words, but by appealing to +things. And, if so, we must allow that things may be known without names; +for names, as we have several times admitted, are the images of things; and +the higher knowledge is of things, and is not to be derived from names; and +though I do not doubt that the inventors of language gave names, under the +idea that all things are in a state of motion and flux, I believe that they +were mistaken; and that having fallen into a whirlpool themselves, they are +trying to drag us after them. For is there not a true beauty and a true +good, which is always beautiful and always good? Can the thing beauty be +vanishing away from us while the words are yet in our mouths? And they +could not be known by any one if they are always passing away--for if they +are always passing away, the observer has no opportunity of observing their +state. Whether the doctrine of the flux or of the eternal nature be the +truer, is hard to determine. But no man of sense will put himself, or the +education of his mind, in the power of names: he will not condemn himself +to be an unreal thing, nor will he believe that everything is in a flux +like the water in a leaky vessel, or that the world is a man who has a +running at the nose. This doctrine may be true, Cratylus, but is also very +likely to be untrue; and therefore I would have you reflect while you are +young, and find out the truth, and when you know come and tell me. 'I have +thought, Socrates, and after a good deal of thinking I incline to +Heracleitus.' Then another day, my friend, you shall give me a lesson. +'Very good, Socrates, and I hope that you will continue to study these +things yourself.' + +... + +We may now consider (I) how far Plato in the Cratylus has discovered the +true principles of language, and then (II) proceed to compare modern +speculations respecting the origin and nature of language with the +anticipations of his genius. + +I. (1) Plato is aware that language is not the work of chance; nor does he +deny that there is a natural fitness in names. He only insists that this +natural fitness shall be intelligibly explained. But he has no idea that +language is a natural organism. He would have heard with surprise that +languages are the common work of whole nations in a primitive or semi- +barbarous age. How, he would probably have argued, could men devoid of art +have contrived a structure of such complexity? No answer could have been +given to this question, either in ancient or in modern times, until the +nature of primitive antiquity had been thoroughly studied, and the +instincts of man had been shown to exist in greater force, when his state +approaches more nearly to that of children or animals. The philosophers of +the last century, after their manner, would have vainly endeavoured to +trace the process by which proper names were converted into common, and +would have shown how the last effort of abstraction invented prepositions +and auxiliaries. The theologian would have proved that language must have +had a divine origin, because in childhood, while the organs are pliable, +the intelligence is wanting, and when the intelligence is able to frame +conceptions, the organs are no longer able to express them. Or, as others +have said: Man is man because he has the gift of speech; and he could not +have invented that which he is. But this would have been an 'argument too +subtle' for Socrates, who rejects the theological account of the origin of +language 'as an excuse for not giving a reason,' which he compares to the +introduction of the 'Deus ex machina' by the tragic poets when they have to +solve a difficulty; thus anticipating many modern controversies in which +the primary agency of the divine Being is confused with the secondary +cause; and God is assumed to have worked a miracle in order to fill up a +lacuna in human knowledge. (Compare Timaeus.) + +Neither is Plato wrong in supposing that an element of design and art +enters into language. The creative power abating is supplemented by a +mechanical process. 'Languages are not made but grow,' but they are made +as well as grow; bursting into life like a plant or a flower, they are also +capable of being trained and improved and engrafted upon one another. The +change in them is effected in earlier ages by musical and euphonic +improvements, at a later stage by the influence of grammar and logic, and +by the poetical and literary use of words. They develope rapidly in +childhood, and when they are full grown and set they may still put forth +intellectual powers, like the mind in the body, or rather we may say that +the nobler use of language only begins when the frame-work is complete. +The savage or primitive man, in whom the natural instinct is strongest, is +also the greatest improver of the forms of language. He is the poet or +maker of words, as in civilised ages the dialectician is the definer or +distinguisher of them. The latter calls the second world of abstract terms +into existence, as the former has created the picture sounds which +represent natural objects or processes. Poetry and philosophy--these two, +are the two great formative principles of language, when they have passed +their first stage, of which, as of the first invention of the arts in +general, we only entertain conjecture. And mythology is a link between +them, connecting the visible and invisible, until at length the sensuous +exterior falls away, and the severance of the inner and outer world, of the +idea and the object of sense, becomes complete. At a later period, logic +and grammar, sister arts, preserve and enlarge the decaying instinct of +language, by rule and method, which they gather from analysis and +observation. + +(2) There is no trace in any of Plato's writings that he was acquainted +with any language but Greek. Yet he has conceived very truly the relation +of Greek to foreign languages, which he is led to consider, because he +finds that many Greek words are incapable of explanation. Allowing a good +deal for accident, and also for the fancies of the conditores linguae +Graecae, there is an element of which he is unable to give an account. +These unintelligible words he supposes to be of foreign origin, and to have +been derived from a time when the Greeks were either barbarians, or in +close relations to the barbarians. Socrates is aware that this principle +is liable to great abuse; and, like the 'Deus ex machina,' explains +nothing. Hence he excuses himself for the employment of such a device, +and remarks that in foreign words there is still a principle of +correctness, which applies equally both to Greeks and barbarians. + +(3) But the greater number of primary words do not admit of derivation +from foreign languages; they must be resolved into the letters out of which +they are composed, and therefore the letters must have a meaning. The +framers of language were aware of this; they observed that alpha was +adapted to express size; eta length; omicron roundness; nu inwardness; rho +accent rush or roar; lambda liquidity; gamma lambda the detention of the +liquid or slippery element; delta and tau binding; phi, psi, sigma, xi, +wind and cold, and so on. Plato's analysis of the letters of the alphabet +shows a wonderful insight into the nature of language. He does not +expressively distinguish between mere imitation and the symbolical use of +sound to express thought, but he recognises in the examples which he gives +both modes of imitation. Gesture is the mode which a deaf and dumb person +would take of indicating his meaning. And language is the gesture of the +tongue; in the use of the letter rho accent, to express a rushing or +roaring, or of omicron to express roundness, there is a direct imitation; +while in the use of the letter alpha to express size, or of eta to express +length, the imitation is symbolical. The use of analogous or similar +sounds, in order to express similar analogous ideas, seems to have escaped +him. + +In passing from the gesture of the body to the movement of the tongue, +Plato makes a great step in the physiology of language. He was probably +the first who said that 'language is imitative sound,' which is the +greatest and deepest truth of philology; although he is not aware of the +laws of euphony and association by which imitation must be regulated. He +was probably also the first who made a distinction between simple and +compound words, a truth second only in importance to that which has just +been mentioned. His great insight in one direction curiously contrasts +with his blindness in another; for he appears to be wholly unaware (compare +his derivation of agathos from agastos and thoos) of the difference between +the root and termination. But we must recollect that he was necessarily +more ignorant than any schoolboy of Greek grammar, and had no table of the +inflexions of verbs and nouns before his eyes, which might have suggested +to him the distinction. + +(4) Plato distinctly affirms that language is not truth, or 'philosophie +une langue bien faite.' At first, Socrates has delighted himself with +discovering the flux of Heracleitus in language. But he is covertly +satirising the pretence of that or any other age to find philosophy in +words; and he afterwards corrects any erroneous inference which might be +gathered from his experiment. For he finds as many, or almost as many, +words expressive of rest, as he had previously found expressive of motion. +And even if this had been otherwise, who would learn of words when he might +learn of things? There is a great controversy and high argument between +Heracleiteans and Eleatics, but no man of sense would commit his soul in +such enquiries to the imposers of names...In this and other passages Plato +shows that he is as completely emancipated from the influence of 'Idols of +the tribe' as Bacon himself. + +The lesson which may be gathered from words is not metaphysical or moral, +but historical. They teach us the affinity of races, they tell us +something about the association of ideas, they occasionally preserve the +memory of a disused custom; but we cannot safely argue from them about +right and wrong, matter and mind, freedom and necessity, or the other +problems of moral and metaphysical philosophy. For the use of words on +such subjects may often be metaphorical, accidental, derived from other +languages, and may have no relation to the contemporary state of thought +and feeling. Nor in any case is the invention of them the result of +philosophical reflection; they have been commonly transferred from matter +to mind, and their meaning is the very reverse of their etymology. Because +there is or is not a name for a thing, we cannot argue that the thing has +or has not an actual existence; or that the antitheses, parallels, +conjugates, correlatives of language have anything corresponding to them in +nature. There are too many words as well as too few; and they generalize +the objects or ideas which they represent. The greatest lesson which the +philosophical analysis of language teaches us is, that we should be above +language, making words our servants, and not allowing them to be our +masters. + +Plato does not add the further observation, that the etymological meaning +of words is in process of being lost. If at first framed on a principle of +intelligibility, they would gradually cease to be intelligible, like those +of a foreign language, he is willing to admit that they are subject to many +changes, and put on many disguises. He acknowledges that the 'poor +creature' imitation is supplemented by another 'poor creature,'-- +convention. But he does not see that 'habit and repute,' and their +relation to other words, are always exercising an influence over them. +Words appear to be isolated, but they are really the parts of an organism +which is always being reproduced. They are refined by civilization, +harmonized by poetry, emphasized by literature, technically applied in +philosophy and art; they are used as symbols on the border-ground of human +knowledge; they receive a fresh impress from individual genius, and come +with a new force and association to every lively-minded person. They are +fixed by the simultaneous utterance of millions, and yet are always +imperceptibly changing;--not the inventors of language, but writing and +speaking, and particularly great writers, or works which pass into the +hearts of nations, Homer, Shakespear, Dante, the German or English Bible, +Kant and Hegel, are the makers of them in later ages. They carry with them +the faded recollection of their own past history; the use of a word in a +striking and familiar passage gives a complexion to its use everywhere +else, and the new use of an old and familiar phrase has also a peculiar +power over us. But these and other subtleties of language escaped the +observation of Plato. He is not aware that the languages of the world are +organic structures, and that every word in them is related to every other; +nor does he conceive of language as the joint work of the speaker and the +hearer, requiring in man a faculty not only of expressing his thoughts but +of understanding those of others. + +On the other hand, he cannot be justly charged with a desire to frame +language on artificial principles. Philosophers have sometimes dreamed of +a technical or scientific language, in words which should have fixed +meanings, and stand in the same relation to one another as the substances +which they denote. But there is no more trace of this in Plato than there +is of a language corresponding to the ideas; nor, indeed, could the want of +such a language be felt until the sciences were far more developed. Those +who would extend the use of technical phraseology beyond the limits of +science or of custom, seem to forget that freedom and suggestiveness and +the play of association are essential characteristics of language. The +great master has shown how he regarded pedantic distinctions of words or +attempts to confine their meaning in the satire on Prodicus in the +Protagoras. + +(5) In addition to these anticipations of the general principles of +philology, we may note also a few curious observations on words and sounds. +'The Eretrians say sklerotes for skleroter;' 'the Thessalians call Apollo +Amlos;' 'The Phrygians have the words pur, udor, kunes slightly changed;' +'there is an old Homeric word emesato, meaning "he contrived";' 'our +forefathers, and especially the women, who are most conservative of the +ancient language, loved the letters iota and delta; but now iota is changed +into eta and epsilon, and delta into zeta; this is supposed to increase the +grandeur of the sound.' Plato was very willing to use inductive arguments, +so far as they were within his reach; but he would also have assigned a +large influence to chance. Nor indeed is induction applicable to philology +in the same degree as to most of the physical sciences. For after we have +pushed our researches to the furthest point, in language as in all the +other creations of the human mind, there will always remain an element of +exception or accident or free-will, which cannot be eliminated. + +The question, 'whether falsehood is impossible,' which Socrates +characteristically sets aside as too subtle for an old man (compare +Euthyd.), could only have arisen in an age of imperfect consciousness, +which had not yet learned to distinguish words from things. Socrates +replies in effect that words have an independent existence; thus +anticipating the solution of the mediaeval controversy of Nominalism and +Realism. He is aware too that languages exist in various degrees of +perfection, and that the analysis of them can only be carried to a certain +point. 'If we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are +the appropriate expressions, that would be the most perfect state of +language.' These words suggest a question of deeper interest than the +origin of language; viz. what is the ideal of language, how far by any +correction of their usages existing languages might become clearer and more +expressive than they are, more poetical, and also more logical; or whether +they are now finally fixed and have received their last impress from time +and authority. + +On the whole, the Cratylus seems to contain deeper truths about language +than any other ancient writing. But feeling the uncertain ground upon +which he is walking, and partly in order to preserve the character of +Socrates, Plato envelopes the whole subject in a robe of fancy, and allows +his principles to drop out as if by accident. + +II. What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and nature +of language? Like other modern metaphysical enquiries, they end at last in +a statement of facts. But, in order to state or understand the facts, a +metaphysical insight seems to be required. There are more things in +language than the human mind easily conceives. And many fallacies have to +be dispelled, as well as observations made. The true spirit of philosophy +or metaphysics can alone charm away metaphysical illusions, which are +always reappearing, formerly in the fancies of neoplatonist writers, now in +the disguise of experience and common sense. An analogy, a figure of +speech, an intelligible theory, a superficial observation of the +individual, have often been mistaken for a true account of the origin of +language. + +Speaking is one of the simplest natural operations, and also the most +complex. Nothing would seem to be easier or more trivial than a few words +uttered by a child in any language. Yet into the formation of those words +have entered causes which the human mind is not capable of calculating. +They are a drop or two of the great stream or ocean of speech which has +been flowing in all ages. They have been transmitted from one language to +another; like the child himself, they go back to the beginnings of the +human race. How they originated, who can tell? Nevertheless we can +imagine a stage of human society in which the circle of men's minds was +narrower and their sympathies and instincts stronger; in which their organs +of speech were more flexible, and the sense of hearing finer and more +discerning; in which they lived more in company, and after the manner of +children were more given to express their feelings; in which 'they moved +all together,' like a herd of wild animals, 'when they moved at all.' +Among them, as in every society, a particular person would be more +sensitive and intelligent than the rest. Suddenly, on some occasion of +interest (at the approach of a wild beast, shall we say?), he first, they +following him, utter a cry which resounds through the forest. The cry is +almost or quite involuntary, and may be an imitation of the roar of the +animal. Thus far we have not speech, but only the inarticulate expression +of feeling or emotion in no respect differing from the cries of animals; +for they too call to one another and are answered. But now suppose that +some one at a distance not only hears the sound, but apprehends the +meaning: or we may imagine that the cry is repeated to a member of the +society who had been absent; the others act the scene over again when he +returns home in the evening. And so the cry becomes a word. The hearer in +turn gives back the word to the speaker, who is now aware that he has +acquired a new power. Many thousand times he exercises this power; like a +child learning to talk, he repeats the same cry again, and again he is +answered; he tries experiments with a like result, and the speaker and the +hearer rejoice together in their newly-discovered faculty. At first there +would be few such cries, and little danger of mistaking or confusing them. +For the mind of primitive man had a narrow range of perceptions and +feelings; his senses were microscopic; twenty or thirty sounds or gestures +would be enough for him, nor would he have any difficulty in finding them. +Naturally he broke out into speech--like the young infant he laughed and +babbled; but not until there were hearers as well as speakers did language +begin. Not the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object, but the +interjection or the vocal imitation of the object understood, is the first +rudiment of human speech. + +After a while the word gathers associations, and has an independent +existence. The imitation of the lion's roar calls up the fears and hopes +of the chase, which are excited by his appearance. In the moment of +hearing the sound, without any appreciable interval, these and other latent +experiences wake up in the mind of the hearer. Not only does he receive an +impression, but he brings previous knowledge to bear upon that impression. +Necessarily the pictorial image becomes less vivid, while the association +of the nature and habits of the animal is more distinctly perceived. The +picture passes into a symbol, for there would be too many of them and they +would crowd the mind; the vocal imitation, too, is always in process of +being lost and being renewed, just as the picture is brought back again in +the description of the poet. Words now can be used more freely because +there are more of them. What was once an involuntary expression becomes +voluntary. Not only can men utter a cry or call, but they can communicate +and converse; they can not only use words, but they can even play with +them. The word is separated both from the object and from the mind; and +slowly nations and individuals attain to a fuller consciousness of +themselves. + +Parallel with this mental process the articulation of sounds is gradually +becoming perfected. The finer sense detects the differences of them, and +begins, first to agglomerate, then to distinguish them. Times, persons, +places, relations of all kinds, are expressed by modifications of them. +The earliest parts of speech, as we may call them by anticipation, like the +first utterances of children, probably partook of the nature of +interjections and nouns; then came verbs; at length the whole sentence +appeared, and rhythm and metre followed. Each stage in the progress of +language was accompanied by some corresponding stage in the mind and +civilisation of man. In time, when the family became a nation, the wild +growth of dialects passed into a language. Then arose poetry and +literature. We can hardly realize to ourselves how much with each +improvement of language the powers of the human mind were enlarged; how the +inner world took the place of outer; how the pictorial or symbolical or +analogical word was refined into a notion; how language, fair and large and +free, was at last complete. + +So we may imagine the speech of man to have begun as with the cries of +animals, or the stammering lips of children, and to have attained by +degrees the perfection of Homer and Plato. Yet we are far from saying that +this or any other theory of language is proved by facts. It is not +difficult to form an hypothesis which by a series of imaginary transitions +will bridge over the chasm which separates man from the animals. +Differences of kind may often be thus resolved into differences of degree. +But we must not assume that we have in this way discovered the true account +of them. Through what struggles the harmonious use of the organs of speech +was acquired; to what extent the conditions of human life were different; +how far the genius of individuals may have contributed to the discovery of +this as of the other arts, we cannot say: Only we seem to see that +language is as much the creation of the ear as of the tongue, and the +expression of a movement stirring the hearts not of one man only but of +many, 'as the trees of the wood are stirred by the wind.' The theory is +consistent or not inconsistent with our own mental experience, and throws +some degree of light upon a dark corner of the human mind. + +In the later analysis of language, we trace the opposite and contrasted +elements of the individual and nation, of the past and present, of the +inward and outward, of the subject and object, of the notional and +relational, of the root or unchanging part of the word and of the changing +inflexion, if such a distinction be admitted, of the vowel and the +consonant, of quantity and accent, of speech and writing, of poetry and +prose. We observe also the reciprocal influence of sounds and conceptions +on each other, like the connexion of body and mind; and further remark that +although the names of objects were originally proper names, as the +grammarian or logician might call them, yet at a later stage they become +universal notions, which combine into particulars and individuals, and are +taken out of the first rude agglomeration of sounds that they may be +replaced in a higher and more logical order. We see that in the simplest +sentences are contained grammar and logic--the parts of speech, the Eleatic +philosophy and the Kantian categories. So complex is language, and so +expressive not only of the meanest wants of man, but of his highest +thoughts; so various are the aspects in which it is regarded by us. Then +again, when we follow the history of languages, we observe that they are +always slowly moving, half dead, half alive, half solid, half fluid; the +breath of a moment, yet like the air, continuous in all ages and +countries,--like the glacier, too, containing within them a trickling +stream which deposits debris of the rocks over which it passes. There were +happy moments, as we may conjecture, in the lives of nations, at which they +came to the birth--as in the golden age of literature, the man and the time +seem to conspire; the eloquence of the bard or chief, as in later times the +creations of the great writer who is the expression of his age, became +impressed on the minds of their countrymen, perhaps in the hour of some +crisis of national development--a migration, a conquest, or the like. The +picture of the word which was beginning to be lost, is now revived; the +sound again echoes to the sense; men find themselves capable not only of +expressing more feelings, and describing more objects, but of expressing +and describing them better. The world before the flood, that is to say, +the world of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand years ago, has passed away and +left no sign. But the best conception that we can form of it, though +imperfect and uncertain, is gained from the analogy of causes still in +action, some powerful and sudden, others working slowly in the course of +infinite ages. Something too may be allowed to 'the persistency of the +strongest,' to 'the survival of the fittest,' in this as in the other +realms of nature. + +These are some of the reflections which the modern philosophy of language +suggests to us about the powers of the human mind and the forces and +influences by which the efforts of men to utter articulate sounds were +inspired. Yet in making these and similar generalizations we may note also +dangers to which we are exposed. (1) There is the confusion of ideas with +facts--of mere possibilities, and generalities, and modes of conception +with actual and definite knowledge. The words 'evolution,' 'birth,' 'law,' +development,' 'instinct,' 'implicit,' 'explicit,' and the like, have a +false clearness or comprehensiveness, which adds nothing to our knowledge. +The metaphor of a flower or a tree, or some other work of nature or art, is +often in like manner only a pleasing picture. (2) There is the fallacy of +resolving the languages which we know into their parts, and then imagining +that we can discover the nature of language by reconstructing them. (3) +There is the danger of identifying language, not with thoughts but with +ideas. (4) There is the error of supposing that the analysis of grammar +and logic has always existed, or that their distinctions were familiar to +Socrates and Plato. (5) There is the fallacy of exaggerating, and also