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diff --git a/old/1232-0.txt b/old/1232-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..383ab86 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/1232-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5177 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Prince, by Nicolo Machiavelli + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you +will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before +using this eBook. + +Title: The Prince + +Author: Nicolo Machiavelli + +Translator: W. K. Marriott + +Release Date: March, 1998 [eBook #1232] +[Most recently updated: July 1, 2022] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +Produced by: John Bickers, David Widger and Others + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE *** + + + + +The Prince + +by Nicolo Machiavelli + +Translated by W. K. Marriott + + +Contents + + INTRODUCTION + YOUTH Æt. 1-25—1469-94 + OFFICE Æt. 25-43—1494-1512 + LITERATURE AND DEATH Æt. 43-58—1512-27 + THE MAN AND HIS WORKS + DEDICATION + + THE PRINCE + CHAPTER I. HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED + CHAPTER II. CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES + CHAPTER III. CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES + CHAPTER IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH + CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED + CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY + CHAPTER VII. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE + CHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS + CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY + CHAPTER X. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED + CHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES + CHAPTER XII. HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES + CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN + CHAPTER XIV. THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR + CHAPTER XV. CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED + CHAPTER XVI. CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS + CHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED + CHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH + CHAPTER XIX. THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED + CHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? + CHAPTER XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN + CHAPTER XXII. CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES + CHAPTER XXIII. HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED + CHAPTER XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES + CHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER + CHAPTER XXVI. AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS + + DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI + + THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA + + + + +_ Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to +1512 held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic +missions to various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; +later exiled and returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd +June 1527._ + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the +second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, +and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were +members of the old Florentine nobility. + +His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly +enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of +Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an +Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Il Magnifico. +The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year +Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official career +Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted +until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his +office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they +were once more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s +literary activity and increasing influence; but he died, within a few +weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his +fifty-eighth year, without having regained office. + + + + +YOUTH — Æt. 1-25—1469-94 + + +Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the +Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of +this representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been +described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by +the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving +Lorenzo. Savonarola’s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have +been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power over the +fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a +gibe in _The Prince_, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed +prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean +rule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli +strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to +Lorenzo’s grandson that he dedicates _The Prince_. + +Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a picture of the +young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: “They were freer +than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other +kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, +and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with +wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly +was thought the wisest.” In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli +shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and +leads us to infer that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes: +“I have received your letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure, +especially because you tell me you are quite restored in health, than +which I could have no better news; for if God grant life to you, and to +me, I hope to make a good man of you if you are willing to do your +share.” Then, writing of a new patron, he continues: “This will turn +out well for you, but it is necessary for you to study; since, then, +you have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters +and music, for you see what honour is done to me for the little skill I +have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to please me, and to bring success +and honour to yourself, do right and study, because others will help +you if you help yourself.” + + + + +OFFICE — Æt. 25-43—1494-1512 + + +The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spent in the service of the +free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the +expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After +serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed +Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and +Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of +Machiavelli’s life, for during this time he took a leading part in the +affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and +dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere +recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and +soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and +supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters +which illustrate _The Prince_. + +His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, “my lady of Forli” +of _The Prince_, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it +is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on +fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is +urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes. + +In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for +continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct +of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft +summarized in _The Prince_, and was consequently driven out. He, also, +it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support +to Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge +that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the +faith of princes. + +Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied with events arising out +of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the +Duke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of _The +Prince_. Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke +for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have +seized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the +pattern of Cesare Borgia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed +by some critics as the “hero” of _The Prince_. Yet in _The Prince_ the +duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the +fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that +might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save +him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens; +and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims +that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen +fatality. + +On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to +watch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia +cheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano +delle Rovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most +reason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election, +says that he who thinks new favours will cause great personages to +forget old injuries deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had +ruined Cesare. + +It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that +pontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought +to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing +chiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius +that Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and +women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man +that will win and hold them both. + +It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian +states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, +with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those +events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they +impinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with +Louis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch’s character has +already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as +the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but +who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, +had he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have +been ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men +of the age, and his character has been drawn by many hands; but +Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the +secret of his many failures when he describes him as a secretive man, +without force of character—ignoring the human agencies necessary to +carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the fulfilment of +his wishes. + +The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official career were filled with +events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the +three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the +object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in +the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won +in eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during +these events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out +between the pope and the French, because friendship with France had +dictated the entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II +finally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance +of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy +of the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the +Medici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st +September 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the signal +for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end +to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without regaining +office. + + + + +LITERATURE AND DEATH — Æt. 43-58—1512-27 + + +On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had +vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, +was dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he +was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici, +imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope, +Leo X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at +San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In +a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a +very interesting description of his life at this period, which +elucidates his methods and his motives in writing _The Prince_. After +describing his daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he +writes: “The evening being come, I return home and go to my study; at +the entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt, +and put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass +into the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly +received by them, I am fed with that food which is mine alone; where I +do not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their +actions, and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours I +feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay, +death does not terrify me; I am possessed entirely by those great men. +And because Dante says: + +Knowledge doth come of learning well retained, +Unfruitful else, + +I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have +composed a small work on ‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out as +fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a +principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how +they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever +pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, +especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it +to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will +be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had +with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it.” + +The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form +in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work +during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some +unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici. Although +Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or +presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo +ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any +employment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s lifetime, +_The Prince_ was never published by him, and its text is still +disputable. + +Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: “And as to this +little thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that +during the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have +neither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by +one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And of my +loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I could not +now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and honest, as +I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my +honesty.” + +Before Machiavelli had got _The Prince_ off his hands he commenced his +“Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,” which should be read +concurrently with _The Prince_. These and several minor works occupied +him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look +after the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the +Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her +citizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new +constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on +one pretext or another it was not promulgated. + +In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to +settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly +remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he +was much sought after, and also for the production of his “Art of War.” +It was in the same year that he received a commission at the instance +of Cardinal de’ Medici to write the “History of Florence,” a task which +occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may have +determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old writer +observes that “an able statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will +endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play +with.” + +When the “History of Florence” was finished, Machiavelli took it to +Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in +the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is +somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written _The +Prince_ for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained +power in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence” +to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year +the battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left +Francis I a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This +was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular +party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more +banished. + +Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his +return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the “Ten of +Liberty and Peace.” Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached +Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527. + + + + +THE MAN AND HIS WORKS + + +No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence +has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her +most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have +found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the +germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle +to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of his name, +it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which +this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that +the researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more +reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an “unholy +necromancer,” which so long haunted men’s vision, has begun to fade. + +Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and +industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and +with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced +retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he +depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the +successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only +moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political +employments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, +overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren +of results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery +that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct +of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear +by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of +compromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to +suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when +he set him to write the “History of Florence,” rather than employ him +in the state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and +there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure. + +Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on _The +Prince_, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they +are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as +they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contemporaries; yet +they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of +Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical +incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses which +Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and +conduct. + +Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish +some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, _The +Prince_ is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men +are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the +days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices +which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. +Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them +to be—and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses; +prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to +a higher plane—Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an +empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the +arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to +fight. + +It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s that government +should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the +people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of +society; to this “high argument” _The Prince_ contributes but little. +Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments +otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and +insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests _The +Prince_ with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the +incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which +still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other +and their neighbours. + +In translating _The Prince_ my aim has been to achieve at all costs an +exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent +paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. +Machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he +wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his +substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. _Quis eo fuit +unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?_ +In _The Prince_, it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not +only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an +Englishman of Shakespeare’s time the translation of such a treatise was +in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius +of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to +the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example: +the word _intrattenere_, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy +adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would +by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered “entertain,” and every +contemporary reader would understand what was meant by saying that +“Rome _entertained_ the Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting +their power.” But to-day such a phrase would seem obsolete and +ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that “_Rome +maintained friendly relations with the Ætolians_,” etc., using four +words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy brevity +of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute fidelity to +the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can only hope that +the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author’s meaning, may +overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it. + +The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli: + +Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di +trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto +dal duca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da +Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; +Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell’ +Alemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di +Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., +1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence, +1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in +verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose, +1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d’oro (poem in +terza rima), 1517; Dell’ arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il +riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta di +Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie +fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525. + +Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti +carnascialeschi. + +Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, +6 vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., +1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7. + +Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. +Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G. +Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri +intorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. +Ferrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929. + + + + +DEDICATION + + +To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici + +Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed +to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in +which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses, +arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented +to princes, worthy of their greatness. + +Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some +testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my +possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as, +the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience +in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which, +having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now +send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence. + +And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance, +nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable, +seeing that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to +offer you the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all +that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and +dangers; which work I have not embellished with swelling or magnificent +words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic +allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed +to embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour +should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the +weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable. + +Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low +and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of +princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves +below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of +lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves +upon high mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it +needs to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to be +of the people. + +Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I +send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you +will learn my extreme desire that you should attain that greatness +which fortune and your other attributes promise. And if your +Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your +eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a +great and continued malignity of fortune. + + + + +THE PRINCE + + + + +CHAPTER I. +HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE +ACQUIRED + + +All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been +and are either republics or principalities. + +Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long +established; or they are new. + +The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or +they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the +prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of +the King of Spain. + +Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a +prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of +the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. + + + + +CHAPTER II. +CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES + + +I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another +place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to +principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, +and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved. + +I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary +states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than +new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of +his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, +for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless +he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if +he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to +the usurper, he will regain it. + +We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have +withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius +in ’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the +hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it +happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices +cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects +will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and +duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are +lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another. + + + + +CHAPTER III. +CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES + + +But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be +not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken +collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from +an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for +men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and +this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein +they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have +gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common +necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have +submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships +which he must put upon his new acquisition. + +In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in +seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends +who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the +way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, +feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed +forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill +of the natives. + +For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied +Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it +only needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the +gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future +benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is +very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, +they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with +little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the +delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in +the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time +it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on the +borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to +bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be +defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above +mentioned. + + [1] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who + married Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and + died in 1510. + +Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second +time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains +to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and +what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself +more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France. + +Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an +ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country +and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold +them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; +and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of +the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in +other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will +live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, +and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, +although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the +customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst +themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has +only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of +their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws +nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will +become entirely one body with the old principality. + +But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, +customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great +energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real +helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside +there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has +made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other +measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled +there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the +spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy +them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are +great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the +country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied +by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have +more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He +who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost +caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested +from him with the greatest difficulty. + +The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, +which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do +this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A +prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense +he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority +only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them +to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and +scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being +uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not +to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have +been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not +costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as +has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one +has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, +because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious +ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man +ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge. + +But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much +more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, +so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are +exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting +of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and +all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their +own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such +guards are as useless as a colony is useful. + +Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects +ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful +neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care +that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a +footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be +introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of +ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were +brought into Greece by the Ætolians; and in every other country where +they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And +the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner +enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the +hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to +those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over +to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he +has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold +of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, +and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of +them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does +not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, +and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and +troubles. + +The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these +measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with[2] +the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the +greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. +Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and +Ætolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was +humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and +Ætolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor +did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends +without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make +them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because +the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do, +who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for +which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it +is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the +medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; +for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic +fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but +difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either +detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but +difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the +evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise +man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not +having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that +every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the +Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to +avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war +is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of +others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in +Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided +both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which +is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the +benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and +prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring +with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good. + + [2] See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.” + +But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the +things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] as +the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held +possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he +has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain +a state composed of divers elements. + + [3] Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462, + died 1515. + + [4] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498. + +King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who +desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I +will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a +foothold in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every +door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to +accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have +succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not +made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, +regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; +the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of +Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of +Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, +the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then +could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, +which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made +the king master of two-thirds of Italy. + +Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could +have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above +laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although +they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the +Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been +forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have +made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no +sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to +occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was +weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had +thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by +adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater +authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to +follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of +Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was +himself forced to come into Italy. + +And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and +deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, +divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter +in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country +and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and +whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he +drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out +in turn. + +The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always +do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but +when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is +folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with +her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she +ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with +the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she +got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had +not the excuse of that necessity. + +Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, +he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he +brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did +not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to +injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from +the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought +Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to +humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have +consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have +kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would +never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also +because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order +to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not +have had the courage. + +And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander +and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given +above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, +because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your +disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king +had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in +exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap to +Rouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the +faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept. + + [5] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and + married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to + retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown. + + [6] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a + cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510. + +Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the +conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and +wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that +is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes +with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope +Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal +Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I +replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning +that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such +greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the +Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin +may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which +never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming +powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about +either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him +who has been raised to power. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. +WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL +AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH + + +Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly +acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great +became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was +scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole +empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained +themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose +among themselves from their own ambitions. + +I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to +be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of +servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his +favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity +by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons +have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and +hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a +prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, +because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as +superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as +to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular +affection. + +The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the +King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one +lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into +sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and +changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the +midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, +and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king +take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both +of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state +of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The +causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that +the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can +he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the +lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his +ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with +great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when +they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, +for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in +mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his +own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has +been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot +replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this +prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the +others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not +rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it. + +The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because +one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, +for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, +for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the +victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with +infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from +those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated +the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves +the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either +to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings +the opportunity. + +Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of +Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and +therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him +in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which +victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, +for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would +have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults +raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves. + +But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted +like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the +Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities +there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them +endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the +power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed +away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting +afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself +his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed +there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other +than the Romans were acknowledged. + +When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with +which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which +others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; +this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the +conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state. + + + + +CHAPTER V. +CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER +THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED + + +Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been +accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three +courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the +next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live +under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an +oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a +government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand +without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support +him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will +hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other +way. + +There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held +Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they +lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, +dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as +the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did +not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities +in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them +otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city +accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be +destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of +liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither +time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do +or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges +unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they +immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been +held in bondage by the Florentines. + +But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and +his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to +obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in +making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern +themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a +prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But +in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire +for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of +their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them +or to reside there. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND +ABILITY + + +Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities +as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of +state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, +and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely +to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A +wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to +imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not +equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the +clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far +distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow +attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their +strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of +so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach. + +I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a +new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, +accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired +the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station +presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of +these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. +Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the +strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no +other state, is compelled to reside there in person. + +But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, +have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, +and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not +discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet +he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy +to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have +acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their +particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be +found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. +And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed +anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material +to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that +opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and +without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain. + +It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of +Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that +they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of +bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and +that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should +become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary +that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of +the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. +Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians +dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, +and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity +whereby their country was ennobled and made famous. + +Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a +principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The +difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules +and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their +government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there +is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or +more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the +introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for +enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and +lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This +coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on +their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily +believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them. +Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the +opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others +defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along +with them. + +It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter +thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves +or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate +their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In +the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass +anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they +are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have +conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the +reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it +is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that +persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when +they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by +force. + +If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not +have enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to +Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things +immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no +means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the +unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties +in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the +ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are +overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated, +they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards +powerful, secure, honoured, and happy. + +To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some +resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like +kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[1] This man rose from a private +station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to +fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him +for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their +prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one +who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. +This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old +alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on +such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had +endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping. + + [1] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF +OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE + + +Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private +citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they +have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they +have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state +is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as +happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the +Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might +hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those +emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens +came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the +fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable +things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position; +because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not +reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having +always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it +because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful. + +States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature +which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and +correspondencies[1] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not +overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become +princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be +prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, +and that those foundations, which others have laid _before_ they became +princes, they must lay _afterwards_. + + [1] “Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and + correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of + “correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth and seventeenth + centuries. + +Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or +fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and +these are Francesco Sforza[2] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper +means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be +Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties +he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called +by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy +of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he +had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise +and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and +fortunes of others had bestowed on him. + + [2] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria + Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, + on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli + was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia + (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations + of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and along with his letters to + his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years + before _The Prince_, of the proceedings of the duke in his + “Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare + Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended to the + present work. + +Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations +may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be +laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, +therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be +seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not +consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what +better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions; +and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but +the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune. + +Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had +many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see +his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the +Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke +of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini +were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he +saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been +assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, +namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved +him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers, +so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was +easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other +reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not +only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving +the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy +with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He +was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the +attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the +king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the +Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was +hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to +him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that +the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him, +that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might +themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the +same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and +attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And +as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the +Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from +that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the +arms and the luck of others. + +For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in +Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, +making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to +their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that +in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned +entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the +Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came +to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length +that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them, +called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the +rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless +dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the +French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by +trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse +to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the +mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke did not fail to secure with +all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses—the +Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his +power at Sinigalia.