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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/1232-0.txt b/1232-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ec3279 --- /dev/null +++ b/1232-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4799 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 1232 *** + +The Prince + +by Nicolo Machiavelli + +Translated by W. K. Marriott + + +Contents + + INTRODUCTION + YOUTH Æt. 1-25—1469-94 + OFFICE Æt. 25-43—1494-1512 + LITERATURE AND DEATH Æt. 43-58—1512-27 + THE MAN AND HIS WORKS + DEDICATION + + THE PRINCE + CHAPTER I. HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED + CHAPTER II. CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES + CHAPTER III. CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES + CHAPTER IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH + CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED + CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY + CHAPTER VII. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE + CHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS + CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY + CHAPTER X. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED + CHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES + CHAPTER XII. HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES + CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN + CHAPTER XIV. THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR + CHAPTER XV. CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED + CHAPTER XVI. CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS + CHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED + CHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH + CHAPTER XIX. THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED + CHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? + CHAPTER XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN + CHAPTER XXII. CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES + CHAPTER XXIII. HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED + CHAPTER XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES + CHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER + CHAPTER XXVI. AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS + + DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI + + THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA + + + + +_ Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to +1512 held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic +missions to various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; +later exiled and returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd +June 1527._ + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the +second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, +and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were +members of the old Florentine nobility. + +His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly +enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of +Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an +Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Il Magnifico. +The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year +Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official career +Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted +until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his +office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they +were once more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s +literary activity and increasing influence; but he died, within a few +weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his +fifty-eighth year, without having regained office. + + + + +YOUTH — Æt. 1-25—1469-94 + + +Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the +Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of +this representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been +described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by +the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving +Lorenzo. Savonarola’s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have +been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power over the +fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a +gibe in _The Prince_, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed +prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean +rule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli +strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to +Lorenzo’s grandson that he dedicates _The Prince_. + +Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a picture of the +young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: “They were freer +than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other +kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, +and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with +wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly +was thought the wisest.” In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli +shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and +leads us to infer that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes: +“I have received your letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure, +especially because you tell me you are quite restored in health, than +which I could have no better news; for if God grant life to you, and to +me, I hope to make a good man of you if you are willing to do your +share.” Then, writing of a new patron, he continues: “This will turn +out well for you, but it is necessary for you to study; since, then, +you have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters +and music, for you see what honour is done to me for the little skill I +have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to please me, and to bring success +and honour to yourself, do right and study, because others will help +you if you help yourself.” + + + + +OFFICE — Æt. 25-43—1494-1512 + + +The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spent in the service of the +free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the +expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After +serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed +Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and +Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of +Machiavelli’s life, for during this time he took a leading part in the +affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and +dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere +recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and +soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and +supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters +which illustrate _The Prince_. + +His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, “my lady of Forli” +of _The Prince_, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it +is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on +fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is +urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes. + +In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for +continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct +of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft +summarized in _The Prince_, and was consequently driven out. He, also, +it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support +to Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge +that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the +faith of princes. + +Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied with events arising out +of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the +Duke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of _The +Prince_. Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke +for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have +seized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the +pattern of Cesare Borgia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed +by some critics as the “hero” of _The Prince_. Yet in _The Prince_ the +duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the +fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that +might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save +him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens; +and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims +that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen +fatality. + +On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to +watch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia +cheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano +delle Rovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most +reason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election, +says that he who thinks new favours will cause great personages to +forget old injuries deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had +ruined Cesare. + +It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that +pontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought +to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing +chiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius +that Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and +women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man +that will win and hold them both. + +It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian +states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, +with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those +events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they +impinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with +Louis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch’s character has +already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as +the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but +who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, +had he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have +been ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men +of the age, and his character has been drawn by many hands; but +Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the +secret of his many failures when he describes him as a secretive man, +without force of character—ignoring the human agencies necessary to +carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the fulfilment of +his wishes. + +The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official career were filled with +events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the +three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the +object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in +the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won +in eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during +these events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out +between the pope and the French, because friendship with France had +dictated the entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II +finally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance +of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy +of the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the +Medici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st +September 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the signal +for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end +to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without regaining +office. + + + + +LITERATURE AND DEATH — Æt. 43-58—1512-27 + + +On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had +vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, +was dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he +was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici, +imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope, +Leo X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at +San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In +a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a +very interesting description of his life at this period, which +elucidates his methods and his motives in writing _The Prince_. After +describing his daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he +writes: “The evening being come, I return home and go to my study; at +the entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt, +and put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass +into the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly +received by them, I am fed with that food which is mine alone; where I +do not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their +actions, and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours I +feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay, +death does not terrify me; I am possessed entirely by those great men. +And because Dante says: + +Knowledge doth come of learning well retained, +Unfruitful else, + +I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have +composed a small work on ‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out as +fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a +principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how +they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever +pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, +especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it +to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will +be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had +with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it.” + +The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form +in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work +during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some +unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici. Although +Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or +presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo +ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any +employment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s lifetime, +_The Prince_ was never published by him, and its text is still +disputable. + +Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: “And as to this +little thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that +during the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have +neither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by +one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And of my +loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I could not +now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and honest, as +I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my +honesty.” + +Before Machiavelli had got _The Prince_ off his hands he commenced his +“Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,” which should be read +concurrently with _The Prince_. These and several minor works occupied +him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look +after the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the +Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her +citizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new +constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on +one pretext or another it was not promulgated. + +In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to +settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly +remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he +was much sought after, and also for the production of his “Art of War.” +It was in the same year that he received a commission at the instance +of Cardinal de’ Medici to write the “History of Florence,” a task which +occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may have +determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old writer +observes that “an able statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will +endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play +with.” + +When the “History of Florence” was finished, Machiavelli took it to +Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in +the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is +somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written _The +Prince_ for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained +power in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence” +to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year +the battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left +Francis I a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This +was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular +party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more +banished. + +Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his +return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the “Ten of +Liberty and Peace.” Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached +Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527. + + + + +THE MAN AND HIS WORKS + + +No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence +has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her +most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have +found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the +germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle +to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of his name, +it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which +this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that +the researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more +reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an “unholy +necromancer,” which so long haunted men’s vision, has begun to fade. + +Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and +industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and +with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced +retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he +depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the +successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only +moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political +employments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, +overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren +of results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery +that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct +of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear +by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of +compromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to +suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when +he set him to write the “History of Florence,” rather than employ him +in the state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and +there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure. + +Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on _The +Prince_, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they +are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as +they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contemporaries; yet +they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of +Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical +incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses which +Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and +conduct. + +Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish +some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, _The +Prince_ is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men +are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the +days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices +which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. +Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them +to be—and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses; +prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to +a higher plane—Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an +empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the +arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to +fight. + +It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s that government +should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the +people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of +society; to this “high argument” _The Prince_ contributes but little. +Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments +otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and +insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests _The +Prince_ with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the +incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which +still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other +and their neighbours. + +In translating _The Prince_ my aim has been to achieve at all costs an +exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent +paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. +Machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he +wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his +substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. _Quis eo fuit +unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?_ +In _The Prince_, it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not +only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an +Englishman of Shakespeare’s time the translation of such a treatise was +in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius +of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to +the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example: +the word _intrattenere_, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy +adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would +by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered “entertain,” and every +contemporary reader would understand what was meant by saying that +“Rome _entertained_ the Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting +their power.” But to-day such a phrase would seem obsolete and +ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that “_Rome +maintained friendly relations with the Ætolians_,” etc., using four +words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy brevity +of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute fidelity to +the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can only hope that +the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author’s meaning, may +overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it. + +The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli: + +Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di +trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto +dal duca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da +Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; +Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell’ +Alemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di +Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., +1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence, +1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in +verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose, +1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d’oro (poem in +terza rima), 1517; Dell’ arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il +riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta di +Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie +fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525. + +Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti +carnascialeschi. + +Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, +6 vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., +1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7. + +Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. +Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G. +Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri +intorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. +Ferrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929. + + + + +DEDICATION + + +To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici + +Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed +to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in +which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses, +arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented +to princes, worthy of their greatness. + +Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some +testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my +possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as, +the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience +in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which, +having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now +send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence. + +And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance, +nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable, +seeing that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to +offer you the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all +that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and +dangers; which work I have not embellished with swelling or magnificent +words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic +allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed +to embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour +should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the +weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable. + +Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low +and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of +princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves +below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of +lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves +upon high mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it +needs to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to be +of the people. + +Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I +send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you +will learn my extreme desire that you should attain that greatness +which fortune and your other attributes promise. And if your +Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your +eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a +great and continued malignity of fortune. + + + + +THE PRINCE + + + + +CHAPTER I. +HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE +ACQUIRED + + +All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been +and are either republics or principalities. + +Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long +established; or they are new. + +The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or +they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the +prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of +the King of Spain. + +Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a +prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of +the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. + + + + +CHAPTER II. +CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES + + +I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another +place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to +principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, +and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved. + +I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary +states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than +new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of +his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, +for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless +he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if +he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to +the usurper, he will regain it. + +We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have +withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius +in ’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the +hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it +happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices +cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects +will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and +duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are +lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another. + + + + +CHAPTER III. +CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES + + +But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be +not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken +collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from +an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for +men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and +this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein +they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have +gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common +necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have +submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships +which he must put upon his new acquisition. + +In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in +seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends +who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the +way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, +feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed +forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill +of the natives. + +For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied +Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it +only needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the +gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future +benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is +very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, +they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with +little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the +delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in +the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time +it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on the +borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to +bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be +defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above +mentioned. + + [1] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who + married Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and + died in 1510. + +Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second +time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains +to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and +what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself +more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France. + +Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an +ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country +and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold +them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; +and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of +the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in +other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will +live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, +and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, +although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the +customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst +themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has +only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of +their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws +nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will +become entirely one body with the old principality. + +But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, +customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great +energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real +helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside +there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has +made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other +measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled +there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the +spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy +them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are +great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the +country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied +by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have +more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He +who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost +caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested +from him with the greatest difficulty. + +The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, +which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do +this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A +prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense +he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority +only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them +to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and +scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being +uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not +to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have +been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not +costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as +has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one +has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, +because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious +ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man +ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge. + +But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much +more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, +so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are +exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting +of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and +all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their +own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such +guards are as useless as a colony is useful. + +Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects +ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful +neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care +that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a +footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be +introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of +ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were +brought into Greece by the Ætolians; and in every other country where +they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And +the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner +enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the +hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to +those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over +to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he +has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold +of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, +and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of +them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does +not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, +and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and +troubles. + +The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these +measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with[2] +the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the +greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. +Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and +Ætolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was +humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and +Ætolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor +did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends +without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make +them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because +the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do, +who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for +which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it +is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the +medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; +for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic +fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but +difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either +detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but +difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the +evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise +man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not +having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that +every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the +Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to +avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war +is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of +others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in +Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided +both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which +is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the +benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and +prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring +with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good. + + [2] See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.” + +But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the +things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] as +the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held +possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he +has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain +a state composed of divers elements. + + [3] Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462, + died 1515. + + [4] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498. + +King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who +desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I +will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a +foothold in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every +door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to +accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have +succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not +made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, +regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; +the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of +Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of +Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, +the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then +could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, +which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made +the king master of two-thirds of Italy. + +Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could +have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above +laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although +they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the +Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been +forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have +made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no +sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to +occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was +weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had +thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by +adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater +authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to +follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of +Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was +himself forced to come into Italy. + +And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and +deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, +divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter +in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country +and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and +whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he +drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out +in turn. + +The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always +do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but +when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is +folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with +her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she +ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with +the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she +got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had +not the excuse of that necessity. + +Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, +he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he +brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did +not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to +injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from +the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought +Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to +humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have +consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have +kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would +never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also +because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order +to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not +have had the courage. + +And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander +and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given +above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, +because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your +disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king +had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in +exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap to +Rouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the +faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept. + + [5] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and + married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to + retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown. + + [6] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a + cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510. + +Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the +conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and +wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that +is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes +with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope +Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal +Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I +replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning +that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such +greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the +Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin +may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which +never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming +powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about +either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him +who has been raised to power. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. +WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL +AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH + + +Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly +acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great +became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was +scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole +empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained +themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose +among themselves from their own ambitions. + +I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to +be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of +servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his +favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity +by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons +have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and +hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a +prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, +because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as +superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as +to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular +affection. + +The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the +King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one +lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into +sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and +changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the +midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, +and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king +take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both +of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state +of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The +causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that +the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can +he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the +lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his +ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with +great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when +they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, +for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in +mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his +own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has +been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot +replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this +prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the +others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not +rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it. + +The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because +one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, +for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, +for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the +victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with +infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from +those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated +the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves +the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either +to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings +the opportunity. + +Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of +Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and +therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him +in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which +victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, +for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would +have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults +raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves. + +But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted +like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the +Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities +there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them +endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the +power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed +away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting +afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself +his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed +there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other +than the Romans were acknowledged. + +When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with +which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which +others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; +this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the +conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state. + + + + +CHAPTER V. +CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER +THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED + + +Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been +accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three +courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the +next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live +under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an +oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a +government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand +without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support +him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will +hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other +way. + +There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held +Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they +lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, +dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as +the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did +not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities +in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them +otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city +accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be +destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of +liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither +time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do +or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges +unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they +immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been +held in bondage by the Florentines. + +But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and +his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to +obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in +making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern +themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a +prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But +in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire +for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of +their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them +or to reside there. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND +ABILITY + + +Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities +as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of +state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, +and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely +to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A +wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to +imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not +equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the +clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far +distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow +attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their +strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of +so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach. + +I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a +new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, +accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired +the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station +presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of +these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. +Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the +strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no +other state, is compelled to reside there in person. + +But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, +have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, +and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not +discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet +he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy +to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have +acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their +particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be +found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. +And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed +anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material +to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that +opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and +without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain. + +It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of +Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that +they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of +bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and +that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should +become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary +that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of +the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. +Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians +dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, +and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity +whereby their country was ennobled and made famous. + +Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a +principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The +difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules +and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their +government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there +is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or +more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the +introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for +enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and +lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This +coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on +their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily +believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them. +Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the +opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others +defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along +with them. + +It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter +thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves +or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate +their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In +the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass +anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they +are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have +conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the +reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it +is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that +persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when +they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by +force. + +If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not +have enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to +Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things +immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no +means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the +unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties +in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the +ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are +overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated, +they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards +powerful, secure, honoured, and happy. + +To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some +resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like +kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[1] This man rose from a private +station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to +fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him +for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their +prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one +who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. +This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old +alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on +such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had +endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping. + + [1] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF +OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE + + +Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private +citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they +have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they +have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state +is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as +happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the +Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might +hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those +emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens +came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the +fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable +things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position; +because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not +reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having +always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it +because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful. + +States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature +which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and +correspondencies[1] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not +overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become +princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be +prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, +and that those foundations, which others have laid _before_ they became +princes, they must lay _afterwards_. + + [1] “Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and + correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of + “correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth and seventeenth + centuries. + +Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or +fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and +these are Francesco Sforza[2] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper +means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be +Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties +he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called +by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy +of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he +had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise +and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and +fortunes of others had bestowed on him. + + [2] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria + Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, + on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli + was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia + (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations + of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and along with his letters to + his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years + before _The Prince_, of the proceedings of the duke in his + “Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare + Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended to the + present work. + +Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations +may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be +laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, +therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be +seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not +consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what +better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions; +and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but +the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune. + +Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had +many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see +his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the +Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke +of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini +were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he +saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been +assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, +namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved +him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers, +so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was +easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other +reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not +only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving +the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy +with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He +was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the +attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the +king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the +Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was +hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to +him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that +the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him, +that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might +themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the +same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and +attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And +as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the +Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from +that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the +arms and the luck of others. + +For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in +Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, +making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to +their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that +in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned +entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the +Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came +to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length +that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them, +called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the +rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless +dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the +French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by +trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse +to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the +mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke did not fail to secure with +all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses—the +Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his +power at Sinigalia.[3] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned +their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good +foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of +Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he +gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, +and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out. + + [3] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502. + +When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak +masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave +them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was +full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing +to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it +necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer +Ramiro d’Orco,[4] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest +power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the +greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not +advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but +that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the +country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their +advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some +hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the +people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if +any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in +the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took +Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the +piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The +barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied +and dismayed. + + [4] Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua. + +But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding +himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate +dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great +measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if +he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, +for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would +not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and +to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards +the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. +It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would +have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived. + +Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future +he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church +might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which +Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by +exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as +to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to +himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope +with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the +college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before +the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first +shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had +accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords +as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the +Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And +as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany, +for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his +protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French +were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and +in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down +upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through +hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines +would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was +prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much +power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer +have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his +own power and ability. + +But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He +left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the +rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick +unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and +he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the +foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not +had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he +would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his +foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a +month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst +the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they +could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope +him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not +have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of +Alexander,[5] everything would have been different to him. On the day +that Julius the Second[6] was elected, he told me that he had thought +of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had +provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that, +when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die. + + [5] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503. + + [6] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad + Vincula, born 1443, died 1513. + +When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to +blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to +offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of +others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and +far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and +only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness +frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to +secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome +either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the +people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate +those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of +things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to +destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship +with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal +and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the +actions of this man. + +Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he +made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope +to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected +Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any +cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they +became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom +he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, +San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[7] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear +him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their +relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the +kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above +everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, +failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad +Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages +to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his +choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin. + + [7] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. +CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS + + +Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither +of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is +manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be +more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are +when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the +principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private +person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first +method, it will be illustrated by two examples—one ancient, the other +modern—and without entering further into the subject, I consider these +two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them. + +Agathocles, the Sicilian,[1] became King of Syracuse not only from a +private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a +potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous +life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of +mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession, +he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established +in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself +prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that +which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding +for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, +was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the +senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating +to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the +senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held +the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And although he +was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not +only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for +its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time +raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme +necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, +leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa. + + [1] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C. + +Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will +see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as +he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any +one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were +gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly +held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent +to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, +without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not +glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and +extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his +greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be +seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain. +Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite +wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent +men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius. + +In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da +Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by +his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his +youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his +discipline, he might attain some high position in the military +profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, +and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body +and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing a +paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some +citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than +its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So +he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many +years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look +upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire +anything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he +had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would +be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and +he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably +by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also +to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up. + +Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, +and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he +lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having +arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a +solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of +Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual +in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave +discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son +Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and +others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to +be discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a +chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after +him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places +and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto, +mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief +magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to +obey him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the +prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and +strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a +way that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only +was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all +his neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as +that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by +Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, +as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this +parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made +his leader in valour and wickedness. + +Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after +infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his +country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be +conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by +means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold +the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this +follows from severities[2] being badly or properly used. Those may be +called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are +applied at one blow and are necessary to one’s security, and that are +not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage +of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding +they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than +decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God +or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is +impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves. + + [2] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern + equivalent of Machiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than + the more obvious “cruelties.” + +Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought +to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for +him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to +repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to +reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does +otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to +keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor +can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and +repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so +that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given +little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer. + +And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such +a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall +make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled +times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help +you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be +under any obligation to you for them. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. +CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY + + +But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the +prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, +but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil +principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain +to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a +principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the +favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties +are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be +ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and +oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in +cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or +anarchy. + +A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, +accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the +nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the +reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that +under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, +finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of +one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his +authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles +maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the +aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around +him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can +neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches +sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around +him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. + +Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, +satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is +more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, +while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added +also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, +because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure +himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect +from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile +nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will +rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and +astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain +favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is +compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well +without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and +to give or take away authority when it pleases him. + +Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to +be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape +their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or +they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought +to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt +with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a +natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, +especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in +prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. +But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it +is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, +and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they +were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him. + +Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people +ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only +ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the +people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above +everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may +easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they +receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more +closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more +devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their +favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as +these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, +so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the +people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity. + +Nabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, +and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his +country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was +only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this +would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not +let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that “He who +builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for this is true when a +private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that +the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the +magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as +happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in +Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, +who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who +does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and +energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a one will never find +himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his +foundations well. + + [1] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus + in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C. + + [2] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s + “Florentine History,” Book III. + +These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from +the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either +rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their +government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on +the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and +who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with +great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not +the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the +citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, +are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will +always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For +such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when +citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with +him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to +die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its +citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this +experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore +a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will +always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state +and of him, and then he will always find them faithful. + + + + +CHAPTER X. +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO +BE MEASURED + + +It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of +these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in +case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether +he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite +clear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by +their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise +a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack +them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot +show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to +defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been +discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second +case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision +and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. +And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the +other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often +repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are +always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it +will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town +well fortified, and is not hated by his people. + +The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country +around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits +them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, +because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the +taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they +have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they +always keep in public depots enough for one year’s eating, drinking, +and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss +to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the +community in those labours that are the life and strength of the city, +and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold +military exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to +uphold them. + +Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself +odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only +be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this +world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a +whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever +should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it +burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and +self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that +a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by +giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for +long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving +himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold. + +Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin +the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot +and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the +prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the +damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer +any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with +their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that +their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his +defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they +confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is +well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the +minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not +fail to support and defend them. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. +CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES + + +It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching +which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they +are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held +without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of +religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the +principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. +These princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have +subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are +not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, +and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate +themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being +upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak +no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would +be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them. + +Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church +has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from +Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have +been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) +have valued the temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France +trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and +to ruin the Venetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not +appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. + +Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[1] this country was +under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the +Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal +anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; +the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those +about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. +To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as +it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made +use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini +and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with +arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate +weak and powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a +courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could +rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a +cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a +pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to +speak, one people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would +arise hostile to the Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet +would not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the +temporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in Italy. + + [1] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494. + +Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have +ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to +prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by +reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things +which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although +his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, +nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church, +which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all +his labours. + +Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all +the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the +chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the +way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been +practised before Alexander’s time. Such things Julius not only +followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin +the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these +enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, +inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any +private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within +the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them +some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: +the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and +the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused +the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their +cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster +the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to +support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders +and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope +Leo[2] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, +if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more +venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues. + + [2] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. +HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES + + +Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such +principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having +considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and +having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and +to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of +offence and defence which belong to each of them. + +We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his +foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to +ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or +composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good +laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are +well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the +discussion and shall speak of the arms. + +I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state +are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. +Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds +his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for +they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, +valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the +fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so +long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war +by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for +keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to +make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your +soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take +themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble +to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by +resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they +formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet +when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that +Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in +hand;[1] and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the +truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have +related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who +have also suffered the penalty. + + [1] “With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the _bons mots_ + of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII seized + Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his + quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the + country. _Cf_. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King + Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a + kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy + without resistance: so that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont + to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with chalk in their hands, + to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swords to fight.” + +I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The +mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, +you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own +greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others +contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are +ruined in the usual way. + +And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, +whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted +to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in +person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its +citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it +ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so +that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes +and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and +mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to +bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its +citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and +Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely +armed and quite free. + +Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who +were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the +Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. +After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of +their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their +liberty. + +Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against +the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,[2] +allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His +father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[3] of Naples, left +her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms +of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the +Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these +arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have +defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been +favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have +stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and +others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer +was Giovanni Acuto,[4] and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot +be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the +Florentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the +Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco +turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the +kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while +ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most +prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest +renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have +been proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became +the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if +they held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their +achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and +gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed +gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned +to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they +forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the +beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much +territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to +fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under +Carmignuola,[5] they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him +a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), +and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they +feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they +were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to +lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order +to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their +captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of +Pitigliano,[6] and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not +gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,[7] where in one battle they lost +that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much +trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed +and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. + + [2] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448. + + [3] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples. + + [4] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John + Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was knighted by + Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops and went into + Italy. These became the famous “White Company.” He took part in many + wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible + Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of + Bernabo Visconti. + + [5] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, + executed at Venice, 5th May 1432. + + [6] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San + Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria, + in 1487. “Primo capitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; + Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510. + + [7] Battle of Vaila in 1509. + +And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled +for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, +in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better +prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has +recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired +more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more +states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms +against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were +oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain +authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became +princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the +hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of +priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both +commenced to enlist foreigners. + +The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[8] +the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, +Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After +these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms +of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been +overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted +by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to +lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own. +They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory, +they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not +give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a +moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs +were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand +soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They +had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to +themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking +prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at +night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night; +they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did +they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their +military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both +fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and +contempt. + + [8] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in + Romagna. He was the leader of the famous “Company of St George,” + composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. +CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN + + +Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a +prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by +Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise +against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to +auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[1] for his +assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in +themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always +disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their +captive. + + [1] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), + surnamed “The Catholic,” born 1452, died 1516. + +And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish +to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which +cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw +himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune +brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his +rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the +Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all +expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not +become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his +auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs. + +The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand +Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other +time of their troubles. + +The Emperor of Constantinople,[2] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten +thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not +willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to +the infidels. + + [2] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383. + +Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, +for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them +the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to +others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and +better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one +community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you +have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough +authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most +dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has +always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing +rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming +that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others. + +I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke +entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French +soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, +such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, +discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; +whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and +dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference +between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one +considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when +he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he +relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and +found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when +every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces. + +I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am +unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I +have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by +the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted +like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him +that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to +pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with +aliens. + +I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament +applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with +Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed +him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them +on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to +meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of +others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind +you fast. + +Charles the Seventh,[3] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[4] +having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, +recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he +established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and +infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and +began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as +is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised +the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of +his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his +men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so +accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they +can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot +stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come +off well against others. The armies of the French have thus become +mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms +together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, +but much inferior to one’s own forces. And this example proves it, for +the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of +Charles had been enlarged or maintained. + + [3] Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died + 1461. + + [4] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483. + +But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks +well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I +have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a +principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not +truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster +to the Roman Empire[5] should be examined, it will be found to have +commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time +the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour +which had raised it passed away to others. + + [5] “Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the + reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of + the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence. + When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank + under the weight of its military obligations, he said that this was + ‘wholly unhistorical.’ He might well have added that the Roman power + was at its zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to + fight for the State, but that it began to decline as soon as this + obligation was no longer recognised.”—_Pall Mall Gazette_, 15th May + 1906. + +I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having +its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good +fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And +it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing +can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own +strength. And one’s own forces are those which are composed either of +subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or +auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one’s own forces will be easily +found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one +will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many +republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which +rules I entirely commit myself. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. +THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR + + +A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything +else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is +the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force +that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often +enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the +contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than +of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing +it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is +to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from +a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding +the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons. +For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to +be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which a prince +ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing +proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not +reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him +who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed +servants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other +suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together. And +therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and +above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by +his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, therefore, to +have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should +addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two +ways, the one by action, the other by study. + +As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well +organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he +accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of +localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the +valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of +rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which +knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his +country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by +means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands +with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study +hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and +marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance +to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of +one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the +prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable +that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his +enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to +besiege towns to advantage. + +Philopoemen,[1] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which +writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he +never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in +the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: “If +the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here +with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best +advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, +how ought we to pursue?” And he would set forth to them, as he went, +all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their +opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these +continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any +unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with. + + [1] Philopoemen, “the last of the Greeks,” born 252 B.C., died 183 + B.C. + +But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and +study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne +themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, +so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as +an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been +praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he +always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated +Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of +Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of +Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, +affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things +which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to +observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but +increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be +available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find +him prepared to resist her blows. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. +CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR +BLAMED + + +It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a +prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have +written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in +mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from +the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a +thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me +more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the +imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities +which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is +so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is +done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his +preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his +professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much +that is evil. + +Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how +to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. +Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, +and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are +spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are +remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or +praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, +using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our language is +still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly +who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed +generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, +another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; +one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one +sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another +frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know +that every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a +prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but +because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human +conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently +prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which +would lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible, +from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he +may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need +not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without +which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is +considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like +virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which +looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. +CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS + + +Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I +say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, +liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation +for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should +be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the +reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among +men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of +magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts +all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to +maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax +them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him +odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by +any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded +few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by +whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing +to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being +miserly. + +Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of +liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if +he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in +time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that +with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself +against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without +burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises +liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, +and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few. + +We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have +been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was +assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he +did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King +of France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax +on his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his +long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken +or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A +prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that +he can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he +is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a +reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will +enable him to govern. + +And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and +many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, +and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, +or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is +dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; +and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; +but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his +expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one should +reply: Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies, +who have been considered very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends +that which is his own or his subjects’ or else that of others. In the +first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to +neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who goes +forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion, +handling that which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary, +otherwise he would not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is +neither yours nor your subjects’ you can be a ready giver, as were +Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not take away your +reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; it is only +squandering your own that injures you. + +And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst +you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor +or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a +prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised +and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to +have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, +than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to +incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. +CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED +THAN FEARED + + +Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every +prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. +Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare +Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled +the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if +this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more +merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for +cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[1] Therefore a prince, so +long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the +reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more +merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to +arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to +injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a +prince offend the individual only. + + [1] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi + factions in 1502 and 1503. + +And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the +imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence +Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign +owing to its being new, saying: + +“Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt +Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.”[2] + +Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he +himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and +humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and +too much distrust render him intolerable. + + [2] . . . against my will, my fate +A throne unsettled, and an infant state, +Bid me defend my realms with all my pow’rs, +And guard with these severities my shores. + +Christopher Pitt. + +Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than +feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to +be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it +is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be +dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that +they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as +you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, +property, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far +distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that prince +who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other +precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by +payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be +earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied +upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than +one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation +which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for +their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which +never fails. + +Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he +does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well +being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he +abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their +women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of +someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, +but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, +because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss +of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are +never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always +find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for +taking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner +lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and has under control a +multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard +the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army +united or disposed to its duties. + +Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that +having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to +fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or +against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This +arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his +boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his +soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not +sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire his +deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal +cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been +sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most +excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man, +against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from +nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more +license than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was +upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of +the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio, +yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate +punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in +the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew +much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This +disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have +destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the +control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed +itself, but contributed to his glory. + +Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the +conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing +according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself +on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must +endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII.[1] +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH + + + [1] “The present chapter has given greater offence than any other + portion of Machiavelli’s writings.” Burd, “Il Principe,” p. 297. + +Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and +to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience +has been that those princes who have done great things have held good +faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect +of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on +their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting,[2] the one +by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the +second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, +it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is +necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast +and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient +writers, who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were +given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his +discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who +was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know +how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not +durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the +beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot +defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against +wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares +and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do +not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor +ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, +and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If +men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they +are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to +observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince +legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless +modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and +engagements have been made void and of no effect through the +faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the +fox has succeeded best. + + [2] “Contesting,” _i.e_. “striving for mastery.” Mr Burd points out + that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero’s “De Officiis”: + “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum + per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum + est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.” + +But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, +and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and +so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will +always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent +example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing +else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he +always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power +in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would +observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to +his wishes,[3] because he well understood this side of mankind. + + [3] “Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).” The + words “ad votum” are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550. + +Alexander never did what he said, +Cesare never said what he did. + +Italian Proverb. + +Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities +I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And +I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe +them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear +merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with +a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able +and know how to change to the opposite. + +And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, +cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often +forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,[4] +friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him +to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and +variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to +diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then +to know how to set about it. + + [4] “Contrary to fidelity” or “faith,” “contro alla fede,” and “tutto + fede,” “altogether faithful,” in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy + that these two phrases, “contro alla fede” and “tutto fede,” were + omitted in the Testina edition, which was published with the sanction + of the papal authorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the + word “fede” was “the faith,” _i.e_. the Catholic creed, and not as + rendered here “fidelity” and “faithful.” Observe that the word + “religione” was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being + used to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness “the + religion,” a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot + heresy. South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this + passage as follows: “That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, + Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political + scheme: ‘That the show of religion was helpful to the politician, but + the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.’” + +For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything +slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five +qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether +merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing +more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as +men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it +belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. +Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and +those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who +have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all +men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, +one judges by the result. + +For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding +his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be +praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a +thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are +only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have +no ground to rest on. + +One prince[5] of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never +preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most +hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of +reputation and kingdom many a time. + + [5] Ferdinand of Aragon. “When Machiavelli was writing _The Prince_ it + would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand’s name here + without giving offence.” Burd’s “Il Principe,” p. 308. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX. +THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED + + +Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I +have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss +briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has +been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him +hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will +have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other +reproaches. + +It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, +and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from +both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor +their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has +only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease +in many ways. + +It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, +effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince +should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in +his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his +private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are +irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can +hope either to deceive him or to get round him. + +That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, +and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, +provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by +his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a +prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his +subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From +the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, +and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will +always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they +should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should +affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations +and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will +resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did. + +But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has +only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can +easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by +keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for +him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most +efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not +to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a +prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the +conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have +the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a +conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the +conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires +cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he +believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to +a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content +himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so +that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the +other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare +friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith +with you. + +And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side +of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of +punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the +majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and +the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the +popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to +conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the +execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to +the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and +thus cannot hope for any escape. + +Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content +with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer +Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the +present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had +conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer +Giovanni,[1] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination +the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the +popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in +Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after +the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese, +having information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in +Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a +blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of +their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due +course to the government. + + [1] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He + ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of + conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent experience + (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured for his + alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy. + +For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies +of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is +hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear +everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have +taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep +the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most +important objects a prince can have. + +Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, +and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty +and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its +authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of +the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths +would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the +hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to +protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care +of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be +liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people +for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who +could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the +king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or +a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can +draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs +of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in +their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish +the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people. + +It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths +of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to +my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great +qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have +been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, +therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of +some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were +not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only +submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who +studies the affairs of those times. + +It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to +the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were +Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son +Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. + +There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the +ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be +contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to +put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so +beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard +thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the +people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring +prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, +cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should +exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give +vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors +were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great +authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the +principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours, +were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about +injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes +cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to +avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they +ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the +most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had +need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the +people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not, +accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them. + +From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being +all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, +and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died +honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, +and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, +being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always +kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated +nor despised. + +But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, +who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not +endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, +having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt +for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his +administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as +much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a +prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for +when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain +yourself—it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles—you +have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works +will do you harm. + +But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, +that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in +the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by +him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who +allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the +army conspired against him, and murdered him. + +Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus +Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and +rapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to +commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except +Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour +that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed +by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much +admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were +kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and +satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were +great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the +fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a +prince to imitate. + +Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in +Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to +Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the +praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to +aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy +before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the +Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this +there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the +whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the +Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in +the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he +considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided +to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, +being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that +dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that +the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted +by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, +and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the +Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had +received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this +ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him +out in France, and took from him his government and life. He who will, +therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a +most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and +respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be +wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well, +because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which +the people might have conceived against him for his violence. + +But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent +qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and +acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of +fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which +caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and +cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single +murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those +of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by +those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the +midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that +such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and +desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who +does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the +less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do +any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the +service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had +contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily +threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was +a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin. + +But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to +hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and +he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his +people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave +himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he +might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not +maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete +with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the +imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being +hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against +and was killed. + +It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike +man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, +of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the +throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated +and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought +him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great +indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to +his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the +imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity +by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, +practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at +the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa +rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy +conspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter, +besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were +disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so +many against him, murdered him. + +I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being +thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this +discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this +difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far +less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some +indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that +are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were +the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary +to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more +necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy +the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more +powerful. + +From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him +twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend +the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, +putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them +his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in +the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the +people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state +of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that +it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an +hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old +prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by +those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this +being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, +because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in +new ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state +is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its +hereditary lord. + +But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will +consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been +fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how +it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in +another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to +unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for +Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was +heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly +destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated +Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in +his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot +imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow +those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which +are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are +proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and +firm. + + + + +CHAPTER XX. +ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, +ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? + + +1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their +subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; +others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid +themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning +of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown +and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on +all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those +states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as +comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit. + +2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather +when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by +arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted +become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your +subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be +armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be +handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they +quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, +considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and +service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm +them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either +for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions +breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it +follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character +already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient +to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. +Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has +always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a +prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old +one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those +who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time +and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters +should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state +shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you. + +3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed +to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by +fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their +tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This +may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way +balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for +to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; +rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided +cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always +assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The +Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the +Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although +they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these +disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their +differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not +afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one +party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, +therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be +permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the +more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but +if war comes this policy proves fallacious. + +4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the +difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore +fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who +has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes +enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may +have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, +as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many +consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with +craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed +it, his renown may rise higher. + +5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and +assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were +distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo +Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been +distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak +generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will only say +this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been +hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support +themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they +will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as +they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad +impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always +extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too +much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands +it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours +has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which +induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural +affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then +he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for +it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons +for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern +affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends +of those men who were contented under the former government, and are +therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, +were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it. + +6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states +more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit +to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of +refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been +made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in +our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello +so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on +returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, +razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and +considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the +Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, +therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you +good in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be +reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than +from foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear +from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone. The +castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, +more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the +state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—not to be hated by +the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they +will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be +wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. +It has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use +to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli,[1] when the Count +Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to +withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and +thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that +time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses +were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, +and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, +it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have +been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these +things considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as +well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, +cares little about being hated by the people. + + [1] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia + Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that + Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the + countess announces the appointment: “I have been with the signori,” + wrote Fortunati, “to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me + that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary + to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me at once.” _Cf_. “Catherine + Sforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI. +HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN + + +Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and +setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the +present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he +has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be +the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds +you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the +beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the +foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without +any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile +occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations; +thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power +and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and +of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the +foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him. +Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater +schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and +clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable +example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa, +he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his +achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the +minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the +issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of +the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against +him. + +Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal +affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da +Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life +doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some +method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. +And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action +to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man. + +A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a +downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he +declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course +will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two +of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character +that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In +either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare +yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if +you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the +conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been +conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to +protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want +doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who +loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in +hand, court his fate. + +Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive out +the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the +Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the +Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed +in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged +them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: “As for that +which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your +state not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; +because by not interfering you will be left, without favour or +consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror.” Thus it will always +happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality, +whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with +arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally +follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when a prince +declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with +whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful +and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is +established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to +become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all +are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard, +especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you +may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you +become companions on a fortune that may rise again. + +In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that +you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it +greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of +one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved +him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with +your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be +noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with +one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, +unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers +you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as +possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with +France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their +ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as +happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to +attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince +ought to favour one of the parties. + +Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe +courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, +because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid +one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in +knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to +take the lesser evil. + +A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour +the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his +citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and +agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not +be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken +away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but +the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things +and designs in any way to honour his city or state. + +Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles +at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into +guilds or into societies,[1] he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, +and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of +courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty +of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything. + + [1] “Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.” “Arti” were craft or + trade guilds, _cf_. Florio: “Arte . . . a whole company of any trade + in any city or corporation town.” The guilds of Florence are most + admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject + (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called + “artel,” exist in Russia to-day, _cf_. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s + “Russia,” ed. 1905: “The sons . . . were always during the working + season members of an artel. In some of the larger towns there are + artels of a much more complex kind— permanent associations, possessing + large capital, and pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the + individual members.” The word “artel,” despite its apparent + similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with “ars” + or “arte.” Its root is that of the verb “rotisya,” to bind oneself by + an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only another form of + “rota,” which now signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the + underlying idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu” + were possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included + individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or + “clans” would be most appropriate. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII. +CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES + + +The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they +are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the +first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is +by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and +faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to +recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are +otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error +which he made was in choosing them. + +There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to +be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there +are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; +another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which +neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first +is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. +Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the +first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know +good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have +the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his +servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the +servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest. + +But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one +test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his +own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in +everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you +ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in +his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, +and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not +concerned. + +On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study +him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with +him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he +cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, +many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him +dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, +are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, +the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII. +HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED + + +I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it +is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless +they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of +whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own +affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with +difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they +run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way +of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that +to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell +you the truth, respect for you abates. + +Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the +wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking +the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, +and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and +listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With +these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry +himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more +freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of +these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be +steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either +overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions +that he falls into contempt. + +I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of +affairs to Maximilian,[1] the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, +said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. +This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the +above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he does not communicate his +designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in +carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at +once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being +pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he +does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he +wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions. + + [1] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman + Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after + her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in Italian + politics. + +A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he +wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every +one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to +be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning +the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any +consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be +felt. + +And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression +of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good +advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, +because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not +wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has +yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very +prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would +not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take +away his state from him. + +But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more +than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to +unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, +and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through +them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always +prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. +Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they +come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the +prince from good counsels. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV. +WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES + + +The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince +to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and +fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the +actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an +hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men +and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more +by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good +they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost +defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will +be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and +adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and +with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a +prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom. + +And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in +Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and +others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in +regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in +the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the +people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known +how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that +have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost. + +Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who +was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the +greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a +warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, +he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the +end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the +kingdom. + +Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their +principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own +sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a +change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the +calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they +thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that +the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would +recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very +bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would +never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later +on to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, +it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no +avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, +certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour. + + + + +CHAPTER XXV. +WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER + + +It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the +opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by +fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and +that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us +believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let +chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times +because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may +still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes +pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. +Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true +that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[1] but that she +still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less. + + [1] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: “The older one gets the + more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does + three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe.” Sorel’s + “Eastern Question.” + +I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood +overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away +the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to +its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, +though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when +the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences +and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass +away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so +dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour +has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where +she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain +her. + +And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and +which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open +country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been +defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either +this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it +would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say +concerning resistance to fortune in general. + +But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be +seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change +of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from +causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the +prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I +believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions +according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not +accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in +affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, +glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, +another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, +another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by +a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain +his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different +observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other +impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they +conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from +what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same +effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the +other does not. + +Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs +himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a +way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if +times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course +of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to +know how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot +deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having +always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it +is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time +to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; +but had he changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have +changed. + +Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and +found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of +action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise +against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The +Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he +had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France; +nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his +accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the +Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the +former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, +he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having +observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as +to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore +Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff +with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome +until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, +as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. +Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the +others would have raised a thousand fears. + +I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they +all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience +the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go +cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have +deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him. + +I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind +steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are +successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider +that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a +woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and +ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by +the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She +is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they +are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI. +AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS + + +Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and +wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a +new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an +opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of +things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this +country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new +prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present. + +And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be +captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians +should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the +soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate +the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to +discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy +should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should +be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, +more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten, +despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation. + +Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us +think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was +afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected +him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet +heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of +Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, +and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she +entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs +and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and +willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it. + +Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope +than in your illustrious house,[1] with its valour and fortune, +favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and +which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be +difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the +men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet +they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the +present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier +than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours. + + [1] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. + In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII. + +With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is +necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in +them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness +is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those +men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how +extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example: +the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth +water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your +greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do +everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory +which belongs to us. + +And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians +have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious +house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many +campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, +this has happened because the old order of things was not good, and +none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man +more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was +newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and dignified will +make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting +opportunities to bring such into use in every form. + +Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. +Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how +superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But +when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs +entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are +capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there +having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by +valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for +so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty years, +whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a +poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, +afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.[2] + + [2] The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; + Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513. + +If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable +men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things, +as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own +forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better +soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will be +much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince, +honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is +necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended +against foreigners by Italian valour. + +And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very +formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which +a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be +relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, +and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in +close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the +Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are +overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this +latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at +the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by +German battalions, who follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the +Spaniards, by agility of body and with the aid of their shields, got in +under the pikes of the Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack, +while the Germans stood helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed +up, all would have been over with them. It is possible, therefore, +knowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a new one, +which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need not +create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. And these are +the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new +prince. + +This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for +letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the +love with which he would be received in all those provinces which have +suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for +revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. +What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? +What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To +all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your +illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with +which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard +our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be +verified that saying of Petrarch: + +Virtu contro al Furore + Prendera l’arme, e fia il combatter corto: +Che l’antico valore + Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto. + +Virtue against fury shall advance the fight, + And it i’ th’ combat soon shall put to flight: +For the old Roman valour is not dead, + Nor in th’ Italians’ brests extinguished. + +Edward Dacre, 1640. + + + + +DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING +VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE +DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI + +BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI + + +The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to +clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been +raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of +Arezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, +whence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against +Giovanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring +that city under his domination, and to make it the head of his +Romagnian duchy. + +These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and +their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too +powerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek +to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon +this a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to +which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, +Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the +tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo +Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and +courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which +might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they +decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the +Florentines; and they sent their men to one place and another, +promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to unite +with them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once reported +throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under the duke, +among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting a +revolution. + +Thus it arose that, men’s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by +certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held +for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The +castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there; +so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being +carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from +being drawn up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping +upon the bridge and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being +effected, the whole state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being +encouraged in this, not so much by the capture of the fort, as by the +Diet at Magione, from whom they expected to get assistance. + +Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose +the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any +town, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and +they sent again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in +destroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and +that they ought not to wait for another opportunity. + +But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli +and Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo +Machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the +duke against his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, +because, against everybody’s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone +over to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his door. +But recovering courage from the offers of the Florentines, he decided +to temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that remained to +him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to get assistance. +This latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the King of France +for men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he turned into +cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money. + +Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached +Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the +aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the +duke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with +offers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did +not fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he +wished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough +for him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have the +principality. + +And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to +him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a +standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every +care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such +preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in +separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there +came also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found +himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open +war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous to +outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of +reconciliation. + +And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in +which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand +ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed +an alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come +personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the +other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and +other places seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and +not to make war against or ally themselves with any one without his +permission. + +This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, +again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his +state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the +fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by +the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends. +But the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed +his men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of +November together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to +Cesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the +Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of +Urbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but +nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that +if the duke wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were +ready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To +this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with +Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was +very willing to proceed against Sinigalia. + +It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the +fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give +it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to +come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being +invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no +suspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French +men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred +lancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena +about the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the utmost +cunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for +him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of compliance +would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the +reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the +arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very +stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not +offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by +Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he +agreed to wait. + +Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on +30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most +trusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor +d’Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as +Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should +arrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting +certain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they +reached Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they +came to the duke’s quarters, where they should be seized. + +The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which +there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to +assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from +Fano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day +of December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of +about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the +infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms. + +Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of +the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who +goes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases +of which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia +is distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot +and from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs +a little river which bathes that part of the walls looking towards +Fano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes +for a good space by road along the mountains, and reaches the river +which passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left hand along the bank +of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge +which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast of the gate that +leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but transversely. Before +this gate there stands a collection of houses with a square to which +the bank of the river forms one side. + +The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and +to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant +from Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men +of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band, +which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty +horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters +having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and +when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass +over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards the river and +the other towards the country, and a way was left in the middle through +which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the town. + +Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a +few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a +cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his +approaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the +man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that +when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet +the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He +recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his +nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of +their fathers that should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came +before the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were received by him +with goodwill; they were at once placed between those who were +commissioned to look after them. + +But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band +in Sinigalia, was missing—for Oliverotto was waiting in the square +before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and +drilling them—signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care +of Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that +Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined +Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of +their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke; +and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come +himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice, +came before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and +Oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others. + +So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke’s +quarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made +them prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that +the men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. +Those of Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of +the Orsini and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment +of the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, +and bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and +Vitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of the +country and saved themselves. + +But the duke’s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men +of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not +repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have +completely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced, +the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a +room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in +keeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of +the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the +blame for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the +Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome +that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of +Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th +January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the +same way. + + + + +THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA + +WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI + +And sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI + +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328 + + +It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who +have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them, +who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in +their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and +obscurity; or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way. +They have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have +had so mean a parentage that in shame they have given themselves out to +be sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be wearisome to relate +who these persons may have been because they are well known to +everybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly edifying to +those who read them, they are omitted. I believe that these lowly +beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is desirous of showing to +the world that such men owe much to her and little to wisdom, because +she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take no part in +their career: thus all success must be attributed to her. Castruccio +Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds, if he is +measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he was +born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor distinguished +in his birth, as the course of this history will show. It appeared to +be desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in him such +indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great exemplar +to men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his +actions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds. + +The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families +of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in +estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a +son Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca, +and for this reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He +had an only sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but +Buonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again +went to live with her brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the +house where he resided, and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, +any person could have access to it without difficulty. One morning, +shortly after sunrise, Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio +was called, had occasion to go into the vineyard as usual to gather +herbs for seasoning the dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the +leaves of a vine she turned her eyes in that direction, and heard +something resembling the cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards +it, and saw the hands and face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the +leaves and who seemed to be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and +partly fearing, yet full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it +to the house, where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is +customary, and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When +he heard what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised +or compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves +what should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no +children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for +it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They +baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As +the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of +wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those +lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended +to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his +canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with +this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio +was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached +the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of +Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left +off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, +delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in +running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he +far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at +any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of +wars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with +vexation and sorrow. + +There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, +named Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, +bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had +often fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a +Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman +resided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others most +mornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the +top of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he +had often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of the street +in those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far +excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to exercise a royal +authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed him, Messer +Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. Being +informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio he felt +a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called him one +day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the house of +a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use arms, or in +the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses and the +services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased +Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he +stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer +Francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable, +nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly studies and +take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and +in a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was +driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear +that he would not be able to hold him much longer. + +Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to +the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was +astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that +virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true +gentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and +could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and +tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all others, +and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. But what +enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the delightful +modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or word to +others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with his +equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him beloved, +not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When Castruccio +had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were driven from Pavia +by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the Visconti to assist +the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in charge of his forces. +Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and courage in this +expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other captain, and +his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but throughout all +Lombardy. + +Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he +left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many +friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary +for that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son +thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to +be his son’s tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died +Francesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that +goodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to +the son the gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the +father. Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and +tutor of Pagolo, which increased enormously his power and position, and +created a certain amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the +former universal goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring +tyrannical intentions. Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli +Opizi, the head of the Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of +Messer Francesco to become the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him +that Castruccio, with the great abilities which he already showed, and +holding the position of governor, deprived him of his opportunity; +therefore he began to sow those seeds which should rob Castruccio of +his eminence. Castruccio at first treated this with scorn, but +afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able +to bring him into disgrace with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples +and have him driven out of Lucca. + +The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo, +who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became +their lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca, +with whom Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting +their restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought +into his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of +the Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio +cautiously fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies +and munitions of war, in order that it might stand a siege for a few +days in case of need. When the night came which had been agreed upon +with Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between the mountains and +Pisa with many men, the signal was given, and without being observed +Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and set fire to the +portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the city, calling +the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. Uguccione +entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer +Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The +governor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the +wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found +that more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those +who fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the +headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most +hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese. + +As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party +that the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they +determined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a +large army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence +they marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into +Lucca. Upon this Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and +with a number of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved +against the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the +enemy withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between +Montecatini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to +Montecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight +skirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence. +Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed +coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing +worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the army +in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought about the ruin of the +Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its captain +had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observed this, and +allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief; he also +showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions of the +camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more insolent the +more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they drew out in +the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. Presently, +deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having mastered +their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he spoke a +few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to them the +certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands. Castruccio +had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the centre +of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of the +army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant +men on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he +moved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of his +lines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had +come in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centre +squadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the +wings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings +of the two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained +out of action, for these two portions of the line of battle were +separated from each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach +each other. By this expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio’s men +were opposed to the weaker part of the enemy’s troops, and the most +efficient men of the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines +were unable to fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or +to give any assistance to their own flanks. So, without much +difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the +centre battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to +attack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. The defeat +was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than ten +thousand men killed with many officers and knights of the Guelph party +in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them, among whom +were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his nephew, and +Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castruccio the loss did +not amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was Francesco, +the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed in the +first onset. + +This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that +Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it +appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of +power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only +waited for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the +death of Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in +Lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge. +On the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were +driven off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming +to the knowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him +a proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his +son Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take +Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio, +fearing no evil, went to the governor in a friendly way, was +entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing +to put him to death lest the people should be incensed, kept him alive, +in order to hear further from his father concerning his intentions. +Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at once +set out from Pisa to Lucca with four hundred horsemen to finish the +business in his own way; but he had not yet reached the baths when the +Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and created Count Gaddo +della Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reached Lucca he heard +of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise to him to turn +back, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them should +close their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard of what +had happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to demand +the liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had +arrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private +circles, afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised +a tumult, and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded +that Castruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse +might happen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered +his friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked +Uguccione; who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away +with his friends to Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in +poverty. + +But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, +and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people +that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having +obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the +recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of +Uguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded +a treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed +a fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course +of two months Castruccio captured the town. With the reputation gained +at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a +short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the +pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and +wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the +lord of it. After this victory he returned to Lucca, and was welcomed +by the whole people. And now Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any +longer to defer making himself a prince, got himself created the lord +of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico, +Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he had +corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and deliberately elected +prince by the people. At this time Frederick of Bavaria, the King of +the Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial crown, and +Castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met him at +the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as his deputy in +Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because of the +people’s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was received in +great honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him, +and he was appointed the emperor’s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time +the Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had +driven out of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick. +Frederick created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread +of the Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were +constrained to accept him as their lord. + +Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian +affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian +Ghibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio +for help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his +country, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among these +exiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, +and Piero Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. +Castruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all +Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to +gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer +Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces +of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he +divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied +with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he +could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without +those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he +surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer +Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven +out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the +King Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the +Florentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at home, +they should be compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to +defend themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized +Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country. +Whereupon the Florentines recalled their army, which had scarcely +reached Tuscany, when Castruccio was forced by other necessities to +return to Lucca. + +There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so +powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance +him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not +received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited +other families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They +found their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set +upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and +killed him. They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano +di Poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion, +intervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms; +and he offered to be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him +what they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater +intelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the +news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in +command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set out for home. +Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at an end, yet he +posted his men in the most advantageous places throughout the city. As +it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be very much obliged to +him, he sought him out, and without saying anything on his own behalf, +for he did not recognize any need for doing so, he begged Castruccio to +pardon the other members of his family by reason of their youth, their +former friendships, and the obligations which Castruccio was under to +their house. To this Castruccio graciously responded, and begged +Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure +to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to +hear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to +him, saying that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of +showing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and +Castruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown +into prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered +San Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace, +as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to +leave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce, +which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and +desirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded +with them for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the +conquests they had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, +turned his attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should +not again be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, +under various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by +their ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of +them, but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had +in his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that +none of them were to be trusted. Then for his further security he +raised a fortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom +he had killed or hunted out of the state. + +Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his +position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of +increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he +could get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, +which was his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends +with the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both +parties confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it +always had been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the +Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each +of these men held secret communications with Castruccio, and each +desired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many +threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the +Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city; +both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they +believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than +the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave +promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and +to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the +appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself +direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and +both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a +signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other +Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans +of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the +hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the +palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them +many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to +the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and +quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great +valour. + +About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness +of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. +The German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened—murders +and tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put +an end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should +call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of +the city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he +could apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not +only to give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome. +Castruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the +emperor this service, because he believed that he himself would not be +safe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo +Guinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six +hundred horsemen, where he was received by Enrico with the greatest +distinction. In a short time the presence of Castruccio obtained such +respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or violence, good order +was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio having sent by sea from +the country round Pisa large quantities of corn, and thus removed the +source of the trouble. When he had chastised some of the Roman leaders, +and admonished others, voluntary obedience was rendered to Enrico. +Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman senator. This +dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in +a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on its +front: “I am what God wills.” Whilst on the back was: “What God desires +shall be.” + +During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio +should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could +tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be +difficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were +Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face +danger. These men kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia, +and with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by night, and +after driving out some of Castruccio’s officials and partisans, and +killing others, they restored the city to its freedom. The news of this +greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on +in great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines heard of his return, +knowing that he would lose no time, they decided to intercept him with +their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the belief that by doing so +they would cut off his road to Pistoia. Assembling a great army of the +supporters of the Guelph cause, the Florentines entered the Pistoian +territories. On the other hand, Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his +army; and having heard where the Florentines’ lay, he decided not to +encounter it in the plains of Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of +Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could, to attack it boldly in the +Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if he succeeded in this design, +victory was assured, although he was informed that the Florentines had +thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he +had every confidence in his own abilities and the valour of his troops, +yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open lest he should be +overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and +Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the +exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places +narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still +narrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that +twenty men side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was +Manfred, a German, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had +been allowed to remain in possession of the castle, it being common to +the Lucchese and the Pistoians, and unclaimed by either—neither of them +wishing to displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of +neutrality, and came under obligations to no one. For these reasons, +and also because the castle was well fortified, he had always been able +to maintain his position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to +fall upon his enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and +there was no fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force +before they became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this +trouble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which +possession of this castle would give him, and having an intimate +friendship with a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with +him that four hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle +the night before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put +to death. + +Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the +Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away +from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his +army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they +reached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill +on the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the +castle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching +from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of +Serravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the +hill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his +infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a +path on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four +hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never +expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they +aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the +Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by surprise +when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close were they +upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It was a case +of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were assailed +with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own, +although some few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting +reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The +cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were +unable to get their men either backward or forward, owing to the +narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought +to be done or what could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were +engaged with the enemy’s infantry were scattered or killed without +having made any effective defence because of their unfortunate +position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a stout +resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on both +flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their +friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a +decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one thousand +infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four hundred +horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the whole +force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they carried +out with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the attack, +but gave way, and were soon in full retreat—conquered more by their +unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in the +rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each man +seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very +sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini +dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all +Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on +the Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the +Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out +the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not +content with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both +sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola, +about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the +spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding +horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals in +commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to +corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city +gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the +participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso Lupacci +and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the Florentines great +anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, they sent envoys +to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of their city; and +he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of the Guelph +cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines to +receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and +he sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen. + +Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the +pressure of Castruccio’s army, owing to his being compelled to leave +his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a +conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, +one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland +should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this +conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of +Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy +paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few +are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy +Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio. +This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio +Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering +their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put +him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove their +families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and +Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought and +energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the Florentines +their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await the coming of +Carlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided +to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more than thirty +thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry—having called to their aid +every Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether they should +attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be better to +march on the latter—a course, owing to the recent conspiracy, more +likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them, because they believed +that the surrender of Pistoia would follow the acquisition of Pisa. + +In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army +and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from +thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army +which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree +alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would +deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to +think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects +of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand +foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with this army went to +Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand +infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than any other town in the +Pisan district, owing to its situation between the rivers Arno and +Gusciana and its slight elevation above the surrounding plain. +Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being victualled unless they +divided their forces, nor could they approach it either from the +direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through to Pisa, or +attack Castruccio’s forces except at a disadvantage. In one case they +would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one under his +own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case they +would have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy, +an undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to +take this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of +the river and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide +expanse of land between them and the river. + +The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to +decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and, +having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the +latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet +the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the +saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the +Florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of +cavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was +fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the Florentines +with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, not allowing +them to issue from the river before he charged them; he also sent one +thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same number down the +Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much impeded by their +arms and the water that they were not able to mount the banks of the +river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the river more +difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had crossed having +broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep with mud, many of +the horses rolled over with their riders and many of them had stuck so +fast that they could not move. When the Florentine captains saw the +difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them and moved +higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less treacherous and +the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met at the bank by +the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who, being light +armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with +tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses, +alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and +trampled each other in great confusion. The fight between the men of +Castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp +and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation and neither +would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back +into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land +in order to make room for the others pressing forward, who if they +could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and in this +obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. Castruccio +shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom they had +before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines reproached each +other that the many should be overcome by the few. At length +Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that both his +men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had many +killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take up +a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded +these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and +one part of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This +cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and +thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these +tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with Castruccio’s +reserves they could not stand against them and at once fell back into +the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet gained any +decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, knowing his +inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand on the +defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he hoped that +when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make short work +of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the +Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the remainder +of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This they did with +lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the +enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. The Florentine +captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had met with in +crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry cross lower +down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio’s army. But +here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of +Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines +were so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them +escaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains +were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with +Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine +commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter +was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a battle. Of the +Florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and thirty-one men, +whilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and seventy men. + +But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his +life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus +ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry +into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but +death could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle +the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued +and overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on +their return from victory and personally thank them. He was also on the +watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day; +he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be +the first man in the saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio +stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on the banks of the +Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of +which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to such troubles; but it +was the cause of his death. On the following night he was attacked with +high fever, which increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it must +prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and +addressed him as follows: + +“If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the +midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my +successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left +thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, +because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and +Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the +Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these +peoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least +more peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, but +one more secure and established on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who +insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me +with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the first, nor the time +to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I have +never concealed it, how I entered the house of thy father whilst yet a +boy—a stranger to all those ambitions which every generous soul should +feel—and how I was brought up by him, and loved as though I had been +born of his blood; how under his governance I learned to be valiant and +capable of availing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been +witness. When thy good father came to die, he committed thee and all +his possessions to my care, and I have brought thee up with that love, +and increased thy estate with that care, which I was bound to show. And +in order that thou shouldst not only possess the estate which thy +father left, but also that which my fortune and abilities have gained, +I have never married, so that the love of children should never deflect +my mind from that gratitude which I owed to the children of thy father. +Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I am well content, but I am +deeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure. +Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest +contented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are +of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be +sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under +a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with +factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs +recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended +Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly +destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than +they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the +princes of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far +distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou +hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory +of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has brought +thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist +thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering +under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to thee. And +whereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I believed that +war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou hast every +inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance will bring +thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest important in this +world that a man should know himself, and the measure of his own +strength and means; and he who knows that he has not a genius for +fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. And it will be +well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this +way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and in this +thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that what I +have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that +I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.” + +After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, +and Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending +Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his +successor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him, +and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he +was. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he +was buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to +Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the +abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, +and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This +latter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the time of the +great-grandson of Pagolo. + +From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a +man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time, +but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the +ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious +presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke +with him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, +and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or +snowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends, +but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false +with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he +desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory +that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was +bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He +was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear +nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees +that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully +sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not look +for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was not +angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that +he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on +the following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a +partridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom +Castruccio had said: “You would not have given more than a penny.” +“That is true,” answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: “A +ducat is much less to me.” Having about him a flatterer on whom he had +spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: “Fisherman +are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in order that +they may take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by +spittle that I may catch a whale”; and this was not only heard by +Castruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest that it +was wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: “If that be +a vice then you should not fare so splendidly at the feasts of our +saints.” Passing through a street he saw a young man as he came out of +a house of ill fame blush at being seen by Castruccio, and said to him: +“Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out, but when thou goest +into such places.” A friend gave him a very curiously tied knot to undo +and was told: “Fool, do you think that I wish to untie a thing which +gave so much trouble to fasten.” Castruccio said to one who professed +to be a philosopher: “You are like the dogs who always run after those +who will give them the best to eat,” and was answered: “We are rather +like the doctors who go to the houses of those who have the greatest +need of them.” Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much +disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for +cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did not fear +anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since +every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one +what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: “When thou goest to a +banquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon +another.” To a person who was boasting that he had read many things, +Castruccio said: “He knows better than to boast of remembering many +things.” Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming +intoxicated. Castruccio replied: “An ox does the same.” Castruccio was +acquainted with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being +blamed by a friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be +taken in by a woman, he said: “She has not taken me in, I have taken +her.” Being also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered: +“Thou dost not spend as much as I do?” and being told that it was true, +he continued: “Then thou art more avaricious than I am gluttonous.” +Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of +Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by Taddeo into a +chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers +and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered some +saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him much +disturbed by this, said to him: “I knew not where to spit in order to +offend thee less.” Being asked how Caesar died he said: “God willing I +will die as he did.” Being one night in the house of one of his +gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of +his friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was +usual in one of his station, so he said: “He who is considered wise by +day will not be considered a fool at night.” A person came to demand a +favour of Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea +threw himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by +Castruccio, said: “Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast +thy ears in thy feet,” whereupon he obtained double the favour he had +asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one, +seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled +blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous +words, he said to him: “When you have another request to make, send +someone else to make it.” Having been wearied by a similar man with a +long oration who wound up by saying: “Perhaps I have fatigued you by +speaking so long,” Castruccio said: “You have not, because I have not +listened to a word you said.” He used to say of one who had been a +beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was +dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now he +took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, he +said: “Do you laugh because you are successful or because another is +unfortunate?” Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco +Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: “What shall I give you if +you will let me give you a blow on the nose?” Castruccio answered: “A +helmet.” Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been +instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done +wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived +themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly +those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying +that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused +when the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise +that whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first +to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with +only looking at her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to +be buried when he died, and answered: “With the face turned downwards, +for I know when I am gone this country will be turned upside down.” On +being asked if it had ever occurred to him to become a friar in order +to save his soul, he answered that it had not, because it appeared +strange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione +della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat +to preserve his health, and replied: “If the man be rich let him eat +when he is hungry; if he be poor, then when he can.” Seeing one of his +gentlemen make a member of his family lace him up, he said to him: “I +pray God that you will let him feed you also.” Seeing that someone had +written upon his house in Latin the words: “May God preserve this house +from the wicked,” he said, “The owner must never go in.” Passing +through one of the streets he saw a small house with a very large door, +and remarked: “That house will fly through the door.” He was having a +discussion with the ambassador of the King of Naples concerning the +property of some banished nobles, when a dispute arose between them, +and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the king. “Is this +king of yours a bad man or a good one?” asked Castruccio, and was told +that he was a good one, whereupon he said, “Why should you suggest that +I should be afraid of a good man?” + +I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and +weighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his +high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a +prince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune, +so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune; +therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be +seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they +were placed by him to testify forever to his days of adversity. As in +his life he was inferior neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of +Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in the same year of his +age as they did, and he would doubtless have excelled both of them had +Fortune decreed that he should be born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia +or Rome. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 1232 *** diff --git a/1232-h/1232-h.htm b/1232-h/1232-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..385ded7 --- /dev/null +++ b/1232-h/1232-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,5545 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=UTF-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Prince, by Nicolo Machiavelli</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + +body { margin-left: 20%; + margin-right: 20%; + text-align: justify; } + +h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {text-align: center; font-style: normal; font-weight: +normal; line-height: 1.5; margin-top: .5em; margin-bottom: .5em;} + +h1 {font-size: 300%; + margin-top: 0.6em; + margin-bottom: 0.6em; + letter-spacing: 0.12em; + word-spacing: 0.2em; + text-indent: 0em;} +h2 {font-size: 150%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} +h3 {font-size: 130%; margin-top: 1em;} +h4 {font-size: 120%;} +h5 {font-size: 110%;} + +.no-break {page-break-before: avoid;} /* for epubs */ + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always; margin-top: 4em;} + +hr {width: 80%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: 0.25em; + margin-bottom: 0.25em; } + +.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} + +p.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: 90%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.letter {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.noindent {text-indent: 0% } + +p.center {text-align: center; + text-indent: 0em; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.footnote {font-size: 90%; + text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +sup { vertical-align: top; font-size: 0.6em; } + +a:link {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:visited {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:hover {color:red} + +</style> + +</head> + +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 1232 ***</div> + +<h1>The Prince</h1> + +<h2 class="no-break">by Nicolo Machiavelli</h2> + +<h3> +Translated by W. K. Marriott +</h3> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style=""> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref01">INTRODUCTION</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref02">YOUTH Æt. 1-25—1469-94</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref03">OFFICE Æt. 25-43—1494-1512</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref04">LITERATURE AND DEATH Æt. 43-58—1512-27</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref05">THE MAN AND HIS WORKS</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref06">DEDICATION</a><br /><br /></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap00"><b>THE PRINCE</b></a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">CHAPTER I. HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">CHAPTER II. CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap03">CHAPTER III. CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap04">CHAPTER IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap05">CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap06">CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap07">CHAPTER VII. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap08">CHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap09">CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap10">CHAPTER X. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap11">CHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap12">CHAPTER XII. HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap13">CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap14">CHAPTER XIV. THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap15">CHAPTER XV. CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap16">CHAPTER XVI. CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap17">CHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap18">CHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap19">CHAPTER XIX. THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap20">CHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap21">CHAPTER XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap22">CHAPTER XXII. CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap23">CHAPTER XXIII. HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap24">CHAPTER XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap25">CHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap26">CHAPTER XXVI. AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS</a><br /><br /></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap27"><b>DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI</b></a><br /><br /></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap28"><b>THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA</b></a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p class="letter"> +<i> +Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to 1512 +held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic missions to +various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; later exiled and +returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd June 1527. +</i> +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref01"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<p> +Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the second +son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, and of +Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were members of the +old Florentine nobility. +</p> + +<p> +His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly +enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of +Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an +Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Il Magnifico. The +downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year +Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official career +Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted until +1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his office. +The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they were once +more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s literary activity +and increasing influence; but he died, within a few weeks of the expulsion +of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his fifty-eighth year, without having +regained office. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref02"></a>YOUTH — Æt. 1-25—1469-94</h2> + +<p> +Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the +Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of this +representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been described +as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by the fervent +and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving Lorenzo. +Savonarola’s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have been slight, +for although at one time he wielded immense power over the fortunes of +Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a gibe in <i>The +Prince</i>, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed prophet who came to +a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean rule during the life +of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli strongly, for he +frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to Lorenzo’s grandson +that he dedicates <i>The Prince</i>. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a picture of the young +men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: “They were freer than +their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other kinds of +excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, and women; +their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with wit and +acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly was thought +the wisest.” In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli shows why youth +should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and leads us to infer +that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes: “I have received your +letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure, especially because you +tell me you are quite restored in health, than which I could have no +better news; for if God grant life to you, and to me, I hope to make a +good man of you if you are willing to do your share.” Then, writing of a +new patron, he continues: “This will turn out well for you, but it is +necessary for you to study; since, then, you have no longer the excuse of +illness, take pains to study letters and music, for you see what honour is +done to me for the little skill I have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to +please me, and to bring success and honour to yourself, do right and +study, because others will help you if you help yourself.” +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref03"></a>OFFICE — Æt. 25-43—1494-1512</h2> + +<p> +The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spent in the service of the +free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the +expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After serving +four years in one of the public offices he was appointed Chancellor and +Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and Peace. Here we +are on firm ground when dealing with the events of Machiavelli’s life, for +during this time he took a leading part in the affairs of the Republic, +and we have its decrees, records, and dispatches to guide us, as well as +his own writings. A mere recapitulation of a few of his transactions with +the statesmen and soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his +activities, and supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences +and characters which illustrate <i>The Prince</i>. +</p> + +<p> +His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, “my lady of Forli” of +<i>The Prince</i>, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it is far +better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on fortresses. +This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is urged by him in +many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes. +</p> + +<p> +In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for +continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct of +affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft +summarized in <i>The Prince</i>, and was consequently driven out. He, also, it +was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support to +Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge that +such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the faith +of princes. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied with events arising out of +the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the Duke +Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of <i>The Prince</i>. +Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke for the +benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have seized; he can, +indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the pattern of Cesare +Borgia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed by some critics as the +“hero” of <i>The Prince</i>. Yet in <i>The Prince</i> the duke is in point of fact +cited as a type of the man who rises on the fortune of others, and falls +with them; who takes every course that might be expected from a prudent +man but the course which will save him; who is prepared for all +eventualities but the one which happens; and who, when all his abilities +fail to carry him through, exclaims that it was not his fault, but an +extraordinary and unforeseen fatality. +</p> + +<p> +On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to watch +the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia cheated into +allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano delle Rovere +(Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most reason to fear the +duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election, says that he who +thinks new favours will cause great personages to forget old injuries +deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had ruined Cesare. +</p> + +<p> +It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that pontiff +was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought to a +successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing chiefly to +his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius that +Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and women, and +concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man that will win +and hold them both. +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian +states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, with +results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those events, +and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they impinge on +the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with Louis XII of +France, and his estimate of that monarch’s character has already been +alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as the man who +accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but who in reality +had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, had he allowed +himself to be influenced by such motives, would have been ruined. The +Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men of the age, and his +character has been drawn by many hands; but Machiavelli, who was an envoy +at his court in 1507-8, reveals the secret of his many failures when he +describes him as a secretive man, without force of character—ignoring +the human agencies necessary to carry his schemes into effect, and never +insisting on the fulfilment of his wishes. +</p> + +<p> +The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official career were filled with +events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the +three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the +object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in the +battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won in eight +hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during these events, +complicated as they were by the feud which broke out between the pope and +the French, because friendship with France had dictated the entire policy +of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II finally formed the Holy League +against France, and with the assistance of the Swiss drove the French out +of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy of the Pope, and had to submit to his +terms, one of which was that the Medici should be restored. The return of +the Medici to Florence on 1st September 1512, and the consequent fall of +the Republic, was the signal for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his +friends, and thus put an end to his public career, for, as we have seen, +he died without regaining office. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref04"></a>LITERATURE AND DEATH — Æt. 43-58—1512-27 +</h2> + +<p> +On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had vainly +hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, was +dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he was +accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici, +imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope, Leo +X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at San +Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In a +letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a very +interesting description of his life at this period, which elucidates his +methods and his motives in writing <i>The Prince</i>. After describing his +daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he writes: “The evening +being come, I return home and go to my study; at the entrance I pull off +my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt, and put on my noble court +dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass into the ancient courts of +the men of old, where, being lovingly received by them, I am fed with that +food which is mine alone; where I do not hesitate to speak with them, and +to ask for the reason of their actions, and they in their benignity answer +me; and for four hours I feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, +poverty does not dismay, death does not terrify me; I am possessed +entirely by those great men. And because Dante says: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +Knowledge doth come of learning well retained,<br /> +Unfruitful else, +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have +composed a small work on ‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out as +fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a +principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how they +can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever pleased you, +this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, especially to a new one, +it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it to his Magnificence +Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will be able to tell you +what is in it, and of the discourses I have had with him; nevertheless, I +am still enriching and polishing it.” +</p> + +<p> +The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form in +which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work during its +composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some unknown +reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici. Although +Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or +presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo ever +received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any +employment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s lifetime, +<i>The Prince</i> was never published by him, and its text is still disputable. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: “And as to this little +thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that during the +fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have neither slept +nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by one who has reaped +experience at the expense of others. And of my loyalty none could doubt, +because having always kept faith I could not now learn how to break it; +for he who has been faithful and honest, as I have, cannot change his +nature; and my poverty is a witness to my honesty.” +</p> + +<p> +Before Machiavelli had got <i>The Prince</i> off his hands he commenced his +“Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,” which should be read +concurrently with <i>The Prince</i>. These and several minor works occupied him +until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look after the +affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the Medicean rulers +of Florence granted a few political concessions to her citizens, and +Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new constitution under which +the Great Council was to be restored; but on one pretext or another it was +not promulgated. +</p> + +<p> +In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to +settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly remarkable +for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he was much +sought after, and also for the production of his “Art of War.” It was in +the same year that he received a commission at the instance of Cardinal +de’ Medici to write the “History of Florence,” a task which occupied him +until 1525. His return to popular favour may have determined the Medici to +give him this employment, for an old writer observes that “an able +statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will endeavour to overturn the +ship unless he has an empty cask to play with.” +</p> + +<p> +When the “History of Florence” was finished, Machiavelli took it to Rome +for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in the +meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is somewhat +remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written <i>The Prince</i> for the +instruction of the Medici after they had just regained power in Florence, +so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence” to the head of the +family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year the battle of Pavia +destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left Francis I a prisoner in the +hands of his great rival, Charles V. This was followed by the sack of +Rome, upon the news of which the popular party at Florence threw off the +yoke of the Medici, who were once more banished. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his +return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the “Ten of +Liberty and Peace.” Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached +Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref05"></a>THE MAN AND HIS WORKS</h2> + +<p> +No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence +has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her most +famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have found in +his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the germs of her +renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle to protest +against the world-wide and evil signification of his name, it may be +pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which this +sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that the +researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more +reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an “unholy +necromancer,” which so long haunted men’s vision, has begun to fade. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and +industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and +with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced +retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he depicted +by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the successful +statesman and author, for he appears to have been only moderately +prosperous in his several embassies and political employments. He was +misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, overawed by Cesare +Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren of results; his +attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery that he raised +astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct of his own affairs +he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear by the side of +Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of compromising himself; his +connection with the Medici was open to suspicion, and Giuliano appears to +have recognized his real forte when he set him to write the “History of +Florence,” rather than employ him in the state. And it is on the literary +side of his character, and there alone, that we find no weakness and no +failure. +</p> + +<p> +Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on <i>The +Prince</i>, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they +are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as they +are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contemporaries; yet they cannot +be said to be out of date so long as the governments of Europe rely on +material rather than on moral forces. Its historical incidents and +personages become interesting by reason of the uses which Machiavelli +makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and conduct. +</p> + +<p> +Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish +some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, <i>The +Prince</i> is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men are +still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the days of +Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices which +Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. Men will +not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them to be—and +are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses; prudence +consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to a +higher plane—Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an +empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the arms +of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to fight. +</p> + +<p> +It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s that government should +be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the people +with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of society; to this +“high argument” <i>The Prince</i> contributes but little. Machiavelli always +refused to write either of men or of governments otherwise than as he +found them, and he writes with such skill and insight that his work is of +abiding value. But what invests <i>The Prince</i> with more than a merely +artistic or historical interest is the incontrovertible truth that it +deals with the great principles which still guide nations and rulers in +their relationship with each other and their neighbours. +</p> + +<p> +In translating <i>The Prince</i> my aim has been to achieve at all costs an +exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent paraphrase +adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. Machiavelli was no +facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he wrote obliged him to weigh +every word; his themes were lofty, his substance grave, his manner nobly plain +and serious. <i>Quis eo fuit unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in +explanandis pressior?</i> In <i>The Prince</i>, it may be truly said, there is +reason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of every word. +To an Englishman of Shakespeare’s time the translation of such a treatise +was in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius of +the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to the +Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example: the word +<i>intrattenere</i>, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy adopted by +the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would by an Elizabethan +be correctly rendered “entertain,” and every contemporary reader +would understand what was meant by saying that “Rome <i>entertained</i> +the Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting their power.” But to-day +such a phrase would seem obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are +compelled to say that “<i>Rome maintained friendly relations with the +Ætolians</i>,” etc., using four words to do the work of one. I have tried +to preserve the pithy brevity of the Italian so far as was consistent with an +absolute fidelity to the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can +only hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author’s +meaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli: +</p> + +<p> +Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di +trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto dal +duca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, +etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; Decennale primo +(poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell’ Alemagna, 1508-12; +Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di Francia, 1510; Discorsi +sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., 1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; +Andria, comedy translated from Terence, 1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy +in five acts, with prologue in verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; +Clizia, comedy in prose, 1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; +Asino d’oro (poem in terza rima), 1517; Dell’ arte della guerra, 1519-20; +Discorso sopra il riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose +della citta di Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; +Istorie fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525. +</p> + +<p> +Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti carnascialeschi. +</p> + +<p> +Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, 6 +vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., 1820-2; +Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7. +</p> + +<p> +Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. Alvisi, +1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G. +Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri intorno +allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. Ferrara, The +Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref06"></a>DEDICATION</h2> + +<p class="center"> +To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici +</p> + +<p> +Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to come +before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in which they see +him take most delight; whence one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, +precious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their +greatness. +</p> + +<p> +Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some testimony +of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my possessions anything +which I hold more dear than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the actions +of great men, acquired by long experience in contemporary affairs, and a +continual study of antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and +prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to your +Magnificence. +</p> + +<p> +And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance, +nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable, seeing +that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to offer you the +opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all that I have learnt in so +many years, and with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not +embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with rounded +periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments whatever, with which +so many are accustomed to embellish their works; for I have wished either that +no honour should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the +weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable. +</p> + +<p> +Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low and +humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of princes; because, +just as those who draw landscapes place themselves below in the plain to +contemplate the nature of the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to +contemplate the plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to +understand the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to understand +that of princes it needs to be of the people. +</p> + +<p> +Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I send +it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you will learn my +extreme desire that you should attain that greatness which fortune and your +other attributes promise. And if your Magnificence from the summit of your +greatness will sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see +how unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap00"></a>THE PRINCE</h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>CHAPTER I.<br /> +HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED +</h2> + +<p> +All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been +and are either republics or principalities. +</p> + +<p> +Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long +established; or they are new. +</p> + +<p> +The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they +are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince who +has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of the King of +Spain. +</p> + +<p> +Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a prince, +or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of the prince +himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>CHAPTER II.<br /> +CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES +</h2> + +<p> +I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place +I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to +principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and +discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved. +</p> + +<p> +I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, +and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones; +for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, +and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of +average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of +it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be so +deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will +regain it. +</p> + +<p> +We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have +withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius in +’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the +hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it +happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause +him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be +naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of +his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one +change always leaves the toothing for another. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap03"></a>CHAPTER III.<br /> +CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES +</h2> + +<p> +But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be +not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken +collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an +inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men +change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope +induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are +deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from +bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, +which always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him +with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon +his new acquisition. +</p> + +<p> +In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing +that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends who put you +there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way they +expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling bound +to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in +entering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives. +</p> + +<p> +For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied +Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only +needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the gates to +him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would +not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is very true that, +after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so +lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with little reluctance, takes +the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out +the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to +cause France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke +Lodovico<a href="#fn-3.1" name="fnref-3.1" id="fnref-3.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +to raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second +time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies +should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes +above mentioned. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.1" id="fn-3.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.1">[1]</a> +Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who married +Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second +time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains to +name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what any +one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securely +in his acquisition than did the King of France. +</p> + +<p> +Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an +ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country and +language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them, +especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and to +hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the prince +who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other things +the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly +together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, +which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, although there +may be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, +and the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who +has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two +considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is +extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are +altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body +with the old principality. +</p> + +<p> +But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs, +or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are +needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be +that he who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would make +his position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk in +Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for +holding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able +to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they +spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand, +they are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no longer +remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your officials; +the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing +to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, +to fear him. He who would attack that state from the outside must have the +utmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested +from him with the greatest difficulty. +</p> + +<p> +The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, +which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do this +or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A prince +does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send +them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the +citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new +inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are +never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept +quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should +happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, +I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they +injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, +cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well +treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter +injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is +to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in +fear of revenge. +</p> + +<p> +But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much +more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, so +that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, +because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrison +up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile, +and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able +to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a +colony is useful. +</p> + +<p> +Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects +ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful +neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that +no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing +there; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by +those who are discontented, either through excess of ambition or through +fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were brought into Greece by the +Ætolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing they +were brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is +that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject +states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the +ruling power. So that in respect to those subject states he has not to +take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them +quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to +take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much +authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can +easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely +master in the country. And he who does not properly manage this business +will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will +have endless difficulties and troubles. +</p> + +<p> +The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these +measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with<a href="#fn-3.2" name="fnref-3.2" id="fnref-3.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the +greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece +appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Ætolians were kept +friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven +out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and Ætolians never secured for them +permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever +induce the Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the +influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over +the country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes +ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future +ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it +is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no +longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, +as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the +malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, +not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to +detect but difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the +evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to +see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been +foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see +them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, +dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a +head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to +the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and +Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have +avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which +is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the +benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and +prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring with it +good as well as evil, and evil as well as good. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.2" id="fn-3.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.2">[2]</a> +See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.” +</p> + +<p> +But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the +things mentioned. I will speak of Louis<a href="#fn-3.3" name="fnref-3.3" id="fnref-3.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +(and not of Charles)<a href="#fn-3.4" name="fnref-3.4" id="fnref-3.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held +possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he has done +the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed +of divers elements. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.3" id="fn-3.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.3">[3]</a> +Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462, +died 1515. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.4" id="fn-3.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.4">[4]</a> +Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498. +</p> + +<p> +King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who +desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I will +not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a foothold +in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every door +was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to +accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded +very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some +mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once +the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines +became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the +Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, +of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the Sienese—everybody +made advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians +realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that +they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of +two-thirds of Italy. +</p> + +<p> +Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have +maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid +down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they +were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church, +some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to +stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself +secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan +than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the +Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening +himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown +themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much +temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. And +having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much +so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his +becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy. +</p> + +<p> +And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and deprived +himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, divided it +with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in Italy he +takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the +malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas he +could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove him +out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn. +</p> + +<p> +The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do +so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when +they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and +blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces +she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have +divided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in +Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in +Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of +that necessity. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, he +increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought +in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not send +colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure him had he +not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians; +because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, +it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but +having first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their +ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from +designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented +except to become masters themselves there; also because the others would +not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the +Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the courage. +</p> + +<p> +And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander +and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given +above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is +not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And if another +should allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he would +assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his +marriage<a href="#fn-3.5" name="fnref-3.5" id="fnref-3.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +and for the cap to Rouen,<a href="#fn-3.6" name="fnref-3.6" id="fnref-3.6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> +to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, +and how it ought to be kept. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.5" id="fn-3.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.5">[5]</a> +Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and married in 1499 +Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to retain the Duchy of +Brittany for the crown. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.6" id="fn-3.6"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.6">[6]</a> +The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a cardinal by +Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510. +</p> + +<p> +Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the conditions +observed by those who have taken possession of countries and wished to +retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonable +and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when +Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually +called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that +the Italians did not understand war, I replied to him that the French did +not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have +allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen +that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by +France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule +is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another +becoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought +about either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by +him who has been raised to power. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap04"></a>CHAPTER IV.<br /> +WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE +SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH +</h2> + +<p> +Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly +acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great +became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was scarcely +settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would +have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had +to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from +their own ambitions. +</p> + +<p> +I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be +governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of +servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour +and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by +antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have +states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them +in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and his +servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the +country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if they +yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and +they do not bear him any particular affection. +</p> + +<p> +The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the +King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, +the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he +sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he +chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body +of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they +have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at +his peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize +great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is +conquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in +seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in +by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his +designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises +from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and +bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect +little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot +carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who +attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and he +will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others; +but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in such +a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the +family of this prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one +to fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror +did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them +after it. +</p> + +<p> +The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because one +can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for one +always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for the +reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory +easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite +difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you +have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of +the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the heads of +fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy or +exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity. +</p> + +<p> +Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius, +you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore it was +only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in the field, and +then to take the country from him. After which victory, Darius being +killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the above reasons. And +if his successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and +at their ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except +those they provoked themselves. +</p> + +<p> +But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted +like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the +Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities +there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them +endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the power +and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and the +Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongst +themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the +country, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family +of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were +acknowledged. +</p> + +<p> +When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with which +Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which others +have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; this is +not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but +by the want of uniformity in the subject state. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap05"></a>CHAPTER V.<br /> +CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR +OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED +</h2> + +<p> +Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been +accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three +courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the +next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live +under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an +oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, +being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his +friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him; and therefore +he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by +the means of its own citizens than in any other way. +</p> + +<p> +There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held +Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they lost +them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, +dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the +Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not +succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the +country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than +by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom +and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in +rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient +privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever +cause it to forget. And whatever you may do or provide against, they never +forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or +dispersed, but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as Pisa +after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines. +</p> + +<p> +But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and +his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey +and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in making +one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern +themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a +prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But in +republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for +vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their +former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to +reside there. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap06"></a>CHAPTER VI.<br /> +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND +ABILITY +</h2> + +<p> +Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities as +I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state; +because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and +following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the +ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise man +ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those +who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at +least it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, +designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing +the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much +higher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great +a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark +they wish to reach. +</p> + +<p> +I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a +new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, accordingly +as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the state. Now, +as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station presupposes either +ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these things will +mitigate in some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied +least on fortune is established the strongest. Further, it facilitates +matters when the prince, having no other state, is compelled to reside +there in person. +</p> + +<p> +But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, +have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and +such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not +discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet he +ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to +speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or +founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular +deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to +those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in examining +their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune +beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the form +which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their powers of mind +would have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity +would have come in vain. +</p> + +<p> +It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of +Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that +they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of +bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and that +he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become King +of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should +find the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and the +Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not have +shown his ability had he not found the Athenians dispersed. These +opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability +enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their country was +ennobled and made famous. +</p> + +<p> +Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a +principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The difficulties +they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules and methods +which they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its +security. And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more +difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in +its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of +things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well +under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well +under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who +have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who +do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience +of them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the +opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others defend +lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them. +</p> + +<p> +It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter +thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or +have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate their +enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the first +instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; but when +they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely +endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the +unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the +nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them, +it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary +to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be +possible to make them believe by force. +</p> + +<p> +If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not have +enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to Fra +Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things +immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means +of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to +believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating +their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with +ability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those +who envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be +respected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, +and happy. +</p> + +<p> +To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some +resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: it is +Hiero the Syracusan.<a href="#fn-6.1" name="fnref-6.1" id="fnref-6.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +This man rose from a private station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, +either, owe anything to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being +oppressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being +made their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that +one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This +man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances, made +new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such foundations he was +able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in +acquiring, he had but little in keeping. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-6.1" id="fn-6.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-6.1">[1]</a> +Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap07"></a>CHAPTER VII.<br /> +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS +OR BY GOOD FORTUNE +</h2> + +<p> +Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private +citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they +have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have +many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is +given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened +to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where +princes were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both +for his security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the +corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand +simply elevated upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated +them—two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the +knowledge requisite for the position; because, unless they are men of +great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should +know how to command, having always lived in a private condition; besides, +they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep +friendly and faithful. +</p> + +<p> +States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which are +born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and correspondencies<a href="#fn-7.1" name="fnref-7.1" id="fnref-7.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as is +said, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability that +they know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has +thrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid +<i>before</i> they became princes, they must lay <i>afterwards</i>. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.1" id="fn-7.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.1">[1]</a> +“Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and +correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of +“correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth +and seventeenth centuries. +</p> + +<p> +Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or fortune, I +wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and these are +Francesco Sforza<a href="#fn-7.2" name="fnref-7.2" id="fnref-7.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and with great ability, from +being a private person rose to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired +with a thousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, +Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during +the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding +that he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise +and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes +of others had bestowed on him. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.2" id="fn-7.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.2">[2]</a> +Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria Visconti, a +natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose death he +procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli was the accredited agent +of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during the +transactions which led up to the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at +Sinigalia, and along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an +account, written ten years before <i>The Prince</i>, of the proceedings of the +duke in his “Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello +ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended +to the present work. +</p> + +<p> +Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations may +be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid +with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore, +all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen that he +laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not consider it +superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to +give a new prince than the example of his actions; and if his dispositions +were of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and +extreme malignity of fortune. +</p> + +<p> +Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many +immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way to +make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church; and if he +was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and the +Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already under +the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy, +especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands that would +fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi +and their following. It behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of +affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master of +part of their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found the +Venetians, moved by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into +Italy; he would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy +by dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came +into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of +Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him +for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of +the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the +Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was hindered +by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other, +the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the +Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him, that not only might +they hinder him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had +won, and that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a +warning when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go +very unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind +when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and +the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided to +depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others. +</p> + +<p> +For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in Rome, by +gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them his +gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their rank, honouring them +with office and command in such a way that in a few months all attachment to +the factions was destroyed and turned entirely to the duke. After this he +awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of +the Colonna house. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, +perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was +ruin to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the +rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the +duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having restored his +authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or other +outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how to +conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke +did not fail to secure with all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, +and horses—the Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought +them into his power at Sinigalia.<a href="#fn-7.3" name="fnref-7.3" id="fnref-7.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends, +the duke laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the +Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate +their prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is +worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it +out. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.3" id="fn-7.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.3">[3]</a> +Sinigalia, 31st December 1502. +</p> + +<p> +When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters, +who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more cause +for disunion than for union, so that the country was full of robbery, quarrels, +and every kind of violence; and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience +to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon +he promoted Messer Ramiro d’Orco,<a href="#fn-7.4" name="fnref-7.4" id="fnref-7.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short +time restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke +considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he +had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment +in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their +advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatred +against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them +entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been +practised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the +minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be +executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at +his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once +satisfied and dismayed. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.4" id="fn-7.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.4">[4]</a> +Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua. +</p> + +<p> +But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding himself +now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by +having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushed +those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceed +with his conquest, had next to consider France, for he knew that the king, +who too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And from +this time he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with France in +the expedition which she was making towards the kingdom of Naples against +the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure +himself against them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had +Alexander lived. +</p> + +<p> +Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future he +had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church might +not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which +Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by +exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as to +take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself all +the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their aid, +as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the college more to himself. +Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Pope should die that he +could by his own measures resist the first shock. Of these four things, at +the death of Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had killed as +many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had +escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous +party in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to +become master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, +and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France +(for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the +Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he +pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, +partly through hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the +Florentines would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he +was prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much +power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer +have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own +power and ability. +</p> + +<p> +But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He left the +duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the rest in the air, +between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto death. Yet there were +in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how men are to be +won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he had +laid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in +good health, he would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his +foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In +Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the Baglioni, the +Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect anything +against him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he wished, at least the +one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But if he had been in +sound health at the death of Alexander,<a href="#fn-7.5" name="fnref-7.5" id="fnref-7.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +everything would have been different to him. On the day that Julius the +Second<a href="#fn-7.6" name="fnref-7.6" id="fnref-7.6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> was +elected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might occur at the +death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except that he had +never anticipated that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the +point to die. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.5" id="fn-7.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.5">[5]</a> +Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.6" id="fn-7.6"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.6">[6]</a> +Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula, born +1443, died 1513. +</p> + +<p> +When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to blame +him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to offer +him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others, +are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and +far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and +only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness +frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to secure +himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome either by +force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be +followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have power +or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to be +severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal +soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princes +in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution, +cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man. +</p> + +<p> +Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he made a +bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to his own +mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected Pope; and he ought +never to have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured or +who had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. For men injure either from +fear or hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad +Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio.<a href="#fn-7.7" name="fnref-7.7" id="fnref-7.7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> +The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; +the latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from his +influence, the kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above +everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him, +he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He who +believes that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuries +is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of +his ultimate ruin. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.7" id="fn-7.7"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.7">[7]</a> +San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap08"></a>CHAPTER VIII.<br /> +CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS +</h2> + +<p> +Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither of +which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is manifest +to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be more +copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are when, either +by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, or when +by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the prince +of his country. And speaking of the first method, it will be illustrated +by two examples—one ancient, the other modern—and without +entering further into the subject, I consider these two examples will +suffice those who may be compelled to follow them. +</p> + +<p> +Agathocles, the Sicilian,<a href="#fn-8.1" name="fnref-8.1" id="fnref-8.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +became King of Syracuse not only from a private but from a low and abject +position. This man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his +fortunes always led an infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies +with so much ability of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the +military profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being +established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself +prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had +been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purpose +with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One +morning he assembled the people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to +discuss with them things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the +soldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he +seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And +although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet +not only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its +defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the +siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were +compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to +be content with the possession of Africa. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-8.1" id="fn-8.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-8.1">[1]</a> +Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will +see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as he +attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any one, +but step by step in the military profession, which steps were gained with +a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly held by him +with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent to slay +fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy, +without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if +the courage of Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from +dangers be considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring and +overcoming hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less +than the most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and +inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated +among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either +to fortune or genius. +</p> + +<p> +In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da Fermo, +having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by his +maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his youth sent +to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his discipline, +he might attain some high position in the military profession. After +Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short +time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body and mind, he became the +first man in his profession. But it appearing a paltry thing to serve +under others, he resolved, with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom +the slavery of their country was dearer than its liberty, and with the +help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani +that, having been away from home for many years, he wished to visit him +and his city, and in some measure to look upon his patrimony; and although +he had not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that +the citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to +come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his +friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should +be received honourably by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to +his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up. +</p> + +<p> +Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, and +he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he lodged him +in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having arranged what +was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a solemn banquet to +which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of Fermo. When the +viands and all the other entertainments that are usual in such banquets +were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave discourses, +speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of +their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others answered; but he +rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more +private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and +the rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they seated +than soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the +rest. After these murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and +down the town and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in +fear the people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of +which he made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were +able to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military +ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the +principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had +become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would have +been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to +be overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli +at Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed +this parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had +made his leader in valour and wickedness. +</p> + +<p> +Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after infinite +treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his country, and +defend himself from external enemies, and never be conspired against by his own +citizens; seeing that many others, by means of cruelty, have never been able +even in peaceful times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times of +war. I believe that this follows from severities<a href="#fn-8.2" name="fnref-8.2" id="fnref-8.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +being badly or properly used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil it +is possible to speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to +one’s security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can +be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, +notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather +than decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God or +man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible +for those who follow the other to maintain themselves. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-8.2" id="fn-8.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-8.2">[2]</a> +Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern equivalent of +Machiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than the +more obvious “cruelties.” +</p> + +<p> +Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to +examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to +inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them +daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, +and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from +timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his +hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves +to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought +to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; +benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavour of them +may last longer. +</p> + +<p> +And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such a +way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall make +him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times, you +are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for they +will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any +obligation to you for them. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap09"></a>CHAPTER IX.<br /> +CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY +</h2> + +<p> +But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the +prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but +by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil +principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to +it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is +obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the +nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and +from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed +by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and +from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three +results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy. +</p> + +<p> +A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, +accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles, +seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation of +one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his shadow +they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot +resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and +make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtains +sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more +difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the +former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his +equals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his +liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself +alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. +</p> + +<p> +Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, +satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is +more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, +while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also +that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because +of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as +they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile +people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only +to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against him; for they, +being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in +time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect +to prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same +people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make and +unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be +looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their +course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do +not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be +honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in +two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural +want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, especially +of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you +honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. But when for their +own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they +are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to +guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because +in adversity they always help to ruin him. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought +to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only ask not +to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes +a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek to +win the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them +under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom +they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thus +the people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised +to the principality by their favours; and the prince can win their +affections in many ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances +one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is +necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no +security in adversity. +</p> + +<p> +Nabis,<a href="#fn-9.1" name="fnref-9.1" id="fnref-9.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious +Roman army, and against them he defended his country and his government; and +for the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make himself +secure against a few, but this would not have been sufficient had the people +been hostile. And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite +proverb that “He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for +this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades +himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by +the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened +to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali<a href="#fn-9.2" name="fnref-9.2" id="fnref-9.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +in Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, who can +command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in +other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole +people encouraged—such a one will never find himself deceived in them, +and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-9.1" id="fn-9.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-9.1">[1]</a> +Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus in 195 B.C.; +killed 192 B.C. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-9.2" id="fn-9.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-9.2">[2]</a> +Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s +“Florentine History,” Book III. +</p> + +<p> +These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the +civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule +personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government is +weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of +those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in +troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by +intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid tumults +to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects, +accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mind to obey +him amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a +scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what +he observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because +then every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far +distant they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the +state has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the +more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. +Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens +will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state +and of him, and then he will always find them faithful. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap10"></a>CHAPTER X.<br /> +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE +MEASURED +</h2> + +<p> +It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of +these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in +case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he +has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite clear +I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by their +own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise a +sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack them; +and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot show +themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defend +themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, +but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can +say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortify +their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. And whoever +shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the other concerns of +his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, will never +be attacked without great caution, for men are always adverse to +enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be +an easy thing to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not +hated by his people. +</p> + +<p> +The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country +around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them, +nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, because +they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the taking of them +by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they have proper ditches +and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they always keep in public +depots enough for one year’s eating, drinking, and firing. And beyond +this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the state, they always +have the means of giving work to the community in those labours that are +the life and strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people +are supported; they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover +have many ordinances to uphold them. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself +odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only be +driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this world +are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year in +the field without being interfered with. And whoever should reply: If the +people have property outside the city, and see it burnt, they will not +remain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will make them forget +their prince; to this I answer that a powerful and courageous prince will +overcome all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects +that the evil will not be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty of +the enemy, then preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who seem +to him to be too bold. +</p> + +<p> +Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin +the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and +ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the prince +to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage is +already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; +and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with their prince, +he appearing to be under obligations to them now that their houses have +been burnt and their possessions ruined in his defence. For it is the +nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those +they receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it will not be +difficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast +from first to last, when he does not fail to support and defend them. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap11"></a>CHAPTER XI.<br /> +CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES +</h2> + +<p> +It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching +which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they are +acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without +either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of religion, +which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the principalities +may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. These princes +alone have states and do not defend them; and they have subjects and do +not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are not taken from +them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they have +neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. Such +principalities only are secure and happy. But being upheld by powers, to +which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, +being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous +and rash man to discuss them. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church has +attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from Alexander +backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been called +potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) have valued the +temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France trembles +before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and to ruin the +Venetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not appear to +me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. +</p> + +<p> +Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,<a href="#fn-11.1" name="fnref-11.1" id="fnref-11.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +this country was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of +Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two +principal anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; +the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about +whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To restrain +the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as it was for the +defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made use of the barons of +Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonnesi, had always a +pretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under the eyes of +the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And although there might +arise sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor +wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also +a cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a pope, +he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one +people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the +Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin +the Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were little +esteemed in Italy. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-11.1" id="fn-11.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-11.1">[1]</a> +Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494. +</p> + +<p> +Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have +ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to prevail; +and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by reason of +the entry of the French, he brought about all those things which I have +discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although his intention was +not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, nevertheless, what he did +contributed to the greatness of the Church, which, after his death and the +ruin of the duke, became the heir to all his labours. +</p> + +<p> +Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all the +Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the +chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the way open +to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been practised before +Alexander’s time. Such things Julius not only followed, but improved +upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the +French out of Italy. All of these enterprises prospered with him, and so much +the more to his credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church +and not any private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions +within the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them +some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: the one, +the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and the other, not +allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused the disorders among them. +For whenever these factions have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for +long, because cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the +barons are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates +arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness +Pope Leo<a href="#fn-11.2" name="fnref-11.2" id="fnref-11.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others made +it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more venerated by his +goodness and infinite other virtues. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-11.2" id="fn-11.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-11.2">[2]</a> +Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap12"></a>CHAPTER XII.<br /> +HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES +</h2> + +<p> +Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such +principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having +considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and +having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and to +hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of offence +and defence which belong to each of them. +</p> + +<p> +We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his +foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to +ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or +composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws +where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well +armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion +and shall speak of the arms. +</p> + +<p> +I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are +either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and +auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on +these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, +ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly +before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and +destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is +robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other +attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is +not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be +your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves +off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble to prove, for the +ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for +many years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and +appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed +what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize +Italy with chalk in hand;<a href="#fn-12.1" name="fnref-12.1" id="fnref-12.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they +were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were +the sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.1" id="fn-12.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.1">[1]</a> +“With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the +<i>bons mots</i> of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles +VIII seized Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his +quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the country. +<i>Cf</i>. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King +Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a kind of a +felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy without resistance: so +that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came +into Italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather than +with swords to fight.” +</p> + +<p> +I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The mercenary +captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot +trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by +oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your +intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual +way. +</p> + +<p> +And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, whether +mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to, either by +a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in person and perform +the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its citizens, and when one +is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and +when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave the +command. And experience has shown princes and republics, single-handed, +making the greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; +and it is more difficult to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, +under the sway of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed with +foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The +Switzers are completely armed and quite free. +</p> + +<p> +Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who were +oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, +although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. After the +death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of their soldiers +by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their liberty. +</p> + +<p> +Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against the +Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,<a href="#fn-12.2" name="fnref-12.2" id="fnref-12.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father, +Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna<a href="#fn-12.3" name="fnref-12.3" id="fnref-12.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into +the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the +Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and +yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them, I +reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of +the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not +conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitions +elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,<a href="#fn-12.4" name="fnref-12.4" id="fnref-12.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one will +acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have stood at his +discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each +other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church +and the kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while +ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent +man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man +had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the +Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies +they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. The +Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted +safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with +armed gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned to +enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook this +virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their +expansion on land, through not having much territory, and because of their +great reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when they +expanded, as under Carmignuola,<a href="#fn-12.5" name="fnref-12.5" id="fnref-12.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man +(they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, +knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer +conquer under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they +able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had acquired, +they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him. They had +afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, +the count of Pitigliano,<a href="#fn-12.6" name="fnref-12.6" id="fnref-12.6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> +and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened +afterwards at Vaila,<a href="#fn-12.7" name="fnref-12.7" id="fnref-12.7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> +where in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had +acquired with so much trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but +slowly, long delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.2" id="fn-12.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.2">[2]</a> +Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.3" id="fn-12.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.3">[3]</a> +Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.4" id="fn-12.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.4">[4]</a> +Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John Hawkwood. He fought +in the English wars in France, and was knighted by Edward III; afterwards he +collected a body of troops and went into Italy. These became the famous +“White Company.” He took part in many wars, and died in Florence in +1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married +Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.5" id="fn-12.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.5">[5]</a> +Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, executed at +Venice, 5th May 1432. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.6" id="fn-12.6"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.6">[6]</a> +Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San Severino; died +fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria, in 1487. “Primo +capitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; Nicolo +Orsini, born 1442, died 1510. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.7" id="fn-12.7"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.7">[7]</a> +Battle of Vaila in 1509. +</p> + +<p> +And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled for +many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, in order +that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared to +counteract them. You must understand that the empire has recently come to +be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal power, +and that Italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason that +many of the great cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerly +favoured by the emperor, were oppressing them, whilst the Church was +favouring them so as to gain authority in temporal power: in many others +their citizens became princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell +partly into the hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church +consisting of priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, +both commenced to enlist foreigners. +</p> + +<p> +The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,<a href="#fn-12.8" name="fnref-12.8" id="fnref-12.8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> +the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and +Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came all the +other captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy; and the end of all +their valour has been, that she has been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, +ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has +guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might +increase their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without +territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did +not give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a +moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were +brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were +not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used every +art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing +in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not +attack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at +night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did +they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military +rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers; +thus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.8" id="fn-12.8"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.8">[8]</a> +Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in Romagna. He was the +leader of the famous “Company of St George,” composed entirely of +Italian soldiers. He died in 1409. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap13"></a>CHAPTER XIII.<br /> +CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN +</h2> + +<p> +Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince is +called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in the +most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara, had poor +proof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, +King of Spain,<a href="#fn-13.1" name="fnref-13.1" id="fnref-13.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in +themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for +losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.1" id="fn-13.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.1">[1]</a> +Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), surnamed “The +Catholic,” born 1452, died 1516. +</p> + +<p> +And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish to +leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which cannot +fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw himself +entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune brought +about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice; +because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the Switzers having +risen and driven out the conquerors (against all expectation, both his and +others), it so came to pass that he did not become prisoner to his +enemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, he having conquered by +other arms than theirs. +</p> + +<p> +The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand Frenchmen +to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other time of their +troubles. +</p> + +<p> +The Emperor of Constantinople,<a href="#fn-13.2" name="fnref-13.2" id="fnref-13.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +to oppose his neighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war +being finished, were not willing to quit; this was the beginning of the +servitude of Greece to the infidels. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.2" id="fn-13.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.2">[2]</a> +Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, +for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the +ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others; +but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better +opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one community, +they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made +their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure +you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in +auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these +arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them +than to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real victory which is +gained with the arms of others. +</p> + +<p> +I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke +entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, +and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces not +appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less +danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on +handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he +destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference between one and +the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers the +difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the +French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his own +soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever +increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw that +he was complete master of his own forces. +</p> + +<p> +I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am +unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I have +named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the +Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like our +Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he could +neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and +afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens. +</p> + +<p> +I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament +applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with +Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed him +with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on his +back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the +enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of others +either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast. +</p> + +<p> +Charles the Seventh,<a href="#fn-13.3" name="fnref-13.3" id="fnref-13.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +the father of King Louis the Eleventh,<a href="#fn-13.4" name="fnref-13.4" id="fnref-13.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, recognized +the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in his +kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his son, +King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the Switzers, which +mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to that +kingdom; because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely +diminished the value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry +altogether; and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as +they are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that +they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot stand +against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off well +against others. The armies of the French have thus become mixed, partly +mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together are much better than +mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one’s own +forces. And this example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be +unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.3" id="fn-13.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.3">[3]</a> +Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died +1461. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.4" id="fn-13.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.4">[4]</a> +Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483. +</p> + +<p> +But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks well at +first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above of +hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot recognize evils +until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight is given to +few. And if the first disaster to the Roman Empire<a href="#fn-13.5" name="fnref-13.5" id="fnref-13.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the enlisting +of the Goths; because from that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to +decline, and all that valour which had raised it passed away to others. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.5" id="fn-13.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.5">[5]</a> +“Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the +reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of the +conditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence. When Mr +Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank under the weight +of its military obligations, he said that this was ‘wholly +unhistorical.’ He might well have added that the Roman power was at its +zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, +but that it began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer +recognised.”—<i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, 15th May 1906. +</p> + +<p> +I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its +own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not +having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has always +been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain +or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. And one’s +own forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, or +dependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to make +ready one’s own forces will be easily found if the rules suggested by me +shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the father +of Alexander the Great, and many republics and princes have armed and +organized themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap14"></a>CHAPTER XIV.<br /> +THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR +</h2> + +<p> +A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else +for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole +art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not +only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise +from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that +when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their +states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and +what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of the art. Francesco +Sforza, through being martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; +and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from +dukes became private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed +brings you, it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those +ignominies against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown +later on. Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the +unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield +obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should +be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one disdain +and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well +together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, +over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be +respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, +therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace +he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do +in two ways, the one by action, the other by study. +</p> + +<p> +As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well +organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he +accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of +localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys +open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and +marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge is +useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his country, and is better +able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the knowledge and +observation of that locality, he understands with ease any other which it +may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, +and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, +have a certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a +knowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a +knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the +essential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it +teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to +array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage. +</p> + +<p> +Philopoemen,<a href="#fn-14.1" name="fnref-14.1" id="fnref-14.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which writers have bestowed on him, +is commended because in time of peace he never had anything in his mind but the +rules of war; and when he was in the country with friends, he often stopped and +reasoned with them: “If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should +find ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should +one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, +how ought we to pursue?” And he would set forth to them, as he went, all +the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion and +state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual discussions +there could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected circumstances that he +could not deal with. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-14.1" id="fn-14.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-14.1">[1]</a> +Philopoemen, “the last of the Greeks,” born 252 B.C., died 183 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and study +there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne +themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so +as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as an +illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised and +famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his +mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar +Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by +Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of Scipio how that +imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, and +liberality Scipio conformed to those things which have been written of +Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to observe some such rules, and +never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with +industry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so +that if fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap15"></a>CHAPTER XV.<br /> +CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED +</h2> + +<p> +It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince +towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have written on this +point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it again, +especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of other +people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful +to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up +the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for many have +pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known +or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to +live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner +effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act +entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him +among so much that is evil. +</p> + +<p> +Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to +do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. Therefore, +putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, and discussing +those which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken of, and +chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable for some of +those qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is +that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because +an avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to possess by +robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much of the +use of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one +compassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and +cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, another haughty; one +lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, +another easy; one grave, another frivolous; one religious, another +unbelieving, and the like. And I know that every one will confess that it +would be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities +that are considered good; but because they can neither be entirely +possessed nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is +necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid +the reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also to +keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it; +but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon himself +to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a +reproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved with +difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be found +that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; +whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him +security and prosperity. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap16"></a>CHAPTER XVI.<br /> +CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS +</h2> + +<p> +Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I say +that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, liberality +exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injures +you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised, it +may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite. +Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is +obliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus +inclined will consume in such acts all his property, and will be compelled +in the end, if he wish to maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh +down his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. This +will soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be +little valued by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many +and rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled +by whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing +to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of liberality +in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if he is wise he +ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in time he will come +to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that with his economy his +revenues are enough, that he can defend himself against all attacks, and +is able to engage in enterprises without burdening his people; thus it +comes to pass that he exercises liberality towards all from whom he does +not take, who are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does +not give, who are few. +</p> + +<p> +We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have +been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was +assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he did +not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King of +France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on +his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long +thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or +conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A prince, +therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he can +defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he is not +forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputation +for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will enable him to +govern. +</p> + +<p> +And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and many +others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, and by +being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, or in a +way to become one. In the first case this liberality is dangerous, in the +second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; and Caesar was one +of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived +after becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have +destroyed his government. And if any one should reply: Many have been +princes, and have done great things with armies, who have been considered +very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends that which is his own or his +subjects’ or else that of others. In the first case he ought to be +sparing, in the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for +liberality. And to the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting it +by pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, +this liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by +soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects’ you can be +a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not +take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; +it is only squandering your own that injures you. +</p> + +<p> +And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you +exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor or +despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a prince +should guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated; +and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have a +reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be +compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to incur a name for +rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap17"></a>CHAPTER XVII.<br /> +CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN +FEARED +</h2> + +<p> +Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every prince +ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. Nevertheless he ought +to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; +notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored +it to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to +have been much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a +reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.<a href="#fn-17.1" name="fnref-17.1" id="fnref-17.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought +not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be +more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, +from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole +people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the +individual only. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-17.1" id="fn-17.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-17.1">[1]</a> +During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi factions in 1502 and +1503. +</p> + +<p> +And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the +imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence +Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign +owing to its being new, saying: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt<br /> +Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.”<a href="#fn-17.2" name="fnref-17.2" id="fnref-17.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he +himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and +humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and too +much distrust render him intolerable. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-17.2" id="fn-17.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-17.2">[2]</a> +. . . against my will, my fate<br /> +A throne unsettled, and an infant state,<br /> +Bid me defend my realms with all my pow’rs,<br /> +And guard with these severities my shores.<br /> +<br /> +Christopher Pitt. +</p> + +<p> +Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared +or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both, +but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer +to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with. +Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are +ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed +they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life, +and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it +approaches they turn against you. And that prince who, relying entirely on +their promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because +friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or +nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in +time of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending +one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the +link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every +opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of +punishment which never fails. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does +not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being +feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains +from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women. But +when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he +must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all +things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more +quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. +Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are never wanting; for he +who has once begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts for +seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the +contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince +is with his army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it +is quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for +without it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties. +</p> + +<p> +Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that having +led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to fight in +foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or against the +prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This arose from nothing +else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valour, made him +revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without that +cruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect. And +short-sighted writers admire his deeds from one point of view and from +another condemn the principal cause of them. That it is true his other +virtues would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case +of Scipio, that most excellent man, not only of his own times but within +the memory of man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; +this arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his +soldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. For +this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the +corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate +of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the +legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone +in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew +much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This +disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have destroyed +in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the control of +the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but +contributed to his glory. +</p> + +<p> +Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the +conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing +according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself on +that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must +endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap18"></a>CHAPTER XVIII.<a href="#fn-18.1" name="fnref-18.1" id="fnref-18.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a><br /> +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH +</h2> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.1" id="fn-18.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.1">[1]</a> +“The present chapter has given greater offence than any other portion of +Machiavelli’s writings.” Burd, “Il Principe,” p. 297. +</p> + +<p> +Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live +with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that +those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little +account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in +the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know there +are two ways of contesting,<a href="#fn-18.2" name="fnref-18.2" id="fnref-18.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +the one by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the +second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is +necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a +prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has +been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how +Achilles and many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to +nurse, who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they +had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a +prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other +is not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the +beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend +himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. +Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to +terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what +they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when +such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him +to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not +hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are +not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince +legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern +examples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been +made void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has +known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.2" id="fn-18.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.2">[2]</a> +“Contesting,” <i>i.e</i>. “striving for mastery.” Mr +Burd points out that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero’s +“De Officiis”: “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per +disceptationem, alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc +beluarum; confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.” +</p> + +<p> +But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be +a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to +present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who +will allow himself to be deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over in +silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thought +of doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a man who +had greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, +yet would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according +to his wishes,<a href="#fn-18.3" name="fnref-18.3" id="fnref-18.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> because he well understood this side of mankind. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.3" id="fn-18.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.3">[3]</a> +“Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).” The +words “ad votum” are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550.<br /> +<br /> +Alexander never did what he said,<br /> +Cesare never said what he did.<br /> +<br /> +Italian Proverb. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I +have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I +shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them +is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear +merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a +mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and +know how to change to the opposite. +</p> + +<p> +And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, cannot +observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in +order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,<a href="#fn-18.4" name="fnref-18.4" id="fnref-18.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to have a +mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune +force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can +avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.4" id="fn-18.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.4">[4]</a> +“Contrary to fidelity” or “faith,” “contro alla +fede,” and “tutto fede,” “altogether faithful,” +in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy that these two phrases, “contro +alla fede” and “tutto fede,” were omitted in the Testina +edition, which was published with the sanction of the papal authorities. It may +be that the meaning attached to the word “fede” was “the +faith,” <i>i.e</i>. the Catholic creed, and not as rendered here +“fidelity” and “faithful.” Observe that the word +“religione” was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being +used to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness “the +religion,” a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot heresy. +South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as follows: +“That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, Nicolo Machiavel, laid +down this for a master rule in his political scheme: ‘That the show of +religion was helpful to the politician, but the reality of it hurtful and +pernicious.’” +</p> + +<p> +For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything +slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five +qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether +merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more +necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge +generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to +everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees +what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare +not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of +the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of +princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result. +</p> + +<p> +For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding +his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be +praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing +seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the +vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no ground +to rest on. +</p> + +<p> +One prince<a href="#fn-18.5" name="fnref-18.5" id="fnref-18.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else +but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had +kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.5" id="fn-18.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.5">[5]</a> +Ferdinand of Aragon. “When Machiavelli was writing <i>The Prince</i> it +would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand’s name here +without giving offence.” Burd’s “Il Principe,” p. 308. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap19"></a>CHAPTER XIX.<br /> +THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED +</h2> + +<p> +Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I have +spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss briefly +under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in part +said before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or +contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have +fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches. +</p> + +<p> +It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and +to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both of +which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor their honor is +touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with +the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways. +</p> + +<p> +It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, +mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should guard himself +as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness, +courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his +subjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain +himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or +to get round him. +</p> + +<p> +That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, and +he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, provided +it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, he +can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince ought to +have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other +from without, on account of external powers. From the latter he is +defended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he is well +armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet +within when they are quiet without, unless they should have been already +disturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if +he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long +as he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis the +Spartan did. +</p> + +<p> +But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has +only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can +easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping +the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him to +accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most efficacious +remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated +and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a prince always +expects to please them by his removal; but when the conspirator can only +look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such +a course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. +And as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have +been successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he +take a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and +as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him +the material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can +look for every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be +assured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must +be a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to +keep faith with you. +</p> + +<p> +And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side of +the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of +punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the +majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the +state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the popular +goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire. +For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of +his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime; +because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot +hope for any escape. +</p> + +<p> +Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content with +one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale +Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present Annibale), +having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him, not one +of his family survived but Messer Giovanni,<a href="#fn-19.1" name="fnref-19.1" id="fnref-19.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the people rose and +murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the popular goodwill which the +house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in Bologna; which was so great that, +although none remained there after the death of Annibale who was able to rule +the state, the Bolognese, having information that there was one of the +Bentivogli family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son +of a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of their +city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the +government. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-19.1" id="fn-19.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-19.1">[1]</a> +Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He ruled Bologna +from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of conspiracies may +get its edge from his own very recent experience (February 1513), when he had +been arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the Boscoli +conspiracy. +</p> + +<p> +For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of +little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is hostile +to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and +everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care +not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied +and contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can +have. +</p> + +<p> +Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, and +in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and +security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its +authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of the +nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths would +be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the hatred +of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect +them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the +king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be liable to +from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people for +favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could +beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the king. +Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or a +greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can draw +another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of +reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their own +hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, +but not so as to make himself hated by the people. +</p> + +<p> +It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths of +the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to my +opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great qualities +of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed by +subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer +these objections, I will recall the characters of some of the emperors, +and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those +alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for consideration those +things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times. +</p> + +<p> +It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the +empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were Marcus and +his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus +Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. +</p> + +<p> +There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the ambition +of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contended +with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with +the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset with +difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to give +satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people loved peace, +and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers +loved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which +qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people, so +that they could get double pay and give vent to their own greed and +cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were always overthrown who, +either by birth or training, had no great authority, and most of them, +especially those who came new to the principality, recognizing the +difficulty of these two opposing humours, were inclined to give +satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. +Which course was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by +someone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every +one, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the +utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, +those emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered +more readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out +advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to +maintain authority over them. +</p> + +<p> +From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being all +men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and +benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died +honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and +owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, being +possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both +orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor +despised. +</p> + +<p> +But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who, +being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure the +honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, having given +cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old +age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And +here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as +by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his +state is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom +you think you have need of to maintain yourself—it may be either the +people or the soldiers or the nobles—you have to submit to its +humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm. +</p> + +<p> +But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, that +among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the +fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by him +unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed +himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the army +conspired against him, and murdered him. +</p> + +<p> +Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus +Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-men +who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of +iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a bad end; +but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers +friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned +successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of the +soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awed +and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this +man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well +how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, +it is necessary for a prince to imitate. +</p> + +<p> +Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in +Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome +and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian +soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the +throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known +that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, +elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for +Severus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two +difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had +caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west where +Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he considered it +dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to attack Niger +and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected emperor +by the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and sent him +the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his +colleague; which things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after +Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he +returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, little +recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by treachery +sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish +him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and took from him his +government and life. He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions +of this man will find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he +will find him feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the +army; and it need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold +the empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from +that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his +violence. +</p> + +<p> +But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent +qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and +acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of +fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused +him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties +were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he +killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria. +He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had around +him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army by a +centurion. And here it must be noted that such-like deaths, which are +deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be +avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear to die can inflict +them; but a prince may fear them the less because they are very rare; he +has only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs +or has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken +this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom +also he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it +turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin. +</p> + +<p> +But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to hold +the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had +only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and +soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up to +amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his +rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity, +often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators, and doing +other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he fell into +contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and despised by +the other, he was conspired against and was killed. +</p> + +<p> +It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike +man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of +whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the +throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated +and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him +into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great +indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to his +dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the imperial +seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, +through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many +cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of +his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the +Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, +to which may be added his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia and +meeting with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, +and fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him. +</p> + +<p> +I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being +thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this +discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this +difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far +less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some +indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that are +veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were the +armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary to give +satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary +to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people +rather the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful. +</p> + +<p> +From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him twelve +thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the +security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, putting +aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends. +The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the hands of +soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the people, he must +keep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the Soldan is +unlike all other principalities, for the reason that it is like the +Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or a +newly formed principality; because the sons of the old prince are not the +heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority, +and the sons remain only noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it +cannot be called a new principality, because there are none of those +difficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for although the prince +is new, the constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to +receive him as if he were its hereditary lord. +</p> + +<p> +But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will +consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal +to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how it +happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another, +only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. +Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and +Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the +principality; and likewise it would have been utterly destructive to +Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they not +having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps. +Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot imitate the actions of +Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow those of Severus, but he +ought to take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his +state, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state +that may already be stable and firm. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap20"></a>CHAPTER XX.<br /> +ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, +ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? +</h2> + +<p> +1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their +subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; +others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid +themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of +their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and +destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of +these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which +a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as +the matter of itself will admit. +</p> + +<p> +2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather when +he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by arming +them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become +faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects +become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when +those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more +freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they quite +understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, considering +it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and service should +have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once +offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for +want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you. +And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to +mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they should +be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful +enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince +in a new principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of +examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a +province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that +state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these +again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; +and matters should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the +state shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near +you. +</p> + +<p> +3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to +say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by +fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their +tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This may +have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced, but +I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, because +I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain +that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, +because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the +other will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by +the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their +tributary cities; and although they never allowed them to come to +bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the +citizens, distracted by their differences, should not unite against them. +Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, after +the rout at Vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state. +Such methods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince, because these +factions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods +for enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in +times of peace, but if war comes this policy proves fallacious. +</p> + +<p> +4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the difficulties +and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore fortune, +especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who has a greater +necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise +and form designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity of +overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which his +enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that a wise prince, +when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity +against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher. +</p> + +<p> +5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance +in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among +those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of +Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by +others. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so +much with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who at the +commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a +description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be gained +over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the +prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for +them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; +and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those +who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since +the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of +secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the +reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a +natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, +then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, +for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons +for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern +affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends of +those men who were contented under the former government, and are +therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, were +favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it. +</p> + +<p> +6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states more +securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who +might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a first +attack. I praise this system because it has been made use of formerly. +Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to +demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he might keep that state; +Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been +driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that +province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose +it; the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, +therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in +one way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the +prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build +fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the people +ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has +made, and will make, more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other +disorder in the state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—not +to be hated by the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet +they will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting +foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been +seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless +to the Countess of Forli,<a href="#fn-20.1" name="fnref-20.1" id="fnref-20.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was +able to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and +thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that +the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little value +to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, her +enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer for +her, both then and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have +had the fortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him who +builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, +trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-20.1" id="fn-20.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-20.1">[1]</a> +Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia Landriani, born +1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as +envoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces the +appointment: “I have been with the signori,” wrote Fortunati, +“to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me that Nicolo +Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary to my Lords of the +Ten, is to leave with me at once.” <i>Cf</i>. “Catherine +Sforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap21"></a>CHAPTER XXI.<br /> +HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN +</h2> + +<p> +Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a +fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of +Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has risen, by fame +and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the foremost king in +Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds you will find them all +great and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he +attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions. +He did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance, for he +held the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in thinking of the war +and not anticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceive that by +these means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was able +with the money of the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and +by that long war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has +since distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as +to undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to +driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a +more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he +assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; +and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, and have +kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with +the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of +the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against +him. +</p> + +<p> +Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal +affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano, +who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some +extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of +rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a prince +ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain for +himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man. +</p> + +<p> +A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright +enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself +in favour of one party against the other; which course will always be more +advantageous than standing neutral; because if two of your powerful +neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one of +them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case it will +always be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war +strenuously; because, in the first case, if you do not declare yourself, +you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and +satisfaction of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasons +to offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you. Because he who +conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time +of trial; and he who loses will not harbour you because you did not +willingly, sword in hand, court his fate. +</p> + +<p> +Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive out +the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the +Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the Romans +urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in the +council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to stand +neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: “As for that which has been +said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to +interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by not +interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the guerdon +of the conqueror.” Thus it will always happen that he who is not your +friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will +entreat you to declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to +avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are +generally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour +of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although +the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is +indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are +never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing +you. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not +show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally +yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may +aid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again. +</p> + +<p> +In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that you +have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it greater +prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one by the +aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him; and +conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your +assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted that +a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one more +powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless +necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are at +his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being at +the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against the +Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could have been +avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentines +when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then in such a +case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of the +parties. +</p> + +<p> +Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe +courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because +it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble +without running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to +distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser +evil. +</p> + +<p> +A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour the +proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his citizens +to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and agriculture, +and in every other following, so that the one should not be deterred from +improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him or +another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the prince ought to +offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any way +to honour his city or state. +</p> + +<p> +Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at +convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into guilds or +into societies,<a href="#fn-21.1" name="fnref-21.1" id="fnref-21.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and +show himself an example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always +maintaining the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in +anything. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-21.1" id="fn-21.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-21.1">[1]</a> +“Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.” +“Arti” were craft or trade guilds, <i>cf</i>. Florio: +“Arte . . . a whole company of any trade in any city or corporation +town.” The guilds of Florence are most admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe +Staley in his work on the subject (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat +similar character, called “artel,” exist in Russia to-day, +<i>cf</i>. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s “Russia,” ed. 1905: +“The sons . . . were always during the working season members of an +artel. In some of the larger towns there are artels of a much more complex +kind— permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarily +responsible for the acts of the individual members.” The word +“artel,” despite its apparent similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude +assures me, no connection with “ars” or “arte.” Its +root is that of the verb “rotisya,” to bind oneself by an oath; and +it is generally admitted to be only another form of “rota,” which +now signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the underlying +idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu” were +possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included individuals +connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or +“clans” would be most appropriate. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap22"></a>CHAPTER XXII.<br /> +CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES +</h2> + +<p> +The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they +are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the +first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by +observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and +faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to +recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are +otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which +he made was in choosing them. +</p> + +<p> +There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to be +a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there are +three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another +which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which neither +comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is the most +excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore, it follows +necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he was in the +second, for whenever one has judgment to know good and bad when it is said +and done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he can +recognize the good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise +and the other correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is +kept honest. +</p> + +<p> +But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one test +which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his own +interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in +everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever +be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his hands +ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and never pay +any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned. +</p> + +<p> +On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study +him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him +the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he cannot +stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, many +riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dread +chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, are thus +disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, the end +will always be disastrous for either one or the other. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap23"></a>CHAPTER XXIII.<br /> +HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED +</h2> + +<p> +I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is +a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they are +very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whom courts +are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in +a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from +this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of +falling into contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself +from flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth +does not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth, respect +for you abates. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise +men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the +truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of +none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to +their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these +councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in +such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall +speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen +to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his +resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or +is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt. +</p> + +<p> +I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of affairs +to Maximilian,<a href="#fn-23.1" name="fnref-23.1" id="fnref-23.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: He consulted with no one, +yet never got his own way in anything. This arose because of his following a +practice the opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he +does not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on +them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they +are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being +pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he does one +day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends +to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-23.1" id="fn-23.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-23.1">[1]</a> +Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. He +married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after her death, Bianca +Sforza; and thus became involved in Italian politics. +</p> + +<p> +A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes +and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from +offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constant +inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which +he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not +told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt. +</p> + +<p> +And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression of +his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good +advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because +this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise himself +will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs +entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this case +indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long, because such +a governor would in a short time take away his state from him. +</p> + +<p> +But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more +than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to unite +them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and the +prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And they +are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to you +unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferred +that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the +prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap24"></a>CHAPTER XXIV.<br /> +WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES +</h2> + +<p> +The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to +appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed in +the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a new +prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and +when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than +ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by the +past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no +further; they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he fails +them not in other things. Thus it will be a double glory for him to have +established a new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with good +laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a +double disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of +wisdom. +</p> + +<p> +And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in Italy +in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, +there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in regard to arms +from the causes which have been discussed at length; in the next place, +some one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or +if he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure the +nobles. In the absence of these defects states that have power enough to +keep an army in the field cannot be lost. +</p> + +<p> +Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who was +conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the +greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a +warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he +sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the end he +lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their +principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own +sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change +(it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm +against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thought +of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people, +disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. This +course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to have +neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish to +fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to restore +you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for +your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which does not +depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable that +depend on yourself and your valour. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap25"></a>CHAPTER XXV.<br /> +WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER +</h2> + +<p> +It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that +the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune and by God that +men with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them; +and because of this they would have us believe that it is not necessary to +labour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been +more credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have +been seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. +Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. +Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that +Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,<a href="#fn-25.1" name="fnref-25.1" id="fnref-25.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little +less. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-25.1" id="fn-25.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-25.1">[1]</a> +Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: “The older one gets the more +convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does three-quarters of the +business of this miserable universe.” Sorel’s “Eastern +Question.” +</p> + +<p> +I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows +the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away the soil from +place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence, +without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its nature +be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes +fair, shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such a +manner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their +force be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with +fortune, who shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, +and thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and +defences have not been raised to constrain her. +</p> + +<p> +And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and +which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open +country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been +defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either this +invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it would not +have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning resistance +to fortune in general. +</p> + +<p> +But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be +seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of +disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes that +have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who relies +entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he will +be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the +times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be +successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which +every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by +various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force, +another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one +succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of +two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, +two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being +cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than +whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. +This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently bring +about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his +object and the other does not. +</p> + +<p> +Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himself +with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way that +his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if times and +affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action. +But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how to +accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from +what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always prospered +by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it; +and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous, +does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his +conduct with the times fortune would not have changed. +</p> + +<p> +Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and +found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action +that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against +Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians were +not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the enterprise +still under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless he personally +entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness and energy, a +move which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the +latter from fear, the former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; +on the other hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that +king, having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his +friend so as to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. +Therefore Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other +pontiff with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in +Rome until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything +fixed, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have +succeeded. Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, +and the others would have raised a thousand fears. +</p> + +<p> +I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they all +succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience the +contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go +cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have +deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him. +</p> + +<p> +I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast +in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but +unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better +to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you +wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is +seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than +by those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, +woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more +violent, and with more audacity command her. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap26"></a>CHAPTER XXVI.<br /> +AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS +</h2> + +<p> +Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and +wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a new +prince, and whether there were elements that would give an opportunity to +a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things which would do +honour to him and good to the people of this country, it appears to me +that so many things concur to favour a new prince that I never knew a time +more fit than the present. +</p> + +<p> +And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be +captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians +should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the +soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate +the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to +discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy +should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should be +more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, more +scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten, +despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation. +</p> + +<p> +Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us think +he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was afterwards +seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him; so that +Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal her wounds +and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy, to the +swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse those +sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God to send +someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous insolencies. +It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a banner if only +someone will raise it. +</p> + +<p> +Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope than in +your illustrious house,<a href="#fn-26.1" name="fnref-26.1" id="fnref-26.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +with its valour and fortune, favoured by God and by the Church of which it is +now the chief, and which could be made the head of this redemption. This will +not be difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the +men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were +men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for +their enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was God more +their friend than He is yours. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-26.1" id="fn-26.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-26.1">[1]</a> +Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. In 1523 +Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII. +</p> + +<p> +With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is +necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in them. +Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness is great +the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those men to whom +I have directed your attention. Further than this, how extraordinarily the +ways of God have been manifested beyond example: the sea is divided, a +cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth water, it has rained +manna, everything has contributed to your greatness; you ought to do the +rest. God is not willing to do everything, and thus take away our free +will and that share of glory which belongs to us. +</p> + +<p> +And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians have +been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious house; +and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns, it has +always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has happened +because the old order of things was not good, and none of us have known +how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to establish +new laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen. Such things +when they are well founded and dignified will make him revered and +admired, and in Italy there are not wanting opportunities to bring such +into use in every form. +</p> + +<p> +Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. Look +attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior the +Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when it comes to armies +they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from the insufficiency +of the leaders, since those who are capable are not obedient, and each one +seems to himself to know, there having never been any one so distinguished +above the rest, either by valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. +Hence it is that for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past +twenty years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always +given a poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, +afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.<a href="#fn-26.2" name="fnref-26.2" id="fnref-26.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-26.2" id="fn-26.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-26.2">[2]</a> +The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; Genoa, 1507; +Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513. +</p> + +<p> +If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable +men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things, as +a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own +forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better soldiers. +And although singly they are good, altogether they will be much better +when they find themselves commanded by their prince, honoured by him, and +maintained at his expense. Therefore it is necessary to be prepared with +such arms, so that you can be defended against foreigners by Italian +valour. +</p> + +<p> +And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very formidable, +nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which a third order +would not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied upon to +overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the Switzers +are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close combat. Owing +to this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to +resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by Spanish +infantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot be shown, +nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when +the Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions, who follow the +same tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with +the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and stood +out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless, and, if +the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with them. It is +possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these infantries, to +invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; +this need not create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. +And these are the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power +upon a new prince. +</p> + +<p> +This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting +Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love with +which he would be received in all those provinces which have suffered so +much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for revenge, with what +stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. What door would be +closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? What envy would hinder +him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all of us this barbarous +dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious house take up this +charge with that courage and hope with which all just enterprises are +undertaken, so that under its standard our native country may be ennobled, +and under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +Virtu contro al Furore<br /> + Prendera l’arme, e fia il combatter corto:<br /> +Che l’antico valore<br /> + Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.<br /> +<br /> +Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,<br /> + And it i’ th’ combat soon shall put to flight:<br /> +For the old Roman valour is not dead,<br /> + Nor in th’ Italians’ brests extinguished.<br /> +<br /> +Edward Dacre, 1640. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap27"></a>DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE +VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR +PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI +</h2> + +<p class="center"> +BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI +</p> + +<p> +The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to clear +himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been raised +against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of Arezzo and +other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, whence he +intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against Giovanni +Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring that city +under his domination, and to make it the head of his Romagnian duchy. +</p> + +<p> +These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and their +following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too powerful, +and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek to destroy +them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon this a meeting +was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to which came the +cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, Vitellozzo Vitelli, +Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the tyrant of Perugia, and +Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. +Here were discussed the power and courage of the duke and the necessity of +curbing his ambitions, which might otherwise bring danger to the rest of +being ruined. And they decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to +strive to win over the Florentines; and they sent their men to one place +and another, promising to one party assistance and to another +encouragement to unite with them against the common enemy. This meeting +was at once reported throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented +under the duke, among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of +effecting a revolution. +</p> + +<p> +Thus it arose that, men’s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by +certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held for +the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The castellan +was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there; so the +conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being carried to +the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from being drawn +up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping upon the bridge +and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being effected, the whole +state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being encouraged in this, not so +much by the capture of the fort, as by the Diet at Magione, from whom they +expected to get assistance. +</p> + +<p> +Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose the +opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any town, +should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and they sent +again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in destroying the +common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and that they ought +not to wait for another opportunity. +</p> + +<p> +But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli and +Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo Machiavelli, +their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the duke against his +enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, because, against +everybody’s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone over to the enemy +and he found himself disarmed and war at his door. But recovering courage +from the offers of the Florentines, he decided to temporize before +fighting with the few soldiers that remained to him, and to negotiate for +a reconciliation, and also to get assistance. This latter he obtained in +two ways, by sending to the King of France for men and by enlisting +men-at-arms and others whom he turned into cavalry of a sort: to all he +gave money. +</p> + +<p> +Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached +Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the aid +of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the duke +resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with offers of +reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did not fail in any +practices to make the insurgents understand that he wished every man who +had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough for him to have the +title of prince, whilst others might have the principality. +</p> + +<p> +And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to him +to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a +standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every +care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such +preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in +separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there came +also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found himself +sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open war, he +considered that it would be safer and more advantageous to outwit them, +and for this reason he did not stop the work of reconciliation. +</p> + +<p> +And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in +which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand +ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed an +alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come +personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the other +hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and other places +seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and not to make war +against or ally themselves with any one without his permission. +</p> + +<p> +This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, +again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his +state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the +fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by the +enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends. But +the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed his +men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of November +together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to Cesena, where he +stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the Vitelli and Orsini, +who had assembled with their men in the duchy of Urbino, as to the +enterprise in which they should now take part; but nothing being +concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that if the duke wished +to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were ready; if he did not +wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To this the duke replied that +he did not wish to enter into war with Tuscany, and thus become hostile to +the Florentines, but that he was very willing to proceed against +Sinigalia. +</p> + +<p> +It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the +fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give it +up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to come +there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being invited by +them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no suspicions. And +the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French men-at-arms who were +with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred lancers under Mons. di +Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena about the middle of December, +and went to Fano, and with the utmost cunning and cleverness he persuaded +the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them +that any lack of compliance would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and +permanency of the reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make +use of the arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very +stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not +offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by +Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he +agreed to wait. +</p> + +<p> +Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on +30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most trusted +followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor d’Euna, who was +afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as Vitellozzo, Pagolo +Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should arrive, his followers +in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting certain men to certain +pairs, who should entertain them until they reached Sinigalia; nor should +they be permitted to leave until they came to the duke’s quarters, where +they should be seized. +</p> + +<p> +The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which there +were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to assemble +by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from Fano, and +await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day of December +at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of about two +hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the infantry, whom he +accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms. +</p> + +<p> +Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of the +Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who goes +towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases of which +are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia is distant +from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot and from the +shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs a little river +which bathes that part of the walls looking towards Fano, facing the high +road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes for a good space by road +along the mountains, and reaches the river which passes by Sinigalia. If +he turns to his left hand along the bank of it, and goes for the distance +of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge which crosses the river; he is then +almost abreast of the gate that leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight +line, but transversely. Before this gate there stands a collection of +houses with a square to which the bank of the river forms one side. +</p> + +<p> +The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and to +honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant from +Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men of the +duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band, which +consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty horsemen, who +were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters having been thus +arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and when the leaders of +the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass over, but having opened +it, one portion wheeled towards the river and the other towards the +country, and a way was left in the middle through which the infantry +passed, without stopping, into the town. +</p> + +<p> +Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a few +horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a cape +lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his +approaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability of +the man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that +when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet the +duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He recommended his +house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his nephews that it +was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of their fathers that +should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came before the duke and +saluted him respectfully, and were received by him with goodwill; they +were at once placed between those who were commissioned to look after +them. +</p> + +<p> +But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band in +Sinigalia, was missing—for Oliverotto was waiting in the square +before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and drilling +them—signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care of +Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that +Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined +Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of their +quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke; and he +advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come himself to +meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice, came before the +duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and Oliverotto, having made his +obeisance, joined the others. +</p> + +<p> +So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke’s quarters, +and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made them +prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that the men of +Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. Those of +Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of the Orsini +and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment of the +destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, and bearing +in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and Vitellian houses, +they stood together against the hostile forces of the country and saved +themselves. +</p> + +<p> +But the duke’s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men of +Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not repressed +this outrage by killing some of them they would have completely sacked it. +Night having come and the tumult being silenced, the duke prepared to kill +Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a room and caused them to be +strangled. Neither of them used words in keeping with their past lives: +Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of the pope full pardon for his sins; +Oliverotto cringed and laid the blame for all injuries against the duke on +Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until +the duke heard from Rome that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the +Archbishop of Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which +news, on 18th January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were +strangled in the same way. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap28"></a>THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA +</h2> + +<p class="center"> +WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI +</p> + +<p class="center"> +And sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI +</p> + +<h3> +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328 +</h3> + +<p> +It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who have +considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them, who +have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in their +day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and obscurity; or have +been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way. They have either been +exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have had so mean a parentage +that in shame they have given themselves out to be sons of Jove or of some +other deity. It would be wearisome to relate who these persons may have +been because they are well known to everybody, and, as such tales would +not be particularly edifying to those who read them, they are omitted. I +believe that these lowly beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is +desirous of showing to the world that such men owe much to her and little +to wisdom, because she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take +no part in their career: thus all success must be attributed to her. +Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds, +if he is measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he +was born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor +distinguished in his birth, as the course of this history will show. It +appeared to be desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in +him such indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great +exemplar to men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his +actions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds. +</p> + +<p> +The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families of +Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in estate, +as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a son Antonio, +who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca, and for this +reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He had an only +sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso dying +she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again went to live with her +brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the house where he resided, +and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, any person could have +access to it without difficulty. One morning, shortly after sunrise, +Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called, had occasion +to go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the dinner, +and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves of a vine she turned her +eyes in that direction, and heard something resembling the cry of an +infant. Whereupon she went towards it, and saw the hands and face of a +baby who was lying enveloped in the leaves and who seemed to be crying for +its mother. Partly wondering and partly fearing, yet full of compassion, +she lifted it up and carried it to the house, where she washed it and +clothed it with clean linen as is customary, and showed it to Messer +Antonio when he returned home. When he heard what had happened and saw the +child he was not less surprised or compassionate than his sister. They +discussed between themselves what should be done, and seeing that he was +priest and that she had no children, they finally determined to bring it +up. They had a nurse for it, and it was reared and loved as if it were +their own child. They baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio +after their father. As the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and +gave evidence of wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond +his years those lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer +Antonio intended to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted +him into his canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was +given with this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of +Castruccio was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio +reached the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of +Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left off +reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, delighting +in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in running, leaping, and +wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he far excelled his companions +in courage and bodily strength, and if at any time he did turn to books, +only those pleased him which told of wars and the mighty deeds of men. +Messer Antonio beheld all this with vexation and sorrow. +</p> + +<p> +There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, named +Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, bodily +strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had often fought +under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a Ghibelline was the +valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman resided in Lucca and +was accustomed to assemble with others most mornings and evenings under +the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the top of the square of San +Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he had often seen Castruccio +taking part with other children of the street in those games of which I +have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far excelled the other boys, and +that he appeared to exercise a royal authority over them, and that they +loved and obeyed him, Messer Francesco became greatly desirous of learning +who he was. Being informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of +Castruccio he felt a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he +called him one day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in +the house of a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use +arms, or in the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses +and the services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased +Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he stood +silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer Francesco to +speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable, nothing would +please him more than to give up his priestly studies and take up those of +a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and in a very short time +he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was driven to yield by his +knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear that he would not be able +to hold him much longer. +</p> + +<p> +Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to the +house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was astonishing to +find that in a very short time he manifested all that virtue and bearing +which we are accustomed to associate with a true gentleman. In the first +place he became an accomplished horseman, and could manage with ease the +most fiery charger, and in all jousts and tournaments, although still a +youth, he was observed beyond all others, and he excelled in all exercises +of strength and dexterity. But what enhanced so much the charm of these +accomplishments, was the delightful modesty which enabled him to avoid +offence in either act or word to others, for he was deferential to the +great men, modest with his equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These +gifts made him beloved, not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all +Lucca. When Castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines +were driven from Pavia by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by +the Visconti to assist the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in +charge of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and +courage in this expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other +captain, and his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but +throughout all Lombardy. +</p> + +<p> +Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he left +it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many friends +as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary for that +purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son thirteen +years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to be his son’s +tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died Francesco called +Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that goodwill which he +(Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to the son the +gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the father. Upon the +death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and tutor of Pagolo, +which increased enormously his power and position, and created a certain +amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the former universal +goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring tyrannical intentions. +Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the head of the +Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of Messer Francesco to become +the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him that Castruccio, with the +great abilities which he already showed, and holding the position of +governor, deprived him of his opportunity; therefore he began to sow those +seeds which should rob Castruccio of his eminence. Castruccio at first +treated this with scorn, but afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that +Messer Giorgio might be able to bring him into disgrace with the deputy of +King Ruberto of Naples and have him driven out of Lucca. +</p> + +<p> +The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo, +who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became their +lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca, with whom +Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting their +restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought into his +plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of the Opizi. +Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio cautiously fortified +the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies and munitions of war, in +order that it might stand a siege for a few days in case of need. When the +night came which had been agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occupied the +plain between the mountains and Pisa with many men, the signal was given, +and without being observed Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and +set fire to the portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the +city, calling the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. +Uguccione entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer +Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The +governor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the +wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found +that more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those who +fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the +headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most +hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese. +</p> + +<p> +As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party that +the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they determined to +restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a large army in the +Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence they marched to +Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into Lucca. Upon this +Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and with a number of +German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved against the +quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the enemy withdrew +from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between Montecatini and Pescia. +Uguccione now took up a position near to Montecarlo, and within about two +miles of the enemy, and slight skirmishes between the horse of both +parties were of daily occurrence. Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the +Pisans and Lucchese delayed coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, +finding himself growing worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left +the command of the army in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought +about the ruin of the Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having +lost its captain had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio +observed this, and allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this +belief; he also showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the +munitions of the camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more +insolent the more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they +drew out in the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. +Presently, deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having +mastered their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he +spoke a few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to +them the certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands. +Castruccio had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the +centre of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of +the army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant +men on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he +moved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of his +lines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had +come in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centre +squadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the +wings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings of +the two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained out +of action, for these two portions of the line of battle were separated +from each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach each other. By +this expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio’s men were opposed to +the weaker part of the enemy’s troops, and the most efficient men of the +enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines were unable to fight with +those who were arrayed opposite to them, or to give any assistance to +their own flanks. So, without much difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to +flight on both flanks, and the centre battalions took to flight when they +found themselves exposed to attack, without having a chance of displaying +their valour. The defeat was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, +there being more than ten thousand men killed with many officers and +knights of the Guelph party in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come +to help them, among whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and +Carlo, his nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of +Castruccio the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, among +whom was Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was +killed in the first onset. +</p> + +<p> +This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that +Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it +appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of +power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only waited +for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the death of +Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in Lucca, the +murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge. On the +sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were driven +off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming to the +knowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him a proper +opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his son Neri, who +was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take Castruccio +prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio, fearing no evil, +went to the governor in a friendly way, was entertained at supper, and +then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing to put him to death lest the +people should be incensed, kept him alive, in order to hear further from +his father concerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and +cowardice of his son, and at once set out from Pisa to Lucca with four +hundred horsemen to finish the business in his own way; but he had not yet +reached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and +created Count Gaddo della Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reached +Lucca he heard of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise to +him to turn back, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them +should close their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard of +what had happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to +demand the liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had +arrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private circles, +afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised a tumult, +and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded that +Castruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse might +happen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered his +friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked Uguccione; +who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away with his friends +to Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in poverty. +</p> + +<p> +But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, and +he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people that they +appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having obtained this, +and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the recovery of the many +towns which had rebelled after the departure of Uguccione, and with the +help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded a treaty, he marched to +Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed a fort against it, which +is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course of two months Castruccio +captured the town. With the reputation gained at that siege, he rapidly +seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a short time had overrun the +whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the pass which leads from Lombardy +to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and wrested it from the hands of +Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the lord of it. After this victory he +returned to Lucca, and was welcomed by the whole people. And now +Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any longer to defer making himself a +prince, got himself created the lord of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del +Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico, Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, +all of whom he had corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and +deliberately elected prince by the people. At this time Frederick of +Bavaria, the King of the Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial +crown, and Castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met +him at the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as his +deputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because +of the people’s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was received +in great honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him, +and he was appointed the emperor’s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time the +Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had driven +out of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Frederick +created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of the +Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were constrained to +accept him as their lord. +</p> + +<p> +Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian +affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian Ghibellines, +who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio for help and +counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his country, if enabled +to recover it with his assistance. Among these exiles were Matteo Guidi, +Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, and Piero Buonaccorsi, all +exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. Castruccio had the secret intention of +becoming the master of all Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own +forces; and in order to gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a +league with Messer Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for +him the forces of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five +gates, he divided his own country districts into five parts, which he +supplied with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so +that he could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, +without those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he +surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer +Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven +out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the King +Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the Florentines in +their own territories, so that, being attacked at home, they should be +compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to defend +themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized Fucecchio and San +Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country. Whereupon the +Florentines recalled their army, which had scarcely reached Tuscany, when +Castruccio was forced by other necessities to return to Lucca. +</p> + +<p> +There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so powerful +that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance him to the +dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not received such +rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited other families +to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They found their +opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set upon the +lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and killed him. They +endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano di Poggio, a +peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion, intervened and +compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms; and he offered to +be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him what they desired. +Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater intelligence than they +had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the news of what had happened +at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in command of the army, and with a +troop of cavalry set out for home. Contrary to his expectations, he found +the rebellion at an end, yet he posted his men in the most advantageous +places throughout the city. As it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio +ought to be very much obliged to him, he sought him out, and without +saying anything on his own behalf, for he did not recognize any need for +doing so, he begged Castruccio to pardon the other members of his family +by reason of their youth, their former friendships, and the obligations +which Castruccio was under to their house. To this Castruccio graciously +responded, and begged Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave +him more pleasure to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him +anxiety to hear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his +family to him, saying that he thanked God for having given him the +opportunity of showing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of +Stefano and Castruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately +thrown into prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had +recovered San Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make +peace, as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at +Lucca to leave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a +truce, which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and +desirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded with +them for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conquests +they had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned his +attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should not again be +subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, under various +pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their ambition +might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, but depriving +them of country and property, and those whom he had in his hands of life +also, stating that he had found by experience that none of them were to be +trusted. Then for his further security he raised a fortress in Lucca with +the stones of the towers of those whom he had killed or hunted out of the +state. +</p> + +<p> +Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his +position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of +increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he could +get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, which was +his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends with the +mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both parties confided +their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it always had been, into the +Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the Bianchi was Bastiano di +Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each of these men held secret +communications with Castruccio, and each desired to drive the other out of +the city; and, after many threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo +fortified himself at the Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese +side of the city; both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, +because they believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to +fight than the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He +gave promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, +and to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the +appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself +direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and both +were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a signal +given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other Bastiano di +Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans of either +faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the hands of +Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the palace, compelled +the people to yield obedience to him, making them many promises and +remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to the city to see the +new prince, and all were filled with hope and quickly settled down, +influenced in a great measure by his great valour. +</p> + +<p> +About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness of +living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. The +German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened—murders +and tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put an +end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should call +in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of the +city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he could +apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not only to +give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome. Castruccio +considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the emperor this +service, because he believed that he himself would not be safe if at any +time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command at +Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six hundred horsemen, where he was +received by Enrico with the greatest distinction. In a short time the +presence of Castruccio obtained such respect for the emperor that, without +bloodshed or violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason of +Castruccio having sent by sea from the country round Pisa large quantities +of corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. When he had chastised +some of the Roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary obedience was +rendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman +senator. This dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being +clothed in a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on +its front: “I am what God wills.” Whilst on the back was: “What God +desires shall be.” +</p> + +<p> +During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio +should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could +tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be difficult +in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were Baldo Cecchi +and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face danger. These +men kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia, and with the aid +of the Florentines entered the city by night, and after driving out some +of Castruccio’s officials and partisans, and killing others, they restored +the city to its freedom. The news of this greatly angered Castruccio, and +taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When the +Florentines heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, they +decided to intercept him with their forces in the Val di Nievole, under +the belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pistoia. +Assembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph cause, the +Florentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other hand, +Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard where the +Florentines’ lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains of Pistoia, +nor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could, +to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if he +succeeded in this design, victory was assured, although he was informed +that the Florentines had thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve +thousand. Although he had every confidence in his own abilities and the +valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open +lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle between +Pescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole, +not in the exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in +places narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still +narrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that twenty +men side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a +German, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to +remain in possession of the castle, it being common to the Lucchese and +the Pistoians, and unclaimed by either—neither of them wishing to +displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and came +under obligations to no one. For these reasons, and also because the +castle was well fortified, he had always been able to maintain his +position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to fall upon his +enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and there was no +fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force before they became +engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this trouble with Florence +arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which possession of this +castle would give him, and having an intimate friendship with a resident +in the castle, he managed matters so with him that four hundred of his men +were to be admitted into the castle the night before the attack on the +Florentines, and the castellan put to death. +</p> + +<p> +Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the +Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away from +Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his army from +Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they reached their +encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill on the following +morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the castle at night, had +also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching from thence at midnight +in dead silence, had reached the foot of Serravalle: thus he and the +Florentines commenced the ascent of the hill at the same time in the +morning. Castruccio sent forward his infantry by the main road, and a +troop of four hundred horsemen by a path on the left towards the castle. +The Florentines sent forward four hundred cavalry ahead of their army +which was following, never expecting to find Castruccio in possession of +the hill, nor were they aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it +happened that the Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely +taken by surprise when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so +close were they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. +It was a case of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were +assailed with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own, +although some few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting +reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The +cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were unable +to get their men either backward or forward, owing to the narrowness of +the pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought to be done or +what could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were engaged with the +enemy’s infantry were scattered or killed without having made any +effective defence because of their unfortunate position, although in sheer +desperation they had offered a stout resistance. Retreat had been +impossible, with the mountains on both flanks, whilst in front were their +enemies, and in the rear their friends. When Castruccio saw that his men +were unable to strike a decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, +he sent one thousand infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join +the four hundred horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and +commanded the whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These +orders they carried out with such fury that the Florentines could not +sustain the attack, but gave way, and were soon in full retreat—conquered +more by their unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. +Those in the rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, +each man seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very +sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini +dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all Florentine +noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on the Florentine +side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the Guelphs. Immediately +the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out the friends of the +Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not content with occupying +Prato and all the castles on the plains on both sides of the Arno, but +marched his army into the plain of Peretola, about two miles from +Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the spoils, and celebrating +his victory with feasts and games, holding horse races, and foot races for +men and women. He also struck medals in commemoration of the defeat of the +Florentines. He endeavoured to corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, +who were to open the city gates at night; but the conspiracy was +discovered, and the participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom +were Tommaso Lupacci and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the +Florentines great anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, +they sent envoys to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of +their city; and he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of +the Guelph cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines +to receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and +he sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen. +</p> + +<p> +Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the +pressure of Castruccio’s army, owing to his being compelled to leave his +positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a +conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, one +of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland should +be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this conspiracy, +intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of Castruccio, and +drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy paucity of numbers is +essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few are not sufficient, and +in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy Lanfranchi encountered a +person who revealed the design to Castruccio. This betrayal cannot be +passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, +two Florentine exiles who were suffering their banishment in Pisa. +Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put him to death, and beheaded +many other noble citizens, and drove their families into exile. It now +appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughly +disaffected; he employed much thought and energy upon securing his +position there, and this gave the Florentines their opportunity to +reorganize their army, and to await the coming of Carlo, the son of the +King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided to lose no more time, and +assembled a great army of more than thirty thousand infantry and ten +thousand cavalry—having called to their aid every Guelph there was +in Italy. They consulted whether they should attack Pistoia or Pisa first, +and decided that it would be better to march on the latter—a course, +owing to the recent conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more +advantage to them, because they believed that the surrender of Pistoia +would follow the acquisition of Pisa. +</p> + +<p> +In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army and +quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from thence +on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army which the +Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree alarmed, +believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would deliver the +empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to think that his +enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects of success, than +at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand foot soldiers and four +thousand horsemen, and with this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sent +Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand infantry. Fucecchio has a +stronger position than any other town in the Pisan district, owing to its +situation between the rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevation +above the surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its +being victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approach +it either from the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through +to Pisa, or attack Castruccio’s forces except at a disadvantage. In one +case they would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one +under his own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case +they would have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy, +an undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to take +this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of the +river and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse +of land between them and the river. +</p> + +<p> +The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to +decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and, +having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the +latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet the +water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the saddles of +the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the Florentines commenced +the battle by ordering forward a number of cavalry and ten thousand +infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was fixed, and who well knew +what to do, at once attacked the Florentines with five thousand infantry +and three thousand horsemen, not allowing them to issue from the river +before he charged them; he also sent one thousand light infantry up the +river bank, and the same number down the Arno. The infantry of the +Florentines were so much impeded by their arms and the water that they +were not able to mount the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had made +the passage of the river more difficult for the others, by reason of the +few who had crossed having broken up the bed of the river, and this being +deep with mud, many of the horses rolled over with their riders and many +of them had stuck so fast that they could not move. When the Florentine +captains saw the difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them +and moved higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less +treacherous and the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met at +the bank by the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who, +being light armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with +tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses, +alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and trampled +each other in great confusion. The fight between the men of Castruccio and +those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp and terrible; both +sides fought with the utmost desperation and neither would yield. The +soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back into the river, +whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land in order to make +room for the others pressing forward, who if they could but get out of the +water would be able to fight, and in this obstinate conflict they were +urged on by their captains. Castruccio shouted to his men that these were +the same enemies whom they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the +Florentines reproached each other that the many should be overcome by the +few. At length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that +both his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had +many killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take +up a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded +these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and one +part of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This cleared a +space of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and thus gained +possession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these tired soldiers +found themselves at close quarters with Castruccio’s reserves they could +not stand against them and at once fell back into the river. The cavalry +of either side had not as yet gained any decisive advantage over the +other, because Castruccio, knowing his inferiority in this arm, had +commanded his leaders only to stand on the defensive against the attacks +of their adversaries, as he hoped that when he had overcome the infantry +he would be able to make short work of the cavalry. This fell out as he +had hoped, for when he saw the Florentine army driven back across the +river he ordered the remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry of +the enemy. This they did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their own +cavalry, fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to +flight. The Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry +had met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry +cross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio’s +army. But here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of +Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines were +so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them +escaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains were +taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo +Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine commissioners, fled to +Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter was infinitely greater, as +might be expected in such a battle. Of the Florentines there fell twenty +thousand two hundred and thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost one +thousand five hundred and seventy men. +</p> + +<p> +But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his life +just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus ruined all +those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry into effect, +and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but death could have +stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle the whole of the +day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued and overheated, he +stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on their return from +victory and personally thank them. He was also on the watch for any +attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day; he being of the +opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be the first man in the +saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio stood exposed to a wind +which often rises at midday on the banks of the Arno, and which is often +very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as +he was accustomed to such troubles; but it was the cause of his death. On +the following night he was attacked with high fever, which increased so +rapidly that the doctors saw it must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, +called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the midst +of the career which was leading to that glory which all my successes +promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left thee, if a +smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, because I should +have been content with the governorships of Lucca and Pisa. I should +neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the Florentines with +so many injuries. But I would have made both these peoples my friends, and +I should have lived, if no longer, at least more peacefully, and have left +you a state without a doubt smaller, but one more secure and established +on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who insists upon having the +arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me with sufficient judgment to +recognize this from the first, nor the time to surmount it. Thou hast +heard, for many have told thee, and I have never concealed it, how I +entered the house of thy father whilst yet a boy—a stranger to all +those ambitions which every generous soul should feel—and how I was +brought up by him, and loved as though I had been born of his blood; how +under his governance I learned to be valiant and capable of availing +myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been witness. When thy good +father came to die, he committed thee and all his possessions to my care, +and I have brought thee up with that love, and increased thy estate with +that care, which I was bound to show. And in order that thou shouldst not +only possess the estate which thy father left, but also that which my +fortune and abilities have gained, I have never married, so that the love +of children should never deflect my mind from that gratitude which I owed +to the children of thy father. Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I +am well content, but I am deeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee +unsettled and insecure. Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which +will never rest contented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa, +where the men are of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they +may be sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve +under a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up +with factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the +wrongs recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended +Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly destroyed, +who will hail the news of my death with more delight than they would the +acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the princes of Milan +thou canst place no reliance, for they are far distant, slow, and their +help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou hast no hope in anything but +in thine own abilities, and in the memory of my valour, and in the +prestige which this latest victory has brought thee; which, as thou +knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist thee to come to terms +with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering under this great defeat, +should be inclined to listen to thee. And whereas I have sought to make +them my enemies, because I believed that war with them would conduce to my +power and glory, thou hast every inducement to make friends of them, +because their alliance will bring thee advantages and security. It is of +the greatest important in this world that a man should know himself, and +the measure of his own strength and means; and he who knows that he has +not a genius for fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. +And it will be well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to +learn in this way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and +in this thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that +what I have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in +that I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.” +</p> + +<p> +After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, and +Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending Pagolo +to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his successor, he died. +He left a happy memory to those who had known him, and no prince of those +times was ever loved with such devotion as he was. His obsequies were +celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he was buried in San Francesco +at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to +Castruccio, for he had not the abilities. Not long after the death of +Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty +held on to Lucca. This latter city continued in the family of Guinigi +until the time of the great-grandson of Pagolo. +</p> + +<p> +From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a man +of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time, but +also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the ordinary +height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious presence, and he +welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke with him rarely left +him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, and he wore it cut short +above the ears, and, whether it rained or snowed, he always went without a +hat. He was delightful among friends, but terrible to his enemies; just to +his subjects; ready to play false with the unfaithful, and willing to +overcome by fraud those whom he desired to subdue, because he was wont to +say that it was the victory that brought the glory, not the methods of +achieving it. No one was bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in +extricating himself. He was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt +everything and fear nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because +one always sees that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also +wonderfully sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did +not look for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was +not angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that +he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on the +following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a partridge, +and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom Castruccio had +said: “You would not have given more than a penny.” “That is true,” +answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: “A ducat is much less to +me.” Having about him a flatterer on whom he had spat to show that he +scorned him, the flatterer said to him: “Fisherman are willing to let the +waters of the sea saturate them in order that they may take a few little +fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by spittle that I may catch a +whale”; and this was not only heard by Castruccio with patience but +rewarded. When told by a priest that it was wicked for him to live so +sumptuously, Castruccio said: “If that be a vice then you should not fare +so splendidly at the feasts of our saints.” Passing through a street he +saw a young man as he came out of a house of ill fame blush at being seen +by Castruccio, and said to him: “Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou +comest out, but when thou goest into such places.” A friend gave him a +very curiously tied knot to undo and was told: “Fool, do you think that I +wish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to fasten.” Castruccio +said to one who professed to be a philosopher: “You are like the dogs who +always run after those who will give them the best to eat,” and was +answered: “We are rather like the doctors who go to the houses of those +who have the greatest need of them.” Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn, +Castruccio was much disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was +reproached for cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did +not fear anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, +since every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one +what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: “When thou goest to a +banquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon another.” +To a person who was boasting that he had read many things, Castruccio +said: “He knows better than to boast of remembering many things.” Someone +bragged that he could drink much without becoming intoxicated. Castruccio +replied: “An ox does the same.” Castruccio was acquainted with a girl with +whom he had intimate relations, and being blamed by a friend who told him +that it was undignified for him to be taken in by a woman, he said: “She +has not taken me in, I have taken her.” Being also blamed for eating very +dainty foods, he answered: “Thou dost not spend as much as I do?” and +being told that it was true, he continued: “Then thou art more avaricious +than I am gluttonous.” Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and +splendid citizen of Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by +Taddeo into a chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones +representing flowers and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. +Castruccio gathered some saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, +and seeing him much disturbed by this, said to him: “I knew not where to +spit in order to offend thee less.” Being asked how Caesar died he said: +“God willing I will die as he did.” Being one night in the house of one of +his gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of +his friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was usual +in one of his station, so he said: “He who is considered wise by day will +not be considered a fool at night.” A person came to demand a favour of +Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea threw himself on +his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by Castruccio, said: +“Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast thy ears in thy +feet,” whereupon he obtained double the favour he had asked. Castruccio +used to say that the way to hell was an easy one, seeing that it was in a +downward direction and you travelled blindfolded. Being asked a favour by +one who used many superfluous words, he said to him: “When you have +another request to make, send someone else to make it.” Having been +wearied by a similar man with a long oration who wound up by saying: +“Perhaps I have fatigued you by speaking so long,” Castruccio said: “You +have not, because I have not listened to a word you said.” He used to say +of one who had been a beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine +man, that he was dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the +wives and now he took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who +laughed, he said: “Do you laugh because you are successful or because +another is unfortunate?” Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer +Francesco Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: “What shall I give +you if you will let me give you a blow on the nose?” Castruccio answered: +“A helmet.” Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been +instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done +wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived +themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly +those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying that +they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused when +the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise that whilst +men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first to learn if it +were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with only looking at +her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to be buried when he +died, and answered: “With the face turned downwards, for I know when I am +gone this country will be turned upside down.” On being asked if it had +ever occurred to him to become a friar in order to save his soul, he +answered that it had not, because it appeared strange to him that Fra +Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione della Faggiuola to the +Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat to preserve his health, +and replied: “If the man be rich let him eat when he is hungry; if he be +poor, then when he can.” Seeing one of his gentlemen make a member of his +family lace him up, he said to him: “I pray God that you will let him feed +you also.” Seeing that someone had written upon his house in Latin the +words: “May God preserve this house from the wicked,” he said, “The owner +must never go in.” Passing through one of the streets he saw a small house +with a very large door, and remarked: “That house will fly through the +door.” He was having a discussion with the ambassador of the King of +Naples concerning the property of some banished nobles, when a dispute +arose between them, and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the +king. “Is this king of yours a bad man or a good one?” asked Castruccio, +and was told that he was a good one, whereupon he said, “Why should you +suggest that I should be afraid of a good man?” +</p> + +<p> +I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and weighty, +but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his high +qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a prince. And +as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune, so he also +desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune; therefore the +manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be seen to this day +fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they were placed by him to +testify forever to his days of adversity. As in his life he was inferior +neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander, nor to Scipio of +Rome, so he died in the same year of his age as they did, and he would +doubtless have excelled both of them had Fortune decreed that he should be +born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia or Rome. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 1232 ***</div> +</body> + +</html> + + diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0aef05f --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #1232 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1232) diff --git a/old/1232-0.txt b/old/1232-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..383ab86 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/1232-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5177 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Prince, by Nicolo Machiavelli + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you +will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before +using this eBook. + +Title: The Prince + +Author: Nicolo Machiavelli + +Translator: W. K. Marriott + +Release Date: March, 1998 [eBook #1232] +[Most recently updated: July 1, 2022] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +Produced by: John Bickers, David Widger and Others + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE *** + + + + +The Prince + +by Nicolo Machiavelli + +Translated by W. K. Marriott + + +Contents + + INTRODUCTION + YOUTH Æt. 1-25—1469-94 + OFFICE Æt. 25-43—1494-1512 + LITERATURE AND DEATH Æt. 43-58—1512-27 + THE MAN AND HIS WORKS + DEDICATION + + THE PRINCE + CHAPTER I. HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED + CHAPTER II. CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES + CHAPTER III. CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES + CHAPTER IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH + CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED + CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY + CHAPTER VII. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE + CHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS + CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY + CHAPTER X. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED + CHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES + CHAPTER XII. HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES + CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN + CHAPTER XIV. THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR + CHAPTER XV. CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED + CHAPTER XVI. CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS + CHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED + CHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH + CHAPTER XIX. THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED + CHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? + CHAPTER XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN + CHAPTER XXII. CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES + CHAPTER XXIII. HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED + CHAPTER XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES + CHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER + CHAPTER XXVI. AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS + + DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI + + THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA + + + + +_ Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to +1512 held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic +missions to various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; +later exiled and returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd +June 1527._ + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the +second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, +and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were +members of the old Florentine nobility. + +His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly +enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of +Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an +Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Il Magnifico. +The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year +Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official career +Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted +until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his +office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they +were once more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s +literary activity and increasing influence; but he died, within a few +weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his +fifty-eighth year, without having regained office. + + + + +YOUTH — Æt. 1-25—1469-94 + + +Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the +Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of +this representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been +described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by +the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving +Lorenzo. Savonarola’s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have +been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power over the +fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a +gibe in _The Prince_, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed +prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean +rule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli +strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to +Lorenzo’s grandson that he dedicates _The Prince_. + +Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a picture of the +young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: “They were freer +than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other +kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, +and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with +wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly +was thought the wisest.” In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli +shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and +leads us to infer that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes: +“I have received your letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure, +especially because you tell me you are quite restored in health, than +which I could have no better news; for if God grant life to you, and to +me, I hope to make a good man of you if you are willing to do your +share.” Then, writing of a new patron, he continues: “This will turn +out well for you, but it is necessary for you to study; since, then, +you have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters +and music, for you see what honour is done to me for the little skill I +have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to please me, and to bring success +and honour to yourself, do right and study, because others will help +you if you help yourself.” + + + + +OFFICE — Æt. 25-43—1494-1512 + + +The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spent in the service of the +free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the +expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After +serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed +Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and +Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of +Machiavelli’s life, for during this time he took a leading part in the +affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and +dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere +recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and +soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and +supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters +which illustrate _The Prince_. + +His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, “my lady of Forli” +of _The Prince_, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it +is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on +fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is +urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes. + +In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for +continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct +of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft +summarized in _The Prince_, and was consequently driven out. He, also, +it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support +to Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge +that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the +faith of princes. + +Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied with events arising out +of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the +Duke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of _The +Prince_. Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke +for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have +seized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the +pattern of Cesare Borgia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed +by some critics as the “hero” of _The Prince_. Yet in _The Prince_ the +duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the +fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that +might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save +him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens; +and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims +that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen +fatality. + +On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to +watch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia +cheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano +delle Rovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most +reason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election, +says that he who thinks new favours will cause great personages to +forget old injuries deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had +ruined Cesare. + +It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that +pontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought +to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing +chiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius +that Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and +women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man +that will win and hold them both. + +It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian +states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, +with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those +events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they +impinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with +Louis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch’s character has +already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as +the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but +who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, +had he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have +been ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men +of the age, and his character has been drawn by many hands; but +Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the +secret of his many failures when he describes him as a secretive man, +without force of character—ignoring the human agencies necessary to +carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the fulfilment of +his wishes. + +The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official career were filled with +events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the +three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the +object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in +the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won +in eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during +these events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out +between the pope and the French, because friendship with France had +dictated the entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II +finally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance +of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy +of the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the +Medici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st +September 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the signal +for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end +to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without regaining +office. + + + + +LITERATURE AND DEATH — Æt. 43-58—1512-27 + + +On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had +vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, +was dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he +was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici, +imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope, +Leo X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at +San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In +a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a +very interesting description of his life at this period, which +elucidates his methods and his motives in writing _The Prince_. After +describing his daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he +writes: “The evening being come, I return home and go to my study; at +the entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt, +and put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass +into the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly +received by them, I am fed with that food which is mine alone; where I +do not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their +actions, and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours I +feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay, +death does not terrify me; I am possessed entirely by those great men. +And because Dante says: + +Knowledge doth come of learning well retained, +Unfruitful else, + +I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have +composed a small work on ‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out as +fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a +principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how +they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever +pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, +especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it +to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will +be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had +with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it.” + +The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form +in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work +during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some +unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici. Although +Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or +presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo +ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any +employment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s lifetime, +_The Prince_ was never published by him, and its text is still +disputable. + +Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: “And as to this +little thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that +during the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have +neither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by +one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And of my +loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I could not +now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and honest, as +I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my +honesty.” + +Before Machiavelli had got _The Prince_ off his hands he commenced his +“Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,” which should be read +concurrently with _The Prince_. These and several minor works occupied +him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look +after the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the +Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her +citizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new +constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on +one pretext or another it was not promulgated. + +In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to +settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly +remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he +was much sought after, and also for the production of his “Art of War.” +It was in the same year that he received a commission at the instance +of Cardinal de’ Medici to write the “History of Florence,” a task which +occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may have +determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old writer +observes that “an able statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will +endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play +with.” + +When the “History of Florence” was finished, Machiavelli took it to +Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in +the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is +somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written _The +Prince_ for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained +power in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence” +to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year +the battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left +Francis I a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This +was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular +party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more +banished. + +Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his +return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the “Ten of +Liberty and Peace.” Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached +Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527. + + + + +THE MAN AND HIS WORKS + + +No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence +has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her +most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have +found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the +germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle +to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of his name, +it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which +this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that +the researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more +reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an “unholy +necromancer,” which so long haunted men’s vision, has begun to fade. + +Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and +industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and +with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced +retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he +depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the +successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only +moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political +employments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, +overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren +of results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery +that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct +of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear +by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of +compromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to +suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when +he set him to write the “History of Florence,” rather than employ him +in the state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and +there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure. + +Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on _The +Prince_, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they +are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as +they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contemporaries; yet +they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of +Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical +incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses which +Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and +conduct. + +Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish +some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, _The +Prince_ is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men +are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the +days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices +which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. +Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them +to be—and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses; +prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to +a higher plane—Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an +empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the +arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to +fight. + +It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s that government +should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the +people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of +society; to this “high argument” _The Prince_ contributes but little. +Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments +otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and +insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests _The +Prince_ with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the +incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which +still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other +and their neighbours. + +In translating _The Prince_ my aim has been to achieve at all costs an +exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent +paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. +Machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he +wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his +substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. _Quis eo fuit +unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?_ +In _The Prince_, it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not +only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an +Englishman of Shakespeare’s time the translation of such a treatise was +in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius +of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to +the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example: +the word _intrattenere_, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy +adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would +by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered “entertain,” and every +contemporary reader would understand what was meant by saying that +“Rome _entertained_ the Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting +their power.” But to-day such a phrase would seem obsolete and +ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that “_Rome +maintained friendly relations with the Ætolians_,” etc., using four +words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy brevity +of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute fidelity to +the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can only hope that +the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author’s meaning, may +overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it. + +The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli: + +Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di +trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto +dal duca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da +Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; +Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell’ +Alemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di +Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., +1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence, +1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in +verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose, +1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d’oro (poem in +terza rima), 1517; Dell’ arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il +riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta di +Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie +fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525. + +Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti +carnascialeschi. + +Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, +6 vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., +1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7. + +Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. +Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G. +Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri +intorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. +Ferrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929. + + + + +DEDICATION + + +To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici + +Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed +to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in +which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses, +arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented +to princes, worthy of their greatness. + +Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some +testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my +possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as, +the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience +in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which, +having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now +send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence. + +And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance, +nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable, +seeing that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to +offer you the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all +that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and +dangers; which work I have not embellished with swelling or magnificent +words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic +allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed +to embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour +should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the +weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable. + +Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low +and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of +princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves +below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of +lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves +upon high mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it +needs to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to be +of the people. + +Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I +send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you +will learn my extreme desire that you should attain that greatness +which fortune and your other attributes promise. And if your +Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your +eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a +great and continued malignity of fortune. + + + + +THE PRINCE + + + + +CHAPTER I. +HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE +ACQUIRED + + +All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been +and are either republics or principalities. + +Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long +established; or they are new. + +The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or +they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the +prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of +the King of Spain. + +Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a +prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of +the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. + + + + +CHAPTER II. +CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES + + +I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another +place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to +principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, +and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved. + +I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary +states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than +new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of +his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, +for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless +he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if +he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to +the usurper, he will regain it. + +We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have +withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius +in ’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the +hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it +happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices +cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects +will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and +duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are +lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another. + + + + +CHAPTER III. +CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES + + +But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be +not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken +collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from +an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for +men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and +this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein +they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have +gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common +necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have +submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships +which he must put upon his new acquisition. + +In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in +seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends +who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the +way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, +feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed +forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill +of the natives. + +For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied +Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it +only needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the +gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future +benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is +very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, +they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with +little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the +delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in +the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time +it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on the +borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to +bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be +defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above +mentioned. + + [1] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who + married Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and + died in 1510. + +Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second +time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains +to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and +what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself +more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France. + +Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an +ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country +and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold +them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; +and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of +the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in +other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will +live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, +and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, +although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the +customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst +themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has +only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of +their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws +nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will +become entirely one body with the old principality. + +But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, +customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great +energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real +helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside +there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has +made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other +measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled +there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the +spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy +them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are +great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the +country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied +by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have +more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He +who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost +caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested +from him with the greatest difficulty. + +The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, +which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do +this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A +prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense +he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority +only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them +to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and +scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being +uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not +to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have +been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not +costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as +has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one +has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, +because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious +ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man +ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge. + +But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much +more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, +so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are +exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting +of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and +all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their +own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such +guards are as useless as a colony is useful. + +Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects +ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful +neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care +that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a +footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be +introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of +ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were +brought into Greece by the Ætolians; and in every other country where +they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And +the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner +enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the +hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to +those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over +to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he +has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold +of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, +and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of +them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does +not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, +and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and +troubles. + +The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these +measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with[2] +the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the +greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. +Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and +Ætolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was +humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and +Ætolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor +did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends +without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make +them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because +the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do, +who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for +which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it +is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the +medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; +for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic +fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but +difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either +detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but +difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the +evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise +man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not +having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that +every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the +Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to +avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war +is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of +others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in +Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided +both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which +is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the +benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and +prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring +with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good. + + [2] See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.” + +But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the +things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] as +the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held +possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he +has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain +a state composed of divers elements. + + [3] Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462, + died 1515. + + [4] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498. + +King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who +desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I +will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a +foothold in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every +door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to +accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have +succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not +made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, +regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; +the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of +Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of +Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, +the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then +could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, +which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made +the king master of two-thirds of Italy. + +Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could +have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above +laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although +they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the +Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been +forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have +made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no +sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to +occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was +weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had +thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by +adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater +authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to +follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of +Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was +himself forced to come into Italy. + +And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and +deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, +divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter +in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country +and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and +whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he +drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out +in turn. + +The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always +do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but +when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is +folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with +her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she +ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with +the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she +got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had +not the excuse of that necessity. + +Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, +he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he +brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did +not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to +injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from +the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought +Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to +humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have +consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have +kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would +never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also +because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order +to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not +have had the courage. + +And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander +and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given +above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, +because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your +disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king +had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in +exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap to +Rouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the +faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept. + + [5] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and + married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to + retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown. + + [6] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a + cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510. + +Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the +conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and +wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that +is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes +with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope +Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal +Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I +replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning +that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such +greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the +Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin +may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which +never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming +powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about +either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him +who has been raised to power. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. +WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL +AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH + + +Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly +acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great +became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was +scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole +empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained +themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose +among themselves from their own ambitions. + +I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to +be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of +servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his +favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity +by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons +have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and +hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a +prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, +because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as +superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as +to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular +affection. + +The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the +King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one +lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into +sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and +changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the +midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, +and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king +take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both +of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state +of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The +causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that +the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can +he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the +lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his +ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with +great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when +they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, +for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in +mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his +own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has +been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot +replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this +prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the +others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not +rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it. + +The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because +one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, +for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, +for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the +victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with +infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from +those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated +the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves +the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either +to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings +the opportunity. + +Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of +Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and +therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him +in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which +victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, +for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would +have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults +raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves. + +But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted +like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the +Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities +there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them +endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the +power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed +away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting +afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself +his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed +there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other +than the Romans were acknowledged. + +When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with +which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which +others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; +this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the +conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state. + + + + +CHAPTER V. +CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER +THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED + + +Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been +accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three +courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the +next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live +under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an +oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a +government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand +without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support +him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will +hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other +way. + +There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held +Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they +lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, +dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as +the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did +not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities +in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them +otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city +accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be +destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of +liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither +time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do +or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges +unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they +immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been +held in bondage by the Florentines. + +But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and +his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to +obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in +making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern +themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a +prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But +in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire +for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of +their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them +or to reside there. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND +ABILITY + + +Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities +as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of +state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, +and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely +to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A +wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to +imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not +equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the +clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far +distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow +attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their +strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of +so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach. + +I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a +new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, +accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired +the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station +presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of +these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. +Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the +strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no +other state, is compelled to reside there in person. + +But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, +have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, +and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not +discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet +he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy +to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have +acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their +particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be +found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. +And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed +anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material +to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that +opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and +without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain. + +It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of +Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that +they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of +bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and +that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should +become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary +that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of +the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. +Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians +dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, +and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity +whereby their country was ennobled and made famous. + +Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a +principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The +difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules +and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their +government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there +is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or +more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the +introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for +enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and +lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This +coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on +their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily +believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them. +Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the +opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others +defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along +with them. + +It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter +thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves +or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate +their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In +the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass +anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they +are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have +conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the +reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it +is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that +persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when +they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by +force. + +If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not +have enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to +Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things +immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no +means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the +unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties +in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the +ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are +overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated, +they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards +powerful, secure, honoured, and happy. + +To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some +resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like +kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[1] This man rose from a private +station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to +fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him +for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their +prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one +who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. +This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old +alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on +such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had +endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping. + + [1] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF +OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE + + +Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private +citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they +have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they +have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state +is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as +happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the +Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might +hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those +emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens +came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the +fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable +things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position; +because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not +reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having +always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it +because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful. + +States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature +which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and +correspondencies[1] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not +overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become +princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be +prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, +and that those foundations, which others have laid _before_ they became +princes, they must lay _afterwards_. + + [1] “Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and + correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of + “correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth and seventeenth + centuries. + +Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or +fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and +these are Francesco Sforza[2] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper +means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be +Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties +he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called +by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy +of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he +had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise +and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and +fortunes of others had bestowed on him. + + [2] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria + Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, + on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli + was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia + (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations + of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and along with his letters to + his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years + before _The Prince_, of the proceedings of the duke in his + “Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare + Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended to the + present work. + +Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations +may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be +laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, +therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be +seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not +consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what +better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions; +and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but +the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune. + +Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had +many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see +his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the +Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke +of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini +were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he +saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been +assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, +namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved +him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers, +so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was +easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other +reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not +only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving +the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy +with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He +was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the +attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the +king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the +Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was +hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to +him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that +the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him, +that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might +themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the +same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and +attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And +as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the +Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from +that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the +arms and the luck of others. + +For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in +Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, +making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to +their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that +in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned +entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the +Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came +to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length +that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them, +called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the +rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless +dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the +French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by +trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse +to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the +mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke did not fail to secure with +all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses—the +Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his +power at Sinigalia.[3] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned +their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good +foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of +Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he +gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, +and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out. + + [3] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502. + +When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak +masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave +them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was +full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing +to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it +necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer +Ramiro d’Orco,[4] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest +power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the +greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not +advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but +that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the +country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their +advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some +hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the +people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if +any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in +the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took +Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the +piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The +barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied +and dismayed. + + [4] Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua. + +But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding +himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate +dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great +measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if +he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, +for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would +not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and +to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards +the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. +It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would +have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived. + +Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future +he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church +might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which +Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by +exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as +to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to +himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope +with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the +college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before +the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first +shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had +accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords +as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the +Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And +as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany, +for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his +protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French +were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and +in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down +upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through +hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines +would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was +prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much +power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer +have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his +own power and ability. + +But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He +left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the +rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick +unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and +he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the +foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not +had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he +would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his +foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a +month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst +the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they +could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope +him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not +have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of +Alexander,[5] everything would have been different to him. On the day +that Julius the Second[6] was elected, he told me that he had thought +of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had +provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that, +when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die. + + [5] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503. + + [6] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad + Vincula, born 1443, died 1513. + +When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to +blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to +offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of +others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and +far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and +only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness +frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to +secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome +either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the +people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate +those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of +things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to +destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship +with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal +and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the +actions of this man. + +Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he +made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope +to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected +Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any +cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they +became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom +he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, +San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[7] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear +him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their +relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the +kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above +everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, +failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad +Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages +to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his +choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin. + + [7] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. +CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS + + +Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither +of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is +manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be +more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are +when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the +principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private +person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first +method, it will be illustrated by two examples—one ancient, the other +modern—and without entering further into the subject, I consider these +two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them. + +Agathocles, the Sicilian,[1] became King of Syracuse not only from a +private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a +potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous +life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of +mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession, +he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established +in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself +prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that +which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding +for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, +was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the +senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating +to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the +senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held +the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And although he +was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not +only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for +its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time +raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme +necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, +leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa. + + [1] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C. + +Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will +see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as +he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any +one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were +gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly +held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent +to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, +without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not +glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and +extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his +greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be +seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain. +Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite +wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent +men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius. + +In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da +Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by +his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his +youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his +discipline, he might attain some high position in the military +profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, +and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body +and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing a +paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some +citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than +its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So +he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many +years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look +upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire +anything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he +had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would +be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and +he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably +by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also +to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up. + +Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, +and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he +lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having +arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a +solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of +Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual +in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave +discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son +Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and +others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to +be discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a +chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after +him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places +and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto, +mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief +magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to +obey him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the +prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and +strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a +way that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only +was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all +his neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as +that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by +Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, +as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this +parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made +his leader in valour and wickedness. + +Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after +infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his +country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be +conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by +means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold +the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this +follows from severities[2] being badly or properly used. Those may be +called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are +applied at one blow and are necessary to one’s security, and that are +not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage +of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding +they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than +decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God +or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is +impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves. + + [2] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern + equivalent of Machiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than + the more obvious “cruelties.” + +Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought +to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for +him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to +repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to +reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does +otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to +keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor +can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and +repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so +that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given +little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer. + +And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such +a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall +make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled +times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help +you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be +under any obligation to you for them. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. +CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY + + +But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the +prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, +but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil +principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain +to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a +principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the +favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties +are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be +ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and +oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in +cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or +anarchy. + +A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, +accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the +nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the +reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that +under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, +finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of +one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his +authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles +maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the +aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around +him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can +neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches +sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around +him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. + +Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, +satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is +more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, +while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added +also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, +because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure +himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect +from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile +nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will +rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and +astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain +favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is +compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well +without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and +to give or take away authority when it pleases him. + +Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to +be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape +their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or +they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought +to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt +with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a +natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, +especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in +prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. +But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it +is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, +and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they +were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him. + +Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people +ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only +ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the +people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above +everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may +easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they +receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more +closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more +devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their +favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as +these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, +so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the +people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity. + +Nabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, +and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his +country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was +only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this +would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not +let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that “He who +builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for this is true when a +private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that +the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the +magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as +happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in +Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, +who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who +does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and +energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a one will never find +himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his +foundations well. + + [1] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus + in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C. + + [2] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s + “Florentine History,” Book III. + +These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from +the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either +rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their +government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on +the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and +who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with +great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not +the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the +citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, +are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will +always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For +such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when +citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with +him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to +die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its +citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this +experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore +a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will +always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state +and of him, and then he will always find them faithful. + + + + +CHAPTER X. +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO +BE MEASURED + + +It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of +these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in +case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether +he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite +clear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by +their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise +a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack +them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot +show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to +defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been +discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second +case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision +and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. +And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the +other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often +repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are +always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it +will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town +well fortified, and is not hated by his people. + +The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country +around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits +them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, +because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the +taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they +have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they +always keep in public depots enough for one year’s eating, drinking, +and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss +to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the +community in those labours that are the life and strength of the city, +and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold +military exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to +uphold them. + +Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself +odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only +be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this +world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a +whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever +should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it +burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and +self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that +a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by +giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for +long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving +himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold. + +Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin +the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot +and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the +prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the +damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer +any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with +their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that +their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his +defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they +confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is +well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the +minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not +fail to support and defend them. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. +CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES + + +It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching +which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they +are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held +without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of +religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the +principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. +These princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have +subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are +not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, +and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate +themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being +upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak +no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would +be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them. + +Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church +has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from +Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have +been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) +have valued the temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France +trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and +to ruin the Venetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not +appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. + +Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[1] this country was +under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the +Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal +anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; +the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those +about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. +To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as +it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made +use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini +and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with +arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate +weak and powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a +courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could +rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a +cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a +pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to +speak, one people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would +arise hostile to the Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet +would not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the +temporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in Italy. + + [1] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494. + +Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have +ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to +prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by +reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things +which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although +his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, +nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church, +which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all +his labours. + +Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all +the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the +chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the +way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been +practised before Alexander’s time. Such things Julius not only +followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin +the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these +enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, +inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any +private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within +the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them +some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: +the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and +the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused +the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their +cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster +the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to +support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders +and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope +Leo[2] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, +if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more +venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues. + + [2] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. +HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES + + +Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such +principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having +considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and +having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and +to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of +offence and defence which belong to each of them. + +We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his +foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to +ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or +composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good +laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are +well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the +discussion and shall speak of the arms. + +I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state +are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. +Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds +his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for +they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, +valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the +fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so +long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war +by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for +keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to +make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your +soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take +themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble +to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by +resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they +formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet +when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that +Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in +hand;[1] and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the +truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have +related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who +have also suffered the penalty. + + [1] “With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the _bons mots_ + of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII seized + Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his + quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the + country. _Cf_. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King + Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a + kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy + without resistance: so that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont + to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with chalk in their hands, + to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swords to fight.” + +I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The +mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, +you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own +greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others +contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are +ruined in the usual way. + +And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, +whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted +to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in +person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its +citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it +ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so +that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes +and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and +mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to +bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its +citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and +Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely +armed and quite free. + +Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who +were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the +Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. +After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of +their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their +liberty. + +Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against +the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,[2] +allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His +father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[3] of Naples, left +her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms +of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the +Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these +arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have +defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been +favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have +stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and +others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer +was Giovanni Acuto,[4] and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot +be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the +Florentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the +Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco +turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the +kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while +ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most +prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest +renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have +been proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became +the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if +they held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their +achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and +gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed +gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned +to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they +forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the +beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much +territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to +fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under +Carmignuola,[5] they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him +a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), +and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they +feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they +were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to +lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order +to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their +captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of +Pitigliano,[6] and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not +gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,[7] where in one battle they lost +that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much +trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed +and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. + + [2] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448. + + [3] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples. + + [4] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John + Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was knighted by + Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops and went into + Italy. These became the famous “White Company.” He took part in many + wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible + Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of + Bernabo Visconti. + + [5] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, + executed at Venice, 5th May 1432. + + [6] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San + Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria, + in 1487. “Primo capitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; + Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510. + + [7] Battle of Vaila in 1509. + +And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled +for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, +in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better +prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has +recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired +more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more +states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms +against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were +oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain +authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became +princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the +hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of +priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both +commenced to enlist foreigners. + +The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[8] +the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, +Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After +these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms +of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been +overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted +by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to +lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own. +They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory, +they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not +give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a +moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs +were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand +soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They +had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to +themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking +prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at +night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night; +they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did +they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their +military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both +fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and +contempt. + + [8] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in + Romagna. He was the leader of the famous “Company of St George,” + composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. +CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN + + +Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a +prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by +Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise +against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to +auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[1] for his +assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in +themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always +disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their +captive. + + [1] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), + surnamed “The Catholic,” born 1452, died 1516. + +And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish +to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which +cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw +himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune +brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his +rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the +Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all +expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not +become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his +auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs. + +The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand +Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other +time of their troubles. + +The Emperor of Constantinople,[2] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten +thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not +willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to +the infidels. + + [2] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383. + +Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, +for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them +the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to +others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and +better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one +community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you +have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough +authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most +dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has +always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing +rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming +that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others. + +I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke +entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French +soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, +such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, +discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; +whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and +dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference +between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one +considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when +he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he +relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and +found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when +every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces. + +I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am +unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I +have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by +the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted +like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him +that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to +pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with +aliens. + +I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament +applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with +Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed +him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them +on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to +meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of +others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind +you fast. + +Charles the Seventh,[3] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[4] +having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, +recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he +established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and +infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and +began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as +is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised +the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of +his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his +men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so +accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they +can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot +stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come +off well against others. The armies of the French have thus become +mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms +together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, +but much inferior to one’s own forces. And this example proves it, for +the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of +Charles had been enlarged or maintained. + + [3] Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died + 1461. + + [4] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483. + +But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks +well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I +have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a +principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not +truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster +to the Roman Empire[5] should be examined, it will be found to have +commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time +the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour +which had raised it passed away to others. + + [5] “Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the + reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of + the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence. + When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank + under the weight of its military obligations, he said that this was + ‘wholly unhistorical.’ He might well have added that the Roman power + was at its zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to + fight for the State, but that it began to decline as soon as this + obligation was no longer recognised.”—_Pall Mall Gazette_, 15th May + 1906. + +I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having +its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good +fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And +it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing +can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own +strength. And one’s own forces are those which are composed either of +subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or +auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one’s own forces will be easily +found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one +will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many +republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which +rules I entirely commit myself. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. +THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR + + +A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything +else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is +the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force +that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often +enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the +contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than +of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing +it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is +to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from +a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding +the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons. +For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to +be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which a prince +ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing +proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not +reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him +who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed +servants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other +suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together. And +therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and +above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by +his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, therefore, to +have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should +addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two +ways, the one by action, the other by study. + +As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well +organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he +accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of +localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the +valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of +rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which +knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his +country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by +means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands +with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study +hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and +marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance +to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of +one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the +prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable +that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his +enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to +besiege towns to advantage. + +Philopoemen,[1] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which +writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he +never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in +the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: “If +the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here +with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best +advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, +how ought we to pursue?” And he would set forth to them, as he went, +all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their +opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these +continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any +unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with. + + [1] Philopoemen, “the last of the Greeks,” born 252 B.C., died 183 + B.C. + +But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and +study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne +themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, +so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as +an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been +praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he +always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated +Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of +Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of +Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, +affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things +which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to +observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but +increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be +available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find +him prepared to resist her blows. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. +CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR +BLAMED + + +It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a +prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have +written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in +mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from +the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a +thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me +more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the +imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities +which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is +so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is +done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his +preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his +professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much +that is evil. + +Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how +to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. +Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, +and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are +spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are +remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or +praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, +using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our language is +still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly +who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed +generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, +another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; +one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one +sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another +frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know +that every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a +prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but +because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human +conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently +prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which +would lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible, +from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he +may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need +not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without +which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is +considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like +virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which +looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. +CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS + + +Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I +say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, +liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation +for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should +be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the +reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among +men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of +magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts +all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to +maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax +them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him +odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by +any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded +few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by +whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing +to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being +miserly. + +Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of +liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if +he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in +time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that +with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself +against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without +burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises +liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, +and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few. + +We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have +been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was +assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he +did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King +of France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax +on his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his +long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken +or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A +prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that +he can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he +is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a +reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will +enable him to govern. + +And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and +many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, +and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, +or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is +dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; +and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; +but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his +expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one should +reply: Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies, +who have been considered very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends +that which is his own or his subjects’ or else that of others. In the +first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to +neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who goes +forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion, +handling that which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary, +otherwise he would not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is +neither yours nor your subjects’ you can be a ready giver, as were +Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not take away your +reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; it is only +squandering your own that injures you. + +And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst +you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor +or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a +prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised +and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to +have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, +than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to +incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. +CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED +THAN FEARED + + +Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every +prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. +Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare +Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled +the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if +this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more +merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for +cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[1] Therefore a prince, so +long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the +reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more +merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to +arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to +injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a +prince offend the individual only. + + [1] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi + factions in 1502 and 1503. + +And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the +imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence +Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign +owing to its being new, saying: + +“Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt +Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.”[2] + +Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he +himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and +humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and +too much distrust render him intolerable. + + [2] . . . against my will, my fate +A throne unsettled, and an infant state, +Bid me defend my realms with all my pow’rs, +And guard with these severities my shores. + +Christopher Pitt. + +Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than +feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to +be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it +is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be +dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that +they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as +you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, +property, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far +distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that prince +who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other +precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by +payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be +earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied +upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than +one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation +which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for +their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which +never fails. + +Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he +does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well +being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he +abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their +women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of +someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, +but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, +because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss +of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are +never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always +find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for +taking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner +lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and has under control a +multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard +the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army +united or disposed to its duties. + +Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that +having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to +fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or +against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This +arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his +boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his +soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not +sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire his +deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal +cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been +sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most +excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man, +against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from +nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more +license than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was +upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of +the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio, +yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate +punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in +the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew +much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This +disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have +destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the +control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed +itself, but contributed to his glory. + +Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the +conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing +according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself +on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must +endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII.[1] +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH + + + [1] “The present chapter has given greater offence than any other + portion of Machiavelli’s writings.” Burd, “Il Principe,” p. 297. + +Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and +to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience +has been that those princes who have done great things have held good +faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect +of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on +their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting,[2] the one +by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the +second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, +it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is +necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast +and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient +writers, who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were +given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his +discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who +was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know +how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not +durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the +beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot +defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against +wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares +and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do +not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor +ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, +and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If +men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they +are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to +observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince +legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless +modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and +engagements have been made void and of no effect through the +faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the +fox has succeeded best. + + [2] “Contesting,” _i.e_. “striving for mastery.” Mr Burd points out + that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero’s “De Officiis”: + “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum + per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum + est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.” + +But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, +and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and +so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will +always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent +example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing +else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he +always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power +in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would +observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to +his wishes,[3] because he well understood this side of mankind. + + [3] “Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).” The + words “ad votum” are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550. + +Alexander never did what he said, +Cesare never said what he did. + +Italian Proverb. + +Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities +I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And +I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe +them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear +merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with +a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able +and know how to change to the opposite. + +And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, +cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often +forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,[4] +friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him +to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and +variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to +diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then +to know how to set about it. + + [4] “Contrary to fidelity” or “faith,” “contro alla fede,” and “tutto + fede,” “altogether faithful,” in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy + that these two phrases, “contro alla fede” and “tutto fede,” were + omitted in the Testina edition, which was published with the sanction + of the papal authorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the + word “fede” was “the faith,” _i.e_. the Catholic creed, and not as + rendered here “fidelity” and “faithful.” Observe that the word + “religione” was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being + used to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness “the + religion,” a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot + heresy. South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this + passage as follows: “That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, + Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political + scheme: ‘That the show of religion was helpful to the politician, but + the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.’” + +For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything +slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five +qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether +merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing +more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as +men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it +belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. +Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and +those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who +have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all +men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, +one judges by the result. + +For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding +his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be +praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a +thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are +only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have +no ground to rest on. + +One prince[5] of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never +preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most +hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of +reputation and kingdom many a time. + + [5] Ferdinand of Aragon. “When Machiavelli was writing _The Prince_ it + would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand’s name here + without giving offence.” Burd’s “Il Principe,” p. 308. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX. +THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED + + +Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I +have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss +briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has +been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him +hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will +have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other +reproaches. + +It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, +and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from +both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor +their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has +only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease +in many ways. + +It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, +effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince +should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in +his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his +private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are +irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can +hope either to deceive him or to get round him. + +That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, +and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, +provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by +his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a +prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his +subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From +the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, +and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will +always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they +should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should +affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations +and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will +resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did. + +But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has +only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can +easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by +keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for +him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most +efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not +to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a +prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the +conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have +the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a +conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the +conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires +cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he +believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to +a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content +himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so +that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the +other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare +friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith +with you. + +And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side +of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of +punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the +majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and +the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the +popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to +conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the +execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to +the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and +thus cannot hope for any escape. + +Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content +with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer +Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the +present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had +conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer +Giovanni,[1] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination +the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the +popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in +Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after +the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese, +having information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in +Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a +blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of +their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due +course to the government. + + [1] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He + ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of + conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent experience + (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured for his + alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy. + +For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies +of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is +hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear +everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have +taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep +the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most +important objects a prince can have. + +Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, +and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty +and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its +authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of +the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths +would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the +hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to +protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care +of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be +liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people +for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who +could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the +king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or +a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can +draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs +of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in +their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish +the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people. + +It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths +of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to +my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great +qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have +been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, +therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of +some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were +not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only +submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who +studies the affairs of those times. + +It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to +the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were +Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son +Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. + +There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the +ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be +contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to +put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so +beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard +thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the +people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring +prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, +cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should +exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give +vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors +were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great +authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the +principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours, +were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about +injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes +cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to +avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they +ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the +most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had +need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the +people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not, +accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them. + +From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being +all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, +and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died +honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, +and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, +being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always +kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated +nor despised. + +But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, +who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not +endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, +having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt +for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his +administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as +much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a +prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for +when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain +yourself—it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles—you +have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works +will do you harm. + +But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, +that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in +the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by +him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who +allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the +army conspired against him, and murdered him. + +Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus +Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and +rapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to +commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except +Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour +that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed +by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much +admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were +kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and +satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were +great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the +fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a +prince to imitate. + +Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in +Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to +Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the +praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to +aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy +before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the +Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this +there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the +whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the +Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in +the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he +considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided +to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, +being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that +dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that +the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted +by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, +and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the +Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had +received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this +ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him +out in France, and took from him his government and life. He who will, +therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a +most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and +respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be +wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well, +because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which +the people might have conceived against him for his violence. + +But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent +qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and +acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of +fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which +caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and +cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single +murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those +of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by +those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the +midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that +such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and +desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who +does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the +less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do +any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the +service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had +contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily +threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was +a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin. + +But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to +hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and +he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his +people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave +himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he +might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not +maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete +with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the +imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being +hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against +and was killed. + +It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike +man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, +of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the +throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated +and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought +him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great +indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to +his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the +imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity +by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, +practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at +the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa +rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy +conspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter, +besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were +disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so +many against him, murdered him. + +I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being +thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this +discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this +difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far +less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some +indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that +are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were +the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary +to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more +necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy +the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more +powerful. + +From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him +twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend +the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, +putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them +his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in +the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the +people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state +of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that +it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an +hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old +prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by +those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this +being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, +because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in +new ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state +is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its +hereditary lord. + +But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will +consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been +fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how +it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in +another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to +unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for +Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was +heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly +destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated +Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in +his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot +imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow +those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which +are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are +proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and +firm. + + + + +CHAPTER XX. +ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, +ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? + + +1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their +subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; +others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid +themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning +of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown +and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on +all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those +states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as +comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit. + +2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather +when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by +arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted +become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your +subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be +armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be +handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they +quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, +considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and +service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm +them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either +for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions +breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it +follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character +already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient +to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. +Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has +always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a +prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old +one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those +who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time +and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters +should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state +shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you. + +3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed +to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by +fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their +tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This +may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way +balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for +to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; +rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided +cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always +assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The +Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the +Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although +they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these +disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their +differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not +afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one +party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, +therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be +permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the +more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but +if war comes this policy proves fallacious. + +4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the +difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore +fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who +has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes +enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may +have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, +as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many +consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with +craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed +it, his renown may rise higher. + +5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and +assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were +distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo +Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been +distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak +generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will only say +this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been +hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support +themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they +will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as +they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad +impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always +extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too +much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands +it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours +has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which +induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural +affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then +he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for +it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons +for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern +affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends +of those men who were contented under the former government, and are +therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, +were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it. + +6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states +more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit +to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of +refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been +made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in +our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello +so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on +returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, +razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and +considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the +Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, +therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you +good in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be +reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than +from foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear +from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone. The +castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, +more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the +state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—not to be hated by +the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they +will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be +wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. +It has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use +to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli,[1] when the Count +Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to +withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and +thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that +time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses +were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, +and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, +it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have +been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these +things considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as +well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, +cares little about being hated by the people. + + [1] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia + Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that + Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the + countess announces the appointment: “I have been with the signori,” + wrote Fortunati, “to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me + that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary + to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me at once.” _Cf_. “Catherine + Sforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI. +HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN + + +Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and +setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the +present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he +has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be +the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds +you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the +beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the +foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without +any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile +occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations; +thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power +and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and +of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the +foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him. +Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater +schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and +clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable +example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa, +he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his +achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the +minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the +issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of +the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against +him. + +Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal +affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da +Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life +doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some +method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. +And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action +to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man. + +A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a +downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he +declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course +will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two +of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character +that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In +either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare +yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if +you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the +conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been +conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to +protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want +doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who +loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in +hand, court his fate. + +Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive out +the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the +Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the +Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed +in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged +them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: “As for that +which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your +state not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; +because by not interfering you will be left, without favour or +consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror.” Thus it will always +happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality, +whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with +arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally +follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when a prince +declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with +whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful +and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is +established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to +become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all +are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard, +especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you +may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you +become companions on a fortune that may rise again. + +In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that +you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it +greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of +one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved +him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with +your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be +noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with +one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, +unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers +you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as +possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with +France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their +ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as +happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to +attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince +ought to favour one of the parties. + +Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe +courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, +because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid +one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in +knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to +take the lesser evil. + +A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour +the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his +citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and +agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not +be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken +away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but +the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things +and designs in any way to honour his city or state. + +Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles +at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into +guilds or into societies,[1] he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, +and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of +courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty +of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything. + + [1] “Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.” “Arti” were craft or + trade guilds, _cf_. Florio: “Arte . . . a whole company of any trade + in any city or corporation town.” The guilds of Florence are most + admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject + (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called + “artel,” exist in Russia to-day, _cf_. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s + “Russia,” ed. 1905: “The sons . . . were always during the working + season members of an artel. In some of the larger towns there are + artels of a much more complex kind— permanent associations, possessing + large capital, and pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the + individual members.” The word “artel,” despite its apparent + similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with “ars” + or “arte.” Its root is that of the verb “rotisya,” to bind oneself by + an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only another form of + “rota,” which now signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the + underlying idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu” + were possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included + individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or + “clans” would be most appropriate. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII. +CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES + + +The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they +are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the +first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is +by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and +faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to +recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are +otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error +which he made was in choosing them. + +There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to +be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there +are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; +another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which +neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first +is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. +Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the +first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know +good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have +the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his +servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the +servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest. + +But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one +test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his +own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in +everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you +ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in +his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, +and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not +concerned. + +On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study +him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with +him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he +cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, +many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him +dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, +are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, +the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII. +HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED + + +I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it +is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless +they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of +whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own +affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with +difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they +run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way +of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that +to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell +you the truth, respect for you abates. + +Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the +wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking +the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, +and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and +listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With +these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry +himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more +freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of +these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be +steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either +overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions +that he falls into contempt. + +I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of +affairs to Maximilian,[1] the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, +said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. +This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the +above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he does not communicate his +designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in +carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at +once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being +pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he +does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he +wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions. + + [1] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman + Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after + her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in Italian + politics. + +A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he +wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every +one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to +be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning +the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any +consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be +felt. + +And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression +of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good +advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, +because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not +wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has +yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very +prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would +not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take +away his state from him. + +But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more +than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to +unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, +and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through +them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always +prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. +Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they +come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the +prince from good counsels. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV. +WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES + + +The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince +to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and +fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the +actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an +hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men +and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more +by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good +they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost +defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will +be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and +adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and +with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a +prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom. + +And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in +Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and +others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in +regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in +the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the +people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known +how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that +have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost. + +Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who +was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the +greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a +warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, +he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the +end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the +kingdom. + +Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their +principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own +sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a +change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the +calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they +thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that +the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would +recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very +bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would +never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later +on to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, +it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no +avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, +certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour. + + + + +CHAPTER XXV. +WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER + + +It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the +opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by +fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and +that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us +believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let +chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times +because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may +still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes +pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. +Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true +that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[1] but that she +still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less. + + [1] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: “The older one gets the + more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does + three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe.” Sorel’s + “Eastern Question.” + +I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood +overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away +the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to +its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, +though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when +the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences +and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass +away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so +dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour +has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where +she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain +her. + +And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and +which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open +country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been +defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either +this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it +would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say +concerning resistance to fortune in general. + +But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be +seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change +of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from +causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the +prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I +believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions +according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not +accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in +affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, +glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, +another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, +another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by +a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain +his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different +observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other +impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they +conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from +what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same +effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the +other does not. + +Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs +himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a +way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if +times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course +of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to +know how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot +deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having +always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it +is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time +to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; +but had he changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have +changed. + +Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and +found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of +action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise +against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The +Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he +had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France; +nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his +accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the +Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the +former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, +he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having +observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as +to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore +Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff +with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome +until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, +as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. +Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the +others would have raised a thousand fears. + +I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they +all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience +the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go +cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have +deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him. + +I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind +steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are +successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider +that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a +woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and +ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by +the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She +is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they +are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI. +AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS + + +Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and +wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a +new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an +opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of +things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this +country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new +prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present. + +And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be +captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians +should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the +soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate +the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to +discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy +should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should +be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, +more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten, +despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation. + +Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us +think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was +afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected +him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet +heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of +Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, +and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she +entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs +and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and +willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it. + +Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope +than in your illustrious house,[1] with its valour and fortune, +favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and +which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be +difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the +men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet +they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the +present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier +than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours. + + [1] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. + In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII. + +With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is +necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in +them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness +is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those +men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how +extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example: +the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth +water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your +greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do +everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory +which belongs to us. + +And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians +have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious +house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many +campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, +this has happened because the old order of things was not good, and +none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man +more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was +newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and dignified will +make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting +opportunities to bring such into use in every form. + +Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. +Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how +superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But +when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs +entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are +capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there +having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by +valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for +so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty years, +whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a +poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, +afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.[2] + + [2] The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; + Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513. + +If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable +men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things, +as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own +forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better +soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will be +much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince, +honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is +necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended +against foreigners by Italian valour. + +And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very +formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which +a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be +relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, +and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in +close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the +Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are +overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this +latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at +the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by +German battalions, who follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the +Spaniards, by agility of body and with the aid of their shields, got in +under the pikes of the Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack, +while the Germans stood helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed +up, all would have been over with them. It is possible, therefore, +knowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a new one, +which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need not +create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. And these are +the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new +prince. + +This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for +letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the +love with which he would be received in all those provinces which have +suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for +revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. +What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? +What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To +all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your +illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with +which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard +our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be +verified that saying of Petrarch: + +Virtu contro al Furore + Prendera l’arme, e fia il combatter corto: +Che l’antico valore + Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto. + +Virtue against fury shall advance the fight, + And it i’ th’ combat soon shall put to flight: +For the old Roman valour is not dead, + Nor in th’ Italians’ brests extinguished. + +Edward Dacre, 1640. + + + + +DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING +VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE +DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI + +BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI + + +The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to +clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been +raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of +Arezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, +whence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against +Giovanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring +that city under his domination, and to make it the head of his +Romagnian duchy. + +These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and +their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too +powerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek +to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon +this a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to +which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, +Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the +tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo +Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and +courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which +might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they +decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the +Florentines; and they sent their men to one place and another, +promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to unite +with them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once reported +throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under the duke, +among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting a +revolution. + +Thus it arose that, men’s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by +certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held +for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The +castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there; +so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being +carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from +being drawn up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping +upon the bridge and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being +effected, the whole state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being +encouraged in this, not so much by the capture of the fort, as by the +Diet at Magione, from whom they expected to get assistance. + +Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose +the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any +town, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and +they sent again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in +destroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and +that they ought not to wait for another opportunity. + +But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli +and Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo +Machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the +duke against his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, +because, against everybody’s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone +over to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his door. +But recovering courage from the offers of the Florentines, he decided +to temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that remained to +him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to get assistance. +This latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the King of France +for men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he turned into +cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money. + +Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached +Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the +aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the +duke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with +offers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did +not fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he +wished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough +for him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have the +principality. + +And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to +him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a +standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every +care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such +preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in +separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there +came also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found +himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open +war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous to +outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of +reconciliation. + +And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in +which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand +ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed +an alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come +personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the +other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and +other places seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and +not to make war against or ally themselves with any one without his +permission. + +This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, +again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his +state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the +fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by +the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends. +But the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed +his men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of +November together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to +Cesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the +Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of +Urbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but +nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that +if the duke wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were +ready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To +this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with +Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was +very willing to proceed against Sinigalia. + +It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the +fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give +it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to +come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being +invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no +suspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French +men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred +lancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena +about the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the utmost +cunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for +him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of compliance +would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the +reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the +arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very +stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not +offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by +Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he +agreed to wait. + +Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on +30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most +trusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor +d’Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as +Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should +arrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting +certain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they +reached Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they +came to the duke’s quarters, where they should be seized. + +The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which +there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to +assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from +Fano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day +of December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of +about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the +infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms. + +Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of +the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who +goes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases +of which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia +is distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot +and from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs +a little river which bathes that part of the walls looking towards +Fano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes +for a good space by road along the mountains, and reaches the river +which passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left hand along the bank +of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge +which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast of the gate that +leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but transversely. Before +this gate there stands a collection of houses with a square to which +the bank of the river forms one side. + +The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and +to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant +from Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men +of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band, +which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty +horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters +having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and +when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass +over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards the river and +the other towards the country, and a way was left in the middle through +which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the town. + +Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a +few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a +cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his +approaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the +man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that +when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet +the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He +recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his +nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of +their fathers that should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came +before the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were received by him +with goodwill; they were at once placed between those who were +commissioned to look after them. + +But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band +in Sinigalia, was missing—for Oliverotto was waiting in the square +before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and +drilling them—signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care +of Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that +Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined +Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of +their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke; +and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come +himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice, +came before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and +Oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others. + +So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke’s +quarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made +them prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that +the men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. +Those of Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of +the Orsini and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment +of the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, +and bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and +Vitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of the +country and saved themselves. + +But the duke’s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men +of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not +repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have +completely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced, +the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a +room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in +keeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of +the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the +blame for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the +Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome +that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of +Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th +January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the +same way. + + + + +THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA + +WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI + +And sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI + +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328 + + +It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who +have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them, +who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in +their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and +obscurity; or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way. +They have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have +had so mean a parentage that in shame they have given themselves out to +be sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be wearisome to relate +who these persons may have been because they are well known to +everybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly edifying to +those who read them, they are omitted. I believe that these lowly +beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is desirous of showing to +the world that such men owe much to her and little to wisdom, because +she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take no part in +their career: thus all success must be attributed to her. Castruccio +Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds, if he is +measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he was +born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor distinguished +in his birth, as the course of this history will show. It appeared to +be desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in him such +indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great exemplar +to men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his +actions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds. + +The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families +of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in +estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a +son Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca, +and for this reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He +had an only sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but +Buonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again +went to live with her brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the +house where he resided, and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, +any person could have access to it without difficulty. One morning, +shortly after sunrise, Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio +was called, had occasion to go into the vineyard as usual to gather +herbs for seasoning the dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the +leaves of a vine she turned her eyes in that direction, and heard +something resembling the cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards +it, and saw the hands and face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the +leaves and who seemed to be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and +partly fearing, yet full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it +to the house, where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is +customary, and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When +he heard what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised +or compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves +what should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no +children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for +it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They +baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As +the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of +wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those +lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended +to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his +canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with +this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio +was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached +the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of +Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left +off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, +delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in +running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he +far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at +any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of +wars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with +vexation and sorrow. + +There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, +named Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, +bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had +often fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a +Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman +resided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others most +mornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the +top of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he +had often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of the street +in those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far +excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to exercise a royal +authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed him, Messer +Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. Being +informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio he felt +a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called him one +day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the house of +a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use arms, or in +the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses and the +services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased +Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he +stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer +Francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable, +nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly studies and +take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and +in a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was +driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear +that he would not be able to hold him much longer. + +Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to +the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was +astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that +virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true +gentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and +could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and +tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all others, +and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. But what +enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the delightful +modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or word to +others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with his +equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him beloved, +not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When Castruccio +had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were driven from Pavia +by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the Visconti to assist +the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in charge of his forces. +Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and courage in this +expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other captain, and +his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but throughout all +Lombardy. + +Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he +left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many +friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary +for that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son +thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to +be his son’s tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died +Francesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that +goodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to +the son the gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the +father. Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and +tutor of Pagolo, which increased enormously his power and position, and +created a certain amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the +former universal goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring +tyrannical intentions. Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli +Opizi, the head of the Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of +Messer Francesco to become the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him +that Castruccio, with the great abilities which he already showed, and +holding the position of governor, deprived him of his opportunity; +therefore he began to sow those seeds which should rob Castruccio of +his eminence. Castruccio at first treated this with scorn, but +afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able +to bring him into disgrace with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples +and have him driven out of Lucca. + +The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo, +who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became +their lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca, +with whom Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting +their restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought +into his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of +the Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio +cautiously fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies +and munitions of war, in order that it might stand a siege for a few +days in case of need. When the night came which had been agreed upon +with Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between the mountains and +Pisa with many men, the signal was given, and without being observed +Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and set fire to the +portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the city, calling +the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. Uguccione +entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer +Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The +governor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the +wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found +that more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those +who fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the +headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most +hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese. + +As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party +that the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they +determined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a +large army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence +they marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into +Lucca. Upon this Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and +with a number of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved +against the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the +enemy withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between +Montecatini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to +Montecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight +skirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence. +Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed +coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing +worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the army +in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought about the ruin of the +Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its captain +had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observed this, and +allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief; he also +showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions of the +camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more insolent the +more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they drew out in +the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. Presently, +deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having mastered +their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he spoke a +few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to them the +certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands. Castruccio +had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the centre +of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of the +army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant +men on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he +moved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of his +lines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had +come in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centre +squadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the +wings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings +of the two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained +out of action, for these two portions of the line of battle were +separated from each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach +each other. By this expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio’s men +were opposed to the weaker part of the enemy’s troops, and the most +efficient men of the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines +were unable to fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or +to give any assistance to their own flanks. So, without much +difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the +centre battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to +attack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. The defeat +was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than ten +thousand men killed with many officers and knights of the Guelph party +in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them, among whom +were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his nephew, and +Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castruccio the loss did +not amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was Francesco, +the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed in the +first onset. + +This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that +Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it +appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of +power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only +waited for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the +death of Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in +Lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge. +On the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were +driven off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming +to the knowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him +a proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his +son Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take +Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio, +fearing no evil, went to the governor in a friendly way, was +entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing +to put him to death lest the people should be incensed, kept him alive, +in order to hear further from his father concerning his intentions. +Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at once +set out from Pisa to Lucca with four hundred horsemen to finish the +business in his own way; but he had not yet reached the baths when the +Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and created Count Gaddo +della Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reached Lucca he heard +of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise to him to turn +back, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them should +close their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard of what +had happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to demand +the liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had +arrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private +circles, afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised +a tumult, and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded +that Castruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse +might happen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered +his friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked +Uguccione; who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away +with his friends to Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in +poverty. + +But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, +and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people +that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having +obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the +recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of +Uguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded +a treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed +a fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course +of two months Castruccio captured the town. With the reputation gained +at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a +short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the +pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and +wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the +lord of it. After this victory he returned to Lucca, and was welcomed +by the whole people. And now Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any +longer to defer making himself a prince, got himself created the lord +of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico, +Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he had +corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and deliberately elected +prince by the people. At this time Frederick of Bavaria, the King of +the Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial crown, and +Castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met him at +the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as his deputy in +Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because of the +people’s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was received in +great honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him, +and he was appointed the emperor’s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time +the Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had +driven out of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick. +Frederick created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread +of the Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were +constrained to accept him as their lord. + +Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian +affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian +Ghibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio +for help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his +country, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among these +exiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, +and Piero Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. +Castruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all +Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to +gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer +Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces +of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he +divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied +with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he +could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without +those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he +surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer +Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven +out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the +King Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the +Florentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at home, +they should be compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to +defend themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized +Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country. +Whereupon the Florentines recalled their army, which had scarcely +reached Tuscany, when Castruccio was forced by other necessities to +return to Lucca. + +There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so +powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance +him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not +received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited +other families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They +found their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set +upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and +killed him. They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano +di Poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion, +intervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms; +and he offered to be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him +what they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater +intelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the +news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in +command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set out for home. +Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at an end, yet he +posted his men in the most advantageous places throughout the city. As +it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be very much obliged to +him, he sought him out, and without saying anything on his own behalf, +for he did not recognize any need for doing so, he begged Castruccio to +pardon the other members of his family by reason of their youth, their +former friendships, and the obligations which Castruccio was under to +their house. To this Castruccio graciously responded, and begged +Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure +to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to +hear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to +him, saying that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of +showing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and +Castruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown +into prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered +San Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace, +as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to +leave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce, +which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and +desirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded +with them for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the +conquests they had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, +turned his attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should +not again be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, +under various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by +their ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of +them, but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had +in his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that +none of them were to be trusted. Then for his further security he +raised a fortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom +he had killed or hunted out of the state. + +Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his +position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of +increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he +could get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, +which was his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends +with the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both +parties confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it +always had been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the +Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each +of these men held secret communications with Castruccio, and each +desired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many +threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the +Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city; +both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they +believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than +the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave +promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and +to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the +appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself +direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and +both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a +signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other +Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans +of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the +hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the +palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them +many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to +the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and +quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great +valour. + +About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness +of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. +The German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened—murders +and tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put +an end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should +call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of +the city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he +could apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not +only to give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome. +Castruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the +emperor this service, because he believed that he himself would not be +safe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo +Guinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six +hundred horsemen, where he was received by Enrico with the greatest +distinction. In a short time the presence of Castruccio obtained such +respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or violence, good order +was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio having sent by sea from +the country round Pisa large quantities of corn, and thus removed the +source of the trouble. When he had chastised some of the Roman leaders, +and admonished others, voluntary obedience was rendered to Enrico. +Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman senator. This +dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in +a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on its +front: “I am what God wills.” Whilst on the back was: “What God desires +shall be.” + +During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio +should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could +tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be +difficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were +Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face +danger. These men kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia, +and with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by night, and +after driving out some of Castruccio’s officials and partisans, and +killing others, they restored the city to its freedom. The news of this +greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on +in great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines heard of his return, +knowing that he would lose no time, they decided to intercept him with +their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the belief that by doing so +they would cut off his road to Pistoia. Assembling a great army of the +supporters of the Guelph cause, the Florentines entered the Pistoian +territories. On the other hand, Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his +army; and having heard where the Florentines’ lay, he decided not to +encounter it in the plains of Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of +Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could, to attack it boldly in the +Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if he succeeded in this design, +victory was assured, although he was informed that the Florentines had +thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he +had every confidence in his own abilities and the valour of his troops, +yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open lest he should be +overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and +Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the +exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places +narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still +narrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that +twenty men side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was +Manfred, a German, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had +been allowed to remain in possession of the castle, it being common to +the Lucchese and the Pistoians, and unclaimed by either—neither of them +wishing to displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of +neutrality, and came under obligations to no one. For these reasons, +and also because the castle was well fortified, he had always been able +to maintain his position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to +fall upon his enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and +there was no fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force +before they became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this +trouble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which +possession of this castle would give him, and having an intimate +friendship with a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with +him that four hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle +the night before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put +to death. + +Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the +Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away +from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his +army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they +reached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill +on the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the +castle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching +from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of +Serravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the +hill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his +infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a +path on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four +hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never +expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they +aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the +Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by surprise +when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close were they +upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It was a case +of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were assailed +with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own, +although some few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting +reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The +cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were +unable to get their men either backward or forward, owing to the +narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought +to be done or what could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were +engaged with the enemy’s infantry were scattered or killed without +having made any effective defence because of their unfortunate +position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a stout +resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on both +flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their +friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a +decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one thousand +infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four hundred +horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the whole +force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they carried +out with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the attack, +but gave way, and were soon in full retreat—conquered more by their +unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in the +rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each man +seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very +sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini +dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all +Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on +the Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the +Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out +the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not +content with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both +sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola, +about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the +spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding +horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals in +commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to +corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city +gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the +participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso Lupacci +and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the Florentines great +anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, they sent envoys +to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of their city; and +he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of the Guelph +cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines to +receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and +he sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen. + +Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the +pressure of Castruccio’s army, owing to his being compelled to leave +his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a +conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, +one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland +should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this +conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of +Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy +paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few +are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy +Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio. +This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio +Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering +their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put +him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove their +families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and +Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought and +energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the Florentines +their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await the coming of +Carlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided +to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more than thirty +thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry—having called to their aid +every Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether they should +attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be better to +march on the latter—a course, owing to the recent conspiracy, more +likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them, because they believed +that the surrender of Pistoia would follow the acquisition of Pisa. + +In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army +and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from +thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army +which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree +alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would +deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to +think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects +of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand +foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with this army went to +Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand +infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than any other town in the +Pisan district, owing to its situation between the rivers Arno and +Gusciana and its slight elevation above the surrounding plain. +Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being victualled unless they +divided their forces, nor could they approach it either from the +direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through to Pisa, or +attack Castruccio’s forces except at a disadvantage. In one case they +would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one under his +own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case they +would have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy, +an undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to +take this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of +the river and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide +expanse of land between them and the river. + +The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to +decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and, +having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the +latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet +the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the +saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the +Florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of +cavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was +fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the Florentines +with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, not allowing +them to issue from the river before he charged them; he also sent one +thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same number down the +Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much impeded by their +arms and the water that they were not able to mount the banks of the +river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the river more +difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had crossed having +broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep with mud, many of +the horses rolled over with their riders and many of them had stuck so +fast that they could not move. When the Florentine captains saw the +difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them and moved +higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less treacherous and +the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met at the bank by +the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who, being light +armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with +tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses, +alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and +trampled each other in great confusion. The fight between the men of +Castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp +and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation and neither +would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back +into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land +in order to make room for the others pressing forward, who if they +could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and in this +obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. Castruccio +shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom they had +before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines reproached each +other that the many should be overcome by the few. At length +Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that both his +men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had many +killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take up +a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded +these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and +one part of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This +cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and +thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these +tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with Castruccio’s +reserves they could not stand against them and at once fell back into +the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet gained any +decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, knowing his +inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand on the +defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he hoped that +when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make short work +of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the +Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the remainder +of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This they did with +lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the +enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. The Florentine +captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had met with in +crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry cross lower +down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio’s army. But +here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of +Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines +were so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them +escaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains +were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with +Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine +commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter +was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a battle. Of the +Florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and thirty-one men, +whilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and seventy men. + +But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his +life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus +ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry +into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but +death could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle +the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued +and overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on +their return from victory and personally thank them. He was also on the +watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day; +he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be +the first man in the saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio +stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on the banks of the +Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of +which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to such troubles; but it +was the cause of his death. On the following night he was attacked with +high fever, which increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it must +prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and +addressed him as follows: + +“If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the +midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my +successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left +thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, +because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and +Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the +Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these +peoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least +more peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, but +one more secure and established on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who +insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me +with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the first, nor the time +to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I have +never concealed it, how I entered the house of thy father whilst yet a +boy—a stranger to all those ambitions which every generous soul should +feel—and how I was brought up by him, and loved as though I had been +born of his blood; how under his governance I learned to be valiant and +capable of availing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been +witness. When thy good father came to die, he committed thee and all +his possessions to my care, and I have brought thee up with that love, +and increased thy estate with that care, which I was bound to show. And +in order that thou shouldst not only possess the estate which thy +father left, but also that which my fortune and abilities have gained, +I have never married, so that the love of children should never deflect +my mind from that gratitude which I owed to the children of thy father. +Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I am well content, but I am +deeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure. +Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest +contented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are +of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be +sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under +a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with +factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs +recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended +Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly +destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than +they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the +princes of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far +distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou +hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory +of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has brought +thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist +thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering +under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to thee. And +whereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I believed that +war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou hast every +inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance will bring +thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest important in this +world that a man should know himself, and the measure of his own +strength and means; and he who knows that he has not a genius for +fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. And it will be +well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this +way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and in this +thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that what I +have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that +I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.” + +After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, +and Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending +Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his +successor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him, +and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he +was. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he +was buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to +Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the +abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, +and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This +latter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the time of the +great-grandson of Pagolo. + +From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a +man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time, +but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the +ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious +presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke +with him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, +and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or +snowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends, +but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false +with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he +desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory +that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was +bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He +was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear +nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees +that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully +sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not look +for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was not +angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that +he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on +the following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a +partridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom +Castruccio had said: “You would not have given more than a penny.” +“That is true,” answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: “A +ducat is much less to me.” Having about him a flatterer on whom he had +spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: “Fisherman +are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in order that +they may take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by +spittle that I may catch a whale”; and this was not only heard by +Castruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest that it +was wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: “If that be +a vice then you should not fare so splendidly at the feasts of our +saints.” Passing through a street he saw a young man as he came out of +a house of ill fame blush at being seen by Castruccio, and said to him: +“Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out, but when thou goest +into such places.” A friend gave him a very curiously tied knot to undo +and was told: “Fool, do you think that I wish to untie a thing which +gave so much trouble to fasten.” Castruccio said to one who professed +to be a philosopher: “You are like the dogs who always run after those +who will give them the best to eat,” and was answered: “We are rather +like the doctors who go to the houses of those who have the greatest +need of them.” Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much +disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for +cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did not fear +anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since +every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one +what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: “When thou goest to a +banquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon +another.” To a person who was boasting that he had read many things, +Castruccio said: “He knows better than to boast of remembering many +things.” Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming +intoxicated. Castruccio replied: “An ox does the same.” Castruccio was +acquainted with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being +blamed by a friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be +taken in by a woman, he said: “She has not taken me in, I have taken +her.” Being also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered: +“Thou dost not spend as much as I do?” and being told that it was true, +he continued: “Then thou art more avaricious than I am gluttonous.” +Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of +Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by Taddeo into a +chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers +and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered some +saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him much +disturbed by this, said to him: “I knew not where to spit in order to +offend thee less.” Being asked how Caesar died he said: “God willing I +will die as he did.” Being one night in the house of one of his +gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of +his friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was +usual in one of his station, so he said: “He who is considered wise by +day will not be considered a fool at night.” A person came to demand a +favour of Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea +threw himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by +Castruccio, said: “Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast +thy ears in thy feet,” whereupon he obtained double the favour he had +asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one, +seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled +blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous +words, he said to him: “When you have another request to make, send +someone else to make it.” Having been wearied by a similar man with a +long oration who wound up by saying: “Perhaps I have fatigued you by +speaking so long,” Castruccio said: “You have not, because I have not +listened to a word you said.” He used to say of one who had been a +beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was +dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now he +took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, he +said: “Do you laugh because you are successful or because another is +unfortunate?” Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco +Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: “What shall I give you if +you will let me give you a blow on the nose?” Castruccio answered: “A +helmet.” Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been +instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done +wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived +themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly +those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying +that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused +when the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise +that whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first +to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with +only looking at her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to +be buried when he died, and answered: “With the face turned downwards, +for I know when I am gone this country will be turned upside down.” On +being asked if it had ever occurred to him to become a friar in order +to save his soul, he answered that it had not, because it appeared +strange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione +della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat +to preserve his health, and replied: “If the man be rich let him eat +when he is hungry; if he be poor, then when he can.” Seeing one of his +gentlemen make a member of his family lace him up, he said to him: “I +pray God that you will let him feed you also.” Seeing that someone had +written upon his house in Latin the words: “May God preserve this house +from the wicked,” he said, “The owner must never go in.” Passing +through one of the streets he saw a small house with a very large door, +and remarked: “That house will fly through the door.” He was having a +discussion with the ambassador of the King of Naples concerning the +property of some banished nobles, when a dispute arose between them, +and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the king. “Is this +king of yours a bad man or a good one?” asked Castruccio, and was told +that he was a good one, whereupon he said, “Why should you suggest that +I should be afraid of a good man?” + +I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and +weighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his +high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a +prince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune, +so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune; +therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be +seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they +were placed by him to testify forever to his days of adversity. As in +his life he was inferior neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of +Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in the same year of his +age as they did, and he would doubtless have excelled both of them had +Fortune decreed that he should be born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia +or Rome. + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE *** + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will +be renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the +United States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part +of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm +concept and trademark. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: The Prince</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Nicolo Machiavelli</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: W. K. Marriott</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: March, 1998 [eBook #1232]<br /> +[Most recently updated: July 1, 2022]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: John Bickers, David Widger and Others</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE ***</div> + +<h1>The Prince</h1> + +<h2 class="no-break">by Nicolo Machiavelli</h2> + +<h3> +Translated by W. K. Marriott +</h3> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style=""> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref01">INTRODUCTION</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref02">YOUTH Æt. 1-25—1469-94</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref03">OFFICE Æt. 25-43—1494-1512</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref04">LITERATURE AND DEATH Æt. 43-58—1512-27</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref05">THE MAN AND HIS WORKS</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref06">DEDICATION</a><br /><br /></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap00"><b>THE PRINCE</b></a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">CHAPTER I. HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">CHAPTER II. CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap03">CHAPTER III. CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap04">CHAPTER IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap05">CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap06">CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap07">CHAPTER VII. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap08">CHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap09">CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap10">CHAPTER X. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap11">CHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap12">CHAPTER XII. HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap13">CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap14">CHAPTER XIV. THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap15">CHAPTER XV. CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap16">CHAPTER XVI. CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap17">CHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap18">CHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap19">CHAPTER XIX. THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap20">CHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap21">CHAPTER XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap22">CHAPTER XXII. CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap23">CHAPTER XXIII. HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap24">CHAPTER XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap25">CHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap26">CHAPTER XXVI. AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS</a><br /><br /></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap27"><b>DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI</b></a><br /><br /></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap28"><b>THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA</b></a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p class="letter"> +<i> +Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to 1512 +held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic missions to +various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; later exiled and +returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd June 1527. +</i> +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref01"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<p> +Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the second +son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, and of +Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were members of the +old Florentine nobility. +</p> + +<p> +His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly +enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of +Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an +Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Il Magnifico. The +downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year +Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official career +Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted until +1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his office. +The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they were once +more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s literary activity +and increasing influence; but he died, within a few weeks of the expulsion +of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his fifty-eighth year, without having +regained office. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref02"></a>YOUTH — Æt. 1-25—1469-94</h2> + +<p> +Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the +Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of this +representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been described +as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by the fervent +and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving Lorenzo. +Savonarola’s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have been slight, +for although at one time he wielded immense power over the fortunes of +Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a gibe in <i>The +Prince</i>, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed prophet who came to +a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean rule during the life +of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli strongly, for he +frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to Lorenzo’s grandson +that he dedicates <i>The Prince</i>. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a picture of the young +men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: “They were freer than +their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other kinds of +excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, and women; +their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with wit and +acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly was thought +the wisest.” In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli shows why youth +should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and leads us to infer +that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes: “I have received your +letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure, especially because you +tell me you are quite restored in health, than which I could have no +better news; for if God grant life to you, and to me, I hope to make a +good man of you if you are willing to do your share.” Then, writing of a +new patron, he continues: “This will turn out well for you, but it is +necessary for you to study; since, then, you have no longer the excuse of +illness, take pains to study letters and music, for you see what honour is +done to me for the little skill I have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to +please me, and to bring success and honour to yourself, do right and +study, because others will help you if you help yourself.” +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref03"></a>OFFICE — Æt. 25-43—1494-1512</h2> + +<p> +The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spent in the service of the +free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the +expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After serving +four years in one of the public offices he was appointed Chancellor and +Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and Peace. Here we +are on firm ground when dealing with the events of Machiavelli’s life, for +during this time he took a leading part in the affairs of the Republic, +and we have its decrees, records, and dispatches to guide us, as well as +his own writings. A mere recapitulation of a few of his transactions with +the statesmen and soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his +activities, and supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences +and characters which illustrate <i>The Prince</i>. +</p> + +<p> +His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, “my lady of Forli” of +<i>The Prince</i>, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it is far +better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on fortresses. +This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is urged by him in +many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes. +</p> + +<p> +In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for +continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct of +affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft +summarized in <i>The Prince</i>, and was consequently driven out. He, also, it +was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support to +Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge that +such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the faith +of princes. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied with events arising out of +the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the Duke +Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of <i>The Prince</i>. +Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke for the +benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have seized; he can, +indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the pattern of Cesare +Borgia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed by some critics as the +“hero” of <i>The Prince</i>. Yet in <i>The Prince</i> the duke is in point of fact +cited as a type of the man who rises on the fortune of others, and falls +with them; who takes every course that might be expected from a prudent +man but the course which will save him; who is prepared for all +eventualities but the one which happens; and who, when all his abilities +fail to carry him through, exclaims that it was not his fault, but an +extraordinary and unforeseen fatality. +</p> + +<p> +On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to watch +the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia cheated into +allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano delle Rovere +(Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most reason to fear the +duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election, says that he who +thinks new favours will cause great personages to forget old injuries +deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had ruined Cesare. +</p> + +<p> +It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that pontiff +was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought to a +successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing chiefly to +his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius that +Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and women, and +concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man that will win +and hold them both. +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian +states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, with +results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those events, +and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they impinge on +the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with Louis XII of +France, and his estimate of that monarch’s character has already been +alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as the man who +accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but who in reality +had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, had he allowed +himself to be influenced by such motives, would have been ruined. The +Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men of the age, and his +character has been drawn by many hands; but Machiavelli, who was an envoy +at his court in 1507-8, reveals the secret of his many failures when he +describes him as a secretive man, without force of character—ignoring +the human agencies necessary to carry his schemes into effect, and never +insisting on the fulfilment of his wishes. +</p> + +<p> +The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official career were filled with +events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the +three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the +object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in the +battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won in eight +hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during these events, +complicated as they were by the feud which broke out between the pope and +the French, because friendship with France had dictated the entire policy +of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II finally formed the Holy League +against France, and with the assistance of the Swiss drove the French out +of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy of the Pope, and had to submit to his +terms, one of which was that the Medici should be restored. The return of +the Medici to Florence on 1st September 1512, and the consequent fall of +the Republic, was the signal for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his +friends, and thus put an end to his public career, for, as we have seen, +he died without regaining office. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref04"></a>LITERATURE AND DEATH — Æt. 43-58—1512-27 +</h2> + +<p> +On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had vainly +hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, was +dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he was +accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici, +imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope, Leo +X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at San +Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In a +letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a very +interesting description of his life at this period, which elucidates his +methods and his motives in writing <i>The Prince</i>. After describing his +daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he writes: “The evening +being come, I return home and go to my study; at the entrance I pull off +my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt, and put on my noble court +dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass into the ancient courts of +the men of old, where, being lovingly received by them, I am fed with that +food which is mine alone; where I do not hesitate to speak with them, and +to ask for the reason of their actions, and they in their benignity answer +me; and for four hours I feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, +poverty does not dismay, death does not terrify me; I am possessed +entirely by those great men. And because Dante says: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +Knowledge doth come of learning well retained,<br /> +Unfruitful else, +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have +composed a small work on ‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out as +fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a +principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how they +can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever pleased you, +this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, especially to a new one, +it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it to his Magnificence +Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will be able to tell you +what is in it, and of the discourses I have had with him; nevertheless, I +am still enriching and polishing it.” +</p> + +<p> +The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form in +which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work during its +composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some unknown +reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici. Although +Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or +presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo ever +received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any +employment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s lifetime, +<i>The Prince</i> was never published by him, and its text is still disputable. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: “And as to this little +thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that during the +fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have neither slept +nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by one who has reaped +experience at the expense of others. And of my loyalty none could doubt, +because having always kept faith I could not now learn how to break it; +for he who has been faithful and honest, as I have, cannot change his +nature; and my poverty is a witness to my honesty.” +</p> + +<p> +Before Machiavelli had got <i>The Prince</i> off his hands he commenced his +“Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,” which should be read +concurrently with <i>The Prince</i>. These and several minor works occupied him +until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look after the +affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the Medicean rulers +of Florence granted a few political concessions to her citizens, and +Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new constitution under which +the Great Council was to be restored; but on one pretext or another it was +not promulgated. +</p> + +<p> +In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to +settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly remarkable +for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he was much +sought after, and also for the production of his “Art of War.” It was in +the same year that he received a commission at the instance of Cardinal +de’ Medici to write the “History of Florence,” a task which occupied him +until 1525. His return to popular favour may have determined the Medici to +give him this employment, for an old writer observes that “an able +statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will endeavour to overturn the +ship unless he has an empty cask to play with.” +</p> + +<p> +When the “History of Florence” was finished, Machiavelli took it to Rome +for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in the +meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is somewhat +remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written <i>The Prince</i> for the +instruction of the Medici after they had just regained power in Florence, +so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence” to the head of the +family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year the battle of Pavia +destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left Francis I a prisoner in the +hands of his great rival, Charles V. This was followed by the sack of +Rome, upon the news of which the popular party at Florence threw off the +yoke of the Medici, who were once more banished. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his +return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the “Ten of +Liberty and Peace.” Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached +Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref05"></a>THE MAN AND HIS WORKS</h2> + +<p> +No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence +has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her most +famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have found in +his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the germs of her +renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle to protest +against the world-wide and evil signification of his name, it may be +pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which this +sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that the +researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more +reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an “unholy +necromancer,” which so long haunted men’s vision, has begun to fade. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and +industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and +with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced +retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he depicted +by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the successful +statesman and author, for he appears to have been only moderately +prosperous in his several embassies and political employments. He was +misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, overawed by Cesare +Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren of results; his +attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery that he raised +astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct of his own affairs +he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear by the side of +Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of compromising himself; his +connection with the Medici was open to suspicion, and Giuliano appears to +have recognized his real forte when he set him to write the “History of +Florence,” rather than employ him in the state. And it is on the literary +side of his character, and there alone, that we find no weakness and no +failure. +</p> + +<p> +Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on <i>The +Prince</i>, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they +are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as they +are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contemporaries; yet they cannot +be said to be out of date so long as the governments of Europe rely on +material rather than on moral forces. Its historical incidents and +personages become interesting by reason of the uses which Machiavelli +makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and conduct. +</p> + +<p> +Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish +some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, <i>The +Prince</i> is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men are +still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the days of +Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices which +Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. Men will +not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them to be—and +are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses; prudence +consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to a +higher plane—Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an +empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the arms +of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to fight. +</p> + +<p> +It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s that government should +be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the people +with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of society; to this +“high argument” <i>The Prince</i> contributes but little. Machiavelli always +refused to write either of men or of governments otherwise than as he +found them, and he writes with such skill and insight that his work is of +abiding value. But what invests <i>The Prince</i> with more than a merely +artistic or historical interest is the incontrovertible truth that it +deals with the great principles which still guide nations and rulers in +their relationship with each other and their neighbours. +</p> + +<p> +In translating <i>The Prince</i> my aim has been to achieve at all costs an +exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent paraphrase +adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. Machiavelli was no +facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he wrote obliged him to weigh +every word; his themes were lofty, his substance grave, his manner nobly plain +and serious. <i>Quis eo fuit unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in +explanandis pressior?</i> In <i>The Prince</i>, it may be truly said, there is +reason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of every word. +To an Englishman of Shakespeare’s time the translation of such a treatise +was in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius of +the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to the +Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example: the word +<i>intrattenere</i>, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy adopted by +the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would by an Elizabethan +be correctly rendered “entertain,” and every contemporary reader +would understand what was meant by saying that “Rome <i>entertained</i> +the Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting their power.” But to-day +such a phrase would seem obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are +compelled to say that “<i>Rome maintained friendly relations with the +Ætolians</i>,” etc., using four words to do the work of one. I have tried +to preserve the pithy brevity of the Italian so far as was consistent with an +absolute fidelity to the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can +only hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author’s +meaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli: +</p> + +<p> +Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di +trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto dal +duca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, +etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; Decennale primo +(poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell’ Alemagna, 1508-12; +Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di Francia, 1510; Discorsi +sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., 1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; +Andria, comedy translated from Terence, 1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy +in five acts, with prologue in verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; +Clizia, comedy in prose, 1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; +Asino d’oro (poem in terza rima), 1517; Dell’ arte della guerra, 1519-20; +Discorso sopra il riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose +della citta di Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; +Istorie fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525. +</p> + +<p> +Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti carnascialeschi. +</p> + +<p> +Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, 6 +vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., 1820-2; +Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7. +</p> + +<p> +Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. Alvisi, +1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G. +Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri intorno +allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. Ferrara, The +Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref06"></a>DEDICATION</h2> + +<p class="center"> +To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici +</p> + +<p> +Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to come +before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in which they see +him take most delight; whence one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, +precious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their +greatness. +</p> + +<p> +Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some testimony +of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my possessions anything +which I hold more dear than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the actions +of great men, acquired by long experience in contemporary affairs, and a +continual study of antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and +prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to your +Magnificence. +</p> + +<p> +And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance, +nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable, seeing +that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to offer you the +opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all that I have learnt in so +many years, and with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not +embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with rounded +periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments whatever, with which +so many are accustomed to embellish their works; for I have wished either that +no honour should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the +weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable. +</p> + +<p> +Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low and +humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of princes; because, +just as those who draw landscapes place themselves below in the plain to +contemplate the nature of the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to +contemplate the plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to +understand the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to understand +that of princes it needs to be of the people. +</p> + +<p> +Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I send +it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you will learn my +extreme desire that you should attain that greatness which fortune and your +other attributes promise. And if your Magnificence from the summit of your +greatness will sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see +how unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap00"></a>THE PRINCE</h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>CHAPTER I.<br /> +HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED +</h2> + +<p> +All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been +and are either republics or principalities. +</p> + +<p> +Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long +established; or they are new. +</p> + +<p> +The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they +are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince who +has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of the King of +Spain. +</p> + +<p> +Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a prince, +or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of the prince +himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>CHAPTER II.<br /> +CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES +</h2> + +<p> +I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place +I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to +principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and +discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved. +</p> + +<p> +I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, +and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones; +for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, +and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of +average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of +it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be so +deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will +regain it. +</p> + +<p> +We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have +withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius in +’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the +hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it +happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause +him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be +naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of +his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one +change always leaves the toothing for another. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap03"></a>CHAPTER III.<br /> +CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES +</h2> + +<p> +But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be +not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken +collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an +inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men +change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope +induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are +deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from +bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, +which always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him +with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon +his new acquisition. +</p> + +<p> +In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing +that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends who put you +there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way they +expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling bound +to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in +entering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives. +</p> + +<p> +For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied +Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only +needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the gates to +him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would +not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is very true that, +after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so +lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with little reluctance, takes +the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out +the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to +cause France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke +Lodovico<a href="#fn-3.1" name="fnref-3.1" id="fnref-3.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +to raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second +time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies +should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes +above mentioned. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.1" id="fn-3.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.1">[1]</a> +Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who married +Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second +time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains to +name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what any +one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securely +in his acquisition than did the King of France. +</p> + +<p> +Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an +ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country and +language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them, +especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and to +hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the prince +who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other things +the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly +together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, +which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, although there +may be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, +and the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who +has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two +considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is +extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are +altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body +with the old principality. +</p> + +<p> +But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs, +or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are +needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be +that he who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would make +his position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk in +Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for +holding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able +to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they +spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand, +they are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no longer +remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your officials; +the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing +to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, +to fear him. He who would attack that state from the outside must have the +utmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested +from him with the greatest difficulty. +</p> + +<p> +The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, +which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do this +or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A prince +does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send +them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the +citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new +inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are +never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept +quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should +happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, +I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they +injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, +cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well +treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter +injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is +to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in +fear of revenge. +</p> + +<p> +But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much +more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, so +that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, +because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrison +up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile, +and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able +to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a +colony is useful. +</p> + +<p> +Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects +ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful +neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that +no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing +there; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by +those who are discontented, either through excess of ambition or through +fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were brought into Greece by the +Ætolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing they +were brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is +that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject +states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the +ruling power. So that in respect to those subject states he has not to +take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them +quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to +take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much +authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can +easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely +master in the country. And he who does not properly manage this business +will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will +have endless difficulties and troubles. +</p> + +<p> +The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these +measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with<a href="#fn-3.2" name="fnref-3.2" id="fnref-3.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the +greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece +appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Ætolians were kept +friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven +out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and Ætolians never secured for them +permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever +induce the Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the +influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over +the country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes +ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future +ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it +is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no +longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, +as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the +malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, +not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to +detect but difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the +evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to +see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been +foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see +them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, +dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a +head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to +the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and +Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have +avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which +is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the +benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and +prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring with it +good as well as evil, and evil as well as good. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.2" id="fn-3.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.2">[2]</a> +See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.” +</p> + +<p> +But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the +things mentioned. I will speak of Louis<a href="#fn-3.3" name="fnref-3.3" id="fnref-3.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +(and not of Charles)<a href="#fn-3.4" name="fnref-3.4" id="fnref-3.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held +possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he has done +the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed +of divers elements. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.3" id="fn-3.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.3">[3]</a> +Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462, +died 1515. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.4" id="fn-3.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.4">[4]</a> +Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498. +</p> + +<p> +King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who +desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I will +not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a foothold +in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every door +was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to +accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded +very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some +mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once +the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines +became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the +Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, +of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the Sienese—everybody +made advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians +realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that +they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of +two-thirds of Italy. +</p> + +<p> +Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have +maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid +down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they +were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church, +some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to +stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself +secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan +than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the +Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening +himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown +themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much +temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. And +having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much +so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his +becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy. +</p> + +<p> +And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and deprived +himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, divided it +with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in Italy he +takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the +malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas he +could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove him +out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn. +</p> + +<p> +The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do +so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when +they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and +blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces +she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have +divided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in +Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in +Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of +that necessity. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, he +increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought +in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not send +colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure him had he +not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians; +because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, +it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but +having first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their +ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from +designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented +except to become masters themselves there; also because the others would +not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the +Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the courage. +</p> + +<p> +And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander +and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given +above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is +not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And if another +should allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he would +assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his +marriage<a href="#fn-3.5" name="fnref-3.5" id="fnref-3.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +and for the cap to Rouen,<a href="#fn-3.6" name="fnref-3.6" id="fnref-3.6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> +to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, +and how it ought to be kept. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.5" id="fn-3.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.5">[5]</a> +Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and married in 1499 +Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to retain the Duchy of +Brittany for the crown. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.6" id="fn-3.6"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.6">[6]</a> +The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a cardinal by +Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510. +</p> + +<p> +Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the conditions +observed by those who have taken possession of countries and wished to +retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonable +and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when +Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually +called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that +the Italians did not understand war, I replied to him that the French did +not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have +allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen +that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by +France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule +is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another +becoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought +about either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by +him who has been raised to power. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap04"></a>CHAPTER IV.<br /> +WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE +SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH +</h2> + +<p> +Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly +acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great +became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was scarcely +settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would +have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had +to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from +their own ambitions. +</p> + +<p> +I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be +governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of +servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour +and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by +antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have +states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them +in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and his +servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the +country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if they +yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and +they do not bear him any particular affection. +</p> + +<p> +The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the +King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, +the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he +sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he +chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body +of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they +have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at +his peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize +great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is +conquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in +seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in +by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his +designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises +from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and +bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect +little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot +carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who +attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and he +will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others; +but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in such +a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the +family of this prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one +to fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror +did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them +after it. +</p> + +<p> +The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because one +can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for one +always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for the +reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory +easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite +difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you +have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of +the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the heads of +fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy or +exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity. +</p> + +<p> +Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius, +you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore it was +only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in the field, and +then to take the country from him. After which victory, Darius being +killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the above reasons. And +if his successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and +at their ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except +those they provoked themselves. +</p> + +<p> +But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted +like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the +Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities +there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them +endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the power +and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and the +Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongst +themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the +country, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family +of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were +acknowledged. +</p> + +<p> +When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with which +Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which others +have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; this is +not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but +by the want of uniformity in the subject state. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap05"></a>CHAPTER V.<br /> +CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR +OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED +</h2> + +<p> +Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been +accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three +courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the +next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live +under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an +oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, +being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his +friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him; and therefore +he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by +the means of its own citizens than in any other way. +</p> + +<p> +There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held +Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they lost +them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, +dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the +Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not +succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the +country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than +by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom +and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in +rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient +privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever +cause it to forget. And whatever you may do or provide against, they never +forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or +dispersed, but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as Pisa +after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines. +</p> + +<p> +But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and +his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey +and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in making +one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern +themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a +prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But in +republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for +vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their +former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to +reside there. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap06"></a>CHAPTER VI.<br /> +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND +ABILITY +</h2> + +<p> +Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities as +I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state; +because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and +following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the +ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise man +ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those +who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at +least it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, +designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing +the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much +higher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great +a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark +they wish to reach. +</p> + +<p> +I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a +new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, accordingly +as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the state. Now, +as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station presupposes either +ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these things will +mitigate in some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied +least on fortune is established the strongest. Further, it facilitates +matters when the prince, having no other state, is compelled to reside +there in person. +</p> + +<p> +But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, +have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and +such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not +discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet he +ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to +speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or +founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular +deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to +those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in examining +their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune +beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the form +which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their powers of mind +would have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity +would have come in vain. +</p> + +<p> +It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of +Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that +they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of +bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and that +he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become King +of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should +find the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and the +Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not have +shown his ability had he not found the Athenians dispersed. These +opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability +enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their country was +ennobled and made famous. +</p> + +<p> +Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a +principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The difficulties +they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules and methods +which they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its +security. And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more +difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in +its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of +things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well +under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well +under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who +have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who +do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience +of them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the +opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others defend +lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them. +</p> + +<p> +It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter +thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or +have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate their +enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the first +instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; but when +they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely +endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the +unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the +nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them, +it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary +to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be +possible to make them believe by force. +</p> + +<p> +If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not have +enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to Fra +Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things +immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means +of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to +believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating +their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with +ability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those +who envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be +respected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, +and happy. +</p> + +<p> +To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some +resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: it is +Hiero the Syracusan.<a href="#fn-6.1" name="fnref-6.1" id="fnref-6.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +This man rose from a private station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, +either, owe anything to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being +oppressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being +made their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that +one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This +man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances, made +new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such foundations he was +able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in +acquiring, he had but little in keeping. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-6.1" id="fn-6.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-6.1">[1]</a> +Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap07"></a>CHAPTER VII.<br /> +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS +OR BY GOOD FORTUNE +</h2> + +<p> +Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private +citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they +have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have +many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is +given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened +to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where +princes were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both +for his security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the +corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand +simply elevated upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated +them—two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the +knowledge requisite for the position; because, unless they are men of +great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should +know how to command, having always lived in a private condition; besides, +they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep +friendly and faithful. +</p> + +<p> +States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which are +born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and correspondencies<a href="#fn-7.1" name="fnref-7.1" id="fnref-7.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as is +said, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability that +they know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has +thrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid +<i>before</i> they became princes, they must lay <i>afterwards</i>. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.1" id="fn-7.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.1">[1]</a> +“Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and +correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of +“correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth +and seventeenth centuries. +</p> + +<p> +Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or fortune, I +wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and these are +Francesco Sforza<a href="#fn-7.2" name="fnref-7.2" id="fnref-7.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and with great ability, from +being a private person rose to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired +with a thousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, +Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during +the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding +that he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise +and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes +of others had bestowed on him. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.2" id="fn-7.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.2">[2]</a> +Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria Visconti, a +natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose death he +procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli was the accredited agent +of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during the +transactions which led up to the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at +Sinigalia, and along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an +account, written ten years before <i>The Prince</i>, of the proceedings of the +duke in his “Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello +ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended +to the present work. +</p> + +<p> +Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations may +be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid +with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore, +all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen that he +laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not consider it +superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to +give a new prince than the example of his actions; and if his dispositions +were of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and +extreme malignity of fortune. +</p> + +<p> +Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many +immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way to +make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church; and if he +was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and the +Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already under +the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy, +especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands that would +fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi +and their following. It behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of +affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master of +part of their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found the +Venetians, moved by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into +Italy; he would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy +by dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came +into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of +Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him +for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of +the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the +Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was hindered +by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other, +the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the +Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him, that not only might +they hinder him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had +won, and that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a +warning when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go +very unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind +when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and +the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided to +depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others. +</p> + +<p> +For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in Rome, by +gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them his +gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their rank, honouring them +with office and command in such a way that in a few months all attachment to +the factions was destroyed and turned entirely to the duke. After this he +awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of +the Colonna house. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, +perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was +ruin to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the +rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the +duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having restored his +authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or other +outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how to +conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke +did not fail to secure with all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, +and horses—the Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought +them into his power at Sinigalia.<a href="#fn-7.3" name="fnref-7.3" id="fnref-7.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends, +the duke laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the +Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate +their prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is +worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it +out. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.3" id="fn-7.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.3">[3]</a> +Sinigalia, 31st December 1502. +</p> + +<p> +When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters, +who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more cause +for disunion than for union, so that the country was full of robbery, quarrels, +and every kind of violence; and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience +to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon +he promoted Messer Ramiro d’Orco,<a href="#fn-7.4" name="fnref-7.4" id="fnref-7.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short +time restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke +considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he +had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment +in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their +advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatred +against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them +entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been +practised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the +minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be +executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at +his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once +satisfied and dismayed. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.4" id="fn-7.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.4">[4]</a> +Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua. +</p> + +<p> +But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding himself +now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by +having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushed +those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceed +with his conquest, had next to consider France, for he knew that the king, +who too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And from +this time he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with France in +the expedition which she was making towards the kingdom of Naples against +the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure +himself against them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had +Alexander lived. +</p> + +<p> +Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future he +had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church might +not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which +Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by +exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as to +take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself all +the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their aid, +as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the college more to himself. +Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Pope should die that he +could by his own measures resist the first shock. Of these four things, at +the death of Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had killed as +many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had +escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous +party in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to +become master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, +and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France +(for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the +Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he +pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, +partly through hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the +Florentines would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he +was prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much +power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer +have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own +power and ability. +</p> + +<p> +But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He left the +duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the rest in the air, +between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto death. Yet there were +in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how men are to be +won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he had +laid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in +good health, he would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his +foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In +Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the Baglioni, the +Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect anything +against him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he wished, at least the +one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But if he had been in +sound health at the death of Alexander,<a href="#fn-7.5" name="fnref-7.5" id="fnref-7.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +everything would have been different to him. On the day that Julius the +Second<a href="#fn-7.6" name="fnref-7.6" id="fnref-7.6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> was +elected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might occur at the +death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except that he had +never anticipated that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the +point to die. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.5" id="fn-7.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.5">[5]</a> +Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.6" id="fn-7.6"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.6">[6]</a> +Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula, born +1443, died 1513. +</p> + +<p> +When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to blame +him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to offer +him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others, +are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and +far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and +only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness +frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to secure +himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome either by +force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be +followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have power +or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to be +severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal +soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princes +in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution, +cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man. +</p> + +<p> +Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he made a +bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to his own +mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected Pope; and he ought +never to have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured or +who had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. For men injure either from +fear or hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad +Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio.<a href="#fn-7.7" name="fnref-7.7" id="fnref-7.7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> +The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; +the latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from his +influence, the kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above +everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him, +he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He who +believes that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuries +is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of +his ultimate ruin. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.7" id="fn-7.7"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.7">[7]</a> +San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap08"></a>CHAPTER VIII.<br /> +CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS +</h2> + +<p> +Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither of +which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is manifest +to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be more +copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are when, either +by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, or when +by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the prince +of his country. And speaking of the first method, it will be illustrated +by two examples—one ancient, the other modern—and without +entering further into the subject, I consider these two examples will +suffice those who may be compelled to follow them. +</p> + +<p> +Agathocles, the Sicilian,<a href="#fn-8.1" name="fnref-8.1" id="fnref-8.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +became King of Syracuse not only from a private but from a low and abject +position. This man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his +fortunes always led an infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies +with so much ability of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the +military profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being +established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself +prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had +been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purpose +with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One +morning he assembled the people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to +discuss with them things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the +soldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he +seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And +although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet +not only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its +defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the +siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were +compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to +be content with the possession of Africa. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-8.1" id="fn-8.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-8.1">[1]</a> +Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will +see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as he +attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any one, +but step by step in the military profession, which steps were gained with +a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly held by him +with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent to slay +fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy, +without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if +the courage of Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from +dangers be considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring and +overcoming hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less +than the most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and +inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated +among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either +to fortune or genius. +</p> + +<p> +In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da Fermo, +having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by his +maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his youth sent +to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his discipline, +he might attain some high position in the military profession. After +Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short +time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body and mind, he became the +first man in his profession. But it appearing a paltry thing to serve +under others, he resolved, with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom +the slavery of their country was dearer than its liberty, and with the +help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani +that, having been away from home for many years, he wished to visit him +and his city, and in some measure to look upon his patrimony; and although +he had not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that +the citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to +come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his +friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should +be received honourably by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to +his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up. +</p> + +<p> +Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, and +he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he lodged him +in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having arranged what +was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a solemn banquet to +which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of Fermo. When the +viands and all the other entertainments that are usual in such banquets +were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave discourses, +speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of +their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others answered; but he +rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more +private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and +the rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they seated +than soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the +rest. After these murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and +down the town and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in +fear the people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of +which he made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were +able to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military +ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the +principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had +become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would have +been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to +be overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli +at Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed +this parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had +made his leader in valour and wickedness. +</p> + +<p> +Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after infinite +treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his country, and +defend himself from external enemies, and never be conspired against by his own +citizens; seeing that many others, by means of cruelty, have never been able +even in peaceful times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times of +war. I believe that this follows from severities<a href="#fn-8.2" name="fnref-8.2" id="fnref-8.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +being badly or properly used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil it +is possible to speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to +one’s security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can +be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, +notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather +than decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God or +man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible +for those who follow the other to maintain themselves. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-8.2" id="fn-8.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-8.2">[2]</a> +Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern equivalent of +Machiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than the +more obvious “cruelties.” +</p> + +<p> +Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to +examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to +inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them +daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, +and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from +timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his +hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves +to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought +to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; +benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavour of them +may last longer. +</p> + +<p> +And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such a +way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall make +him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times, you +are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for they +will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any +obligation to you for them. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap09"></a>CHAPTER IX.<br /> +CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY +</h2> + +<p> +But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the +prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but +by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil +principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to +it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is +obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the +nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and +from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed +by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and +from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three +results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy. +</p> + +<p> +A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, +accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles, +seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation of +one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his shadow +they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot +resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and +make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtains +sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more +difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the +former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his +equals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his +liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself +alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. +</p> + +<p> +Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, +satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is +more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, +while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also +that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because +of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as +they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile +people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only +to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against him; for they, +being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in +time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect +to prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same +people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make and +unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be +looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their +course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do +not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be +honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in +two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural +want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, especially +of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you +honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. But when for their +own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they +are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to +guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because +in adversity they always help to ruin him. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought +to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only ask not +to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes +a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek to +win the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them +under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom +they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thus +the people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised +to the principality by their favours; and the prince can win their +affections in many ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances +one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is +necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no +security in adversity. +</p> + +<p> +Nabis,<a href="#fn-9.1" name="fnref-9.1" id="fnref-9.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious +Roman army, and against them he defended his country and his government; and +for the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make himself +secure against a few, but this would not have been sufficient had the people +been hostile. And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite +proverb that “He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for +this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades +himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by +the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened +to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali<a href="#fn-9.2" name="fnref-9.2" id="fnref-9.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +in Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, who can +command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in +other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole +people encouraged—such a one will never find himself deceived in them, +and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-9.1" id="fn-9.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-9.1">[1]</a> +Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus in 195 B.C.; +killed 192 B.C. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-9.2" id="fn-9.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-9.2">[2]</a> +Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s +“Florentine History,” Book III. +</p> + +<p> +These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the +civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule +personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government is +weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of +those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in +troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by +intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid tumults +to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects, +accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mind to obey +him amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a +scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what +he observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because +then every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far +distant they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the +state has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the +more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. +Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens +will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state +and of him, and then he will always find them faithful. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap10"></a>CHAPTER X.<br /> +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE +MEASURED +</h2> + +<p> +It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of +these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in +case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he +has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite clear +I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by their +own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise a +sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack them; +and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot show +themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defend +themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, +but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can +say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortify +their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. And whoever +shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the other concerns of +his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, will never +be attacked without great caution, for men are always adverse to +enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be +an easy thing to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not +hated by his people. +</p> + +<p> +The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country +around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them, +nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, because +they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the taking of them +by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they have proper ditches +and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they always keep in public +depots enough for one year’s eating, drinking, and firing. And beyond +this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the state, they always +have the means of giving work to the community in those labours that are +the life and strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people +are supported; they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover +have many ordinances to uphold them. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself +odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only be +driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this world +are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year in +the field without being interfered with. And whoever should reply: If the +people have property outside the city, and see it burnt, they will not +remain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will make them forget +their prince; to this I answer that a powerful and courageous prince will +overcome all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects +that the evil will not be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty of +the enemy, then preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who seem +to him to be too bold. +</p> + +<p> +Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin +the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and +ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the prince +to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage is +already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; +and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with their prince, +he appearing to be under obligations to them now that their houses have +been burnt and their possessions ruined in his defence. For it is the +nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those +they receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it will not be +difficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast +from first to last, when he does not fail to support and defend them. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap11"></a>CHAPTER XI.<br /> +CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES +</h2> + +<p> +It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching +which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they are +acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without +either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of religion, +which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the principalities +may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. These princes +alone have states and do not defend them; and they have subjects and do +not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are not taken from +them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they have +neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. Such +principalities only are secure and happy. But being upheld by powers, to +which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, +being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous +and rash man to discuss them. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church has +attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from Alexander +backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been called +potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) have valued the +temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France trembles +before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and to ruin the +Venetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not appear to +me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. +</p> + +<p> +Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,<a href="#fn-11.1" name="fnref-11.1" id="fnref-11.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +this country was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of +Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two +principal anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; +the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about +whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To restrain +the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as it was for the +defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made use of the barons of +Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonnesi, had always a +pretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under the eyes of +the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And although there might +arise sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor +wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also +a cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a pope, +he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one +people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the +Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin +the Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were little +esteemed in Italy. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-11.1" id="fn-11.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-11.1">[1]</a> +Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494. +</p> + +<p> +Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have +ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to prevail; +and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by reason of +the entry of the French, he brought about all those things which I have +discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although his intention was +not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, nevertheless, what he did +contributed to the greatness of the Church, which, after his death and the +ruin of the duke, became the heir to all his labours. +</p> + +<p> +Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all the +Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the +chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the way open +to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been practised before +Alexander’s time. Such things Julius not only followed, but improved +upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the +French out of Italy. All of these enterprises prospered with him, and so much +the more to his credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church +and not any private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions +within the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them +some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: the one, +the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and the other, not +allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused the disorders among them. +For whenever these factions have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for +long, because cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the +barons are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates +arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness +Pope Leo<a href="#fn-11.2" name="fnref-11.2" id="fnref-11.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others made +it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more venerated by his +goodness and infinite other virtues. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-11.2" id="fn-11.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-11.2">[2]</a> +Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap12"></a>CHAPTER XII.<br /> +HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES +</h2> + +<p> +Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such +principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having +considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and +having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and to +hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of offence +and defence which belong to each of them. +</p> + +<p> +We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his +foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to +ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or +composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws +where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well +armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion +and shall speak of the arms. +</p> + +<p> +I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are +either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and +auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on +these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, +ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly +before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and +destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is +robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other +attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is +not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be +your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves +off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble to prove, for the +ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for +many years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and +appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed +what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize +Italy with chalk in hand;<a href="#fn-12.1" name="fnref-12.1" id="fnref-12.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they +were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were +the sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.1" id="fn-12.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.1">[1]</a> +“With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the +<i>bons mots</i> of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles +VIII seized Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his +quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the country. +<i>Cf</i>. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King +Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a kind of a +felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy without resistance: so +that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came +into Italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather than +with swords to fight.” +</p> + +<p> +I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The mercenary +captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot +trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by +oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your +intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual +way. +</p> + +<p> +And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, whether +mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to, either by +a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in person and perform +the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its citizens, and when one +is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and +when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave the +command. And experience has shown princes and republics, single-handed, +making the greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; +and it is more difficult to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, +under the sway of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed with +foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The +Switzers are completely armed and quite free. +</p> + +<p> +Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who were +oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, +although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. After the +death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of their soldiers +by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their liberty. +</p> + +<p> +Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against the +Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,<a href="#fn-12.2" name="fnref-12.2" id="fnref-12.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father, +Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna<a href="#fn-12.3" name="fnref-12.3" id="fnref-12.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into +the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the +Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and +yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them, I +reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of +the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not +conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitions +elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,<a href="#fn-12.4" name="fnref-12.4" id="fnref-12.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one will +acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have stood at his +discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each +other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church +and the kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while +ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent +man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man +had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the +Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies +they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. The +Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted +safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with +armed gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned to +enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook this +virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their +expansion on land, through not having much territory, and because of their +great reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when they +expanded, as under Carmignuola,<a href="#fn-12.5" name="fnref-12.5" id="fnref-12.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man +(they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, +knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer +conquer under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they +able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had acquired, +they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him. They had +afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, +the count of Pitigliano,<a href="#fn-12.6" name="fnref-12.6" id="fnref-12.6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> +and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened +afterwards at Vaila,<a href="#fn-12.7" name="fnref-12.7" id="fnref-12.7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> +where in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had +acquired with so much trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but +slowly, long delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.2" id="fn-12.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.2">[2]</a> +Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.3" id="fn-12.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.3">[3]</a> +Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.4" id="fn-12.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.4">[4]</a> +Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John Hawkwood. He fought +in the English wars in France, and was knighted by Edward III; afterwards he +collected a body of troops and went into Italy. These became the famous +“White Company.” He took part in many wars, and died in Florence in +1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married +Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.5" id="fn-12.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.5">[5]</a> +Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, executed at +Venice, 5th May 1432. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.6" id="fn-12.6"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.6">[6]</a> +Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San Severino; died +fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria, in 1487. “Primo +capitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; Nicolo +Orsini, born 1442, died 1510. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.7" id="fn-12.7"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.7">[7]</a> +Battle of Vaila in 1509. +</p> + +<p> +And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled for +many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, in order +that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared to +counteract them. You must understand that the empire has recently come to +be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal power, +and that Italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason that +many of the great cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerly +favoured by the emperor, were oppressing them, whilst the Church was +favouring them so as to gain authority in temporal power: in many others +their citizens became princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell +partly into the hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church +consisting of priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, +both commenced to enlist foreigners. +</p> + +<p> +The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,<a href="#fn-12.8" name="fnref-12.8" id="fnref-12.8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> +the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and +Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came all the +other captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy; and the end of all +their valour has been, that she has been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, +ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has +guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might +increase their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without +territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did +not give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a +moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were +brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were +not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used every +art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing +in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not +attack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at +night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did +they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military +rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers; +thus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.8" id="fn-12.8"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.8">[8]</a> +Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in Romagna. He was the +leader of the famous “Company of St George,” composed entirely of +Italian soldiers. He died in 1409. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap13"></a>CHAPTER XIII.<br /> +CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN +</h2> + +<p> +Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince is +called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in the +most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara, had poor +proof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, +King of Spain,<a href="#fn-13.1" name="fnref-13.1" id="fnref-13.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in +themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for +losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.1" id="fn-13.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.1">[1]</a> +Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), surnamed “The +Catholic,” born 1452, died 1516. +</p> + +<p> +And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish to +leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which cannot +fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw himself +entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune brought +about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice; +because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the Switzers having +risen and driven out the conquerors (against all expectation, both his and +others), it so came to pass that he did not become prisoner to his +enemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, he having conquered by +other arms than theirs. +</p> + +<p> +The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand Frenchmen +to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other time of their +troubles. +</p> + +<p> +The Emperor of Constantinople,<a href="#fn-13.2" name="fnref-13.2" id="fnref-13.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +to oppose his neighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war +being finished, were not willing to quit; this was the beginning of the +servitude of Greece to the infidels. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.2" id="fn-13.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.2">[2]</a> +Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, +for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the +ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others; +but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better +opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one community, +they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made +their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure +you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in +auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these +arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them +than to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real victory which is +gained with the arms of others. +</p> + +<p> +I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke +entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, +and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces not +appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less +danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on +handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he +destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference between one and +the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers the +difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the +French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his own +soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever +increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw that +he was complete master of his own forces. +</p> + +<p> +I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am +unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I have +named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the +Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like our +Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he could +neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and +afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens. +</p> + +<p> +I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament +applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with +Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed him +with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on his +back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the +enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of others +either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast. +</p> + +<p> +Charles the Seventh,<a href="#fn-13.3" name="fnref-13.3" id="fnref-13.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +the father of King Louis the Eleventh,<a href="#fn-13.4" name="fnref-13.4" id="fnref-13.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, recognized +the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in his +kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his son, +King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the Switzers, which +mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to that +kingdom; because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely +diminished the value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry +altogether; and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as +they are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that +they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot stand +against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off well +against others. The armies of the French have thus become mixed, partly +mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together are much better than +mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one’s own +forces. And this example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be +unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.3" id="fn-13.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.3">[3]</a> +Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died +1461. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.4" id="fn-13.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.4">[4]</a> +Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483. +</p> + +<p> +But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks well at +first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above of +hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot recognize evils +until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight is given to +few. And if the first disaster to the Roman Empire<a href="#fn-13.5" name="fnref-13.5" id="fnref-13.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the enlisting +of the Goths; because from that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to +decline, and all that valour which had raised it passed away to others. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.5" id="fn-13.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.5">[5]</a> +“Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the +reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of the +conditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence. When Mr +Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank under the weight +of its military obligations, he said that this was ‘wholly +unhistorical.’ He might well have added that the Roman power was at its +zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, +but that it began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer +recognised.”—<i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, 15th May 1906. +</p> + +<p> +I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its +own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not +having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has always +been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain +or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. And one’s +own forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, or +dependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to make +ready one’s own forces will be easily found if the rules suggested by me +shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the father +of Alexander the Great, and many republics and princes have armed and +organized themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap14"></a>CHAPTER XIV.<br /> +THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR +</h2> + +<p> +A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else +for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole +art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not +only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise +from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that +when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their +states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and +what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of the art. Francesco +Sforza, through being martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; +and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from +dukes became private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed +brings you, it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those +ignominies against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown +later on. Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the +unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield +obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should +be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one disdain +and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well +together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, +over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be +respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, +therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace +he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do +in two ways, the one by action, the other by study. +</p> + +<p> +As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well +organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he +accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of +localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys +open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and +marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge is +useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his country, and is better +able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the knowledge and +observation of that locality, he understands with ease any other which it +may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, +and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, +have a certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a +knowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a +knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the +essential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it +teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to +array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage. +</p> + +<p> +Philopoemen,<a href="#fn-14.1" name="fnref-14.1" id="fnref-14.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which writers have bestowed on him, +is commended because in time of peace he never had anything in his mind but the +rules of war; and when he was in the country with friends, he often stopped and +reasoned with them: “If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should +find ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should +one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, +how ought we to pursue?” And he would set forth to them, as he went, all +the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion and +state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual discussions +there could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected circumstances that he +could not deal with. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-14.1" id="fn-14.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-14.1">[1]</a> +Philopoemen, “the last of the Greeks,” born 252 B.C., died 183 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and study +there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne +themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so +as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as an +illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised and +famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his +mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar +Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by +Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of Scipio how that +imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, and +liberality Scipio conformed to those things which have been written of +Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to observe some such rules, and +never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with +industry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so +that if fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap15"></a>CHAPTER XV.<br /> +CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED +</h2> + +<p> +It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince +towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have written on this +point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it again, +especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of other +people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful +to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up +the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for many have +pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known +or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to +live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner +effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act +entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him +among so much that is evil. +</p> + +<p> +Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to +do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. Therefore, +putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, and discussing +those which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken of, and +chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable for some of +those qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is +that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because +an avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to possess by +robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much of the +use of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one +compassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and +cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, another haughty; one +lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, +another easy; one grave, another frivolous; one religious, another +unbelieving, and the like. And I know that every one will confess that it +would be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities +that are considered good; but because they can neither be entirely +possessed nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is +necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid +the reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also to +keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it; +but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon himself +to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a +reproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved with +difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be found +that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; +whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him +security and prosperity. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap16"></a>CHAPTER XVI.<br /> +CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS +</h2> + +<p> +Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I say +that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, liberality +exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injures +you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised, it +may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite. +Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is +obliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus +inclined will consume in such acts all his property, and will be compelled +in the end, if he wish to maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh +down his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. This +will soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be +little valued by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many +and rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled +by whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing +to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of liberality +in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if he is wise he +ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in time he will come +to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that with his economy his +revenues are enough, that he can defend himself against all attacks, and +is able to engage in enterprises without burdening his people; thus it +comes to pass that he exercises liberality towards all from whom he does +not take, who are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does +not give, who are few. +</p> + +<p> +We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have +been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was +assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he did +not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King of +France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on +his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long +thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or +conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A prince, +therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he can +defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he is not +forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputation +for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will enable him to +govern. +</p> + +<p> +And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and many +others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, and by +being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, or in a +way to become one. In the first case this liberality is dangerous, in the +second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; and Caesar was one +of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived +after becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have +destroyed his government. And if any one should reply: Many have been +princes, and have done great things with armies, who have been considered +very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends that which is his own or his +subjects’ or else that of others. In the first case he ought to be +sparing, in the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for +liberality. And to the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting it +by pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, +this liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by +soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects’ you can be +a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not +take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; +it is only squandering your own that injures you. +</p> + +<p> +And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you +exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor or +despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a prince +should guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated; +and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have a +reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be +compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to incur a name for +rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap17"></a>CHAPTER XVII.<br /> +CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN +FEARED +</h2> + +<p> +Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every prince +ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. Nevertheless he ought +to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; +notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored +it to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to +have been much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a +reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.<a href="#fn-17.1" name="fnref-17.1" id="fnref-17.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought +not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be +more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, +from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole +people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the +individual only. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-17.1" id="fn-17.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-17.1">[1]</a> +During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi factions in 1502 and +1503. +</p> + +<p> +And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the +imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence +Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign +owing to its being new, saying: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt<br /> +Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.”<a href="#fn-17.2" name="fnref-17.2" id="fnref-17.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he +himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and +humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and too +much distrust render him intolerable. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-17.2" id="fn-17.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-17.2">[2]</a> +. . . against my will, my fate<br /> +A throne unsettled, and an infant state,<br /> +Bid me defend my realms with all my pow’rs,<br /> +And guard with these severities my shores.<br /> +<br /> +Christopher Pitt. +</p> + +<p> +Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared +or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both, +but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer +to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with. +Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are +ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed +they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life, +and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it +approaches they turn against you. And that prince who, relying entirely on +their promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because +friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or +nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in +time of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending +one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the +link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every +opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of +punishment which never fails. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does +not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being +feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains +from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women. But +when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he +must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all +things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more +quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. +Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are never wanting; for he +who has once begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts for +seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the +contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince +is with his army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it +is quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for +without it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties. +</p> + +<p> +Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that having +led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to fight in +foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or against the +prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This arose from nothing +else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valour, made him +revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without that +cruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect. And +short-sighted writers admire his deeds from one point of view and from +another condemn the principal cause of them. That it is true his other +virtues would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case +of Scipio, that most excellent man, not only of his own times but within +the memory of man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; +this arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his +soldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. For +this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the +corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate +of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the +legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone +in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew +much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This +disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have destroyed +in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the control of +the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but +contributed to his glory. +</p> + +<p> +Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the +conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing +according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself on +that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must +endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap18"></a>CHAPTER XVIII.<a href="#fn-18.1" name="fnref-18.1" id="fnref-18.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a><br /> +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH +</h2> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.1" id="fn-18.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.1">[1]</a> +“The present chapter has given greater offence than any other portion of +Machiavelli’s writings.” Burd, “Il Principe,” p. 297. +</p> + +<p> +Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live +with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that +those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little +account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in +the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know there +are two ways of contesting,<a href="#fn-18.2" name="fnref-18.2" id="fnref-18.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +the one by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the +second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is +necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a +prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has +been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how +Achilles and many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to +nurse, who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they +had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a +prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other +is not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the +beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend +himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. +Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to +terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what +they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when +such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him +to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not +hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are +not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince +legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern +examples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been +made void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has +known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.2" id="fn-18.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.2">[2]</a> +“Contesting,” <i>i.e</i>. “striving for mastery.” Mr +Burd points out that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero’s +“De Officiis”: “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per +disceptationem, alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc +beluarum; confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.” +</p> + +<p> +But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be +a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to +present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who +will allow himself to be deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over in +silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thought +of doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a man who +had greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, +yet would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according +to his wishes,<a href="#fn-18.3" name="fnref-18.3" id="fnref-18.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> because he well understood this side of mankind. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.3" id="fn-18.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.3">[3]</a> +“Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).” The +words “ad votum” are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550.<br /> +<br /> +Alexander never did what he said,<br /> +Cesare never said what he did.<br /> +<br /> +Italian Proverb. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I +have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I +shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them +is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear +merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a +mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and +know how to change to the opposite. +</p> + +<p> +And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, cannot +observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in +order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,<a href="#fn-18.4" name="fnref-18.4" id="fnref-18.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to have a +mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune +force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can +avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.4" id="fn-18.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.4">[4]</a> +“Contrary to fidelity” or “faith,” “contro alla +fede,” and “tutto fede,” “altogether faithful,” +in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy that these two phrases, “contro +alla fede” and “tutto fede,” were omitted in the Testina +edition, which was published with the sanction of the papal authorities. It may +be that the meaning attached to the word “fede” was “the +faith,” <i>i.e</i>. the Catholic creed, and not as rendered here +“fidelity” and “faithful.” Observe that the word +“religione” was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being +used to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness “the +religion,” a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot heresy. +South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as follows: +“That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, Nicolo Machiavel, laid +down this for a master rule in his political scheme: ‘That the show of +religion was helpful to the politician, but the reality of it hurtful and +pernicious.’” +</p> + +<p> +For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything +slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five +qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether +merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more +necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge +generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to +everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees +what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare +not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of +the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of +princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result. +</p> + +<p> +For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding +his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be +praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing +seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the +vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no ground +to rest on. +</p> + +<p> +One prince<a href="#fn-18.5" name="fnref-18.5" id="fnref-18.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else +but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had +kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.5" id="fn-18.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.5">[5]</a> +Ferdinand of Aragon. “When Machiavelli was writing <i>The Prince</i> it +would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand’s name here +without giving offence.” Burd’s “Il Principe,” p. 308. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap19"></a>CHAPTER XIX.<br /> +THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED +</h2> + +<p> +Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I have +spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss briefly +under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in part +said before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or +contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have +fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches. +</p> + +<p> +It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and +to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both of +which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor their honor is +touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with +the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways. +</p> + +<p> +It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, +mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should guard himself +as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness, +courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his +subjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain +himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or +to get round him. +</p> + +<p> +That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, and +he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, provided +it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, he +can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince ought to +have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other +from without, on account of external powers. From the latter he is +defended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he is well +armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet +within when they are quiet without, unless they should have been already +disturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if +he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long +as he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis the +Spartan did. +</p> + +<p> +But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has +only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can +easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping +the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him to +accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most efficacious +remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated +and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a prince always +expects to please them by his removal; but when the conspirator can only +look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such +a course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. +And as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have +been successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he +take a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and +as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him +the material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can +look for every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be +assured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must +be a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to +keep faith with you. +</p> + +<p> +And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side of +the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of +punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the +majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the +state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the popular +goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire. +For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of +his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime; +because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot +hope for any escape. +</p> + +<p> +Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content with +one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale +Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present Annibale), +having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him, not one +of his family survived but Messer Giovanni,<a href="#fn-19.1" name="fnref-19.1" id="fnref-19.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the people rose and +murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the popular goodwill which the +house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in Bologna; which was so great that, +although none remained there after the death of Annibale who was able to rule +the state, the Bolognese, having information that there was one of the +Bentivogli family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son +of a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of their +city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the +government. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-19.1" id="fn-19.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-19.1">[1]</a> +Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He ruled Bologna +from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of conspiracies may +get its edge from his own very recent experience (February 1513), when he had +been arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the Boscoli +conspiracy. +</p> + +<p> +For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of +little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is hostile +to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and +everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care +not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied +and contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can +have. +</p> + +<p> +Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, and +in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and +security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its +authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of the +nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths would +be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the hatred +of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect +them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the +king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be liable to +from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people for +favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could +beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the king. +Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or a +greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can draw +another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of +reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their own +hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, +but not so as to make himself hated by the people. +</p> + +<p> +It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths of +the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to my +opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great qualities +of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed by +subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer +these objections, I will recall the characters of some of the emperors, +and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those +alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for consideration those +things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times. +</p> + +<p> +It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the +empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were Marcus and +his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus +Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. +</p> + +<p> +There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the ambition +of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contended +with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with +the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset with +difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to give +satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people loved peace, +and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers +loved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which +qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people, so +that they could get double pay and give vent to their own greed and +cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were always overthrown who, +either by birth or training, had no great authority, and most of them, +especially those who came new to the principality, recognizing the +difficulty of these two opposing humours, were inclined to give +satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. +Which course was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by +someone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every +one, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the +utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, +those emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered +more readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out +advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to +maintain authority over them. +</p> + +<p> +From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being all +men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and +benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died +honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and +owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, being +possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both +orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor +despised. +</p> + +<p> +But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who, +being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure the +honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, having given +cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old +age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And +here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as +by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his +state is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom +you think you have need of to maintain yourself—it may be either the +people or the soldiers or the nobles—you have to submit to its +humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm. +</p> + +<p> +But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, that +among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the +fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by him +unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed +himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the army +conspired against him, and murdered him. +</p> + +<p> +Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus +Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-men +who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of +iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a bad end; +but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers +friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned +successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of the +soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awed +and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this +man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well +how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, +it is necessary for a prince to imitate. +</p> + +<p> +Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in +Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome +and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian +soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the +throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known +that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, +elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for +Severus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two +difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had +caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west where +Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he considered it +dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to attack Niger +and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected emperor +by the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and sent him +the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his +colleague; which things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after +Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he +returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, little +recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by treachery +sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish +him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and took from him his +government and life. He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions +of this man will find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he +will find him feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the +army; and it need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold +the empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from +that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his +violence. +</p> + +<p> +But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent +qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and +acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of +fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused +him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties +were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he +killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria. +He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had around +him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army by a +centurion. And here it must be noted that such-like deaths, which are +deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be +avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear to die can inflict +them; but a prince may fear them the less because they are very rare; he +has only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs +or has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken +this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom +also he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it +turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin. +</p> + +<p> +But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to hold +the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had +only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and +soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up to +amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his +rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity, +often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators, and doing +other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he fell into +contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and despised by +the other, he was conspired against and was killed. +</p> + +<p> +It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike +man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of +whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the +throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated +and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him +into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great +indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to his +dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the imperial +seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, +through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many +cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of +his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the +Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, +to which may be added his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia and +meeting with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, +and fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him. +</p> + +<p> +I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being +thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this +discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this +difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far +less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some +indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that are +veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were the +armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary to give +satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary +to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people +rather the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful. +</p> + +<p> +From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him twelve +thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the +security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, putting +aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends. +The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the hands of +soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the people, he must +keep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the Soldan is +unlike all other principalities, for the reason that it is like the +Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or a +newly formed principality; because the sons of the old prince are not the +heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority, +and the sons remain only noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it +cannot be called a new principality, because there are none of those +difficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for although the prince +is new, the constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to +receive him as if he were its hereditary lord. +</p> + +<p> +But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will +consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal +to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how it +happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another, +only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. +Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and +Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the +principality; and likewise it would have been utterly destructive to +Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they not +having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps. +Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot imitate the actions of +Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow those of Severus, but he +ought to take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his +state, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state +that may already be stable and firm. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap20"></a>CHAPTER XX.<br /> +ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, +ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? +</h2> + +<p> +1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their +subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; +others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid +themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of +their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and +destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of +these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which +a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as +the matter of itself will admit. +</p> + +<p> +2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather when +he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by arming +them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become +faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects +become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when +those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more +freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they quite +understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, considering +it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and service should +have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once +offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for +want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you. +And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to +mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they should +be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful +enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince +in a new principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of +examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a +province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that +state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these +again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; +and matters should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the +state shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near +you. +</p> + +<p> +3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to +say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by +fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their +tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This may +have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced, but +I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, because +I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain +that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, +because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the +other will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by +the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their +tributary cities; and although they never allowed them to come to +bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the +citizens, distracted by their differences, should not unite against them. +Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, after +the rout at Vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state. +Such methods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince, because these +factions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods +for enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in +times of peace, but if war comes this policy proves fallacious. +</p> + +<p> +4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the difficulties +and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore fortune, +especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who has a greater +necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise +and form designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity of +overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which his +enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that a wise prince, +when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity +against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher. +</p> + +<p> +5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance +in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among +those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of +Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by +others. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so +much with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who at the +commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a +description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be gained +over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the +prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for +them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; +and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those +who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since +the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of +secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the +reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a +natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, +then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, +for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons +for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern +affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends of +those men who were contented under the former government, and are +therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, were +favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it. +</p> + +<p> +6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states more +securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who +might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a first +attack. I praise this system because it has been made use of formerly. +Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to +demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he might keep that state; +Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been +driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that +province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose +it; the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, +therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in +one way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the +prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build +fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the people +ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has +made, and will make, more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other +disorder in the state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—not +to be hated by the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet +they will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting +foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been +seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless +to the Countess of Forli,<a href="#fn-20.1" name="fnref-20.1" id="fnref-20.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was +able to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and +thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that +the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little value +to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, her +enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer for +her, both then and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have +had the fortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him who +builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, +trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-20.1" id="fn-20.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-20.1">[1]</a> +Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia Landriani, born +1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as +envoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces the +appointment: “I have been with the signori,” wrote Fortunati, +“to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me that Nicolo +Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary to my Lords of the +Ten, is to leave with me at once.” <i>Cf</i>. “Catherine +Sforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap21"></a>CHAPTER XXI.<br /> +HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN +</h2> + +<p> +Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a +fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of +Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has risen, by fame +and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the foremost king in +Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds you will find them all +great and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he +attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions. +He did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance, for he +held the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in thinking of the war +and not anticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceive that by +these means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was able +with the money of the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and +by that long war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has +since distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as +to undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to +driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a +more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he +assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; +and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, and have +kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with +the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of +the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against +him. +</p> + +<p> +Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal +affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano, +who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some +extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of +rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a prince +ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain for +himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man. +</p> + +<p> +A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright +enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself +in favour of one party against the other; which course will always be more +advantageous than standing neutral; because if two of your powerful +neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one of +them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case it will +always be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war +strenuously; because, in the first case, if you do not declare yourself, +you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and +satisfaction of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasons +to offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you. Because he who +conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time +of trial; and he who loses will not harbour you because you did not +willingly, sword in hand, court his fate. +</p> + +<p> +Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive out +the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the +Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the Romans +urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in the +council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to stand +neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: “As for that which has been +said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to +interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by not +interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the guerdon +of the conqueror.” Thus it will always happen that he who is not your +friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will +entreat you to declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to +avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are +generally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour +of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although +the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is +indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are +never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing +you. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not +show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally +yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may +aid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again. +</p> + +<p> +In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that you +have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it greater +prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one by the +aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him; and +conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your +assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted that +a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one more +powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless +necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are at +his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being at +the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against the +Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could have been +avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentines +when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then in such a +case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of the +parties. +</p> + +<p> +Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe +courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because +it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble +without running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to +distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser +evil. +</p> + +<p> +A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour the +proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his citizens +to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and agriculture, +and in every other following, so that the one should not be deterred from +improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him or +another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the prince ought to +offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any way +to honour his city or state. +</p> + +<p> +Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at +convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into guilds or +into societies,<a href="#fn-21.1" name="fnref-21.1" id="fnref-21.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and +show himself an example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always +maintaining the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in +anything. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-21.1" id="fn-21.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-21.1">[1]</a> +“Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.” +“Arti” were craft or trade guilds, <i>cf</i>. Florio: +“Arte . . . a whole company of any trade in any city or corporation +town.” The guilds of Florence are most admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe +Staley in his work on the subject (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat +similar character, called “artel,” exist in Russia to-day, +<i>cf</i>. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s “Russia,” ed. 1905: +“The sons . . . were always during the working season members of an +artel. In some of the larger towns there are artels of a much more complex +kind— permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarily +responsible for the acts of the individual members.” The word +“artel,” despite its apparent similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude +assures me, no connection with “ars” or “arte.” Its +root is that of the verb “rotisya,” to bind oneself by an oath; and +it is generally admitted to be only another form of “rota,” which +now signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the underlying +idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu” were +possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included individuals +connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or +“clans” would be most appropriate. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap22"></a>CHAPTER XXII.<br /> +CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES +</h2> + +<p> +The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they +are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the +first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by +observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and +faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to +recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are +otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which +he made was in choosing them. +</p> + +<p> +There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to be +a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there are +three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another +which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which neither +comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is the most +excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore, it follows +necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he was in the +second, for whenever one has judgment to know good and bad when it is said +and done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he can +recognize the good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise +and the other correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is +kept honest. +</p> + +<p> +But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one test +which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his own +interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in +everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever +be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his hands +ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and never pay +any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned. +</p> + +<p> +On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study +him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him +the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he cannot +stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, many +riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dread +chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, are thus +disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, the end +will always be disastrous for either one or the other. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap23"></a>CHAPTER XXIII.<br /> +HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED +</h2> + +<p> +I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is +a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they are +very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whom courts +are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in +a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from +this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of +falling into contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself +from flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth +does not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth, respect +for you abates. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise +men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the +truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of +none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to +their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these +councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in +such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall +speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen +to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his +resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or +is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt. +</p> + +<p> +I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of affairs +to Maximilian,<a href="#fn-23.1" name="fnref-23.1" id="fnref-23.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: He consulted with no one, +yet never got his own way in anything. This arose because of his following a +practice the opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he +does not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on +them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they +are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being +pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he does one +day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends +to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-23.1" id="fn-23.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-23.1">[1]</a> +Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. He +married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after her death, Bianca +Sforza; and thus became involved in Italian politics. +</p> + +<p> +A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes +and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from +offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constant +inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which +he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not +told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt. +</p> + +<p> +And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression of +his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good +advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because +this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise himself +will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs +entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this case +indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long, because such +a governor would in a short time take away his state from him. +</p> + +<p> +But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more +than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to unite +them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and the +prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And they +are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to you +unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferred +that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the +prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap24"></a>CHAPTER XXIV.<br /> +WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES +</h2> + +<p> +The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to +appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed in +the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a new +prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and +when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than +ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by the +past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no +further; they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he fails +them not in other things. Thus it will be a double glory for him to have +established a new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with good +laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a +double disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of +wisdom. +</p> + +<p> +And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in Italy +in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, +there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in regard to arms +from the causes which have been discussed at length; in the next place, +some one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or +if he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure the +nobles. In the absence of these defects states that have power enough to +keep an army in the field cannot be lost. +</p> + +<p> +Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who was +conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the +greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a +warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he +sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the end he +lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their +principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own +sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change +(it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm +against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thought +of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people, +disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. This +course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to have +neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish to +fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to restore +you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for +your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which does not +depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable that +depend on yourself and your valour. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap25"></a>CHAPTER XXV.<br /> +WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER +</h2> + +<p> +It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that +the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune and by God that +men with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them; +and because of this they would have us believe that it is not necessary to +labour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been +more credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have +been seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. +Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. +Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that +Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,<a href="#fn-25.1" name="fnref-25.1" id="fnref-25.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little +less. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-25.1" id="fn-25.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-25.1">[1]</a> +Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: “The older one gets the more +convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does three-quarters of the +business of this miserable universe.” Sorel’s “Eastern +Question.” +</p> + +<p> +I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows +the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away the soil from +place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence, +without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its nature +be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes +fair, shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such a +manner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their +force be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with +fortune, who shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, +and thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and +defences have not been raised to constrain her. +</p> + +<p> +And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and +which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open +country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been +defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either this +invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it would not +have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning resistance +to fortune in general. +</p> + +<p> +But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be +seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of +disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes that +have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who relies +entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he will +be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the +times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be +successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which +every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by +various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force, +another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one +succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of +two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, +two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being +cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than +whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. +This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently bring +about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his +object and the other does not. +</p> + +<p> +Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himself +with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way that +his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if times and +affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action. +But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how to +accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from +what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always prospered +by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it; +and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous, +does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his +conduct with the times fortune would not have changed. +</p> + +<p> +Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and +found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action +that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against +Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians were +not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the enterprise +still under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless he personally +entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness and energy, a +move which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the +latter from fear, the former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; +on the other hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that +king, having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his +friend so as to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. +Therefore Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other +pontiff with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in +Rome until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything +fixed, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have +succeeded. Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, +and the others would have raised a thousand fears. +</p> + +<p> +I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they all +succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience the +contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go +cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have +deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him. +</p> + +<p> +I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast +in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but +unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better +to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you +wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is +seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than +by those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, +woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more +violent, and with more audacity command her. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap26"></a>CHAPTER XXVI.<br /> +AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS +</h2> + +<p> +Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and +wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a new +prince, and whether there were elements that would give an opportunity to +a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things which would do +honour to him and good to the people of this country, it appears to me +that so many things concur to favour a new prince that I never knew a time +more fit than the present. +</p> + +<p> +And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be +captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians +should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the +soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate +the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to +discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy +should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should be +more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, more +scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten, +despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation. +</p> + +<p> +Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us think +he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was afterwards +seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him; so that +Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal her wounds +and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy, to the +swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse those +sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God to send +someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous insolencies. +It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a banner if only +someone will raise it. +</p> + +<p> +Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope than in +your illustrious house,<a href="#fn-26.1" name="fnref-26.1" id="fnref-26.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +with its valour and fortune, favoured by God and by the Church of which it is +now the chief, and which could be made the head of this redemption. This will +not be difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the +men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were +men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for +their enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was God more +their friend than He is yours. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-26.1" id="fn-26.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-26.1">[1]</a> +Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. In 1523 +Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII. +</p> + +<p> +With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is +necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in them. +Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness is great +the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those men to whom +I have directed your attention. Further than this, how extraordinarily the +ways of God have been manifested beyond example: the sea is divided, a +cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth water, it has rained +manna, everything has contributed to your greatness; you ought to do the +rest. God is not willing to do everything, and thus take away our free +will and that share of glory which belongs to us. +</p> + +<p> +And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians have +been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious house; +and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns, it has +always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has happened +because the old order of things was not good, and none of us have known +how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to establish +new laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen. Such things +when they are well founded and dignified will make him revered and +admired, and in Italy there are not wanting opportunities to bring such +into use in every form. +</p> + +<p> +Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. Look +attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior the +Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when it comes to armies +they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from the insufficiency +of the leaders, since those who are capable are not obedient, and each one +seems to himself to know, there having never been any one so distinguished +above the rest, either by valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. +Hence it is that for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past +twenty years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always +given a poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, +afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.<a href="#fn-26.2" name="fnref-26.2" id="fnref-26.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-26.2" id="fn-26.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-26.2">[2]</a> +The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; Genoa, 1507; +Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513. +</p> + +<p> +If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable +men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things, as +a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own +forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better soldiers. +And although singly they are good, altogether they will be much better +when they find themselves commanded by their prince, honoured by him, and +maintained at his expense. Therefore it is necessary to be prepared with +such arms, so that you can be defended against foreigners by Italian +valour. +</p> + +<p> +And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very formidable, +nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which a third order +would not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied upon to +overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the Switzers +are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close combat. Owing +to this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to +resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by Spanish +infantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot be shown, +nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when +the Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions, who follow the +same tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with +the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and stood +out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless, and, if +the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with them. It is +possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these infantries, to +invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; +this need not create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. +And these are the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power +upon a new prince. +</p> + +<p> +This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting +Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love with +which he would be received in all those provinces which have suffered so +much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for revenge, with what +stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. What door would be +closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? What envy would hinder +him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all of us this barbarous +dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious house take up this +charge with that courage and hope with which all just enterprises are +undertaken, so that under its standard our native country may be ennobled, +and under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +Virtu contro al Furore<br /> + Prendera l’arme, e fia il combatter corto:<br /> +Che l’antico valore<br /> + Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.<br /> +<br /> +Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,<br /> + And it i’ th’ combat soon shall put to flight:<br /> +For the old Roman valour is not dead,<br /> + Nor in th’ Italians’ brests extinguished.<br /> +<br /> +Edward Dacre, 1640. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap27"></a>DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE +VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR +PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI +</h2> + +<p class="center"> +BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI +</p> + +<p> +The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to clear +himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been raised +against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of Arezzo and +other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, whence he +intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against Giovanni +Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring that city +under his domination, and to make it the head of his Romagnian duchy. +</p> + +<p> +These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and their +following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too powerful, +and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek to destroy +them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon this a meeting +was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to which came the +cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, Vitellozzo Vitelli, +Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the tyrant of Perugia, and +Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. +Here were discussed the power and courage of the duke and the necessity of +curbing his ambitions, which might otherwise bring danger to the rest of +being ruined. And they decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to +strive to win over the Florentines; and they sent their men to one place +and another, promising to one party assistance and to another +encouragement to unite with them against the common enemy. This meeting +was at once reported throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented +under the duke, among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of +effecting a revolution. +</p> + +<p> +Thus it arose that, men’s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by +certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held for +the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The castellan +was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there; so the +conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being carried to +the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from being drawn +up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping upon the bridge +and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being effected, the whole +state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being encouraged in this, not so +much by the capture of the fort, as by the Diet at Magione, from whom they +expected to get assistance. +</p> + +<p> +Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose the +opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any town, +should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and they sent +again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in destroying the +common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and that they ought +not to wait for another opportunity. +</p> + +<p> +But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli and +Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo Machiavelli, +their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the duke against his +enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, because, against +everybody’s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone over to the enemy +and he found himself disarmed and war at his door. But recovering courage +from the offers of the Florentines, he decided to temporize before +fighting with the few soldiers that remained to him, and to negotiate for +a reconciliation, and also to get assistance. This latter he obtained in +two ways, by sending to the King of France for men and by enlisting +men-at-arms and others whom he turned into cavalry of a sort: to all he +gave money. +</p> + +<p> +Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached +Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the aid +of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the duke +resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with offers of +reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did not fail in any +practices to make the insurgents understand that he wished every man who +had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough for him to have the +title of prince, whilst others might have the principality. +</p> + +<p> +And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to him +to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a +standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every +care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such +preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in +separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there came +also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found himself +sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open war, he +considered that it would be safer and more advantageous to outwit them, +and for this reason he did not stop the work of reconciliation. +</p> + +<p> +And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in +which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand +ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed an +alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come +personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the other +hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and other places +seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and not to make war +against or ally themselves with any one without his permission. +</p> + +<p> +This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, +again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his +state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the +fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by the +enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends. But +the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed his +men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of November +together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to Cesena, where he +stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the Vitelli and Orsini, +who had assembled with their men in the duchy of Urbino, as to the +enterprise in which they should now take part; but nothing being +concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that if the duke wished +to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were ready; if he did not +wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To this the duke replied that +he did not wish to enter into war with Tuscany, and thus become hostile to +the Florentines, but that he was very willing to proceed against +Sinigalia. +</p> + +<p> +It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the +fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give it +up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to come +there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being invited by +them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no suspicions. And +the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French men-at-arms who were +with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred lancers under Mons. di +Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena about the middle of December, +and went to Fano, and with the utmost cunning and cleverness he persuaded +the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them +that any lack of compliance would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and +permanency of the reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make +use of the arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very +stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not +offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by +Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he +agreed to wait. +</p> + +<p> +Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on +30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most trusted +followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor d’Euna, who was +afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as Vitellozzo, Pagolo +Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should arrive, his followers +in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting certain men to certain +pairs, who should entertain them until they reached Sinigalia; nor should +they be permitted to leave until they came to the duke’s quarters, where +they should be seized. +</p> + +<p> +The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which there +were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to assemble +by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from Fano, and +await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day of December +at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of about two +hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the infantry, whom he +accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms. +</p> + +<p> +Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of the +Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who goes +towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases of which +are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia is distant +from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot and from the +shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs a little river +which bathes that part of the walls looking towards Fano, facing the high +road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes for a good space by road +along the mountains, and reaches the river which passes by Sinigalia. If +he turns to his left hand along the bank of it, and goes for the distance +of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge which crosses the river; he is then +almost abreast of the gate that leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight +line, but transversely. Before this gate there stands a collection of +houses with a square to which the bank of the river forms one side. +</p> + +<p> +The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and to +honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant from +Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men of the +duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band, which +consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty horsemen, who +were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters having been thus +arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and when the leaders of +the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass over, but having opened +it, one portion wheeled towards the river and the other towards the +country, and a way was left in the middle through which the infantry +passed, without stopping, into the town. +</p> + +<p> +Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a few +horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a cape +lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his +approaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability of +the man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that +when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet the +duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He recommended his +house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his nephews that it +was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of their fathers that +should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came before the duke and +saluted him respectfully, and were received by him with goodwill; they +were at once placed between those who were commissioned to look after +them. +</p> + +<p> +But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band in +Sinigalia, was missing—for Oliverotto was waiting in the square +before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and drilling +them—signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care of +Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that +Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined +Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of their +quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke; and he +advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come himself to +meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice, came before the +duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and Oliverotto, having made his +obeisance, joined the others. +</p> + +<p> +So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke’s quarters, +and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made them +prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that the men of +Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. Those of +Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of the Orsini +and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment of the +destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, and bearing +in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and Vitellian houses, +they stood together against the hostile forces of the country and saved +themselves. +</p> + +<p> +But the duke’s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men of +Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not repressed +this outrage by killing some of them they would have completely sacked it. +Night having come and the tumult being silenced, the duke prepared to kill +Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a room and caused them to be +strangled. Neither of them used words in keeping with their past lives: +Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of the pope full pardon for his sins; +Oliverotto cringed and laid the blame for all injuries against the duke on +Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until +the duke heard from Rome that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the +Archbishop of Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which +news, on 18th January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were +strangled in the same way. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap28"></a>THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA +</h2> + +<p class="center"> +WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI +</p> + +<p class="center"> +And sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI +</p> + +<h3> +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328 +</h3> + +<p> +It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who have +considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them, who +have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in their +day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and obscurity; or have +been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way. They have either been +exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have had so mean a parentage +that in shame they have given themselves out to be sons of Jove or of some +other deity. It would be wearisome to relate who these persons may have +been because they are well known to everybody, and, as such tales would +not be particularly edifying to those who read them, they are omitted. I +believe that these lowly beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is +desirous of showing to the world that such men owe much to her and little +to wisdom, because she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take +no part in their career: thus all success must be attributed to her. +Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds, +if he is measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he +was born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor +distinguished in his birth, as the course of this history will show. It +appeared to be desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in +him such indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great +exemplar to men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his +actions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds. +</p> + +<p> +The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families of +Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in estate, +as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a son Antonio, +who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca, and for this +reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He had an only +sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso dying +she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again went to live with her +brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the house where he resided, +and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, any person could have +access to it without difficulty. One morning, shortly after sunrise, +Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called, had occasion +to go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the dinner, +and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves of a vine she turned her +eyes in that direction, and heard something resembling the cry of an +infant. Whereupon she went towards it, and saw the hands and face of a +baby who was lying enveloped in the leaves and who seemed to be crying for +its mother. Partly wondering and partly fearing, yet full of compassion, +she lifted it up and carried it to the house, where she washed it and +clothed it with clean linen as is customary, and showed it to Messer +Antonio when he returned home. When he heard what had happened and saw the +child he was not less surprised or compassionate than his sister. They +discussed between themselves what should be done, and seeing that he was +priest and that she had no children, they finally determined to bring it +up. They had a nurse for it, and it was reared and loved as if it were +their own child. They baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio +after their father. As the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and +gave evidence of wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond +his years those lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer +Antonio intended to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted +him into his canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was +given with this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of +Castruccio was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio +reached the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of +Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left off +reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, delighting +in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in running, leaping, and +wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he far excelled his companions +in courage and bodily strength, and if at any time he did turn to books, +only those pleased him which told of wars and the mighty deeds of men. +Messer Antonio beheld all this with vexation and sorrow. +</p> + +<p> +There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, named +Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, bodily +strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had often fought +under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a Ghibelline was the +valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman resided in Lucca and +was accustomed to assemble with others most mornings and evenings under +the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the top of the square of San +Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he had often seen Castruccio +taking part with other children of the street in those games of which I +have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far excelled the other boys, and +that he appeared to exercise a royal authority over them, and that they +loved and obeyed him, Messer Francesco became greatly desirous of learning +who he was. Being informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of +Castruccio he felt a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he +called him one day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in +the house of a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use +arms, or in the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses +and the services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased +Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he stood +silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer Francesco to +speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable, nothing would +please him more than to give up his priestly studies and take up those of +a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and in a very short time +he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was driven to yield by his +knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear that he would not be able +to hold him much longer. +</p> + +<p> +Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to the +house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was astonishing to +find that in a very short time he manifested all that virtue and bearing +which we are accustomed to associate with a true gentleman. In the first +place he became an accomplished horseman, and could manage with ease the +most fiery charger, and in all jousts and tournaments, although still a +youth, he was observed beyond all others, and he excelled in all exercises +of strength and dexterity. But what enhanced so much the charm of these +accomplishments, was the delightful modesty which enabled him to avoid +offence in either act or word to others, for he was deferential to the +great men, modest with his equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These +gifts made him beloved, not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all +Lucca. When Castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines +were driven from Pavia by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by +the Visconti to assist the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in +charge of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and +courage in this expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other +captain, and his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but +throughout all Lombardy. +</p> + +<p> +Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he left +it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many friends +as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary for that +purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son thirteen +years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to be his son’s +tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died Francesco called +Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that goodwill which he +(Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to the son the +gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the father. Upon the +death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and tutor of Pagolo, +which increased enormously his power and position, and created a certain +amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the former universal +goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring tyrannical intentions. +Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the head of the +Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of Messer Francesco to become +the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him that Castruccio, with the +great abilities which he already showed, and holding the position of +governor, deprived him of his opportunity; therefore he began to sow those +seeds which should rob Castruccio of his eminence. Castruccio at first +treated this with scorn, but afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that +Messer Giorgio might be able to bring him into disgrace with the deputy of +King Ruberto of Naples and have him driven out of Lucca. +</p> + +<p> +The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo, +who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became their +lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca, with whom +Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting their +restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought into his +plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of the Opizi. +Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio cautiously fortified +the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies and munitions of war, in +order that it might stand a siege for a few days in case of need. When the +night came which had been agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occupied the +plain between the mountains and Pisa with many men, the signal was given, +and without being observed Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and +set fire to the portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the +city, calling the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. +Uguccione entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer +Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The +governor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the +wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found +that more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those who +fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the +headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most +hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese. +</p> + +<p> +As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party that +the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they determined to +restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a large army in the +Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence they marched to +Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into Lucca. Upon this +Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and with a number of +German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved against the +quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the enemy withdrew +from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between Montecatini and Pescia. +Uguccione now took up a position near to Montecarlo, and within about two +miles of the enemy, and slight skirmishes between the horse of both +parties were of daily occurrence. Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the +Pisans and Lucchese delayed coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, +finding himself growing worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left +the command of the army in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought +about the ruin of the Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having +lost its captain had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio +observed this, and allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this +belief; he also showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the +munitions of the camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more +insolent the more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they +drew out in the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. +Presently, deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having +mastered their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he +spoke a few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to +them the certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands. +Castruccio had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the +centre of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of +the army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant +men on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he +moved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of his +lines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had +come in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centre +squadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the +wings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings of +the two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained out +of action, for these two portions of the line of battle were separated +from each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach each other. By +this expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio’s men were opposed to +the weaker part of the enemy’s troops, and the most efficient men of the +enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines were unable to fight with +those who were arrayed opposite to them, or to give any assistance to +their own flanks. So, without much difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to +flight on both flanks, and the centre battalions took to flight when they +found themselves exposed to attack, without having a chance of displaying +their valour. The defeat was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, +there being more than ten thousand men killed with many officers and +knights of the Guelph party in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come +to help them, among whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and +Carlo, his nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of +Castruccio the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, among +whom was Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was +killed in the first onset. +</p> + +<p> +This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that +Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it +appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of +power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only waited +for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the death of +Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in Lucca, the +murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge. On the +sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were driven +off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming to the +knowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him a proper +opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his son Neri, who +was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take Castruccio +prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio, fearing no evil, +went to the governor in a friendly way, was entertained at supper, and +then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing to put him to death lest the +people should be incensed, kept him alive, in order to hear further from +his father concerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and +cowardice of his son, and at once set out from Pisa to Lucca with four +hundred horsemen to finish the business in his own way; but he had not yet +reached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and +created Count Gaddo della Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reached +Lucca he heard of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise to +him to turn back, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them +should close their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard of +what had happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to +demand the liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had +arrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private circles, +afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised a tumult, +and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded that +Castruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse might +happen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered his +friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked Uguccione; +who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away with his friends +to Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in poverty. +</p> + +<p> +But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, and +he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people that they +appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having obtained this, +and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the recovery of the many +towns which had rebelled after the departure of Uguccione, and with the +help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded a treaty, he marched to +Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed a fort against it, which +is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course of two months Castruccio +captured the town. With the reputation gained at that siege, he rapidly +seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a short time had overrun the +whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the pass which leads from Lombardy +to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and wrested it from the hands of +Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the lord of it. After this victory he +returned to Lucca, and was welcomed by the whole people. And now +Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any longer to defer making himself a +prince, got himself created the lord of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del +Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico, Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, +all of whom he had corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and +deliberately elected prince by the people. At this time Frederick of +Bavaria, the King of the Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial +crown, and Castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met +him at the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as his +deputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because +of the people’s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was received +in great honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him, +and he was appointed the emperor’s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time the +Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had driven +out of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Frederick +created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of the +Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were constrained to +accept him as their lord. +</p> + +<p> +Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian +affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian Ghibellines, +who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio for help and +counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his country, if enabled +to recover it with his assistance. Among these exiles were Matteo Guidi, +Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, and Piero Buonaccorsi, all +exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. Castruccio had the secret intention of +becoming the master of all Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own +forces; and in order to gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a +league with Messer Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for +him the forces of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five +gates, he divided his own country districts into five parts, which he +supplied with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so +that he could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, +without those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he +surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer +Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven +out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the King +Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the Florentines in +their own territories, so that, being attacked at home, they should be +compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to defend +themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized Fucecchio and San +Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country. Whereupon the +Florentines recalled their army, which had scarcely reached Tuscany, when +Castruccio was forced by other necessities to return to Lucca. +</p> + +<p> +There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so powerful +that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance him to the +dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not received such +rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited other families +to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They found their +opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set upon the +lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and killed him. They +endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano di Poggio, a +peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion, intervened and +compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms; and he offered to +be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him what they desired. +Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater intelligence than they +had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the news of what had happened +at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in command of the army, and with a +troop of cavalry set out for home. Contrary to his expectations, he found +the rebellion at an end, yet he posted his men in the most advantageous +places throughout the city. As it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio +ought to be very much obliged to him, he sought him out, and without +saying anything on his own behalf, for he did not recognize any need for +doing so, he begged Castruccio to pardon the other members of his family +by reason of their youth, their former friendships, and the obligations +which Castruccio was under to their house. To this Castruccio graciously +responded, and begged Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave +him more pleasure to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him +anxiety to hear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his +family to him, saying that he thanked God for having given him the +opportunity of showing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of +Stefano and Castruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately +thrown into prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had +recovered San Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make +peace, as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at +Lucca to leave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a +truce, which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and +desirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded with +them for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conquests +they had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned his +attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should not again be +subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, under various +pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their ambition +might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, but depriving +them of country and property, and those whom he had in his hands of life +also, stating that he had found by experience that none of them were to be +trusted. Then for his further security he raised a fortress in Lucca with +the stones of the towers of those whom he had killed or hunted out of the +state. +</p> + +<p> +Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his +position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of +increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he could +get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, which was +his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends with the +mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both parties confided +their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it always had been, into the +Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the Bianchi was Bastiano di +Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each of these men held secret +communications with Castruccio, and each desired to drive the other out of +the city; and, after many threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo +fortified himself at the Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese +side of the city; both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, +because they believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to +fight than the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He +gave promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, +and to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the +appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself +direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and both +were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a signal +given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other Bastiano di +Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans of either +faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the hands of +Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the palace, compelled +the people to yield obedience to him, making them many promises and +remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to the city to see the +new prince, and all were filled with hope and quickly settled down, +influenced in a great measure by his great valour. +</p> + +<p> +About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness of +living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. The +German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened—murders +and tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put an +end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should call +in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of the +city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he could +apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not only to +give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome. Castruccio +considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the emperor this +service, because he believed that he himself would not be safe if at any +time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command at +Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six hundred horsemen, where he was +received by Enrico with the greatest distinction. In a short time the +presence of Castruccio obtained such respect for the emperor that, without +bloodshed or violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason of +Castruccio having sent by sea from the country round Pisa large quantities +of corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. When he had chastised +some of the Roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary obedience was +rendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman +senator. This dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being +clothed in a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on +its front: “I am what God wills.” Whilst on the back was: “What God +desires shall be.” +</p> + +<p> +During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio +should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could +tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be difficult +in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were Baldo Cecchi +and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face danger. These +men kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia, and with the aid +of the Florentines entered the city by night, and after driving out some +of Castruccio’s officials and partisans, and killing others, they restored +the city to its freedom. The news of this greatly angered Castruccio, and +taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When the +Florentines heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, they +decided to intercept him with their forces in the Val di Nievole, under +the belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pistoia. +Assembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph cause, the +Florentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other hand, +Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard where the +Florentines’ lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains of Pistoia, +nor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could, +to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if he +succeeded in this design, victory was assured, although he was informed +that the Florentines had thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve +thousand. Although he had every confidence in his own abilities and the +valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open +lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle between +Pescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole, +not in the exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in +places narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still +narrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that twenty +men side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a +German, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to +remain in possession of the castle, it being common to the Lucchese and +the Pistoians, and unclaimed by either—neither of them wishing to +displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and came +under obligations to no one. For these reasons, and also because the +castle was well fortified, he had always been able to maintain his +position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to fall upon his +enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and there was no +fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force before they became +engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this trouble with Florence +arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which possession of this +castle would give him, and having an intimate friendship with a resident +in the castle, he managed matters so with him that four hundred of his men +were to be admitted into the castle the night before the attack on the +Florentines, and the castellan put to death. +</p> + +<p> +Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the +Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away from +Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his army from +Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they reached their +encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill on the following +morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the castle at night, had +also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching from thence at midnight +in dead silence, had reached the foot of Serravalle: thus he and the +Florentines commenced the ascent of the hill at the same time in the +morning. Castruccio sent forward his infantry by the main road, and a +troop of four hundred horsemen by a path on the left towards the castle. +The Florentines sent forward four hundred cavalry ahead of their army +which was following, never expecting to find Castruccio in possession of +the hill, nor were they aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it +happened that the Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely +taken by surprise when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so +close were they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. +It was a case of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were +assailed with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own, +although some few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting +reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The +cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were unable +to get their men either backward or forward, owing to the narrowness of +the pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought to be done or +what could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were engaged with the +enemy’s infantry were scattered or killed without having made any +effective defence because of their unfortunate position, although in sheer +desperation they had offered a stout resistance. Retreat had been +impossible, with the mountains on both flanks, whilst in front were their +enemies, and in the rear their friends. When Castruccio saw that his men +were unable to strike a decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, +he sent one thousand infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join +the four hundred horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and +commanded the whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These +orders they carried out with such fury that the Florentines could not +sustain the attack, but gave way, and were soon in full retreat—conquered +more by their unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. +Those in the rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, +each man seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very +sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini +dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all Florentine +noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on the Florentine +side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the Guelphs. Immediately +the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out the friends of the +Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not content with occupying +Prato and all the castles on the plains on both sides of the Arno, but +marched his army into the plain of Peretola, about two miles from +Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the spoils, and celebrating +his victory with feasts and games, holding horse races, and foot races for +men and women. He also struck medals in commemoration of the defeat of the +Florentines. He endeavoured to corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, +who were to open the city gates at night; but the conspiracy was +discovered, and the participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom +were Tommaso Lupacci and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the +Florentines great anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, +they sent envoys to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of +their city; and he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of +the Guelph cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines +to receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and +he sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen. +</p> + +<p> +Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the +pressure of Castruccio’s army, owing to his being compelled to leave his +positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a +conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, one +of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland should +be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this conspiracy, +intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of Castruccio, and +drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy paucity of numbers is +essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few are not sufficient, and +in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy Lanfranchi encountered a +person who revealed the design to Castruccio. This betrayal cannot be +passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, +two Florentine exiles who were suffering their banishment in Pisa. +Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put him to death, and beheaded +many other noble citizens, and drove their families into exile. It now +appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughly +disaffected; he employed much thought and energy upon securing his +position there, and this gave the Florentines their opportunity to +reorganize their army, and to await the coming of Carlo, the son of the +King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided to lose no more time, and +assembled a great army of more than thirty thousand infantry and ten +thousand cavalry—having called to their aid every Guelph there was +in Italy. They consulted whether they should attack Pistoia or Pisa first, +and decided that it would be better to march on the latter—a course, +owing to the recent conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more +advantage to them, because they believed that the surrender of Pistoia +would follow the acquisition of Pisa. +</p> + +<p> +In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army and +quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from thence +on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army which the +Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree alarmed, +believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would deliver the +empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to think that his +enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects of success, than +at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand foot soldiers and four +thousand horsemen, and with this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sent +Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand infantry. Fucecchio has a +stronger position than any other town in the Pisan district, owing to its +situation between the rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevation +above the surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its +being victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approach +it either from the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through +to Pisa, or attack Castruccio’s forces except at a disadvantage. In one +case they would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one +under his own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case +they would have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy, +an undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to take +this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of the +river and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse +of land between them and the river. +</p> + +<p> +The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to +decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and, +having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the +latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet the +water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the saddles of +the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the Florentines commenced +the battle by ordering forward a number of cavalry and ten thousand +infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was fixed, and who well knew +what to do, at once attacked the Florentines with five thousand infantry +and three thousand horsemen, not allowing them to issue from the river +before he charged them; he also sent one thousand light infantry up the +river bank, and the same number down the Arno. The infantry of the +Florentines were so much impeded by their arms and the water that they +were not able to mount the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had made +the passage of the river more difficult for the others, by reason of the +few who had crossed having broken up the bed of the river, and this being +deep with mud, many of the horses rolled over with their riders and many +of them had stuck so fast that they could not move. When the Florentine +captains saw the difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them +and moved higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less +treacherous and the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met at +the bank by the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who, +being light armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with +tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses, +alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and trampled +each other in great confusion. The fight between the men of Castruccio and +those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp and terrible; both +sides fought with the utmost desperation and neither would yield. The +soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back into the river, +whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land in order to make +room for the others pressing forward, who if they could but get out of the +water would be able to fight, and in this obstinate conflict they were +urged on by their captains. Castruccio shouted to his men that these were +the same enemies whom they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the +Florentines reproached each other that the many should be overcome by the +few. At length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that +both his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had +many killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take +up a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded +these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and one +part of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This cleared a +space of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and thus gained +possession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these tired soldiers +found themselves at close quarters with Castruccio’s reserves they could +not stand against them and at once fell back into the river. The cavalry +of either side had not as yet gained any decisive advantage over the +other, because Castruccio, knowing his inferiority in this arm, had +commanded his leaders only to stand on the defensive against the attacks +of their adversaries, as he hoped that when he had overcome the infantry +he would be able to make short work of the cavalry. This fell out as he +had hoped, for when he saw the Florentine army driven back across the +river he ordered the remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry of +the enemy. This they did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their own +cavalry, fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to +flight. The Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry +had met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry +cross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio’s +army. But here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of +Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines were +so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them +escaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains were +taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo +Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine commissioners, fled to +Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter was infinitely greater, as +might be expected in such a battle. Of the Florentines there fell twenty +thousand two hundred and thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost one +thousand five hundred and seventy men. +</p> + +<p> +But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his life +just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus ruined all +those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry into effect, +and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but death could have +stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle the whole of the +day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued and overheated, he +stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on their return from +victory and personally thank them. He was also on the watch for any +attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day; he being of the +opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be the first man in the +saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio stood exposed to a wind +which often rises at midday on the banks of the Arno, and which is often +very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as +he was accustomed to such troubles; but it was the cause of his death. On +the following night he was attacked with high fever, which increased so +rapidly that the doctors saw it must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, +called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the midst +of the career which was leading to that glory which all my successes +promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left thee, if a +smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, because I should +have been content with the governorships of Lucca and Pisa. I should +neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the Florentines with +so many injuries. But I would have made both these peoples my friends, and +I should have lived, if no longer, at least more peacefully, and have left +you a state without a doubt smaller, but one more secure and established +on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who insists upon having the +arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me with sufficient judgment to +recognize this from the first, nor the time to surmount it. Thou hast +heard, for many have told thee, and I have never concealed it, how I +entered the house of thy father whilst yet a boy—a stranger to all +those ambitions which every generous soul should feel—and how I was +brought up by him, and loved as though I had been born of his blood; how +under his governance I learned to be valiant and capable of availing +myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been witness. When thy good +father came to die, he committed thee and all his possessions to my care, +and I have brought thee up with that love, and increased thy estate with +that care, which I was bound to show. And in order that thou shouldst not +only possess the estate which thy father left, but also that which my +fortune and abilities have gained, I have never married, so that the love +of children should never deflect my mind from that gratitude which I owed +to the children of thy father. Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I +am well content, but I am deeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee +unsettled and insecure. Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which +will never rest contented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa, +where the men are of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they +may be sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve +under a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up +with factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the +wrongs recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended +Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly destroyed, +who will hail the news of my death with more delight than they would the +acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the princes of Milan +thou canst place no reliance, for they are far distant, slow, and their +help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou hast no hope in anything but +in thine own abilities, and in the memory of my valour, and in the +prestige which this latest victory has brought thee; which, as thou +knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist thee to come to terms +with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering under this great defeat, +should be inclined to listen to thee. And whereas I have sought to make +them my enemies, because I believed that war with them would conduce to my +power and glory, thou hast every inducement to make friends of them, +because their alliance will bring thee advantages and security. It is of +the greatest important in this world that a man should know himself, and +the measure of his own strength and means; and he who knows that he has +not a genius for fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. +And it will be well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to +learn in this way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and +in this thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that +what I have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in +that I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.” +</p> + +<p> +After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, and +Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending Pagolo +to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his successor, he died. +He left a happy memory to those who had known him, and no prince of those +times was ever loved with such devotion as he was. His obsequies were +celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he was buried in San Francesco +at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to +Castruccio, for he had not the abilities. Not long after the death of +Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty +held on to Lucca. This latter city continued in the family of Guinigi +until the time of the great-grandson of Pagolo. +</p> + +<p> +From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a man +of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time, but +also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the ordinary +height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious presence, and he +welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke with him rarely left +him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, and he wore it cut short +above the ears, and, whether it rained or snowed, he always went without a +hat. He was delightful among friends, but terrible to his enemies; just to +his subjects; ready to play false with the unfaithful, and willing to +overcome by fraud those whom he desired to subdue, because he was wont to +say that it was the victory that brought the glory, not the methods of +achieving it. No one was bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in +extricating himself. He was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt +everything and fear nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because +one always sees that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also +wonderfully sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did +not look for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was +not angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that +he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on the +following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a partridge, +and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom Castruccio had +said: “You would not have given more than a penny.” “That is true,” +answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: “A ducat is much less to +me.” Having about him a flatterer on whom he had spat to show that he +scorned him, the flatterer said to him: “Fisherman are willing to let the +waters of the sea saturate them in order that they may take a few little +fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by spittle that I may catch a +whale”; and this was not only heard by Castruccio with patience but +rewarded. When told by a priest that it was wicked for him to live so +sumptuously, Castruccio said: “If that be a vice then you should not fare +so splendidly at the feasts of our saints.” Passing through a street he +saw a young man as he came out of a house of ill fame blush at being seen +by Castruccio, and said to him: “Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou +comest out, but when thou goest into such places.” A friend gave him a +very curiously tied knot to undo and was told: “Fool, do you think that I +wish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to fasten.” Castruccio +said to one who professed to be a philosopher: “You are like the dogs who +always run after those who will give them the best to eat,” and was +answered: “We are rather like the doctors who go to the houses of those +who have the greatest need of them.” Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn, +Castruccio was much disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was +reproached for cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did +not fear anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, +since every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one +what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: “When thou goest to a +banquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon another.” +To a person who was boasting that he had read many things, Castruccio +said: “He knows better than to boast of remembering many things.” Someone +bragged that he could drink much without becoming intoxicated. Castruccio +replied: “An ox does the same.” Castruccio was acquainted with a girl with +whom he had intimate relations, and being blamed by a friend who told him +that it was undignified for him to be taken in by a woman, he said: “She +has not taken me in, I have taken her.” Being also blamed for eating very +dainty foods, he answered: “Thou dost not spend as much as I do?” and +being told that it was true, he continued: “Then thou art more avaricious +than I am gluttonous.” Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and +splendid citizen of Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by +Taddeo into a chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones +representing flowers and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. +Castruccio gathered some saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, +and seeing him much disturbed by this, said to him: “I knew not where to +spit in order to offend thee less.” Being asked how Caesar died he said: +“God willing I will die as he did.” Being one night in the house of one of +his gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of +his friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was usual +in one of his station, so he said: “He who is considered wise by day will +not be considered a fool at night.” A person came to demand a favour of +Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea threw himself on +his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by Castruccio, said: +“Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast thy ears in thy +feet,” whereupon he obtained double the favour he had asked. Castruccio +used to say that the way to hell was an easy one, seeing that it was in a +downward direction and you travelled blindfolded. Being asked a favour by +one who used many superfluous words, he said to him: “When you have +another request to make, send someone else to make it.” Having been +wearied by a similar man with a long oration who wound up by saying: +“Perhaps I have fatigued you by speaking so long,” Castruccio said: “You +have not, because I have not listened to a word you said.” He used to say +of one who had been a beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine +man, that he was dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the +wives and now he took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who +laughed, he said: “Do you laugh because you are successful or because +another is unfortunate?” Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer +Francesco Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: “What shall I give +you if you will let me give you a blow on the nose?” Castruccio answered: +“A helmet.” Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been +instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done +wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived +themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly +those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying that +they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused when +the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise that whilst +men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first to learn if it +were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with only looking at +her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to be buried when he +died, and answered: “With the face turned downwards, for I know when I am +gone this country will be turned upside down.” On being asked if it had +ever occurred to him to become a friar in order to save his soul, he +answered that it had not, because it appeared strange to him that Fra +Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione della Faggiuola to the +Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat to preserve his health, +and replied: “If the man be rich let him eat when he is hungry; if he be +poor, then when he can.” Seeing one of his gentlemen make a member of his +family lace him up, he said to him: “I pray God that you will let him feed +you also.” Seeing that someone had written upon his house in Latin the +words: “May God preserve this house from the wicked,” he said, “The owner +must never go in.” Passing through one of the streets he saw a small house +with a very large door, and remarked: “That house will fly through the +door.” He was having a discussion with the ambassador of the King of +Naples concerning the property of some banished nobles, when a dispute +arose between them, and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the +king. “Is this king of yours a bad man or a good one?” asked Castruccio, +and was told that he was a good one, whereupon he said, “Why should you +suggest that I should be afraid of a good man?” +</p> + +<p> +I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and weighty, +but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his high +qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a prince. And +as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune, so he also +desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune; therefore the +manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be seen to this day +fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they were placed by him to +testify forever to his days of adversity. As in his life he was inferior +neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander, nor to Scipio of +Rome, so he died in the same year of his age as they did, and he would +doubtless have excelled both of them had Fortune decreed that he should be +born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia or Rome. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Prince + +Author: Nicolo Machiavelli + +Translator: W. K. Marriott + +Release Date: February 11, 2006 [EBook #1232] +Last updated: August 26, 2016 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE *** + + + + +Produced by John Bickers, David Widger and Others + + + + + +THE PRINCE + +by Nicolo Machiavelli + +Translated by W. K. Marriott + + +Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to 1512 +held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic missions to +various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; later exiled and +returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd June 1527. + + + + +INTRODUCTION + +Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the +second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, +and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were members +of the old Florentine nobility. + +His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly +enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of +Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an +Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de' Medici, Il Magnifico. +The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year +Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official career +Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted +until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his +office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they +were once more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli's literary +activity and increasing influence; but he died, within a few weeks of +the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his fifty-eighth +year, without having regained office. + + + + +YOUTH -- Aet. 1-25--1469-94 + +Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the +Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of +this representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been +described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by +the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving +Lorenzo. Savonarola's influence upon the young Machiavelli must have +been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power over the +fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of +a gibe in "The Prince," where he is cited as an example of an unarmed +prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean +rule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli +strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to +Lorenzo's grandson that he dedicates "The Prince." + +Machiavelli, in his "History of Florence," gives us a picture of the +young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: "They were freer +than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other +kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, +and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with +wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly +was thought the wisest." In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli shows +why youth should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and leads +us to infer that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes: "I +have received your letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure, +especially because you tell me you are quite restored in health, than +which I could have no better news; for if God grant life to you, and +to me, I hope to make a good man of you if you are willing to do your +share." Then, writing of a new patron, he continues: "This will turn +out well for you, but it is necessary for you to study; since, then, you +have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters and +music, for you see what honour is done to me for the little skill I +have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to please me, and to bring success +and honour to yourself, do right and study, because others will help you +if you help yourself." + + + + +OFFICE -- Aet. 25-43--1494-1512 + +The second period of Machiavelli's life was spent in the service of the +free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from +the expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After +serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed +Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty +and Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of +Machiavelli's life, for during this time he took a leading part in +the affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, +and dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere +recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and +soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and +supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters +which illustrate "The Prince." + +His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, "my lady of Forli" of +"The Prince," from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it +is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on +fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is +urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes. + +In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for +continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct +of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft +summarized in "The Prince," and was consequently driven out. He, also, +it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support +to Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge +that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the +faith of princes. + +Machiavelli's public life was largely occupied with events arising out +of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the +Duke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of "The Prince." +Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke for the +benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have seized; he +can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the pattern of Cesare +Borgia's conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed by some critics as +the "hero" of "The Prince." Yet in "The Prince" the duke is in point of +fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the fortune of others, and +falls with them; who takes every course that might be expected from a +prudent man but the course which will save him; who is prepared for all +eventualities but the one which happens; and who, when all his abilities +fail to carry him through, exclaims that it was not his fault, but an +extraordinary and unforeseen fatality. + +On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to watch +the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia cheated +into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano delle Rovere +(Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most reason to fear +the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election, says that +he who thinks new favours will cause great personages to forget old +injuries deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had ruined +Cesare. + +It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that pontiff +was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought to a +successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing chiefly +to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius that +Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and women, and +concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man that will win +and hold them both. + +It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian +states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, +with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those +events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they +impinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with +Louis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch's character has +already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as +the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but +who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, +had he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have been +ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men +of the age, and his character has been drawn by many hands; but +Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the secret +of his many failures when he describes him as a secretive man, without +force of character--ignoring the human agencies necessary to carry +his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the fulfilment of his +wishes. + +The remaining years of Machiavelli's official career were filled with +events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the +three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the +object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in +the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won in +eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during these +events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out between +the pope and the French, because friendship with France had dictated the +entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II finally formed +the Holy League against France, and with the assistance of the Swiss +drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy of the Pope, +and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the Medici should +be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st September +1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the signal for the +dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end to his +public career, for, as we have seen, he died without regaining office. + + + + +LITERATURE AND DEATH -- Aet. 43-58--1512-27 + +On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had +vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, was +dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he was +accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici, +imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope, +Leo X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at San +Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In a +letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left +a very interesting description of his life at this period, which +elucidates his methods and his motives in writing "The Prince." After +describing his daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he +writes: "The evening being come, I return home and go to my study; at +the entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt, +and put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I +pass into the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly +received by them, I am fed with that food which is mine alone; where I +do not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their +actions, and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours I +feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay, +death does not terrify me; I am possessed entirely by those great men. +And because Dante says: + + Knowledge doth come of learning well retained, + Unfruitful else, + +I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have +composed a small work on 'Principalities,' where I pour myself out +as fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a +principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how +they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever +pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, +especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it +to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will +be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had with +him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it." + +The "little book" suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form +in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work +during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some +unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de' Medici. Although +Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or +presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo +ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any +employment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli's lifetime, +"The Prince" was never published by him, and its text is still +disputable. + +Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: "And as to this little +thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that during the +fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have neither +slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by one who +has reaped experience at the expense of others. And of my loyalty none +could doubt, because having always kept faith I could not now learn how +to break it; for he who has been faithful and honest, as I have, cannot +change his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my honesty." + +Before Machiavelli had got "The Prince" off his hands he commenced his +"Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius," which should be read +concurrently with "The Prince." These and several minor works occupied +him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look +after the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the +Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to +her citizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new +constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on +one pretext or another it was not promulgated. + +In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli +to settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly +remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he +was much sought after, and also for the production of his "Art of War." +It was in the same year that he received a commission at the instance +of Cardinal de' Medici to write the "History of Florence," a task +which occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may have +determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old writer +observes that "an able statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will +endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play +with." + +When the "History of Florence" was finished, Machiavelli took it to +Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de' Medici, who had in +the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is somewhat +remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written "The Prince" for +the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained power in +Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the "History of Florence" to the +head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year the +battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left Francis I +a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This was followed +by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular party at +Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more banished. + +Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his +return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the "Ten of +Liberty and Peace." Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached +Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527. + + + + +THE MAN AND HIS WORKS + +No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence +has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her +most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have +found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the +germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle +to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of his name, +it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which +this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that +the researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more +reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an "unholy +necromancer," which so long haunted men's vision, has begun to fade. + +Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and +industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and +with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced +retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he +depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, +the successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been +only moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political +employments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, +overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren of +results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery that +he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct of his +own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear by the +side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of compromising +himself; his connection with the Medici was open to suspicion, and +Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when he set him to +write the "History of Florence," rather than employ him in the state. +And it is on the literary side of his character, and there alone, that +we find no weakness and no failure. + +Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on "The +Prince," its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they +are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as +they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli's contemporaries; yet they +cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of Europe +rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical incidents +and personages become interesting by reason of the uses which +Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and +conduct. + +Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish +some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, "The +Prince" is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men +are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the +days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices +which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. +Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them +to be--and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses; +prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then--to pass to +a higher plane--Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win +an empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and +the arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to +fight. + +It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli's that government +should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the +people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of society; +to this "high argument" "The Prince" contributes but little. Machiavelli +always refused to write either of men or of governments otherwise than +as he found them, and he writes with such skill and insight that his +work is of abiding value. But what invests "The Prince" with more than +a merely artistic or historical interest is the incontrovertible truth +that it deals with the great principles which still guide nations and +rulers in their relationship with each other and their neighbours. + +In translating "The Prince" my aim has been to achieve at all costs an +exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent paraphrase +adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. Machiavelli was +no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he wrote obliged him +to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his substance grave, his +manner nobly plain and serious. "Quis eo fuit unquam in partiundis +rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?" In "The Prince," it may +be truly said, there is reason assignable, not only for every word, but +for the position of every word. To an Englishman of Shakespeare's time +the translation of such a treatise was in some ways a comparatively easy +task, for in those times the genius of the English more nearly resembled +that of the Italian language; to the Englishman of to-day it is not so +simple. To take a single example: the word "intrattenere," employed by +Machiavelli to indicate the policy adopted by the Roman Senate towards +the weaker states of Greece, would by an Elizabethan be correctly +rendered "entertain," and every contemporary reader would understand +what was meant by saying that "Rome entertained the Aetolians and the +Achaeans without augmenting their power." But to-day such a phrase would +seem obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say +that "Rome maintained friendly relations with the Aetolians," etc., +using four words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the +pithy brevity of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute +fidelity to the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can +only hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author's +meaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it. + +The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli: + +Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di +trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto dal +duca Valentino nell' ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, +etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; Decennale +primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell' Alemagna, +1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di Francia, 1510; +Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., 1512-17; Il Principe, +1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence, 1513 (?); Mandragola, +prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in verse, 1513; Della +lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose, 1515 (?); Belfagor +arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d'oro (poem in terza rima), 1517; Dell' +arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il riformare lo stato di +Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta di Lucca, 1520; Vita +di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie fiorentine, 8 books, +1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525. + +Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti carnascialeschi. + +Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, 6 +vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., 1820-2; +Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7. + +Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. +Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. +G. Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri +intorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. +Ferrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929. + + + + +DEDICATION + + To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De' Medici: + + Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are + accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most + precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one + often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and + similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness. + + Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with + some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among + my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so + much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by + long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of + antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and + prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to + your Magnificence. + + And although I may consider this work unworthy of your + countenance, nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it + may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a + better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in + the shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and + with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not + embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with + rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments + whatever, with which so many are accustomed to embellish their + works; for I have wished either that no honour should be given it, + or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the + theme shall make it acceptable. + + Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man + of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the + concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes + place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of + the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the + plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to understand + the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to + understand that of princes it needs to be of the people. + + Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in + which I send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered + by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain + that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise. + And if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will + sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how + unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune. + + + + +THE PRINCE + + + + +CHAPTER I -- HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT +MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED + +All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been +and are either republics or principalities. + +Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long +established; or they are new. + +The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or +they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the +prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of +the King of Spain. + +Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a +prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of +the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. + + + + +CHAPTER II -- CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES + +I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another +place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to +principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, +and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved. + +I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, +and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new +ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his +ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a +prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he +be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he +should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the +usurper, he will regain it. + +We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have +withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope Julius +in '10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the +hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it +happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause +him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be +naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration +of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for +one change always leaves the toothing for another. + + + + +CHAPTER III -- CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES + +But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be +not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken +collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from +an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for +men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this +hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they +are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have +gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common +necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have +submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships +which he must put upon his new acquisition. + +In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in +seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends +who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the +way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, +feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed +forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill +of the natives. + +For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied +Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it +only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the +gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future +benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is +very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, +they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with +little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the +delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the +weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time it was +enough for the Duke Lodovico(*) to raise insurrections on the borders; +but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to bring +the whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated and +driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above mentioned. + + (*) Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco + Sforza, who married Beatrice d'Este. He ruled over Milan + from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510. + +Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second +time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains +to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what +any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more +securely in his acquisition than did the King of France. + +Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an +ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country +and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them, +especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and +to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the +prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other +things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live +quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and +Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, +although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the +customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst +themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only +to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of their +former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor +their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will become +entirely one body with the old principality. + +But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, +customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great +energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real +helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there. +This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has made +that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures +taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled there, would +not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders +are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one +is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are great, and then one +can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged +by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the +prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and +wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would attack that state +from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince +resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest +difficulty. + +The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, +which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do +this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A +prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he +can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of +the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new +inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, +are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily +kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it +should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In +conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more +faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being +poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men +ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge +themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; +therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a +kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge. + +But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much +more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the +state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are +exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting +of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and +all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their +own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such +guards are as useless as a colony is useful. + +Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects +ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful +neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care +that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get +a footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be +introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of +ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were +brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where +they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And the +usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters +a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred +which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to those +subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to +himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has +acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of +too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and +with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, +so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does not +properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and +whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles. + +The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these +measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with(*) +the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the +greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. +Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and +Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was +humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and +Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor +did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends +without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them +agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because the +Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do, +who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for +which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is +easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine +is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it +happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, +that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to +detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or +treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to +cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise +have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they +can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, +they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, +there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, +dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them +come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only +to be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight +with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; +they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that +ever please them which is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our +time:--Let us enjoy the benefits of the time--but rather the benefits of +their own valour and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and +is able to bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good. + + (*) See remark in the introduction on the word + "intrattenere." + +But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the +things mentioned. I will speak of Louis(*) (and not of Charles)(+) as +the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held +possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he +has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a +state composed of divers elements. + + (*) Louis XII, King of France, "The Father of the People," + born 1462, died 1515. + + (+) Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498. + +King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who +desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I +will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a +foothold in Italy, and having no friends there--seeing rather that every +door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles--he was forced to +accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded +very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some +mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once +the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines +became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the +Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of +Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the +Sienese--everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then could +the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, +in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king +master of two-thirds of Italy. + +Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have +maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid +down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they +were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church, +some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to +stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself +secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in +Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the +Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening +himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown +themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much +temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. And +having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so +much so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent +his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into +Italy. + +And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and +deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, +divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in +Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and +the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas +he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove +him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn. + +The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always +do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but +when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is +folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with +her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she +ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with +the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got +a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not +the excuse of that necessity. + +Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, +he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he +brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not +send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure +him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the +Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain +into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble +them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have +consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have +kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would +never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also +because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order +to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not +have had the courage. + +And if any one should say: "King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander +and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war," I answer for the reasons given +above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because +it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And +if another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the +Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the +dissolution of his marriage(*) and for the cap to Rouen,(+) to that I +reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and +how it ought to be kept. + + (*) Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis + XI, and married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles + VIII, in order to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the + crown. + + (+) The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d'Amboise, + created a cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510. + +Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the +conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and +wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that +is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes +with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, +was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen +observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I replied +to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning that +otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such +greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church +and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin may be +attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which never or +rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful +is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by +astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him who has been +raised to power. + + + + +CHAPTER IV -- WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT +REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH + +Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly +acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the +Great became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it +was scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole +empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained +themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose +among themselves from their own ambitions. + +I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to +be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body +of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his +favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity +by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons +have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold +them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince +and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all +the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and +if they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and +official, and they do not bear him any particular affection. + +The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the +King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, +the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he +sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as +he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient +body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; +they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away +except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these states +will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, +but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the +difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper +cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be +assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around +him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being +all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and +one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, +as they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. +Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him +united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the +revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed +in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there +is nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being +exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no credit +with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his +victory, so he ought not to fear them after it. + +The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because +one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, +for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, +for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the +victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with +infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from +those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated +the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves +the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either +to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings +the opportunity. + +Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of +Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and +therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in +the field, and then to take the country from him. After which victory, +Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the +above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would have +enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults raised +in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves. + +But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted +like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the +Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities +there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them +endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the +power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed +away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting +afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself +his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed +there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other +than the Romans were acknowledged. + +When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with +which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which +others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; +this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the +conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state. + + + + +CHAPTER V -- CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH +LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED + +Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been +accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three +courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the +next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live +under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an +oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, +being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without +his friendship and interest, and does it utmost to support him; and +therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it +more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way. + +There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held +Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy; nevertheless they +lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, +dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as +the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did +not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many +cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them +otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city +accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be +destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty +and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time +nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do or +provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges unless +they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they immediately +rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been held in +bondage by the Florentines. + +But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and +his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to +obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in +making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern +themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a +prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But +in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire +for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their +former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to +reside there. + + + + +CHAPTER VI -- CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE'S +OWN ARMS AND ABILITY + +Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities +as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of +state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and +following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to +the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise +man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate +those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal +theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever +archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far +distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow +attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their +strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of +so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach. + +I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is +a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, +accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired +the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station +presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other +of these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. +Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the +strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no +other state, is compelled to reside there in person. + +But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, +have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, +and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not +discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet +he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to +speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or +founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular +deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior +to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in +examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything +to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould +into the form which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their +powers of mind would have been extinguished, and without those powers +the opportunity would have come in vain. + +It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of +Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that +they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of +bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and +that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become +King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus +should find the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, +and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus +could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians +dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, +and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby +their country was ennobled and made famous. + +Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire +a principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The +difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules +and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their +government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there +is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or +more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction +of a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies +all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm +defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises +partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and +partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new +things until they have had a long experience of them. Thus it happens +that whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack they +do it like partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise +that the prince is endangered along with them. + +It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter +thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves +or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate +their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the +first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; +but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely +endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the +unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the +nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade +them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is +necessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it +may be possible to make them believe by force. + +If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not +have enforced their constitutions for long--as happened in our time to +Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things +immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means +of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to +believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating +their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with +ability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those +who envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be +respected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, +and happy. + +To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some +resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: +it is Hiero the Syracusan.(*) This man rose from a private station to +be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to fortune but +opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him for their +captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their prince. He was +of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one who writes +of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This man +abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances, +made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such +foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had +endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping. + + (*) Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C. + + + + +CHAPTER VII -- CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER +BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE + +Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private +citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they +have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have +many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state +is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; +as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the +Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might +hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those +emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens +came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the +fortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant and unstable +things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position; +because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not +reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having always +lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it because they +have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful. + +States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature +which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and +correspondencies(*) fixed in such a way that the first storm will +not overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become +princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be +prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, +and that those foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they became +princes, they must lay AFTERWARDS. + + (*) "Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e. + foundations) and correspondencies or relations with other + states--a common meaning of "correspondence" and + "correspondency" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. + +Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or +fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and +these are Francesco Sforza(*) and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper +means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be +Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties +he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by +the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy of +his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he had +taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise and +able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and +fortunes of others had bestowed on him. + + (*) Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married + Bianca Maria Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo + Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose death he procured his + own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli was the accredited + agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia (1478- + 1507) during the transactions which led up to the + assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and + along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left + an account, written ten years before "The Prince," of the + proceedings of the duke in his "Descritione del modo tenuto + dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli," + etc., a translation of which is appended to the present + work. + +Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations +may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will +be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, +therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be +seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not +consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what +better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions; +and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but +the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune. + +Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had +many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his +way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church; +and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan +and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were +already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the +arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been assisted, in +hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini +and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved him, therefore, +to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make +himself securely master of part of their states. This was easy for him +to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other reasons, inclined +to bring back the French into Italy; he would not only not oppose this, +but he would render it more easy by dissolving the former marriage of +King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy with the assistance of +the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan +than the Pope had soldiers from him for the attempt on the Romagna, +which yielded to him on the reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, +having acquired the Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing to +hold that and to advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, +his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of +France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which +he was using, would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder +him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and +that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning +when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very +unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind when +he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the +king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided to +depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others. + +For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in +Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, +making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their +rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that in a few +months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned entirely +to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini, +having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came to him +soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length that the +aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them, called a +meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at +Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke, +all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having restored +his authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French +or other outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew +so well how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor +Pagolo--whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of +attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses--the Orsini were +reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power +at Sinigalia.(*) Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their +partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good foundations +to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the +people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he gained them +all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, and to be +imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out. + + (*) Sinigalia, 31st December 1502. + +When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak +masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave +them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was +full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing +to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it +necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer +Ramiro d'Orco,(*) a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest +power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the +greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not +advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but +that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the +country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their +advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some +hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, +and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any +cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in the +natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, +and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the piazza at +Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of +this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed. + + (*) Ramiro d'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua. + +But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding +himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate +dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great +measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he +wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, for +he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would not +support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and to +temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards the +kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It +was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would have +quickly accomplished had Alexander lived. + +Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future +he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church +might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which +Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by +exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as +to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself +all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their +aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the college more to +himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Pope should die +that he could by his own measures resist the first shock. Of these four +things, at the death of Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had +killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and +few had escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the +most numerous party in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he +intended to become master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia +and Piombino, and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer +to study France (for the French were already driven out of the kingdom +of Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy +his goodwill), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena +yielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of +the Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he +continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander died, +for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would have +stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the forces +of others, but solely on his own power and ability. + +But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He +left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the +rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto +death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew +so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations +which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those +armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he would have +overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his foundations were +good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In Rome, +although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the Baglioni, +the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect +anything against him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he wished, +at least the one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But +if he had been in sound health at the death of Alexander,(*) everything +would have been different to him. On the day that Julius the Second(+) +was elected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might +occur at the death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, +except that he had never anticipated that, when the death did happen, he +himself would be on the point to die. + + (*) Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503. + + (+) Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San + Pietro ad Vincula, born 1443, died 1513. + +When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to +blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to +offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of +others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and +far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, +and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness +frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to +secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome +either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the +people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those +who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things +for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy +a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings +and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend +with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this +man. + +Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he +made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope +to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected +Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any +cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they became +pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom he +had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San +Giorgio, and Ascanio.(*) The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear him, +Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their relationship and +obligations, the former from his influence, the kingdom of France having +relations with him. Therefore, above everything, the duke ought to have +created a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him, he ought to have consented to +Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He who believes that new benefits +will cause great personages to forget old injuries is deceived. +Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of his +ultimate ruin. + + (*) San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio + Sforza. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII -- CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY +WICKEDNESS + +Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither +of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is +manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be +more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are +when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the +principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private +person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first +method, it will be illustrated by two examples--one ancient, the other +modern--and without entering further into the subject, I consider these +two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them. + +Agathocles, the Sicilian,(*) became King of Syracuse not only from +a private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a +potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous +life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of +mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession, +he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established +in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself +prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that +which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding +for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was +fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the senate +of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating to the +Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the senators and +the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held the princedom +of that city without any civil commotion. And although he was twice +routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not only was +he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its defence, +with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the +siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were +compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, +had to be content with the possession of Africa. + + (*) Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C. + +Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will +see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as +he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any +one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were +gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly +held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent +to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, +without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but +not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and +extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his +greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be +seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain. +Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite +wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent +men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius. + +In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da +Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up +by his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his +youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under +his discipline, he might attain some high position in the military +profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, +and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body +and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing +a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some +citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than +its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So +he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many +years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look +upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire anything +except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he had not +spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would be +accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and he +entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably by +the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also to +that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up. + +Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, +and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he +lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having +arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a +solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of +Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual +in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave +discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son +Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others +answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be +discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, +whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after him. No +sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places and +slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto, +mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief +magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to obey +him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the prince. He +killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and strengthened +himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a way that, in +the year during which he held the principality, not only was he +secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all his +neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as that +of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by Cesare +Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, as was +stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this parricide, he +was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in +valour and wickedness. + +Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after +infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in +his country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be +conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by means +of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold the +state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this +follows from severities(*) being badly or properly used. Those may be +called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are +applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and that are +not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage +of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding +they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than +decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God +or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is +impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves. + + (*) Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the + modern equivalent of Machiavelli's thought when he speaks of + "crudelta" than the more obvious "cruelties." + +Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought +to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him +to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat +them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure +them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either +from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife +in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach +themselves to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For +injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, +they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that +the flavour of them may last longer. + +And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such +a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall +make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled +times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help +you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be +under any obligation to you for them. + + + + +CHAPTER IX -- CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY + +But coming to the other point--where a leading citizen becomes the +prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, +but by the favour of his fellow citizens--this may be called a civil +principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to +it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality +is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the +nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, +and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor +oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the +people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one +of three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy. + +A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, +accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles, +seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation +of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his +shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding +they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of +themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. +He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains +himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of +the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who +consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule +nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular +favour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not +prepared to obey him. + +Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, +satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is +more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, +while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also +that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because +of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, +as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a +hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he +has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against +him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always +come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him +whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live +always with the same people, but he can do well without the same nobles, +being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away +authority when it pleases him. + +Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to +be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their +course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do +not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be +honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt +with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a +natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, +especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in +prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. +But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it +is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, +and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they +were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him. + +Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people +ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they +only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to +the people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above +everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may +easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they +receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more +closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted +to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours; +and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary +according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit +them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people +friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity. + +Nabis,(*) Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, +and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his country +and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was only +necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would +not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not let any +one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that "He who builds on +the people, builds on the mud," for this is true when a private citizen +makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that the people will +free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates; +wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened to the +Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali(+) in Florence. But granted +a prince who has established himself as above, who can command, and is +a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other +qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole +people encouraged--such a one will never find himself deceived in them, +and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well. + + (*) Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under + Flamininus in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C. + + (+) Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in + Machiavelli's "Florentine History," Book III. + +These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the +civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule +personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government +is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill +of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially +in troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either +by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid +tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and +subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of +a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be in +doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince +cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens have +need of the state, because then every one agrees with him; they all +promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him; +but in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then +he finds but few. And so much the more is this experiment dangerous, +inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore a wise prince ought to +adopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and +kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will +always find them faithful. + + + + +CHAPTER X -- CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL +PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED + +It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of +these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in +case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether +he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite +clear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by +their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise +a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack +them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot +show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to +defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been +discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second +case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision +and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. +And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the +other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often +repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are +always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it +will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well +fortified, and is not hated by his people. + +The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country +around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits +them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, +because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the +taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they +have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they +always keep in public depots enough for one year's eating, drinking, and +firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to +the state, they always have the means of giving work to the community +in those labours that are the life and strength of the city, and on +the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold military +exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to uphold them. + +Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself +odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only +be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this +world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole +year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever should +reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it burnt, +they will not remain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will +make them forget their prince; to this I answer that a powerful and +courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by giving at one +time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for long, at another +time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving himself adroitly +from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold. + +Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin +the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and +ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the prince +to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage +is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any +remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with +their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that +their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his +defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they +confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is +well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the +minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not +fail to support and defend them. + + + + +CHAPTER XI -- CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES + +It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching +which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they +are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held +without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of +religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the +principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. +These princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have +subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are +not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, +and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. +Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being upheld by +powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of +them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act +of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them. + +Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the +Church has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from +Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been +called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) +have valued the temporal power very slightly--yet now a king of France +trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and +to ruin the Venetians--although this may be very manifest, it does not +appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. + +Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,(*) this country was +under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the +Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal +anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; the +other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about +whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To +restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as it +was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made use +of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini and +Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in +their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and +powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a courageous pope, +such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these +annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness; +for in the ten years, which is the average life of a pope, he can with +difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one people +should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the +Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet would not have time +to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the +pope were little esteemed in Italy. + + (*) Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494. + +Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that +have ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to +prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by +reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things +which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although +his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, +nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church, +which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all +his labours. + +Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all +the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the +chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found +the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been +practised before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not only followed, +but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the +Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these +enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, +inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any +private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within +the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them +some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: the +one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and the +other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused the +disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their cardinals +they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster the factions +in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to support them, and +thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders and tumults among +the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope Leo(*) found the +pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others made it +great in arms, he will make it still greater and more venerated by his +goodness and infinite other virtues. + + (*) Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de' Medici. + + + + +CHAPTER XII -- HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING +MERCENARIES + +Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such +principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having +considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and +having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and +to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of +offence and defence which belong to each of them. + +We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his +foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go +to ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or +composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws +where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well +armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion +and shall speak of the arms. + +I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state +are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. +Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds +his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; +for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, +valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the +fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so +long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war +by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for +keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient +to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be +your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take +themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble +to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by +resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they +formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet +when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that +Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in +hand;(*) and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the +truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have +related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who +have also suffered the penalty. + + (*) "With chalk in hand," "col gesso." This is one of the + _bons mots_ of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with + which Charles VIII seized Italy, implying that it was only + necessary for him to send his quartermasters to chalk up the + billets for his soldiers to conquer the country. Cf. "The + History of Henry VII," by Lord Bacon: "King Charles had + conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a kind + of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of + Italy without resistance: so that it was true what Pope + Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came into + Italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, + rather than with swords to fight." + +I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The +mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they +are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own +greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others +contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are +ruined in the usual way. + +And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, +whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to, +either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in +person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its +citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it +ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so +that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes and +republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and mercenaries +doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to bring a +republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its citizens +than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood +for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely armed and +quite free. + +Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who +were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the +Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. +After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of +their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their +liberty. + +Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against +the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,(*) +allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father, +Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna(+) of Naples, left her +unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms of +the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the Venetians +and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and yet +their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them, +I reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, +for of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some +have not conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their +ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,(%) and +since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one +will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have +stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him, +so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy; +Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us come +to that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines appointed as +their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who from a private +position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man had taken Pisa, +nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the Florentines to +keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies they had +no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. The +Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have +acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, +when with armed gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was +before they turned to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight +on land they forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And +in the beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much +territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much +to fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under +Carmignuola,(#) they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him +a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), +and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they +feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they +were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose +again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order to +secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their +captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of +Pitigliano,(&) and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not +gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,($) where in one battle they +lost that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much +trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed +and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. + + (*) Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448. + + (+) Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of + Naples. + + (%) Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir + John Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and + was knighted by Edward III; afterwards he collected a body + of troops and went into Italy. These became the famous + "White Company." He took part in many wars, and died in + Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, + a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo + Visconti. + + (#) Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about + 1390, executed at Venice, 5th May 1432. + + (&) Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of + San Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, + Duke of Austria, in 1487. "Primo capitano in Italia."-- + Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, + died 1510. + + ($) Battle of Vaila in 1509. + +And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled +for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, +in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better +prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has +recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more +temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more states, +for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms against their +nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were oppressing them, +whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain authority in temporal +power: in many others their citizens became princes. From this it came +to pass that Italy fell partly into the hands of the Church and of +republics, and, the Church consisting of priests and the republic of +citizens unaccustomed to arms, both commenced to enlist foreigners. + +The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,(*) the +Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and +Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came +all the other captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy; +and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been overrun +by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the +Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to lower +the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own. They did +this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory, they were +unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not give them +any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force +of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were brought to +such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were +not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used +every art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their soldiers, +not killing in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating without +ransom. They did not attack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the +towns attack encampments at night; they did not surround the camp either +with stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these +things were permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to +avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought +Italy to slavery and contempt. + + (*) Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio + in Romagna. He was the leader of the famous "Company of St + George," composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in + 1409. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII -- CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN + +Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince +is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope +Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise +against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to +auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,(*) for his +assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good +in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always +disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their +captive. + + (*) Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of + Naples), surnamed "The Catholic," born 1452, died 1516. + +And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish +to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which +cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw +himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune +brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his +rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and +the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all +expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did +not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his +auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs. + +The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand +Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other +time of their troubles. + +The Emperor of Constantinople,(*) to oppose his neighbours, sent ten +thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not +willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to +the infidels. + + (*) Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383. + +Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, +for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the +ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others; +but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better +opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one +community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you +have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority +to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; +in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided +these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose +with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real +victory which is gained with the arms of others. + +I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke +entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, +and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces +not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less +danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, +on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he +destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference between one +and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers +the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the +French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his +own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever +increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw +that he was complete master of his own forces. + +I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am +unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I +have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the +Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like +our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he +could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, +and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens. + +I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament +applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with +Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed +him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them +on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to +meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of +others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind +you fast. + +Charles the Seventh,(*) the father of King Louis the Eleventh,(+) having +by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, recognized +the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established +in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. +Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to +enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now +seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the +reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of +his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his +men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so +accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they +can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot +stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come +off well against others. The armies of the French have thus become +mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together +are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but much +inferior to one's own forces. And this example proves it, for the +kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had +been enlarged or maintained. + + (*) Charles VII of France, surnamed "The Victorious," born + 1403, died 1461. + + (+) Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483. + +But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks +well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have +said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality +cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; +and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster to the Roman +Empire(*) should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only +with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time the vigour of +the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour which had raised +it passed away to others. + + (*) "Many speakers to the House the other night in the + debate on the reduction of armaments seemed to show a most + lamentable ignorance of the conditions under which the + British Empire maintains its existence. When Mr Balfour + replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank under + the weight of its military obligations, he said that this + was 'wholly unhistorical.' He might well have added that the + Roman power was at its zenith when every citizen + acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, but that + it began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer + recognized."--Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906. + +I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its +own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, +not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has +always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so +uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. +And one's own forces are those which are composed either of subjects, +citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And +the way to make ready one's own forces will be easily found if the rules +suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider +how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and +princes have armed and organized themselves, to which rules I entirely +commit myself. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV -- THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF +WAR + +A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else +for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the +sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it +not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men +to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is +seen that when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have +lost their states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect +this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of +the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from a private person +became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and +troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons. For among other +evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be despised, and +this is one of those ignominies against which a prince ought to guard +himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing proportionate +between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who +is armed should yield obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that +the unarmed man should be secure among armed servants. Because, there +being in the one disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible +for them to work well together. And therefore a prince who does not +understand the art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already +mentioned, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. +He ought never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of +war, and in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in +war; this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study. + +As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well +organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he +accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of +localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys +open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and +marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge +is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his country, and +is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the +knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands with ease any +other which it may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because +the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for +instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance to those of other +countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one country one can +easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this +skill lacks the essential which it is desirable that a captain should +possess, for it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, +to lead armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage. + +Philopoemen,(*) Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which +writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he +never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in +the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: "If +the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here +with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best +advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, +how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as he went, all +the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion +and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual +discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected +circumstances that he could not deal with. + + (*) Philopoemen, "the last of the Greeks," born 252 B.C., + died 183 B.C. + +But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and +study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne +themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, +so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as +an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised +and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept +in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar +Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written +by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of Scipio how that +imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, and +liberality Scipio conformed to those things which have been written of +Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to observe some such rules, and +never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with +industry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, +so that if fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows. + + + +CHAPTER XV -- CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, +ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED + +It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince +towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have written on +this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it +again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of +other people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall +be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to +follow up the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for +many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never +been known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one +ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to +be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who +wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with +what destroys him among so much that is evil. + +Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know +how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. +Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, and +discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken +of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable +for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and +thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan +term (because an avaricious person in our language is still he who +desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives +himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed generous, +one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, another +faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; one +affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, +another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another frivolous; +one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know that every +one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a prince to +exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but because +they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human +conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently +prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which +would lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible, +from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he +may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need +not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without +which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is +considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like +virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which +looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI -- CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS + +Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I say +that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, liberality +exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, +injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be +exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach +of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the +name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so +that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts all his property, +and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to maintain the name +of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax them, and do +everything he can to get money. This will soon make him odious to his +subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by any one; thus, +with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded few, he is +affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the +first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from +it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly. + +Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of +liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if +he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in +time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that +with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself +against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without +burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises liberality +towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, and meanness +towards those to whom he does not give, who are few. + +We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have +been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was +assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he +did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King of +France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on +his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long +thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or +conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A +prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he +can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he +is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account +a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will +enable him to govern. + +And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and +many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, +and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in +fact, or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is +dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; +and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; +but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his +expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one should +reply: Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies, +who have been considered very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends +that which is his own or his subjects' or else that of others. In the +first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to neglect +any opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who goes forth with +his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that +which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary, otherwise he +would not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is neither yours +nor your subjects' you can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and +Alexander; because it does not take away your reputation if you squander +that of others, but adds to it; it is only squandering your own that +injures you. + +And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst +you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor +or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a +prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised +and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to +have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, +than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to +incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII -- CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS +BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED + +Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every +prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. +Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare +Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the +Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if this +be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more merciful +than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for cruelty, +permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.(*) Therefore a prince, so long as he +keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of +cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than those +who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which follow +murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole people, +whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the +individual only. + + (*) During the rioting between the Cancellieri and + Panciatichi factions in 1502 and 1503. + +And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the +imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence +Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign +owing to its being new, saying: + + "Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt + Moliri, et late fines custode tueri."(*) + +Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he +himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and +humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and +too much distrust render him intolerable. + + (*) . . . against my will, my fate + A throne unsettled, and an infant state, + Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs, + And guard with these severities my shores. + + Christopher Pitt. + +Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than +feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to +be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it +is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be +dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that +they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as +you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, +property, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far +distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that +prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other +precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by +payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be +earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied +upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one +who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, +owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their +advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never +fails. + +Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he +does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well +being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he +abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their +women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of +someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, +but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, +because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss +of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are +never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always +find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking +life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But +when a prince is with his army, and has under control a multitude of +soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation +of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army united or +disposed to its duties. + +Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that +having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, +to fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or +against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This +arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his +boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of +his soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not +sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire +his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal +cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been +sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most +excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man, +against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from +nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more +license than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was +upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of +the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio, +yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate +punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in +the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew +much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. +This disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have +destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the +control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed +itself, but contributed to his glory. + +Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the +conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing +according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself +on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must +endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. + + + +CHAPTER XVIII(*) -- CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP +FAITH + + (*) "The present chapter has given greater offence than any + other portion of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, "Il + Principe," p. 297. + +Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and +to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience +has been that those princes who have done great things have held good +faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect +of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on +their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting,(*) the one +by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the +second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it +is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary +for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the +man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, +who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were given to +the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his discipline; +which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half +beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make +use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable. A +prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought +to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself +against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. +Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a +lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not +understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought +he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and +when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men +were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are +bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe +it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate +reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern examples +could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made +void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who +has known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best. + + (*) "Contesting," i.e. "striving for mastery." Mr Burd + points out that this passage is imitated directly from + Cicero's "De Officiis": "Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, + unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim; cumque illud + proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum est ad + posterius, si uti non licet superiore." + +But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, +and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and +so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will +always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent +example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing +else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he +always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power +in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would +observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to +his wishes,(*) because he well understood this side of mankind. + + (*) "Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad + votum)." The words "ad votum" are omitted in the Testina + addition, 1550. + + Alexander never did what he said, + Cesare never said what he did. + + Italian Proverb. + +Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities +I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And +I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe +them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear +merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a +mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and +know how to change to the opposite. + +And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, +cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often +forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,(*) +friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to +have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations +of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the +good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to +set about it. + + (*) "Contrary to fidelity" or "faith," "contro alla fede," + and "tutto fede," "altogether faithful," in the next + paragraph. It is noteworthy that these two phrases, "contro + alla fede" and "tutto fede," were omitted in the Testina + edition, which was published with the sanction of the papal + authorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the word + "fede" was "the faith," i.e. the Catholic creed, and not as + rendered here "fidelity" and "faithful." Observe that the + word "religione" was suffered to stand in the text of the + Testina, being used to signify indifferently every shade of + belief, as witness "the religion," a phrase inevitably + employed to designate the Huguenot heresy. South in his + Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as + follows: "That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, + Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his + political scheme: 'That the show of religion was helpful to + the politician, but the reality of it hurtful and + pernicious.'" + +For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything +slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five +qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether +merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing +more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men +judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to +everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees +what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare +not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty +of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and +especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges +by the result. + +For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding +his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be +praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a +thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are +only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have +no ground to rest on. + +One prince(*) of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never +preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is +most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of +reputation and kingdom many a time. + + (*) Ferdinand of Aragon. "When Machiavelli was writing 'The + Prince' it would have been clearly impossible to mention + Ferdinand's name here without giving offence." Burd's "Il + Principe," p. 308. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX -- THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED + +Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I +have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss +briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has +been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him +hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he +will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other +reproaches. + +It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, +and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from +both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor their +honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to +contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many +ways. + +It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, +effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should +guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his +actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his +private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are +irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can +hope either to deceive him or to get round him. + +That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, +and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, +provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by +his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason +a prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his +subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From +the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, +and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will +always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they +should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should +affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and +has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist +every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did. + +But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has +only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince +can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by +keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary +for him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most +efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not +to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against +a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the +conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have +the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront +a conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the +conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires +cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he +believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind +to a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content +himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that, +seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other +to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a +thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you. + +And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side +of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of +punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the +majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and +the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the +popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to +conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the +execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to +the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and +thus cannot hope for any escape. + +Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content +with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer +Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the +present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had +conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer +Giovanni,(*) who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination +the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the +popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in +Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after the +death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese, having +information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence, +who up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith, sent to +Florence for him and gave him the government of their city, and it was +ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government. + + (*) Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan + 1508. He ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli's + strong condemnation of conspiracies may get its edge from + his own very recent experience (February 1513), when he had + been arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the + Boscoli conspiracy. + +For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies +of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it +is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear +everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have +taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the +people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most important +objects a prince can have. + +Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, and +in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty +and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its +authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of +the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths +would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the +hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to +protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care +of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be +liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people +for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who +could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the +king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or +a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can +draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs +of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in +their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish +the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people. + +It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths +of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary +to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great +qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been +killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, +to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of some of the +emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different +to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for +consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the +affairs of those times. + +It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to +the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were +Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son +Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. + +There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the +ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be +contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to +put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset +with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing +to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people +loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince, +whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and +rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise +upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to +their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were +always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great +authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the +principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours, +were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about +injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes +cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to +avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they +ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the +most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had +need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to +the people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not, +accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them. + +From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being +all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, +and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died +honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, +and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, +being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept +both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor +despised. + +But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, +who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not +endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, +having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt +for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his +administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as +much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince +wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for when that +body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself--it +may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles--you have to +submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do +you harm. + +But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, +that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the +fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by +him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who +allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the +army conspired against him, and murdered him. + +Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus +Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-men +who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of +iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a bad +end; but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers +friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned +successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of +the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished +and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the +actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show +briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which +natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a prince to imitate. + +Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in +Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome +and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian +soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the +throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known +that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, +elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for +Severus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two +difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had +caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west where +Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he considered it +dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to attack +Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected +emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and +sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made +Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted by Albinus as true. +But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental +affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, +little recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had +by treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was +compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and +took from him his government and life. He who will, therefore, carefully +examine the actions of this man will find him a most valiant lion and +a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and respected by every one, +and not hated by the army; and it need not be wondered at that he, a +new man, was able to hold the empire so well, because his supreme +renown always protected him from that hatred which the people might have +conceived against him for his violence. + +But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent +qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and +acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring +of fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which +caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and +cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single +murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those of +Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those +he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst +of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such-like +deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate +courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear +to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the less because +they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do any grave injury +to those whom he employs or has around him in the service of the state. +Antoninus had not taken this care, but had contumeliously killed a +brother of that centurion, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained +in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and +proved the emperor's ruin. + +But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to +hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, +and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his +people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave +himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might +indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining +his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators, +and doing other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he +fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and +despised by the other, he was conspired against and was killed. + +It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike +man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, +of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the +throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated +and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought +him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great +indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession +to his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the +imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity +by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, +practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger +at the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa +rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy +conspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter, +besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were +disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so +many against him, murdered him. + +I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being +thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this +discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this +difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a +far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some +indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that +are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were +the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary +to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more +necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the +people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful. + +From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him +twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend +the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, +putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them +his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the +hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the people, +he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the +Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that it +is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an +hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old +prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by +those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this +being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, because +there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new +ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state is +old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary +lord. + +But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will +consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been +fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how +it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number +in another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to +unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for +Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who +was heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly +destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated +Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread +in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot +imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow +those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which +are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are proper +and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm. + + + + +CHAPTER XX -- ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES +OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? + +1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their +subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; +others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid +themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning +of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown +and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all +of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states +in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as +comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit. + +2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather +when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by +arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted +become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your +subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be +armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be +handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they +quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, +considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and +service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm +them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either +for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions +breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it +follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already +shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to +defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, +as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always +distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince +acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then +it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have +been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and +opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should +be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be +your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you. + +3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed +to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by +fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their +tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. +This may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way +balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept +for to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; +rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided +cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always +assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. +The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the +Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although +they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these +disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their +differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not +afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one +party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, +therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be +permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the +more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if +war comes this policy proves fallacious. + +4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the +difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore +fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who +has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes +enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have +the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a +ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that +a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster +some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown +may rise higher. + +5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance +in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than +among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince +of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by +others. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies +so much with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who +at the commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of +a description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be +gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to +serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very +necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had +formed of them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from +them than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect +his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a +prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he +must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who +did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him, but only +discontent with their government, then he will only keep them friendly +with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy +them. And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which +can be taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is +easier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented +under the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of +those who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and +encouraged him to seize it. + +6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states +more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit +to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge +from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been made use +of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times +has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he +might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to +his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the +foundations all the fortresses in that province, and considered that +without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the Bentivogli +returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, therefore, +are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in one +way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus: +the prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners +ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners +than from the people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, +built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the +house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason +the best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because, +although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the +people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist +a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen in our +times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless to the +Countess of Forli,(*) when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed; +for by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack and wait +for assistance from Milan, and thus recover her state; and the posture +of affairs was such at that time that the foreigners could not assist +the people. But fortresses were of little value to her afterwards when +Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied +with foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer for her, both then +and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have had the +fortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him +who builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame +whoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people. + + (*) Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and + Lucrezia Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the + Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499. + A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces the + appointment: "I have been with the signori," wrote + Fortunati, "to learn whom they would send and when. They + tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine + noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me + at once." Cf. "Catherine Sforza," by Count Pasolini, + translated by P. Sylvester, 1898. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI -- HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN + +Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting +a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present +King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has +risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the +foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds +you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the +beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the +foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without +any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile +occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations; +thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power +and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and +of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the +foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him. +Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater +schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and +clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable +example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa, +he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his +achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds +of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of +them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the other, +that men have never been given time to work steadily against him. + +Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal +affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano, +who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some +extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of +rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a +prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain +for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man. + +A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a +downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he +declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course +will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two +of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character +that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. +In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare +yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if +you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to +the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been +conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to +protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want +doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who +loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in hand, +court his fate. + +Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive +out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of +the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the +Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in +the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to +stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: "As for that which has +been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not +to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by +not interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the +guerdon of the conqueror." Thus it will always happen that he who is not +your friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend +will entreat you to declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, +to avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are +generally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour +of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although +the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is +indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are +never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing +you. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not +show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally +yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he +may aid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again. + +In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that +you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it +greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction +of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved +him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your +assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted +that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one +more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless +necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are +at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being +at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against +the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could +have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the +Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then +in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of +the parties. + +Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe +courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, +because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid +one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in +knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to +take the lesser evil. + +A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour +the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his +citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and +agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not be +deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away +from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the +prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and +designs in any way to honour his city or state. + +Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles +at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into +guilds or into societies,(*) he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and +associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of courtesy +and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his +rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything. + + (*) "Guilds or societies," "in arti o in tribu." "Arti" were + craft or trade guilds, cf. Florio: "Arte . . . a whole + company of any trade in any city or corporation town." The + guilds of Florence are most admirably described by Mr + Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject (Methuen, 1906). + Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called + "artel," exist in Russia to-day, cf. Sir Mackenzie Wallace's + "Russia," ed. 1905: "The sons . . . were always during the + working season members of an artel. In some of the larger + towns there are artels of a much more complex kind-- + permanent associations, possessing large capital, and + pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the individual + members." The word "artel," despite its apparent similarity, + has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with "ars" or + "arte." Its root is that of the verb "rotisya," to bind + oneself by an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only + another form of "rota," which now signifies a "regimental + company." In both words the underlying idea is that of a + body of men united by an oath. "Tribu" were possibly gentile + groups, united by common descent, and included individuals + connected by marriage. Perhaps our words "sects" or "clans" + would be most appropriate. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII -- CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES + +The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they +are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the +first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is +by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and +faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how +to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are +otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error +which he made was in choosing them. + +There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to +be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there +are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; +another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which +neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is +the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore, +it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he +was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know good and +bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the +initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant, +and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the servant cannot +hope to deceive him, and is kept honest. + +But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one +test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his +own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in +everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever +be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his +hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and +never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned. + +On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study +him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with +him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he +cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, +many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him +dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, +are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, +the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII -- HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED + +I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it +is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless +they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of +whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own +affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with +difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they +run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way +of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that +to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell +you the truth, respect for you abates. + +Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the +wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking +the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, +and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and +listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. +With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry +himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more +freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of +these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be +steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown +by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls +into contempt. + +I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of +affairs to Maximilian,(*) the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, +said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. +This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the +above; for the emperor is a secretive man--he does not communicate his +designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in +carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are +at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being +pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he +does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he +wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions. + + (*) Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the + Holy Roman Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of + Charles the Bold; after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus + became involved in Italian politics. + +A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he +wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one +from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be +a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the +things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any +consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be +felt. + +And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression +of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good +advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because +this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise +himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his +affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In +this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long, +because such a governor would in a short time take away his state from +him. + +But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more +than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to +unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and +the prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And +they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue +to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be +inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of +the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good +counsels. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV -- WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES + +The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince +to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed +in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of +a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary +one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind +far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the +present than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy +it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defence of a +prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will be a double +glory for him to have established a new principality, and adorned and +strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good +example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a prince, +shall lose his state by want of wisdom. + +And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in +Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, +and others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in +regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in +the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the +people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known +how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that +have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost. + +Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who +was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to +the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a +warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he +sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the +end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the +kingdom. + +Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their +principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own +sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change +(it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm +against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they +thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that +the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall +them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to +have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never +wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to +restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will +not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which +does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and +durable that depend on yourself and your valour. + + + + +CHAPTER XXV -- WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO +WITHSTAND HER + +It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the +opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by +fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and +that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us +believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let +chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times +because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and +may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes +pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. +Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that +Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,(*) but that she still +leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less. + + (*) Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: "The older + one gets the more convinced one becomes that his Majesty + King Chance does three-quarters of the business of this + miserable universe." Sorel's "Eastern Question." + +I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood +overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away +the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to +its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, +though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when +the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences +and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may +pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so +dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour +has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where +she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain +her. + +And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and +which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open +country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been +defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either +this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it +would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning +resistance to fortune in general. + +But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be +seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change +of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes +that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who +relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that +he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of +the times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will +not be successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end +which every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there +by various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force, +another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one +succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of +two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, +two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being +cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than +whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. +This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently +bring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains +his object and the other does not. + +Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs +himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a +way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if +times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course +of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know +how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate +from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always +prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well +to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn +adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he +changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have changed. + +Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and +found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action +that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against +Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians +were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the +enterprise still under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless +he personally entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness +and energy, a move which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute +and passive, the latter from fear, the former from desire to recover +the kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, he drew after him the King of +France, because that king, having observed the movement, and desiring +to make the Pope his friend so as to humble the Venetians, found it +impossible to refuse him. Therefore Julius with his impetuous action +accomplished what no other pontiff with simple human wisdom could have +done; for if he had waited in Rome until he could get away, with his +plans arranged and everything fixed, as any other pontiff would have +done, he would never have succeeded. Because the King of France would +have made a thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a +thousand fears. + +I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they +all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience +the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go +cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have +deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him. + +I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind +steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are +successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider +that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is +a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and +ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by +the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is, +therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are +less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI -- AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS + +Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and +wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to +a new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an +opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of +things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this +country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new +prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present. + +And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be +captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians +should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the +soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate +the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to +discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy +should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should +be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, +more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten, +despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation. + +Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us +think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was +afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him; +so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal +her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy, +to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse +those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God +to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous +insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a +banner if only someone will raise it. + +Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope +than in your illustrious house,(*) with its valour and fortune, favoured +by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and which could +be made the head of this redemption. This will not be difficult if you +will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the men I have named. +And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were men, and +each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for +their enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was +God more their friend than He is yours. + + (*) Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal + by Leo X. In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the + title of Clement VII. + +With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is +necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in +them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness +is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those +men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how +extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example: +the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured +forth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to +your greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do +everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory +which belongs to us. + +And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians +have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious +house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns, +it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has +happened because the old order of things was not good, and none of us +have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to +establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen. +Such things when they are well founded and dignified will make him +revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting opportunities to +bring such into use in every form. + +Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. +Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior +the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when it comes +to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from +the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are capable are not +obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there having never been +any one so distinguished above the rest, either by valour or fortune, +that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for so long a time, +and during so much fighting in the past twenty years, whenever there +has been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a poor account of +itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, afterwards Allesandria, +Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.(*) + + (*) The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, + 1501; Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513. + +If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable +men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things, +as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your +own forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better +soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will +be much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince, +honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is +necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended +against foreigners by Italian valour. + +And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very +formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which +a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied +upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the +Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close +combat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards +are unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by +Spanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot +be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of +Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions, +who follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility +of body and with the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the +Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood +helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been +over with them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both +these infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not +be afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but +a variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which +confer reputation and power upon a new prince. + +This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting +Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love +with which he would be received in all those provinces which have +suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for +revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. +What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? +What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all +of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious +house take up this charge with that courage and hope with which all +just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard our native +country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be verified that +saying of Petrarch: + + Virtu contro al Furore + Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto: + Che l'antico valore + Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto. + + Virtue against fury shall advance the fight, + And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight: + For the old Roman valour is not dead, + Nor in th' Italians' brests extinguished. + + Edward Dacre, 1640. + + + + +DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING +VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE +DI GRAVINA ORSINI + +BY + +NICOLO MACHIAVELLI + + +The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to +clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been +raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of Arezzo +and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, whence +he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against Giovanni +Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring that city +under his domination, and to make it the head of his Romagnian duchy. + +These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and +their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too +powerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek +to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon +this a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, +to which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, +Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the tyrant +of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo Petrucci, +the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and courage of the +duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which might otherwise +bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they decided not to +abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the Florentines; and +they sent their men to one place and another, promising to one party +assistance and to another encouragement to unite with them against the +common enemy. This meeting was at once reported throughout all Italy, +and those who were discontented under the duke, among whom were the +people of Urbino, took hope of effecting a revolution. + +Thus it arose that, men's minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by +certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was +held for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The +castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there; +so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being +carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from +being drawn up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping +upon the bridge and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being +effected, the whole state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being +encouraged in this, not so much by the capture of the fort, as by the +Diet at Magione, from whom they expected to get assistance. + +Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose +the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any town, +should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and they sent +again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in destroying +the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and that they +ought not to wait for another opportunity. + +But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli and +Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo Machiavelli, +their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the duke against +his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, because, against +everybody's expectation, his soldiers had at once gone over to the +enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his door. But recovering +courage from the offers of the Florentines, he decided to temporize +before fighting with the few soldiers that remained to him, and to +negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to get assistance. This latter +he obtained in two ways, by sending to the King of France for men and by +enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he turned into cavalry of a sort: +to all he gave money. + +Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached +Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the +aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the duke +resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with offers of +reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did not fail in +any practices to make the insurgents understand that he wished every man +who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough for him to have +the title of prince, whilst others might have the principality. + +And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to +him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a +standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took +every care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such +preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in +separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there +came also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found +himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open +war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous +to outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of +reconciliation. + +And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in +which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand +ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed +an alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come +personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the +other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and +other places seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and +not to make war against or ally themselves with any one without his +permission. + +This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, +again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in +his state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the +fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by +the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends. +But the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed +his men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of November +together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to Cesena, where he +stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the Vitelli and Orsini, +who had assembled with their men in the duchy of Urbino, as to the +enterprise in which they should now take part; but nothing being +concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that if the duke +wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were ready; if +he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To this the duke +replied that he did not wish to enter into war with Tuscany, and thus +become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was very willing to +proceed against Sinigalia. + +It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the +fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give +it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him +to come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being +invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no +suspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French +men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred +lancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena +about the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the utmost +cunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for +him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of compliance would +cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the reconciliation, +and that he was a man who wished to make use of the arms and councils of +his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very stubborn, for the death of +his brother warned him that he should not offend a prince and afterwards +trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had +corrupted with gifts and promises, he agreed to wait. + +Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be +on 30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most +trusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor d'Euna, +who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as Vitellozzo, +Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should arrive, his +followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting certain +men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they reached +Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they came to the +duke's quarters, where they should be seized. + +The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which +there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to +assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from +Fano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day +of December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade +of about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the +infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms. + +Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of +the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who +goes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases +of which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia is +distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot +and from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs +a little river which bathes that part of the walls looking towards Fano, +facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes for +a good space by road along the mountains, and reaches the river which +passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left hand along the bank of it, +and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge which +crosses the river; he is then almost abreast of the gate that leads into +Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but transversely. Before this gate +there stands a collection of houses with a square to which the bank of +the river forms one side. + +The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and +to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant +from Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men +of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band, +which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty +horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters +having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and +when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass +over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards the river and +the other towards the country, and a way was left in the middle through +which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the town. + +Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a +few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a +cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his +approaching death--a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the +man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that +when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet the +duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He recommended +his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his nephews that +it was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of their fathers +that should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came before +the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were received by him with +goodwill; they were at once placed between those who were commissioned +to look after them. + +But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band in +Sinigalia, was missing--for Oliverotto was waiting in the square before +his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and drilling +them--signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care of +Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that +Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined +Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of +their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke; +and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come +himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice, came +before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and Oliverotto, +having made his obeisance, joined the others. + +So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke's quarters, +and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made them +prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that the men +of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. Those of +Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of the Orsini +and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment of the +destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, and +bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and Vitellian +houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of the country +and saved themselves. + +But the duke's soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the +men of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had +not repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have +completely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced, +the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into +a room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in +keeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of +the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the blame +for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the Duke di +Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome that the +pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of Florence, and +Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th January 1502, in +the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the same way. + + + + + +THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA + +WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI + +And sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI + + +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328 + +It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who +have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them, +who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in +their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and obscurity; +or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way. They have +either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have had so +mean a parentage that in shame they have given themselves out to be +sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be wearisome to relate who +these persons may have been because they are well known to everybody, +and, as such tales would not be particularly edifying to those who read +them, they are omitted. I believe that these lowly beginnings of great +men occur because Fortune is desirous of showing to the world that such +men owe much to her and little to wisdom, because she begins to show +her hand when wisdom can really take no part in their career: thus all +success must be attributed to her. Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was +one of those men who did great deeds, if he is measured by the times in +which he lived and the city in which he was born; but, like many others, +he was neither fortunate nor distinguished in his birth, as the course +of this history will show. It appeared to be desirable to recall his +memory, because I have discerned in him such indications of valour and +fortune as should make him a great exemplar to men. I think also that +I ought to call your attention to his actions, because you of all men I +know delight most in noble deeds. + +The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families +of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in +estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a son +Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca, and +for this reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He had an +only sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso +dying she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again went to live +with her brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the house where +he resided, and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, any person +could have access to it without difficulty. One morning, shortly after +sunrise, Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called, +had occasion to go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for +seasoning the dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves +of a vine she turned her eyes in that direction, and heard something +resembling the cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards it, and saw +the hands and face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the leaves and +who seemed to be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and partly +fearing, yet full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it to +the house, where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is +customary, and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When +he heard what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised +or compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves +what should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no +children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for +it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They +baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As +the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of +wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those +lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended +to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his +canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with +this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio was +quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached the +age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of Messer +Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left +off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, +delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in running, +leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he far excelled +his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at any time he did +turn to books, only those pleased him which told of wars and the mighty +deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with vexation and sorrow. + +There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, +named Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, +bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had +often fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a +Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman +resided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others most +mornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the +top of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he had +often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of the street +in those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far +excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to exercise a royal +authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed him, Messer +Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. Being informed +of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio he felt a greater +desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called him one day and +asked him whether he would more willingly live in the house of a +gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use arms, or in +the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses and +the services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased +Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though +he stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer +Francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable, +nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly studies and +take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and +in a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was +driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear +that he would not be able to hold him much longer. + +Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest +to the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was +astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that +virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true +gentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and +could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and +tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all others, +and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. But what +enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the delightful +modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or word to +others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with his equals, +and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him beloved, not only +by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When Castruccio had reached +his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were driven from Pavia by the +Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the Visconti to assist the +Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in charge of his forces. +Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and courage in this +expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other captain, and +his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but throughout all +Lombardy. + +Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he +left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many +friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary +for that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son +thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio +to be his son's tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died +Francesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that +goodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to +the son the gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the father. +Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and tutor of +Pagolo, which increased enormously his power and position, and created +a certain amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the former +universal goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring tyrannical +intentions. Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the +head of the Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of Messer +Francesco to become the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him that +Castruccio, with the great abilities which he already showed, and +holding the position of governor, deprived him of his opportunity; +therefore he began to sow those seeds which should rob Castruccio of his +eminence. Castruccio at first treated this with scorn, but afterwards +he grew alarmed, thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able to bring +him into disgrace with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples and have him +driven out of Lucca. + +The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo, +who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became +their lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca, +with whom Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting +their restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought into +his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of the +Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio cautiously +fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies and +munitions of war, in order that it might stand a siege for a few days +in case of need. When the night came which had been agreed upon with +Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between the mountains and +Pisa with many men, the signal was given, and without being observed +Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and set fire to the +portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the city, calling +the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. Uguccione +entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer Giorgio +with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The governor +was driven out, and the government reformed according to the wishes of +Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found that more +than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those who +fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the +headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most +hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese. + +As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party +that the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they determined +to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a large army in +the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence they marched to +Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into Lucca. Upon this +Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and with a number +of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved against +the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the enemy +withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between Montecatini and +Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to Montecarlo, and within +about two miles of the enemy, and slight skirmishes between the horse +of both parties were of daily occurrence. Owing to the illness of +Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed coming to battle with the +enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing worse, went to Montecarlo to +be cured, and left the command of the army in the hands of Castruccio. +This change brought about the ruin of the Guelphs, who, thinking +that the hostile army having lost its captain had lost its head, grew +over-confident. Castruccio observed this, and allowed some days to pass +in order to encourage this belief; he also showed signs of fear, and +did not allow any of the munitions of the camp to be used. On the other +side, the Guelphs grew more insolent the more they saw these evidences +of fear, and every day they drew out in the order of battle in front +of the army of Castruccio. Presently, deeming that the enemy was +sufficiently emboldened, and having mastered their tactics, he decided +to join battle with them. First he spoke a few words of encouragement to +his soldiers, and pointed out to them the certainty of victory if they +would but obey his commands. Castruccio had noticed how the enemy had +placed all his best troops in the centre of the line of battle, and his +less reliable men on the wings of the army; whereupon he did exactly +the opposite, putting his most valiant men on the flanks, while those +on whom he could not so strongly rely he moved to the centre. Observing +this order of battle, he drew out of his lines and quickly came in sight +of the hostile army, who, as usual, had come in their insolence to defy +him. He then commanded his centre squadrons to march slowly, whilst +he moved rapidly forward those on the wings. Thus, when they came into +contact with the enemy, only the wings of the two armies became engaged, +whilst the center battalions remained out of action, for these two +portions of the line of battle were separated from each other by a long +interval and thus unable to reach each other. By this expedient the more +valiant part of Castruccio's men were opposed to the weaker part of the +enemy's troops, and the most efficient men of the enemy were disengaged; +and thus the Florentines were unable to fight with those who were +arrayed opposite to them, or to give any assistance to their own flanks. +So, without much difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to flight on +both flanks, and the centre battalions took to flight when they found +themselves exposed to attack, without having a chance of displaying +their valour. The defeat was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, +there being more than ten thousand men killed with many officers and +knights of the Guelph party in Tuscany, and also many princes who had +come to help them, among whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, +and Carlo, his nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of +Castruccio the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, among +whom was Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was +killed in the first onset. + +This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that +Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it +appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of +power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only waited +for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the death of +Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in Lucca, the +murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge. On the +sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were driven +off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming to +the knowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him a +proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his +son Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take +Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio, +fearing no evil, went to the governor in a friendly way, was entertained +at supper, and then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing to put him to +death lest the people should be incensed, kept him alive, in order to +hear further from his father concerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed +the hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at once set out from Pisa +to Lucca with four hundred horsemen to finish the business in his own +way; but he had not yet reached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and +put his deputy to death and created Count Gaddo della Gherardesca their +lord. Before Uguccione reached Lucca he heard of the occurrences at +Pisa, but it did not appear wise to him to turn back, lest the Lucchese +with the example of Pisa before them should close their gates against +him. But the Lucchese, having heard of what had happened at Pisa, +availed themselves of this opportunity to demand the liberation of +Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had arrived in their city. +They first began to speak of it in private circles, afterwards openly +in the squares and streets; then they raised a tumult, and with arms in +their hands went to Uguccione and demanded that Castruccio should be +set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse might happen, released him +from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered his friends around him, and +with the help of the people attacked Uguccione; who, finding he had no +resource but in flight, rode away with his friends to Lombardy, to the +lords of Scale, where he died in poverty. + +But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, +and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people +that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having +obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the +recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of +Uguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded a +treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed a +fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course of +two months Castruccio captured the town. With the reputation gained +at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in +a short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the +pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and +wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the +lord of it. After this victory he returned to Lucca, and was welcomed by +the whole people. And now Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any longer to +defer making himself a prince, got himself created the lord of Lucca +by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico, Francesco +Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he had corrupted; and he +was afterwards solemnly and deliberately elected prince by the people. +At this time Frederick of Bavaria, the King of the Romans, came into +Italy to assume the Imperial crown, and Castruccio, in order that +he might make friends with him, met him at the head of five hundred +horsemen. Castruccio had left as his deputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, +who was held in high estimation, because of the people's love for +the memory of his father. Castruccio was received in great honour by +Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him, and he was +appointed the emperor's lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time the Pisans +were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had driven out +of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Frederick +created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of the +Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were constrained to +accept him as their lord. + +Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian +affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian Ghibellines, +who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio for help +and counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his country, +if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among these exiles were +Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, and Piero +Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. Castruccio had the +secret intention of becoming the master of all Tuscany by the aid of +these men and of his own forces; and in order to gain greater weight +in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer Matteo Visconti, the +Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces of his city and the +country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he divided his own country +districts into five parts, which he supplied with arms, and enrolled the +men under captains and ensigns, so that he could quickly bring into the +field twenty thousand soldiers, without those whom he could summon to +his assistance from Pisa. While he surrounded himself with these forces +and allies, it happened at Messer Matteo Visconti was attacked by +the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven out the Ghibellines with the +assistance of a Florentine army and the King Ruberto. Messer Matteo +called upon Castruccio to invade the Florentines in their own +territories, so that, being attacked at home, they should be compelled +to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to defend themselves. +Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized Fucecchio and San Miniato, +inflicting immense damage upon the country. Whereupon the Florentines +recalled their army, which had scarcely reached Tuscany, when Castruccio +was forced by other necessities to return to Lucca. + +There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so +powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance +him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not +received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited +other families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They found +their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set upon the +lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and killed him. +They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano di Poggio, a +peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion, intervened and +compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms; and he offered +to be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him what +they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater +intelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard +the news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi +in command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set out for home. +Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at an end, yet he +posted his men in the most advantageous places throughout the city. As +it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be very much obliged to +him, he sought him out, and without saying anything on his own behalf, +for he did not recognize any need for doing so, he begged Castruccio to +pardon the other members of his family by reason of their youth, their +former friendships, and the obligations which Castruccio was under to +their house. To this Castruccio graciously responded, and begged Stefano +to reassure himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure to find +the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to hear of its +inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to him, saying +that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of showing his +clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and Castruccio they +surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown into prison and +put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered San Miniato, +whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace, as it did not +appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to leave him. +He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce, which they +readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and desirous of +getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded with them for +two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conquests they had +made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned his attention +to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should not again be subject to +the perils from which he had just escaped, he, under various pretences +and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their ambition might +aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, but depriving them +of country and property, and those whom he had in his hands of life +also, stating that he had found by experience that none of them were to +be trusted. Then for his further security he raised a fortress in Lucca +with the stones of the towers of those whom he had killed or hunted out +of the state. + +Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his +position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of +increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he could +get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, which was +his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends with +the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both parties +confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it always had +been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the Bianchi was +Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each of these men +held secret communications with Castruccio, and each desired to drive +the other out of the city; and, after many threatenings, they came to +blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the Florentine gate, Bastiano at that +of the Lucchese side of the city; both trusted more in Castruccio than +in the Florentines, because they believed that Castruccio was far more +ready and willing to fight than the Florentines, and they both sent to +him for assistance. He gave promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he +would come in person, and to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo +Guinigi. At the appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, +and went himself direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside +the city, and both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders +entered, and at a signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, +and the other Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed +the partisans of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia +passed into the hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to +leave the palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, +making them many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside +flocked to the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope +and quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great +valour. + +About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness +of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. The +German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened--murders and +tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put an end +to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should call +in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of the +city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he could +apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not only +to give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome. Castruccio +considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the emperor this +service, because he believed that he himself would not be safe if at any +time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command +at Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six hundred horsemen, where +he was received by Enrico with the greatest distinction. In a short time +the presence of Castruccio obtained such respect for the emperor that, +without bloodshed or violence, good order was restored, chiefly by +reason of Castruccio having sent by sea from the country round Pisa +large quantities of corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. +When he had chastised some of the Roman leaders, and admonished others, +voluntary obedience was rendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many +honours, and was made a Roman senator. This dignity was assumed with the +greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in a brocaded toga, which had +the following words embroidered on its front: "I am what God wills." +Whilst on the back was: "What God desires shall be." + +During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio +should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could +tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be difficult +in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were Baldo Cecchi +and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face danger. These +men kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia, and with the +aid of the Florentines entered the city by night, and after driving out +some of Castruccio's officials and partisans, and killing others, they +restored the city to its freedom. The news of this greatly angered +Castruccio, and taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to +Pistoia. When the Florentines heard of his return, knowing that he would +lose no time, they decided to intercept him with their forces in the +Val di Nievole, under the belief that by doing so they would cut off his +road to Pistoia. Assembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph +cause, the Florentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other +hand, Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard +where the Florentines' lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains +of Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as +he possibly could, to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He +believed that if he succeeded in this design, victory was assured, +although he was informed that the Florentines had thirty thousand men, +whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he had every confidence +in his own abilities and the valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to +attack his enemy in the open lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers. +Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill +which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the exact pass, but about a +bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places narrow and steep, whilst in +general it ascends gently, but is still narrow, especially at the summit +where the waters divide, so that twenty men side by side could hold it. +The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a German, who, before Castruccio +became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to remain in possession of the +castle, it being common to the Lucchese and the Pistoians, and unclaimed +by either--neither of them wishing to displace Manfred as long as he +kept his promise of neutrality, and came under obligations to no one. +For these reasons, and also because the castle was well fortified, +he had always been able to maintain his position. It was here that +Castruccio had determined to fall upon his enemy, for here his few men +would have the advantage, and there was no fear lest, seeing the large +masses of the hostile force before they became engaged, they should not +stand. As soon as this trouble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw the +immense advantage which possession of this castle would give him, and +having an intimate friendship with a resident in the castle, he managed +matters so with him that four hundred of his men were to be admitted +into the castle the night before the attack on the Florentines, and the +castellan put to death. + +Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the +Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away +from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his +army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they reached +their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill on the +following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the castle at +night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching from thence +at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of Serravalle: thus he +and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the hill at the same time in +the morning. Castruccio sent forward his infantry by the main road, +and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a path on the left towards the +castle. The Florentines sent forward four hundred cavalry ahead of +their army which was following, never expecting to find Castruccio in +possession of the hill, nor were they aware of his having seized the +castle. Thus it happened that the Florentine horsemen mounting the hill +were completely taken by surprise when they discovered the infantry of +Castruccio, and so close were they upon it they had scarcely time to +pull down their visors. It was a case of unready soldiers being attacked +by ready, and they were assailed with such vigour that with difficulty +they could hold their own, although some few of them got through. When +the noise of the fighting reached the Florentine camp below, it was +filled with confusion. The cavalry and infantry became inextricably +mixed: the captains were unable to get their men either backward or +forward, owing to the narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult +no one knew what ought to be done or what could be done. In a short time +the cavalry who were engaged with the enemy's infantry were scattered +or killed without having made any effective defence because of their +unfortunate position, although in sheer desperation they had offered +a stout resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on +both flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their +friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a +decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one thousand +infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four hundred +horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the whole +force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they carried out +with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the attack, +but gave way, and were soon in full retreat--conquered more by their +unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in the +rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each +man seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very +sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were +Bandini dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all +Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on the +Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the Guelphs. +Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out the +friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not +content with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both +sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola, +about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the +spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding +horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals +in commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to +corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city +gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the participators +in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso Lupacci and +Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the Florentines great +anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, they sent envoys to +King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of their city; and he, +knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of the Guelph cause +was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines to receive from +them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and he sent his +son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen. + +Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the +pressure of Castruccio's army, owing to his being compelled to leave +his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a +conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, +one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland +should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this +conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of +Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy +paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few +are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy +Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio. +This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio +Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering +their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put +him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove their +families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and +Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought and energy +upon securing his position there, and this gave the Florentines their +opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await the coming of Carlo, +the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided to lose +no more time, and assembled a great army of more than thirty thousand +infantry and ten thousand cavalry--having called to their aid every +Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether they should attack +Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be better to march on +the latter--a course, owing to the recent conspiracy, more likely to +succeed, and of more advantage to them, because they believed that the +surrender of Pistoia would follow the acquisition of Pisa. + +In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army +and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from +thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army +which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree +alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would +deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to +think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects +of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand +foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with this army went to +Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand +infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than any other town in +the Pisan district, owing to its situation between the rivers Arno and +Gusciana and its slight elevation above the surrounding plain. Moreover, +the enemy could not hinder its being victualled unless they divided +their forces, nor could they approach it either from the direction +of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through to Pisa, or attack +Castruccio's forces except at a disadvantage. In one case they would +find themselves placed between his two armies, the one under his own +command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case they would +have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy, an +undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to take +this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of the +river and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide +expanse of land between them and the river. + +The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to +decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and, +having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the +latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet +the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the +saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the Florentines +commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of cavalry and ten +thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was fixed, and +who well knew what to do, at once attacked the Florentines with five +thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, not allowing them to +issue from the river before he charged them; he also sent one thousand +light infantry up the river bank, and the same number down the Arno. The +infantry of the Florentines were so much impeded by their arms and the +water that they were not able to mount the banks of the river, whilst +the cavalry had made the passage of the river more difficult for the +others, by reason of the few who had crossed having broken up the bed of +the river, and this being deep with mud, many of the horses rolled over +with their riders and many of them had stuck so fast that they could not +move. When the Florentine captains saw the difficulties their men were +meeting, they withdrew them and moved higher up the river, hoping to +find the river bed less treacherous and the banks more adapted for +landing. These men were met at the bank by the forces which Castruccio +had already sent forward, who, being light armed with bucklers and +javelins in their hands, let fly with tremendous shouts into the faces +and bodies of the cavalry. The horses, alarmed by the noise and the +wounds, would not move forward, and trampled each other in great +confusion. The fight between the men of Castruccio and those of the +enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp and terrible; both sides +fought with the utmost desperation and neither would yield. The soldiers +of Castruccio fought to drive the others back into the river, whilst the +Florentines strove to get a footing on land in order to make room for +the others pressing forward, who if they could but get out of the water +would be able to fight, and in this obstinate conflict they were urged +on by their captains. Castruccio shouted to his men that these were the +same enemies whom they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the +Florentines reproached each other that the many should be overcome by +the few. At length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, +and that both his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that +both sides had many killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of +infantry to take up a position at the rear of those who were fighting; +he then commanded these latter to open their ranks as if they intended +to retreat, and one part of them to turn to the right and another to +the left. This cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took +advantage, and thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. +But when these tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with +Castruccio's reserves they could not stand against them and at once fell +back into the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet gained +any decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, knowing his +inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand on the +defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he hoped that +when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make short work +of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the +Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the remainder +of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This they did with +lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the +enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. The Florentine +captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had met with in +crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry cross lower +down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio's army. +But here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of +Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines +were so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them +escaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains were +taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo +Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine commissioners, fled to +Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter was infinitely greater, +as might be expected in such a battle. Of the Florentines there fell +twenty thousand two hundred and thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost +one thousand five hundred and seventy men. + +But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his +life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus ruined +all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry into +effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but death +could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle the +whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued and +overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on +their return from victory and personally thank them. He was also on the +watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day; +he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be the +first man in the saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio stood +exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on the banks of the Arno, +and which is often very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of which +he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to such troubles; but it was +the cause of his death. On the following night he was attacked with high +fever, which increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it must prove +fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and +addressed him as follows: + +"If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the +midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my +successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have +left thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, +because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and +Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the +Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these +peoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least more +peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, but one +more secure and established on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who +insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me +with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the first, nor the time +to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I have +never concealed it, how I entered the house of thy father whilst yet a +boy--a stranger to all those ambitions which every generous soul should +feel--and how I was brought up by him, and loved as though I had been +born of his blood; how under his governance I learned to be valiant and +capable of availing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been +witness. When thy good father came to die, he committed thee and all his +possessions to my care, and I have brought thee up with that love, and +increased thy estate with that care, which I was bound to show. And in +order that thou shouldst not only possess the estate which thy father +left, but also that which my fortune and abilities have gained, I have +never married, so that the love of children should never deflect my mind +from that gratitude which I owed to the children of thy father. Thus I +leave thee a vast estate, of which I am well content, but I am deeply +concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure. Thou hast +the city of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest contented under +thy government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are of nature +changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be sometimes held +in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under a Lucchese. +Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with factions and +deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs recently +inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended Florentines, +injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly destroyed, who +will hail the news of my death with more delight than they would the +acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the princes of Milan +thou canst place no reliance, for they are far distant, slow, and their +help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou hast no hope in anything +but in thine own abilities, and in the memory of my valour, and in the +prestige which this latest victory has brought thee; which, as thou +knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist thee to come to terms +with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering under this great +defeat, should be inclined to listen to thee. And whereas I have sought +to make them my enemies, because I believed that war with them would +conduce to my power and glory, thou hast every inducement to make +friends of them, because their alliance will bring thee advantages +and security. It is of the greatest important in this world that a man +should know himself, and the measure of his own strength and means; and +he who knows that he has not a genius for fighting must learn how to +govern by the arts of peace. And it will be well for thee to rule +thy conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this way to enjoy what my +life-work and dangers have gained; and in this thou wilt easily succeed +when thou hast learnt to believe that what I have told thee is true. And +thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that I have left thee this realm +and have taught thee how to keep it." + +After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, and +Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending Pagolo +to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his successor, he +died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him, and no +prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he was. His +obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he was buried +in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to Pagolo Guinigi +as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the abilities. Not long +after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, and then Pistoia, and +only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This latter city continued in the +family of Guinigi until the time of the great-grandson of Pagolo. + +From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a +man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own +time, but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above +the ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious +presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke +with him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, +and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or +snowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends, +but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false +with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he +desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory +that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was +bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He +was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear +nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees that +the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully sharp or +biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not look for any +indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was not angered +with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that he has +listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on the +following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a partridge, +and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom Castruccio had +said: "You would not have given more than a penny." "That is true," +answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: "A ducat is much less +to me." Having about him a flatterer on whom he had spat to show that +he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: "Fisherman are willing to let +the waters of the sea saturate them in order that they may take a few +little fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by spittle that I may +catch a whale"; and this was not only heard by Castruccio with patience +but rewarded. When told by a priest that it was wicked for him to live +so sumptuously, Castruccio said: "If that be a vice then you should +not fare so splendidly at the feasts of our saints." Passing through a +street he saw a young man as he came out of a house of ill fame blush at +being seen by Castruccio, and said to him: "Thou shouldst not be ashamed +when thou comest out, but when thou goest into such places." A friend +gave him a very curiously tied knot to undo and was told: "Fool, do +you think that I wish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to +fasten." Castruccio said to one who professed to be a philosopher: "You +are like the dogs who always run after those who will give them the best +to eat," and was answered: "We are rather like the doctors who go to the +houses of those who have the greatest need of them." Going by water from +Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much disturbed by a dangerous storm that +sprang up, and was reproached for cowardice by one of those with him, +who said that he did not fear anything. Castruccio answered that he +did not wonder at that, since every man valued his soul for what is was +worth. Being asked by one what he ought to do to gain estimation, he +said: "When thou goest to a banquet take care that thou dost not seat +one piece of wood upon another." To a person who was boasting that he +had read many things, Castruccio said: "He knows better than to boast +of remembering many things." Someone bragged that he could drink much +without becoming intoxicated. Castruccio replied: "An ox does the +same." Castruccio was acquainted with a girl with whom he had intimate +relations, and being blamed by a friend who told him that it was +undignified for him to be taken in by a woman, he said: "She has not +taken me in, I have taken her." Being also blamed for eating very dainty +foods, he answered: "Thou dost not spend as much as I do?" and being +told that it was true, he continued: "Then thou art more avaricious +than I am gluttonous." Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and +splendid citizen of Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown +by Taddeo into a chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones +representing flowers and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. +Castruccio gathered some saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon +Taddeo, and seeing him much disturbed by this, said to him: "I knew not +where to spit in order to offend thee less." Being asked how Caesar +died he said: "God willing I will die as he did." Being one night in the +house of one of his gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was +reproved by one of his friends for dancing and amusing himself with +them more than was usual in one of his station, so he said: "He who is +considered wise by day will not be considered a fool at night." A person +came to demand a favour of Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening +to his plea threw himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply +reproved by Castruccio, said: "Thou art the reason of my acting thus for +thou hast thy ears in thy feet," whereupon he obtained double the favour +he had asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy +one, seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled +blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous +words, he said to him: "When you have another request to make, send +someone else to make it." Having been wearied by a similar man with a +long oration who wound up by saying: "Perhaps I have fatigued you by +speaking so long," Castruccio said: "You have not, because I have not +listened to a word you said." He used to say of one who had been a +beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was +dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now he +took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, he +said: "Do you laugh because you are successful or because another is +unfortunate?" Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco +Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: "What shall I give you if +you will let me give you a blow on the nose?" Castruccio answered: +"A helmet." Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been +instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done +wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived +themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly +those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying +that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused +when the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise that +whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first to +learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with +only looking at her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to +be buried when he died, and answered: "With the face turned downwards, +for I know when I am gone this country will be turned upside down." On +being asked if it had ever occurred to him to become a friar in order to +save his soul, he answered that it had not, because it appeared strange +to him that Fra Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione della +Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat to +preserve his health, and replied: "If the man be rich let him eat +when he is hungry; if he be poor, then when he can." Seeing one of his +gentlemen make a member of his family lace him up, he said to him: "I +pray God that you will let him feed you also." Seeing that someone had +written upon his house in Latin the words: "May God preserve this house +from the wicked," he said, "The owner must never go in." Passing through +one of the streets he saw a small house with a very large door, and +remarked: "That house will fly through the door." He was having a +discussion with the ambassador of the King of Naples concerning the +property of some banished nobles, when a dispute arose between them, and +the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the king. "Is this king of +yours a bad man or a good one?" asked Castruccio, and was told that he +was a good one, whereupon he said, "Why should you suggest that I should +be afraid of a good man?" + +I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and +weighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to +his high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a +prince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune, +so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune; +therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be +seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they were +placed by him to testify forever to his days of adversity. As in +his life he was inferior neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of +Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in the same year of his +age as they did, and he would doubtless have excelled both of them had +Fortune decreed that he should be born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia +or Rome. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Prince, by Nicolo Machiavelli + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE *** + +***** This file should be named 1232.txt or 1232.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/2/3/1232/ + +Produced by John Bickers, David Widger and Others + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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From 1494 to 1512 held an official +post at Florence which included diplomatic +missions to various European courts. +Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; later exiled and +returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on +22nd June 1527. + + + +INTRODUCTION + +Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the +second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, +and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were +members of the old Florentine nobility. + +His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly +enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of +Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as +an Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de' Medici, Il +Magnifico. The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in +which year Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official +career Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which +lasted until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli +lost his office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, +when they were once more driven out. This was the period of +Machiavelli's literary activity and increasing influence; but he died, +within a few weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, +in his fifty-eighth year, without having regained office. + + + +YOUTH +Aet. 1-25--1469-94 + +Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the +Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of +this representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been +described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed +by the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour- +loving Lorenzo. Savonarola's influence upon the young Machiavelli must +have been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power +over the fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a +subject of a gibe in "The Prince," where he is cited as an example of +an unarmed prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of +the Medicean rule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have +impressed Machiavelli strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his +writings, and it is to Lorenzo's grandson that he dedicates "The +Prince." + +Machiavelli, in his "History of Florence," gives us a picture of the +young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: "They were freer +than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other +kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, +and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak +with wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most +cleverly was thought the wisest." In a letter to his son Guido, +Machiavelli shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities +for study, and leads us to infer that his own youth had been so +occupied. He writes: "I have received your letter, which has given me +the greatest pleasure, especially because you tell me you are quite +restored in health, than which I could have no better news; for if God +grant life to you, and to me, I hope to make a good man of you if you +are willing to do your share." Then, writing of a new patron, he +continues: "This will turn out well for you, but it is necessary for +you to study; since, then, you have no longer the excuse of illness, +take pains to study letters and music, for you see what honour is done +to me for the little skill I have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to +please me, and to bring success and honour to yourself, do right and +study, because others will help you if you help yourself." + + + +OFFICE +Aet. 25-43--1494-1512 + +The second period of Machiavelli's life was spent in the service of +the free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from +the expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After +serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed +Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty +and Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of +Machiavelli's life, for during this time he took a leading part in the +affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and +dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere +recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and +soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and +supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters +which illustrate "The Prince." + +His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, "my lady of Forli" +of "The Prince," from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it +is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on +fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is +urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes. + +In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for +continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct +of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft +summarized in "The Prince," and was consequently driven out. He, also, +it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support +to Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge +that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning +the faith of princes. + +Machiavelli's public life was largely occupied with events arising out +of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the +Duke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of "The +Prince." Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke +for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have +seized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the +pattern of Cesare Borgia's conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed +by some critics as the "hero" of "The Prince." Yet in "The Prince" the +duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the +fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that +might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save +him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens; +and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims +that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen +fatality. + +On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to +watch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia +cheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano +delle Rovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most +reason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this +election, says that he who thinks new favours will cause great +personages to forget old injuries deceives himself. Julius did not +rest until he had ruined Cesare. + +It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that +pontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he +brought to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, +owing chiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope +Julius that Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune +and women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious +man that will win and hold them both. + +It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian +states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, +with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those +events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they +impinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings +with Louis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch's character +has already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of +Aragon as the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of +religion, but who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or +integrity; and who, had he allowed himself to be influenced by such +motives, would have been ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the +most interesting men of the age, and his character has been drawn by +many hands; but Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, +reveals the secret of his many failures when he describes him as a +secretive man, without force of character--ignoring the human agencies +necessary to carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the +fulfilment of his wishes. + +The remaining years of Machiavelli's official career were filled with +events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the +three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the +object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in +the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won +in eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during +these events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out +between the pope and the French, because friendship with France had +dictated the entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II +finally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance +of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy +of the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the +Medici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st +September 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the +signal for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put +an end to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without +regaining office. + + + +LITERATURE AND DEATH +Aet. 43-58--1512-27 + +On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had +vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, +was dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he +was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the +Medici, imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new +Medicean people, Leo X, procured his release, and he retired to his +small property at San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted +himself to literature. In a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th +December 1513, he has left a very interesting description of his life +at this period, which elucidates his methods and his motives in +writing "The Prince." After describing his daily occupations with his +family and neighbours, he writes: "The evening being come, I return +home and go to my study; at the entrance I pull off my peasant- +clothes, covered with dust and dirt, and put on my noble court dress, +and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass into the ancient courts of the +men of old, where, being lovingly received by them, I am fed with that +food which is mine alone; where I do not hesitate to speak with them, +and to ask for the reason of their actions, and they in their +benignity answer me; and for four hours I feel no weariness, I forget +every trouble, poverty does not dismay, death does not terrify me; I +am possessed entirely by those great men. And because Dante says: + + Knowledge doth come of learning well retained, + Unfruitful else, + +I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have +composed a small work on 'Principalities,' where I pour myself out as +fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a +principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how +they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever +pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, +especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it +to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will +be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had +with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it." + +The "little book" suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form +in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work +during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for +some unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de' Medici. +Although Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be +sent or presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that +Lorenzo ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave +Machiavelli any employment. Although it was plagiarized during +Machiavelli's lifetime, "The Prince" was never published by him, and +its text is still disputable. + +Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: "And as to this +little thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that +during the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I +have neither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be +served by one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And +of my loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I +could not now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and +honest, as I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a +witness to my honesty." + +Before Machiavelli had got "The Prince" off his hands he commenced his +"Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius," which should be read +concurrently with "The Prince." These and several minor works occupied +him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look +after the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the +Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her +citizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new +constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on +one pretext or another it was not promulgated. + +In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to +settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly +remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he +was much sought after, and also for the production of his "Art of +War." It was in the same year that he received a commission at the +instance of Cardinal de' Medici to write the "History of Florence," a +task which occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may +have determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old +writer observes that "an able statesman out of work, like a huge +whale, will endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask +to play with." + +When the "History of Florence" was finished, Machiavelli took it to +Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de' Medici, who had in +the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is +somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written "The +Prince" for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained +power in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the "History of Florence" +to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year +the battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left +Francis I a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This +was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular +party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more +banished. + +Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his +return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the "Ten of +Liberty and Peace." Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached +Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527. + + + +THE MAN AND HIS WORKS + +No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern +Florence has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the +side of her most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations +may have found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity +and the germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst +it is idle to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of +his name, it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his +doctrine which this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own +day, and that the researches of recent times have enabled us to +interpret him more reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the +shape of an "unholy necromancer," which so long haunted men's vision, +has begun to fade. + +Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and +industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and +with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced +retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he +depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, +the successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only +moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political +employments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, +overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren +of results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery +that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct +of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear +by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of +compromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to +suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when +he set him to write the "History of Florence," rather than employ him +in the state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and +there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure. + +Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on "The +Prince," its problems are still debatable and interesting, because +they are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such +as they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli's contemporaries; yet +they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of +Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical +incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses +which Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of +government and conduct. + +Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish +some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, "The +Prince" is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men +are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the +days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices +which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. +Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them +to be--and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe +courses; prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then +--to pass to a higher plane--Machiavelli reiterates that, although +crimes may win an empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are +just wars, and the arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other +resource but to fight. + +It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli's that government +should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the +people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of +society; to this "high argument" "The Prince" contributes but little. +Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments +otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and +insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests "The +Prince" with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the +incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which +still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other +and their neighbours. + +In translating "The Prince" my aim has been to achieve at all costs an +exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent +paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. +Machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he +wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his +substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. "Quis eo fuit +unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?" +In "The Prince," it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not +only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an +Englishman of Shakespeare's time the translation of such a treatise +was in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the +genius of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian +language; to the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a +single example: the word "intrattenere," employed by Machiavelli to +indicate the policy adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker +states of Greece, would by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered +"entertain," and every contemporary reader would understand what was +meant by saying that "Rome entertained the Aetolians and the Achaeans +without augmenting their power." But to-day such a phrase would seem +obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that +"Rome maintained friendly relations with the Aetolians," etc., using +four words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy +brevity of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute +fidelity to the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can +only hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author's +meaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it. + +The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli: + +Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di +trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto +dal duca Valentino nell' ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da +Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; +Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell' +Alemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di +Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., +1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence, +1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in +verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose, +1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d'oro (poem in +terza rima), 1517; Dell' arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il +riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta +di Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie +fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525. + +Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti +carnascialeschi. + +Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, +6 vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., +1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7. + +Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. +Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. +G. Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri +intorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. +Ferrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929. + + + +DEDICATION + + To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De' Medici: + + Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are + accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most + precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one + often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and + similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness. + + Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with + some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among + my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so + much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by + long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of + antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and + prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to + your Magnificence. + + And although I may consider this work unworthy of your + countenance, nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it + may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a + better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in + the shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and + with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not + embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with + rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments + whatever, with which so many are accustomed to embellish their + works; for I have wished either that no honour should be given it, + or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the + theme shall make it acceptable. + + Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man + of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the + concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes + place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of + the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the + plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to understand + the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to + understand that if princes it needs to be of the people. + + Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in + which I send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered + by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain + that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise. + And if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will + sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how + unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune. + + + + + +THE PRINCE + + + +CHAPTER I + +HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, +AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED + +All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have +been and are either republics or principalities. + +Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been +long established; or they are new. + +The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or +they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the +prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of +the King of Spain. + +Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a +prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of +the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. + + + +CHAPTER II + +CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES + +I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another +place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only +to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated +above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and +preserved. + +I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary +states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than +new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of +his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, +for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, +unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; +and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister +happens to the usurper, he will regain it. + +We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have +withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope +Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. +For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; +hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary +vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his +subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the +antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make +for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for +another. + + + +CHAPTER III + +CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES + +But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it +be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, +taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly +from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; +for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, +and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: +wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience +they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural +and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those +who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other +hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition. + +In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in +seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends +who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in +the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against +them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in +armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the +goodwill of the natives. + +For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied +Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it +only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the +gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future +benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is +very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, +they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with +little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish +the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself +in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first +time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[*] to raise insurrections on +the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was +necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies +should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the +causes above mentioned. + +[*] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who + married Beatrice d'Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, + and died in 1510. + +Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second +time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it +remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he +had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining +himself more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France. + +Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an +ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country +and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold +them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self- +government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed +the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, +preserving in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in +customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, +Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to France for +so long a time: and, although there may be some difference in +language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the people will +easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has annexed them, +if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two +considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is +extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are +altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one +body with the old principality. + +But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, +customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great +energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real +helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside +there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has +made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other +measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled +there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the +spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy +them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are +great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the +country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied +by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have +more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He +who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost +caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested +from him with the greatest difficulty. + +The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, +which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do +this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A +prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense +he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority +only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them +to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and +scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being +uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not +to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have +been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not +costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as +has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one +has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, +because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more +serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a +man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of +revenge. + +But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends +much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the +state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are +exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting +of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and +all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their +own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such +guards are as useless as a colony is useful. + +Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects +ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful +neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care +that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a +footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be +introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of +ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were +brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where +they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And +the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner +enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by +the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in +respect to those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain +them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state +which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not +get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his +own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more +powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And +he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he +has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless +difficulties and troubles. + +The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely +these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations +with[*] the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept +down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain +authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The +Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of +Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the +Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase +their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans +to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of +Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the +country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent +princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but +also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, +because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait +until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the +malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians +say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it +is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, +not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it +becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. This it happens in +affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen +(which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly +redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been +permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no +longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt +with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come +to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to +be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight +with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in +Italy; they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor +did that ever please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise +ones of our time:--Let us enjoy the benefits of the time--but rather +the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives +everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as +evil, and evil as well as good. + +[*] See remark in the introduction on the word "intrattenere." + +But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the +things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[*] (and not of Charles[+]) as +the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held +possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he +has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain +a state composed of divers elements. + +[*] Louis XII, King of France, "The Father of the People," born 1462, + died 1515. + +[+] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498. + +King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, +who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. +I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get +a foothold in Italy, and having no friends there--seeing rather that +every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles--he was +forced to accept those friendships which he could get, and he would +have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had +not made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, +regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; +the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke +of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of +Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, +the Sienese--everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then +could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, +which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made +the king master of two-thirds of Italy. + +Let any one now consider with that little difficulty the king could +have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above +laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although +they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the +Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been +forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have +made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no +sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander +to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he +was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who +had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church +by adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater +authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to +follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of +Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was +himself forced to come into Italy. + +And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and +deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of +Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime +arbiter in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that +country and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to +shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own +pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to +drive him, Louis, out in turn. + +The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men +always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not +blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, +then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have +attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if she +could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition +which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the +excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition +merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity. + +Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, +he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he +brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did +not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to +injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from +the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought +Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to +humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to +have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always +have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians +would never have consented except to become masters themselves there; +also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in +order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they +would not have had the courage. + +And if any one should say: "King Louis yielded the Romagna to +Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I answer for the +reasons given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to +avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to +your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the +king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, +in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[*] and for the cap to +Rouen,[+] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the +faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept. + +[*] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and + married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order + to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown. + +[+] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d'Amboise, created a + cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510. + +Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the +conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries +and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much +that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at +Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope +Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal +Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I +replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning +that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such +greatness. And in fact is has been seen that the greatness of the +Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin +may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which +never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming +powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about +either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him +who has been raised to power. + + + +CHAPTER IV + +WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL +AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH + +Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly +acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great +became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was +scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole +empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained +themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose +among themselves from their own ambitions. + +I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to +be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of +servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his +favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that +dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such +barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords +and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by +a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, +because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as +superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as +to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular +affection. + +The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the +King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one +lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into +sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and +changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the +midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, +and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the +king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers +both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the +state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding +it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk +are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the +kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt +of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons +given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only +be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little +advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot +carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who +attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and +he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of +others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the +field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is +nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being +exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no +credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them +before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it. + +The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because +one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, +for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such +men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render +the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with +infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from +those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated +the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make +themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are +unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost +whenever time brings the opportunity. + +Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of +Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and +therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him +in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which +victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, +for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they +would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no +tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves. + +But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted +like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the +Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities +there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them +endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the +power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed +away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting +afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself +his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had +assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, +none other than the Romans were acknowledged. + +When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with +which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which +others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; +this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the +conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state. + + + +CHAPTER V + +CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH +LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED + +Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been +accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are +three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin +them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit +them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing +within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because +such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot +stand without his friendship and interest, and does it utmost to +support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to +freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than +in any other way. + +There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held +Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless they +lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, +dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as +the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did +not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many +cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain +them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a +city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be +destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of +liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither +time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may +do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges +unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they +immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had +been held in bondage by the Florentines. + +But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, +and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed +to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree +in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to +govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, +and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more +easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and +more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the +memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to +destroy them or to reside there. + + + +CHAPTER VI + +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED +BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY + +Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities +as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of +state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, +and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep +entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they +imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great +men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his +ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him +act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet +appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength +of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach +by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with +the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach. + +I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is +a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, +accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired +the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private +station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or +other of these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. +Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the +strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no +other state, is compelled to reside there in person. + +But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through +fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, +Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although +one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will +of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made +him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who +have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if +their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not +be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a +preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see +that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought +them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them. +Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been +extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come +in vain. + +It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people +of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order +that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out +of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, +and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should +become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary +that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government +of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long +peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the +Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men +fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the +opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made famous. + +Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a +principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The +difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules +and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their +government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there +is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, +or more uncertain in its success, then to take the lead in the +introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for +enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and +lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This +coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws +on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not +readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of +them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the +opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others +defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along +with them. + +It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter +thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves +or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate +their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In +the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass +anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then +they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have +conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the +reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it +is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that +persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when +they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by +force. + +If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not +have enforced their constitutions for long--as happened in our time to +Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things +immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no +means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the +unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great +difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers +are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when +these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are +exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will continue +afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy. + +To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears +some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a +like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[*] This man rose from a private +station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to +fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose +him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their +prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that +one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a +king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up +old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and +allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, +whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in +keeping. + +[*] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C. + + + +CHAPTER VII + +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER +BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE + +Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private +citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they +have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they +have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some +state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows +it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the +Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they +might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also +were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being +citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill +and the fortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant and +unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the +position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it +is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, +having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold +it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and +faithful. + +States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature +which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and +correspondencies[*] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not +overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become +princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be +prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their +laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they +became princes, they must lay AFTERWARDS. + +[*] "Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e. foundations) and + correspondencies or relations with other states--a common meaning + of "correspondence" and "correspondency" in the sixteenth and + seventeenth centuries. + +Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or +fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, +and these are Francesco Sforza[*] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by +proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose +to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand +anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare +Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during +the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, +notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that +ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the +states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him. + +[*] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria + Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of + Milan, on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. + Machiavelli was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to + Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to + the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and + along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an + account, written ten years before "The Prince," of the proceedings + of the duke in his "Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino + nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli," etc., a translation of which + is appended to the present work. + +Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations +may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will +be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, +therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be +seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not +consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what +better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions; +and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but +the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune. + +Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had +many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see +his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the +Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke +of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and +Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides +this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might +have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the +Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It +behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the +powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. +This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by +other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would +not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by +dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came +into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of +Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from +him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the +reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the +Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to +advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did +not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to +say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, +would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from +winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the +king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, +after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very +unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind +when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, +and the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke +decided to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others. + +For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in +Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, +making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to +their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that +in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and +turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to +crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. +This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving +at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin +to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung +the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless +dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the +French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by +trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse +to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the +mediation of Signor Pagolo--whom the duke did not fail to secure with +all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses--the +Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his +power at Sinigalia.