of +diminishing the interval which separates articulate from inarticulate +language--the cries of animals from the speech of man--the instincts of +animals from the reason of man. (6) There is the danger which besets all +enquiries into the early history of man--of interpreting the past by the +present, and of substituting the definite and intelligible for the true but +dim outline which is the horizon of human knowledge. + +The greatest light is thrown upon the nature of language by analogy. We +have the analogy of the cries of animals, of the songs of birds ('man, like +the nightingale, is a singing bird, but is ever binding up thoughts with +musical notes'), of music, of children learning to speak, of barbarous +nations in which the linguistic instinct is still undecayed, of ourselves +learning to think and speak a new language, of the deaf and dumb who have +words without sounds, of the various disorders of speech; and we have the +after-growth of mythology, which, like language, is an unconscious creation +of the human mind. We can observe the social and collective instincts of +animals, and may remark how, when domesticated, they have the power of +understanding but not of speaking, while on the other hand, some birds +which are comparatively devoid of intelligence, make a nearer approach to +articulate speech. We may note how in the animals there is a want of that +sympathy with one another which appears to be the soul of language. We can +compare the use of speech with other mental and bodily operations; for +speech too is a kind of gesture, and in the child or savage accompanied +with gesture. We may observe that the child learns to speak, as he learns +to walk or to eat, by a natural impulse; yet in either case not without a +power of imitation which is also natural to him--he is taught to read, but +he breaks forth spontaneously in speech. We can trace the impulse to bind +together the world in ideas beginning in the first efforts to speak and +culminating in philosophy. But there remains an element which cannot be +explained, or even adequately described. We can understand how man creates +or constructs consciously and by design; and see, if we do not understand, +how nature, by a law, calls into being an organised structure. But the +intermediate organism which stands between man and nature, which is the +work of mind yet unconscious, and in which mind and matter seem to meet, +and mind unperceived to herself is really limited by all other minds, is +neither understood nor seen by us, and is with reluctance admitted to be a +fact. + +Language is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations, the +transfiguration of the world in thought, the meeting-point of the physical +and mental sciences, and also the mirror in which they are reflected, +present at every moment to the individual, and yet having a sort of eternal +or universal nature. When we analyze our own mental processes, we find +words everywhere in every degree of clearness and consistency, fading away +in dreams and more like pictures, rapidly succeeding one another in our +waking thoughts, attaining a greater distinctness and consecutiveness in +speech, and a greater still in writing, taking the place of one another +when we try to become emancipated from their influence. For in all +processes of the mind which are conscious we are talking to ourselves; the +attempt to think without words is a mere illusion,--they are always +reappearing when we fix our thoughts. And speech is not a separate +faculty, but the expression of all our faculties, to which all our other +powers of expression, signs, looks, gestures, lend their aid, of which the +instrument is not the tongue only, but more than half the human frame. + +The minds of men are sometimes carried on to think of their lives and of +their actions as links in a chain of causes and effects going back to the +beginning of time. A few have seemed to lose the sense of their own +individuality in the universal cause or nature. In like manner we might +think of the words which we daily use, as derived from the first speech of +man, and of all the languages in the world, as the expressions or varieties +of a single force or life of language of which the thoughts of men are the +accident. Such a conception enables us to grasp the power and wonder of +languages, and is very natural to the scientific philologist. For he, like +the metaphysician, believes in the reality of that which absorbs his own +mind. Nor do we deny the enormous influence which language has exercised +over thought. Fixed words, like fixed ideas, have often governed the +world. But in such representations we attribute to language too much the +nature of a cause, and too little of an effect,--too much of an absolute, +too little of a relative character,--too much of an ideal, too little of a +matter-of-fact existence. + +Or again, we may frame a single abstract notion of language of which all +existent languages may be supposed to be the perversion. But we must not +conceive that this logical figment had ever a real existence, or is +anything more than an effort of the mind to give unity to infinitely +various phenomena. There is no abstract language 'in rerum natura,' any +more than there is an abstract tree, but only languages in various stages +of growth, maturity, and decay. Nor do other logical distinctions or even +grammatical exactly correspond to the facts of language; for they too are +attempts to give unity and regularity to a subject which is partly +irregular. + +We find, however, that there are distinctions of another kind by which this +vast field of language admits of being mapped out. There is the +distinction between biliteral and triliteral roots, and the various +inflexions which accompany them; between the mere mechanical cohesion of +sounds or words, and the 'chemical' combination of them into a new word; +there is the distinction between languages which have had a free and full +development of their organisms, and languages which have been stunted in +their growth,--lamed in their hands or feet, and never able to acquire +afterwards the powers in which they are deficient; there is the distinction +between synthetical languages like Greek and Latin, which have retained +their inflexions, and analytical languages like English or French, which +have lost them. Innumerable as are the languages and dialects of mankind, +there are comparatively few classes to which they can be referred. + +Another road through this chaos is provided by the physiology of speech. +The organs of language are the same in all mankind, and are only capable of +uttering a certain number of sounds. Every man has tongue, teeth, lips, +palate, throat, mouth, which he may close or open, and adapt in various +ways; making, first, vowels and consonants; and secondly, other classes of +letters. The elements of all speech, like the elements of the musical +scale, are few and simple, though admitting of infinite gradations and +combinations. Whatever slight differences exist in the use or formation of +these organs, owing to climate or the sense of euphony or other causes, +they are as nothing compared with their agreement. Here then is a real +basis of unity in the study of philology, unlike that imaginary abstract +unity of which we were just now speaking. + +Whether we regard language from the psychological, or historical, or +physiological point of view, the materials of our knowledge are +inexhaustible. The comparisons of children learning to speak, of barbarous +nations, of musical notes, of the cries of animals, of the song of birds, +increase our insight into the nature of human speech. Many observations +which would otherwise have escaped us are suggested by them. But they do +not explain why, in man and in man only, the speaker met with a response +from the hearer, and the half articulate sound gradually developed into +Sanscrit and Greek. They hardly enable us to approach any nearer the +secret of the origin of language, which, like some of the other great +secrets of nature,--the origin of birth and death, or of animal life,-- +remains inviolable. That problem is indissolubly bound up with the origin +of man; and if we ever know more of the one, we may expect to know more of +the other. (Compare W. Humboldt, 'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des +menschlichen Sprachbaues;' M. Muller, 'Lectures on the Science of +Language;' Steinthal, 'Einleitung in die Psychologie und +Sprachwissenschaft.' + +... + +It is more than sixteen years since the preceding remarks were written, +which with a few alterations have now been reprinted. During the interval +the progress of philology has been very great. More languages have been +compared; the inner structure of language has been laid bare; the relations +of sounds have been more accurately discriminated; the manner in which +dialects affect or are affected by the literary or principal form of a +language is better understood. Many merely verbal questions have been +eliminated; the remains of the old traditional methods have died away. The +study has passed from the metaphysical into an historical stage. Grammar +is no longer confused with language, nor the anatomy of words and sentences +with their life and use. Figures of speech, by which the vagueness of +theories is often concealed, have been stripped off; and we see language +more as it truly was. The immensity of the subject is gradually revealed +to us, and the reign of law becomes apparent. Yet the law is but partially +seen; the traces of it are often lost in the distance. For languages have +a natural but not a perfect growth; like other creations of nature into +which the will of man enters, they are full of what we term accident and +irregularity. And the difficulties of the subject become not less, but +greater, as we proceed--it is one of those studies in which we seem to know +less as we know more; partly because we are no longer satisfied with the +vague and superficial ideas of it which prevailed fifty years ago; partly +also because the remains of the languages with which we are acquainted +always were, and if they are still living, are, in a state of transition; +and thirdly, because there are lacunae in our knowledge of them which can +never be filled up. Not a tenth, not a hundredth part of them has been +preserved. Yet the materials at our disposal are far greater than any +individual can use. Such are a few of the general reflections which the +present state of philology calls up. + +(1) Language seems to be composite, but into its first elements the +philologer has never been able to penetrate. However far he goes back, he +never arrives at the beginning; or rather, as in Geology or in Astronomy, +there is no beginning. He is too apt to suppose that by breaking up the +existing forms of language into their parts he will arrive at a previous +stage of it, but he is merely analyzing what never existed, or is never +known to have existed, except in a composite form. He may divide nouns and +verbs into roots and inflexions, but he has no evidence which will show +that the omega of tupto or the mu of tithemi, though analogous to ego, me, +either became pronouns or were generated out of pronouns. To say that +'pronouns, like ripe fruit, dropped out of verbs,' is a misleading figure +of speech. Although all languages have some common principles, there is no +primitive form or forms of language known to us, or to be reasonably +imagined, from which they are all descended. No inference can be drawn +from language, either for or against the unity of the human race. Nor is +there any proof that words were ever used without any relation to each +other. Whatever may be the meaning of a sentence or a word when applied to +primitive language, it is probable that the sentence is more akin to the +original form than the word, and that the later stage of language is the +result rather of analysis than of synthesis, or possibly is a combination +of the two. Nor, again, are we sure that the original process of learning +to speak was the same in different places or among different races of men. +It may have been slower with some, quicker with others. Some tribes may +have used shorter, others longer words or cries: they may have been more +or less inclined to agglutinate or to decompose them: they may have +modified them by the use of prefixes, suffixes, infixes; by the lengthening +and strengthening of vowels or by the shortening and weakening of them, by +the condensation or rarefaction of consonants. But who gave to language +these primeval laws; or why one race has triliteral, another biliteral +roots; or why in some members of a group of languages b becomes p, or d, t, +or ch, k; or why two languages resemble one another in certain parts of +their structure and differ in others; or why in one language there is a +greater development of vowels, in another of consonants, and the like--are +questions of which we only 'entertain conjecture.' We must remember the +length of time that has elapsed since man first walked upon the earth, and +that in this vast but unknown period every variety of language may have +been in process of formation and decay, many times over. + +(Compare Plato, Laws):-- + +'ATHENIAN STRANGER: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of +government? Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in +which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good +and evil? + +CLEINIAS: What do you mean? + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: I mean that he might watch them from the point of view +of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite +ages. + +CLEINIAS: How so? + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which +has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them? + +CLEINIAS: Hardly. + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and +incalculable? + +CLEINIAS: No doubt. + +ATHENIAN STRANGER: And have there not been thousands and thousands of +cities which have come into being and perished during this period? And has +not every place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising, +and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?' + +Aristot. Metaph.:-- + +'And if a person should conceive the tales of mythology to mean only that +men thought the gods to be the first essences of things, he would deem the +reflection to have been inspired and would consider that, whereas probably +every art and part of wisdom had been DISCOVERED AND LOST MANY TIMES OVER, +such notions were but a remnant of the past which has survived to our +day.') + +It can hardly be supposed that any traces of an original language still +survive, any more than of the first huts or buildings which were +constructed by man. Nor are we at all certain of the relation, if any, in +which the greater families of languages stand to each other. The influence +of individuals must always have been a disturbing element. Like great +writers in later times, there may have been many a barbaric genius who +taught the men of his tribe to sing or speak, showing them by example how +to continue or divide their words, charming their souls with rhythm and +accent and intonation, finding in familiar objects the expression of their +confused fancies--to whom the whole of language might in truth be said to +be a figure of speech. One person may have introduced a new custom into +the formation or pronunciation of a word; he may have been imitated by +others, and the custom, or form, or accent, or quantity, or rhyme which he +introduced in a single word may have become the type on which many other +words or inflexions of words were framed, and may have quickly ran through +a whole language. For like the other gifts which nature has bestowed upon +man, that of speech has been conveyed to him through the medium, not of the +many, but of the few, who were his 'law-givers'--'the legislator with the +dialectician standing on his right hand,' in Plato's striking image, who +formed the manners of men and gave them customs, whose voice and look and +behaviour, whose gesticulations and other peculiarities were instinctively +imitated by them,--the 'king of men' who was their priest, almost their +God...But these are conjectures only: so little do we know of the origin +of language that the real scholar is indisposed to touch the subject at +all. + +(2) There are other errors besides the figment of a primitive or original +language which it is time to leave behind us. We no longer divide +languages into synthetical and analytical, or suppose similarity of +structure to be the safe or only guide to the affinities of them. We do +not confuse the parts of speech with the categories of Logic. Nor do we +conceive languages any more than civilisations to be in a state of +dissolution; they do not easily pass away, but are far more tenacious of +life than the tribes by whom they are spoken. 'Where two or three are +gathered together,' they survive. As in the human frame, as in the state, +there is a principle of renovation as well as of decay which is at work in +all of them. Neither do we suppose them to be invented by the wit of man. +With few exceptions, e.g. technical words or words newly imported from a +foreign language, and the like, in which art has imitated nature, 'words +are not made but grow.' Nor do we attribute to them a supernatural origin. +The law which regulates them is like the law which governs the circulation +of the blood, or the rising of the sap in trees; the action of it is +uniform, but the result, which appears in the superficial forms of men and +animals or in the leaves of trees, is an endless profusion and variety. +The laws of vegetation are invariable, but no two plants, no two leaves of +the forest are precisely the same. The laws of language are invariable, +but no two languages are alike, no two words have exactly the same meaning. +No two sounds are exactly of the same quality, or give precisely the same +impression. + +It would be well if there were a similar consensus about some other points +which appear to be still in dispute. Is language conscious or unconscious? +In speaking or writing have we present to our minds the meaning or the +sound or the construction of the words which we are using?--No more than +the separate drops of water with which we quench our thirst are present: +the whole draught may be conscious, but not the minute particles of which +it is made up: So the whole sentence may be conscious, but the several +words, syllables, letters are not thought of separately when we are +uttering them. Like other natural operations, the process of speech, when +most perfect, is least observed by us. We do not pause at each mouthful to +dwell upon the taste of it: nor has the speaker time to ask himself the +comparative merits of different modes of expression while he is uttering +them. There are many things in the use of language which may be observed +from without, but which cannot be explained from within. Consciousness +carries us but a little way in the investigation of the mind; it is not the +faculty of internal observation, but only the dim light which makes such +observation possible. What is supposed to be our consciousness of language +is really only the analysis of it, and this analysis admits of innumerable +degrees. But would it not be better if this term, which is so misleading, +and yet has played so great a part in mental science, were either banished +or used only with the distinct meaning of 'attention to our own minds,' +such as is called forth, not by familiar mental processes, but by the +interruption of them? Now in this sense we may truly say that we are not +conscious of ordinary speech, though we are commonly roused to attention by +the misuse or mispronunciation of a word. Still less, even in schools and +academies, do we ever attempt to invent new words or to alter the meaning +of old ones, except in the case, mentioned above, of technical or borrowed +words which are artificially made or imported because a need of them is +felt. Neither in our own nor in any other age has the conscious effort of +reflection in man contributed in an appreciable degree to the formation of +language. 'Which of us by taking thought' can make new words or +constructions? Reflection is the least of the causes by which language is +affected, and is likely to have the least power, when the linguistic +instinct is greatest, as in young children and in the infancy of nations. + +A kindred error is the separation of the phonetic from the mental element +of language; they are really inseparable--no definite line can be drawn +between them, any more than in any other common act of mind and body. It +is true that within certain limits we possess the power of varying sounds +by opening and closing the mouth, by touching the palate or the teeth with +the tongue, by lengthening or shortening the vocal instrument, by greater +or less stress, by a higher or lower pitch of the voice, and we can +substitute one note or accent for another. But behind the organs of speech +and their action there remains the informing mind, which sets them in +motion and works together with them. And behind the great structure of +human speech and the lesser varieties of language which arise out of the +many degrees and kinds of human intercourse, there is also the unknown or +over-ruling law of God or nature which gives order to it in its infinite +greatness, and variety in its infinitesimal minuteness--both equally +inscrutable to us. We need no longer discuss whether philology is to be +classed with the Natural or the Mental sciences, if we frankly recognize +that, like all the sciences which are concerned with man, it has a double +aspect,--inward and outward; and that the inward can only be known through +the outward. Neither need we raise the question whether the laws of +language, like the other laws of human action, admit of exceptions. The +answer in all cases is the same--that the laws of nature are uniform, +though the consistency or continuity of them is not always perceptible to +us. The superficial appearances of language, as of nature, are irregular, +but we do not therefore deny their deeper uniformity. The comparison of +the growth of language in the individual and in the nation cannot be wholly +discarded, for nations are made up of individuals. But in this, as in the +other political sciences, we must distinguish between collective and +individual actions or processes, and not attribute to the one what belongs +to the other. Again, when we speak of the hereditary or paternity of a +language, we must remember that the parents are alive as well as the +children, and that all the preceding generations survive (after a manner) +in the latest form of it. And when, for the purposes of comparison, we +form into groups the roots or terminations of words, we should not forget +how casual is the manner in which their resemblances have arisen--they were +not first written down by a grammarian in the paradigms of a grammar and +learned out of a book, but were due to many chance attractions of sound or +of meaning, or of both combined. So many cautions have to be borne in +mind, and so many first thoughts to be dismissed, before we can proceed +safely in the path of philological enquiry. It might be well sometimes to +lay aside figures of speech, such as the 'root' and the 'branches,' the +'stem,' the 'strata' of Geology, the 'compounds' of Chemistry, 'the ripe +fruit of pronouns dropping from verbs' (see above), and the like, which are +always interesting, but are apt to be delusive. Yet such figures of speech +are far nearer the truth than the theories which attribute the invention +and improvement of language to the conscious action of the human +mind...Lastly, it is doubted by recent philologians whether climate can be +supposed to have exercised any influence worth speaking of on a language: +such a view is said to be unproven: it had better therefore not be +silently assumed. + +'Natural selection' and the 'survival of the fittest' have been applied in +the field of philology, as well as in the other sciences which are +concerned with animal and vegetable life. And a Darwinian school of +philologists has sprung up, who are sometimes accused of putting words in +the place of things. It seems to be true, that whether applied to language +or to other branches of knowledge, the Darwinian theory, unless very +precisely defined, hardly escapes from being a truism. If by 'the natural +selection' of words or meanings of words or by the 'persistence and +survival of the fittest' the maintainer of the theory intends to affirm +nothing more than this--that the word 'fittest to survive' survives, he +adds not much to the knowledge of language. But if he means that the word +or the meaning of the word or some portion of the word which comes into use +or drops out of use is selected or rejected on the ground of economy or +parsimony or ease to the speaker or clearness or euphony or expressiveness, +or greater or less demand for it, or anything of this sort, he is affirming +a proposition which has several senses, and in none of these senses can be +assisted to be uniformly true. For the laws of language are precarious, +and can only act uniformly when there is such frequency of intercourse +among neighbours as is sufficient to enforce them. And there are many +reasons why a man should prefer his own way of speaking to that of others, +unless by so doing he becomes unintelligible. The struggle for existence +among words is not of that fierce and irresistible kind in which birds, +beasts and fishes devour one another, but of a milder sort, allowing one +usage to be substituted for another, not by force, but by the persuasion, +or rather by the prevailing habit, of a majority. The favourite figure, in +this, as in some other uses of it, has tended rather to obscure than +explain the subject to which it has been applied. Nor in any case can the +struggle for existence be deemed to be the sole or principal cause of +changes in language, but only one among many, and one of which we cannot +easily measure the importance. There is a further objection which may be +urged equally against all applications of the Darwinian theory. As in +animal life and likewise in vegetable, so in languages, the process of +change is said to be insensible: sounds, like animals, are supposed to +pass into one another by imperceptible gradation. But in both cases the +newly-created forms soon become fixed; there are few if any vestiges of the +intermediate links, and so the better half of the evidence of the change is +wanting. + +(3) Among the incumbrances or illusions of language may be reckoned many +of the rules and traditions of grammar, whether ancient grammar or the +corrections of it which modern philology has introduced. Grammar, like +law, delights in definition: human speech, like human action, though very +far from being a mere chaos, is indefinite, admits of degrees, and is +always in a state of change or transition. Grammar gives an erroneous +conception of language: for it reduces to a system that which is not a +system. Its figures of speech, pleonasms, ellipses, anacolutha, pros to +semainomenon, and the like have no reality; they do not either make +conscious expressions more intelligible or show the way in which they have +arisen; they are chiefly designed to bring an earlier use of language into +conformity with the later. Often they seem intended only to remind us that +great poets like Aeschylus or Sophocles or Pindar or a great prose writer +like Thucydides are guilty of taking unwarrantable liberties with +grammatical rules; it appears never to have occurred to the inventors of +them that these real 'conditores linguae Graecae' lived in an age before +grammar, when 'Greece also was living