[3] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned +their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good +foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of +Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he +gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, +and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out. + + [3] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502. + +When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak +masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave +them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was +full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing +to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it +necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer +Ramiro d’Orco,[4] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest +power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the +greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not +advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but +that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the +country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their +advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some +hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the +people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if +any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in +the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took +Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the +piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The +barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied +and dismayed. + + [4] Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua. + +But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding +himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate +dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great +measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if +he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, +for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would +not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and +to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards +the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. +It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would +have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived. + +Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future +he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church +might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which +Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by +exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as +to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to +himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope +with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the +college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before +the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first +shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had +accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords +as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the +Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And +as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany, +for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his +protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French +were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and +in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down +upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through +hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines +would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was +prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much +power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer +have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his +own power and ability. + +But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He +left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the +rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick +unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and +he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the +foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not +had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he +would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his +foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a +month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst +the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they +could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope +him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not +have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of +Alexander,[5] everything would have been different to him. On the day +that Julius the Second[6] was elected, he told me that he had thought +of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had +provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that, +when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die. + + [5] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503. + + [6] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad + Vincula, born 1443, died 1513. + +When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to +blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to +offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of +others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and +far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and +only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness +frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to +secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome +either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the +people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate +those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of +things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to +destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship +with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal +and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the +actions of this man. + +Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he +made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope +to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected +Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any +cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they +became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom +he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, +San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[7] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear +him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their +relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the +kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above +everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, +failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad +Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages +to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his +choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin. + + [7] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. +CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS + + +Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither +of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is +manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be +more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are +when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the +principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private +person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first +method, it will be illustrated by two examples—one ancient, the other +modern—and without entering further into the subject, I consider these +two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them. + +Agathocles, the Sicilian,[1] became King of Syracuse not only from a +private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a +potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous +life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of +mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession, +he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established +in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself +prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that +which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding +for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, +was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the +senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating +to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the +senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held +the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And although he +was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not +only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for +its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time +raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme +necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, +leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa. + + [1] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C. + +Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will +see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as +he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any +one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were +gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly +held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent +to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, +without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not +glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and +extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his +greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be +seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain. +Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite +wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent +men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius. + +In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da +Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by +his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his +youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his +discipline, he might attain some high position in the military +profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, +and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body +and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing a +paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some +citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than +its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So +he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many +years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look +upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire +anything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he +had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would +be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and +he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably +by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also +to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up. + +Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, +and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he +lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having +arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a +solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of +Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual +in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave +discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son +Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and +others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to +be discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a +chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after +him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places +and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto, +mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief +magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to +obey him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the +prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and +strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a +way that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only +was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all +his neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as +that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by +Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, +as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this +parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made +his leader in valour and wickedness. + +Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after +infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his +country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be +conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by +means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold +the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this +follows from severities[2] being badly or properly used. Those may be +called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are +applied at one blow and are necessary to one’s security, and that are +not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage +of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding +they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than +decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God +or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is +impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves. + + [2] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern + equivalent of Machiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than + the more obvious “cruelties.” + +Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought +to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for +him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to +repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to +reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does +otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to +keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor +can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and +repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so +that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given +little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer. + +And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such +a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall +make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled +times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help +you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be +under any obligation to you for them. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. +CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY + + +But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the +prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, +but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil +principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain +to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a +principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the +favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties +are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be +ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and +oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in +cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or +anarchy. + +A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, +accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the +nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the +reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that +under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, +finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of +one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his +authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles +maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the +aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around +him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can +neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches +sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around +him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. + +Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, +satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is +more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, +while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added +also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, +because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure +himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect +from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile +nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will +rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and +astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain +favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is +compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well +without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and +to give or take away authority when it pleases him. + +Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to +be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape +their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or +they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought +to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt +with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a +natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, +especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in +prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. +But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it +is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, +and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they +were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him. + +Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people +ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only +ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the +people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above +everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may +easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they +receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more +closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more +devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their +favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as +these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, +so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the +people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity. + +Nabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, +and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his +country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was +only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this +would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not +let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that “He who +builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for this is true when a +private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that +the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the +magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as +happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in +Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, +who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who +does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and +energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a one will never find +himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his +foundations well. + + [1] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus + in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C. + + [2] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s + “Florentine History,” Book III. + +These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from +the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either +rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their +government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on +the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and +who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with +great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not +the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the +citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, +are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will +always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For +such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when +citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with +him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to +die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its +citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this +experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore +a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will +always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state +and of him, and then he will always find them faithful. + + + + +CHAPTER X. +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO +BE MEASURED + + +It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of +these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in +case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether +he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite +clear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by +their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise +a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack +them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot +show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to +defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been +discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second +case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision +and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. +And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the +other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often +repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are +always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it +will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town +well fortified, and is not hated by his people. + +The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country +around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits +them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, +because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the +taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they +have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they +always keep in public depots enough for one year’s eating, drinking, +and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss +to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the +community in those labours that are the life and strength of the city, +and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold +military exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to +uphold them. + +Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself +odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only +be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this +world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a +whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever +should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it +burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and +self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that +a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by +giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for +long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving +himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold. + +Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin +the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot +and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the +prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the +damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer +any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with +their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that +their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his +defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they +confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is +well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the +minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not +fail to support and defend them. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. +CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES + + +It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching +which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they +are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held +without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of +religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the +principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. +These princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have +subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are +not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, +and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate +themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being +upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak +no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would +be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them. + +Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church +has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from +Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have +been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) +have valued the temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France +trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and +to ruin the Venetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not +appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. + +Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[1] this country was +under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the +Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal +anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; +the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those +about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. +To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as +it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made +use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini +and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with +arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate +weak and powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a +courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could +rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a +cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a +pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to +speak, one people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would +arise hostile to the Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet +would not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the +temporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in Italy. + + [1] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494. + +Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have +ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to +prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by +reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things +which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although +his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, +nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church, +which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all +his labours. + +Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all +the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the +chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the +way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been +practised before Alexander’s time. Such things Julius not only +followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin +the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these +enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, +inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any +private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within +the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them +some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: +the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and +the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused +the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their +cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster +the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to +support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders +and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope +Leo[2] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, +if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more +venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues. + + [2] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. +HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES + + +Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such +principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having +considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and +having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and +to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of +offence and defence which belong to each of them. + +We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his +foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to +ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or +composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good +laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are +well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the +discussion and shall speak of the arms. + +I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state +are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. +Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds +his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for +they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, +valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the +fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so +long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war +by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for +keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to +make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your +soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take +themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble +to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by +resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they +formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet +when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that +Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in +hand;[1] and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the +truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have +related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who +have also suffered the penalty. + + [1] “With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the _bons mots_ + of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII seized + Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his + quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the + country. _Cf_. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King + Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a + kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy + without resistance: so that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont + to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with chalk in their hands, + to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swords to fight.” + +I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The +mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, +you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own +greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others +contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are +ruined in the usual way. + +And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, +whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted +to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in +person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its +citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it +ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so +that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes +and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and +mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to +bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its +citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and +Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely +armed and quite free. + +Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who +were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the +Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. +After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of +their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their +liberty. + +Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against +the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,[2] +allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His +father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[3] of Naples, left +her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms +of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the +Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these +arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have +defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been +favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have +stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and +others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer +was Giovanni Acuto,[4] and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot +be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the +Florentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the +Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco +turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the +kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while +ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most +prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest +renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have +been proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became +the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if +they held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their +achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and +gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed +gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned +to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they +forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the +beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much +territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to +fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under +Carmignuola,[5] they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him +a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), +and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they +feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they +were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to +lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order +to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their +captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of +Pitigliano,[6] and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not +gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,[7] where in one battle they lost +that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much +trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed +and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. + + [2] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448. + + [3] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples. + + [4] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John + Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was knighted by + Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops and went into + Italy. These became the famous “White Company.” He took part in many + wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible + Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of + Bernabo Visconti. + + [5] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, + executed at Venice, 5th May 1432. + + [6] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San + Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria, + in 1487. “Primo capitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; + Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510. + + [7] Battle of Vaila in 1509. + +And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled +for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, +in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better +prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has +recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired +more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more +states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms +against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were +oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain +authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became +princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the +hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of +priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both +commenced to enlist foreigners. + +The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[8] +the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, +Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After +these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms +of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been +overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted +by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to +lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own. +They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory, +they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not +give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a +moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs +were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand +soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They +had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to +themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking +prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at +night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night; +they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did +they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their +military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both +fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and +contempt. + + [8] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in + Romagna. He was the leader of the famous “Company of St George,” + composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. +CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN + + +Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a +prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by +Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise +against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to +auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[1] for his +assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in +themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always +disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their +captive. + + [1] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), + surnamed “The Catholic,” born 1452, died 1516. + +And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish +to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which +cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw +himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune +brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his +rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the +Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all +expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not +become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his +auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs. + +The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand +Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other +time of their troubles. + +The Emperor of Constantinople,[2] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten +thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not +willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to +the infidels. + + [2] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383. + +Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, +for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them +the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to +others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and +better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one +community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you +have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough +authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most +dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has +always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing +rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming +that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others. + +I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke +entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French +soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, +such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, +discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; +whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and +dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference +between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one +considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when +he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he +relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and +found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when +every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces. + +I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am +unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I +have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by +the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted +like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him +that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to +pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with +aliens. + +I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament +applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with +Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed +him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them +on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to +meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of +others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind +you fast. + +Charles the Seventh,[3] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[4] +having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, +recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he +established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and +infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and +began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as +is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised +the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of +his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his +men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so +accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they +can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot +stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come +off well against others. The armies of the French have thus become +mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms +together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, +but much inferior to one’s own forces. And this example proves it, for +the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of +Charles had been enlarged or maintained. + + [3] Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died + 1461. + + [4] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483. + +But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks +well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I +have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a +principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not +truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster +to the Roman Empire[5] should be examined, it will be found to have +commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time +the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour +which had raised it passed away to others. + + [5] “Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the + reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of + the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence. + When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank + under the weight of its military obligations, he said that this was + ‘wholly unhistorical.’ He might well have added that the Roman power + was at its zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to + fight for the State, but that it began to decline as soon as this + obligation was no longer recognised.”—_Pall Mall Gazette_, 15th May + 1906. + +I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having +its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good +fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And +it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing +can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own +strength. And one’s own forces are those which are composed either of +subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or +auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one’s own forces will be easily +found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one +will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many +republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which +rules I entirely commit myself. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. +THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR + + +A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything +else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is +the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force +that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often +enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the +contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than +of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing +it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is +to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from +a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding +the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons. +For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to +be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which a prince +ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing +proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not +reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him +who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed +servants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other +suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together. And +therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and +above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by +his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, therefore, to +have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should +addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two +ways, the one by action, the other by study. + +As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well +organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he +accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of +localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the +valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of +rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which +knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his +country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by +means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands +with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study +hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and +marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance +to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of +one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the +prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable +that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his +enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to +besiege towns to advantage. + +Philopoemen,[1] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which +writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he +never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in +the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: “If +the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here +with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best +advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, +how ought we to pursue?” And he would set forth to them, as he went, +all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their +opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these +continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any +unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with. + + [1] Philopoemen, “the last of the Greeks,” born 252 B.C., died 183 + B.C. + +But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and +study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne +themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, +so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as +an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been +praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he +always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated +Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of +Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of +Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, +affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things +which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to +observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but +increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be +available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find +him prepared to resist her blows. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. +CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR +BLAMED + + +It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a +prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have +written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in +mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from +the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a +thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me +more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the +imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities +which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is +so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is +done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his +preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his +professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much +that is evil. + +Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how +to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. +Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, +and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are +spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are +remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or +praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, +using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our language is +still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly +who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed +generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, +another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; +one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one +sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another +frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know +that every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a +prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but +because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human +conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently +prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which +would lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible, +from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he +may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need +not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without +which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is +considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like +virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which +looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. +CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS + + +Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I +say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, +liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation +for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should +be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the +reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among +men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of +magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts +all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to +maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax +them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him +odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by +any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded +few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by +whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing +to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being +miserly. + +Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of +liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if +he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in +time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that +with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself +against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without +burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises +liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, +and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few. + +We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have +been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was +assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he +did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King +of France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax +on his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his +long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken +or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A +prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that +he can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he +is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a +reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will +enable him to govern. + +And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and +many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, +and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, +or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is +dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; +and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; +but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his +expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one should +reply: Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies, +who have been considered very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends +that which is his own or his subjects’ or else that of others. In the +first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to +neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who goes +forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion, +handling that which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary, +otherwise he would not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is +neither yours nor your subjects’ you can be a ready giver, as were +Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not take away your +reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; it is only +squandering your own that injures you. + +And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst +you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor +or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a +prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised +and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to +have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, +than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to +incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. +CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED +THAN FEARED + + +Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every +prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. +Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare +Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled +the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if +this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more +merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for +cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[1] Therefore a prince, so +long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the +reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more +merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to +arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to +injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a +prince offend the individual only. + + [1] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi + factions in 1502 and 1503. + +And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the +imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence +Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign +owing to its being new, saying: + +“Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt +Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.”[2] + +Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he +himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and +humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and +too much distrust render him intolerable. + + [2] . . . against my will, my fate +A throne unsettled, and an infant state, +Bid me defend my realms with all my pow’rs, +And guard with these severities my shores. + +Christopher Pitt. + +Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than +feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to +be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it +is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be +dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that +they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as +you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, +property, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far +distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that prince +who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other +precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by +payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be +earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied +upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than +one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation +which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for +their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which +never fails. + +Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he +does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well +being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he +abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their +women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of +someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, +but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, +because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss +of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are +never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always +find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for +taking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner +lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and has under control a +multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard +the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army +united or disposed to its duties. + +Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that +having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to +fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or +against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This +arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his +boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his +soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not +sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire his +deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal +cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been +sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most +excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man, +against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from +nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more +license than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was +upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of +the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio, +yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate +punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in +the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew +much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This +disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have +destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the +control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed +itself, but contributed to his glory. + +Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the +conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing +according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself +on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must +endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII.[1] +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH + + + [1] “The present chapter has given greater offence than any other + portion of Machiavelli’s writings.” Burd, “Il Principe,” p. 297. + +Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and +to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience +has been that those princes who have done great things have held good +faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect +of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on +their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting,[2] the one +by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the +second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, +it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is +necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast +and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient +writers, who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were +given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his +discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who +was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know +how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not +durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the +beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot +defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against +wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares +and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do +not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor +ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, +and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If +men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they +are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to +observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince +legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless +modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and +engagements have been made void and of no effect through the +faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the +fox has succeeded best. + + [2] “Contesting,” _i.e_. “striving for mastery.” Mr Burd points out + that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero’s “De Officiis”: + “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum + per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum + est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.” + +But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, +and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and +so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will +always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent +example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing +else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he +always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power +in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would +observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to +his wishes,[3] because he well understood this side of mankind. + + [3] “Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).” The + words “ad votum” are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550. + +Alexander never did what he said, +Cesare never said what he did. + +Italian Proverb. + +Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities +I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And +I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe +them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear +merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with +a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able +and know how to change to the opposite. + +And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, +cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often +forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,[4] +friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him +to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and +variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to +diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then +to know how to set about it. + + [4] “Contrary to fidelity” or “faith,” “contro alla fede,” and “tutto + fede,” “altogether faithful,” in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy + that these two phrases, “contro alla fede” and “tutto fede,” were + omitted in the Testina edition, which was published with the sanction + of the papal authorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the + word “fede” was “the faith,” _i.e_. the Catholic creed, and not as + rendered here “fidelity” and “faithful.” Observe that the word + “religione” was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being + used to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness “the + religion,” a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot + heresy. South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this + passage as follows: “That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, + Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political + scheme: ‘That the show of religion was helpful to the politician, but + the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.’” + +For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything +slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five +qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether +merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing +more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as +men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it +belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. +Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and +those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who +have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all +men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, +one judges by the result. + +For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding +his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be +praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a +thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are +only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have +no ground to rest on. + +One prince[5] of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never +preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most +hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of +reputation and kingdom many a time. + + [5] Ferdinand of Aragon. “When Machiavelli was writing _The Prince_ it + would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand’s name here + without giving offence.” Burd’s “Il Principe,” p. 308. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX. +THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED + + +Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I +have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss +briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has +been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him +hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will +have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other +reproaches. + +It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, +and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from +both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor +their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has +only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease +in many ways. + +It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, +effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince +should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in +his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his +private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are +irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can +hope either to deceive him or to get round him. + +That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, +and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, +provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by +his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a +prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his +subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From +the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, +and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will +always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they +should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should +affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations +and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will +resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did. + +But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has +only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can +easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by +keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for +him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most +efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not +to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a +prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the +conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have +the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a +conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the +conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires +cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he +believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to +a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content +himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so +that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the +other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare +friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith +with you. + +And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side +of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of +punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the +majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and +the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the +popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to +conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the +execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to +the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and +thus cannot hope for any escape. + +Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content +with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer +Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the +present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had +conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer +Giovanni,[1] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination +the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the +popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in +Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after +the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese, +having information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in +Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a +blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of +their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due +course to the government. + + [1] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He + ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of + conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent experience + (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured for his + alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy. + +For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies +of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is +hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear +everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have +taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep +the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most +important objects a prince can have. + +Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, +and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty +and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its +authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of +the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths +would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the +hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to +protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care +of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be +liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people +for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who +could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the +king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or +a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can +draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs +of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in +their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish +the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people. + +It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths +of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to +my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great +qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have +been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, +therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of +some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were +not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only +submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who +studies the affairs of those times. + +It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to +the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were +Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son +Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. + +There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the +ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be +contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to +put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so +beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard +thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the +people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring +prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, +cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should +exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give +vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors +were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great +authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the +principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours, +were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about +injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes +cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to +avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they +ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the +most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had +need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the +people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not, +accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them. + +From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being +all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, +and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died +honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, +and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, +being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always +kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated +nor despised. + +But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, +who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not +endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, +having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt +for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his +administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as +much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a +prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for +when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain +yourself—it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles—you +have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works +will do you harm. + +But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, +that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in +the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by +him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who +allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the +army conspired against him, and murdered him. + +Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus +Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and +rapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to +commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except +Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour +that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed +by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much +admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were +kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and +satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were +great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the +fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a +prince to imitate. + +Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in +Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to +Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the +praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to +aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy +before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the +Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this +there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the +whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the +Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in +the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he +considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided +to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, +being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that +dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that +the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted +by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, +and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the +Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had +received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this +ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him +out in France, and took from him his government and life. He who will, +therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a +most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and +respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be +wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well, +because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which +the people might have conceived against him for his violence. + +But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent +qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and +acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of +fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which +caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and +cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single +murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those +of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by +those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the +midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that +such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and +desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who +does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the +less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do +any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the +service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had +contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily +threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was +a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin. + +But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to +hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and +he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his +people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave +himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he +might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not +maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete +with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the +imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being +hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against +and was killed. + +It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike +man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, +of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the +throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated +and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought +him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great +indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to +his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the +imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity +by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, +practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at +the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa +rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy +conspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter, +besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were +disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so +many against him, murdered him. + +I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being +thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this +discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this +difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far +less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some +indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that +are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were +the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary +to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more +necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy +the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more +powerful. + +From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him +twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend +the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, +putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them +his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in +the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the +people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state +of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that +it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an +hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old +prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by +those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this +being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, +because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in +new ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state +is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its +hereditary lord. + +But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will +consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been +fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how +it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in +another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to +unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for +Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was +heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly +destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated +Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in +his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot +imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow +those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which +are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are +proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and +firm. + + + + +CHAPTER XX. +ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, +ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? + + +1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their +subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; +others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid +themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning +of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown +and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on +all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those +states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as +comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit. + +2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather +when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by +arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted +become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your +subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be +armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be +handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they +quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, +considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and +service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm +them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either +for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions +breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it +follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character +already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient +to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. +Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has +always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a +prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old +one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those +who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time +and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters +should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state +shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you. + +3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed +to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by +fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their +tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This +may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way +balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for +to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; +rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided +cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always +assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The +Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the +Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although +they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these +disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their +differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not +afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one +party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, +therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be +permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the +more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but +if war comes this policy proves fallacious. + +4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the +difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore +fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who +has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes +enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may +have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, +as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many +consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with +craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed +it, his renown may rise higher. + +5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and +assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were +distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo +Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been +distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak +generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will only say +this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been +hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support +themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they +will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as +they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad +impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always +extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too +much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands +it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours +has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which +induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural +affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then +he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for +it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons +for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern +affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends +of those men who were contented under the former government, and are +therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, +were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it. + +6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states +more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit +to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of +refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been +made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in +our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello +so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on +returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, +razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and +considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the +Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, +therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you +good in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be +reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than +from foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear +from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone. The +castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, +more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the +state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—not to be hated by +the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they +will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be +wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. +It has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use +to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli,[1] when the Count +Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to +withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and +thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that +time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses +were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, +and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, +it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have +been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these +things considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as +well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, +cares little about being hated by the people. + + [1] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia + Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that + Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the + countess announces the appointment: “I have been with the signori,” + wrote Fortunati, “to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me + that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary + to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me at once.” _Cf_. “Catherine + Sforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI. +HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN + + +Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and +setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the +present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he +has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be +the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds +you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the +beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the +foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without +any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile +occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations; +thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power +and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and +of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the +foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him. +Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater +schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and +clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable +example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa, +he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his +achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the +minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the +issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of +the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against +him. + +Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal +affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da +Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life +doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some +method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. +And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action +to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man. + +A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a +downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he +declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course +will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two +of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character +that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In +either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare +yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if +you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the +conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been +conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to +protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want +doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who +loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in +hand, court his fate. + +Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive out +the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the +Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the +Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed +in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged +them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: “As for that +which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your +state not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; +because by not interfering you will be left, without favour or +consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror.” Thus it will always +happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality, +whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with +arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally +follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when a prince +declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with +whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful +and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is +established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to +become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all +are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard, +especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you +may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you +become companions on a fortune that may rise again. + +In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that +you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it +greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of +one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved +him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with +your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be +noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with +one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, +unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers +you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as +possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with +France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their +ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as +happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to +attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince +ought to favour one of the parties. + +Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe +courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, +because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid +one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in +knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to +take the lesser evil. + +A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour +the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his +citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and +agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not +be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken +away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but +the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things +and designs in any way to honour his city or state. + +Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles +at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into +guilds or into societies,[1] he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, +and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of +courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty +of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything. + + [1] “Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.” “Arti” were craft or + trade guilds, _cf_. Florio: “Arte . . . a whole company of any trade + in any city or corporation town.” The guilds of Florence are most + admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject + (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called + “artel,” exist in Russia to-day, _cf_. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s + “Russia,” ed. 1905: “The sons . . . were always during the working + season members of an artel. In some of the larger towns there are + artels of a much more complex kind— permanent associations, possessing + large capital, and pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the + individual members.” The word “artel,” despite its apparent + similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with “ars” + or “arte.” Its root is that of the verb “rotisya,” to bind oneself by + an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only another form of + “rota,” which now signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the + underlying idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu” + were possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included + individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or + “clans” would be most appropriate. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII. +CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES + + +The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they +are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the +first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is +by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and +faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to +recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are +otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error +which he made was in choosing them. + +There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to +be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there +are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; +another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which +neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first +is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. +Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the +first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know +good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have +the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his +servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the +servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest. + +But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one +test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his +own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in +everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you +ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in +his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, +and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not +concerned. + +On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study +him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with +him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he +cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, +many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him +dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, +are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, +the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII. +HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED + + +I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it +is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless +they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of +whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own +affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with +difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they +run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way +of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that +to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell +you the truth, respect for you abates. + +Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the +wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking +the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, +and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and +listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With +these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry +himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more +freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of +these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be +steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either +overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions +that he falls into contempt. + +I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of +affairs to Maximilian,[1] the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, +said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. +This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the +above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he does not communicate his +designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in +carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at +once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being +pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he +does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he +wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions. + + [1] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman + Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after + her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in Italian + politics. + +A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he +wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every +one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to +be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning +the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any +consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be +felt. + +And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression +of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good +advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, +because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not +wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has +yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very +prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would +not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take +away his state from him. + +But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more +than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to +unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, +and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through +them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always +prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. +Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they +come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the +prince from good counsels. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV. +WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES + + +The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince +to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and +fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the +actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an +hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men +and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more +by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good +they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost +defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will +be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and +adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and +with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a +prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom. + +And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in +Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and +others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in +regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in +the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the +people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known +how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that +have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost. + +Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who +was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the +greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a +warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, +he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the +end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the +kingdom. + +Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their +principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own +sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a +change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the +calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they +thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that +the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would +recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very +bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would +never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later +on to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, +it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no +avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, +certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour. + + + + +CHAPTER XXV. +WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER + + +It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the +opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by +fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and +that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us +believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let +chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times +because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may +still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes +pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. +Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true +that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[1] but that she +still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less. + + [1] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: “The older one gets the + more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does + three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe.” Sorel’s + “Eastern Question.” + +I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood +overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away +the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to +its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, +though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when +the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences +and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass +away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so +dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour +has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where +she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain +her. + +And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and +which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open +country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been +defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either +this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it +would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say +concerning resistance to fortune in general. + +But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be +seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change +of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from +causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the +prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I +believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions +according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not +accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in +affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, +glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, +another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, +another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by +a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain +his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different +observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other +impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they +conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from +what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same +effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the +other does not. + +Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs +himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a +way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if +times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course +of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to +know how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot +deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having +always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it +is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time +to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; +but had he changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have +changed. + +Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and +found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of +action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise +against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The +Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he +had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France; +nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his +accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the +Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the +former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, +he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having +observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as +to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore +Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff +with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome +until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, +as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. +Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the +others would have raised a thousand fears. + +I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they +all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience +the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go +cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have +deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him. + +I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind +steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are +successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider +that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a +woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and +ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by +the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She +is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they +are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI. +AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS + + +Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and +wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a +new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an +opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of +things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this +country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new +prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present. + +And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be +captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians +should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the +soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate +the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to +discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy +should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should +be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, +more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten, +despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation. + +Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us +think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was +afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected +him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet +heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of +Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, +and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she +entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs +and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and +willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it. + +Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope +than in your illustrious house,[1] with its valour and fortune, +favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and +which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be +difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the +men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet +they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the +present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier +than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours. + + [1] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. + In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII. + +With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is +necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in +them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness +is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those +men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how +extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example: +the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth +water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your +greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do +everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory +which belongs to us. + +And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians +have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious +house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many +campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, +this has happened because the old order of things was not good, and +none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man +more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was +newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and dignified will +make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting +opportunities to bring such into use in every form. + +Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. +Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how +superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But +when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs +entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are +capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there +having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by +valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for +so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty years, +whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a +poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, +afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.[2] + + [2] The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; + Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513. + +If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable +men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things, +as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own +forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better +soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will be +much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince, +honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is +necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended +against foreigners by Italian valour. + +And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very +formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which +a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be +relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, +and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in +close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the +Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are +overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this +latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at +the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by +German battalions, who follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the +Spaniards, by agility of body and with the aid of their shields, got in +under the pikes of the Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack, +while the Germans stood helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed +up, all would have been over with them. It is possible, therefore, +knowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a new one, +which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need not +create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. And these are +the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new +prince. + +This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for +letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the +love with which he would be received in all those provinces which have +suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for +revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. +What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? +What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To +all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your +illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with +which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard +our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be +verified that saying of Petrarch: + +Virtu contro al Furore + Prendera l’arme, e fia il combatter corto: +Che l’antico valore + Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto. + +Virtue against fury shall advance the fight, + And it i’ th’ combat soon shall put to flight: +For the old Roman valour is not dead, + Nor in th’ Italians’ brests extinguished. + +Edward Dacre, 1640. + + + + +DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING +VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE +DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI + +BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI + + +The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to +clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been +raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of +Arezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, +whence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against +Giovanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring +that city under his domination, and to make it the head of his +Romagnian duchy. + +These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and +their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too +powerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek +to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon +this a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to +which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, +Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the +tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo +Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and +courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which +might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they +decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the +Florentines; and they sent their men to one place and another, +promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to unite +with them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once reported +throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under the duke, +among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting a +revolution. + +Thus it arose that, men’s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by +certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held +for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The +castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there; +so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being +carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from +being drawn up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping +upon the bridge and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being +effected, the whole state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being +encouraged in this, not so much by the capture of the fort, as by the +Diet at Magione, from whom they expected to get assistance. + +Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose +the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any +town, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and +they sent again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in +destroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and +that they ought not to wait for another opportunity. + +But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli +and Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo +Machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the +duke against his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, +because, against everybody’s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone +over to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his door. +But recovering courage from the offers of the Florentines, he decided +to temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that remained to +him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to get assistance. +This latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the King of France +for men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he turned into +cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money. + +Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached +Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the +aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the +duke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with +offers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did +not fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he +wished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough +for him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have the +principality. + +And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to +him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a +standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every +care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such +preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in +separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there +came also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found +himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open +war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous to +outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of +reconciliation. + +And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in +which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand +ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed +an alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come +personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the +other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and +other places seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and +not to make war against or ally themselves with any one without his +permission. + +This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, +again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his +state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the +fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by +the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends. +But the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed +his men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of +November together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to +Cesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the +Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of +Urbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but +nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that +if the duke wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were +ready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To +this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with +Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was +very willing to proceed against Sinigalia. + +It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the +fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give +it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to +come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being +invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no +suspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French +men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred +lancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena +about the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the utmost +cunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for +him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of compliance +would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the +reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the +arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very +stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not +offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by +Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he +agreed to wait. + +Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on +30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most +trusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor +d’Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as +Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should +arrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting +certain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they +reached Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they +came to the duke’s quarters, where they should be seized. + +The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which +there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to +assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from +Fano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day +of December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of +about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the +infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms. + +Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of +the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who +goes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases +of which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia +is distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot +and from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs +a little river which bathes that part of the walls looking towards +Fano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes +for a good space by road along the mountains, and reaches the river +which passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left hand along the bank +of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge +which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast of the gate that +leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but transversely. Before +this gate there stands a collection of houses with a square to which +the bank of the river forms one side. + +The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and +to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant +from Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men +of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band, +which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty +horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters +having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and +when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass +over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards the river and +the other towards the country, and a way was left in the middle through +which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the town. + +Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a +few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a +cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his +approaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the +man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that +when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet +the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He +recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his +nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of +their fathers that should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came +before the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were received by him +with goodwill; they were at once placed between those who were +commissioned to look after them. + +But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band +in Sinigalia, was missing—for Oliverotto was waiting in the square +before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and +drilling them—signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care +of Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that +Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined +Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of +their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke; +and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come +himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice, +came before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and +Oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others. + +So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke’s +quarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made +them prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that +the men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. +Those of Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of +the Orsini and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment +of the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, +and bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and +Vitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of the +country and saved themselves. + +But the duke’s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men +of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not +repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have +completely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced, +the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a +room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in +keeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of +the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the +blame for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the +Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome +that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of +Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th +January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the +same way. + + + + +THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA + +WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI + +And sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI + +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328 + + +It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who +have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them, +who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in +their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and +obscurity; or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way. +They have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have +had so mean a parentage that in shame they have given themselves out to +be sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be wearisome to relate +who these persons may have been because they are well known to +everybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly edifying to +those who read them, they are omitted. I believe that these lowly +beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is desirous of showing to +the world that such men owe much to her and little to wisdom, because +she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take no part in +their career: thus all success must be attributed to her. Castruccio +Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds, if he is +measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he was +born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor distinguished +in his birth, as the course of this history will show. It appeared to +be desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in him such +indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great exemplar +to men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his +actions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds. + +The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families +of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in +estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a +son Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca, +and for this reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He +had an only sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but +Buonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again +went to live with her brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the +house where he resided, and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, +any person could have access to it without difficulty. One morning, +shortly after sunrise, Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio +was called, had occasion to go into the vineyard as usual to gather +herbs for seasoning the dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the +leaves of a vine she turned her eyes in that direction, and heard +something resembling the cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards +it, and saw the hands and face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the +leaves and who seemed to be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and +partly fearing, yet full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it +to the house, where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is +customary, and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When +he heard what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised +or compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves +what should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no +children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for +it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They +baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As +the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of +wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those +lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended +to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his +canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with +this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio +was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached +the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of +Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left +off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, +delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in +running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he +far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at +any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of +wars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with +vexation and sorrow. + +There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, +named Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, +bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had +often fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a +Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman +resided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others most +mornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the +top of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he +had often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of the street +in those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far +excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to exercise a royal +authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed him, Messer +Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. Being +informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio he felt +a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called him one +day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the house of +a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use arms, or in +the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses and the +services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased +Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he +stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer +Francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable, +nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly studies and +take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and +in a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was +driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear +that he would not be able to hold him much longer. + +Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to +the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was +astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that +virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true +gentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and +could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and +tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all others, +and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. But what +enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the delightful +modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or word to +others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with his +equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him beloved, +not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When Castruccio +had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were driven from Pavia +by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the Visconti to assist +the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in charge of his forces. +Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and courage in this +expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other captain, and +his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but throughout all +Lombardy. + +Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he +left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many +friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary +for that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son +thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to +be his son’s tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died +Francesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that +goodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to +the son the gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the +father. Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and +tutor of Pagolo, which increased enormously his power and position, and +created a certain amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the +former universal goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring +tyrannical intentions. Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli +Opizi, the head of the Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of +Messer Francesco to become the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him +that Castruccio, with the great abilities which he already showed, and +holding the position of governor, deprived him of his opportunity; +therefore he began to sow those seeds which should rob Castruccio of +his eminence. Castruccio at first treated this with scorn, but +afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able +to bring him into disgrace with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples +and have him driven out of Lucca. + +The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo, +who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became +their lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca, +with whom Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting +their restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought +into his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of +the Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio +cautiously fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies +and munitions of war, in order that it might stand a siege for a few +days in case of need. When the night came which had been agreed upon +with Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between the mountains and +Pisa with many men, the signal was given, and without being observed +Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and set fire to the +portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the city, calling +the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. Uguccione +entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer +Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The +governor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the +wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found +that more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those +who fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the +headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most +hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese. + +As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party +that the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they +determined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a +large army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence +they marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into +Lucca. Upon this Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and +with a number of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved +against the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the +enemy withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between +Montecatini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to +Montecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight +skirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence. +Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed +coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing +worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the army +in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought about the ruin of the +Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its captain +had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observed this, and +allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief; he also +showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions of the +camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more insolent the +more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they drew out in +the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. Presently, +deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having mastered +their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he spoke a +few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to them the +certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands. Castruccio +had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the centre +of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of the +army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant +men on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he +moved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of his +lines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had +come in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centre +squadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the +wings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings +of the two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained +out of action, for these two portions of the line of battle were +separated from each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach +each other. By this expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio’s men +were opposed to the weaker part of the enemy’s troops, and the most +efficient men of the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines +were unable to fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or +to give any assistance to their own flanks. So, without much +difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the +centre battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to +attack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. The defeat +was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than ten +thousand men killed with many officers and knights of the Guelph party +in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them, among whom +were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his nephew, and +Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castruccio the loss did +not amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was Francesco, +the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed in the +first onset. + +This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that +Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it +appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of +power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only +waited for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the +death of Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in +Lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge. +On the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were +driven off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming +to the knowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him +a proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his +son Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take +Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio, +fearing no evil, went to the governor in a friendly way, was +entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing +to put him to death lest the people should be incensed, kept him alive, +in order to hear further from his father concerning his intentions. +Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at once +set out from Pisa to Lucca with four hundred horsemen to finish the +business in his own way; but he had not yet reached the baths when the +Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and created Count Gaddo +della Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reached Lucca he heard +of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise to him to turn +back, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them should +close their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard of what +had happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to demand +the liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had +arrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private +circles, afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised +a tumult, and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded +that Castruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse +might happen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered +his friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked +Uguccione; who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away +with his friends to Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in +poverty. + +But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, +and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people +that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having +obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the +recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of +Uguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded +a treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed +a fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course +of two months Castruccio captured the town. With the reputation gained +at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a +short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the +pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and +wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the +lord of it. After this victory he returned to Lucca, and was welcomed +by the whole people. And now Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any +longer to defer making himself a prince, got himself created the lord +of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico, +Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he had +corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and deliberately elected +prince by the people. At this time Frederick of Bavaria, the King of +the Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial crown, and +Castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met him at +the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as his deputy in +Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because of the +people’s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was received in +great honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him, +and he was appointed the emperor’s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time +the Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had +driven out of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick. +Frederick created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread +of the Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were +constrained to accept him as their lord. + +Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian +affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian +Ghibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio +for help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his +country, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among these +exiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, +and Piero Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. +Castruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all +Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to +gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer +Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces +of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he +divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied +with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he +could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without +those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he +surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer +Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven +out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the +King Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the +Florentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at home, +they should be compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to +defend themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized +Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country. +Whereupon the Florentines recalled their army, which had scarcely +reached Tuscany, when Castruccio was forced by other necessities to +return to Lucca. + +There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so +powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance +him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not +received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited +other families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They +found their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set +upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and +killed him. They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano +di Poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion, +intervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms; +and he offered to be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him +what they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater +intelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the +news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in +command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set out for home. +Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at an end, yet he +posted his men in the most advantageous places throughout the city. As +it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be very much obliged to +him, he sought him out, and without saying anything on his own behalf, +for he did not recognize any need for doing so, he begged Castruccio to +pardon the other members of his family by reason of their youth, their +former friendships, and the obligations which Castruccio was under to +their house. To this Castruccio graciously responded, and begged +Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure +to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to +hear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to +him, saying that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of +showing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and +Castruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown +into prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered +San Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace, +as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to +leave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce, +which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and +desirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded +with them for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the +conquests they had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, +turned his attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should +not again be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, +under various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by +their ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of +them, but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had +in his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that +none of them were to be trusted. Then for his further security he +raised a fortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom +he had killed or hunted out of the state. + +Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his +position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of +increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he +could get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, +which was his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends +with the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both +parties confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it +always had been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the +Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each +of these men held secret communications with Castruccio, and each +desired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many +threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the +Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city; +both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they +believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than +the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave +promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and +to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the +appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself +direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and +both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a +signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other +Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans +of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the +hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the +palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them +many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to +the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and +quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great +valour. + +About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness +of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. +The German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened—murders +and tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put +an end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should +call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of +the city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he +could apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not +only to give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome. +Castruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the +emperor this service, because he believed that he himself would not be +safe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo +Guinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six +hundred horsemen, where he was received by Enrico with the greatest +distinction. In a short time the presence of Castruccio obtained such +respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or violence, good order +was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio having sent by sea from +the country round Pisa large quantities of corn, and thus removed the +source of the trouble. When he had chastised some of the Roman leaders, +and admonished others, voluntary obedience was rendered to Enrico. +Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman senator. This +dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in +a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on its +front: “I am what God wills.” Whilst on the back was: “What God desires +shall be.” + +During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio +should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could +tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be +difficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were +Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face +danger. These men kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia, +and with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by night, and +after driving out some of Castruccio’s officials and partisans, and +killing others, they restored the city to its freedom. The news of this +greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on +in great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines heard of his return, +knowing that he would lose no time, they decided to intercept him with +their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the belief that by doing so +they would cut off his road to Pistoia. Assembling a great army of the +supporters of the Guelph cause, the Florentines entered the Pistoian +territories. On the other hand, Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his +army; and having heard where the Florentines’ lay, he decided not to +encounter it in the plains of Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of +Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could, to attack it boldly in the +Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if he succeeded in this design, +victory was assured, although he was informed that the Florentines had +thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he +had every confidence in his own abilities and the valour of his troops, +yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open lest he should be +overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and +Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the +exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places +narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still +narrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that +twenty men side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was +Manfred, a German, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had +been allowed to remain in possession of the castle, it being common to +the Lucchese and the Pistoians, and unclaimed by either—neither of them +wishing to displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of +neutrality, and came under obligations to no one. For these reasons, +and also because the castle was well fortified, he had always been able +to maintain his position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to +fall upon his enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and +there was no fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force +before they became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this +trouble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which +possession of this castle would give him, and having an intimate +friendship with a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with +him that four hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle +the night before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put +to death. + +Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the +Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away +from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his +army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they +reached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill +on the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the +castle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching +from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of +Serravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the +hill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his +infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a +path on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four +hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never +expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they +aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the +Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by surprise +when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close were they +upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It was a case +of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were assailed +with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own, +although some few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting +reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The +cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were +unable to get their men either backward or forward, owing to the +narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought +to be done or what could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were +engaged with the enemy’s infantry were scattered or killed without +having made any effective defence because of their unfortunate +position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a stout +resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on both +flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their +friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a +decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one thousand +infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four hundred +horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the whole +force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they carried +out with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the attack, +but gave way, and were soon in full retreat—conquered more by their +unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in the +rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each man +seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very +sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini +dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all +Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on +the Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the +Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out +the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not +content with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both +sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola, +about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the +spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding +horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals in +commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to +corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city +gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the +participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso Lupacci +and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the Florentines great +anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, they sent envoys +to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of their city; and +he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of the Guelph +cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines to +receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and +he sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen. + +Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the +pressure of Castruccio’s army, owing to his being compelled to leave +his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a +conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, +one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland +should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this +conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of +Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy +paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few +are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy +Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio. +This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio +Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering +their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put +him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove their +families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and +Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought and +energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the Florentines +their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await the coming of +Carlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided +to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more than thirty +thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry—having called to their aid +every Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether they should +attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be better to +march on the latter—a course, owing to the recent conspiracy, more +likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them, because they believed +that the surrender of Pistoia would follow the acquisition of Pisa. + +In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army +and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from +thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army +which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree +alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would +deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to +think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects +of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand +foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with this army went to +Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand +infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than any other town in the +Pisan district, owing to its situation between the rivers Arno and +Gusciana and its slight elevation above the surrounding plain. +Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being victualled unless they +divided their forces, nor could they approach it either from the +direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through to Pisa, or +attack Castruccio’s forces except at a disadvantage. In one case they +would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one under his +own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case they +would have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy, +an undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to +take this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of +the river and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide +expanse of land between them and the river. + +The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to +decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and, +having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the +latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet +the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the +saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the +Florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of +cavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was +fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the Florentines +with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, not allowing +them to issue from the river before he charged them; he also sent one +thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same number down the +Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much impeded by their +arms and the water that they were not able to mount the banks of the +river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the river more +difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had crossed having +broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep with mud, many of +the horses rolled over with their riders and many of them had stuck so +fast that they could not move. When the Florentine captains saw the +difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them and moved +higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less treacherous and +the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met at the bank by +the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who, being light +armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with +tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses, +alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and +trampled each other in great confusion. The fight between the men of +Castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp +and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation and neither +would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back +into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land +in order to make room for the others pressing forward, who if they +could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and in this +obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. Castruccio +shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom they had +before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines reproached each +other that the many should be overcome by the few. At length +Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that both his +men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had many +killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take up +a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded +these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and +one part of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This +cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and +thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these +tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with Castruccio’s +reserves they could not stand against them and at once fell back into +the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet gained any +decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, knowing his +inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand on the +defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he hoped that +when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make short work +of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the +Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the remainder +of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This they did with +lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the +enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. The Florentine +captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had met with in +crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry cross lower +down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio’s army. But +here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of +Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines +were so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them +escaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains +were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with +Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine +commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter +was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a battle. Of the +Florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and thirty-one men, +whilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and seventy men. + +But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his +life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus +ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry +into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but +death could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle +the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued +and overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on +their return from victory and personally thank them. He was also on the +watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day; +he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be +the first man in the saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio +stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on the banks of the +Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of +which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to such troubles; but it +was the cause of his death. On the following night he was attacked with +high fever, which increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it must +prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and +addressed him as follows: + +“If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the +midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my +successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left +thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, +because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and +Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the +Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these +peoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least +more peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, but +one more secure and established on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who +insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me +with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the first, nor the time +to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I have +never concealed it, how I entered the house of thy father whilst yet a +boy—a stranger to all those ambitions which every generous soul should +feel—and how I was brought up by him, and loved as though I had been +born of his blood; how under his governance I learned to be valiant and +capable of availing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been +witness. When thy good father came to die, he committed thee and all +his possessions to my care, and I have brought thee up with that love, +and increased thy estate with that care, which I was bound to show. And +in order that thou shouldst not only possess the estate which thy +father left, but also that which my fortune and abilities have gained, +I have never married, so that the love of children should never deflect +my mind from that gratitude which I owed to the children of thy father. +Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I am well content, but I am +deeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure. +Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest +contented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are +of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be +sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under +a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with +factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs +recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended +Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly +destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than +they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the +princes of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far +distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou +hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory +of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has brought +thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist +thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering +under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to thee. And +whereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I believed that +war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou hast every +inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance will bring +thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest important in this +world that a man should know himself, and the measure of his own +strength and means; and he who knows that he has not a genius for +fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. And it will be +well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this +way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and in this +thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that what I +have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that +I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.” + +After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, +and Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending +Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his +successor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him, +and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he +was. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he +was buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to +Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the +abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, +and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This +latter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the time of the +great-grandson of Pagolo. + +From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a +man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time, +but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the +ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious +presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke +with him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, +and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or +snowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends, +but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false +with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he +desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory +that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was +bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He +was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear +nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees +that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully +sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not look +for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was not +angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that +he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on +the following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a +partridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom +Castruccio had said: “You would not have given more than a penny.” +“That is true,” answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: “A +ducat is much less to me.” Having about him a flatterer on whom he had +spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: “Fisherman +are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in order that +they may take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by +spittle that I may catch a whale”; and this was not only heard by +Castruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest that it +was wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: “If that be +a vice then you should not fare so splendidly at the feasts of our +saints.” Passing through a street he saw a young man as he came out of +a house of ill fame blush at being seen by Castruccio, and said to him: +“Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out, but when thou goest +into such places.” A friend gave him a very curiously tied knot to undo +and was told: “Fool, do you think that I wish to untie a thing which +gave so much trouble to fasten.” Castruccio said to one who professed +to be a philosopher: “You are like the dogs who always run after those +who will give them the best to eat,” and was answered: “We are rather +like the doctors who go to the houses of those who have the greatest +need of them.” Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much +disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for +cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did not fear +anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since +every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one +what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: “When thou goest to a +banquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon +another.” To a person who was boasting that he had read many things, +Castruccio said: “He knows better than to boast of remembering many +things.” Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming +intoxicated. Castruccio replied: “An ox does the same.” Castruccio was +acquainted with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being +blamed by a friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be +taken in by a woman, he said: “She has not taken me in, I have taken +her.” Being also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered: +“Thou dost not spend as much as I do?” and being told that it was true, +he continued: “Then thou art more avaricious than I am gluttonous.” +Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of +Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by Taddeo into a +chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers +and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered some +saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him much +disturbed by this, said to him: “I knew not where to spit in order to +offend thee less.” Being asked how Caesar died he said: “God willing I +will die as he did.” Being one night in the house of one of his +gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of +his friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was +usual in one of his station, so he said: “He who is considered wise by +day will not be considered a fool at night.” A person came to demand a +favour of Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea +threw himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by +Castruccio, said: “Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast +thy ears in thy feet,” whereupon he obtained double the favour he had +asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one, +seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled +blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous +words, he said to him: “When you have another request to make, send +someone else to make it.” Having been wearied by a similar man with a +long oration who wound up by saying: “Perhaps I have fatigued you by +speaking so long,” Castruccio said: “You have not, because I have not +listened to a word you said.” He used to say of one who had been a +beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was +dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now he +took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, he +said: “Do you laugh because you are successful or because another is +unfortunate?” Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco +Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: “What shall I give you if +you will let me give you a blow on the nose?” Castruccio answered: “A +helmet.” Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been +instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done +wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived +themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly +those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying +that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused +when the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise +that whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first +to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with +only looking at her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to +be buried when he died, and answered: “With the face turned downwards, +for I know when I am gone this country will be turned upside down.” On +being asked if it had ever occurred to him to become a friar in order +to save his soul, he answered that it had not, because it appeared +strange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione +della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat +to preserve his health, and replied: “If the man be rich let him eat +when he is hungry; if he be poor, then when he can.” Seeing one of his +gentlemen make a member of his family lace him up, he said to him: “I +pray God that you will let him feed you also.” Seeing that someone had +written upon his house in Latin the words: “May God preserve this house +from the wicked,” he said, “The owner must never go in.” Passing +through one of the streets he saw a small house with a very large door, +and remarked: “That house will fly through the door.” He was having a +discussion with the ambassador of the King of Naples concerning the +property of some banished nobles, when a dispute arose between them, +and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the king. “Is this +king of yours a bad man or a good one?” asked Castruccio, and was told +that he was a good one, whereupon he said, “Why should you suggest that +I should be afraid of a good man?” + +I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and +weighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his +high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a +prince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune, +so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune; +therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be +seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they +were placed by him to testify forever to his days of adversity. As in +his life he was inferior neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of +Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in the same year of his +age as they did, and he would doubtless have excelled both of them had +Fortune decreed that he should be born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia +or Rome. + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE *** + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will +be renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the +United States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part +of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm +concept and trademark. 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