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diff --git a/old/old/tprnc10.txt b/old/old/tprnc10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a3eca4 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/tprnc10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5080 @@ +The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Prince, by Nicolo Machiavelli +Includes Two Shorter Works on Valentino and Castracani +#1, 2 and 3 in our series by Machiavelli + + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check +the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!! + +Please take a look at the important information in this header. +We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an +electronic path open for the next readers. Do not remove this. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*These Etexts Prepared By Hundreds of Volunteers and Donations* + +Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and +further information is included below. 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From 1494 to 1512 held an official +post at Florence which included diplomatic +missions to various European courts. +Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; later exiled and +returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on +22nd June 1527. + + + +INTRODUCTION + +Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the +second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, +and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were +members of the old Florentine nobility. + +His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly +enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of +Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as +an Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de' Medici, Il +Magnifico. The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in +which year Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official +career Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which +lasted until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli +lost his office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, +when they were once more driven out. This was the period of +Machiavelli's literary activity and increasing influence; but he died, +within a few weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, +in his fifty-eighth year, without having regained office. + + + +YOUTH +Aet. 1-25--1469-94 + +Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the +Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of +this representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been +described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed +by the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour- +loving Lorenzo. Savonarola's influence upon the young Machiavelli must +have been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power +over the fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a +subject of a gibe in "The Prince," where he is cited as an example of +an unarmed prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of +the Medicean rule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have +impressed Machiavelli strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his +writings, and it is to Lorenzo's grandson that he dedicates "The +Prince." + +Machiavelli, in his "History of Florence," gives us a picture of the +young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: "They were freer +than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other +kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, +and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak +with wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most +cleverly was thought the wisest." In a letter to his son Guido, +Machiavelli shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities +for study, and leads us to infer that his own youth had been so +occupied. He writes: "I have received your letter, which has given me +the greatest pleasure, especially because you tell me you are quite +restored in health, than which I could have no better news; for if God +grant life to you, and to me, I hope to make a good man of you if you +are willing to do your share." Then, writing of a new patron, he +continues: "This will turn out well for you, but it is necessary for +you to study; since, then, you have no longer the excuse of illness, +take pains to study letters and music, for you see what honour is done +to me for the little skill I have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to +please me, and to bring success and honour to yourself, do right and +study, because others will help you if you help yourself." + + + +OFFICE +Aet. 25-43--1494-1512 + +The second period of Machiavelli's life was spent in the service of +the free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from +the expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After +serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed +Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty +and Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of +Machiavelli's life, for during this time he took a leading part in the +affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and +dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere +recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and +soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and +supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters +which illustrate "The Prince." + +His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, "my lady of Forli" +of "The Prince," from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it +is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on +fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is +urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes. + +In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for +continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct +of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft +summarized in "The Prince," and was consequently driven out. He, also, +it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support +to Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge +that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning +the faith of princes. + +Machiavelli's public life was largely occupied with events arising out +of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the +Duke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of "The +Prince." Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke +for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have +seized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the +pattern of Cesare Borgia's conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed +by some critics as the "hero" of "The Prince." Yet in "The Prince" the +duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the +fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that +might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save +him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens; +and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims +that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen +fatality. + +On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to +watch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia +cheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano +delle Rovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most +reason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this +election, says that he who thinks new favours will cause great +personages to forget old injuries deceives himself. Julius did not +rest until he had ruined Cesare. + +It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that +pontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he +brought to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, +owing chiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope +Julius that Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune +and women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious +man that will win and hold them both. + +It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian +states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, +with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those +events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they +impinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings +with Louis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch's character +has already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of +Aragon as the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of +religion, but who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or +integrity; and who, had he allowed himself to be influenced by such +motives, would have been ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the +most interesting men of the age, and his character has been drawn by +many hands; but Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, +reveals the secret of his many failures when he describes him as a +secretive man, without force of character--ignoring the human agencies +necessary to carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the +fulfilment of his wishes. + +The remaining years of Machiavelli's official career were filled with +events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the +three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the +object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in +the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won +in eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during +these events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out +between the pope and the French, because friendship with France had +dictated the entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II +finally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance +of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy +of the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the +Medici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st +September 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the +signal for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put +an end to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without +regaining office. + + + +LITERATURE AND DEATH +Aet. 43-58--1512-27 + +On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had +vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, +was dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he +was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the +Medici, imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new +Medicean people, Leo X, procured his release, and he retired to his +small property at San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted +himself to literature. In a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th +December 1513, he has left a very interesting description of his life +at this period, which elucidates his methods and his motives in +writing "The Prince." After describing his daily occupations with his +family and neighbours, he writes: "The evening being come, I return +home and go to my study; at the entrance I pull off my peasant- +clothes, covered with dust and dirt, and put on my noble court dress, +and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass into the ancient courts of the +men of old, where, being lovingly received by them, I am fed with that +food which is mine alone; where I do not hesitate to speak with them, +and to ask for the reason of their actions, and they in their +benignity answer me; and for four hours I feel no weariness, I forget +every trouble, poverty does not dismay, death does not terrify me; I +am possessed entirely by those great men. And because Dante says: + + Knowledge doth come of learning well retained, + Unfruitful else, + +I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have +composed a small work on 'Principalities,' where I pour myself out as +fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a +principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how +they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever +pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, +especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it +to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will +be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had +with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it." + +The "little book" suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form +in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work +during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for +some unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de' Medici. +Although Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be +sent or presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that +Lorenzo ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave +Machiavelli any employment. Although it was plagiarized during +Machiavelli's lifetime, "The Prince" was never published by him, and +its text is still disputable. + +Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: "And as to this +little thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that +during the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I +have neither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be +served by one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And +of my loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I +could not now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and +honest, as I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a +witness to my honesty." + +Before Machiavelli had got "The Prince" off his hands he commenced his +"Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius," which should be read +concurrently with "The Prince." These and several minor works occupied +him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look +after the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the +Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her +citizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new +constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on +one pretext or another it was not promulgated. + +In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to +settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly +remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he +was much sought after, and also for the production of his "Art of +War." It was in the same year that he received a commission at the +instance of Cardinal de' Medici to write the "History of Florence," a +task which occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may +have determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old +writer observes that "an able statesman out of work, like a huge +whale, will endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask +to play with." + +When the "History of Florence" was finished, Machiavelli took it to +Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de' Medici, who had in +the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is +somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written "The +Prince" for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained +power in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the "History of Florence" +to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year +the battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left +Francis I a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This +was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular +party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more +banished. + +Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his +return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the "Ten of +Liberty and Peace." Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached +Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527. + + + +THE MAN AND HIS WORKS + +No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern +Florence has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the +side of her most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations +may have found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity +and the germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst +it is idle to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of +his name, it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his +doctrine which this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own +day, and that the researches of recent times have enabled us to +interpret him more reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the +shape of an "unholy necromancer," which so long haunted men's vision, +has begun to fade. + +Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and +industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and +with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced +retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he +depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, +the successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only +moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political +employments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, +overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren +of results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery +that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct +of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear +by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of +compromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to +suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when +he set him to write the "History of Florence," rather than employ him +in the state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and +there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure. + +Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on "The +Prince," its problems are still debatable and interesting, because +they are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such +as they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli's contemporaries; yet +they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of +Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical +incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses +which Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of +government and conduct. + +Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish +some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, "The +Prince" is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men +are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the +days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices +which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. +Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them +to be--and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe +courses; prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then +--to pass to a higher plane--Machiavelli reiterates that, although +crimes may win an empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are +just wars, and the arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other +resource but to fight. + +It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli's that government +should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the +people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of +society; to this "high argument" "The Prince" contributes but little. +Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments +otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and +insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests "The +Prince" with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the +incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which +still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other +and their neighbours. + +In translating "The Prince" my aim has been to achieve at all costs an +exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent +paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. +Machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he +wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his +substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. "Quis eo fuit +unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?" +In "The Prince," it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not +only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an +Englishman of Shakespeare's time the translation of such a treatise +was in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the +genius of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian +language; to the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a +single example: the word "intrattenere," employed by Machiavelli to +indicate the policy adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker +states of Greece, would by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered +"entertain," and every contemporary reader would understand what was +meant by saying that "Rome entertained the Aetolians and the Achaeans +without augmenting their power." But to-day such a phrase would seem +obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that +"Rome maintained friendly relations with the Aetolians," etc., using +four words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy +brevity of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute +fidelity to the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can +only hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author's +meaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it. + +The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli: + +Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di +trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto +dal duca Valentino nell' ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da +Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; +Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell' +Alemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di +Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., +1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence, +1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in +verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose, +1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d'oro (poem in +terza rima), 1517; Dell' arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il +riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta +di Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie +fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525. + +Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti +carnascialeschi. + +Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, +6 vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., +1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7. + +Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. +Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. +G. Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri +intorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. +Ferrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929. + + + +DEDICATION + + To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De' Medici: + + Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are + accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most + precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one + often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and + similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness. + + Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with + some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among + my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so + much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by + long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of + antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and + prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to + your Magnificence. + + And although I may consider this work unworthy of your + countenance, nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it + may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a + better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in + the shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and + with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not + embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with + rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments + whatever, with which so many are accustomed to embellish their + works; for I have wished either that no honour should be given it, + or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the + theme shall make it acceptable. + + Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man + of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the + concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes + place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of + the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the + plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to understand + the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to + understand that if princes it needs to be of the people. + + Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in + which I send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered + by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain + that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise. + And if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will + sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how + unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune. + + + + + +THE PRINCE + + + +CHAPTER I + +HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, +AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED + +All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have +been and are either republics or principalities. + +Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been +long established; or they are new. + +The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or +they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the +prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of +the King of Spain. + +Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a +prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of +the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. + + + +CHAPTER II + +CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES + +I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another +place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only +to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated +above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and +preserved. + +I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary +states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than +new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of +his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, +for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, +unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; +and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister +happens to the usurper, he will regain it. + +We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have +withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope +Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. +For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; +hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary +vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his +subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the +antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make +for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for +another. + + + +CHAPTER III + +CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES + +But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it +be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, +taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly +from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; +for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, +and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: +wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience +they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural +and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those +who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other +hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition. + +In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in +seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends +who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in +the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against +them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in +armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the +goodwill of the natives. + +For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied +Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it +only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the +gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future +benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is +very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, +they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with +little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish +the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself +in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first +time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[*] to raise insurrections on +the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was +necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies +should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the +causes above mentioned. + +[*] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who + married Beatrice d'Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, + and died in 1510. + +Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second +time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it +remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he +had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining +himself more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France. + +Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an +ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country +and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold +them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self- +government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed +the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, +preserving in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in +customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, +Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to France for +so long a time: and, although there may be some difference in +language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the people will +easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has annexed them, +if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two +considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is +extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are +altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one +body with the old principality. + +But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, +customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great +energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real +helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside +there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has +made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other +measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled +there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the +spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy +them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are +great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the +country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied +by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have +more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He +who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost +caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested +from him with the greatest difficulty. + +The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, +which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do +this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A +prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense +he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority +only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them +to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and +scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being +uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not +to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have +been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not +costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as +has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one +has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, +because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more +serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a +man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of +revenge. + +But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends +much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the +state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are +exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting +of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and +all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their +own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such +guards are as useless as a colony is useful. + +Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects +ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful +neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care +that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a +footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be +introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of +ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were +brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where +they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And +the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner +enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by +the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in +respect to those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain +them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state +which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not +get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his +own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more +powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And +he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he +has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless +difficulties and troubles. + +The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely +these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations +with[*] the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept +down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain +authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The +Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of +Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the +Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase +their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans +to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of +Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the +country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent +princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but +also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, +because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait +until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the +malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians +say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it +is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, +not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it +becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. This it happens in +affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen +(which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly +redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been +permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no +longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt +with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come +to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to +be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight +with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in +Italy; they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor +did that ever please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise +ones of our time:--Let us enjoy the benefits of the time--but rather +the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives +everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as +evil, and evil as well as good. + +[*] See remark in the introduction on the word "intrattenere." + +But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the +things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[*] (and not of Charles[+]) as +the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held +possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he +has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain +a state composed of divers elements. + +[*] Louis XII, King of France, "The Father of the People," born 1462, + died 1515. + +[+] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498. + +King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, +who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. +I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get +a foothold in Italy, and having no friends there--seeing rather that +every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles--he was +forced to accept those friendships which he could get, and he would +have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had +not made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, +regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; +the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke +of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of +Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, +the Sienese--everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then +could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, +which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made +the king master of two-thirds of Italy. + +Let any one now consider with that little difficulty the king could +have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above +laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although +they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the +Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been +forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have +made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no +sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander +to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he +was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who +had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church +by adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater +authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to +follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of +Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was +himself forced to come into Italy. + +And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and +deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of +Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime +arbiter in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that +country and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to +shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own +pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to +drive him, Louis, out in turn. + +The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men +always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not +blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, +then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have +attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if she +could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition +which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the +excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition +merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity. + +Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, +he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he +brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did +not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to +injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from +the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought +Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to +humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to +have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always +have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians +would never have consented except to become masters themselves there; +also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in +order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they +would not have had the courage. + +And if any one should say: "King Louis yielded the Romagna to +Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I answer for the +reasons given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to +avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to +your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the +king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, +in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[*] and for the cap to +Rouen,[+] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the +faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept. + +[*] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and + married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order + to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown. + +[+] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d'Amboise, created a + cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510. + +Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the +conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries +and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much +that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at +Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope +Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal +Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I +replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning +that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such +greatness. And in fact is has been seen that the greatness of the +Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin +may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which +never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming +powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about +either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him +who has been raised to power. + + + +CHAPTER IV + +WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL +AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH + +Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly +acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great +became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was +scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole +empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained +themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose +among themselves from their own ambitions. + +I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to +be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of +servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his +favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that +dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such +barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords +and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by +a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, +because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as +superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as +to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular +affection. + +The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the +King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one +lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into +sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and +changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the +midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, +and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the +king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers +both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the +state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding +it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk +are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the +kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt +of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons +given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only +be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little +advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot +carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who +attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and +he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of +others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the +field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is +nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being +exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no +credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them +before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it. + +The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because +one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, +for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such +men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render +the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with +infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from +those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated +the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make +themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are +unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost +whenever time brings the opportunity. + +Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of +Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and +therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him +in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which +victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, +for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they +would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no +tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves. + +But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted +like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the +Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities +there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them +endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the +power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed +away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting +afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself +his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had +assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, +none other than the Romans were acknowledged. + +When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with +which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which +others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; +this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the +conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state. + + + +CHAPTER V + +CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH +LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED + +Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been +accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are +three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin +them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit +them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing +within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because +such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot +stand without his friendship and interest, and does it utmost to +support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to +freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than +in any other way. + +There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held +Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless they +lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, +dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as +the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did +not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many +cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain +them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a +city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be +destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of +liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither +time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may +do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges +unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they +immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had +been held in bondage by the Florentines. + +But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, +and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed +to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree +in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to +govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, +and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more +easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and +more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the +memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to +destroy them or to reside there. + + + +CHAPTER VI + +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED +BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY + +Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities +as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of +state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, +and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep +entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they +imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great +men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his +ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him +act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet +appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength +of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach +by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with +the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach. + +I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is +a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, +accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired +the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private +station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or +other of these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. +Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the +strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no +other state, is compelled to reside there in person. + +But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through +fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, +Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although +one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will +of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made +him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who +have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if +their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not +be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a +preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see +that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought +them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them. +Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been +extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come +in vain. + +It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people +of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order +that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out +of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, +and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should +become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary +that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government +of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long +peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the +Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men +fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the +opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made famous. + +Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a +principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The +difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules +and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their +government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there +is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, +or more uncertain in its success, then to take the lead in the +introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for +enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and +lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This +coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws +on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not +readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of +them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the +opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others +defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along +with them. + +It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter +thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves +or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate +their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In +the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass +anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then +they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have +conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the +reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it +is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that +persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when +they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by +force. + +If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not +have enforced their constitutions for long--as happened in our time to +Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things +immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no +means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the +unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great +difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers +are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when +these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are +exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will continue +afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy. + +To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears +some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a +like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[*] This man rose from a private +station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to +fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose +him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their +prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that +one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a +king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up +old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and +allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, +whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in +keeping. + +[*] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C. + + + +CHAPTER VII + +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER +BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE + +Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private +citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they +have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they +have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some +state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows +it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the +Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they +might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also +were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being +citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill +and the fortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant and +unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the +position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it +is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, +having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold +it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and +faithful. + +States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature +which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and +correspondencies[*] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not +overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become +princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be +prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their +laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they +became princes, they must lay AFTERWARDS. + +[*] "Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e. foundations) and + correspondencies or relations with other states--a common meaning + of "correspondence" and "correspondency" in the sixteenth and + seventeenth centuries. + +Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or +fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, +and these are Francesco Sforza[*] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by +proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose +to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand +anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare +Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during +the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, +notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that +ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the +states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him. + +[*] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria + Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of + Milan, on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. + Machiavelli was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to + Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to + the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and + along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an + account, written ten years before "The Prince," of the proceedings + of the duke in his "Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino + nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli," etc., a translation of which + is appended to the present work. + +Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations +may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will +be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, +therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be +seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not +consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what +better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions; +and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but +the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune. + +Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had +many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see +his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the +Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke +of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and +Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides +this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might +have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the +Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It +behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the +powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. +This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by +other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would +not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by +dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came +into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of +Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from +him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the +reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the +Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to +advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did +not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to +say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, +would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from +winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the +king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, +after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very +unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind +when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, +and the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke +decided to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others. + +For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in +Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, +making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to +their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that +in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and +turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to +crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. +This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving +at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin +to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung +the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless +dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the +French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by +trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse +to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the +mediation of Signor Pagolo--whom the duke did not fail to secure with +all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses--the +Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his +power at Sinigalia.