[*] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned +their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good +foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of +Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, +he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of +notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it +out. + +[*] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502. + +When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak +masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave +them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was +full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing +to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it +necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer +Ramiro d'Orco,[*] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest +power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the +greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not +advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but +that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the +country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had +their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused +some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the +people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if +any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in +the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took +Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the +piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The +barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied +and dismayed. + +[*] Ramiro d'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua. + +But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding +himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate +dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great +measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if +he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, +for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, +would not support him. And from this time he began to seek new +alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she was +making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were +besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against them, +and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived. + +Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the +future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the +Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him +that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. +Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had +despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by +winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb +the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting +the college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power +before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist +the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he +had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed +lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over +the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the +college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master +of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa +was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for +the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the +Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), +he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at +once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of the +Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he +continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander +died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would +have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the +forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability. + +But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He +left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the +rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick +unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and +he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the +foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not +had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he +would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his +foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a +month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and +whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, +they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made +Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would +not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death +of Alexander,[*] everything would have been different to him. On the +day that Julius the Second[+] was elected, he told me that he had +thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and +had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated +that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to +die. + +[*] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503. + +[+] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad + Vincula, born 1443, died 1513. + +When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to +blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought +to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the +arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty +spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct +otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own +sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it +necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, +to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and +feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to +exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the +old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous +and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to +maintain friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they +must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more +lively example than the actions of this man. + +Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom +he made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a +Pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being +elected Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of +any cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they +became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom +he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, +San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[*] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear +him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their +relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the +kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above +everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, +failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad +Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages +to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his +choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin. + +[*] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza. + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS + +Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither +of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is +manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could +be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are +when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the +principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private +person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first +method, it will be illustrated by two examples--one ancient, the other +modern--and without entering further into the subject, I consider +these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow +them. + +Agathocles, the Sicilian,[*] became King of Syracuse not only from a +private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a +potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous +life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability +of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military +profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being +established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make +himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, +that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an +understanding for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, +with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the +people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them +things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers +killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he +seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil +commotion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and +ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but +leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked +Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of Syracuse. The +Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled to come to +terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be content +with the possession of Africa. + +[*] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C. + +Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man +will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, +inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the +favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession, which +steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were +afterwards boldly held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it +cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, +to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may +gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in +entering into and extricating himself from dangers be considered, +together with his greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming +hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the +most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and +inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated +among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed +either to fortune or genius. + +In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da +Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by +his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his +youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under +his discipline, he might attain some high position in the military +profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, +and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body +and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing +a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of +some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was +dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to +seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away +from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in +some measure to look upon his patrimony; and although he had not +laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the +citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to +come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his +friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he +should be received honourably by the Fermians, all of which would be +not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had +brought him up. + +Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, +and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he +lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and +having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto +gave a solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the +chiefs of Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that +are usual in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began +certain grave discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander +and his son Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse +Giovanni and others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such +matters ought to be discussed in a more private place, and he betook +himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens +went in after him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued +from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these +murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town +and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the +people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of which he +made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able +to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military +ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the +principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had +become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would +have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed +himself to be overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the +Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year +after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together with +Vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness. + +Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after +infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his +country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be +conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by +means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold +the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that +this follows from severities[*] being badly or properly used. Those +may be called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, +that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and +that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the +advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, +notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with +time rather than decrease. Those who practise the first system are +able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as +Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who follow the other to +maintain themselves. + +[*] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern + equivalent of Machiavelli's thought when he speaks of "crudelta" + than the more obvious "cruelties." + +Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought +to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for +him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to +repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to +reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does +otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to +keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor +can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and +repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so +that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given +little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer. + +And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in +such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, +shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in +troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones +will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and +no one will be under any obligation to you for them. + + + +CHAPTER IX + +CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY + +But coming to the other point--where a leading citizen becomes the +prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, +but by the favour of his fellow citizens--this may be called a civil +principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain +to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a +principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the +favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties +are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be +ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and +oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises +in cities one of three results, either a principality, self- +government, or anarchy. + +A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, +accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the +nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the +reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that +under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, +finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of +one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his +authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles +maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the +aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around +him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can +neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches +sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around +him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. + +Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to +others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their +object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing +to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to +be added also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile +people, because of their being too many, whilst from the nobles he can +secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may +expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from +hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they +will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far- +seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and +to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the +prince is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do +well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them +daily, and to give or wake away authority when it pleases him. + +Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to +be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape +their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or +they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, +ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may +be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through +pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought +to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and +thus, whilst in prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not +have to fear them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun +binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to +themselves than to you, and a prince out to guard against such, and to +fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they +always help to ruin him. + +Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people +ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they +only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the +people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above +everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may +easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when +they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound +more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more +devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their +favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as +these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, +so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have +the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity. + +Nabis,[*] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, +and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his +country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it +was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but +this would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And +do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that +"He who builds on the people, builds on the mud," for this is true +when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself +that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or +by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, +as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[+] in +Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, +who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who +does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and +energy, keeps the whole people encouraged--such a one will never find +himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his +foundations well. + +[*] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus + in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C. + +[+] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli's + "Florentine History," Book III. + +These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from +the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either +rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their +government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on +the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and +who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with +great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has +not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because +the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from +magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and +there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can +trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet +times, when citizens have need of the state, because then every one +agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they +all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has +need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is +this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. +Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens +will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the +state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful. + + + +CHAPTER X + +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES +OUGHT TO BE MEASURED + +It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character +of these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power +that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, +or whether he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make +this quite clear I say that I consider those who are able to support +themselves by their own resources who can, either by abundance of men +or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle against any one who +comes to attack them; and I consider those always to have need of +others who cannot show themselves against the enemy in the field, but +are forced to defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first +case has been discussed, but we will speak of it again should it +recur. In the second case one can say nothing except to encourage such +princes to provision and fortify their towns, and not on any account +to defend the country. And whoever shall fortify his town well, and +shall have managed the other concerns of his subjects in the way +stated above, and to be often repeated, will never be attacked without +great caution, for men are always adverse to enterprises where +difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing +to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not hated by his +people. + +The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country +around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits +them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near +them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks +the taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing +they have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, +and they always keep in public depots enough for one year's eating, +drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and +without loss to the state, they always have the means of giving work +to the community in those labours that are the life and strength of +the city, and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they +also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover have many +ordinances to uphold them. + +Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself +odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only +be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this +world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a +whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever +should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it +burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and self- +interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that a +powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by +giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for +long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then +preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be +too bold. + +Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and +ruin the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still +hot and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought +the prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have +cooled, the damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there +is no longer any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready +to unite with their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to +them now that their houses have been burnt and their possessions +ruined in his defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the +benefits they confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if +everything is well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise +prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, +when he does not fail to support and defend them. + + + +CHAPTER XI + +CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES + +It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, +touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, +because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they +can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ancient +ordinances of religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a +character that the principalities may be held no matter how their +princes behave and live. These princes alone have states and do not +defend them; and they have subjects and do not rule them; and the +states, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, +although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor +the ability to alienate themselves. Such principalities only are +secure and happy. But being upheld by powers, to which the human mind +cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted +and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash +man to discuss them. + +Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church +has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from +Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have +been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) +have valued the temporal power very slightly--yet now a king of France +trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and +to ruin the Venetians--although this may be very manifest, it does not +appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. + +Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[*] this country was +under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the +Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal +anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; +the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those +about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. +To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, +as it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they +made use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, +Orsini and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing +with arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the +pontificate weak and powerless. And although there might arise +sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor +wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope +is also a cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the +average life of a pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the +factions; and if, so to speak, one people should almost destroy the +Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the Orsini, who would +support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin the +Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were +little esteemed in Italy. + +[*] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494. + +Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that +have ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to +prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by +reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things +which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although +his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, +nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church, +which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to +all his labours. + +Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing +all the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through +the chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found +the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been +practised before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not only +followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin +the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these +enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, +inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any +private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within +the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them +some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: +the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; +and the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who +caused the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have +their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals +foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are +compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates +arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his +Holiness Pope Leo[*] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to +be hoped that, if others made it great in arms, he will make it still +greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues. + +[*] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de' Medici. + + + +CHAPTER XII + +HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES + +Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such +principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having +considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and +having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and +to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of +offence and defence which belong to each of them. + +We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his +foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to +ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or +composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good +laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are +well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the +discussion and shall speak of the arms. + +I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state +are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. +Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one +holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor +safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, +unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have +neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is +deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by +them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other +attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, +which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are +ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if +war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which I should +have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by +nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on +mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared +valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed +what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed +to seize Italy with chalk in hand;[*] and he who told us that our sins +were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the sins he +imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the sins of +princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty. + +[*] "With chalk in hand," "col gesso." This is one of the bons mots of + Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII + seized Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send + his quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to + conquer the country. Cf. "The History of Henry VII," by Lord + Bacon: "King Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost + it again, in a kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole + length of Italy without resistance: so that it was true what Pope + Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with + chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather than with + swords to fight." + +I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The +mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they +are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own +greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others +contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you +are ruined in the usual way. + +And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, +whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted +to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in +person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its +citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, +it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the +laws so that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown +princes and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, +and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult +to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of +its citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and +Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely +armed and quite free. + +Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who +were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with +the Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for +captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made +captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took +away their liberty. + +Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza +against the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at +Caravaggio,[*] allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his +masters. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[+] +of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw +herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her +kingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their +dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make +themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the +Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able +captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not +conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their +ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,[%] +and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every +one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would +have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against +him, so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to +Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But +let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines +appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who +from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man +had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the +Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their +enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they +must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered, +will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent +to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen and plebians they did +valiantly. This was before they turned to enterprises on land, but +when they began to fight on land they forsook this virtue and followed +the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their expansion on land, +through not having much territory, and because of their great +reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when +they expanded, as under Carmignuola,[#] they had a taste of this +mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the Duke +of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how +lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer conquer +under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they +able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had +acquired, they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to +murder him. They had afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da +Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano,[&] and the +like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened +afterwards at Vaila,[$] where in one battle they lost that which in +eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. Because +from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and +inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. + +[*] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448. + +[+] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples. + +[%] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John + Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was + knighted by Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops + and went into Italy. These became the famous "White Company." He + took part in many wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born + about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married + Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti. + +[#] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, + executed at Venice, 5th May 1432. + +[&] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San + Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of + Austria, in 1487. "Primo capitano in Italia."--Machiavelli. Count + of Pitigliano; Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510. + +[$] Battle of Vaila in 1509. + +And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled +for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, +in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better +prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has +recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired +more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more +states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms +against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were +oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain +authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became +princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the +hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of +priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both +commenced to enlist foreigners. + +The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[*] +the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, +Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. +After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the +arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has +been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and +insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, +first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase +their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without +territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few +infantry did not give them any authority; so they were led to employ +cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and +honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of +twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot +soldiers. They had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and +danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but +taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack +towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments +at night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or +ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these things were +permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I +have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to +slavery and contempt. + +[*] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in + Romagna. He was the leader of the famous "Company of St George," + composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409. + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN + +Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a +prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by +Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the +enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned +to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[*] for +his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in +themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always +disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their +captive. + +[*] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), + surnamed "The Catholic," born 1542, died 1516. + +And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish +to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which +cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw +himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune +brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his +rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and +the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all +expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not +become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his +auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs. + +The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand +Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other +time of their troubles. + +The Emperor of Constantinople,[*] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten +thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not +willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to +the infidels. + +[*] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383. + +Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these +arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with +them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience +to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time +and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of +one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, +which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume +enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy +is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, +has always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been +willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not +deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others. + +I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This +duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French +soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, +such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, +discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; +whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and +dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference +between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one +considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when +he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he +relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count +and found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than +when every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces. + +I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am +unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I +have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by +the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted +like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him +that he could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut +to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with +aliens. + +I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament +applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight +with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul +armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had +them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he +wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, +the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, +or they bind you fast. + +Charles the Seventh,[*] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[+] +having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, +recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he +established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and +infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and +began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, +as is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having +raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the +value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; +and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they +are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear +that they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the +French cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers +they do not come off well against others. The armies of the French +have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of +which arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or +auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one's own forces. And this +example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if +the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained. + +[*] Charles VII of France, surnamed "The Victorious," born 1403, died + 1461. + +[+] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483. + +But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks +well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I +have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a +principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not +truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first +disaster to the Roman Empire[*] should be examined, it will be found +to have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from +that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all +that valour which had raised it passed away to others. + +[*] "Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the + reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance + of the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its + existence. When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the + Roman Empire sank under the weight of its military obligations, he + said that this was 'wholly unhistorical.' He might well have added + that the Roman power was at its zenith when every citizen + acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, but that it + began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer + recognized."--Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906. + +I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having +its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good +fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And +it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing +can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its +own strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed either +of subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or +auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one's own forces will be easily +found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one +will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many +republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which +rules I entirely commit myself. + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR + +A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything +else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is +the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force +that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often +enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the +contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than +of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your +losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a +state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being +martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, +through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became +private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, +it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies +against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. +Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the +unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield +obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man +should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one +disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to +work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the +art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, +cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought +never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and +in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; +this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study. + +As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well +organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he +accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of +localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the +valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of +rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which +knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his +country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by +means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he +understands with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to +study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers +and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain +resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of +the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of +others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which +it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to +surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the +battle, to besiege towns to advantage. + +Philopoemen,[*] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which +writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he +never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was +in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: +"If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves +here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one +best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to +retreat, how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as +he went, all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to +their opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by +these continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, +any unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with. + +[*] Philopoemen, "the last of the Greeks," born 252 B.C., died 183 + B.C. + +But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and +study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne +themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and +defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above +all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had +been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds +he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated +Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life +of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life +of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, +affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things +which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to +observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but +increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be +available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find +him prepared to resist her blows. + + + +CHAPTER XV + +CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, +ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED + +It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a +prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have +written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in +mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart +from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write +a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to +me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the +imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities +which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is +so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what +is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his +preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his +professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much +that is evil. + +Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how +to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. +Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, +and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are +spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are +remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame +or praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another +miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our +language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call +one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one +is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one +faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold +and brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another +chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one +grave, another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the +like. And I know that every one will confess that it would be most +praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are +considered good; but because they can neither be entirely possessed +nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary +for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the +reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also to +keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him +it; but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon +himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at +incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can only +be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, +it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, +would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet +followed brings him security and prosperity. + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS + +Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I +say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, +liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation +for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should +be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the +reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among +men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of +magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts +all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to +maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax +them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him +odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by +any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded +few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by +whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and +wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of +being miserly. + +Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of +liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if +he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in +time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that +with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself +against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without +burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises +liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, +and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few. + +We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who +have been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the +Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for +liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he +made war on the King of France; and he made many wars without imposing +any extraordinary tax on his subjects, for he supplied his additional +expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would +not have undertaken or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been +reputed liberal. A prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob +his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does not become poor +and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold +of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those +vices which will enable him to govern. + +And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and +many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, +and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, +or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is +dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered +liberal; and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent +in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not +moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if +any one should reply: Many have been princes, and have done great +things with armies, who have been considered very liberal, I reply: +Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects' or else +that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in the +second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to +the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, +sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, this +liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by +soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' you +can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it +does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but +adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you. + +And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst +you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor +or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a +prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised +and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to +have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, +than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to +incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER +TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED + +Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every +prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. +Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare +Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled +the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if +this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more +merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for +cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[*] Therefore a prince, so +long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the +reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more +merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to +arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to +injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with +a prince offend the individual only. + +[*] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi + factions in 1502 and 1503. + +And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the +imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. +Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her +reign owing to its being new, saying: + + "Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt + Moliri, et late fines custode tueri."[*] + +Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he +himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and +humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and +too much distrust render him intolerable. + +[*] . . . against my will, my fate +A throne unsettled, and an infant state, +Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs, +And guard with these severities my shores. + +Christopher Pitt. + + +Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than +feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish +to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, +it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either +must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of +men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and +as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you +their blood, property, life, and children, as is said above, when the +need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And +that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected +other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by +payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be +earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied +upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than +one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation +which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity +for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment +which never fails. + +Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he +does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well +being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as +he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from +their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the +life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for +manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the +property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their +father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking +away the property are never wanting; for he who has once begun to live +by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what belongs to +others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more +difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his +army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite +necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without +it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties. + +Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that +having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to +fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or +against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This +arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his +boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his +soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not +sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire +his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the +principal cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not +have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that +most excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of +man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this +arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his +soldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. For +this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the +corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a +legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the +insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. +Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there +were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct the +errors of others. This disposition, if he had been continued in the +command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; +but, he being under the control of the Senate, this injurious +characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his +glory. + +Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the +conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing +according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish +himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; +he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. + + + +CHAPTER XVIII[*] + +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH + +[*] "The present chapter has given greater offence than any other + portion of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, "Il Principe," p. 297. + +Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and +to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience +has been that those princes who have done great things have held good +faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the +intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have +relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of +contesting,[*] the one by the law, the other by force; the first +method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first +is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the +second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to +avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively +taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and +many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, +who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as +they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is +necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and +that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being +compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and +the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and +the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is +necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the +wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they +are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith +when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons +that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely +good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will +not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with +them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to +excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern examples could be +given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void +and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has +known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best. + +[*] "Contesting," i.e. "striving for mastery." Mr Burd points out that + this passage is imitated directly from Cicero's "De Officiis": + "Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, + alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; + confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore." + +But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, +and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and +so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will +always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent +example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing +else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he +always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power +in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet +would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded +according to his wishes,[*] because he well understood this side of +mankind. + +[*] "Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum)." The + words "ad votum" are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550. + +Alexander never did what he said, +Cesare never said what he did. + +Italian Proverb. + + +Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good +qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to +have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and +always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them +is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, +and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to +be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite. + +And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, +cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being +often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to +fidelity,[*] friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is +necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as +the winds and variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said +above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if +compelled, then to know how to set about it. + +[*] "Contrary to fidelity" or "faith," "contro alla fede," and "tutto + fede," "altogether faithful," in the next paragraph. It is + noteworthy that these two phrases, "contro alla fede" and "tutto + fede," were omitted in the Testina edition, which was published + with the sanction of the papal authorities. It may be that the + meaning attached to the word "fede" was "the faith," i.e. the + Catholic creed, and not as rendered here "fidelity" and + "faithful." Observe that the word "religione" was suffered to + stand in the text of the Testina, being used to signify + indifferently every shade of belief, as witness "the religion," a + phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot heresy. South + in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as + follows: "That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, Nicolo + Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political + scheme: 'That the show of religion was helpful to the politician, + but the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.'" + +For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets +anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named +five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him +altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There +is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, +inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, +because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch +with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what +you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of +the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the +actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent +to challenge, one judges by the result. + +For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and +holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he +will be praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by +what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world +there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when +the many have no ground to rest on. + +One prince[*] of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never +preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is +most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him +of reputation and kingdom many a time. + +[*] Ferdinand of Aragon. "When Machiavelli was writing 'The Prince' it + would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand's name + here without giving offence." Burd's "Il Principe," p. 308. + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED + +Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I +have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss +briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has +been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make +him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he +will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other +reproaches. + +It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, +and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from +both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor +their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has +only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease +in many ways. + +It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, +effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince +should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show +in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his +private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are +irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can +hope either to deceive him or to get round him. + +That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, +and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, +provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by +his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a +prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his +subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From +the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, +and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will +always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they +should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should +affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations +and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will +resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did. + +But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has +only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can +easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by +keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for +him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most +efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is +not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires +against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but +when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will +not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that +confront a conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many +have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he +who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except +from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have +opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with +which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every +advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, +and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a +very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to +keep faith with you. + +And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the +side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect +of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is +the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends +and the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the +popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as +to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before +the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel +to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, +and thus cannot hope for any escape. + +Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content +with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer +Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the +present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had +conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer +Giovanni,[*] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination +the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the +popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days +in Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there +after the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the +Bolognese, having information that there was one of the Bentivogli +family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of +a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of +their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due +course to the government. + +[*] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He + ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli's strong condemnation + of conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent + experience (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured + for his alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy. + +For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies +of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is +hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear +everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes +have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to +keep the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most +important objects a prince can have. + +Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, +and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty +and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its +authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of +the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths +would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing +the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he +wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the +particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach +which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, +and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, +who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser +without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a better or a +more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king +and kingdom. From this one can draw another important conclusion, that +princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of +others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. And further, I +consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as to +make himself hated by the people. + +It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths +of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary +to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great +qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have +been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, +therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of +some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were +not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only +submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who +studies the affairs of those times. + +It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to +the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were +Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son +Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. + +There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the +ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be +contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to +put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so +beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a +hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because +the people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring +prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, +cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he +should exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and +give vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those +emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had +no great authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to +the principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing +humours, were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring +little about injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, +as princes cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the +first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot +compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to +avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who +through inexperience had need of special favour adhered more readily +to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out +advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to +maintain authority over them. + +From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being +all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, +and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and +died honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary +title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and +afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, +he always kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was +neither hated nor despised. + +But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, +who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not +endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, +having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added +contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of +his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is +acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said +before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do +evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to +maintain yourself--it may be either the people or the soldiers or the +nobles--you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and +then good works will do you harm. + +But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, +that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in +the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by +him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who +allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the +army conspired against him, and murdered him. + +Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus +Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-- +men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every +kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to +a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the +soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he +reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the +sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way +astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And +because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish +to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the +lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a prince to +imitate. + +Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in +Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to +Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the +praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to +aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy +before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the +Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After +this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of +the whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of +the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the +other in the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. +And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, +he decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he +wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to +share that dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, +moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things +were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and +killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and +complained to the Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits +that he had received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, +and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he +sought him out in France, and took from him his government and life. +He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will +find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him +feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it +need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the +empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from +that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his +violence. + +But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent +qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and +acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of +fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which +caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and +cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single +murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those +of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by +those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the +midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such- +like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and +desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who +does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the +less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do +any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the +service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had +contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily +threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, +was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor's ruin. + +But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to +hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, +and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his +people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave +himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he +might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not +maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete +with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the +imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being +hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against +and was killed. + +It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very +warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of +Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected +Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two +things made him hated and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in +Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to all, +and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other, his +having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome and +taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a +reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects in +Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that +the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to +fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all +the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which may +be added his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting +with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and +fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him. + +I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being +thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this +discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have +this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in +a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some +indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that +are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as +were the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more +necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it +is now more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, +to satisfy the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the +more powerful. + +From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him +twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend +the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, +putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them +his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in +the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the +people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the +state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason +that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called +either an hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons +of the old prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that +position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only +noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new +principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it that +are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the +constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive +him as if he were its hereditary lord. + +But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will +consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been +fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how +it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in +another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to +unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for +Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was +heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly +destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated +Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in +his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot +imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow +those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which +are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are +proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and +firm. + + + +CHAPTER XX + +ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES +OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? + +1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed +their subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by +factions; others have fostered enmities against themselves; others +have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in +the beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some +have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a +final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the +particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made, +nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself +will admit. + +2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather +when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by +arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted +become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your +subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be +armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be +handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which +they quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the +latter, considering it to be necessary that those who have the most +danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when +you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust +them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these +opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain +unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the +character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be +sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted +subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new +principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of +examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a +province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of +that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; +and these again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft +and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such a way that all +the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old +state were living near you. + +3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed +to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by +fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their +tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This +may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way +balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept +for to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; +rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided +cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always +assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. +The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the +Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although +they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these +disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their +differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not +afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one +party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, +therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never +be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one +the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, +but if war comes this policy proves fallacious. + +4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the +difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore +fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who +has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes +enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may +have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, +as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many +consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with +craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having +crushed it, his renown may rise higher. + +5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and +assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were +distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who +had been distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot +speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will +only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom +have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to +support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, +and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, +inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by +deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; and thus the +prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who, +serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since +the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means +of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider +the reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be +not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their +government, then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble +and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And +weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can be +taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier +for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under +the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those +who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged +him to seize it. + +6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states +more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit +to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of +refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been +made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in +our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di +Castello so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of +Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by +Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that +province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult +to lose it; the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar +decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to +circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in +another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has +more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build +fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the +people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by +Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the house +of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason the +best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because, +although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if +the people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to +assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen +in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, +unless to the Countess of Forli,[*] when the Count Girolamo, her +consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to withstand the +popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus recover +her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that the +foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little +value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the +people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would +have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated +by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these things +considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as +him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares +little about being hated by the people. + +[*] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia + Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli + that Machiavelli was sent as envy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati + to the countess announces the appointment: "I have been with the + signori," wrote Fortunati, "to learn whom they would send and + when. They tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young + Florentine noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave + with me at once." Cf. "Catherine Sforza," by Count Pasolini, + translated by P. Sylvester, 1898. + + + +CHAPTER XXI + +HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN + +Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and +setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the +present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because +he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to +be the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his +deeds you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In +the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise +was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and +without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of +Castile occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any +innovations; thus they did not perceive that by these means he was +acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money of +the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long +war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since +distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to +undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to +driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be +a more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he +assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked +France; and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, +and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and +occupied with the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a +way, one out of the other, that men have never been given time to work +steadily against him. + +Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal +affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da +Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life +doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some +method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken +about. And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every +action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and +remarkable man. + +A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a +downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he +declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which +course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because +if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a +character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him +or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to +declare yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first +case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey +to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been +conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to +protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want +doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who +loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in +hand, court his fate. + +Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive +out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of +the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand +the Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be +discussed in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of +Antiochus urged them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate +answered: "As for that which has been said, that it is better and more +advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war, nothing can +be more erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left, +without favour or consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror." Thus +it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your +neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare +yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, +generally follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when +a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the +party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be +powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and +there is established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless +as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories +after all are never so complete that the victor must not show some +regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself +loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid +you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again. + +In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that +you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it +greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction +of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have +saved him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do +with your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to +be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance +with one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking +others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he +conquers you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much +as possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined +with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused +their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as +happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to +attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the +prince ought to favour one of the parties. + +Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe +courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, +because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid +one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in +knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice +to take the lesser evil. + +A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour +the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his +citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and +agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not +be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken +away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but +the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things +and designs in any way to honour his city or state. + +Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and +spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is +divided into guilds or into societies,[*] he ought to hold such bodies +in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an +example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining +the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in +anything. + +[*] "Guilds or societies," "in arti o in tribu." "Arti" were craft or + trade guilds, cf. Florio: "Arte . . . a whole company of any trade + in any city or corporation town." The guilds of Florence are most + admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the + subject (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar + character, called "artel," exist in Russia to-day, cf. Sir + Mackenzie Wallace's "Russia," ed. 1905: "The sons . . . were + always during the working season members of an artel. In some of + the larger towns there are artels of a much more complex kind-- + permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarily + responsible for the acts of the individual members." The word + "artel," despite its apparent similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude + assures me, no connection with "ars" or "arte." Its root is that + of the verb "rotisya," to bind oneself by an oath; and it is + generally admitted to be only another form of "rota," which now + signifies a "regimental company." In both words the underlying + idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. "Tribu" were + possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included + individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words "septs" or + "clans" would be most appropriate. + + + +CHAPTER XXII + +CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES + +The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and +they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. +And the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his +understanding, is by observing the men he has around him; and when +they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise, +because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them +faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion +of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them. + +There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to +be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there +are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; +another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which +neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first +is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. +Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the +first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to +know good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may +not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in +his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the +servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest. + +But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one +test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his +own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in +everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you +ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in +his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, +and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not +concerned. + +On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to +study him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing +with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that +he cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire +more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make +him dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards +servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is +otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the +other. + + + +CHAPTER XXIII + +HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED + +I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it +is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless +they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of +whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own +affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved +with difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves +they run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no +other way of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men +understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when +every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates. + +Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the +wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking +the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, +and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and +listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. +With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry +himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more +freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of +these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and +be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either +overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions +that he falls into contempt. + +I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man +of affairs to Maximilian,[*] the present emperor, speaking of his +majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in +anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite +to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man--he does not +communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on +them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and +known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around +him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows +that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever +understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on +his resolutions. + +[*] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman + Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; + after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in + Italian politics. + +A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he +wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every +one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to +be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning +the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that nay one, on +any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger +be felt. + +And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an +impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but +through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they +are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a +prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by +chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens +to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, +but it would not be for long, because such a governor would in a short +time take away his state from him. + +But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more +than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to +unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, +and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through +them. And they are not to found otherwise, because men will always +prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. +Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they +come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the +prince from good counsels. + + + +CHAPTER XXIV + +WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES + +The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince +to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and +fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the +actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an +hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men +and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted +more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present +good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost +defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will +be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and +adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, +and with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, +born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom. + +And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in +Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and +others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in +regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in +the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the +people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known +how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that +have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost. + +Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who +was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to +the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being +a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the +nobles, he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and +if in the end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he +retained the kingdom. + +Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their +principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own +sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a +change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the +calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they +thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that +the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would +recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is +very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you +would never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find +someone later on to restore you. This again either does not happen, +or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that +deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those +only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and +your valour. + + + +CHAPTER XXV + +WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER + +It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the +opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by +fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and +that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us +believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let +chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times +because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may +still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes +pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. +Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true +that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[*] but that +she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little +less. + +[*] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: "The older one gets the + more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does + three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe." + Sorel's "Eastern Question." + +I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood +overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away +the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to +its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, +though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when +the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences +and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass +away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so +dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where +valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her +forces where she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised +to constrain her. + +And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, +and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an +open country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had +been defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, +either this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made +or it would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say +concerning resistance to fortune in general. + +But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may +be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any +change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly +from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that +the prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I +believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions +according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not +accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in +affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, +glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, +another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, +another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by +a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one +attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different +observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other +impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they +conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from +what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the +same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and +the other does not. + +Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs +himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such +a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but +if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his +course of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently +circumspect to know how to accommodate himself to the change, both +because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and +also because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot +be persuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious +man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, +hence he is ruined; but had he changed his conduct with the times +fortune would not have changed. + +Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, +and found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of +action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise +against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The +Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he +had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France; +nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his +accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the +Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the +former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other +hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having +observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as +to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore +Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff +with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome +until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, +as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. +Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the +others would have raised a thousand fears. + +I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they +all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him +experience the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which +required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because +he would never have deviated from those ways to which nature inclined +him. + +I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind +steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are +successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I +consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because +fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary +to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be +mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more +coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, +because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity +command her. + + + +CHAPTER XXVI + +AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS + +Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and +wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a +new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an +opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of +things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this +country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new +prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present. + +And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should +be captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the +Persians should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the +greatness of the soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be +dispersed to illustrate the capabilities of Theseus: then at the +present time, in order to discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it +was necessary that Italy should be reduced to the extremity that she +is now in, that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more +oppressed than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians; +without head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn, overrun; and to +have endured every kind of desolation. + +Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us +think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was +afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected +him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet +heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of +Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, +and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how +she entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these +wrongs and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready +and willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it. + +Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope +than in your illustrious house,[*] with its valour and fortune, +favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and +which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be +difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the +men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet +they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the +present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor +easier than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours. + +[*] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. + In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement + VII. + +With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is +necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in +them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the +willingness is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only +follow those men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than +this, how extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond +example: the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has +poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to +your greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do +everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory +which belongs to us. + +And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians +have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your +illustrious house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so +many campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were +exhausted, this has happened because the old order of things was not +good, and none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing +honours a man more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when +he himself was newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and +dignified will make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are +not wanting opportunities to bring such into use in every form. + +Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. +Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how +superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But +when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs +entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are +capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there +having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by +valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that +for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty +years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always +given a poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, +afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.[*] + +[*] The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; + Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513. + +If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these +remarkable men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before +all things, as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided +with your own forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or +better soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they +will be much better when they find themselves commanded by their +prince, honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it +is necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be +defended against foreigners by Italian valour. + +And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very +formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which +a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be +relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist +cavalry, and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they +encounter them in close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may +again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and +the Switzers are overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a +complete proof of this latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was +some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish +infantry were confronted by German battalions, who follow the same +tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with +the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and +stood out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless, +and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with +them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these +infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be +afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but a +variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which +confer reputation and power upon a new prince. + +This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for +letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express +the love with which he would be received in all those provinces which +have suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst +for revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what +tears. What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to +him? What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? +To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your +illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with +which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard +our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be +verified that saying of Petrarch: + + Virtu contro al Furore + Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto: + Che l'antico valore + Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto. + + Virtue against fury shall advance the fight, + And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight: + For the old Roman valour is not dead, + Nor in th' Italians' brests extinguished. + +Edward Dacre, 1640. + + + + + +DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY +THE DUKE VALENTINO +WHEN MURDERING +VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR +PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI + +BY + +NICOL MACHIAVELLI + + + +The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to +clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had +been raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of +Arezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, +whence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against +Giovanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring +that city under his domination, and to make it the head of his +Romagnian duchy. + +These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and +their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too +powerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek +to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon +this a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to +which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, +Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the +tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo +Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and +courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which +might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they +decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the +Florentines; and they send their men to one place and another, +promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to +unite with them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once +reported throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under +the duke, among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting +a revolution. + +Thus it arose that, men's minds being thus unsettled, it was decided +by certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was +held for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The +castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken +there; so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were +being carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was +prevented from being drawn up by those inside, they took the +opportunity of leaping upon the bridge and thence into the fortress. +Upon this capture being effected, the whole state rebelled and +recalled the old duke, being encouraged in this, not so much by the +capture of the fort, as by the Diet at Magione, from whom they +expected to get assistance. + +Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose +the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any +town, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and +they sent again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in +destroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened +and that they ought not to wait for another opportunity. + +But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli +and Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo +Machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the +duke against his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, +because, against everybody's expectation, his soldiers had at once +gone over to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his +door. But recovering courage from the offers of the Florentines, he +decided to temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that +remained to him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to +get assistance. This latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the +King of France for men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he +turned into cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money. + +Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached +Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the +aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the +duke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with +offers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did +not fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he +wished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was +enough for him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have +the principality. + +And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to +him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to +a standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took +every care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such +preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops +in separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile +there came also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he +found himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in +open war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous +to outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of +reconciliation. + +And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them +in which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four +thousand ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and +he formed an alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force +them to come personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do +so. On the other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of +Urbino and other places seized by them, to serve him in all his +expeditions, and not to make war against or ally themselves with any +one without his permission. + +This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, +again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his +state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the +fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by +the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his +friends. But the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and +dispersed his men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end +of November together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to +Cesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the +Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of +Urbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but +nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that +if the duke wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they +were ready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. +To this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with +Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was +very willing to proceed against Sinigalia. + +It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the +fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give +it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him +to come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being +invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no +suspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French +men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the +hundred lancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left +Cesena about the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the +utmost cunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to +wait for him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of +compliance would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the +reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the +arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very +stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not +offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by +Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he +agreed to wait. + +Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on +30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most +trusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor +d'Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as +Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should +arrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting +certain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they +reached Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they +came to the duke's quarters, where they should be seized. + +The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which +there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to +assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from +Fano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last +day of December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a +cavalcade of about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved +forward the infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at- +arms. + +Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situate on the shore of +the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he +who goes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the +bases of which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of +Sinigalia is distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than +a bow-shot and from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to +the city runs a little river which bathes that part of the walls +looking towards Fano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to +Sinigalia comes for a good space by road along the mountains, and +reaches the river which passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left +hand along the bank of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he +arrives at a bridge which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast +of the gate that leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but +transversely. Before this gate there stands a collection of houses +with a square to which the bank of the river forms one side. + +The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, +and to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles +distant from Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for +the men of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and +his band, which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and +fifty horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. +Matters having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for +Sinigalia, and when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they +did not pass over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards +the river and the other towards the country, and a way was left in the +middle through which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the +town. + +Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a +few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a +cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his +approaching death--a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the +man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that +when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet +the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He +recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised +his nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the +virtues of their fathers that should be kept in mind. These three, +therefore, came before the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were +received by him with goodwill; they were at once placed between those +who were commissioned to look after them. + +But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band +in Sinigalia, was missing--for Oliverotto was waiting in the square +before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and +drilling them--signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the +care of Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures +that Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and +joined Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men +out of their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of +the duke; and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters +and to come himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken +this advice, came before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to +him; and Oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others. + +So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke's +quarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made +them prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that +the men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. +Those of Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of +the Orsini and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment +of the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, +and bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and +Vitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of +the country and saved themselves. + +But the duke's soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the +men of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not +repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have +completely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced, +the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into +a room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in +keeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of +the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the +blame for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the +Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome +that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of +Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th +January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the +same way. + + + + + +THE LIFE OF +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA + +WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI + +And sent to his friends +ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI +And +LUIGI ALAMANNI + + + +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI +1284-1328 + +It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who +have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of +them, who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all +others in their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness +and obscurity; or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous +way. They have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or +they have had so mean a parentage that in shame they have given +themselves out to be sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be +wearisome to relate who these persons may have been because they are +well known to everybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly +edifying to those who read them, they are omitted. I believe that +these lowly beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is desirous +of showing to the world that such men owe much to her and little to +wisdom, because she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really +take no part in their career: thus all success must be attributed to +her. Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great +deeds, if he is measured by the times in which he lived and the city +in which he was born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate +nor distinguished in his birth, as the course of this history will +show. It appeared to be desirable to recall his memory, because I have +discerned in him such indications of valour and fortune as should make +him a great exemplar to men. I think also that I ought to call your +attention to his actions, because you of all men I know delight most +in noble deeds. + +The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble +families of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat +fallen in estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family +was born a son Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San +Michele of Lucca, and for this reason was honoured with the title of +Messer Antonio. He had an only sister, who had been married to +Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not +wishing to marry again went to live with her brother. Messer Antonio +had a vineyard behind the house where he resided, and as it was +bounded on all sides by gardens, any person could have access to it +without difficulty. One morning, shortly after sunrise, Madonna +Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called, had occasion to +go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the +dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves of a vine she +turned her eyes in that direction, and heard something resembling the +cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards it, and saw the hands and +face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the leaves and who seemed to +be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and partly fearing, yet +full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it to the house, +where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is customary, +and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When he heard +what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised or +compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves what +should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no +children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for +it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They +baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As +the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of +wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those +lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended +to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his +canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with +this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio +was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached +the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of +Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left +off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, +delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in +running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he +far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at +any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of +wars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with +vexation and sorrow. + +There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, +named Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, +bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had +often fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a +Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This +gentleman resided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others +most mornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is +at the top of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, +and he had often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of +the street in those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that +Castruccio far excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to +exercise a royal authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed +him, Messer Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. +Being informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio +he felt a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called +him one day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the +house of a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use +arms, or in the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but +masses and the services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that +it pleased Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even +though he stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by +Messer Francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were +agreeable, nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly +studies and take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer +Francesco, and in a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer +Antonio, who was driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the +lad, and the fear that he would not be able to hold him much longer. + +Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to +the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was +astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that +virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true +gentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and +could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and +tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all +others, and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. +But what enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the +delightful modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or +word to others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with +his equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him +beloved, not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When +Castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were +driven from Pavia by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the +Visconti to assist the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in +charge of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and +courage in this expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any +other captain, and his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, +but throughout all Lombardy. + +Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation that he +left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as +many friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are +necessary for that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, +leaving a son thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed +Castruccio to be his son's tutor and administrator of his estate. +Before he died Francesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to +show Pagolo that goodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to +HIM, and to render to the son the gratitude which he had not been able +to repay to the father. Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became +the governor and tutor of Pagolo, which increased enormously his power +and position, and created a certain amount of envy against him in +Lucca in place of the former universal goodwill, for many men +suspected him of harbouring tyrannical intentions. Among these the +leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the head of the Guelph party. +This man hoped after the death of Messer Francesco to become the chief +man in Lucca, but it seemed to him that Castruccio, with the great +abilities which he already showed, and holding the position of +governor, deprived him of his opportunity; therefore he began to sow +those seeds which should rob Castruccio of his eminence. Castruccio at +first treated this with scorn, but afterwards he grew alarmed, +thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able to bring him into disgrace +with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples and have him driven out of +Lucca. + +The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of +Arezzo, who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards +became their lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from +Lucca, with whom Castruccio held communications with the object of +effecting their restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also +brought into his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the +authority of the Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, +Castruccio cautiously fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it +with supplies and munitions of war, in order that it might stand a +siege for a few days in case of need. When the night came which had +been agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between +the mountains and Pisa with many men, the signal was given, and +without being observed Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and +set fire to the portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within +the city, calling the people to arms and forcing open the gate from +his side. Uguccione entered with his men, poured through the town, and +killed Messer Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and +supporters. The governor was driven out, and the government reformed +according to the wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, +because it was found that more than one hundred families were exiled +at that time. Of those who fled, part went to Florence and part to +Pistoia, which city was the headquarters of the Guelph party, and for +this reason it became most hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese. + +As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party +that the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they +determined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a +large army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence +they marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into +Lucca. Upon this Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, +and with a number of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he +moved against the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance +of the enemy withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between +Montecatini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to +Montecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight +skirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence. +Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed +coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing +worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the +army in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought about the ruin of +the Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its +captain had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observed +this, and allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief; +he also showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions +of the camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more +insolent the more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they +drew out in the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. +Presently, deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and +having mastered their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. +First he spoke a few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and +pointed out to them the certainty of victory if they would but obey +his commands. Castruccio had noticed how the enemy had placed all his +best troops in the centre of the line of battle, and his less reliable +men on the wings of the army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, +putting his most valiant men on the flanks, while those on whom he +could not so strongly rely he moved to the centre. Observing this +order of battle, he drew out of his lines and quickly came in sight of +the hostile army, who, as usual, had come in their insolence to defy +him. He then commanded his centre squadrons to march slowly, whilst he +moved rapidly forward those on the wings. Thus, when they came into +contact with the enemy, only the wings of the two armies became +engaged, whilst the center battalions remained out of action, for +these two portions of the line of battle were separated from each +other by a long interval and thus unable to reach each other. By this +expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio's men were opposed to +the weaker part of the enemy's troops, and the most efficient men of +the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines were unable to +fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or to give any +assistance to their own flanks. So, without much difficulty, +Castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the centre +battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to +attack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. The defeat +was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than +ten thousand men killed with many officers and knights of the Guelph +party in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them, +among whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his +nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castruccio +the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was +Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed +in the first onset. + +This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that +Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it +appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of +power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only +waited for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the +death of Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in +Lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for +refuge. On the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, +they were driven off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This +affair coming to the knowledge of Uguccione, who was than at Pisa, it +appeared to him a proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He +therefore sent for his son Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and +commissioned him to take Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him +to death. Castruccio, fearing no evil, went to the governor in a +friendly way, was entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. +But Neri, fearing to put him to death lest the people should be +incensed, kept him alive, in order to hear further from his father +concerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and +cowardice of his son, and at once set out from Pisa to Lucca with four +hundred horsemen to finish the business in his own way; but he had not +yet reached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to +death and created Count Gaddo della Gherardesca their lord. Before +Uguccione reached Lucca he heard of the occurrences at Pisa, but it +did not appear wise to him to turn back, lest the Lucchese with the +example of Pisa before them should close their gates against him. But +the Lucchese, having heard of what had happened at Pisa, availed +themselves of this opportunity to demand the liberation of Castruccio, +notwithstanding that Uguccione had arrived in their city. They first +began to speak of it in private circles, afterwards openly in the +squares and streets; then they raised a tumult, and with arms in their +hands went to Uguccione and demanded that Castruccio should be set at +liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse might happen, released him from +prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered his friends around him, and with +the help of the people attacked Uguccione; who, finding he had no +resource but in flight, rode away with his friends to Lombardy, to the +lords of Scale, where he died in poverty. + +But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, +and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people +that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having +obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the +recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of +Uguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded +a treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he +constructed a fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in +the course of two months Castruccio captured the town. With the +reputation gained at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and +Lavenza, and in a short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In +order to close the pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he +besieged Pontremoli and wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio +Palavicini, who was the lord of it. After this victory he returned to +Lucca, and was welcomed by the whole people. And now Castruccio, +deeming it imprudent any longer to defer making himself a prince, got +himself created the lord of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, +Puccinello dal Portico, Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all +of whom he had corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and +deliberately elected prince by the people. At this time Frederick of +Bavaria, the King of the Romans, came into Italy to assume the +Imperial crown, and Castruccio, in order that he might make friends +with him, met him at the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had +left as his deputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high +estimation, because of the people's love for the memory of his father. +Castruccio was received in great honour by Frederick, and many +privileges were conferred upon him, and he was appointed the emperor's +lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time the Pisans were in great fear of +Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had driven out of Pisa, and they +had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Frederick created Castruccio +the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of the Guelph party, and +particularly of the Florentines, were constrained to accept him as +their lord. + +Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian +affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian +Ghibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to +Castruccio for help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship +of his country, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among +these exiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo +Nardi, and Piero Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. +Castruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all +Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to +gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer +Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces +of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he +divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied +with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he +could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without +those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he +surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer +Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had +driven out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army +and the King Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade +the Florentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at +home, they should be compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in +order to defend themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and +seized Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the +country. Whereupon the Florentines recalled their army, which had +scarcely reached Tuscany, when Castruccio was forced by other +necessities to return to Lucca. + +There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so +powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance +him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not +received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they +incited other families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. +They found their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they +set upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and +killed him. They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but +Stefano di Poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the +rebellion, intervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down +their arms; and he offered to be their mediator with Castruccio to +obtain from him what they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms +with no greater intelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, +having heard the news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put +Pagolo Guinigi in command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set +out for home. Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at +an end, yet he posted his men in the most advantageous places +throughout the city. As it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought +to be very much obliged to him, he sought him out, and without saying +anything on his own behalf, for he did not recognize any need for +doing so, he begged Castruccio to pardon the other members of his +family by reason of their youth, their former friendships, and the +obligations which Castruccio was under to their house. To this +Castruccio graciously responded, and begged Stefano to reassure +himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure to find the tumult +at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to hear of its +inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to him, saying +that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of showing +his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and Castruccio +they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown into prison +and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered San Miniato, +whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace, as it did +not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to leave +him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce, which +they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and desirous +of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded with them +for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conquests they +had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned his +attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should not again +be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, under +various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their +ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, +but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had in +his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that +none of them were to be trusted. Then for his further security he +raised a fortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom +he had killed or hunted out of the state. + +Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened +his position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, +of increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he +could get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, +which was his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made +friends with the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that +both parties confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it +always had been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the +Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each +of these men held secret communications with Castruccio, and each +desired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many +threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the +Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city; +both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they +believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than +the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave +promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and +to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the +appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself +direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and +both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a +signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other +Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans +of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the +hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the +palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them +many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked +to the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and +quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great +valour. + +About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the +dearness of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at +Avignon. The German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what +happened--murders and tumults following each other daily, without his +being able to put an end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest +the Romans should call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive +the Germans out of the city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer +friend to whom he could apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to +him, begging him not only to give him assistance, but also to come in +person to Rome. Castruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to +render the emperor this service, because he believed that he himself +would not be safe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. +Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio set out for +Rome with six hundred horsemen, where he was received by Enrico with +the greatest distinction. In a short time the presence of Castruccio +obtained such respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or +violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio +having sent by sea from the country round Pisa large quantities of +corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. When he had +chastised some of the Roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary +obedience was rendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many honours, +and was made a Roman senator. This dignity was assumed with the +greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in a brocaded toga, which had +the following words embroidered on its front: "I am what God wills." +Whilst on the back was: "What God desires shall be." + +During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that +Castruccio should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how +they could tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not +be difficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence +were Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to +face danger. These men kept up communications with their friends in +Pistoia, and with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by +night, and after driving out some of Castruccio's officials and +partisans, and killing others, they restored the city to its freedom. +The news of this greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of +Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines +heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, they decided +to intercept him with their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the +belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pistoia. +Assembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph cause, the +Florentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other hand, +Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard where +the Florentines' lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains of +Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as he +possibly could, to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He +believed that if he succeeded in this design, victory was assured, +although he was informed that the Florentines had thirty thousand men, +whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he had every confidence +in his own abilities and the valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to +attack his enemy in the open lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers. +Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill +which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the exact pass, but about a +bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places narrow and steep, whilst +in general it ascends gently, but is still narrow, especially at the +summit where the waters divide, so that twenty men side by side could +hold it. The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a German, who, before +Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to remain in +possession of the castle, it being common to the Lucchese and the +Pistoians, and unclaimed by either--neither of them wishing to +displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and +came under obligations to no one. For these reasons, and also because +the castle was well fortified, he had always been able to maintain his +position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to fall upon his +enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and there was no +fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force before they +became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this trouble with +Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which possession +of this castle would give him, and having an intimate friendship with +a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with him that four +hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle the night +before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put to death. + +Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the +Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away +from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his +army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they +reached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill +on the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the +castle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching +from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of +Serravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the +hill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his +infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a +path on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four +hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never +expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they +aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the +Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by +surprise when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close +were they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It +was a case of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were +assailed with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their +own, although some few of them got through. When the noise of the +fighting reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with +confusion. The cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the +captains were unable to get their men either backward or forward, +owing to the narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one +knew what ought to be done or what could be done. In a short time the +cavalry who were engaged with the enemy's infantry were scattered or +killed without having made any effective defence because of their +unfortunate position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a +stout resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on +both flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their +friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a +decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one +thousand infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four +hundred horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the +whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they +carried out with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the +attack, but gave way, and were soon in full retreat--conquered more by +their unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in +the rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each +man seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very +sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were +Bandini dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, +all Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought +on the Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the +Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out +the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not +content with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both +sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola, +about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing +the spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding +horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals +in commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to +corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city +gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the +participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso +Lupacci and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the +Florentines great anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, +they sent envoys to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion +of their city; and he, knowing of what immense importance the +maintenance of the Guelph cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed +with the Florentines to receive from them a yearly tribute of two +hundred thousand florins, and he send his son Carlo to Florence with +four thousand horsemen. + +Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the +pressure of Castruccio's army, owing to his being compelled to leave +his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress +a conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, +one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland +should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this +conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of +Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy +paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few +are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy +Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio. +This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio +Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering +their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and +put him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove +their families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both +Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought +and energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the +Florentines their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await +the coming of Carlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived +they decided to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more +than thirty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry--having called +to their aid every Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether +they should attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be +better to march on the latter--a course, owing to the recent +conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them, +because they believed that the surrender of Pistoia would follow the +acquisition of Pisa. + +In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army +and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing +from thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous +army which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no +degree alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune +would deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no +reason to think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had +better prospects of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled +twenty thousand foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with +this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa +with five thousand infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than +any other town in the Pisan district, owing to its situation between +the rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevation above the +surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being +victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approach +it either from the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get +through to Pisa, or attack Castruccio's forces except at a +disadvantage. In one case they would find themselves placed between +his two armies, the one under his own command and the other under +Pagolo, and in the other case they would have to cross the Arno to get +to close quarters with the enemy, an undertaking of great hazard. In +order to tempt the Florentines to take this latter course, Castruccio +withdrew his men from the banks of the river and placed them under the +walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse of land between them and +the river. + +The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to +decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and, +having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the +latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet +the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the +saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the +Florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of +cavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action +was fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the +Florentines with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, +not allowing them to issue from the river before he charged them; he +also sent one thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same +number down the Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much +impeded by their arms and the water that they were not able to mount +the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the +river more difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had +crossed having broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep +with mud, many of the horses rolled over with their riders and many of +them had stuck so fast that they could not move. When the Florentine +captains saw the difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew +them and moved higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less +treacherous and the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met +at the bank by the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, +who, being light armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let +fly with tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. +The horses, alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move +forward, and trampled each other in great confusion. The fight between +the men of Castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing +was sharp and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation +and neither would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive +the others back into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a +footing on land in order to make room for the others pressing forward, +who if they could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and +in this obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. +Castruccio shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom +they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines +reproached each other that the many should be overcome by the few. At +length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that +both his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides +had many killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry +to take up a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then +commanded these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to +retreat, and one part of them to turn to the right and another to the +left. This cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took +advantage, and thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. +But when these tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with +Castruccio's reserves they could not stand against them and at once +fell back into the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet +gained any decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, +knowing his inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to +stand on the defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he +hoped that when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make +short work of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he +saw the Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the +remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This +they did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, +fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. +The Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had +met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry +cross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of +Castruccio's army. But here, also, the banks were steep and already +lined by the men of Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. +Thus the Florentines were so completely defeated at all points that +scarcely a third of them escaped, and Castruccio was again covered +with glory. Many captains were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of +King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the +Florentine commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, +the slaughter was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a +battle. Of the Florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and +thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and +seventy men. + +But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his +life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus +ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry +into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but +death could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the +battle the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although +fatigued and overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome +his men on their return from victory and personally thank them. He was +also on the watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the +fortunes of the day; he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a +good general to be the first man in the saddle and the last out of it. +Here Castruccio stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on +the banks of the Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he +took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to +such troubles; but it was the cause of his death. On the following +night he was attacked with high fever, which increased so rapidly that +the doctors saw it must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called +Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him as follows: + +"If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the +midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my +successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have +left thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, +because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and +Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the +Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these +peoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least +more peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, +but one more secure and established on a surer foundation. But +Fortune, who insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did +not endow me with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the +first, nor the time to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have +told thee, and I have never concealed it, how I entered the house of +thy father whilst yet a boy--a stranger to all those ambitions which +every generous soul should feel--and how I was brought up by him, and +loved as though I had been born of his blood; how under his governance +I learned to be valiant and capable of availing myself of all that +fortune, of which thou hast been witness. When thy good father came to +die, he committed thee and all his possessions to my care, and I have +brought thee up with that love, and increased thy estate with that +care, which I was bound to show. And in order that thou shouldst not +only possess the estate which thy father left, but also that which my +fortune and abilities have gained, I have never married, so that the +love of children should never deflect my mind from that gratitude +which I owed to the children of thy father. Thus I leave thee a vast +estate, of which I am well content, but I am deeply concerned, +inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure. Thou hast the city +of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest contented under they +government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are of nature +changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be sometimes held in +subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under a Lucchese. +Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with factions and +deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs recently +inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended +Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly +destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than +they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the +princes of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far +distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou +hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory +of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has +brought thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will +assist thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are +suffering under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to +thee. And whereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I +believed that war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou +hast every inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance +will bring thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest +important in this world that a man should know himself, and the +measure of his own strength and means; and he who knows that he has +not a genius for fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of +peace. And it will be well for thee to rule they conduct by my +counsel, and to learn in this way to enjoy what my life-work and +dangers have gained; and in this thou wilt easily succeed when thou +hast learnt to believe that what I have told thee is true. And thou +wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that I have left thee this realm and +have taught thee how to keep it." + +After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, +and Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending +Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his +successor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him, +and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he +was. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he +was buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to +Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the +abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, +and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This +latter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the time of the +great-grandson of Pagolo. + +From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a +man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own +time, but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above +the ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious +presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke +with him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, +and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or +snowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends, +but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false +with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he +desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory +that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was +bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He +was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear +nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees +that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully +sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not +look for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was +not angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened +that he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, +as on the following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a +partridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom +Castruccio had said: "You would not have given more than a penny." +"That is true," answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: "A +ducat is much less to me." Having about him a flatterer on whom he had +spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: +"Fisherman are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in +order that they make take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to +be wetted by spittle that I may catch a whale"; and this was not only +heard by Castruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest +that it was wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: +"If that be a vice than you should not fare so splendidly at the +feasts of our saints." Passing through a street he saw a young man as +he came out of a house of ill fame blush at being seen by Castruccio, +and said to him: "Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out, +but when thou goest into such places." A friend gave him a very +curiously tied knot to undo and was told: "Fool, do you think that I +wish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to fasten." +Castruccio said to one who professed to be a philosopher: "You are +like the dogs who always run after those who will give them the best +to eat," and was answered: "We are rather like the doctors who go to +the houses of those who have the greatest need of them." Going by +water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much disturbed by a +dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for cowardice by +one of those with him, who said that he did not fear anything. +Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since every man +valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one what he +ought to do to gain estimation, he said: "When thou goest to a banquet +take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon another." To +a person who was boasting that he had read many things, Castruccio +said: "He knows better than to boast of remembering many things." +Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming intoxicated. +Castruccio replied: "An ox does the same." Castruccio was acquainted +with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being blamed by a +friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be taken in by +a woman, he said: "She has not taken me in, I have taken her." Being +also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered: "Thou dost not +spend as much as I do?" and being told that it was true, he continued: +"Then thou art more avaricious than I am gluttonous." Being invited by +Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of Luca, to supper, +he went to the house and was shown by Taddeo into a chamber hung with +silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers and foliage of +the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered some saliva in his +mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him much disturbed by +this, said to him: "I knew not where to spit in order to offend thee +less." Being asked how Caesar died he said: "God willing I will die as +he did." Being one night in the house of one of his gentlemen where +many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of his friends for +dancing and amusing himself with them more than was usual in one of +his station, so he said: "He who is considered wise by day will not be +considered a fool at night." A person came to demand a favour of +Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea threw +himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by +Castruccio, said: "Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast +thy ears in thy feet," whereupon he obtained double the favour he had +asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one, +seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled +blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous +words, he said to him: "When you have another request to make, send +someone else to make it." Having been wearied by a similar man with a +long oration who wound up by saying: "Perhaps I have fatigued you by +speaking so long," Castruccio said: "You have not, because I have not +listened to a word you said." He used to say of one who had been a +beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was +dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now +he took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, +he said: "Do you laugh because you are successful or because another +is unfortunate?" Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco +Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: "What shall I give you if +you will let me give you a blow on the nose?" Castruccio answered: "A +helmet." Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been +instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done +wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived +themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly +those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying +that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then +refused when the time came. He said that it always struck him with +surprise that whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would +sound it first to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they +were content with only looking at her. He was once asked in what +manner he would wish to be buried when he died, and answered: "With +the face turned downwards, for I know when I am gone this country will +be turned upside down." On being asked if it had ever occurred to him +to become a friar in order to save his soul, he answered that it had +not, because it appeared strange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to +Paradise and Uguccione della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once +asked when should a man eat to preserve his health, and replied: "If +the man be rich let him eat when he is hungry; if he be poor, then +when he can." Seeing on of his gentlemen make a member of his family +lace him up, he said to him: "I pray God that you will let him feed +you also." Seeing that someone had written upon his house in Latin the +words: "May God preserve this house from the wicked," he said, "The +owner must never go in." Passing through one of the streets he saw a +small house with a very large door, and remarked: "That house will fly +through the door." He was having a discussion with the ambassador of +the King of Naples concerning the property of some banished nobles, +when a dispute arose between them, and the ambassador asked him if he +had no fear of the king. "Is this king of yours a bad man or a good +one?" asked Castruccio, and was told that he was a good one, whereupon +he said, "Why should you suggest that I should be afraid of a good +man?" + +I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and +weighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to +his high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a +prince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good +fortune, so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad +fortune; therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison +are to be seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, +where they were placed by him to testify for ever to his days of +adversity. As in his life he was inferior neither to Philip of +Macedon, the father of Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in +the same year of his age as they did, and he would doubtless have +excelled both of them had Fortune decreed that he should be born, not +in Lucca, but in Macedonia or Rome. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg Etext of The Prince, Etc.,by Machiavelli + diff --git a/old/old/tprnc10.zip b/old/old/tprnc10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a8fbf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/tprnc10.zip diff --git a/old/old/tprnc11.txt b/old/old/tprnc11.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ba2da3 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/tprnc11.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5080 @@ +The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Prince, by Nicolo Machiavelli +Includes Two Shorter Works on Valentino and Castracani +#1, 2 and 3 in our series by Machiavelli + + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check +the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!! + +Please take a look at the important information in this header. +We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an +electronic path open for the next readers. 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From 1494 to 1512 held an official +post at Florence which included diplomatic +missions to various European courts. +Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; later exiled and +returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on +22nd June 1527. + + + +INTRODUCTION + +Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the +second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, +and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were +members of the old Florentine nobility. + +His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly +enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of +Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as +an Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de' Medici, Il +Magnifico. The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in +which year Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official +career Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which +lasted until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli +lost his office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, +when they were once more driven out. This was the period of +Machiavelli's literary activity and increasing influence; but he died, +within a few weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, +in his fifty-eighth year, without having regained office. + + + +YOUTH +Aet. 1-25--1469-94 + +Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the +Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of +this representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been +described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed +by the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour- +loving Lorenzo. Savonarola's influence upon the young Machiavelli must +have been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power +over the fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a +subject of a gibe in "The Prince," where he is cited as an example of +an unarmed prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of +the Medicean rule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have +impressed Machiavelli strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his +writings, and it is to Lorenzo's grandson that he dedicates "The +Prince." + +Machiavelli, in his "History of Florence," gives us a picture of the +young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: "They were freer +than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other +kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, +and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak +with wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most +cleverly was thought the wisest." In a letter to his son Guido, +Machiavelli shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities +for study, and leads us to infer that his own youth had been so +occupied. He writes: "I have received your letter, which has given me +the greatest pleasure, especially because you tell me you are quite +restored in health, than which I could have no better news; for if God +grant life to you, and to me, I hope to make a good man of you if you +are willing to do your share." Then, writing of a new patron, he +continues: "This will turn out well for you, but it is necessary for +you to study; since, then, you have no longer the excuse of illness, +take pains to study letters and music, for you see what honour is done +to me for the little skill I have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to +please me, and to bring success and honour to yourself, do right and +study, because others will help you if you help yourself." + + + +OFFICE +Aet. 25-43--1494-1512 + +The second period of Machiavelli's life was spent in the service of +the free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from +the expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After +serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed +Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty +and Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of +Machiavelli's life, for during this time he took a leading part in the +affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and +dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere +recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and +soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and +supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters +which illustrate "The Prince." + +His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, "my lady of Forli" +of "The Prince," from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it +is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on +fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is +urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes. + +In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for +continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct +of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft +summarized in "The Prince," and was consequently driven out. He, also, +it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support +to Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge +that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning +the faith of princes. + +Machiavelli's public life was largely occupied with events arising out +of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the +Duke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of "The +Prince." Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke +for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have +seized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the +pattern of Cesare Borgia's conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed +by some critics as the "hero" of "The Prince." Yet in "The Prince" the +duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the +fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that +might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save +him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens; +and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims +that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen +fatality. + +On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to +watch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia +cheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano +delle Rovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most +reason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this +election, says that he who thinks new favours will cause great +personages to forget old injuries deceives himself. Julius did not +rest until he had ruined Cesare. + +It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that +pontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he +brought to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, +owing chiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope +Julius that Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune +and women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious +man that will win and hold them both. + +It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian +states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, +with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those +events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they +impinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings +with Louis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch's character +has already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of +Aragon as the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of +religion, but who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or +integrity; and who, had he allowed himself to be influenced by such +motives, would have been ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the +most interesting men of the age, and his character has been drawn by +many hands; but Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, +reveals the secret of his many failures when he describes him as a +secretive man, without force of character--ignoring the human agencies +necessary to carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the +fulfilment of his wishes. + +The remaining years of Machiavelli's official career were filled with +events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the +three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the +object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in +the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won +in eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during +these events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out +between the pope and the French, because friendship with France had +dictated the entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II +finally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance +of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy +of the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the +Medici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st +September 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the +signal for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put +an end to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without +regaining office. + + + +LITERATURE AND DEATH +Aet. 43-58--1512-27 + +On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had +vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, +was dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he +was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the +Medici, imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new +Medicean people, Leo X, procured his release, and he retired to his +small property at San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted +himself to literature. In a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th +December 1513, he has left a very interesting description of his life +at this period, which elucidates his methods and his motives in +writing "The Prince." After describing his daily occupations with his +family and neighbours, he writes: "The evening being come, I return +home and go to my study; at the entrance I pull off my peasant- +clothes, covered with dust and dirt, and put on my noble court dress, +and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass into the ancient courts of the +men of old, where, being lovingly received by them, I am fed with that +food which is mine alone; where I do not hesitate to speak with them, +and to ask for the reason of their actions, and they in their +benignity answer me; and for four hours I feel no weariness, I forget +every trouble, poverty does not dismay, death does not terrify me; I +am possessed entirely by those great men. And because Dante says: + + Knowledge doth come of learning well retained, + Unfruitful else, + +I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have +composed a small work on 'Principalities,' where I pour myself out as +fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a +principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how +they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever +pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, +especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it +to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will +be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had +with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it." + +The "little book" suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form +in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work +during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for +some unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de' Medici. +Although Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be +sent or presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that +Lorenzo ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave +Machiavelli any employment. Although it was plagiarized during +Machiavelli's lifetime, "The Prince" was never published by him, and +its text is still disputable. + +Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: "And as to this +little thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that +during the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I +have neither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be +served by one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And +of my loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I +could not now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and +honest, as I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a +witness to my honesty." + +Before Machiavelli had got "The Prince" off his hands he commenced his +"Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius," which should be read +concurrently with "The Prince." These and several minor works occupied +him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look +after the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the +Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her +citizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new +constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on +one pretext or another it was not promulgated. + +In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to +settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly +remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he +was much sought after, and also for the production of his "Art of +War." It was in the same year that he received a commission at the +instance of Cardinal de' Medici to write the "History of Florence," a +task which occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may +have determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old +writer observes that "an able statesman out of work, like a huge +whale, will endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask +to play with." + +When the "History of Florence" was finished, Machiavelli took it to +Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de' Medici, who had in +the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is +somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written "The +Prince" for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained +power in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the "History of Florence" +to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year +the battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left +Francis I a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This +was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular +party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more +banished. + +Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his +return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the "Ten of +Liberty and Peace." Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached +Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527. + + + +THE MAN AND HIS WORKS + +No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern +Florence has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the +side of her most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations +may have found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity +and the germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst +it is idle to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of +his name, it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his +doctrine which this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own +day, and that the researches of recent times have enabled us to +interpret him more reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the +shape of an "unholy necromancer," which so long haunted men's vision, +has begun to fade. + +Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and +industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and +with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced +retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he +depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, +the successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only +moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political +employments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, +overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren +of results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery +that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct +of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear +by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of +compromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to +suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when +he set him to write the "History of Florence," rather than employ him +in the state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and +there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure. + +Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on "The +Prince," its problems are still debatable and interesting, because +they are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such +as they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli's contemporaries; yet +they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of +Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical +incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses +which Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of +government and conduct. + +Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish +some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, "The +Prince" is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men +are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the +days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices +which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. +Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them +to be--and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe +courses; prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then +--to pass to a higher plane--Machiavelli reiterates that, although +crimes may win an empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are +just wars, and the arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other +resource but to fight. + +It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli's that government +should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the +people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of +society; to this "high argument" "The Prince" contributes but little. +Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments +otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and +insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests "The +Prince" with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the +incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which +still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other +and their neighbours. + +In translating "The Prince" my aim has been to achieve at all costs an +exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent +paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. +Machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he +wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his +substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. "Quis eo fuit +unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?" +In "The Prince," it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not +only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an +Englishman of Shakespeare's time the translation of such a treatise +was in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the +genius of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian +language; to the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a +single example: the word "intrattenere," employed by Machiavelli to +indicate the policy adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker +states of Greece, would by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered +"entertain," and every contemporary reader would understand what was +meant by saying that "Rome entertained the Aetolians and the Achaeans +without augmenting their power." But to-day such a phrase would seem +obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that +"Rome maintained friendly relations with the Aetolians," etc., using +four words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy +brevity of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute +fidelity to the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can +only hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author's +meaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it. + +The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli: + +Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di +trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto +dal duca Valentino nell' ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da +Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; +Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell' +Alemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di +Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., +1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence, +1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in +verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose, +1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d'oro (poem in +terza rima), 1517; Dell' arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il +riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta +di Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie +fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525. + +Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti +carnascialeschi. + +Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, +6 vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., +1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7. + +Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. +Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. +G. Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri +intorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. +Ferrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929. + + + +DEDICATION + + To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De' Medici: + + Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are + accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most + precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one + often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and + similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness. + + Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with + some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among + my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so + much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by + long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of + antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and + prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to + your Magnificence. + + And although I may consider this work unworthy of your + countenance, nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it + may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a + better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in + the shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and + with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not + embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with + rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments + whatever, with which so many are accustomed to embellish their + works; for I have wished either that no honour should be given it, + or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the + theme shall make it acceptable. + + Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man + of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the + concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes + place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of + the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the + plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to understand + the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to + understand that of princes it needs to be of the people. + + Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in + which I send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered + by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain + that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise. + And if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will + sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how + unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune. + + + + + +THE PRINCE + + + +CHAPTER I + +HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, +AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED + +All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have +been and are either republics or principalities. + +Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been +long established; or they are new. + +The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or +they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the +prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of +the King of Spain. + +Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a +prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of +the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. + + + +CHAPTER II + +CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES + +I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another +place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only +to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated +above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and +preserved. + +I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary +states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than +new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of +his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, +for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, +unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; +and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister +happens to the usurper, he will regain it. + +We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have +withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope +Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. +For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; +hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary +vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his +subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the +antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make +for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for +another. + + + +CHAPTER III + +CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES + +But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it +be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, +taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly +from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; +for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, +and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: +wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience +they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural +and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those +who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other +hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition. + +In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in +seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends +who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in +the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against +them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in +armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the +goodwill of the natives. + +For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied +Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it +only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the +gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future +benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is +very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, +they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with +little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish +the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself +in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first +time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[*] to raise insurrections on +the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was +necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies +should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the +causes above mentioned. + +[*] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who + married Beatrice d'Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, + and died in 1510. + +Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second +time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it +remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he +had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining +himself more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France. + +Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an +ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country +and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold +them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self- +government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed +the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, +preserving in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in +customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, +Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to France for +so long a time: and, although there may be some difference in +language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the people will +easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has annexed them, +if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two +considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is +extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are +altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one +body with the old principality. + +But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, +customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great +energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real +helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside +there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has +made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other +measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled +there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the +spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy +them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are +great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the +country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied +by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have +more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He +who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost +caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested +from him with the greatest difficulty. + +The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, +which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do +this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A +prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense +he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority +only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them +to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and +scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being +uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not +to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have +been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not +costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as +has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one +has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, +because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more +serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a +man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of +revenge. + +But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends +much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the +state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are +exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting +of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and +all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their +own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such +guards are as useless as a colony is useful. + +Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects +ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful +neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care +that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a +footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be +introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of +ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were +brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where +they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And +the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner +enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by +the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in +respect to those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain +them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state +which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not +get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his +own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more +powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And +he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he +has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless +difficulties and troubles. + +The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely +these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations +with[*] the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept +down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain +authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The +Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of +Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the +Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase +their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans +to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of +Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the +country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent +princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but +also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, +because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait +until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the +malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians +say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it +is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, +not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it +becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. This it happens in +affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen +(which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly +redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been +permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no +longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt +with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come +to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to +be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight +with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in +Italy; they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor +did that ever please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise +ones of our time:--Let us enjoy the benefits of the time--but rather +the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives +everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as +evil, and evil as well as good. + +[*] See remark in the introduction on the word "intrattenere." + +But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the +things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[*] (and not of Charles[+]) as +the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held +possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he +has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain +a state composed of divers elements. + +[*] Louis XII, King of France, "The Father of the People," born 1462, + died 1515. + +[+] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498. + +King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, +who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. +I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get +a foothold in Italy, and having no friends there--seeing rather that +every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles--he was +forced to accept those friendships which he could get, and he would +have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had +not made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, +regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; +the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke +of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of +Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, +the Sienese--everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then +could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, +which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made +the king master of two-thirds of Italy. + +Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could +have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above +laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although +they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the +Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been +forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have +made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no +sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander +to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he +was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who +had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church +by adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater +authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to +follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of +Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was +himself forced to come into Italy. + +And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and +deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of +Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime +arbiter in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that +country and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to +shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own +pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to +drive him, Louis, out in turn. + +The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men +always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not +blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, +then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have +attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if she +could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition +which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the +excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition +merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity. + +Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, +he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he +brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did +not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to +injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from +the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought +Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to +humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to +have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always +have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians +would never have consented except to become masters themselves there; +also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in +order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they +would not have had the courage. + +And if any one should say: "King Louis yielded the Romagna to +Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I answer for the +reasons given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to +avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to +your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the +king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, +in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[*] and for the cap to +Rouen,[+] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the +faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept. + +[*] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and + married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order + to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown. + +[+] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d'Amboise, created a + cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510. + +Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the +conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries +and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much +that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at +Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope +Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal +Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I +replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning +that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such +greatness. And in fact is has been seen that the greatness of the +Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin +may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which +never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming +powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about +either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him +who has been raised to power. + + + +CHAPTER IV + +WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL +AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH + +Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly +acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great +became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was +scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole +empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained +themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose +among themselves from their own ambitions. + +I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to +be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of +servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his +favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that +dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such +barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords +and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by +a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, +because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as +superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as +to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular +affection. + +The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the +King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one +lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into +sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and +changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the +midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, +and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the +king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers +both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the +state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding +it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk +are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the +kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt +of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons +given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only +be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little +advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot +carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who +attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and +he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of +others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the +field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is +nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being +exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no +credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them +before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it. + +The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because +one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, +for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such +men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render +the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with +infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from +those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated +the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make +themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are +unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost +whenever time brings the opportunity. + +Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of +Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and +therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him +in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which +victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, +for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they +would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no +tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves. + +But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted +like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the +Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities +there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them +endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the +power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed +away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting +afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself +his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had +assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, +none other than the Romans were acknowledged. + +When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with +which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which +others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; +this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the +conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state. + + + +CHAPTER V + +CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH +LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED + +Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been +accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are +three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin +them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit +them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing +within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because +such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot +stand without his friendship and interest, and does it utmost to +support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to +freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than +in any other way. + +There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held +Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless they +lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, +dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as +the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did +not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many +cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain +them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a +city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be +destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of +liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither +time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may +do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges +unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they +immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had +been held in bondage by the Florentines. + +But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, +and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed +to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree +in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to +govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, +and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more +easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and +more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the +memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to +destroy them or to reside there. + + + +CHAPTER VI + +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED +BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY + +Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities +as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of +state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, +and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep +entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they +imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great +men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his +ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him +act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet +appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength +of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach +by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with +the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach. + +I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is +a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, +accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired +the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private +station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or +other of these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. +Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the +strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no +other state, is compelled to reside there in person. + +But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through +fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, +Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although +one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will +of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made +him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who +have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if +their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not +be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a +preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see +that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought +them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them. +Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been +extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come +in vain. + +It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people +of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order +that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out +of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, +and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should +become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary +that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government +of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long +peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the +Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men +fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the +opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made famous. + +Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a +principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The +difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules +and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their +government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there +is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, +or more uncertain in its success, then to take the lead in the +introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for +enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and +lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This +coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws +on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not +readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of +them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the +opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others +defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along +with them. + +It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter +thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves +or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate +their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In +the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass +anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then +they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have +conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the +reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it +is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that +persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when +they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by +force. + +If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not +have enforced their constitutions for long--as happened in our time to +Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things +immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no +means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the +unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great +difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers +are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when +these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are +exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will continue +afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy. + +To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears +some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a +like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[*] This man rose from a private +station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to +fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose +him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their +prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that +one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a +king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up +old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and +allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, +whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in +keeping. + +[*] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C. + + + +CHAPTER VII + +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER +BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE + +Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private +citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they +have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they +have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some +state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows +it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the +Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they +might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also +were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being +citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill +and the fortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant and +unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the +position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it +is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, +having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold +it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and +faithful. + +States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature +which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and +correspondencies[*] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not +overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become +princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be +prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their +laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they +became princes, they must lay AFTERWARDS. + +[*] "Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e. foundations) and + correspondencies or relations with other states--a common meaning + of "correspondence" and "correspondency" in the sixteenth and + seventeenth centuries. + +Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or +fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, +and these are Francesco Sforza[*] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by +proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose +to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand +anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare +Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during +the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, +notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that +ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the +states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him. + +[*] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria + Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of + Milan, on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. + Machiavelli was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to + Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to + the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and + along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an + account, written ten years before "The Prince," of the proceedings + of the duke in his "Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino + nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli," etc., a translation of which + is appended to the present work. + +Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations +may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will +be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, +therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be +seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not +consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what +better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions; +and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but +the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune. + +Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had +many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see +his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the +Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke +of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and +Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides +this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might +have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the +Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It +behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the +powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. +This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by +other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would +not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by +dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came +into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of +Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from +him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the +reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the +Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to +advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did +not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to +say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, +would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from +winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the +king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, +after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very +unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind +when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, +and the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke +decided to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others. + +For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in +Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, +making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to +their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that +in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and +turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to +crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. +This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving +at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin +to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung +the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless +dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the +French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by +trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse +to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the +mediation of Signor Pagolo--whom the duke did not fail to secure with +all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses--the +Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his +power at Sinigalia.[*] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned +their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good +foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of +Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, +he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of +notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it +out. + +[*] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502. + +When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak +masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave +them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was +full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing +to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it +necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer +Ramiro d'Orco,[*] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest +power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the +greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not +advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but +that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the +country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had +their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused +some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the +people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if +any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in +the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took +Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the +piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The +barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied +and dismayed. + +[*] Ramiro d'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua. + +But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding +himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate +dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great +measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if +he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, +for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, +would not support him. And from this time he began to seek new +alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she was +making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were +besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against them, +and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived. + +Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the +future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the +Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him +that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. +Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had +despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by +winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb +the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting +the college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power +before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist +the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he +had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed +lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over +the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the +college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master +of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa +was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for +the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the +Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), +he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at +once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of the +Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he +continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander +died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would +have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the +forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability. + +But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He +left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the +rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick +unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and +he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the +foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not +had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he +would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his +foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a +month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and +whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, +they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made +Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would +not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death +of Alexander,[*] everything would have been different to him. On the +day that Julius the Second[+] was elected, he told me that he had +thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and +had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated +that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to +die. + +[*] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503. + +[+] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad + Vincula, born 1443, died 1513. + +When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to +blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought +to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the +arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty +spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct +otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own +sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it +necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, +to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and +feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to +exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the +old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous +and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to +maintain friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they +must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more +lively example than the actions of this man. + +Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom +he made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a +Pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being +elected Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of +any cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they +became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom +he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, +San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[*] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear +him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their +relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the +kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above +everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, +failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad +Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages +to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his +choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin. + +[*] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza. + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS + +Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither +of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is +manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could +be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are +when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the +principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private +person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first +method, it will be illustrated by two examples--one ancient, the other +modern--and without entering further into the subject, I consider +these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow +them. + +Agathocles, the Sicilian,[*] became King of Syracuse not only from a +private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a +potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous +life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability +of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military +profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being +established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make +himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, +that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an +understanding for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, +with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the +people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them +things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers +killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he +seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil +commotion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and +ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but +leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked +Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of Syracuse. The +Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled to come to +terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be content +with the possession of Africa. + +[*] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C. + +Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man +will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, +inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the +favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession, which +steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were +afterwards boldly held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it +cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, +to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may +gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in +entering into and extricating himself from dangers be considered, +together with his greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming +hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the +most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and +inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated +among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed +either to fortune or genius. + +In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da +Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by +his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his +youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under +his discipline, he might attain some high position in the military +profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, +and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body +and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing +a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of +some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was +dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to +seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away +from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in +some measure to look upon his patrimony; and although he had not +laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the +citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to +come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his +friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he +should be received honourably by the Fermians, all of which would be +not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had +brought him up. + +Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, +and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he +lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and +having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto +gave a solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the +chiefs of Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that +are usual in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began +certain grave discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander +and his son Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse +Giovanni and others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such +matters ought to be discussed in a more private place, and he betook +himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens +went in after him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued +from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these +murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town +and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the +people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of which he +made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able +to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military +ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the +principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had +become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would +have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed +himself to be overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the +Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year +after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together with +Vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness. + +Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after +infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his +country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be +conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by +means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold +the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that +this follows from severities[*] being badly or properly used. Those +may be called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, +that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and +that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the +advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, +notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with +time rather than decrease. Those who practise the first system are +able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as +Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who follow the other to +maintain themselves. + +[*] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern + equivalent of Machiavelli's thought when he speaks of "crudelta" + than the more obvious "cruelties." + +Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought +to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for +him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to +repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to +reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does +otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to +keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor +can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and +repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so +that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given +little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer. + +And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in +such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, +shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in +troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones +will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and +no one will be under any obligation to you for them. + + + +CHAPTER IX + +CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY + +But coming to the other point--where a leading citizen becomes the +prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, +but by the favour of his fellow citizens--this may be called a civil +principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain +to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a +principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the +favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties +are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be +ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and +oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises +in cities one of three results, either a principality, self- +government, or anarchy. + +A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, +accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the +nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the +reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that +under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, +finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of +one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his +authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles +maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the +aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around +him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can +neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches +sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around +him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. + +Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to +others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their +object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing +to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to +be added also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile +people, because of their being too many, whilst from the nobles he can +secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may +expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from +hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they +will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far- +seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and +to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the +prince is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do +well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them +daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him. + +Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to +be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape +their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or +they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, +ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may +be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through +pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought +to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and +thus, whilst in prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not +have to fear them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun +binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to +themselves than to you, and a prince ought to guard against such, and to +fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they +always help to ruin him. + +Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people +ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they +only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the +people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above +everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may +easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when +they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound +more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more +devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their +favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as +these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, +so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have +the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity. + +Nabis,[*] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, +and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his +country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it +was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but +this would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And +do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that +"He who builds on the people, builds on the mud," for this is true +when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself +that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or +by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, +as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[+] in +Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, +who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who +does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and +energy, keeps the whole people encouraged--such a one will never find +himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his +foundations well. + +[*] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus + in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C. + +[+] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli's + "Florentine History," Book III. + +These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from +the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either +rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their +government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on +the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and +who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with +great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has +not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because +the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from +magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and +there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can +trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet +times, when citizens have need of the state, because then every one +agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they +all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has +need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is +this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. +Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens +will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the +state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful. + + + +CHAPTER X + +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES +OUGHT TO BE MEASURED + +It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character +of these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power +that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, +or whether he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make +this quite clear I say that I consider those who are able to support +themselves by their own resources who can, either by abundance of men +or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle against any one who +comes to attack them; and I consider those always to have need of +others who cannot show themselves against the enemy in the field, but +are forced to defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first +case has been discussed, but we will speak of it again should it +recur. In the second case one can say nothing except to encourage such +princes to provision and fortify their towns, and not on any account +to defend the country. And whoever shall fortify his town well, and +shall have managed the other concerns of his subjects in the way +stated above, and to be often repeated, will never be attacked without +great caution, for men are always adverse to enterprises where +difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing +to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not hated by his +people. + +The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country +around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits +them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near +them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks +the taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing +they have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, +and they always keep in public depots enough for one year's eating, +drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and +without loss to the state, they always have the means of giving work +to the community in those labours that are the life and strength of +the city, and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they +also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover have many +ordinances to uphold them. + +Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself +odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only +be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this +world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a +whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever +should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it +burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and self- +interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that a +powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by +giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for +long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then +preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be +too bold. + +Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and +ruin the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still +hot and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought +the prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have +cooled, the damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there +is no longer any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready +to unite with their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to +them now that their houses have been burnt and their possessions +ruined in his defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the +benefits they confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if +everything is well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise +prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, +when he does not fail to support and defend them. + + + +CHAPTER XI + +CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES + +It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, +touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, +because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they +can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ancient +ordinances of religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a +character that the principalities may be held no matter how their +princes behave and live. These princes alone have states and do not +defend them; and they have subjects and do not rule them; and the +states, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, +although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor +the ability to alienate themselves. Such principalities only are +secure and happy. But being upheld by powers, to which the human mind +cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted +and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash +man to discuss them. + +Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church +has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from +Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have +been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) +have valued the temporal power very slightly--yet now a king of France +trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and +to ruin the Venetians--although this may be very manifest, it does not +appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. + +Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[*] this country was +under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the +Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal +anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; +the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those +about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. +To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, +as it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they +made use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, +Orsini and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing +with arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the +pontificate weak and powerless. And although there might arise +sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor +wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope +is also a cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the +average life of a pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the +factions; and if, so to speak, one people should almost destroy the +Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the Orsini, who would +support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin the +Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were +little esteemed in Italy. + +[*] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494. + +Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that +have ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to +prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by +reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things +which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although +his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, +nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church, +which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to +all his labours. + +Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing +all the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through +the chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found +the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been +practised before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not only +followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin +the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these +enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, +inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any +private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within +the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them +some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: +the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; +and the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who +caused the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have +their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals +foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are +compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates +arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his +Holiness Pope Leo[*] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to +be hoped that, if others made it great in arms, he will make it still +greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues. + +[*] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de' Medici. + + + +CHAPTER XII + +HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES + +Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such +principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having +considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and +having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and +to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of +offence and defence which belong to each of them. + +We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his +foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to +ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or +composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good +laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are +well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the +discussion and shall speak of the arms. + +I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state +are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. +Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one +holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor +safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, +unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have +neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is +deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by +them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other +attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, +which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are +ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if +war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which I should +have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by +nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on +mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared +valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed +what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed +to seize Italy with chalk in hand;[*] and he who told us that our sins +were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the sins he +imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the sins of +princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty. + +[*] "With chalk in hand," "col gesso." This is one of the bons mots of + Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII + seized Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send + his quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to + conquer the country. Cf. "The History of Henry VII," by Lord + Bacon: "King Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost + it again, in a kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole + length of Italy without resistance: so that it was true what Pope + Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with + chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather than with + swords to fight." + +I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The +mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they +are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own +greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others +contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you +are ruined in the usual way. + +And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, +whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted +to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in +person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its +citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, +it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the +laws so that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown +princes and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, +and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult +to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of +its citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and +Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely +armed and quite free. + +Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who +were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with +the Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for +captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made +captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took +away their liberty. + +Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza +against the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at +Caravaggio,[*] allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his +masters. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[+] +of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw +herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her +kingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their +dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make +themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the +Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able +captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not +conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their +ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,[%] +and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every +one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would +have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against +him, so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to +Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But +let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines +appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who +from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man +had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the +Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their +enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they +must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered, +will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent +to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen and plebians they did +valiantly. This was before they turned to enterprises on land, but +when they began to fight on land they forsook this virtue and followed +the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their expansion on land, +through not having much territory, and because of their great +reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when +they expanded, as under Carmignuola,[#] they had a taste of this +mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the Duke +of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how +lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer conquer +under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they +able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had +acquired, they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to +murder him. They had afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da +Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano,[&] and the +like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened +afterwards at Vaila,[$] where in one battle they lost that which in +eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. Because +from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and +inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. + +[*] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448. + +[+] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples. + +[%] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John + Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was + knighted by Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops + and went into Italy. These became the famous "White Company." He + took part in many wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born + about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married + Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti. + +[#] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, + executed at Venice, 5th May 1432. + +[&] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San + Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of + Austria, in 1487. "Primo capitano in Italia."--Machiavelli. Count + of Pitigliano; Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510. + +[$] Battle of Vaila in 1509. + +And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled +for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, +in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better +prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has +recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired +more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more +states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms +against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were +oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain +authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became +princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the +hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of +priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both +commenced to enlist foreigners. + +The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[*] +the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, +Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. +After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the +arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has +been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and +insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, +first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase +their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without +territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few +infantry did not give them any authority; so they were led to employ +cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and +honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of +twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot +soldiers. They had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and +danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but +taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack +towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments +at night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or +ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these things were +permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I +have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to +slavery and contempt. + +[*] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in + Romagna. He was the leader of the famous "Company of St George," + composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409. + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN + +Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a +prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by +Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the +enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned +to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[*] for +his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in +themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always +disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their +captive. + +[*] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), + surnamed "The Catholic," born 1542, died 1516. + +And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish +to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which +cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw +himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune +brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his +rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and +the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all +expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not +become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his +auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs. + +The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand +Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other +time of their troubles. + +The Emperor of Constantinople,[*] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten +thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not +willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to +the infidels. + +[*] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383. + +Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these +arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with +them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience +to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time +and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of +one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, +which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume +enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy +is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, +has always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been +willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not +deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others. + +I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This +duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French +soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, +such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, +discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; +whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and +dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference +between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one +considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when +he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he +relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count +and found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than +when every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces. + +I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am +unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I +have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by +the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted +like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him +that he could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut +to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with +aliens. + +I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament +applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight +with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul +armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had +them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he +wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, +the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, +or they bind you fast. + +Charles the Seventh,[*] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[+] +having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, +recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he +established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and +infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and +began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, +as is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having +raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the +value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; +and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they +are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear +that they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the +French cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers +they do not come off well against others. The armies of the French +have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of +which arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or +auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one's own forces. And this +example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if +the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained. + +[*] Charles VII of France, surnamed "The Victorious," born 1403, died + 1461. + +[+] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483. + +But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks +well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I +have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a +principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not +truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first +disaster to the Roman Empire[*] should be examined, it will be found +to have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from +that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all +that valour which had raised it passed away to others. + +[*] "Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the + reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance + of the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its + existence. When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the + Roman Empire sank under the weight of its military obligations, he + said that this was 'wholly unhistorical.' He might well have added + that the Roman power was at its zenith when every citizen + acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, but that it + began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer + recognized."--Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906. + +I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having +its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good +fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And +it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing +can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its +own strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed either +of subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or +auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one's own forces will be easily +found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one +will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many +republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which +rules I entirely commit myself. + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR + +A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything +else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is +the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force +that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often +enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the +contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than +of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your +losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a +state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being +martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, +through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became +private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, +it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies +against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. +Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the +unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield +obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man +should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one +disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to +work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the +art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, +cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought +never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and +in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; +this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study. + +As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well +organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he +accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of +localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the +valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of +rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which +knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his +country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by +means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he +understands with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to +study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers +and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain +resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of +the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of +others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which +it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to +surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the +battle, to besiege towns to advantage. + +Philopoemen,[*] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which +writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he +never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was +in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: +"If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves +here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one +best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to +retreat, how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as +he went, all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to +their opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by +these continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, +any unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with. + +[*] Philopoemen, "the last of the Greeks," born 252 B.C., died 183 + B.C. + +But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and +study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne +themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and +defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above +all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had +been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds +he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated +Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life +of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life +of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, +affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things +which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to +observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but +increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be +available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find +him prepared to resist her blows. + + + +CHAPTER XV + +CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, +ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED + +It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a +prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have +written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in +mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart +from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write +a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to +me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the +imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities +which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is +so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what +is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his +preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his +professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much +that is evil. + +Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how +to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. +Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, +and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are +spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are +remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame +or praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another +miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our +language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call +one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one +is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one +faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold +and brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another +chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one +grave, another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the +like. And I know that every one will confess that it would be most +praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are +considered good; but because they can neither be entirely possessed +nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary +for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the +reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also to +keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him +it; but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon +himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at +incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can only +be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, +it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, +would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet +followed brings him security and prosperity. + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS + +Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I +say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, +liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation +for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should +be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the +reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among +men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of +magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts +all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to +maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax +them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him +odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by +any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded +few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by +whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and +wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of +being miserly. + +Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of +liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if +he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in +time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that +with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself +against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without +burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises +liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, +and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few. + +We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who +have been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the +Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for +liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he +made war on the King of France; and he made many wars without imposing +any extraordinary tax on his subjects, for he supplied his additional +expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would +not have undertaken or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been +reputed liberal. A prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob +his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does not become poor +and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold +of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those +vices which will enable him to govern. + +And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and +many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, +and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, +or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is +dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered +liberal; and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent +in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not +moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if +any one should reply: Many have been princes, and have done great +things with armies, who have been considered very liberal, I reply: +Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects' or else +that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in the +second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to +the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, +sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, this +liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by +soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' you +can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it +does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but +adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you. + +And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst +you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor +or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a +prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised +and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to +have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, +than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to +incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER +TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED + +Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every +prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. +Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare +Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled +the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if +this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more +merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for +cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[*] Therefore a prince, so +long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the +reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more +merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to +arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to +injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with +a prince offend the individual only. + +[*] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi + factions in 1502 and 1503. + +And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the +imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. +Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her +reign owing to its being new, saying: + + "Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt + Moliri, et late fines custode tueri."[*] + +Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he +himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and +humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and +too much distrust render him intolerable. + +[*] . . . against my will, my fate +A throne unsettled, and an infant state, +Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs, +And guard with these severities my shores. + +Christopher Pitt. + + +Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than +feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish +to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, +it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either +must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of +men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and +as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you +their blood, property, life, and children, as is said above, when the +need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And +that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected +other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by +payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be +earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied +upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than +one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation +which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity +for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment +which never fails. + +Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he +does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well +being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as +he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from +their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the +life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for +manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the +property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their +father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking +away the property are never wanting; for he who has once begun to live +by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what belongs to +others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more +difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his +army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite +necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without +it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties. + +Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that +having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to +fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or +against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This +arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his +boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his +soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not +sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire +his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the +principal cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not +have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that +most excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of +man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this +arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his +soldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. For +this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the +corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a +legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the +insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. +Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there +were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct the +errors of others. This disposition, if he had been continued in the +command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; +but, he being under the control of the Senate, this injurious +characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his +glory. + +Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the +conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing +according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish +himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; +he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. + + + +CHAPTER XVIII[*] + +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH + +[*] "The present chapter has given greater offence than any other + portion of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, "Il Principe," p. 297. + +Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and +to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience +has been that those princes who have done great things have held good +faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the +intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have +relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of +contesting,[*] the one by the law, the other by force; the first +method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first +is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the +second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to +avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively +taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and +many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, +who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as +they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is +necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and +that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being +compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and +the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and +the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is +necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the +wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they +are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith +when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons +that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely +good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will +not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with +them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to +excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern examples could be +given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void +and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has +known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best. + +[*] "Contesting," i.e. "striving for mastery." Mr Burd points out that + this passage is imitated directly from Cicero's "De Officiis": + "Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, + alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; + confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore." + +But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, +and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and +so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will +always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent +example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing +else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he +always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power +in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet +would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded +according to his wishes,[*] because he well understood this side of +mankind. + +[*] "Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum)." The + words "ad votum" are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550. + +Alexander never did what he said, +Cesare never said what he did. + +Italian Proverb. + + +Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good +qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to +have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and +always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them +is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, +and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to +be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite. + +And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, +cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being +often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to +fidelity,[*] friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is +necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as +the winds and variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said +above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if +compelled, then to know how to set about it. + +[*] "Contrary to fidelity" or "faith," "contro alla fede," and "tutto + fede," "altogether faithful," in the next paragraph. It is + noteworthy that these two phrases, "contro alla fede" and "tutto + fede," were omitted in the Testina edition, which was published + with the sanction of the papal authorities. It may be that the + meaning attached to the word "fede" was "the faith," i.e. the + Catholic creed, and not as rendered here "fidelity" and + "faithful." Observe that the word "religione" was suffered to + stand in the text of the Testina, being used to signify + indifferently every shade of belief, as witness "the religion," a + phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot heresy. South + in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as + follows: "That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, Nicolo + Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political + scheme: 'That the show of religion was helpful to the politician, + but the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.'" + +For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets +anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named +five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him +altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There +is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, +inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, +because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch +with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what +you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of +the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the +actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent +to challenge, one judges by the result. + +For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and +holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he +will be praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by +what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world +there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when +the many have no ground to rest on. + +One prince[*] of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never +preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is +most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him +of reputation and kingdom many a time. + +[*] Ferdinand of Aragon. "When Machiavelli was writing 'The Prince' it + would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand's name + here without giving offence." Burd's "Il Principe," p. 308. + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED + +Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I +have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss +briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has +been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make +him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he +will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other +reproaches. + +It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, +and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from +both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor +their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has +only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease +in many ways. + +It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, +effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince +should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show +in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his +private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are +irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can +hope either to deceive him or to get round him. + +That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, +and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, +provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by +his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a +prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his +subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From +the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, +and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will +always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they +should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should +affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations +and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will +resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did. + +But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has +only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can +easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by +keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for +him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most +efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is +not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires +against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but +when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will +not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that +confront a conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many +have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he +who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except +from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have +opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with +which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every +advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, +and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a +very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to +keep faith with you. + +And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the +side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect +of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is +the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends +and the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the +popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as +to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before +the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel +to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, +and thus cannot hope for any escape. + +Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content +with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer +Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the +present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had +conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer +Giovanni,[*] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination +the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the +popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days +in Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there +after the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the +Bolognese, having information that there was one of the Bentivogli +family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of +a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of +their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due +course to the government. + +[*] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He + ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli's strong condemnation + of conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent + experience (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured + for his alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy. + +For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies +of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is +hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear +everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes +have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to +keep the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most +important objects a prince can have. + +Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, +and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty +and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its +authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of +the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths +would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing +the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he +wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the +particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach +which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, +and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, +who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser +without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a better or a +more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king +and kingdom. From this one can draw another important conclusion, that +princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of +others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. And further, I +consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as to +make himself hated by the people. + +It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths +of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary +to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great +qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have +been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, +therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of +some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were +not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only +submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who +studies the affairs of those times. + +It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to +the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were +Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son +Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. + +There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the +ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be +contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to +put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so +beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a +hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because +the people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring +prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, +cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he +should exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and +give vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those +emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had +no great authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to +the principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing +humours, were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring +little about injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, +as princes cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the +first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot +compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to +avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who +through inexperience had need of special favour adhered more readily +to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out +advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to +maintain authority over them. + +From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being +all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, +and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and +died honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary +title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and +afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, +he always kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was +neither hated nor despised. + +But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, +who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not +endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, +having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added +contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of +his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is +acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said +before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do +evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to +maintain yourself--it may be either the people or the soldiers or the +nobles--you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and +then good works will do you harm. + +But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, +that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in +the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by +him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who +allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the +army conspired against him, and murdered him. + +Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus +Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-- +men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every +kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to +a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the +soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he +reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the +sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way +astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And +because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish +to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the +lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a prince to +imitate. + +Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in +Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to +Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the +praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to +aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy +before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the +Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After +this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of +the whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of +the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the +other in the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. +And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, +he decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he +wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to +share that dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, +moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things +were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and +killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and +complained to the Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits +that he had received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, +and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he +sought him out in France, and took from him his government and life. +He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will +find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him +feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it +need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the +empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from +that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his +violence. + +But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent +qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and +acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of +fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which +caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and +cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single +murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those +of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by +those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the +midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such- +like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and +desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who +does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the +less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do +any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the +service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had +contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily +threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, +was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor's ruin. + +But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to +hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, +and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his +people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave +himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he +might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not +maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete +with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the +imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being +hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against +and was killed. + +It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very +warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of +Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected +Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two +things made him hated and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in +Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to all, +and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other, his +having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome and +taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a +reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects in +Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that +the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to +fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all +the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which may +be added his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting +with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and +fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him. + +I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being +thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this +discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have +this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in +a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some +indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that +are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as +were the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more +necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it +is now more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, +to satisfy the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the +more powerful. + +From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him +twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend +the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, +putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them +his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in +the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the +people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the +state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason +that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called +either an hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons +of the old prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that +position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only +noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new +principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it that +are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the +constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive +him as if he were its hereditary lord. + +But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will +consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been +fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how +it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in +another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to +unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for +Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was +heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly +destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated +Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in +his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot +imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow +those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which +are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are +proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and +firm. + + + +CHAPTER XX + +ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES +OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? + +1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed +their subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by +factions; others have fostered enmities against themselves; others +have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in +the beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some +have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a +final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the +particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made, +nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself +will admit. + +2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather +when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by +arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted +become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your +subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be +armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be +handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which +they quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the +latter, considering it to be necessary that those who have the most +danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when +you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust +them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these +opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain +unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the +character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be +sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted +subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new +principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of +examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a +province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of +that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; +and these again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft +and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such a way that all +the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old +state were living near you. + +3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed +to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by +fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their +tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This +may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way +balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept +for to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; +rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided +cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always +assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. +The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the +Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although +they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these +disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their +differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not +afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one +party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, +therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never +be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one +the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, +but if war comes this policy proves fallacious. + +4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the +difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore +fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who +has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes +enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may +have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, +as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many +consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with +craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having +crushed it, his renown may rise higher. + +5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and +assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were +distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who +had been distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot +speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will +only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom +have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to +support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, +and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, +inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by +deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; and thus the +prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who, +serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since +the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means +of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider +the reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be +not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their +government, then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble +and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And +weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can be +taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier +for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under +the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those +who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged +him to seize it. + +6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states +more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit +to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of +refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been +made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in +our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di +Castello so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of +Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by +Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that +province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult +to lose it; the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar +decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to +circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in +another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has +more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build +fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the +people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by +Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the house +of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason the +best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because, +although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if +the people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to +assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen +in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, +unless to the Countess of Forli,[*] when the Count Girolamo, her +consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to withstand the +popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus recover +her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that the +foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little +value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the +people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would +have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated +by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these things +considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as +him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares +little about being hated by the people. + +[*] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia + Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli + that Machiavelli was sent as envy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati + to the countess announces the appointment: "I have been with the + signori," wrote Fortunati, "to learn whom they would send and + when. They tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young + Florentine noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave + with me at once." Cf. "Catherine Sforza," by Count Pasolini, + translated by P. Sylvester, 1898. + + + +CHAPTER XXI + +HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN + +Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and +setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the +present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because +he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to +be the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his +deeds you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In +the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise +was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and +without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of +Castile occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any +innovations; thus they did not perceive that by these means he was +acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money of +the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long +war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since +distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to +undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to +driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be +a more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he +assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked +France; and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, +and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and +occupied with the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a +way, one out of the other, that men have never been given time to work +steadily against him. + +Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal +affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da +Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life +doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some +method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken +about. And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every +action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and +remarkable man. + +A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a +downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he +declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which +course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because +if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a +character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him +or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to +declare yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first +case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey +to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been +conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to +protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want +doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who +loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in +hand, court his fate. + +Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive +out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of +the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand +the Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be +discussed in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of +Antiochus urged them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate +answered: "As for that which has been said, that it is better and more +advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war, nothing can +be more erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left, +without favour or consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror." Thus +it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your +neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare +yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, +generally follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when +a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the +party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be +powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and +there is established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless +as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories +after all are never so complete that the victor must not show some +regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself +loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid +you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again. + +In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that +you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it +greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction +of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have +saved him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do +with your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to +be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance +with one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking +others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he +conquers you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much +as possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined +with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused +their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as +happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to +attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the +prince ought to favour one of the parties. + +Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe +courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, +because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid +one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in +knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice +to take the lesser evil. + +A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour +the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his +citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and +agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not +be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken +away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but +the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things +and designs in any way to honour his city or state. + +Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and +spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is +divided into guilds or into societies,[*] he ought to hold such bodies +in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an +example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining +the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in +anything. + +[*] "Guilds or societies," "in arti o in tribu." "Arti" were craft or + trade guilds, cf. Florio: "Arte . . . a whole company of any trade + in any city or corporation town." The guilds of Florence are most + admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the + subject (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar + character, called "artel," exist in Russia to-day, cf. Sir + Mackenzie Wallace's "Russia," ed. 1905: "The sons . . . were + always during the working season members of an artel. In some of + the larger towns there are artels of a much more complex kind-- + permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarily + responsible for the acts of the individual members." The word + "artel," despite its apparent similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude + assures me, no connection with "ars" or "arte." Its root is that + of the verb "rotisya," to bind oneself by an oath; and it is + generally admitted to be only another form of "rota," which now + signifies a "regimental company." In both words the underlying + idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. "Tribu" were + possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included + individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words "sects" or + "clans" would be most appropriate. + + + +CHAPTER XXII + +CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES + +The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and +they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. +And the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his +understanding, is by observing the men he has around him; and when +they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise, +because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them +faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion +of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them. + +There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to +be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there +are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; +another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which +neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first +is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. +Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the +first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to +know good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may +not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in +his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the +servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest. + +But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one +test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his +own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in +everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you +ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in +his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, +and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not +concerned. + +On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to +study him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing +with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that +he cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire +more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make +him dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards +servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is +otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the +other. + + + +CHAPTER XXIII + +HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED + +I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it +is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless +they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of +whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own +affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved +with difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves +they run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no +other way of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men +understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when +every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates. + +Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the +wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking +the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, +and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and +listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. +With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry +himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more +freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of +these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and +be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either +overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions +that he falls into contempt. + +I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man +of affairs to Maximilian,[*] the present emperor, speaking of his +majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in +anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite +to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man--he does not +communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on +them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and +known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around +him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows +that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever +understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on +his resolutions. + +[*] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman + Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; + after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in + Italian politics. + +A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he +wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every +one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to +be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning +the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on +any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger +be felt. + +And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an +impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but +through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they +are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a +prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by +chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens +to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, +but it would not be for long, because such a governor would in a short +time take away his state from him. + +But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more +than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to +unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, +and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through +them. And they are not to found otherwise, because men will always +prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. +Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they +come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the +prince from good counsels. + + + +CHAPTER XXIV + +WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES + +The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince +to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and +fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the +actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an +hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men +and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted +more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present +good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost +defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will +be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and +adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, +and with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, +born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom. + +And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in +Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and +others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in +regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in +the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the +people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known +how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that +have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost. + +Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who +was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to +the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being +a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the +nobles, he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and +if in the end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he +retained the kingdom. + +Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their +principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own +sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a +change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the +calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they +thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that +the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would +recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is +very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you +would never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find +someone later on to restore you. This again either does not happen, +or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that +deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those +only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and +your valour. + + + +CHAPTER XXV + +WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER + +It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the +opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by +fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and +that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us +believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let +chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times +because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may +still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes +pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. +Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true +that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[*] but that +she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little +less. + +[*] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: "The older one gets the + more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does + three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe." + Sorel's "Eastern Question." + +I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood +overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away +the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to +its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, +though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when +the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences +and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass +away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so +dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where +valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her +forces where she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised +to constrain her. + +And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, +and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an +open country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had +been defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, +either this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made +or it would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say +concerning resistance to fortune in general. + +But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may +be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any +change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly +from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that +the prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I +believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions +according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not +accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in +affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, +glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, +another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, +another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by +a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one +attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different +observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other +impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they +conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from +what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the +same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and +the other does not. + +Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs +himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such +a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but +if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his +course of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently +circumspect to know how to accommodate himself to the change, both +because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and +also because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot +be persuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious +man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, +hence he is ruined; but had he changed his conduct with the times +fortune would not have changed. + +Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, +and found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of +action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise +against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The +Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he +had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France; +nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his +accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the +Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the +former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other +hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having +observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as +to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore +Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff +with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome +until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, +as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. +Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the +others would have raised a thousand fears. + +I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they +all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him +experience the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which +required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because +he would never have deviated from those ways to which nature inclined +him. + +I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind +steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are +successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I +consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because +fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary +to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be +mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more +coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, +because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity +command her. + + + +CHAPTER XXVI + +AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS + +Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and +wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a +new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an +opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of +things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this +country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new +prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present. + +And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should +be captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the +Persians should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the +greatness of the soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be +dispersed to illustrate the capabilities of Theseus: then at the +present time, in order to discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it +was necessary that Italy should be reduced to the extremity that she +is now in, that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more +oppressed than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians; +without head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn, overrun; and to +have endured every kind of desolation. + +Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us +think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was +afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected +him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet +heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of +Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, +and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how +she entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these +wrongs and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready +and willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it. + +Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope +than in your illustrious house,[*] with its valour and fortune, +favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and +which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be +difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the +men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet +they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the +present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor +easier than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours. + +[*] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. + In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement + VII. + +With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is +necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in +them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the +willingness is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only +follow those men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than +this, how extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond +example: the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has +poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to +your greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do +everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory +which belongs to us. + +And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians +have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your +illustrious house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so +many campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were +exhausted, this has happened because the old order of things was not +good, and none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing +honours a man more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when +he himself was newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and +dignified will make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are +not wanting opportunities to bring such into use in every form. + +Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. +Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how +superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But +when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs +entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are +capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there +having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by +valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that +for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty +years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always +given a poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, +afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.[*] + +[*] The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; + Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513. + +If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these +remarkable men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before +all things, as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided +with your own forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or +better soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they +will be much better when they find themselves commanded by their +prince, honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it +is necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be +defended against foreigners by Italian valour. + +And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very +formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which +a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be +relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist +cavalry, and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they +encounter them in close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may +again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and +the Switzers are overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a +complete proof of this latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was +some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish +infantry were confronted by German battalions, who follow the same +tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with +the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and +stood out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless, +and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with +them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these +infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be +afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but a +variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which +confer reputation and power upon a new prince. + +This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for +letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express +the love with which he would be received in all those provinces which +have suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst +for revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what +tears. What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to +him? What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? +To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your +illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with +which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard +our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be +verified that saying of Petrarch: + + Virtu contro al Furore + Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto: + Che l'antico valore + Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto. + + Virtue against fury shall advance the fight, + And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight: + For the old Roman valour is not dead, + Nor in th' Italians' brests extinguished. + +Edward Dacre, 1640. + + + + + +DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY +THE DUKE VALENTINO +WHEN MURDERING +VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR +PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI + +BY + +NICOL MACHIAVELLI + + + +The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to +clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had +been raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of +Arezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, +whence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against +Giovanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring +that city under his domination, and to make it the head of his +Romagnian duchy. + +These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and +their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too +powerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek +to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon +this a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to +which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, +Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the +tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo +Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and +courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which +might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they +decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the +Florentines; and they send their men to one place and another, +promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to +unite with them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once +reported throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under +the duke, among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting +a revolution. + +Thus it arose that, men's minds being thus unsettled, it was decided +by certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was +held for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The +castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken +there; so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were +being carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was +prevented from being drawn up by those inside, they took the +opportunity of leaping upon the bridge and thence into the fortress. +Upon this capture being effected, the whole state rebelled and +recalled the old duke, being encouraged in this, not so much by the +capture of the fort, as by the Diet at Magione, from whom they +expected to get assistance. + +Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose +the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any +town, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and +they sent again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in +destroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened +and that they ought not to wait for another opportunity. + +But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli +and Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo +Machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the +duke against his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, +because, against everybody's expectation, his soldiers had at once +gone over to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his +door. But recovering courage from the offers of the Florentines, he +decided to temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that +remained to him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to +get assistance. This latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the +King of France for men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he +turned into cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money. + +Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached +Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the +aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the +duke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with +offers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did +not fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he +wished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was +enough for him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have +the principality. + +And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to +him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to +a standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took +every care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such +preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops +in separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile +there came also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he +found himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in +open war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous +to outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of +reconciliation. + +And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them +in which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four +thousand ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and +he formed an alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force +them to come personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do +so. On the other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of +Urbino and other places seized by them, to serve him in all his +expeditions, and not to make war against or ally themselves with any +one without his permission. + +This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, +again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his +state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the +fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by +the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his +friends. But the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and +dispersed his men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end +of November together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to +Cesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the +Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of +Urbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but +nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that +if the duke wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they +were ready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. +To this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with +Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was +very willing to proceed against Sinigalia. + +It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the +fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give +it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him +to come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being +invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no +suspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French +men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the +hundred lancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left +Cesena about the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the +utmost cunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to +wait for him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of +compliance would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the +reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the +arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very +stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not +offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by +Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he +agreed to wait. + +Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on +30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most +trusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor +d'Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as +Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should +arrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting +certain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they +reached Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they +came to the duke's quarters, where they should be seized. + +The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which +there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to +assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from +Fano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last +day of December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a +cavalcade of about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved +forward the infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at- +arms. + +Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situate on the shore of +the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he +who goes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the +bases of which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of +Sinigalia is distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than +a bow-shot and from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to +the city runs a little river which bathes that part of the walls +looking towards Fano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to +Sinigalia comes for a good space by road along the mountains, and +reaches the river which passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left +hand along the bank of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he +arrives at a bridge which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast +of the gate that leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but +transversely. Before this gate there stands a collection of houses +with a square to which the bank of the river forms one side. + +The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, +and to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles +distant from Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for +the men of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and +his band, which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and +fifty horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. +Matters having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for +Sinigalia, and when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they +did not pass over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards +the river and the other towards the country, and a way was left in the +middle through which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the +town. + +Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a +few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a +cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his +approaching death--a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the +man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that +when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet +the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He +recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised +his nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the +virtues of their fathers that should be kept in mind. These three, +therefore, came before the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were +received by him with goodwill; they were at once placed between those +who were commissioned to look after them. + +But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band +in Sinigalia, was missing--for Oliverotto was waiting in the square +before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and +drilling them--signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the +care of Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures +that Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and +joined Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men +out of their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of +the duke; and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters +and to come himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken +this advice, came before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to +him; and Oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others. + +So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke's +quarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made +them prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that +the men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. +Those of Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of +the Orsini and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment +of the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, +and bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and +Vitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of +the country and saved themselves. + +But the duke's soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the +men of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not +repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have +completely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced, +the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into +a room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in +keeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of +the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the +blame for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the +Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome +that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of +Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th +January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the +same way. + + + + + +THE LIFE OF +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA + +WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI + +And sent to his friends +ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI +And +LUIGI ALAMANNI + + + +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI +1284-1328 + +It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who +have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of +them, who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all +others in their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness +and obscurity; or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous +way. They have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or +they have had so mean a parentage that in shame they have given +themselves out to be sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be +wearisome to relate who these persons may have been because they are +well known to everybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly +edifying to those who read them, they are omitted. I believe that +these lowly beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is desirous +of showing to the world that such men owe much to her and little to +wisdom, because she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really +take no part in their career: thus all success must be attributed to +her. Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great +deeds, if he is measured by the times in which he lived and the city +in which he was born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate +nor distinguished in his birth, as the course of this history will +show. It appeared to be desirable to recall his memory, because I have +discerned in him such indications of valour and fortune as should make +him a great exemplar to men. I think also that I ought to call your +attention to his actions, because you of all men I know delight most +in noble deeds. + +The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble +families of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat +fallen in estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family +was born a son Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San +Michele of Lucca, and for this reason was honoured with the title of +Messer Antonio. He had an only sister, who had been married to +Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not +wishing to marry again went to live with her brother. Messer Antonio +had a vineyard behind the house where he resided, and as it was +bounded on all sides by gardens, any person could have access to it +without difficulty. One morning, shortly after sunrise, Madonna +Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called, had occasion to +go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the +dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves of a vine she +turned her eyes in that direction, and heard something resembling the +cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards it, and saw the hands and +face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the leaves and who seemed to +be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and partly fearing, yet +full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it to the house, +where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is customary, +and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When he heard +what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised or +compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves what +should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no +children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for +it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They +baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As +the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of +wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those +lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended +to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his +canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with +this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio +was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached +the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of +Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left +off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, +delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in +running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he +far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at +any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of +wars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with +vexation and sorrow. + +There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, +named Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, +bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had +often fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a +Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This +gentleman resided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others +most mornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is +at the top of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, +and he had often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of +the street in those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that +Castruccio far excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to +exercise a royal authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed +him, Messer Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. +Being informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio +he felt a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called +him one day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the +house of a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use +arms, or in the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but +masses and the services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that +it pleased Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even +though he stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by +Messer Francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were +agreeable, nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly +studies and take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer +Francesco, and in a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer +Antonio, who was driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the +lad, and the fear that he would not be able to hold him much longer. + +Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to +the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was +astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that +virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true +gentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and +could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and +tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all +others, and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. +But what enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the +delightful modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or +word to others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with +his equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him +beloved, not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When +Castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were +driven from Pavia by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the +Visconti to assist the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in +charge of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and +courage in this expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any +other captain, and his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, +but throughout all Lombardy. + +Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation that he +left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as +many friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are +necessary for that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, +leaving a son thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed +Castruccio to be his son's tutor and administrator of his estate. +Before he died Francesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to +show Pagolo that goodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to +HIM, and to render to the son the gratitude which he had not been able +to repay to the father. Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became +the governor and tutor of Pagolo, which increased enormously his power +and position, and created a certain amount of envy against him in +Lucca in place of the former universal goodwill, for many men +suspected him of harbouring tyrannical intentions. Among these the +leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the head of the Guelph party. +This man hoped after the death of Messer Francesco to become the chief +man in Lucca, but it seemed to him that Castruccio, with the great +abilities which he already showed, and holding the position of +governor, deprived him of his opportunity; therefore he began to sow +those seeds which should rob Castruccio of his eminence. Castruccio at +first treated this with scorn, but afterwards he grew alarmed, +thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able to bring him into disgrace +with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples and have him driven out of +Lucca. + +The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of +Arezzo, who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards +became their lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from +Lucca, with whom Castruccio held communications with the object of +effecting their restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also +brought into his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the +authority of the Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, +Castruccio cautiously fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it +with supplies and munitions of war, in order that it might stand a +siege for a few days in case of need. When the night came which had +been agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between +the mountains and Pisa with many men, the signal was given, and +without being observed Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and +set fire to the portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within +the city, calling the people to arms and forcing open the gate from +his side. Uguccione entered with his men, poured through the town, and +killed Messer Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and +supporters. The governor was driven out, and the government reformed +according to the wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, +because it was found that more than one hundred families were exiled +at that time. Of those who fled, part went to Florence and part to +Pistoia, which city was the headquarters of the Guelph party, and for +this reason it became most hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese. + +As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party +that the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they +determined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a +large army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence +they marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into +Lucca. Upon this Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, +and with a number of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he +moved against the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance +of the enemy withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between +Montecatini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to +Montecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight +skirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence. +Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed +coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing +worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the +army in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought about the ruin of +the Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its +captain had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observed +this, and allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief; +he also showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions +of the camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more +insolent the more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they +drew out in the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. +Presently, deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and +having mastered their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. +First he spoke a few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and +pointed out to them the certainty of victory if they would but obey +his commands. Castruccio had noticed how the enemy had placed all his +best troops in the centre of the line of battle, and his less reliable +men on the wings of the army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, +putting his most valiant men on the flanks, while those on whom he +could not so strongly rely he moved to the centre. Observing this +order of battle, he drew out of his lines and quickly came in sight of +the hostile army, who, as usual, had come in their insolence to defy +him. He then commanded his centre squadrons to march slowly, whilst he +moved rapidly forward those on the wings. Thus, when they came into +contact with the enemy, only the wings of the two armies became +engaged, whilst the center battalions remained out of action, for +these two portions of the line of battle were separated from each +other by a long interval and thus unable to reach each other. By this +expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio's men were opposed to +the weaker part of the enemy's troops, and the most efficient men of +the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines were unable to +fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or to give any +assistance to their own flanks. So, without much difficulty, +Castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the centre +battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to +attack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. The defeat +was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than +ten thousand men killed with many officers and knights of the Guelph +party in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them, +among whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his +nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castruccio +the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was +Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed +in the first onset. + +This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that +Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it +appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of +power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only +waited for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the +death of Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in +Lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for +refuge. On the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, +they were driven off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This +affair coming to the knowledge of Uguccione, who was than at Pisa, it +appeared to him a proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He +therefore sent for his son Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and +commissioned him to take Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him +to death. Castruccio, fearing no evil, went to the governor in a +friendly way, was entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. +But Neri, fearing to put him to death lest the people should be +incensed, kept him alive, in order to hear further from his father +concerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and +cowardice of his son, and at once set out from Pisa to Lucca with four +hundred horsemen to finish the business in his own way; but he had not +yet reached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to +death and created Count Gaddo della Gherardesca their lord. Before +Uguccione reached Lucca he heard of the occurrences at Pisa, but it +did not appear wise to him to turn back, lest the Lucchese with the +example of Pisa before them should close their gates against him. But +the Lucchese, having heard of what had happened at Pisa, availed +themselves of this opportunity to demand the liberation of Castruccio, +notwithstanding that Uguccione had arrived in their city. They first +began to speak of it in private circles, afterwards openly in the +squares and streets; then they raised a tumult, and with arms in their +hands went to Uguccione and demanded that Castruccio should be set at +liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse might happen, released him from +prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered his friends around him, and with +the help of the people attacked Uguccione; who, finding he had no +resource but in flight, rode away with his friends to Lombardy, to the +lords of Scale, where he died in poverty. + +But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, +and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people +that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having +obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the +recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of +Uguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded +a treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he +constructed a fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in +the course of two months Castruccio captured the town. With the +reputation gained at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and +Lavenza, and in a short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In +order to close the pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he +besieged Pontremoli and wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio +Palavicini, who was the lord of it. After this victory he returned to +Lucca, and was welcomed by the whole people. And now Castruccio, +deeming it imprudent any longer to defer making himself a prince, got +himself created the lord of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, +Puccinello dal Portico, Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all +of whom he had corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and +deliberately elected prince by the people. At this time Frederick of +Bavaria, the King of the Romans, came into Italy to assume the +Imperial crown, and Castruccio, in order that he might make friends +with him, met him at the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had +left as his deputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high +estimation, because of the people's love for the memory of his father. +Castruccio was received in great honour by Frederick, and many +privileges were conferred upon him, and he was appointed the emperor's +lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time the Pisans were in great fear of +Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had driven out of Pisa, and they +had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Frederick created Castruccio +the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of the Guelph party, and +particularly of the Florentines, were constrained to accept him as +their lord. + +Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian +affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian +Ghibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to +Castruccio for help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship +of his country, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among +these exiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo +Nardi, and Piero Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. +Castruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all +Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to +gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer +Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces +of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he +divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied +with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he +could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without +those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he +surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer +Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had +driven out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army +and the King Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade +the Florentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at +home, they should be compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in +order to defend themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and +seized Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the +country. Whereupon the Florentines recalled their army, which had +scarcely reached Tuscany, when Castruccio was forced by other +necessities to return to Lucca. + +There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so +powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance +him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not +received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they +incited other families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. +They found their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they +set upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and +killed him. They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but +Stefano di Poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the +rebellion, intervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down +their arms; and he offered to be their mediator with Castruccio to +obtain from him what they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms +with no greater intelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, +having heard the news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put +Pagolo Guinigi in command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set +out for home. Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at +an end, yet he posted his men in the most advantageous places +throughout the city. As it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought +to be very much obliged to him, he sought him out, and without saying +anything on his own behalf, for he did not recognize any need for +doing so, he begged Castruccio to pardon the other members of his +family by reason of their youth, their former friendships, and the +obligations which Castruccio was under to their house. To this +Castruccio graciously responded, and begged Stefano to reassure +himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure to find the tumult +at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to hear of its +inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to him, saying +that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of showing +his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and Castruccio +they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown into prison +and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered San Miniato, +whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace, as it did +not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to leave +him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce, which +they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and desirous +of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded with them +for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conquests they +had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned his +attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should not again +be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, under +various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their +ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, +but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had in +his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that +none of them were to be trusted. Then for his further security he +raised a fortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom +he had killed or hunted out of the state. + +Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened +his position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, +of increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he +could get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, +which was his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made +friends with the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that +both parties confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it +always had been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the +Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each +of these men held secret communications with Castruccio, and each +desired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many +threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the +Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city; +both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they +believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than +the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave +promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and +to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the +appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself +direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and +both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a +signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other +Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans +of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the +hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the +palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them +many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked +to the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and +quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great +valour. + +About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the +dearness of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at +Avignon. The German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what +happened--murders and tumults following each other daily, without his +being able to put an end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest +the Romans should call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive +the Germans out of the city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer +friend to whom he could apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to +him, begging him not only to give him assistance, but also to come in +person to Rome. Castruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to +render the emperor this service, because he believed that he himself +would not be safe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. +Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio set out for +Rome with six hundred horsemen, where he was received by Enrico with +the greatest distinction. In a short time the presence of Castruccio +obtained such respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or +violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio +having sent by sea from the country round Pisa large quantities of +corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. When he had +chastised some of the Roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary +obedience was rendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many honours, +and was made a Roman senator. This dignity was assumed with the +greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in a brocaded toga, which had +the following words embroidered on its front: "I am what God wills." +Whilst on the back was: "What God desires shall be." + +During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that +Castruccio should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how +they could tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not +be difficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence +were Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to +face danger. These men kept up communications with their friends in +Pistoia, and with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by +night, and after driving out some of Castruccio's officials and +partisans, and killing others, they restored the city to its freedom. +The news of this greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of +Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines +heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, they decided +to intercept him with their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the +belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pistoia. +Assembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph cause, the +Florentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other hand, +Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard where +the Florentines' lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains of +Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as he +possibly could, to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He +believed that if he succeeded in this design, victory was assured, +although he was informed that the Florentines had thirty thousand men, +whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he had every confidence +in his own abilities and the valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to +attack his enemy in the open lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers. +Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill +which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the exact pass, but about a +bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places narrow and steep, whilst +in general it ascends gently, but is still narrow, especially at the +summit where the waters divide, so that twenty men side by side could +hold it. The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a German, who, before +Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to remain in +possession of the castle, it being common to the Lucchese and the +Pistoians, and unclaimed by either--neither of them wishing to +displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and +came under obligations to no one. For these reasons, and also because +the castle was well fortified, he had always been able to maintain his +position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to fall upon his +enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and there was no +fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force before they +became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this trouble with +Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which possession +of this castle would give him, and having an intimate friendship with +a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with him that four +hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle the night +before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put to death. + +Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the +Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away +from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his +army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they +reached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill +on the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the +castle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching +from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of +Serravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the +hill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his +infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a +path on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four +hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never +expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they +aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the +Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by +surprise when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close +were they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It +was a case of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were +assailed with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their +own, although some few of them got through. When the noise of the +fighting reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with +confusion. The cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the +captains were unable to get their men either backward or forward, +owing to the narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one +knew what ought to be done or what could be done. In a short time the +cavalry who were engaged with the enemy's infantry were scattered or +killed without having made any effective defence because of their +unfortunate position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a +stout resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on +both flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their +friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a +decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one +thousand infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four +hundred horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the +whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they +carried out with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the +attack, but gave way, and were soon in full retreat--conquered more by +their unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in +the rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each +man seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very +sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were +Bandini dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, +all Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought +on the Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the +Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out +the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not +content with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both +sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola, +about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing +the spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding +horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals +in commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to +corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city +gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the +participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso +Lupacci and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the +Florentines great anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, +they sent envoys to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion +of their city; and he, knowing of what immense importance the +maintenance of the Guelph cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed +with the Florentines to receive from them a yearly tribute of two +hundred thousand florins, and he send his son Carlo to Florence with +four thousand horsemen. + +Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the +pressure of Castruccio's army, owing to his being compelled to leave +his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress +a conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, +one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland +should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this +conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of +Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy +paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few +are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy +Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio. +This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio +Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering +their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and +put him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove +their families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both +Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought +and energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the +Florentines their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await +the coming of Carlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived +they decided to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more +than thirty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry--having called +to their aid every Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether +they should attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be +better to march on the latter--a course, owing to the recent +conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them, +because they believed that the surrender of Pistoia would follow the +acquisition of Pisa. + +In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army +and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing +from thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous +army which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no +degree alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune +would deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no +reason to think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had +better prospects of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled +twenty thousand foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with +this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa +with five thousand infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than +any other town in the Pisan district, owing to its situation between +the rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevation above the +surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being +victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approach +it either from the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get +through to Pisa, or attack Castruccio's forces except at a +disadvantage. In one case they would find themselves placed between +his two armies, the one under his own command and the other under +Pagolo, and in the other case they would have to cross the Arno to get +to close quarters with the enemy, an undertaking of great hazard. In +order to tempt the Florentines to take this latter course, Castruccio +withdrew his men from the banks of the river and placed them under the +walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse of land between them and +the river. + +The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to +decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and, +having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the +latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet +the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the +saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the +Florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of +cavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action +was fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the +Florentines with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, +not allowing them to issue from the river before he charged them; he +also sent one thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same +number down the Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much +impeded by their arms and the water that they were not able to mount +the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the +river more difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had +crossed having broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep +with mud, many of the horses rolled over with their riders and many of +them had stuck so fast that they could not move. When the Florentine +captains saw the difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew +them and moved higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less +treacherous and the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met +at the bank by the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, +who, being light armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let +fly with tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. +The horses, alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move +forward, and trampled each other in great confusion. The fight between +the men of Castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing +was sharp and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation +and neither would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive +the others back into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a +footing on land in order to make room for the others pressing forward, +who if they could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and +in this obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. +Castruccio shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom +they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines +reproached each other that the many should be overcome by the few. At +length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that +both his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides +had many killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry +to take up a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then +commanded these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to +retreat, and one part of them to turn to the right and another to the +left. This cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took +advantage, and thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. +But when these tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with +Castruccio's reserves they could not stand against them and at once +fell back into the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet +gained any decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, +knowing his inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to +stand on the defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he +hoped that when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make +short work of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he +saw the Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the +remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This +they did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, +fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. +The Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had +met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry +cross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of +Castruccio's army. But here, also, the banks were steep and already +lined by the men of Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. +Thus the Florentines were so completely defeated at all points that +scarcely a third of them escaped, and Castruccio was again covered +with glory. Many captains were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of +King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the +Florentine commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, +the slaughter was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a +battle. Of the Florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and +thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and +seventy men. + +But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his +life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus +ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry +into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but +death could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the +battle the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although +fatigued and overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome +his men on their return from victory and personally thank them. He was +also on the watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the +fortunes of the day; he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a +good general to be the first man in the saddle and the last out of it. +Here Castruccio stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on +the banks of the Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he +took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to +such troubles; but it was the cause of his death. On the following +night he was attacked with high fever, which increased so rapidly that +the doctors saw it must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called +Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him as follows: + +"If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the +midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my +successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have +left thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, +because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and +Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the +Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these +peoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least +more peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, +but one more secure and established on a surer foundation. But +Fortune, who insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did +not endow me with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the +first, nor the time to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have +told thee, and I have never concealed it, how I entered the house of +thy father whilst yet a boy--a stranger to all those ambitions which +every generous soul should feel--and how I was brought up by him, and +loved as though I had been born of his blood; how under his governance +I learned to be valiant and capable of availing myself of all that +fortune, of which thou hast been witness. When thy good father came to +die, he committed thee and all his possessions to my care, and I have +brought thee up with that love, and increased thy estate with that +care, which I was bound to show. And in order that thou shouldst not +only possess the estate which thy father left, but also that which my +fortune and abilities have gained, I have never married, so that the +love of children should never deflect my mind from that gratitude +which I owed to the children of thy father. Thus I leave thee a vast +estate, of which I am well content, but I am deeply concerned, +inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure. Thou hast the city +of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest contented under they +government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are of nature +changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be sometimes held in +subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under a Lucchese. +Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with factions and +deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs recently +inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended +Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly +destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than +they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the +princes of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far +distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou +hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory +of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has +brought thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will +assist thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are +suffering under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to +thee. And whereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I +believed that war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou +hast every inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance +will bring thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest +important in this world that a man should know himself, and the +measure of his own strength and means; and he who knows that he has +not a genius for fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of +peace. And it will be well for thee to rule they conduct by my +counsel, and to learn in this way to enjoy what my life-work and +dangers have gained; and in this thou wilt easily succeed when thou +hast learnt to believe that what I have told thee is true. And thou +wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that I have left thee this realm and +have taught thee how to keep it." + +After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, +and Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending +Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his +successor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him, +and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he +was. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he +was buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to +Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the +abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, +and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This +latter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the time of the +great-grandson of Pagolo. + +From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a +man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own +time, but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above +the ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious +presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke +with him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, +and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or +snowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends, +but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false +with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he +desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory +that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was +bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He +was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear +nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees +that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully +sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not +look for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was +not angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened +that he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, +as on the following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a +partridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom +Castruccio had said: "You would not have given more than a penny." +"That is true," answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: "A +ducat is much less to me." Having about him a flatterer on whom he had +spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: +"Fisherman are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in +order that they make take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to +be wetted by spittle that I may catch a whale"; and this was not only +heard by Castruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest +that it was wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: +"If that be a vice than you should not fare so splendidly at the +feasts of our saints." Passing through a street he saw a young man as +he came out of a house of ill fame blush at being seen by Castruccio, +and said to him: "Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out, +but when thou goest into such places." A friend gave him a very +curiously tied knot to undo and was told: "Fool, do you think that I +wish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to fasten." +Castruccio said to one who professed to be a philosopher: "You are +like the dogs who always run after those who will give them the best +to eat," and was answered: "We are rather like the doctors who go to +the houses of those who have the greatest need of them." Going by +water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much disturbed by a +dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for cowardice by +one of those with him, who said that he did not fear anything. +Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since every man +valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one what he +ought to do to gain estimation, he said: "When thou goest to a banquet +take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon another." To +a person who was boasting that he had read many things, Castruccio +said: "He knows better than to boast of remembering many things." +Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming intoxicated. +Castruccio replied: "An ox does the same." Castruccio was acquainted +with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being blamed by a +friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be taken in by +a woman, he said: "She has not taken me in, I have taken her." Being +also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered: "Thou dost not +spend as much as I do?" and being told that it was true, he continued: +"Then thou art more avaricious than I am gluttonous." Being invited by +Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of Luca, to supper, +he went to the house and was shown by Taddeo into a chamber hung with +silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers and foliage of +the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered some saliva in his +mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him much disturbed by +this, said to him: "I knew not where to spit in order to offend thee +less." Being asked how Caesar died he said: "God willing I will die as +he did." Being one night in the house of one of his gentlemen where +many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of his friends for +dancing and amusing himself with them more than was usual in one of +his station, so he said: "He who is considered wise by day will not be +considered a fool at night." A person came to demand a favour of +Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea threw +himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by +Castruccio, said: "Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast +thy ears in thy feet," whereupon he obtained double the favour he had +asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one, +seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled +blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous +words, he said to him: "When you have another request to make, send +someone else to make it." Having been wearied by a similar man with a +long oration who wound up by saying: "Perhaps I have fatigued you by +speaking so long," Castruccio said: "You have not, because I have not +listened to a word you said." He used to say of one who had been a +beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was +dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now +he took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, +he said: "Do you laugh because you are successful or because another +is unfortunate?" Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco +Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: "What shall I give you if +you will let me give you a blow on the nose?" Castruccio answered: "A +helmet." Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been +instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done +wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived +themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly +those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying +that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then +refused when the time came. He said that it always struck him with +surprise that whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would +sound it first to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they +were content with only looking at her. He was once asked in what +manner he would wish to be buried when he died, and answered: "With +the face turned downwards, for I know when I am gone this country will +be turned upside down." On being asked if it had ever occurred to him +to become a friar in order to save his soul, he answered that it had +not, because it appeared strange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to +Paradise and Uguccione della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once +asked when should a man eat to preserve his health, and replied: "If +the man be rich let him eat when he is hungry; if he be poor, then +when he can." Seeing on of his gentlemen make a member of his family +lace him up, he said to him: "I pray God that you will let him feed +you also." Seeing that someone had written upon his house in Latin the +words: "May God preserve this house from the wicked," he said, "The +owner must never go in." Passing through one of the streets he saw a +small house with a very large door, and remarked: "That house will fly +through the door." He was having a discussion with the ambassador of +the King of Naples concerning the property of some banished nobles, +when a dispute arose between them, and the ambassador asked him if he +had no fear of the king. "Is this king of yours a bad man or a good +one?" asked Castruccio, and was told that he was a good one, whereupon +he said, "Why should you suggest that I should be afraid of a good +man?" + +I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and +weighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to +his high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a +prince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good +fortune, so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad +fortune; therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison +are to be seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, +where they were placed by him to testify for ever to his days of +adversity. As in his life he was inferior neither to Philip of +Macedon, the father of Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in +the same year of his age as they did, and he would doubtless have +excelled both of them had Fortune decreed that he should be born, not +in Lucca, but in Macedonia or Rome. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg Etext of The Prince, Etc.,by Machiavelli + diff --git a/old/old/tprnc11.zip b/old/old/tprnc11.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..7d8f2e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/tprnc11.zip |