Greece.' It is the anatomy, not the +physiology of language, which grammar seeks to describe: into the idiom +and higher life of words it does not enter. The ordinary Greek grammar +gives a complete paradigm of the verb, without suggesting that the double +or treble forms of Perfects, Aorists, etc. are hardly ever contemporaneous. +It distinguishes Moods and Tenses, without observing how much of the nature +of one passes into the other. It makes three Voices, Active, Passive, and +Middle, but takes no notice of the precarious existence and uncertain +character of the last of the three. Language is a thing of degrees and +relations and associations and exceptions: grammar ties it up in fixed +rules. Language has many varieties of usage: grammar tries to reduce them +to a single one. Grammar divides verbs into regular and irregular: it +does not recognize that the irregular, equally with the regular, are +subject to law, and that a language which had no exceptions would not be a +natural growth: for it could not have been subjected to the influences by +which language is ordinarily affected. It is always wanting to describe +ancient languages in the terms of a modern one. It has a favourite fiction +that one word is put in the place of another; the truth is that no word is +ever put for another. It has another fiction, that a word has been +omitted: words are omitted because they are no longer needed; and the +omission has ceased to be observed. The common explanation of kata or some +other preposition 'being understood' in a Greek sentence is another fiction +of the same kind, which tends to disguise the fact that under cases were +comprehended originally many more relations, and that prepositions are used +only to define the meaning of them with greater precision. These instances +are sufficient to show the sort of errors which grammar introduces into +language. We are not considering the question of its utility to the +beginner in the study. Even to him the best grammar is the shortest and +that in which he will have least to unlearn. It may be said that the +explanations here referred to are already out of date, and that the study +of Greek grammar has received a new character from comparative philology. +This is true; but it is also true that the traditional grammar has still a +great hold on the mind of the student. + +Metaphysics are even more troublesome than the figments of grammar, because +they wear the appearance of philosophy and there is no test to which they +can be subjected. They are useful in so far as they give us an insight +into the history of the human mind and the modes of thought which have +existed in former ages; or in so far as they furnish wider conceptions of +the different branches of knowledge and of their relation to one another. +But they are worse than useless when they outrun experience and abstract +the mind from the observation of facts, only to envelope it in a mist of +words. Some philologers, like Schleicher, have been greatly influenced by +the philosophy of Hegel; nearly all of them to a certain extent have fallen +under the dominion of physical science. Even Kant himself thought that the +first principles of philosophy could be elicited from the analysis of the +proposition, in this respect falling short of Plato. Westphal holds that +there are three stages of language: (1) in which things were characterized +independently, (2) in which they were regarded in relation to human +thought, and (3) in relation to one another. But are not such distinctions +an anachronism? for they imply a growth of abstract ideas which never +existed in early times. Language cannot be explained by Metaphysics; for +it is prior to them and much more nearly allied to sense. It is not likely +that the meaning of the cases is ultimately resolvable into relations of +space and time. Nor can we suppose the conception of cause and effect or +of the finite and infinite or of the same and other to be latent in +language at a time when in their abstract form they had never entered into +the mind of man...If the science of Comparative Philology had possessed +'enough of Metaphysics to get rid of Metaphysics,' it would have made far +greater progress. + +(4) Our knowledge of language is almost confined to languages which are +fully developed. They are of several patterns; and these become altered by +admixture in various degrees,--they may only borrow a few words from one +another and retain their life comparatively unaltered, or they may meet in +a struggle for existence until one of the two is overpowered and retires +from the field. They attain the full rights and dignity of language when +they acquire the use of writing and have a literature of their own; they +pass into dialects and grow out of them, in proportion as men are isolated +or united by locality or occupation. The common language sometimes reacts +upon the dialects and imparts to them also a literary character. The laws +of language can be best discerned in the great crises of language, +especially in the transitions from ancient to modern forms of them, whether +in Europe or Asia. Such changes are the silent notes of the world's +history; they mark periods of unknown length in which war and conquest were +running riot over whole continents, times of suffering too great to be +endured by the human race, in which the masters became subjects and the +subject races masters, in which driven by necessity or impelled by some +instinct, tribes or nations left their original homes and but slowly found +a resting-place. Language would be the greatest of all historical +monuments, if it could only tell us the history of itself. + +(5) There are many ways in which we may approach this study. The simplest +of all is to observe our own use of language in conversation or in writing, +how we put words together, how we construct and connect sentences, what are +the rules of accent and rhythm in verse or prose, the formation and +composition of words, the laws of euphony and sound, the affinities of +letters, the mistakes to which we are ourselves most liable of spelling or +pronunciation. We may compare with our own language some other, even when +we have only a slight knowledge of it, such as French or German. Even a +little Latin will enable us to appreciate the grand difference between +ancient and modern European languages. In the child learning to speak we +may note the inherent strength of language, which like 'a mountain river' +is always forcing its way out. We may witness the delight in imitation and +repetition, and some of the laws by which sounds pass into one another. We +may learn something also from the falterings of old age, the searching for +words, and the confusion of them with one another, the forgetfulness of +proper names (more commonly than of other words because they are more +isolated), aphasia, and the like. There are philological lessons also to +be gathered from nicknames, from provincialisms, from the slang of great +cities, from the argot of Paris (that language of suffering and crime, so +pathetically described by Victor Hugo), from the imperfect articulation of +the deaf and dumb, from the jabbering of animals, from the analysis of +sounds in relation to the organs of speech. The phonograph affords a +visible evidence of the nature and divisions of sound; we may be truly said +to know what we can manufacture. Artificial languages, such as that of +Bishop Wilkins, are chiefly useful in showing what language is not. The +study of any foreign language may be made also a study of Comparative +Philology. There are several points, such as the nature of irregular +verbs, of indeclinable parts of speech, the influence of euphony, the decay +or loss of inflections, the elements of syntax, which may be examined as +well in the history of our own language as of any other. A few well- +selected questions may lead the student at once into the heart of the +mystery: such as, Why are the pronouns and the verb of existence generally +more irregular than any other parts of speech? Why is the number of words +so small in which the sound is an echo of the sense? Why does the meaning +of words depart so widely from their etymology? Why do substantives often +differ in meaning from the verbs to which they are related, adverbs from +adjectives? Why do words differing in origin coalesce in the same sound +though retaining their differences of meaning? Why are some verbs +impersonal? Why are there only so many parts of speech, and on what +principle are they divided? These are a few crucial questions which give +us an insight from different points of view into the true nature of +language. + +(6) Thus far we have been endeavouring to strip off from language the false +appearances in which grammar and philology, or the love of system +generally, have clothed it. We have also sought to indicate the sources of +our knowledge of it and the spirit in which we should approach it, we may +now proceed to consider some of the principles or natural laws which have +created or modified it. + +i. The first and simplest of all the principles of language, common also +to the animals, is imitation. The lion roars, the wolf howls in the +solitude of the forest: they are answered by similar cries heard from a +distance. The bird, too, mimics the voice of man and makes answer to him. +Man tells to man the secret place in which he is hiding himself; he +remembers and repeats the sound which he has heard. The love of imitation +becomes a passion and an instinct to him. Primitive men learnt to speak +from one another, like a child from its mother or nurse. They learnt of +course a rudimentary, half-articulate language, the cry or song or speech +which was the expression of what we now call human thoughts and feelings. +We may still remark how much greater and more natural the exercise of the +power is in the use of language than in any other process or action of the +human mind. + +ii. Imitation provided the first material of language: but it was +'without form and void.' During how many years or hundreds or thousands of +years the imitative or half-articulate stage continued there is no +possibility of determining. But we may reasonably conjecture that there +was a time when the vocal utterance of man was intermediate between what we +now call language and the cry of a bird or animal. Speech before language +was a rudis indigestaque materies, not yet distributed into words and +sentences, in which the cry of fear or joy mingled with more definite +sounds recognized by custom as the expressions of things or events. It was +the principle of analogy which introduced into this 'indigesta moles' order +and measure. It was Anaxagoras' omou panta chremata, eita nous elthon +diekosmese: the light of reason lighted up all things and at once began to +arrange them. In every sentence, in every word and every termination of a +word, this power of forming relations to one another was contained. There +was a proportion of sound to sound, of meaning to meaning, of meaning to +sound. The cases and numbers of nouns, the persons, tenses, numbers of +verbs, were generally on the same or nearly the same pattern and had the +same meaning. The sounds by which they were expressed were rough-hewn at +first; after a while they grew more refined--the natural laws of euphony +began to affect them. The rules of syntax are likewise based upon analogy. +Time has an analogy with space, arithmetic with geometry. Not only in +musical notes, but in the quantity, quality, accent, rhythm of human +speech, trivial or serious, there is a law of proportion. As in things of +beauty, as in all nature, in the composition as well as in the motion of +all things, there is a similarity of relations by which they are held +together. + +It would be a mistake to suppose that the analogies of language are always +uniform: there may be often a choice between several, and sometimes one +and sometimes another will prevail. In Greek there are three declensions +of nouns; the forms of cases in one of them may intrude upon another. +Similarly verbs in -omega and -mu iota interchange forms of tenses, and the +completed paradigm of the verb is often made up of both. The same nouns +may be partly declinable and partly indeclinable, and in some of their +cases may have fallen out of use. Here are rules with exceptions; they are +not however really exceptions, but contain in themselves indications of +other rules. Many of these interruptions or variations of analogy occur in +pronouns or in the verb of existence of which the forms were too common and +therefore too deeply imbedded in language entirely to drop out. The same +verbs in the same meaning may sometimes take one case, sometimes another. +The participle may also have the character of an adjective, the adverb +either of an adjective or of a preposition. These exceptions are as +regular as the rules, but the causes of them are seldom known to us. + +Language, like the animal and vegetable worlds, is everywhere intersected +by the lines of analogy. Like number from which it seems to be derived, +the principle of analogy opens the eyes of men to discern the similarities +and differences of things, and their relations to one another. At first +these are such as lie on the surface only; after a time they are seen by +men to reach farther down into the nature of things. Gradually in language +they arrange themselves into a sort of imperfect system; groups of personal +and case endings are placed side by side. The fertility of language +produces many more than are wanted; and the superfluous ones are utilized +by the assignment to them of new meanings. The vacuity and the superfluity +are thus partially compensated by each other. It must be remembered that +in all the languages which have a literature, certainly in Sanskrit, Greek, +Latin, we are not at the beginning but almost at the end of the linguistic +process; we have reached a time when the verb and the noun are nearly +perfected, though in no language did they completely perfect themselves, +because for some unknown reason the motive powers of languages seem to have +ceased when they were on the eve of completion: they became fixed or +crystallized in an imperfect form either from the influence of writing and +literature, or because no further differentiation of them was required for +the intelligibility of language. So not without admixture and confusion +and displacement and contamination of sounds and the meanings of words, a +lower stage of language passes into a higher. Thus far we can see and no +further. When we ask the reason why this principle of analogy prevails in +all the vast domain of language, there is no answer to the question; or no +other answer but this, that there are innumerable ways in which, like +number, analogy permeates, not only language, but the whole world, both +visible and intellectual. We know from experience that it does not (a) +arise from any conscious act of reflection that the accusative of a Latin +noun in 'us' should end in 'um;' nor (b) from any necessity of being +understood,--much less articulation would suffice for this; nor (c) from +greater convenience or expressiveness of particular sounds. Such notions +were certainly far enough away from the mind of primitive man. We may +speak of a latent instinct, of a survival of the fittest, easiest, most +euphonic, most economical of breath, in the case of one of two competing +sounds; but these expressions do not add anything to our knowledge. We may +try to grasp the infinity of language either under the figure of a +limitless plain divided into countries and districts by natural boundaries, +or of a vast river eternally flowing whose origin is concealed from us; we +may apprehend partially the laws by which speech is regulated: but we do +not know, and we seem as if we should never know, any more than in the +parallel case of the origin of species, how vocal sounds received life and +grew, and in the form of languages came to be distributed over the earth. + +iii. Next in order to analogy in the formation of language or even prior +to it comes the principle of onomatopea, which is itself a kind of analogy +or similarity of sound and meaning. In by far the greater number of words +it has become disguised and has disappeared; but in no stage of language is +it entirely lost. It belongs chiefly to early language, in which words +were few; and its influence grew less and less as time went on. To the ear +which had a sense of harmony it became a barbarism which disturbed the flow +and equilibrium of discourse; it was an excrescence which had to be cut +out, a survival which needed to be got rid of, because it was out of +keeping with the rest. It remained for the most part only as a formative +principle, which used words and letters not as crude imitations of other +natural sounds, but as symbols of ideas which were naturally associated +with them. It received in another way a new character; it affected not so +much single words, as larger portions of human speech. It regulated the +juxtaposition of sounds and the cadence of sentences. It was the music, +not of song, but of speech, in prose as well as verse. The old onomatopea +of primitive language was refined into an onomatopea of a higher kind, in +which it is no longer true to say that a particular sound corresponds to a +motion or action of man or beast or movement of nature, but that in all the +higher uses of language the sound is the echo of the sense, especially in +poetry, in which beauty and expressiveness are given to human thoughts by +the harmonious composition of the words, syllables, letters, accents, +quantities, rhythms, rhymes, varieties and contrasts of all sorts. The +poet with his 'Break, break, break' or his e pasin nekuessi +kataphthimenoisin anassein or his 'longius ex altoque sinum trahit,' can +produce a far finer music than any crude imitations of things or actions in +sound, although a letter or two having this imitative power may be a lesser +element of beauty in such passages. The same subtle sensibility, which +adapts the word to the thing, adapts the sentence or cadence to the general +meaning or spirit of the passage. This is the higher onomatopea which has +banished the cruder sort as unworthy to have a place in great languages and +literatures. + +We can see clearly enough that letters or collocations of letters do by +various degrees of strength or weakness, length or shortness, emphasis or +pitch, become the natural expressions of the finer parts of human feeling +or thought. And not only so, but letters themselves have a significance; +as Plato observes that the letter rho accent is expressive of motion, the +letters delta and tau of binding and rest, the letter lambda of smoothness, +nu of inwardness, the letter eta of length, the letter omicron of +roundness. These were often combined so as to form composite notions, as +for example in tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged), thrauein (crush), +krouein (strike), thruptein (break), pumbein (whirl),--in all which words +we notice a parallel composition of sounds in their English equivalents. +Plato also remarks, as we remark, that the onomatopoetic principle is far +from prevailing uniformly, and further that no explanation of language +consistently corresponds with any system of philosophy, however great may +be the light which language throws upon the nature of the mind. Both in +Greek and English we find groups of words such as string, swing, sling, +spring, sting, which are parallel to one another and may be said to derive +their vocal effect partly from contrast of letters, but in which it is +impossible to assign a precise amount of meaning to each of the expressive +and onomatopoetic letters. A few of them are directly imitative, as for +example the omega in oon, which represents the round form of the egg by the +figure of the mouth: or bronte (thunder), in which the fulness of the +sound of the word corresponds to the thing signified by it; or bombos +(buzzing), of which the first syllable, as in its English equivalent, has +the meaning of a deep sound. We may observe also (as we see in the case of +the poor stammerer) that speech has the co-operation of the whole body and +may be often assisted or half expressed by gesticulation. A sound or word +is not the work of the vocal organs only; nearly the whole of the upper +part of the human frame, including head, chest, lungs, have a share in +creating it; and it may be accompanied by a movement of the eyes, nose, +fingers, hands, feet which contributes to the effect of it. + +The principle of onomatopea has fallen into discredit, partly because it +has been supposed to imply an actual manufacture of words out of syllables +and letters, like a piece of joiner's work,--a theory of language which is +more and more refuted by facts, and more and more going out of fashion with +philologians; and partly also because the traces of onomatopea in separate +words become almost obliterated in the course of ages. The poet of +language cannot put in and pull out letters, as a painter might insert or +blot out a shade of colour to give effect to his picture. It would be +ridiculous for him to alter any received form of a word in order to render +it more expressive of the sense. He can only select, perhaps out of some +dialect, the form which is already best adapted to his purpose. The true +onomatopea is not a creative, but a formative principle, which in the later +stage of the history of language ceases to act upon individual words; but +still works through the collocation of them in the sentence or paragraph, +and the adaptation of every word, syllable, letter to one another and to +the rhythm of the whole passage. + +iv. Next, under a distinct head, although not separable from the +preceding, may be considered the differentiation of languages, i.e. the +manner in which differences of meaning and form have arisen in them. Into +their first creation we have ceased to enquire: it is their aftergrowth +with which we are now concerned. How did the roots or substantial portions +of words become modified or inflected? and how did they receive separate +meanings? First we remark that words are attracted by the sounds and +senses of other words, so that they form groups of nouns and verbs +analogous in sound and sense to one another, each noun or verb putting +forth inflexions, generally of two or three patterns, and with exceptions. +We do not say that we know how sense became first allied to sound; but we +have no difficulty in ascertaining how the sounds and meanings of words +were in time parted off or differentiated. (1) The chief causes which +regulate the variations of sound are (a) double or differing analogies, +which lead sometimes to one form, sometimes to another (b) euphony, by +which is meant chiefly the greater pleasure to the ear and the greater +facility to the organs of speech which is given by a new formation or +pronunciation of a word (c) the necessity of finding new expressions for +new classes or processes of things. We are told that changes of sound take +place by innumerable gradations until a whole tribe or community or society +find themselves acquiescing in a new pronunciation or use of language. Yet +no one observes the change, or is at all aware that in the course of a +lifetime he and his contemporaries have appreciably varied their intonation +or use of words. On the other hand, the necessities of language seem to +require that the intermediate sounds or meanings of words should quickly +become fixed or set and not continue in a state of transition. The process +of settling down is aided by the organs of speech and by the use of writing +and printing. (2) The meaning of words varies because ideas vary or the +number of things which is included under them or with which they are +associated is increased. A single word is thus made to do duty for many +more things than were formerly expressed by it; and it parts into different +senses when the classes of things or ideas which are represented by it are +themselves different and distinct. A figurative use of a word may easily +pass into a new sense: a new meaning caught up by association may become +more important than all the rest. The good or neutral sense of a word, +such as Jesuit, Puritan, Methodist, Heretic, has been often converted into +a bad one by the malevolence of party spirit. Double forms suggest +different meanings and are often used to express them; and the form or +accent of a word has been not unfrequently altered when there is a +difference of meaning. The difference of gender in nouns is utilized for +the same reason. New meanings of words push themselves into the vacant +spaces of language and retire when they are no longer needed. Language +equally abhors vacancy and superfluity. But the remedial measures by which +both are eliminated are not due to any conscious action of the human mind; +nor is the force exerted by them constraining or necessary. + +(7) We have shown that language, although subject to laws, is far from +being of an exact and uniform nature. We may now speak briefly of the +faults of language. They may be compared to the faults of Geology, in +which different strata cross one another or meet at an angle, or mix with +one another either by slow transitions or by violent convulsions, leaving +many lacunae which can be no longer filled up, and often becoming so +complex that no true explanation of them can be given. So in language +there are the cross influences of meaning and sound, of logic and grammar, +of differing analogies, of words and the inflexions of words, which often +come into conflict with each other. The grammarian, if he were to form new +words, would make them all of the same pattern according to what he +conceives to be the rule, that is, the more common usage of language. The +subtlety of nature goes far beyond art, and it is complicated by +irregularity, so that often we can hardly say that there is a right or +wrong in the formation of words. For almost any formation which is not at +variance with the first principles of language is possible and may be +defended. + +The imperfection of language is really due to the formation and correlation +of words by accident, that is to say, by principles which are unknown to +us. Hence we see why Plato, like ourselves unable to comprehend the whole +of language, was constrained to 'supplement the poor creature imitation by +another poor creature convention.' But the poor creature convention in the +end proves too much for all the rest: for we do not ask what is the origin +of words or whether they are formed according to a correct analogy, but +what is the usage of them; and we are compelled to admit with Hermogenes in +Plato and with Horace that usage is the ruling principle, 'quem penes +arbitrium est, et jus et norma loquendi.' + +(8) There are two ways in which a language may attain permanence or fixity. +First, it may have been embodied in poems or hymns or laws, which may be +repeated for hundreds, perhaps for thousands of years with a religious +accuracy, so that to the priests or rhapsodists of a nation the whole or +the greater part of a language is literally preserved; secondly, it may be +written down and in a written form distributed more or less widely among +the whole nation. In either case the language which is familiarly spoken +may have grown up wholly or in a great measure independently of them. (1) +The first of these processes has been sometimes attended by the result that +the sound of the words has been carefully preserved and that the meaning of +them has either perished wholly, or is only doubtfully recovered by the +efforts of modern philology. The verses have been repeated as a chant or +part of a ritual, but they have had no relation to ordinary life or speech. +(2) The