[*] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned +their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good +foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of +Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, +he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of +notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it +out. + +[*] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502. + +When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak +masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave +them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was +full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing +to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it +necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer +Ramiro d'Orco,[*] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest +power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the +greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not +advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but +that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the +country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had +their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused +some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the +people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if +any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in +the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took +Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the +piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The +barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied +and dismayed. + +[*] Ramiro d'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua. + +But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding +himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate +dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great +measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if +he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, +for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, +would not support him. And from this time he began to seek new +alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she was +making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were +besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against them, +and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived. + +Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the +future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the +Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him +that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. +Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had +despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by +winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb +the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting +the college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power +before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist +the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he +had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed +lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over +the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the +college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master +of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa +was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for +the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the +Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), +he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at +once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of the +Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he +continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander +died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would +have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the +forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability. + +But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He +left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the +rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick +unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and +he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the +foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not +had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he +would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his +foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a +month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and +whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, +they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made +Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would +not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death +of Alexander,[*] everything would have been different to him. On the +day that Julius the Second[+] was elected, he told me that he had +thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and +had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated +that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to +die. + +[*] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503. + +[+] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad + Vincula, born 1443, died 1513. + +When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to +blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought +to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the +arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty +spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct +otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own +sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it +necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, +to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and +feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to +exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the +old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous +and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to +maintain friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they +must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more +lively example than the actions of this man. + +Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom +he made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a +Pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being +elected Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of +any cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they +became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom +he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, +San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[*] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear +him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their +relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the +kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above +everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, +failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad +Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages +to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his +choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin. + +[*] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza. + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS + +Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither +of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is +manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could +be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are +when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the +principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private +person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first +method, it will be illustrated by two examples--one ancient, the other +modern--and without entering further into the subject, I consider +these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow +them. + +Agathocles, the Sicilian,[*] became King of Syracuse not only from a +private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a +potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous +life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability +of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military +profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being +established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make +himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, +that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an +understanding for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, +with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the +people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them +things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers +killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he +seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil +commotion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and +ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but +leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked +Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of Syracuse. The +Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled to come to +terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be content +with the possession of Africa. + +[*] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C. + +Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man +will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, +inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the +favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession, which +steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were +afterwards boldly held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it +cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, +to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may +gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in +entering into and extricating himself from dangers be considered, +together with his greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming +hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the +most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and +inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated +among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed +either to fortune or genius. + +In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da +Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by +his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his +youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under +his discipline, he might attain some high position in the military +profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, +and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body +and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing +a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of +some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was +dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to +seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away +from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in +some measure to look upon his patrimony; and although he had not +laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the +citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to +come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his +friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he +should be received honourably by the Fermians, all of which would be +not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had +brought him up. + +Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, +and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he +lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and +having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto +gave a solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the +chiefs of Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that +are usual in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began +certain grave discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander +and his son Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse +Giovanni and others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such +matters ought to be discussed in a more private place, and he betook +himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens +went in after him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued +from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these +murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town +and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the +people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of which he +made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able +to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military +ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the +principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had +become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would +have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed +himself to be overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the +Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year +after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together with +Vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness. + +Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after +infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his +country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be +conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by +means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold +the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that +this follows from severities[*] being badly or properly used. Those +may be called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, +that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and +that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the +advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, +notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with +time rather than decrease. Those who practise the first system are +able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as +Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who follow the other to +maintain themselves. + +[*] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern + equivalent of Machiavelli's thought when he speaks of "crudelta" + than the more obvious "cruelties." + +Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought +to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for +him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to +repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to +reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does +otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to +keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor +can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and +repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so +that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given +little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer. + +And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in +such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, +shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in +troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones +will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and +no one will be under any obligation to you for them. + + + +CHAPTER IX + +CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY + +But coming to the other point--where a leading citizen becomes the +prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, +but by the favour of his fellow citizens--this may be called a civil +principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain +to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a +principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the +favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties +are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be +ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and +oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises +in cities one of three results, either a principality, self- +government, or anarchy. + +A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, +accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the +nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the +reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that +under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, +finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of +one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his +authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles +maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the +aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around +him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can +neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches +sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around +him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. + +Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to +others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their +object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing +to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to +be added also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile +people, because of their being too many, whilst from the nobles he can +secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may +expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from +hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they +will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far- +seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and +to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the +prince is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do +well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them +daily, and to give or wake away authority when it pleases him. + +Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to +be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape +their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or +they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, +ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may +be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through +pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought +to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and +thus, whilst in prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not +have to fear them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun +binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to +themselves than to you, and a prince out to guard against such, and to +fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they +always help to ruin him. + +Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people +ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they +only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the +people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above +everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may +easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when +they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound +more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more +devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their +favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as +these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, +so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have +the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity. + +Nabis,[*] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, +and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his +country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it +was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but +this would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And +do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that +"He who builds on the people, builds on the mud," for this is true +when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself +that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or +by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, +as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[+] in +Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, +who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who +does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and +energy, keeps the whole people encouraged--such a one will never find +himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his +foundations well. + +[*] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus + in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C. + +[+] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli's + "Florentine History," Book III. + +These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from +the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either +rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their +government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on +the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and +who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with +great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has +not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because +the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from +magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and +there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can +trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet +times, when citizens have need of the state, because then every one +agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they +all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has +need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is +this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. +Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens +will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the +state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful. + + + +CHAPTER X + +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES +OUGHT TO BE MEASURED + +It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character +of these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power +that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, +or whether he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make +this quite clear I say that I consider those who are able to support +themselves by their own resources who can, either by abundance of men +or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle against any one who +comes to attack them; and I consider those always to have need of +others who cannot show themselves against the enemy in the field, but +are forced to defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first +case has been discussed, but we will speak of it again should it +recur. In the second case one can say nothing except to encourage such +princes to provision and fortify their towns, and not on any account +to defend the country. And whoever shall fortify his town well, and +shall have managed the other concerns of his subjects in the way +stated above, and to be often repeated, will never be attacked without +great caution, for men are always adverse to enterprises where +difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing +to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not hated by his +people. + +The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country +around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits +them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near +them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks +the taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing +they have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, +and they always keep in public depots enough for one year's eating, +drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and +without loss to the state, they always have the means of giving work +to the community in those labours that are the life and strength of +the city, and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they +also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover have many +ordinances to uphold them. + +Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself +odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only +be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this +world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a +whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever +should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it +burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and self- +interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that a +powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by +giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for +long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then +preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be +too bold. + +Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and +ruin the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still +hot and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought +the prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have +cooled, the damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there +is no longer any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready +to unite with their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to +them now that their houses have been burnt and their possessions +ruined in his defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the +benefits they confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if +everything is well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise +prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, +when he does not fail to support and defend them. + + + +CHAPTER XI + +CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES + +It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, +touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, +because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they +can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ancient +ordinances of religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a +character that the principalities may be held no matter how their +princes behave and live. These princes alone have states and do not +defend them; and they have subjects and do not rule them; and the +states, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, +although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor +the ability to alienate themselves. Such principalities only are +secure and happy. But being upheld by powers, to which the human mind +cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted +and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash +man to discuss them. + +Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church +has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from +Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have +been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) +have valued the temporal power very slightly--yet now a king of France +trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and +to ruin the Venetians--although this may be very manifest, it does not +appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. + +Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[*] this country was +under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the +Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal +anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; +the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those +about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. +To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, +as it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they +made use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, +Orsini and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing +with arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the +pontificate weak and powerless. And although there might arise +sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor +wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope +is also a cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the +average life of a pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the +factions; and if, so to speak, one people should almost destroy the +Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the Orsini, who would +support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin the +Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were +little esteemed in Italy. + +[*] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494. + +Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that +have ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to +prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by +reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things +which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although +his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, +nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church, +which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to +all his labours. + +Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing +all the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through +the chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found +the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been +practised before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not only +followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin +the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these +enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, +inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any +private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within +the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them +some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: +the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; +and the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who +caused the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have +their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals +foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are +compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates +arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his +Holiness Pope Leo[*] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to +be hoped that, if others made it great in arms, he will make it still +greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues. + +[*] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de' Medici. + + + +CHAPTER XII + +HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES + +Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such +principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having +considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and +having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and +to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of +offence and defence which belong to each of them. + +We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his +foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to +ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or +composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good +laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are +well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the +discussion and shall speak of the arms. + +I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state +are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. +Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one +holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor +safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, +unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have +neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is +deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by +them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other +attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, +which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are +ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if +war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which I should +have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by +nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on +mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared +valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed +what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed +to seize Italy with chalk in hand;[*] and he who told us that our sins +were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the sins he +imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the sins of +princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty. + +[*] "With chalk in hand," "col gesso." This is one of the bons mots of + Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII + seized Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send + his quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to + conquer the country. Cf. "The History of Henry VII," by Lord + Bacon: "King Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost + it again, in a kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole + length of Italy without resistance: so that it was true what Pope + Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with + chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather than with + swords to fight." + +I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The +mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they +are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own +greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others +contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you +are ruined in the usual way. + +And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, +whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted +to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in +person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its +citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, +it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the +laws so that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown +princes and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, +and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult +to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of +its citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and +Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely +armed and quite free. + +Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who +were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with +the Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for +captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made +captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took +away their liberty. + +Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza +against the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at +Caravaggio,[*] allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his +masters. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[+] +of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw +herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her +kingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their +dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make +themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the +Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able +captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not +conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their +ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,[%] +and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every +one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would +have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against +him, so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to +Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But +let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines +appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who +from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man +had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the +Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their +enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they +must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered, +will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent +to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen and plebians they did +valiantly. This was before they turned to enterprises on land, but +when they began to fight on land they forsook this virtue and followed +the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their expansion on land, +through not having much territory, and because of their great +reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when +they expanded, as under Carmignuola,[#] they had a taste of this +mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the Duke +of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how +lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer conquer +under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they +able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had +acquired, they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to +murder him. They had afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da +Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano,[&] and the +like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened +afterwards at Vaila,[$] where in one battle they lost that which in +eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. Because +from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and +inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. + +[*] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448. + +[+] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples. + +[%] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John + Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was + knighted by Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops + and went into Italy. These became the famous "White Company." He + took part in many wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born + about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married + Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti. + +[#] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, + executed at Venice, 5th May 1432. + +[&] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San + Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of + Austria, in 1487. "Primo capitano in Italia."--Machiavelli. Count + of Pitigliano; Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510. + +[$] Battle of Vaila in 1509. + +And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled +for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, +in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better +prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has +recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired +more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more +states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms +against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were +oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain +authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became +princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the +hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of +priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both +commenced to enlist foreigners. + +The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[*] +the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, +Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. +After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the +arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has +been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and +insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, +first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase +their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without +territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few +infantry did not give them any authority; so they were led to employ +cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and +honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of +twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot +soldiers. They had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and +danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but +taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack +towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments +at night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or +ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these things were +permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I +have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to +slavery and contempt. + +[*] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in + Romagna. He was the leader of the famous "Company of St George," + composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409. + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN + +Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a +prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by +Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the +enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned +to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[*] for +his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in +themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always +disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their +captive. + +[*] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), + surnamed "The Catholic," born 1542, died 1516. + +And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish +to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which +cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw +himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune +brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his +rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and +the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all +expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not +become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his +auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs. + +The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand +Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other +time of their troubles. + +The Emperor of Constantinople,[*] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten +thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not +willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to +the infidels. + +[*] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383. + +Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these +arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with +them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience +to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time +and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of +one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, +which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume +enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy +is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, +has always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been +willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not +deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others. + +I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This +duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French +soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, +such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, +discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; +whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and +dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference +between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one +considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when +he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he +relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count +and found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than +when every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces. + +I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am +unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I +have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by +the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted +like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him +that he could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut +to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with +aliens. + +I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament +applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight +with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul +armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had +them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he +wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, +the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, +or they bind you fast. + +Charles the Seventh,[*] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[+] +having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, +recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he +established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and +infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and +began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, +as is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having +raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the +value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; +and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they +are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear +that they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the +French cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers +they do not come off well against others. The armies of the French +have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of +which arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or +auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one's own forces. And this +example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if +the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained. + +[*] Charles VII of France, surnamed "The Victorious," born 1403, died + 1461. + +[+] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483. + +But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks +well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I +have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a +principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not +truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first +disaster to the Roman Empire[*] should be examined, it will be found +to have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from +that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all +that valour which had raised it passed away to others. + +[*] "Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the + reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance + of the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its + existence. When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the + Roman Empire sank under the weight of its military obligations, he + said that this was 'wholly unhistorical.' He might well have added + that the Roman power was at its zenith when every citizen + acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, but that it + began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer + recognized."--Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906. + +I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having +its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good +fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And +it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing +can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its +own strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed either +of subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or +auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one's own forces will be easily +found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one +will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many +republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which +rules I entirely commit myself. + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR + +A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything +else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is +the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force +that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often +enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the +contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than +of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your +losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a +state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being +martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, +through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became +private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, +it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies +against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. +Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the +unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield +obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man +should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one +disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to +work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the +art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, +cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought +never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and +in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; +this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study. + +As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well +organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he +accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of +localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the +valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of +rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which +knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his +country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by +means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he +understands with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to +study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers +and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain +resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of +the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of +others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which +it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to +surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the +battle, to besiege towns to advantage. + +Philopoemen,[*] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which +writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he +never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was +in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: +"If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves +here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one +best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to +retreat, how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as +he went, all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to +their opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by +these continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, +any unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with. + +[*] Philopoemen, "the last of the Greeks," born 252 B.C., died 183 + B.C. + +But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and +study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne +themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and +defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above +all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had +been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds +he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated +Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life +of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life +of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, +affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things +which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to +observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but +increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be +available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find +him prepared to resist her blows. + + + +CHAPTER XV + +CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, +ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED + +It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a +prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have +written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in +mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart +from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write +a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to +me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the +imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities +which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is +so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what +is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his +preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his +professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much +that is evil. + +Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how +to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. +Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, +and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are +spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are +remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame +or praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another +miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our +language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call +one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one +is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one +faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold +and brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another +chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one +grave, another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the +like. And I know that every one will confess that it would be most +praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are +considered good; but because they can neither be entirely possessed +nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary +for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the +reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also to +keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him +it; but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon +himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at +incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can only +be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, +it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, +would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet +followed brings him security and prosperity. + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS + +Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I +say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, +liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation +for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should +be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the +reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among +men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of +magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts +all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to +maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax +them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him +odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by +any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded +few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by +whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and +wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of +being miserly. + +Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of +liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if +he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in +time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that +with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself +against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without +burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises +liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, +and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few. + +We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who +have been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the +Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for +liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he +made war on the King of France; and he made many wars without imposing +any extraordinary tax on his subjects, for he supplied his additional +expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would +not have undertaken or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been +reputed liberal. A prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob +his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does not become poor +and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold +of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those +vices which will enable him to govern. + +And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and +many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, +and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, +or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is +dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered +liberal; and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent +in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not +moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if +any one should reply: Many have been princes, and have done great +things with armies, who have been considered very liberal, I reply: +Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects' or else +that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in the +second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to +the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, +sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, this +liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by +soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' you +can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it +does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but +adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you. + +And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst +you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor +or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a +prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised +and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to +have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, +than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to +incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER +TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED + +Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every +prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. +Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare +Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled +the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if +this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more +merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for +cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[*] Therefore a prince, so +long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the +reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more +merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to +arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to +injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with +a prince offend the individual only. + +[*] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi + factions in 1502 and 1503. + +And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the +imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. +Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her +reign owing to its being new, saying: + + "Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt + Moliri, et late fines custode tueri."[*] + +Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he +himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and +humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and +too much distrust render him intolerable. + +[*] . . . against my will, my fate +A throne unsettled, and an infant state, +Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs, +And guard with these severities my shores. + +Christopher Pitt. + + +Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than +feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish +to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, +it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either +must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of +men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and +as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you +their blood, property, life, and children, as is said above, when the +need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And +that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected +other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by +payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be +earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied +upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than +one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation +which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity +for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment +which never fails. + +Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he +does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well +being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as +he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from +their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the +life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for +manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the +property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their +father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking +away the property are never wanting; for he who has once begun to live +by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what belongs to +others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more +difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his +army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite +necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without +it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties. + +Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that +having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to +fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or +against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This +arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his +boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his +soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not +sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire +his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the +principal cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not +have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that +most excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of +man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this +arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his +soldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. For +this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the +corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a +legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the +insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. +Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there +were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct the +errors of others. This disposition, if he had been continued in the +command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; +but, he being under the control of the Senate, this injurious +characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his +glory. + +Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the +conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing +according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish +himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; +he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. + + + +CHAPTER XVIII[*] + +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH + +[*] "The present chapter has given greater offence than any other + portion of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, "Il Principe," p. 297. + +Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and +to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience +has been that those princes who have done great things have held good +faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the +intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have +relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of +contesting,[*] the one by the law, the other by force; the first +method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first +is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the +second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to +avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively +taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and +many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, +who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as +they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is +necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and +that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being +compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and +the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and +the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is +necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the +wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they +are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith +when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons +that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely +good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will +not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with +them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to +excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern examples could be +given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void +and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has +known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best. + +[*] "Contesting," i.e. "striving for mastery." Mr Burd points out that + this passage is imitated directly from Cicero's "De Officiis": + "Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, + alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; + confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore." + +But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, +and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and +so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will +always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent +example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing +else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he +always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power +in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet +would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded +according to his wishes,[*] because he well understood this side of +mankind. + +[*] "Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum)." The + words "ad votum" are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550. + +Alexander never did what he said, +Cesare never said what he did. + +Italian Proverb. + + +Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good +qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to +have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and +always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them +is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, +and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to +be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite. + +And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, +cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being +often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to +fidelity,[*] friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is +necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as +the winds and variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said +above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if +compelled, then to know how to set about it. + +[*] "Contrary to fidelity" or "faith," "contro alla fede," and "tutto + fede," "altogether faithful," in the next paragraph. It is + noteworthy that these two phrases, "contro alla fede" and "tutto + fede," were omitted in the Testina edition, which was published + with the sanction of the papal authorities. It may be that the + meaning attached to the word "fede" was "the faith," i.e. the + Catholic creed, and not as rendered here "fidelity" and + "faithful." Observe that the word "religione" was suffered to + stand in the text of the Testina, being used to signify + indifferently every shade of belief, as witness "the religion," a + phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot heresy. South + in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as + follows: "That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, Nicolo + Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political + scheme: 'That the show of religion was helpful to the politician, + but the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.'" + +For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets +anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named +five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him +altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There +is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, +inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, +because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch +with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what +you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of +the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the +actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent +to challenge, one judges by the result. + +For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and +holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he +will be praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by +what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world +there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when +the many have no ground to rest on. + +One prince[*] of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never +preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is +most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him +of reputation and kingdom many a time. + +[*] Ferdinand of Aragon. "When Machiavelli was writing 'The Prince' it + would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand's name + here without giving offence." Burd's "Il Principe," p. 308. + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED + +Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I +have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss +briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has +been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make +him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he +will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other +reproaches. + +It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, +and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from +both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor +their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has +only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease +in many ways. + +It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, +effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince +should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show +in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his +private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are +irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can +hope either to deceive him or to get round him. + +That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, +and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, +provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by +his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a +prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his +subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From +the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, +and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will +always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they +should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should +affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations +and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will +resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did. + +But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has +only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can +easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by +keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for +him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most +efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is +not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires +against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but +when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will +not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that +confront a conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many +have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he +who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except +from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have +opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with +which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every +advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, +and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a +very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to +keep faith with you. + +And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the +side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect +of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is +the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends +and the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the +popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as +to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before +the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel +to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, +and thus cannot hope for any escape. + +Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content +with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer +Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the +present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had +conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer +Giovanni,[*] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination +the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the +popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days +in Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there +after the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the +Bolognese, having information that there was one of the Bentivogli +family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of +a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of +their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due +course to the government. + +[*] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He + ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli's strong condemnation + of conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent + experience (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured + for his alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy. + +For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies +of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is +hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear +everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes +have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to +keep the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most +important objects a prince can have. + +Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, +and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty +and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its +authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of +the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths +would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing +the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he +wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the +particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach +which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, +and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, +who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser +without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a better or a +more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king +and kingdom. From this one can draw another important conclusion, that +princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of +others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. And further, I +consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as to +make himself hated by the people. + +It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths +of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary +to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great +qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have +been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, +therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of +some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were +not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only +submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who +studies the affairs of those times. + +It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to +the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were +Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son +Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. + +There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the +ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be +contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to +put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so +beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a +hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because +the people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring +prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, +cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he +should exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and +give vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those +emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had +no great authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to +the principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing +humours, were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring +little about injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, +as princes cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the +first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot +compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to +avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who +through inexperience had need of special favour adhered more readily +to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out +advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to +maintain authority over them. + +From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being +all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, +and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and +died honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary +title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and +afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, +he always kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was +neither hated nor despised. + +But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, +who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not +endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, +having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added +contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of +his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is +acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said +before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do +evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to +maintain yourself--it may be either the people or the soldiers or the +nobles--you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and +then good works will do you harm. + +But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, +that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in +the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by +him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who +allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the +army conspired against him, and murdered him. + +Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus +Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-- +men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every +kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to +a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the +soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he +reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the +sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way +astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And +because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish +to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the +lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a prince to +imitate. + +Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in +Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to +Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the +praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to +aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy +before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the +Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After +this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of +the whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of +the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the +other in the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. +And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, +he decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he +wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to +share that dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, +moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things +were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and +killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and +complained to the Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits +that he had received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, +and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he +sought him out in France, and took from him his government and life. +He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will +find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him +feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it +need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the +empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from +that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his +violence. + +But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent +qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and +acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of +fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which +caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and +cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single +murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those +of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by +those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the +midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such- +like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and +desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who +does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the +less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do +any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the +service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had +contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily +threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, +was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor's ruin. + +But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to +hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, +and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his +people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave +himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he +might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not +maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete +with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the +imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being +hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against +and was killed. + +It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very +warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of +Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected +Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two +things made him hated and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in +Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to all, +and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other, his +having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome and +taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a +reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects in +Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that +the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to +fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all +the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which may +be added his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting +with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and +fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him. + +I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being +thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this +discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have +this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in +a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some +indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that +are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as +were the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more +necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it +is now more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, +to satisfy the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the +more powerful. + +From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him +twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend +the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, +putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them +his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in +the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the +people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the +state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason +that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called +either an hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons +of the old prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that +position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only +noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new +principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it that +are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the +constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive +him as if he were its hereditary lord. + +But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will +consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been +fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how +it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in +another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to +unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for +Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was +heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly +destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated +Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in +his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot +imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow +those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which +are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are +proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and +firm. + + + +CHAPTER XX + +ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES +OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? + +1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed +their subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by +factions; others have fostered enmities against themselves; others +have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in +the beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some +have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a +final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the +particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made, +nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself +will admit. + +2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather +when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by +arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted +become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your +subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be +armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be +handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which +they quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the +latter, considering it to be necessary that those who have the most +danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when +you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust +them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these +opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain +unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the +character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be +sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted +subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new +principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of +examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a +province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of +that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; +and these again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft +and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such a way that all +the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old +state were living near you. + +3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed +to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by +fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their +tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This +may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way +balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept +for to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; +rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided +cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always +assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. +The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the +Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although +they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these +disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their +differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not +afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one +party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, +therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never +be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one +the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, +but if war comes this policy proves fallacious. + +4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the +difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore +fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who +has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes +enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may +have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, +as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many +consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with +craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having +crushed it, his renown may rise higher. + +5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and +assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were +distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who +had been distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot +speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will +only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom +have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to +support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, +and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, +inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by +deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; and thus the +prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who, +serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since +the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means +of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider +the reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be +not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their +government, then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble +and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And +weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can be +taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier +for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under +the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those +who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged +him to seize it. + +6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states +more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit +to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of +refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been +made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in +our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di +Castello so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of +Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by +Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that +province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult +to lose it; the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar +decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to +circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in +another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has +more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build +fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the +people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by +Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the house +of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason the +best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because, +although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if +the people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to +assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen +in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, +unless to the Countess of Forli,[*] when the Count Girolamo, her +consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to withstand the +popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus recover +her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that the +foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little +value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the +people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would +have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated +by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these things +considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as +him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares +little about being hated by the people. + +[*] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia + Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli + that Machiavelli was sent as envy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati + to the countess announces the appointment: "I have been with the + signori," wrote Fortunati, "to learn whom they would send and + when. They tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young + Florentine noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave + with me at once." Cf. "Catherine Sforza," by Count Pasolini, + translated by P. Sylvester, 1898. + + + +CHAPTER XXI + +HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN + +Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and +setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the +present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because +he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to +be the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his +deeds you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In +the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise +was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and +without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of +Castile occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any +innovations; thus they did not perceive that by these means he was +acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money of +the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long +war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since +distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to +undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to +driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be +a more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he +assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked +France; and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, +and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and +occupied with the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a +way, one out of the other, that men have never been given time to work +steadily against him. + +Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal +affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da +Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life +doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some +method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken +about. And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every +action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and +remarkable man. + +A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a +downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he +declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which +course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because +if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a +character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him +or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to +declare yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first +case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey +to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been +conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to +protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want +doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who +loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in +hand, court his fate. + +Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive +out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of +the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand +the Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be +discussed in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of +Antiochus urged them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate +answered: "As for that which has been said, that it is better and more +advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war, nothing can +be more erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left, +without favour or consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror." Thus +it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your +neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare +yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, +generally follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when +a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the +party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be +powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and +there is established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless +as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories +after all are never so complete that the victor must not show some +regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself +loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid +you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again. + +In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that +you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it +greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction +of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have +saved him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do +with your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to +be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance +with one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking +others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he +conquers you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much +as possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined +with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused +their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as +happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to +attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the +prince ought to favour one of the parties. + +Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe +courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, +because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid +one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in +knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice +to take the lesser evil. + +A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour +the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his +citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and +agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not +be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken +away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but +the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things +and designs in any way to honour his city or state. + +Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and +spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is +divided into guilds or into societies,[*] he ought to hold such bodies +in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an +example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining +the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in +anything. + +[*] "Guilds or societies," "in arti o in tribu." "Arti" were craft or + trade guilds, cf. Florio: "Arte . . . a whole company of any trade + in any city or corporation town." The guilds of Florence are most + admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the + subject (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar + character, called "artel," exist in Russia to-day, cf. Sir + Mackenzie Wallace's "Russia," ed. 1905: "The sons . . . were + always during the working season members of an artel. In some of + the larger towns there are artels of a much more complex kind-- + permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarily + responsible for the acts of the individual members." The word + "artel," despite its apparent similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude + assures me, no connection with "ars" or "arte." Its root is that + of the verb "rotisya," to bind oneself by an oath; and it is + generally admitted to be only another form of "rota," which now + signifies a "regimental company." In both words the underlying + idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. "Tribu" were + possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included + individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words "septs" or + "clans" would be most appropriate. + + + +CHAPTER XXII + +CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES + +The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and +they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. +And the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his +understanding, is by observing the men he has around him; and when +they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise, +because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them +faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion +of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them. + +There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to +be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there +are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; +another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which +neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first +is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. +Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the +first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to +know good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may +not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in +his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the +servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest. + +But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one +test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his +own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in +everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you +ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in +his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, +and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not +concerned. + +On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to +study him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing +with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that +he cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire +more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make +him dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards +servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is +otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the +other. + + + +CHAPTER XXIII + +HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED + +I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it +is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless +they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of +whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own +affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved +with difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves +they run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no +other way of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men +understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when +every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates. + +Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the +wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking +the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, +and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and +listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. +With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry +himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more +freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of +these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and +be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either +overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions +that he falls into contempt. + +I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man +of affairs to Maximilian,[*] the present emperor, speaking of his +majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in +anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite +to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man--he does not +communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on +them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and +known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around +him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows +that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever +understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on +his resolutions. + +[*] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman + Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; + after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in + Italian politics. + +A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he +wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every +one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to +be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning +the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that nay one, on +any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger +be felt. + +And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an +impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but +through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they +are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a +prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by +chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens +to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, +but it would not be for long, because such a governor would in a short +time take away his state from him. + +But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more +than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to +unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, +and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through +them. And they are not to found otherwise, because men will always +prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. +Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they +come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the +prince from good counsels. + + + +CHAPTER XXIV + +WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES + +The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince +to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and +fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the +actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an +hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men +and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted +more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present +good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost +defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will +be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and +adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, +and with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, +born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom. + +And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in +Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and +others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in +regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in +the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the +people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known +how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that +have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost. + +Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who +was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to +the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being +a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the +nobles, he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and +if in the end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he +retained the kingdom. + +Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their +principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own +sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a +change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the +calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they +thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that +the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would +recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is +very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you +would never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find +someone later on to restore you. This again either does not happen, +or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that +deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those +only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and +your valour. + + + +CHAPTER XXV + +WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER + +It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the +opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by +fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and +that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us +believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let +chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times +because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may +still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes +pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. +Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true +that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[*] but that +she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little +less. + +[*] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: "The older one gets the + more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does + three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe." + Sorel's "Eastern Question." + +I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood +overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away +the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to +its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, +though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when +the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences +and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass +away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so +dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where +valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her +forces where she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised +to constrain her. + +And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, +and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an +open country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had +been defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, +either this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made +or it would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say +concerning resistance to fortune in general. + +But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may +be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any +change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly +from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that +the prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I +believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions +according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not +accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in +affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, +glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, +another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, +another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by +a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one +attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different +observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other +impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they +conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from +what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the +same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and +the other does not. + +Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs +himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such +a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but +if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his +course of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently +circumspect to know how to accommodate himself to the change, both +because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and +also because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot +be persuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious +man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, +hence he is ruined; but had he changed his conduct with the times +fortune would not have changed. + +Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, +and found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of +action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise +against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The +Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he +had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France; +nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his +accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the +Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the +former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other +hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having +observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as +to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore +Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff +with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome +until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, +as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. +Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the +others would have raised a thousand fears. + +I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they +all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him +experience the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which +required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because +he would never have deviated from those ways to which nature inclined +him. + +I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind +steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are +successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I +consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because +fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary +to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be +mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more +coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, +because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity +command her. + + + +CHAPTER XXVI + +AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS + +Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and +wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a +new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an +opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of +things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this +country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new +prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present. + +And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should +be captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the +Persians should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the +greatness of the soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be +dispersed to illustrate the capabilities of Theseus: then at the +present time, in order to discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it +was necessary that Italy should be reduced to the extremity that she +is now in, that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more +oppressed than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians; +without head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn, overrun; and to +have endured every kind of desolation. + +Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us +think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was +afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected +him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet +heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of +Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, +and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how +she entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these +wrongs and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready +and willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it. + +Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope +than in your illustrious house,[*] with its valour and fortune, +favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and +which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be +difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the +men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet +they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the +present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor +easier than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours. + +[*] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. + In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement + VII. + +With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is +necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in +them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the +willingness is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only +follow those men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than +this, how extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond +example: the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has +poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to +your greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do +everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory +which belongs to us. + +And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians +have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your +illustrious house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so +many campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were +exhausted, this has happened because the old order of things was not +good, and none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing +honours a man more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when +he himself was newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and +dignified will make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are +not wanting opportunities to bring such into use in every form. + +Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. +Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how +superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But +when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs +entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are +capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there +having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by +valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that +for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty +years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always +given a poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, +afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.[*] + +[*] The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; + Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513. + +If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these +remarkable men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before +all things, as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided +with your own forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or +better soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they +will be much better when they find themselves commanded by their +prince, honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it +is necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be +defended against foreigners by Italian valour. + +And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very +formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which +a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be +relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist +cavalry, and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they +encounter them in close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may +again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and +the Switzers are overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a +complete proof of this latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was +some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish +infantry were confronted by German battalions, who follow the same +tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with +the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and +stood out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless, +and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with +them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these +infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be +afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but a +variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which +confer reputation and power upon a new prince. + +This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for +letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express +the love with which he would be received in all those provinces which +have suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst +for revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what +tears. What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to +him? What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? +To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your +illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with +which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard +our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be +verified that saying of Petrarch: + + Virtu contro al Furore + Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto: + Che l'antico valore + Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto. + + Virtue against fury shall advance the fight, + And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight: + For the old Roman valour is not dead, + Nor in th' Italians' brests extinguished. + +Edward Dacre, 1640. + + + + + +DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY +THE DUKE VALENTINO +WHEN MURDERING +VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR +PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI + +BY + +NICOL MACHIAVELLI + + + +The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to +clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had +been raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of +Arezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, +whence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against +Giovanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring +that city under his domination, and to make it the head of his +Romagnian duchy. + +These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and +their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too +powerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek +to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon +this a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to +which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, +Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the +tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo +Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and +courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which +might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they +decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the +Florentines; and they send their men to one place and another, +promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to +unite with them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once +reported throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under +the duke, among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting +a revolution. + +Thus it arose that, men's minds being thus unsettled, it was decided +by certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was +held for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The +castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken +there; so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were +being carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was +prevented from being drawn up by those inside, they took the +opportunity of leaping upon the bridge and thence into the fortress. +Upon this capture being effected, the whole state rebelled and +recalled the old duke, being encouraged in this, not so much by the +capture of the fort, as by the Diet at Magione, from whom they +expected to get assistance. + +Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose +the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any +town, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and +they sent again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in +destroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened +and that they ought not to wait for another opportunity. + +But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli +and Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo +Machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the +duke against his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, +because, against everybody's expectation, his soldiers had at once +gone over to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his +door. But recovering courage from the offers of the Florentines, he +decided to temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that +remained to him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to +get assistance. This latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the +King of France for men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he +turned into cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money. + +Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached +Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the +aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the +duke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with +offers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did +not fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he +wished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was +enough for him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have +the principality. + +And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to +him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to +a standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took +every care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such +preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops +in separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile +there came also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he +found himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in +open war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous +to outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of +reconciliation. + +And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them +in which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four +thousand ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and +he formed an alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force +them to come personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do +so. On the other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of +Urbino and other places seized by them, to serve him in all his +expeditions, and not to make war against or ally themselves with any +one without his permission. + +This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, +again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his +state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the +fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by +the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his +friends. But the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and +dispersed his men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end +of November