invention of writing again is commonly attributed to a particular +epoch, and we are apt to think that such an inestimable gift would have +immediately been diffused over a whole country. But it may have taken a +long time to perfect the art of writing, and another long period may have +elapsed before it came into common use. Its influence on language has been +increased ten, twenty or one hundred fold by the invention of printing. + +Before the growth of poetry or the invention of writing, languages were +only dialects. So they continued to be in parts of the country in which +writing was not used or in which there was no diffusion of literature. In +most of the counties of England there is still a provincial style, which +has been sometimes made by a great poet the vehicle of his fancies. When a +book sinks into the mind of a nation, such as Luther's Bible or the +Authorized English Translation of the Bible, or again great classical works +like Shakspere or Milton, not only have new powers of expression been +diffused through a whole nation, but a great step towards uniformity has +been made. The instinct of language demands regular grammar and correct +spelling: these are imprinted deeply on the tablets of a nation's memory +by a common use of classical and popular writers. In our own day we have +attained to a point at which nearly every printed book is spelt correctly +and written grammatically. + +(9) Proceeding further to trace the influence of literature on language we +note some other causes which have affected the higher use of it: such as +(1) the necessity of clearness and connexion; (2) the fear of tautology; +(3) the influence of metre, rhythm, rhyme, and of the language of prose and +verse upon one another; (4) the power of idiom and quotation; (5) the +relativeness of words to one another. + +It has been usual to depreciate modern languages when compared with +ancient. The latter are regarded as furnishing a type of excellence to +which the former cannot attain. But the truth seems to be that modern +languages, if through the loss of inflections and genders they lack some +power or beauty or expressiveness or precision which is possessed by the +ancient, are in many other respects superior to them: the thought is +generally clearer, the connexion closer, the sentence and paragraph are +better distributed. The best modern languages, for example English or +French, possess as great a power of self-improvement as the Latin, if not +as the Greek. Nor does there seem to be any reason why they should ever +decline or decay. It is a popular remark that our great writers are +beginning to disappear: it may also be remarked that whenever a great +writer appears in the future he will find the English language as perfect +and as ready for use as in the days of Shakspere or Milton. There is no +reason to suppose that English or French will ever be reduced to the low +level of Modern Greek or of Mediaeval Latin. The wide diffusion of great +authors would make such a decline impossible. Nor will modern languages be +easily broken up by amalgamation with each other. The distance between +them is too wide to be spanned, the differences are too great to be +overcome, and the use of printing makes it impossible that one of them +should ever be lost in another. + +The structure of the English language differs greatly from that of either +Latin or Greek. In the two latter, especially in Greek, sentences are +joined together by connecting particles. They are distributed on the right +hand and on the left by men, de, alla, kaitoi, kai de and the like, or +deduced from one another by ara, de, oun, toinun and the like. In English +the majority of sentences are independent and in apposition to one another; +they are laid side by side or slightly connected by the copula. But within +the sentence the expression of the logical relations of the clauses is +closer and more exact: there is less of apposition and participial +structure. The sentences thus laid side by side are also constructed into +paragraphs; these again are less distinctly marked in Greek and Latin than +in English. Generally French, German, and English have an advantage over +the classical languages in point of accuracy. The three concords are more +accurately observed in English than in either Greek or Latin. On the other +hand, the extension of the familiar use of the masculine and feminine +gender to objects of sense and abstract ideas as well as to men and animals +no doubt lends a nameless grace to style which we have a difficulty in +appreciating, and the possible variety in the order of words gives more +flexibility and also a kind of dignity to the period. Of the comparative +effect of accent and quantity and of the relation between them in ancient +and modern languages we are not able to judge. + +Another quality in which modern are superior to ancient languages is +freedom from tautology. No English style is thought tolerable in which, +except for the sake of emphasis, the same words are repeated at short +intervals. Of course the length of the interval must depend on the +character of the word. Striking words and expressions cannot be allowed to +reappear, if at all, except at the distance of a page or more. Pronouns, +prepositions, conjunctions may or rather must recur in successive lines. +It seems to be a kind of impertinence to the reader and strikes +unpleasantly both on the mind and on the ear that the same sounds should be +used twice over, when another word or turn of expression would have given a +new shade of meaning to the thought and would have added a pleasing variety +to the sound. And the mind equally rejects the repetition of the word and +the use of a mere synonym for it,--e.g. felicity and happiness. The +cultivated mind desires something more, which a skilful writer is easily +able to supply out of his treasure-house. + +The fear of tautology has doubtless led to the multiplications of words and +the meanings of words, and generally to an enlargement of the vocabulary. +It is a very early instinct of language; for ancient poetry is almost as +free from tautology as the best modern writings. The speech of young +children, except in so far as they are compelled to repeat themselves by +the fewness of their words, also escapes from it. When they grow up and +have ideas which are beyond their powers of expression, especially in +writing, tautology begins to appear. In like manner when language is +'contaminated' by philosophy it is apt to become awkward, to stammer and +repeat itself, to lose its flow and freedom. No philosophical writer with +the exception of Plato, who is himself not free from tautology, and perhaps +Bacon, has attained to any high degree of literary excellence. + +To poetry the form and polish of language is chiefly to be attributed; and +the most critical period in the history of language is the transition from +verse to prose. At first mankind were contented to express their thoughts +in a set form of words having a kind of rhythm; to which regularity was +given by accent and quantity. But after a time they demanded a greater +degree of freedom, and to those who had all their life been hearing poetry +the first introduction of prose had the charm of novelty. The prose +romances into which the Homeric Poems were converted, for a while probably +gave more delight to the hearers or readers of them than the Poems +themselves, and in time the relation of the two was reversed: the poems +which had once been a necessity of the human mind became a luxury: they +were now superseded by prose, which in all succeeding ages became the +natural vehicle of expression to all mankind. Henceforward prose and +poetry formed each other. A comparatively slender link between them was +also furnished by proverbs. We may trace in poetry how the simple +succession of lines, not without monotony, has passed into a complicated +period, and how in prose, rhythm and accent and the order of words and the +balance of clauses, sometimes not without a slight admixture of rhyme, make +up a new kind of harmony, swelling into strains not less majestic than +those of Homer, Virgil, or Dante. + +One of the most curious and characteristic features of language, affecting +both syntax and style, is idiom. The meaning of the word 'idiom' is that +which is peculiar, that which is familiar, the word or expression which +strikes us or comes home to us, which is more readily understood or more +easily remembered. It is a quality which really exists in infinite +degrees, which we turn into differences of kind by applying the term only +to conspicuous and striking examples of words or phrases which have this +quality. It often supersedes the laws of language or the rules of grammar, +or rather is to be regarded as another law of language which is natural and +necessary. The word or phrase which has been repeated many times over is +more intelligible and familiar to us than one which is rare, and our +familiarity with it more than compensates for incorrectness or inaccuracy +in the use of it. Striking expressions also which have moved the hearts of +nations or are the precious stones and jewels of great authors partake of +the nature of idioms: they are taken out of the sphere of grammar and are +exempt from the proprieties of language. Every one knows that we often put +words together in a manner which would be intolerable if it were not +idiomatic. We cannot argue either about the meaning of words or the use of +constructions that because they are used in one connexion they will be +legitimate in another, unless we allow for this principle. We can bear to +have words and sentences used in new senses or in a new order or even a +little perverted in meaning when we are quite familiar with them. +Quotations are as often applied in a sense which the author did not intend +as in that which he did. The parody of the words of Shakspere or of the +Bible, which has in it something of the nature of a lie, is far from +unpleasing to us. The better known words, even if their meaning be +perverted, are more agreeable to us and have a greater power over us. Most +of us have experienced a sort of delight and feeling of curiosity when we +first came across or when we first used for ourselves a new word or phrase +or figure of speech. + +There are associations of sound and of sense by which every word is linked +to every other. One letter harmonizes with another; every verb or noun +derives its meaning, not only from itself, but from the words with which it +is associated. Some reflection of them near or distant is embodied in it. +In any new use of a word all the existing uses of it have to be considered. +Upon these depends the question whether it will bear the proposed extension +of meaning or not. According to the famous expression of Luther, 'Words +are living creatures, having hands and feet.' When they cease to retain +this living power of adaptation, when they are only put together like the +parts of a piece of furniture, language becomes unpoetical, in expressive, +dead. + +Grammars would lead us to suppose that words have a fixed form and sound. +Lexicons assign to each word a definite meaning or meanings. They both +tend to obscure the fact that the sentence precedes the word and that all +language is relative. (1) It is relative to its own context. Its meaning +is modified by what has been said before and after in the same or in some +other passage: without comparing the context we are not sure whether it is +used in the same sense even in two successive sentences. (2) It is +relative to facts, to time, place, and occasion: when they are already +known to the hearer or reader, they may be presupposed; there is no need to +allude to them further. (3) It is relative to the knowledge of the writer +and reader or of the speaker and hearer. Except for the sake of order and +consecutiveness nothing ought to be expressed which is already commonly or +universally known. A word or two may be sufficient to give an intimation +to a friend; a long or elaborate speech or composition is required to +explain some new idea to a popular audience or to the ordinary reader or to +a young pupil. Grammars and dictionaries are not to be despised; for in +teaching we need clearness rather than subtlety. But we must not therefore +forget that there is also a higher ideal of language in which all is +relative--sounds to sounds, words to words, the parts to the whole--in +which besides the lesser context of the book or speech, there is also the +larger context of history and circumstances. + +The study of Comparative Philology has introduced into the world a new +science which more than any other binds up man with nature, and distant +ages and countries with one another. It may be said to have thrown a light +upon all other sciences and upon the nature of the human mind itself. The +true conception of it dispels many errors, not only of metaphysics and +theology, but also of natural knowledge. Yet it is far from certain that +this newly-found science will continue to progress in the same surprising +manner as heretofore; or that even if our materials are largely increased, +we shall arrive at much more definite conclusions than at present. Like +some other branches of knowledge, it may be approaching a point at which it +can no longer be profitably studied. But at any rate it has brought back +the philosophy of language from theory to fact; it has passed out of the +region of guesses and hypotheses, and has attained the dignity of an +Inductive Science. And it is not without practical and political +importance. It gives a new interest to distant and subject countries; it +brings back the dawning light from one end of the earth to the other. +Nations, like individuals, are better understood by us when we know +something of their early life; and when they are better understood by us, +we feel more kindly towards them. Lastly, we may remember that all +knowledge is valuable for its own sake; and we may also hope that a deeper +insight into the nature of human speech will give us a greater command of +it and enable us to make a nobler use of it. (Compare again W. Humboldt, +'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues;' M. Muller, +'Lectures on the Science of Language;' Steinthal, 'Einleitung in die +Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft:' and for the latter part of the Essay, +Delbruck, 'Study of Language;' Paul's 'Principles of the History of +Language:' to the latter work the author of this Essay is largely +indebted.) + + +CRATYLUS + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Hermogenes, Cratylus. + + +HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument? + +CRATYLUS: If you please. + +HERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus +has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not +conventional; not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use; but +that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for +Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name of +Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers 'Yes.' And Socrates? +'Yes.' Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which he is called. +To this he replies--'If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that +would not be your name.' And when I am anxious to have a further +explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a +notion of his own about the matter, if he would only tell, and could +entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, +what this oracle means; or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is +your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far +sooner hear. + +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that 'hard is the +knowledge of the good.' And the knowledge of names is a great part of +knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma +course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and +language--these are his own words--and then I should have been at once able +to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I +have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the +truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus +in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not +really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;--he means +to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking +after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good +deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better +leave the question open until we have heard both sides. + +HERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and +others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of +correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name which +you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give +another, the new name is as correct as the old--we frequently change the +names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for +there is no name given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit +of the users;--such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to +hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one else. + +SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us see;--Your +meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees +to call it? + +HERMOGENES: That is my notion. + +SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;--suppose that I call a man a +horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a +horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the +world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by +the world:--that is your meaning? + +HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view. + +SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is +in words a true and a false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false +proposition says that which is not? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible? + +SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts +untrue? + +HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole. + +SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every +part? + +HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true. + +SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name? + +HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest. + +SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true +and false? + +HERMOGENES: So we must infer. + +SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the +name? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says +that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other +than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and +countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ +from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from +one another. + +SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the +names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? +For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to +me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. +Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent +essence of their own? + +HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my +perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at +all. + +SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such +thing as a bad man? + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there +are very bad men, and a good many of them. + +SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones? + +HERMOGENES: Not many. + +SOCRATES: Still you have found them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and +the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view? + +HERMOGENES: It would. + +SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as +they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish? + +HERMOGENES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really +distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras +can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one +man cannot in reality be wiser than another. + +HERMOGENES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things +equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his +view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always +equally to be attributed to all. + +HERMOGENES: There cannot. + +SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to +individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment +and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent +essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating +according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own +essence the relation prescribed by nature. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth. + +SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or +equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a +class of being? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things. + +SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, +and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do +not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the +proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; +and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail +and be of no use at all. + +HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way. + +SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right +way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will +not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of +speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural +instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure. + +HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you. + +SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men +speak. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, +is not naming also a sort of action? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had +a special nature of their own? + +HERMOGENES: Precisely. + +SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be +given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not +at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success. + +HERMOGENES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with +something? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or +pierced with something? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce? + +HERMOGENES: An awl. + +SOCRATES: And with which we weave? + +HERMOGENES: A shuttle. + +SOCRATES: And with which we name? + +HERMOGENES: A name. + +SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, 'What sort of instrument is a shuttle?' And +you answer, 'A weaving instrument.' + +HERMOGENES: Well. + +SOCRATES: And I ask again, 'What do we do when we weave?'--The answer is, +that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of +instruments in general? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will +you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we +name? + +HERMOGENES: I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish +things according to their natures? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly we do. + +SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing +natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver? + +HERMOGENES: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well--and well means like a +weaver? and the teacher will use the name well--and well means like a +teacher? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be +using well? + +HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only? + +HERMOGENES: Only the skilled. + +SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using +well? + +HERMOGENES: That of the smith. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled? + +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. + +SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using? + +HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled. + +SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use? + +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the +legislator? + +HERMOGENES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only? + +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. + +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only +a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans +in the world is the rarest. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he +look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does +the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which +is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make +another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according +to which he made the other? + +HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine. + +SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle? + +HERMOGENES: I think so. + +SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of +garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all +of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle +best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the +maker produces in each case. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has +discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must +express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the +material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought to +know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their +several uses? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to +their uses? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the +several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to +put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to +make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a +namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators +will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he +may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of +the same iron. The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and +still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in +Hellas or in a foreign country;--there is no difference. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not +therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the +true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that +country makes no matter. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to +the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or +the weaver who is to use them? + +HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man +who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether +the work is being well done or not? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And who is he? + +HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre. + +SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright? + +HERMOGENES: The pilot. + +SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, +and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? +Will not the user be the man? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how to answer them? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a +dialectician? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name. + +SOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the +pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the +dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given? + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be +no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons; +and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that +not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name +which each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms of +things in letters and syllables. + +HERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in +changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more +readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the +natural fitness of names. + +SOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you +just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to +share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the +matter, a step has been gained; for we have discovered that names have by +nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name. + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? +That, if you care to know, is the next question. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know. + +SOCRATES: Then reflect. + +HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect? + +SOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and +you must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the Sophists, +of whom your brother, Callias, has--rather dearly--bought the reputation of +wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you +had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has +learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names. + +HERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating +Protagoras and his truth ('Truth' was the title of the book of Protagoras; +compare Theaet.), I were to attach any value to what he and his book +affirm! + +SOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets. + +HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does +he say? + +SOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where +he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same +things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about +the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call +things by their right and natural names; do you not think so? + +HERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at +all. But to what are you referring? + +SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a +single combat with Hephaestus? + +'Whom,' as he says, 'the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.' + +HERMOGENES: I remember. + +SOCRATES: Well, and about this river--to know that he ought to be called +Xanthus and not Scamander--is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird +which, as he says, + +'The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:' + +to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name +Cymindis--do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina? +(Compare Il. 'The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb of +the sportive Myrina.') And there are many other observations of the same +kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the +understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, +which he affirms to have been the names of Hector's son, are more within +the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet +means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: you +will remember I dare say the lines to which I refer? (Il.) + +HERMOGENES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of +the names given to Hector's son--Astyanax or Scamandrius? + +HERMOGENES: I do not know. + +SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the +unwise are more likely to give correct names? + +HERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course. + +SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the +wiser? + +HERMOGENES: I should say, the men. + +SOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him +Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other +name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women. + +HERMOGENES: That may be inferred. + +SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than +their wives? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for +the boy than Scamandrius? + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:--does he not +himself suggest a very good reason, when he says, + +'For he alone defended their city and long walls'? + +This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of +the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes. + +HERMOGENES: I see. + +SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you? + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I. + +SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his +name? + +HERMOGENES: What of that? + +SOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of +Astyanax--both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) have +nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is +clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and +holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense; and +indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined +that I had found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the +correctness of names. + +HERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be +on the right track. + +SOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a lion, +and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary course +of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary +births;--if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call +that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a +natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you +agree with me? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I agree. + +SOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not +play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be +called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not +the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does +the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the +essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names +of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves with +the exception of the four epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega; the names of +the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other letters which +we add to them; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be +no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example, +the letter beta--the addition of eta, tau, alpha, gives no offence, and +does not prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator +intended--so well did he know how to give the letters names. + +HERMOGENES: I believe you are right. + +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the +son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire; and +similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is +like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be +disguised until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may +not recognize them, although they are the same, just as any one of us would +not recognize the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell, +although to the physician, who regards the power of them, they are the +same, and he is not put out by the addition; and in like manner the +etymologist is not put out by the addition or transposition or subtraction +of a letter or two, or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this +need not interfere with the meaning. As was just now said, the names of +Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is tau, and yet they +have the same meaning. And how little in common with the letters of their +names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)--and yet the meaning is the same. +And there are many other names which just mean 'king.' Again, there are +several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus +(chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others which denote a +physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of +mortals); and there are many others which might be cited, differing in +their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. Would you not +say so? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow +in the course of nature? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and +are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an +irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the +class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of +a horse foaling a calf. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called +irreligious? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or +Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are correctly +given, his should have an opposite meaning. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains) +who appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps +some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain +wildness of his hero's nature. + +HERMOGENES: That is very likely, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And his father's name is also according to nature. + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon +(admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the +accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his +continuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that admirable +endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon. I also think +that Atreus is rightly called; for his murder of Chrysippus and his +exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his +reputation--the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be +intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty in +seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ateires the stubborn, +or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the destructive one, the name is +perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is also +named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops +who sees what is near only (o ta pelas oron). + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or +foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon +his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and immediate, +--or in other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by +all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus +is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him +are true. + +HERMOGENES: And what are the traditions? + +SOCRATES: Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in +his life--last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his +death he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in the world +below--all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine +that some person who wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted down +by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; and into +this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmuted. +The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning, +although hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is +divided into two parts, for some call him Zena, and use the one half, and +others who use the other half call him Dia; the two together signify the +nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is to +express the nature. For there is none who is more the author of life to us +and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we are right in +calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the +God through whom all creatures always have life (di on zen aei pasi tois +zosin uparchei). There is an irreverence, at first sight, in calling him +son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity), and we might rather expect +Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact; for this is +the meaning of his father's name: Kronos quasi Koros (Choreo, to sweep), +not in the sense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon chai acheraton tou +nou, the pure and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He, as we are +informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo tou +oran ta ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the +way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I +could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more +conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,--then I +might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an +instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end. + +HERMOGENES: You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly +inspired, and to be uttering oracles. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration +from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long +lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom +and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession +of my soul,and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the +investigation of names--that will be the way; but to-morrow, if you are so +disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can +only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this +sort. + +HERMOGENES: With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of the +enquiry about names. + +SOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that +we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names which +witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a +natural fitness? The names of heroes and of men in general are apt to be +deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with whose names, +as we were saying, they may have no business; or they are the expression of +a wish like Eutychides (the son of good fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour), +or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others. But I think that we had +better leave these, for there will be more chance of finding correctness in +the names of immutable essences;--there ought to have been more care taken +about them when they were named, and perhaps there may have been some more +than human power at work occasionally in giving them names. + +HERMOGENES: I think so, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and +show that they are rightly named Gods? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be well. + +SOCRATES: My notion would be something of this sort:--I suspect that the +sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many +barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing +that they were always moving and running, from their running nature they +were called Gods or runners (Theous, Theontas); and when men became +acquainted with the other Gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to +them all. Do you think that likely? + +HERMOGENES: I think it very likely indeed. + +SOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods? + +HERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next? + +SOCRATES: Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this +word? Tell me if my view is right. + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word? + +HERMOGENES: I do not. + +SOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who +came first? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: He says of them-- + +'But now that fate has closed over this race +They are holy demons upon the earth, +Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.' (Hesiod, Works and +Days.) + +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? + +SOCRATES: What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the +golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I am +convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron race. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him +be said to be of golden race? + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: And are not the good wise? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, they are wise. + +SOCRATES: And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called +them demons, because they were daemones (knowing or wise), and in our older +Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say truly, +that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion among the +dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name given to him signifying wisdom. +And I say too, that every wise man who happens to be a good man is more +than human (daimonion) both in life and death, and is rightly called a +demon. + +HERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what +is the meaning of the word 'hero'? (Eros with an eta, in the old writing +eros with an epsilon.) + +SOCRATES: I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the name +is not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods? + +HERMOGENES: What then? + +SOCRATES: All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal +woman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old +Attic, and you will see better that the name heros is only a slight +alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang: either this is the +meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as rhetoricians +and dialecticians, and able to put the question (erotan), for eirein is +equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was saying, in the Attic dialect +the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All this is easy +enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of sophists and rhetors. But +can you tell me why men are called anthropoi?--that is more difficult. + +HERMOGENES: No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I +think that you are the more likely to succeed. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro. + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and +ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before to-morrow's +dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me; and first, +remember that we often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names +as we please and change the accents. Take, for example, the word Dii +Philos; in order to convert this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one +of the iotas and sound the middle syllable grave instead of acute; as, on +the other hand, letters are sometimes inserted in words instead of being +omitted, and the acute takes the place of the grave. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: The name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a +noun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the +alpha, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been +changed to a grave. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that the word 'man' implies that other animals +never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man not +only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and +hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, meaning anathron a +opopen. + +HERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am +curious? + +SOCRATES: Certainly. + +HERMOGENES: I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order. +You know the distinction of soul and body? + +SOCRATES: Of course. + +HERMOGENES: Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words. + +SOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the +word psuche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine +that those who first used the name psuche meant to express that the soul +when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and +revival (anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails then the body +perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But +please stay a moment; I fancy that I can discover something which will be +more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that they +will scorn this explanation. What do you say to another? + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion +to the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul? + +HERMOGENES: Just that. + +SOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the +ordering and containing principle of all things? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; I do. + +SOCRATES: Then you may well call that power phuseche which carries and +holds nature (e phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away into +psuche. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific +than the other. + +SOCRATES: It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that +this was the true meaning of the name. + +HERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word? + +SOCRATES: You mean soma (the body). + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if a +little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave +(sema) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life; +or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives indications to +(semainei) the body; probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the +name, and they were under the impression that the soul is suffering the +punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the +soul is incarcerated, kept safe (soma, sozetai), as the name soma implies, +until the penalty is paid; according to this view, not even a letter of the +word need be changed. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of +words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like +that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any +similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them. + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle +which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,--that of the Gods we know +nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give +themselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves, +whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all principles; +and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will call them by any +sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like, because we do not +know of any other. That also, I think, is a very good custom, and one +which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if you please, in the +first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about them; we do +not presume that we are able to do so; but we are enquiring about the +meaning of men in giving them these names,--in this there can be small +blame. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like +to do as you say. + +SOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom? + +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be very proper. + +SOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia? + +HERMOGENES: That is another and certainly a most difficult question. + +SOCRATES: My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have +been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to +say. + +HERMOGENES: Well, and what of them? + +SOCRATES: They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of +names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still +discernible. For example, that which we term ousia is by some called esia, +and by others again osia. Now that the essence of things should be called +estia, which is akin to the first of these (esia = estia), is rational +enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that estia which +participates in ousia. For in ancient times we too seem to have said esia +for ousia, and this you may note to have been the idea of those who +appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to estia, which was +natural enough if they meant that estia was the essence of things. Those +again who read osia seem to have inclined to the opinion of Heracleitus, +that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing principle +(othoun) is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is therefore +rightly called osia. Enough of this, which is all that we who know nothing +can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and +Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare +say that I am talking great nonsense. + +HERMOGENES: Why, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom. + +HERMOGENES: Of what nature? + +SOCRATES: Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible. + +HERMOGENES: How plausible? + +SOCRATES: I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of +antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also +spoke. + +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and +nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that +you cannot go into the same water twice. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the +names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty much +in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to +both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I +believe, Hesiod also, tells of + +'Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys (Il.--the line is not found +in the extant works of Hesiod.).' + +And again, Orpheus says, that + +'The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his sister +Tethys, who was his mother's daughter.' + +You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of +Heracleitus. + +HERMOGENES: I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but +I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys. + +SOCRATES: Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a +spring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered +(diattomenon, ethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys +is made up of these two words. + +HERMOGENES: The idea is ingenious, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?--of Zeus we have spoken. + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, +whether the latter is called by that or by his other name. + +HERMOGENES: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original +inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks, +and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element +Poseidon; the epsilon was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, +not so; but the name may have been originally written with a double lamda +and not with a sigma, meaning that the God knew many things (Polla eidos). +And perhaps also he being the shaker of the earth, has been named from +shaking (seiein), and then pi and delta have been added. Pluto gives +wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the giver of wealth, which comes out +of the earth beneath. People in general appear to imagine that the term +Hades is connected with the invisible (aeides) and so they are led by their +fears to call the God Pluto instead. + +HERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation? + +SOCRATES: In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this +deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of +always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body +going to him (compare Rep.), my belief is that all is quite consistent, and +that the office and name of the God really correspond. + +HERMOGENES: Why, how is that? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask +you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which confines +him more to the same spot,--desire or necessity? + +HERMOGENES: Desire, Socrates, is stronger far. + +SOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if +he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains? + +HERMOGENES: Assuredly they would. + +SOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I +should certainly infer, and not by necessity? + +HERMOGENES: That is clear. + +SOCRATES: And there are many desires? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the +greatest? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be +made better by associating with another? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been +to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest +of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, +is the God able to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he +is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the +inhabitants of the other world; and even to us who are upon earth he sends +from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more than he wants down +there; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will +have nothing to do with men while they are in the body, but only when the +soul is liberated from the desires and evils of the body. Now there is a +great deal of philosophy and reflection in that; for in their liberated +state he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are +flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself would +suffice to keep them with him in his own far-famed chains. + +HERMOGENES: There is a deal of truth in what you say. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from +the unseen (aeides)--far otherwise, but from his knowledge (eidenai) of all +noble things. + +HERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and +Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities? + +SOCRATES: Demeter is e didousa meter, who gives food like a mother; Here +is the lovely one (erate)--for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and +married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator +was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (aer), +putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the +truth of this if you repeat the letters of Here several times over. People +dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo,--and with +as little reason; the fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from their +ignorance of the nature of names. But they go changing the name into +Phersephone, and they are terrified at this; whereas the new name means +only that the Goddess is wise (sophe); for seeing that all things in the +world are in motion (pheromenon), that principle which embraces and touches +and is able to follow them, is wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be +truly called Pherepaphe (Pherepapha), or some name like it, because she +touches that which is in motion (tou pheromenon ephaptomene), herein +showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she +is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the +present generation care for euphony more than truth. There is the other +name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some +terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact? + +HERMOGENES: To be sure I have, and what you say is true. + +SOCRATES: But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the +power of the God. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any +single name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of the +God, embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,--music, and +prophecy, and medicine, and archery. + +HERMOGENES: That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the +explanation. + +SOCRATES: Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. +In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and +diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as +well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same +object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver +from all impurities? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the +physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon (purifier); or +in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which +is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called Aplos, from aplous +(sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him +Aplos; also he is aei Ballon (always shooting), because he is a master +archer who never misses; or again, the name may refer to his musical +attributes, and then, as in akolouthos, and akoitis, and in many other +words the alpha is supposed to mean 'together,' so the meaning of the name +Apollo will be 'moving together,' whether in the poles of heaven as they +are called, or in the harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he +moves all together by an harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians +ingeniously declare. And he is the God who presides over harmony, and +makes all things move together, both among Gods and among men. And as in +the words akolouthos and akoitis the alpha is substituted for an omicron, +so the name Apollon is equivalent to omopolon; only the second lambda is +added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (apolon). Now +the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts the minds of some who +do not consider the true value of the name, which, as I was saying just +now, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the single one, the +everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (aplous, aei Ballon, +apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to be +derived from their making philosophical enquiries (mosthai); and Leto is +called by this name, because she is such a gentle Goddess, and so willing +(ethelemon) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, as she is +often called by strangers--they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her +smooth and easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy +(artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity, +perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (arete), and perhaps also as +hating intercourse of the sexes (ton aroton misesasa). He who gave the +Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons. + +HERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite? + +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a serious +and also a facetious explanation of both these names; the serious +explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objection to your +hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a joke. Dionusos is +simply didous oinon (giver of wine), Didoinusos, as he might be called in +fun,--and oinos is properly oionous, because wine makes those who drink, +think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (noun) when they have none. The +derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam (aphros), may be fairly accepted +on the authority of Hesiod. + +HERMOGENES: Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an +Athenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares. + +SOCRATES: I am not likely to forget them. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of +Athene. + +HERMOGENES: What other appellation? + +SOCRATES: We call her Pallas. + +HERMOGENES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from +armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the +earth, or by the use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or dancing. + +HERMOGENES: That is quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas? + +HERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name? + +SOCRATES: Athene? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern +interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the +ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that +he meant by Athene 'mind' (nous) and 'intelligence' (dianoia), and the +maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her; and indeed +calls her by a still higher title, 'divine intelligence' (Thou noesis), as +though he would say: This is she who has the mind of God (Theonoa);--using +alpha as a dialectical variety for eta, and taking away iota and sigma +(There seems to be some error in the MSS. The meaning is that the word +theonoa = theounoa is a curtailed form of theou noesis, but the omitted +letters do not agree.). Perhaps, however, the name Theonoe may mean 'she +who knows divine things' (Theia noousa) better than others. Nor shall we +be far wrong in supposing that the author of it wished to identify this +Goddess with moral intelligence (en ethei noesin), and therefore gave her +the name ethonoe; which, however, either he or his successors have altered +into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene. + +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus? + +SOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light (Phaeos istora)? + +HERMOGENES: Surely. + +SOCRATES: Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the eta by attraction; that +is obvious to anybody. + +HERMOGENES: That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets +into your head. + +SOCRATES: To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of +Ares. + +HERMOGENES: What is Ares? + +SOCRATES: Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and +manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which +is the meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every way +appropriate to the God of war. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am +afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the +steeds of Euthyphro can prance. + +HERMOGENES: Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of +whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall +know whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says. + +SOCRATES: I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and +signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or thief, or +liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with +language; as I was telling you, the word eirein is expressive of the use of +speech, and there is an often-recurring Homeric word emesato, which means +'he contrived'--out of these two words, eirein and mesasthai, the +legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech; and +we may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name: 'O my friends,' +says he to us, 'seeing that he is the contriver of tales or speeches, you +may rightly call him Eirhemes.' And this has been improved by us, as we +think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called from the verb +'to tell' (eirein), because she was a messenger. + +HERMOGENES: Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying +that I was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand at +speeches. + +SOCRATES: There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed +son of Hermes. + +HERMOGENES: How do you make that out? + +SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is +always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which +dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and +is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have generally +to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and the +perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called aipolos (goat- +herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, and +rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is +speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is +no marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from +the Gods. + +HERMOGENES: From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why +should we not discuss another kind of Gods--the sun, moon, stars, earth, +aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year? + +SOCRATES: You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I +will not refuse. + +HERMOGENES: You will oblige me. + +SOCRATES: How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom +you mentioned first--the sun? + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric +form, for the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him because +when he rises he gathers (alizoi) men together or because he is always +rolling in his course (aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from aiolein, of +which the meaning is the same as poikillein (to variegate), because he +variegates the productions of the earth. + +HERMOGENES: But what is selene (the moon)? + +SOCRATES: That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon +receives her light from the sun. + +HERMOGENES: Why do you say so? + +SOCRATES: The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much the +same meaning? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old +(enon), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his +revolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the +previous month. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: And as she has a light which is always old and always new (enon +neon aei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and this when +hammered into shape becomes selanaia. + +HERMOGENES: A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do +you say of the month and the stars? + +SOCRATES: Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because +suffering diminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived from +astrape, which is an improvement on anastrope, signifying the upsetting of +the eyes (anastrephein opa). + +HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)? + +SOCRATES: I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of Euthyphro +has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word. +Please, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a +difficulty of this sort. + +HERMOGENES: What is it? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can +tell me what is the meaning of the pur? + +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of +this and several other words?--My belief is that they are of foreign +origin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion of +the barbarians, often borrowed from them. + +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? + +SOCRATES: Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness +of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not according to the +language from which the words are derived, is rather likely to be at fault. + +HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the +word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the +Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly changed, just as +they have udor (water) and kunes (dogs), and many other words. + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; for +something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of pur +and udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which +raises (airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei rei), or +because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the winds 'air- +blasts,' (aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to speak, air-flux +(aetorroun), in the sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun); and because this +moving wind may be expressed by either term he employs the word air (aer = +aetes rheo). Aither (aether) I should interpret as aeitheer; this may be +correctly said, because this element is always running in a flux about the +air (aei thei peri tou aera reon). The meaning of the word ge (earth) +comes out better when in the form of gaia, for the earth may be truly +called 'mother' (gaia, genneteira), as in the language of Homer (Od.) +gegaasi means gegennesthai. + +HERMOGENES: Good. + +SOCRATES: What shall we take next? + +HERMOGENES: There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the year, +eniautos and etos. + +SOCRATES: The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to +know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai +because they divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and the +fruits of the earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the same,-- +'that which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth in their +turn, and passes them in review within itself (en eauto exetazei)': this +is broken up into two words, eniautos from en eauto, and etos from etazei, +just as the original name of Zeus was divided into Zena and Dia; and the +whole proposition means that his power of reviewing from within is one, but +has two names, two words etos and eniautos being thus formed out of a +single proposition. + +HERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress. + +SOCRATES: I am run away with. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But am not yet at my utmost speed. + +HERMOGENES: I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you +would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those +charming words--wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them? + +SOCRATES: That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring; +still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint of heart; and +I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (phronesis) and +understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), and knowledge (episteme), +and all those other charming words, as you call them? + +HERMOGENES: Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning. + +SOCRATES: By the dog of Egypt I have a not bad notion which came into my +head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names were +undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their search +after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly going +round and round, and then they imagine that the world is going round and +round and moving in all directions; and this appearance, which arises out +of their own internal condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; +they think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and +motion, and that the world is always full of every sort of motion and +change. The consideration of the names which I mentioned has led me into +making this reflection. + +HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been +just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely +indicated. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed, I never thought of it. + +SOCRATES: Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a +name indicative of motion. + +HERMOGENES: What was the name? + +SOCRATES: Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify phoras kai rhou noesis +(perception of motion and flux), or perhaps phoras onesis (the blessing of +motion), but is at any rate connected with pheresthai (motion); gnome +(judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration +(nomesis) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider; or, if +you would rather, here is noesis, the very word just now mentioned, which +is neou esis (the desire of the new); the word neos implies that the world +is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express +this longing of the soul, for the original name was neoesis, and not +noesis; but eta took the place of a double epsilon. The word sophrosune is +the salvation (soteria) of that wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now +considering. Epioteme (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the +soul which is good for anything follows (epetai) the motion of things, +neither anticipating them nor falling behind them; wherefore the word +should rather be read as epistemene, inserting epsilon nu. Sunesis +(understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion; the +word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), and, like epistasthai (to +know), implies the progression of the soul in company with the nature of +things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native +growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You must +remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid +motion, often use the word esuthe (he rushed); and there was a famous +Lacedaemonian who was named Sous (Rush), for by this word the +Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (epaphe) of motion is +expressed by sophia, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good +(agathon) is the name which is given to the admirable (agasto) in nature; +for, although all things move, still there are degrees of motion; some are +swifter, some slower; but there are some things which are admirable for +their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called agathon. +Dikaiosune (justice) is clearly dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the +just); but the actual word dikaion is more difficult: men are only agreed +to a certain extent about justice, and then they begin to disagree. For +those who suppose all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of +nature to be a mere receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating +power which passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in +all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element; for if it were not the +subtlest, and a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, +passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not +penetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which +superintends all things and pierces (diaion) all, is rightly called +dikaion; the letter k is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as +I was saying, there is a general agreement about the nature of justice; but +I, Hermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery +that the justice of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world: +now a cause is that because of which anything is created; and some one +comes and whispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because +partaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what he +has said, to interrogate him gently: 'Well, my excellent friend,' say I, +'but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.' Thereupon +they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers, +and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me +with one derivation after another, and at length they quarrel. For one of +them says that justice is the sun, and that he only is the piercing +(diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element which is the guardian of nature. +And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered by the +satirical remark, 'What, is there no justice in the world when the sun is +down?' And when I earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest +opinion, he says, 'Fire in the abstract'; but this is not very +intelligible. Another says, 'No, not fire in the abstract, but the +abstraction of heat in the fire.' Another man professes to laugh at all +this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that justice is mind, for mind, as they +say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and orders all things, and +passes through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself in far +greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was before I began to +learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, which has led me into this +digression, was given to justice for the reasons which I have mentioned. + +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you must +have heard this from some one else. + +SOCRATES: And not the rest? + +HERMOGENES: Hardly. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in +the originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think +that we have as yet discussed courage (andreia),--injustice (adikia), which +is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle +(diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of andreia seems +to imply a battle;--this battle is in the world of existence, and according +to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (enantia rhon): if you +extract the delta from andreia, the name at once signifies the thing, and +you may clearly understand that andreia is not the stream opposed to every +stream, but only to that which is contrary to justice, for otherwise +courage would not have been praised. The words arren (male) and aner (man) +also contain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward flux +(te ano rhon). Gune (woman) I suspect to be the same word as goun (birth): +thelu (female) appears to be partly derived from thele (the teat), because +the teat is like rain, and makes things flourish (tethelenai). + +HERMOGENES: That is surely probable. + +SOCRATES: Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure +the growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed +by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of thein (running), and +allesthai (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth +ground. There are a good many names generally thought to be of importance, +which have still to be explained. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the +possession of mind: you have only to take away the tau and insert two +omichrons, one between the chi and nu, and another between the nu and eta. + +HERMOGENES: That is a very shabby etymology. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original names +have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping +off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in +all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share in the change. Take, +for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter rho inserted? This must +surely be the addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth, but +thinks only of putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often +such that at last no human being can possibly make out the original meaning +of the word. Another example is the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought +properly to be phigx, phiggos, and there are other examples. + +HERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters +which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be +adapted to any object. + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like +yourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability. + +HERMOGENES: Such is my desire. + +SOCRATES: And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a +precisian, or 'you will unnerve me of my strength (Iliad.).' When you have +allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be at the +top of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great accomplishment +--anein; for mekos has the meaning of greatness, and these two, mekos and +anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying, being now at the +top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words +arete (virtue) and kakia (vice); arete I do not as yet understand, but +kakia is transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for +all things being in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos ion (going badly); and +this evil motion when existing in the soul has the general name of kakia, +or vice, specially appropriated to it. The meaning of kakos ienai may be +further illustrated by the use of deilia (cowardice), which ought to have +come after andreia, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word +which has been passed over. Deilia signifies that the soul is bound with a +strong chain (desmos), for lian means strength, and therefore deilia +expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the soul; and aporia +(difficulty) is an evil of the same nature (from a (alpha) not, and +poreuesthai to go), like anything else which is an impediment to motion and +movement. Then the word kakia appears to mean kakos ienai, or going badly, +or limping and halting; of which the consequence is, that the soul becomes +filled with vice. And if kakia is the name of this sort of thing, arete +will be the opposite of it, signifying in the first place ease of motion, +then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the +attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called +arete, or, more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have +had another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is more +eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I daresay +that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that +if the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also right. + +HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a +part in your previous discourse? + +SOCRATES: That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an +opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device. + +HERMOGENES: What device? + +SOCRATES: The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word +also. + +HERMOGENES: Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these +words and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron. + +SOCRATES: The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon roes +(always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our former +derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all +sorts, and hence he gave the name aeischoroun to that which hindered the +flux (aei ischon roun), and that is now beaten together into aischron. + +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon? + +SOCRATES: That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity, +and has been changed by altering omicron upsilon into omicron. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: This name appears to denote mind. + +HERMOGENES: How so? + +SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not +the principle which imposes the name the cause? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their names, +and is not mind the beautiful (kalon)? + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, +and are not other works worthy of blame? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the +works of a carpenter? + +HERMOGENES: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty? + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind? + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works +which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful? + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: What more names remain to us? + +HERMOGENES: There are the words which are connected with agathon and +kalon, such as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and their +opposites. + +SOCRATES: The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may +discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,--for it is a +sister word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the soul +accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle are +called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried round with the +world. + +HERMOGENES: That is probable. + +SOCRATES: Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain), but +you must alter the delta into nu if you want to get at the meaning; for +this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name +intended to express the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and universal +penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a delta +instead of a nu, and so made kerdos. + +HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)? + +SOCRATES: I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable +the gainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but they use the word +in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable (lusiteloun), as that +which being the swiftest thing in existence, allows of no stay in things +and no pause or end of motion, but always, if there begins to be any end, +lets things go again (luei), and makes motion immortal and unceasing: and +in this point of view, as appears to me, the good is happily denominated +lusiteloun--being that which looses (luon) the end (telos) of motion. +Ophelimon (the advantageous) is derived from ophellein, meaning that which +creates and increases; this latter is a common Homeric word, and has a +foreign character. + +HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites? + +SOCRATES: Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak. + +HERMOGENES: Which are they? + +SOCRATES: The words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable), +alusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful). + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes +(hurtful). + +HERMOGENES: Good. + +SOCRATES: The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm +(blaptein) the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to hold +or bind); for aptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a term of +censure; boulomenon aptein roun (wanting to bind the stream) would properly +be boulapteroun, and this, as I imagine, is improved into blaberon. + +HERMOGENES: You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names; +and when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining that you are +making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some prelude to Athene. + +SOCRATES: That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not +mine. + +HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes? + +SOCRATES: What is the meaning of zemiodes?--let me remark, Hermogenes, how +right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words +by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight permutation will +sometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may instance the word deon, +which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say +to you, that the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and +disguised and entirely altered the original meaning both of deon, and also +of zemiodes, which in the old language is clearly indicated. + +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved +the sounds iota and delta, especially the women, who are most conservative +of the ancient language, but now they change iota into eta or epsilon, and +delta into zeta; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound. + +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: For example, in very ancient times they called the day either +imera or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e). + +HERMOGENES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of +the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for +(imeirousi) and love the light which comes after the darkness, and is +therefore called imera, from imeros, desire. + +HERMOGENES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the +meaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be called emera +because it makes things gentle (emera different accents). + +HERMOGENES: Such is my view. + +SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon? + +HERMOGENES: They did so. + +SOCRATES: And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,--it ought to be duogon, which +word expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the purpose of +drawing;--this has been changed into zugon, and there are many other +examples of similar changes. + +HERMOGENES: There are. + +SOCRATES: Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the +word deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other +appellations of good; for deon is here a species of good, and is, +nevertheless, the chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and therefore own +brother of blaberon. + +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain. + +SOCRATES: Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be +the correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the epsilon +into an iota after the old fashion, this word will then agree with other +words meaning good; for dion, not deon, signifies the good, and is a term +of praise; and the author of names has not contradicted himself, but in all +these various appellations, deon (obligatory), ophelimon (advantageous), +lusiteloun (profitable), kerdaleon (gainful), agathon (good), sumpheron +(expedient), euporon (plenteous), the same conception is implied of the +ordering or all-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining +and binding principle which is censured. And this is further illustrated +by the word zemiodes (hurtful), which if the zeta is only changed into +delta as in the ancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as you +will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (dounti ion). + +HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia +(desire), and the like, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty +about them--edone is e (eta) onesis, the action which tends to advantage; +and the original form may be supposed to have been eone, but this has been +altered by the insertion of the delta. Lupe appears to be derived from the +relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in sorrow; ania (trouble) is +the hindrance of motion (alpha and ienai); algedon (distress), if I am not +mistaken, is a foreign word, which is derived from aleinos (grievous); +odune (grief) is called from the putting on (endusis) sorrow; in achthedon +(vexation) 'the word too labours,' as any one may see; chara (joy) is the +very expression of the fluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis +(delight) is so called from the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul, +which may be likened to a breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has +been altered by time into terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia +explain themselves; the former, which ought to be eupherosune and has been +changed euphrosune, is named, as every one may see, from the soul moving +(pheresthai) in harmony with nature; epithumia is really e epi ton thumon +iousa dunamis, the power which enters into the soul; thumos (passion) is +called from the rushing (thuseos) and boiling of the soul; imeros (desire) +denotes the stream (rous) which most draws the soul dia ten esin tes roes-- +because flowing with desire (iemenos), and expresses a longing after things +and violent attraction of the soul to them, and is termed imeros from +possessing this power; pothos (longing) is expressive of the desire of that +which is not present but absent, and in another place (pou); this is the +reason why the name pothos is applied to things absent, as imeros is to +things present; eros (love) is so called because flowing in (esron) from +without; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence introduced through +the eyes, and from flowing in was called esros (influx) in the old time +when they used omicron for omega, and is called eros, now that omega is +substituted for omicron. But why do you not give me another word? + +HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of words? + +SOCRATES: Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses the +march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a +bow (toxon); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis +(thinking), which is only oisis (moving), and implies the movement of the +soul to the essential nature of each thing--just as boule (counsel) has to +do with shooting (bole); and boulesthai (to wish) combines the notion of +aiming and deliberating--all these words seem to follow doxa, and all +involve the idea of shooting, just as aboulia, absence of counsel, on the +other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the mark, or aim, or +proposal, or object. + +HERMOGENES: You are quickening your pace now, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I +have explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and ekousion +(the voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon) and +unresisting--the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as +I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will; +but the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, implies error +and ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is +impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion--and this is the +derivation of the word anagkaion (necessary) an agke ion, going through a +ravine. But while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you +will persevere with your questions. + +HERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such as +aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not forgetting to +enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of our discussion, +has this name of onoma. + +SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai (to seek)? + +HERMOGENES: Yes;--meaning the same as zetein (to enquire). + +SOCRATES: The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying on +ou zetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more obvious in +onomaston (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is +that for which there is a seeking (on ou masma); aletheia is also an +agglomeration of theia ale (divine wandering), implying the divine motion +of existence; pseudos (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is +another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction, +which he compares to sleep (eudein); but the original meaning of the word +is disguised by the addition of psi; on and ousia are ion with an iota +broken off; this agrees with the true principle, for being (on) is also +moving (ion), and the same may be said of not being, which is likewise +called not going (oukion or ouki on = ouk ion). + +HERMOGENES: You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that some +one were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon and doun?-- +show me their fitness. + +SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already +suggested. + +HERMOGENES: What way? + +SOCRATES: To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign +origin; and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this +kind may be true of them; but also the original forms of words may have +been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of +ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language when compared with +that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous tongue. + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest +attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person +go on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the elements out +of which the words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this process, +he who has to answer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the +enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the +elements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed to +be made up of other names? The word agathon (good), for example, is, as we +were saying, a compound of agastos (admirable) and thoos (swift). And +probably thoos is made up of other elements, and these again of others. +But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, then we +shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary element, +which need not be resolved any further. + +HERMOGENES: I believe you to be in the right. + +SOCRATES: And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn +out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be examined +according to some new method? + +HERMOGENES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to this +conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again +say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in +stating the principle of primary names. + +HERMOGENES: Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you. + +SOCRATES: I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle is +applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary--when they are +regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them. + +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: All the names that we have been explaining were intended to +indicate the nature of things. + +HERMOGENES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the +secondary names, is implied in their being names. + +HERMOGENES: Surely. + +SOCRATES: But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from +the primary. + +HERMOGENES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede +analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which +they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a +question: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to +communicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and dumb, make +signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body? + +HERMOGENES: There would be no choice, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of our +hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and +downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if we +were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we should make +our bodies and their gestures as like as we could to them. + +HERMOGENES: I do not see that we could do anything else. + +SOCRATES: We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever +express anything. + +HERMOGENES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or +tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we +want to express. + +HERMOGENES: It must be so, I think. + +SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal +imitator names or imitates? + +HERMOGENES: I think so. + +SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached +the truth as yet. + +HERMOGENES: Why not? + +SOCRATES: Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people +who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they +imitate. + +HERMOGENES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying? + +HERMOGENES: In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, +Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, +although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music +imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the +matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have +colour? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with +imitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music and +drawing? + +HERMOGENES: True. + +SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a +colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well +as of anything else which may be said to have an essence? + +HERMOGENES: I should think so. + +SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in +letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing? + +HERMOGENES: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave +to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called? + +HERMOGENES: I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver, +of whom we are in search. + +SOCRATES: If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to +consider the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention), about +which you were asking; and we may see whether the namer has grasped the +nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the +essence or not. + +HERMOGENES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others? + +HERMOGENES: There must be others. + +SOCRATES: So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them, and +where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by +syllables and letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the +letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the +powers of elementary, and then of compound sounds, and when they have done +so, but not before, they proceed to the consideration of rhythms? + +HERMOGENES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first separating +the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes (letters which are neither +vowels nor semivowels), into classes, according to the received +distinctions of the learned; also the semivowels, which are neither vowels, +nor yet mutes; and distinguishing into classes the vowels themselves? And +when we have perfected the classification of things, we shall give them +names, and see whether, as in the case of letters, there are any classes to +which they may be all referred (cf. Phaedrus); and hence we shall see their +natures, and see, too, whether they have in them classes as there are in +the letters; and when we have well considered all this, we shall know how +to apply them to what they resemble--whether one letter is used to denote +one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them; just, +as in painting, the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses +purple only, or any other colour, and sometimes mixes up several colours, +as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that +kind--he uses his colours as his figures appear to require them; and so, +too, we shall apply letters to the expression of objects, either single +letters when required, or several letters; and so we shall form syllables, +as they are called, and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at +last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large +and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so shall we make +speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some other art. +Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried away-- +meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we but) the ancients +formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like +manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject, and we +must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are +rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear +Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction. + +HERMOGENES: That, Socrates, I can quite believe. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them +in this way? for I am certain that I should not. + +HERMOGENES: Much less am I likely to be able. + +SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if we +can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying +by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the truth about +them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in +this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the +higher method is the one which we or others who would analyse language to +any good purpose must follow; but under the circumstances, as men say, we +must do as well as we can. What do you think? + +HERMOGENES: I very much approve. + +SOCRATES: That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so +find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be +avoided--there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of +first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like +the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in the air; +and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that 'the +Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.' This will be the +best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be even better still, of +deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than +we are; or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is +the same sort of excuse as the last; for all these are not reasons but only +ingenious excuses for having no reasons concerning the truth of words. And +yet any sort of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance +of secondary words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly +then the professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid +explanation of first names, or let him be assured he will only talk +nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true? + +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: My first notions of original names are truly wild and +ridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire, +and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which +you may have. + +HERMOGENES: Fear not; I will do my best. + +SOCRATES: In the first place, the letter rho appears to me to be the +general instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet +explained the meaning of this latter word, which is just iesis (going); for +the letter eta was not in use among the ancients, who only employed +epsilon; and the root is kiein, which is a foreign form, the same as ienai. +And the old word kinesis will be correctly given as iesis in corresponding +modern letters. Assuming this foreign root kiein, and allowing for the +change of the eta and the insertion of the nu, we have kinesis, which +should have been kieinsis or eisis; and stasis is the negative of ienai (or +eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now the letter rho, as I was +saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent instrument for the +expression of motion; and he frequently uses the letter for this purpose: +for example, in the actual words rein and roe he represents motion by rho; +also in the words tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged); and again, in words +such as krouein (strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), thruptein +(break), kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts of +movements he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I +imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at +rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order +to express motion, just as by the letter iota he expresses the subtle +elements which pass through all things. This is why he uses the letter +iota as imitative of motion, ienai, iesthai. And there is another class of +letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi, of which the pronunciation is accompanied +by great expenditure of breath; these are used in the imitation of such +notions as psuchron (shivering), xeon (seething), seiesthai, (to be +shaken), seismos (shock), and are always introduced by the giver of names +when he wants to imitate what is phusodes (windy). He seems to have +thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue in the utterance of +delta and tau was expressive of binding and rest in a place: he further +observed the liquid movement of lambda, in the pronunciation of which the +tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as in +leios (level), and in the word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon +(sleek), in the word kollodes (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of +gamma detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the +notion of a glutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes. +The nu he observed to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a +notion of inwardness; hence he introduced the sound in endos and entos: +alpha he assigned to the expression of size, and nu of length, because they +are great letters: omicron was the sign of roundness, and therefore there +is plenty of omicron mixed up in the word goggulon (round). Thus did the +legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing +on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation compounding other +signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names; but I should +like to hear what Cratylus has more to say. + +HERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies +me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what is +this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or +not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree +in what Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better +of your own? and if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will +either learn of Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you. + +CRATYLUS: Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can +learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any +rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest +of all. + +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, 'to add +little to little' is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that you +can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little +trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon +you. + +SOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which +Hermogenes and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to say +what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall gladly +accept. And I should not be at all surprized to find that you have found +some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on these matters and +have had teachers, and if you have really a better theory of the truth of +names, you may count me in the number of your disciples. + +CRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of +these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I +fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved to +say to you what Achilles in the 'Prayers' says to Ajax,-- + +'Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people, +You appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind.' + +And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers much +to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may +have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself. + +SOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom; +I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself +What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception--when the +deceiver is always at home and always with you--it is quite terrible, and +therefore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to 'look fore and +aft,' in the words of the aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are +we? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of +the thing:--has this proposition been sufficiently proven? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite +true. + +SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And who are they? + +CRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first. + +SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me +explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, +better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders also, the better +sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse. + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work better +and some worse? + +CRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you. + +SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others +worse? + +CRATYLUS: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all. + +SOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, +which was mentioned before:--assuming that he has nothing of the nature of +Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at +all? + +CRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only +appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the +nature which corresponds to it. + +SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even +speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him +Hermogenes, if he is not. + +CRATYLUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this +is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in +all ages. + +CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?--say +something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which +is not? + +SOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I +should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think +that falsehood may be spoken but not said? + +CRATYLUS: Neither spoken nor said. + +SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting +you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: 'Hail, Athenian +stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion'--these words, whether spoken, said, +uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our +friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all? + +CRATYLUS: In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking +nonsense. + +SOCRATES: Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me +whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly +false:--which is all that I want to know. + +CRATYLUS: I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no +purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of +hammering at a brazen pot. + +SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting- +point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing +named? + +CRATYLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation +of the thing? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, +but in another way? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand you. +Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures +or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the things of +which they are the imitation. + +CRATYLUS: They are. + +SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness +of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the +woman, and of the woman to the man? + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first? + +CRATYLUS: Only the first. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each +that which belongs to them and is like them? + +CRATYLUS: That is my view. + +SOCRATES: Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a +good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you: the +first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call +right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and the other +mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in +the case of names, false as well as wrong. + +CRATYLUS: That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may be +wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names--they must be always right. + +SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to +him, 'This is your picture,' showing him his own likeness, or perhaps the +likeness of a woman; and when I say 'show,' I mean bring before the sense +of sight. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And may I not go to him again, and say, 'This is your name'?-- +for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say to him-- +'This is your name'? and may I not then bring to his sense of hearing the +imitation of himself, when I say, 'This is a man'; or of a female of the +human species, when I say, 'This is a woman,' as the case may be? Is not +all that quite possible? + +CRATYLUS: I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say, +Granted. + +SOCRATES: That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be +disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to +objects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong +assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of +names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and +if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of them. +What do you say, Cratylus? + +CRATYLUS: I agree; and think that what you say is very true. + +SOCRATES: And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in +pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or +you may not give them all--some may be wanting; or there may be too many or +too much of them--may there not? + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he +who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one. + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the +nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good +image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a +little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer that some +names are well and others ill made. + +CRATYLUS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be +bad? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be +bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good? + +CRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is +different; for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters alpha or +beta, or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, +or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only written +wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases becomes other +than a name. + +SOCRATES: But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus. + +CRATYLUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which +must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten +at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of +any other number: but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or +to anything which is represented under an image. I should say rather that +the image, if expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer +be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two objects: one of them +shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus; and we will +suppose, further, that some God makes not only a representation such as a +painter would make of your outward form and colour, but also creates an +inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness; and +into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a +word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form; +would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that +there were two Cratyluses? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that there were two Cratyluses. + +SOCRATES: Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle +of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is no +longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive +that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact +counterpart of the realities which they represent? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I see. + +SOCRATES: But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, +if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of +them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which +were the realities. + +CRATYLUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may +be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the name +shall be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the occasional +substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a +sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not +appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, and +described, so long as the general character of the thing which you are +describing is retained; and this, as you will remember, was remarked by +Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of the +letters. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I remember. + +SOCRATES: Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some +of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified;--well, if +all the letters are given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I +think that we had better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in +Aegina who wander about the street late at night: and be likewise told by +truth herself that we have arrived too late; or if not, you must find out +some new notion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name +is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, +you will be inconsistent with yourself. + +CRATYLUS: I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very +reasonable. + +SOCRATES: Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a +name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters. + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names +which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up +of proper and similar letters, or there would be no likeness; but there +will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the beauty and +formation of the word: you would admit that? + +CRATYLUS: There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, +since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a +name at all. + +SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some +derived? + +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are +representations of things, is there any better way of framing +representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you +can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say +that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed +about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them, +and that convention is the only principle; and whether you abide by our +present convention, or make a new and opposite one, according to which you +call small great and great small--that, they would say, makes no +difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you +prefer? + +CRATYLUS: Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than +representation by any chance sign. + +SOCRATES: Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters +out of which the first names are composed must also be like things. +Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could any one ever +compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if there were not +pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, and out of which +the picture is composed? + +CRATYLUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, +unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree +of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And +the original elements are letters? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were +saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter rho is +expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in +saying so? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that you were right. + +SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and +the like? + +CRATYLUS: There again you were right. + +SOCRATES: And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us sklerotes, +is by the Eretrians called skleroter. + +CRATYLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there the +same significance to them in the termination rho, which there is to us in +sigma, or is there no significance to one of us? + +CRATYLUS: Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us. + +SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike? + +CRATYLUS: In as far as they are like. + +SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike? + +CRATYLUS: Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that is +expressive not of hardness but of softness. + +CRATYLUS: Why, perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and +should be altered into rho, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in my +opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon +occasion. + +SOCRATES: Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when I +say skleros (hard), you know what I mean. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom. + +SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I +understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this +is what you are saying? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication +given by me to you? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as +from like, for example in the lamda of sklerotes. But if this is true, +then you have made a convention with yourself, and the correctness of a +name turns out to be convention, since letters which are unlike are +indicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanctioned by +custom and convention. And even supposing that you distinguish custom from +convention ever so much, still you must say that the signification of words +is given by custom and not by likeness, for custom may indicate by the +unlike as well as by the like. But as we are agreed thus far, Cratylus +(for I shall assume that your silence gives consent), then custom and +convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication of our +thoughts; for suppose we take the instance of number, how can you ever +imagine, my good friend, that you will find names resembling every +individual number, unless you allow that which you term convention and +agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names? I +quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things; +but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a +shabby thing, which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of +convention with a view to correctness; for I believe that if we could +always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate, +this would be the most perfect state of language; as the opposite is the +most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what +is the use of them? + +CRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform: +the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which +are expressed by them. + +SOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so +also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other, +because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same art or +science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know +things. + +CRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean. + +SOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of this information about +things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort +of information? or is there any other? What do you say? + +CRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of +information about them; there can be no other. + +SOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who +discovers the names discovers also the things; or is this only the method +of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and discovery. + +CRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery +are of the same nature as instruction. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in +the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of +being deceived? + +CRATYLUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his +conception of the things which they signified--did he not? + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according +to his conception, in what position shall we who are his followers find +ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him? + +CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely +have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all? +And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof +is--that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that +all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose? + +SOCRATES: But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in +error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original +error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, any more +than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw +in the first part of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the long +deductions which follow. And this is the reason why every man should +expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of his first +principles:--are they or are they not rightly laid down? and when he has +duly sifted them, all the rest will follow. Now I should be astonished to +find that names are really consistent. And here let us revert to our +former discussion: Were we not saying that all things are in motion and +progress and flux, and that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do +you not conceive that to be the meaning of them? + +CRATYLUS: Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning. + +SOCRATES: Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous +this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than +going round with them; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at +present, and not reject the epsilon, but make an insertion of an iota +instead of an epsilon (not pioteme, but epiisteme). Take another example: +bebaion (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position, and not +of motion. Again, the word istoria (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the +stopping (istanai) of the stream; and the word piston (faithful) certainly +indicates cessation of motion; then, again, mneme (memory), as any one may +see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as +amartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their +etymologies will be the same as sunesis and episteme and other words which +have a good sense (compare omartein, sunienai, epesthai, sumpheresthai); +and much the same may be said of amathia and akolasia, for amathia may be +explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois +pragmasin. Thus the names which in these instances we find to have the +worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those +which have the best. And any one I believe who would take the trouble +might find many other examples in which the giver of names indicates, not +that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at rest; which is +the opposite of motion. + +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express motion. + +SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is +correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever +sort there are most, those are the true ones? + +CRATYLUS: No; that is not reasonable. + +SOCRATES: Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and +proceed to another, about which I should like to know whether you think +with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names +in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the +art which gave names was the art of the legislator? + +CRATYLUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of +the first names, know or not know the things which they named? + +CRATYLUS: They must have known, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant. + +CRATYLUS: I should say not. + +SOCRATES: Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were +saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things +which he named; are you still of that opinion? + +CRATYLUS: I am. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a +knowledge of the things which he named? + +CRATYLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if +the primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in our +view, the only way of learning and discovering things, is either to +discover names for ourselves or to learn them from others. + +CRATYLUS: I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if things are only to be known through names, how can we +suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before +there were names at all, and therefore before they could have known them? + +CRATYLUS: I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that +a power more than human gave things their first names, and that the names +which are thus given are necessarily their true names. + +SOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired +being or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now that +he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we +mistaken? + +CRATYLUS: But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all. + +SOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are +expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a +point which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them. + +CRATYLUS: No; not in that way, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that +they are like the truth, others contending that THEY are, how or by what +criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to +which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another +standard which, without employing names, will make clear which of the two +are right; and this must be a standard which shows the truth of things. + +CRATYLUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be +known without names? + +CRATYLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there +be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their +affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through themselves? For +that which is other and different from them must signify something other +and different from them. + +CRATYLUS: What you are saying is, I think, true. + +SOCRATES: Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that +names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they +name? + +CRATYLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn +things through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn +them from the things themselves--which is likely to be the nobler and +clearer way; to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of +which the image is the expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn +of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly executed? + +CRATYLUS: I should say that we must learn of the truth. + +SOCRATES: How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, +beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things +is not to be derived from names. No; they must be studied and investigated +in themselves. + +CRATYLUS: Clearly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon +by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the same +direction. I myself do not deny that the givers of names did really give +them under the idea that all things were in motion and flux; which was +their sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a +kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried round, and want to drag us +in after them. There is a matter, master Cratylus, about which I often +dream, and should like to ask your opinion: Tell me, whether there is or +is not any absolute beauty or good, or any other absolute existence? + +CRATYLUS: Certainly, Socrates, I think so. + +SOCRATES: Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face is +fair, or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in a flux; +but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing +away, and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born and +retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths? + +CRATYLUS: Undoubtedly. + +SOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same +state? for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they +remain the same; and if they are always the same and in the same state, and +never depart from their original form, they can never change or be moved. + +CRATYLUS: Certainly they cannot. + +SOCRATES: Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the moment that the +observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that +you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot +know that which has no state. + +CRATYLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at +all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing +abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless +continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge +changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and +if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, +and, according to this view, there will be no one to know and nothing to be +known: but if that which knows and that which is known exists ever, and +the beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist, then I do not +think that they can resemble a process or flux, as we were just now +supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the +truth is what Heracleitus and his followers and many others say, is a +question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or +the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far +trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge +which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of +unreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine +that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, +Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would not +have you be too easily persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and +do not easily accept such a doctrine; for you are young and of an age to +learn. And when you have found the truth, come and tell me. + +CRATYLUS: I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that I +have been considering the matter already, and the result of a great deal of +trouble and consideration is that I incline to Heracleitus. + +SOCRATES: Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall give +me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are intending, and +Hermogenes shall set you on your way. + +CRATYLUS: Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue to +think about these things yourself. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Cratylus, by Plato + |