together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to +Cesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the +Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of +Urbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but +nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that +if the duke wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they +were ready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. +To this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with +Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was +very willing to proceed against Sinigalia. + +It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the +fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give +it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him +to come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being +invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no +suspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French +men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the +hundred lancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left +Cesena about the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the +utmost cunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to +wait for him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of +compliance would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the +reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the +arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very +stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not +offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by +Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he +agreed to wait. + +Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on +30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most +trusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor +d'Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as +Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should +arrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting +certain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they +reached Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they +came to the duke's quarters, where they should be seized. + +The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which +there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to +assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from +Fano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last +day of December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a +cavalcade of about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved +forward the infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at- +arms. + +Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situate on the shore of +the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he +who goes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the +bases of which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of +Sinigalia is distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than +a bow-shot and from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to +the city runs a little river which bathes that part of the walls +looking towards Fano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to +Sinigalia comes for a good space by road along the mountains, and +reaches the river which passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left +hand along the bank of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he +arrives at a bridge which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast +of the gate that leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but +transversely. Before this gate there stands a collection of houses +with a square to which the bank of the river forms one side. + +The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, +and to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles +distant from Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for +the men of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and +his band, which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and +fifty horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. +Matters having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for +Sinigalia, and when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they +did not pass over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards +the river and the other towards the country, and a way was left in the +middle through which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the +town. + +Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a +few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a +cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his +approaching death--a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the +man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that +when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet +the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He +recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised +his nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the +virtues of their fathers that should be kept in mind. These three, +therefore, came before the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were +received by him with goodwill; they were at once placed between those +who were commissioned to look after them. + +But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band +in Sinigalia, was missing--for Oliverotto was waiting in the square +before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and +drilling them--signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the +care of Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures +that Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and +joined Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men +out of their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of +the duke; and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters +and to come himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken +this advice, came before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to +him; and Oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others. + +So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke's +quarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made +them prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that +the men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. +Those of Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of +the Orsini and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment +of the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, +and bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and +Vitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of +the country and saved themselves. + +But the duke's soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the +men of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not +repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have +completely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced, +the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into +a room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in +keeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of +the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the +blame for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the +Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome +that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of +Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th +January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the +same way. + + + + + +THE LIFE OF +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA + +WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI + +And sent to his friends +ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI +And +LUIGI ALAMANNI + + + +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI +1284-1328 + +It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who +have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of +them, who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all +others in their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness +and obscurity; or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous +way. They have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or +they have had so mean a parentage that in shame they have given +themselves out to be sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be +wearisome to relate who these persons may have been because they are +well known to everybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly +edifying to those who read them, they are omitted. I believe that +these lowly beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is desirous +of showing to the world that such men owe much to her and little to +wisdom, because she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really +take no part in their career: thus all success must be attributed to +her. Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great +deeds, if he is measured by the times in which he lived and the city +in which he was born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate +nor distinguished in his birth, as the course of this history will +show. It appeared to be desirable to recall his memory, because I have +discerned in him such indications of valour and fortune as should make +him a great exemplar to men. I think also that I ought to call your +attention to his actions, because you of all men I know delight most +in noble deeds. + +The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble +families of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat +fallen in estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family +was born a son Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San +Michele of Lucca, and for this reason was honoured with the title of +Messer Antonio. He had an only sister, who had been married to +Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not +wishing to marry again went to live with her brother. Messer Antonio +had a vineyard behind the house where he resided, and as it was +bounded on all sides by gardens, any person could have access to it +without difficulty. One morning, shortly after sunrise, Madonna +Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called, had occasion to +go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the +dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves of a vine she +turned her eyes in that direction, and heard something resembling the +cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards it, and saw the hands and +face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the leaves and who seemed to +be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and partly fearing, yet +full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it to the house, +where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is customary, +and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When he heard +what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised or +compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves what +should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no +children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for +it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They +baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As +the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of +wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those +lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended +to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his +canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with +this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio +was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached +the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of +Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left +off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, +delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in +running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he +far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at +any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of +wars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with +vexation and sorrow. + +There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, +named Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, +bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had +often fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a +Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This +gentleman resided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others +most mornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is +at the top of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, +and he had often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of +the street in those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that +Castruccio far excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to +exercise a royal authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed +him, Messer Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. +Being informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio +he felt a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called +him one day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the +house of a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use +arms, or in the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but +masses and the services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that +it pleased Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even +though he stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by +Messer Francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were +agreeable, nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly +studies and take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer +Francesco, and in a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer +Antonio, who was driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the +lad, and the fear that he would not be able to hold him much longer. + +Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to +the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was +astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that +virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true +gentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and +could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and +tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all +others, and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. +But what enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the +delightful modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or +word to others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with +his equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him +beloved, not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When +Castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were +driven from Pavia by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the +Visconti to assist the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in +charge of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and +courage in this expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any +other captain, and his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, +but throughout all Lombardy. + +Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation that he +left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as +many friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are +necessary for that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, +leaving a son thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed +Castruccio to be his son's tutor and administrator of his estate. +Before he died Francesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to +show Pagolo that goodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to +HIM, and to render to the son the gratitude which he had not been able +to repay to the father. Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became +the governor and tutor of Pagolo, which increased enormously his power +and position, and created a certain amount of envy against him in +Lucca in place of the former universal goodwill, for many men +suspected him of harbouring tyrannical intentions. Among these the +leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the head of the Guelph party. +This man hoped after the death of Messer Francesco to become the chief +man in Lucca, but it seemed to him that Castruccio, with the great +abilities which he already showed, and holding the position of +governor, deprived him of his opportunity; therefore he began to sow +those seeds which should rob Castruccio of his eminence. Castruccio at +first treated this with scorn, but afterwards he grew alarmed, +thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able to bring him into disgrace +with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples and have him driven out of +Lucca. + +The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of +Arezzo, who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards +became their lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from +Lucca, with whom Castruccio held communications with the object of +effecting their restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also +brought into his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the +authority of the Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, +Castruccio cautiously fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it +with supplies and munitions of war, in order that it might stand a +siege for a few days in case of need. When the night came which had +been agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between +the mountains and Pisa with many men, the signal was given, and +without being observed Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and +set fire to the portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within +the city, calling the people to arms and forcing open the gate from +his side. Uguccione entered with his men, poured through the town, and +killed Messer Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and +supporters. The governor was driven out, and the government reformed +according to the wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, +because it was found that more than one hundred families were exiled +at that time. Of those who fled, part went to Florence and part to +Pistoia, which city was the headquarters of the Guelph party, and for +this reason it became most hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese. + +As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party +that the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they +determined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a +large army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence +they marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into +Lucca. Upon this Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, +and with a number of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he +moved against the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance +of the enemy withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between +Montecatini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to +Montecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight +skirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence. +Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed +coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing +worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the +army in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought about the ruin of +the Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its +captain had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observed +this, and allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief; +he also showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions +of the camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more +insolent the more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they +drew out in the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. +Presently, deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and +having mastered their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. +First he spoke a few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and +pointed out to them the certainty of victory if they would but obey +his commands. Castruccio had noticed how the enemy had placed all his +best troops in the centre of the line of battle, and his less reliable +men on the wings of the army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, +putting his most valiant men on the flanks, while those on whom he +could not so strongly rely he moved to the centre. Observing this +order of battle, he drew out of his lines and quickly came in sight of +the hostile army, who, as usual, had come in their insolence to defy +him. He then commanded his centre squadrons to march slowly, whilst he +moved rapidly forward those on the wings. Thus, when they came into +contact with the enemy, only the wings of the two armies became +engaged, whilst the center battalions remained out of action, for +these two portions of the line of battle were separated from each +other by a long interval and thus unable to reach each other. By this +expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio's men were opposed to +the weaker part of the enemy's troops, and the most efficient men of +the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines were unable to +fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or to give any +assistance to their own flanks. So, without much difficulty, +Castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the centre +battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to +attack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. The defeat +was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than +ten thousand men killed with many officers and knights of the Guelph +party in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them, +among whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his +nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castruccio +the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was +Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed +in the first onset. + +This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that +Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it +appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of +power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only +waited for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the +death of Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in +Lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for +refuge. On the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, +they were driven off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This +affair coming to the knowledge of Uguccione, who was than at Pisa, it +appeared to him a proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He +therefore sent for his son Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and +commissioned him to take Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him +to death. Castruccio, fearing no evil, went to the governor in a +friendly way, was entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. +But Neri, fearing to put him to death lest the people should be +incensed, kept him alive, in order to hear further from his father +concerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and +cowardice of his son, and at once set out from Pisa to Lucca with four +hundred horsemen to finish the business in his own way; but he had not +yet reached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to +death and created Count Gaddo della Gherardesca their lord. Before +Uguccione reached Lucca he heard of the occurrences at Pisa, but it +did not appear wise to him to turn back, lest the Lucchese with the +example of Pisa before them should close their gates against him. But +the Lucchese, having heard of what had happened at Pisa, availed +themselves of this opportunity to demand the liberation of Castruccio, +notwithstanding that Uguccione had arrived in their city. They first +began to speak of it in private circles, afterwards openly in the +squares and streets; then they raised a tumult, and with arms in their +hands went to Uguccione and demanded that Castruccio should be set at +liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse might happen, released him from +prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered his friends around him, and with +the help of the people attacked Uguccione; who, finding he had no +resource but in flight, rode away with his friends to Lombardy, to the +lords of Scale, where he died in poverty. + +But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, +and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people +that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having +obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the +recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of +Uguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded +a treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he +constructed a fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in +the course of two months Castruccio captured the town. With the +reputation gained at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and +Lavenza, and in a short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In +order to close the pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he +besieged Pontremoli and wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio +Palavicini, who was the lord of it. After this victory he returned to +Lucca, and was welcomed by the whole people. And now Castruccio, +deeming it imprudent any longer to defer making himself a prince, got +himself created the lord of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, +Puccinello dal Portico, Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all +of whom he had corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and +deliberately elected prince by the people. At this time Frederick of +Bavaria, the King of the Romans, came into Italy to assume the +Imperial crown, and Castruccio, in order that he might make friends +with him, met him at the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had +left as his deputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high +estimation, because of the people's love for the memory of his father. +Castruccio was received in great honour by Frederick, and many +privileges were conferred upon him, and he was appointed the emperor's +lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time the Pisans were in great fear of +Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had driven out of Pisa, and they +had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Frederick created Castruccio +the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of the Guelph party, and +particularly of the Florentines, were constrained to accept him as +their lord. + +Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian +affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian +Ghibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to +Castruccio for help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship +of his country, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among +these exiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo +Nardi, and Piero Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. +Castruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all +Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to +gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer +Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces +of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he +divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied +with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he +could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without +those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he +surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer +Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had +driven out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army +and the King Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade +the Florentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at +home, they should be compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in +order to defend themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and +seized Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the +country. Whereupon the Florentines recalled their army, which had +scarcely reached Tuscany, when Castruccio was forced by other +necessities to return to Lucca. + +There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so +powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance +him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not +received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they +incited other families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. +They found their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they +set upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and +killed him. They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but +Stefano di Poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the +rebellion, intervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down +their arms; and he offered to be their mediator with Castruccio to +obtain from him what they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms +with no greater intelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, +having heard the news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put +Pagolo Guinigi in command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set +out for home. Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at +an end, yet he posted his men in the most advantageous places +throughout the city. As it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought +to be very much obliged to him, he sought him out, and without saying +anything on his own behalf, for he did not recognize any need for +doing so, he begged Castruccio to pardon the other members of his +family by reason of their youth, their former friendships, and the +obligations which Castruccio was under to their house. To this +Castruccio graciously responded, and begged Stefano to reassure +himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure to find the tumult +at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to hear of its +inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to him, saying +that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of showing +his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and Castruccio +they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown into prison +and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered San Miniato, +whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace, as it did +not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to leave +him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce, which +they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and desirous +of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded with them +for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conquests they +had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned his +attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should not again +be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, under +various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their +ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, +but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had in +his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that +none of them were to be trusted. Then for his further security he +raised a fortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom +he had killed or hunted out of the state. + +Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened +his position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, +of increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he +could get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, +which was his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made +friends with the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that +both parties confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it +always had been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the +Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each +of these men held secret communications with Castruccio, and each +desired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many +threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the +Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city; +both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they +believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than +the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave +promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and +to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the +appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself +direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and +both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a +signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other +Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans +of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the +hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the +palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them +many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked +to the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and +quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great +valour. + +About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the +dearness of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at +Avignon. The German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what +happened--murders and tumults following each other daily, without his +being able to put an end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest +the Romans should call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive +the Germans out of the city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer +friend to whom he could apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to +him, begging him not only to give him assistance, but also to come in +person to Rome. Castruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to +render the emperor this service, because he believed that he himself +would not be safe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. +Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio set out for +Rome with six hundred horsemen, where he was received by Enrico with +the greatest distinction. In a short time the presence of Castruccio +obtained such respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or +violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio +having sent by sea from the country round Pisa large quantities of +corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. When he had +chastised some of the Roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary +obedience was rendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many honours, +and was made a Roman senator. This dignity was assumed with the +greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in a brocaded toga, which had +the following words embroidered on its front: "I am what God wills." +Whilst on the back was: "What God desires shall be." + +During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that +Castruccio should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how +they could tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not +be difficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence +were Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to +face danger. These men kept up communications with their friends in +Pistoia, and with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by +night, and after driving out some of Castruccio's officials and +partisans, and killing others, they restored the city to its freedom. +The news of this greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of +Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines +heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, they decided +to intercept him with their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the +belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pistoia. +Assembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph cause, the +Florentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other hand, +Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard where +the Florentines' lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains of +Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as he +possibly could, to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He +believed that if he succeeded in this design, victory was assured, +although he was informed that the Florentines had thirty thousand men, +whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he had every confidence +in his own abilities and the valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to +attack his enemy in the open lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers. +Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill +which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the exact pass, but about a +bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places narrow and steep, whilst +in general it ascends gently, but is still narrow, especially at the +summit where the waters divide, so that twenty men side by side could +hold it. The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a German, who, before +Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to remain in +possession of the castle, it being common to the Lucchese and the +Pistoians, and unclaimed by either--neither of them wishing to +displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and +came under obligations to no one. For these reasons, and also because +the castle was well fortified, he had always been able to maintain his +position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to fall upon his +enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and there was no +fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force before they +became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this trouble with +Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which possession +of this castle would give him, and having an intimate friendship with +a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with him that four +hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle the night +before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put to death. + +Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the +Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away +from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his +army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they +reached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill +on the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the +castle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching +from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of +Serravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the +hill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his +infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a +path on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four +hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never +expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they +aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the +Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by +surprise when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close +were they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It +was a case of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were +assailed with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their +own, although some few of them got through. When the noise of the +fighting reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with +confusion. The cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the +captains were unable to get their men either backward or forward, +owing to the narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one +knew what ought to be done or what could be done. In a short time the +cavalry who were engaged with the enemy's infantry were scattered or +killed without having made any effective defence because of their +unfortunate position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a +stout resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on +both flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their +friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a +decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one +thousand infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four +hundred horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the +whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they +carried out with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the +attack, but gave way, and were soon in full retreat--conquered more by +their unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in +the rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each +man seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very +sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were +Bandini dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, +all Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought +on the Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the +Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out +the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not +content with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both +sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola, +about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing +the spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding +horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals +in commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to +corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city +gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the +participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso +Lupacci and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the +Florentines great anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, +they sent envoys to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion +of their city; and he, knowing of what immense importance the +maintenance of the Guelph cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed +with the Florentines to receive from them a yearly tribute of two +hundred thousand florins, and he send his son Carlo to Florence with +four thousand horsemen. + +Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the +pressure of Castruccio's army, owing to his being compelled to leave +his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress +a conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, +one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland +should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this +conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of +Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy +paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few +are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy +Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio. +This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio +Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering +their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and +put him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove +their families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both +Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought +and energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the +Florentines their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await +the coming of Carlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived +they decided to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more +than thirty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry--having called +to their aid every Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether +they should attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be +better to march on the latter--a course, owing to the recent +conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them, +because they believed that the surrender of Pistoia would follow the +acquisition of Pisa. + +In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army +and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing +from thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous +army which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no +degree alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune +would deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no +reason to think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had +better prospects of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled +twenty thousand foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with +this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa +with five thousand infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than +any other town in the Pisan district, owing to its situation between +the rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevation above the +surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being +victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approach +it either from the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get +through to Pisa, or attack Castruccio's forces except at a +disadvantage. In one case they would find themselves placed between +his two armies, the one under his own command and the other under +Pagolo, and in the other case they would have to cross the Arno to get +to close quarters with the enemy, an undertaking of great hazard. In +order to tempt the Florentines to take this latter course, Castruccio +withdrew his men from the banks of the river and placed them under the +walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse of land between them and +the river. + +The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to +decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and, +having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the +latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet +the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the +saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the +Florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of +cavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action +was fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the +Florentines with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, +not allowing them to issue from the river before he charged them; he +also sent one thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same +number down the Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much +impeded by their arms and the water that they were not able to mount +the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the +river more difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had +crossed having broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep +with mud, many of the horses rolled over with their riders and many of +them had stuck so fast that they could not move. When the Florentine +captains saw the difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew +them and moved higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less +treacherous and the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met +at the bank by the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, +who, being light armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let +fly with tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. +The horses, alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move +forward, and trampled each other in great confusion. The fight between +the men of Castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing +was sharp and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation +and neither would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive +the others back into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a +footing on land in order to make room for the others pressing forward, +who if they could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and +in this obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. +Castruccio shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom +they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines +reproached each other that the many should be overcome by the few. At +length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that +both his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides +had many killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry +to take up a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then +commanded these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to +retreat, and one part of them to turn to the right and another to the +left. This cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took +advantage, and thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. +But when these tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with +Castruccio's reserves they could not stand against them and at once +fell back into the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet +gained any decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, +knowing his inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to +stand on the defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he +hoped that when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make +short work of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he +saw the Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the +remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This +they did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, +fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. +The Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had +met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry +cross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of +Castruccio's army. But here, also, the banks were steep and already +lined by the men of Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. +Thus the Florentines were so completely defeated at all points that +scarcely a third of them escaped, and Castruccio was again covered +with glory. Many captains were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of +King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the +Florentine commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, +the slaughter was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a +battle. Of the Florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and +thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and +seventy men. + +But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his +life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus +ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry +into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but +death could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the +battle the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although +fatigued and overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome +his men on their return from victory and personally thank them. He was +also on the watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the +fortunes of the day; he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a +good general to be the first man in the saddle and the last out of it. +Here Castruccio stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on +the banks of the Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he +took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to +such troubles; but it was the cause of his death. On the following +night he was attacked with high fever, which increased so rapidly that +the doctors saw it must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called +Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him as follows: + +"If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the +midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my +successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have +left thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, +because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and +Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the +Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these +peoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least +more peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, +but one more secure and established on a surer foundation. But +Fortune, who insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did +not endow me with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the +first, nor the time to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have +told thee, and I have never concealed it, how I entered the house of +thy father whilst yet a boy--a stranger to all those ambitions which +every generous soul should feel--and how I was brought up by him, and +loved as though I had been born of his blood; how under his governance +I learned to be valiant and capable of availing myself of all that +fortune, of which thou hast been witness. When thy good father came to +die, he committed thee and all his possessions to my care, and I have +brought thee up with that love, and increased thy estate with that +care, which I was bound to show. And in order that thou shouldst not +only possess the estate which thy father left, but also that which my +fortune and abilities have gained, I have never married, so that the +love of children should never deflect my mind from that gratitude +which I owed to the children of thy father. Thus I leave thee a vast +estate, of which I am well content, but I am deeply concerned, +inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure. Thou hast the city +of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest contented under they +government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are of nature +changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be sometimes held in +subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under a Lucchese. +Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with factions and +deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs recently +inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended +Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly +destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than +they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the +princes of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far +distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou +hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory +of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has +brought thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will +assist thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are +suffering under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to +thee. And whereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I +believed that war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou +hast every inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance +will bring thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest +important in this world that a man should know himself, and the +measure of his own strength and means; and he who knows that he has +not a genius for fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of +peace. And it will be well for thee to rule they conduct by my +counsel, and to learn in this way to enjoy what my life-work and +dangers have gained; and in this thou wilt easily succeed when thou +hast learnt to believe that what I have told thee is true. And thou +wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that I have left thee this realm and +have taught thee how to keep it." + +After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, +and Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending +Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his +successor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him, +and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he +was. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he +was buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to +Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the +abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, +and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This +latter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the time of the +great-grandson of Pagolo. + +From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a +man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own +time, but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above +the ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious +presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke +with him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, +and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or +snowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends, +but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false +with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he +desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory +that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was +bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He +was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear +nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees +that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully +sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not +look for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was +not angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened +that he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, +as on the following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a +partridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom +Castruccio had said: "You would not have given more than a penny." +"That is true," answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: "A +ducat is much less to me." Having about him a flatterer on whom he had +spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: +"Fisherman are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in +order that they make take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to +be wetted by spittle that I may catch a whale"; and this was not only +heard by Castruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest +that it was wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: +"If that be a vice than you should not fare so splendidly at the +feasts of our saints." Passing through a street he saw a young man as +he came out of a house of ill fame blush at being seen by Castruccio, +and said to him: "Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out, +but when thou goest into such places." A friend gave him a very +curiously tied knot to undo and was told: "Fool, do you think that I +wish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to fasten." +Castruccio said to one who professed to be a philosopher: "You are +like the dogs who always run after those who will give them the best +to eat," and was answered: "We are rather like the doctors who go to +the houses of those who have the greatest need of them." Going by +water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much disturbed by a +dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for cowardice by +one of those with him, who said that he did not fear anything. +Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since every man +valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one what he +ought to do to gain estimation, he said: "When thou goest to a banquet +take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon another." To +a person who was boasting that he had read many things, Castruccio +said: "He knows better than to boast of remembering many things." +Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming intoxicated. +Castruccio replied: "An ox does the same." Castruccio was acquainted +with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being blamed by a +friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be taken in by +a woman, he said: "She has not taken me in, I have taken her." Being +also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered: "Thou dost not +spend as much as I do?" and being told that it was true, he continued: +"Then thou art more avaricious than I am gluttonous." Being invited by +Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of Luca, to supper, +he went to the house and was shown by Taddeo into a chamber hung with +silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers and foliage of +the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered some saliva in his +mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him much disturbed by +this, said to him: "I knew not where to spit in order to offend thee +less." Being asked how Caesar died he said: "God willing I will die as +he did." Being one night in the house of one of his gentlemen where +many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of his friends for +dancing and amusing himself with them more than was usual in one of +his station, so he said: "He who is considered wise by day will not be +considered a fool at night." A person came to demand a favour of +Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea threw +himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by +Castruccio, said: "Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast +thy ears in thy feet," whereupon he obtained double the favour he had +asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one, +seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled +blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous +words, he said to him: "When you have another request to make, send +someone else to make it." Having been wearied by a similar man with a +long oration who wound up by saying: "Perhaps I have fatigued you by +speaking so long," Castruccio said: "You have not, because I have not +listened to a word you said." He used to say of one who had been a +beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was +dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now +he took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, +he said: "Do you laugh because you are successful or because another +is unfortunate?" Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco +Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: "What shall I give you if +you will let me give you a blow on the nose?" Castruccio answered: "A +helmet." Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been +instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done +wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived +themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly +those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying +that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then +refused when the time came. He said that it always struck him with +surprise that whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would +sound it first to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they +were content with only looking at her. He was once asked in what +manner he would wish to be buried when he died, and answered: "With +the face turned downwards, for I know when I am gone this country will +be turned upside down." On being asked if it had ever occurred to him +to become a friar in order to save his soul, he answered that it had +not, because it appeared strange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to +Paradise and Uguccione della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once +asked when should a man eat to preserve his health, and replied: "If +the man be rich let him eat when he is hungry; if he be poor, then +when he can." Seeing on of his gentlemen make a member of his family +lace him up, he said to him: "I pray God that you will let him feed +you also." Seeing that someone had written upon his house in Latin the +words: "May God preserve this house from the wicked," he said, "The +owner must never go in." Passing through one of the streets he saw a +small house with a very large door, and remarked: "That house will fly +through the door." He was having a discussion with the ambassador of +the King of Naples concerning the property of some banished nobles, +when a dispute arose between them, and the ambassador asked him if he +had no fear of the king. "Is this king of yours a bad man or a good +one?" asked Castruccio, and was told that he was a good one, whereupon +he said, "Why should you suggest that I should be afraid of a good +man?" + +I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and +weighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to +his high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a +prince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good +fortune, so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad +fortune; therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison +are to be seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, +where they were placed by him to testify for ever to his days of +adversity. As in his life he was inferior neither to Philip of +Macedon, the father of Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in +the same year of his age as they did, and he would doubtless have +excelled both of them had Fortune decreed that he should be born, not +in Lucca, but in Macedonia or Rome. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg Etext of The Prince, Etc.,by Machiavelli + |