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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78918 ***
+
+
+
+
+  Transcriber’s Note
+  Italic text displayed as: _italic_
+
+
+
+
+  Senator Fulbright’s
+  Secret Memorandum
+
+  JAMES D. BALES
+
+
+  Concerning the cold war, a well known
+  liberal, William E. Bohn, said: “Many of
+  us on the democratic side are poorly prepared
+  for this historic conflict. There are
+  editors, clergymen, educators, and politicians
+  in this country who hardly know what Communism
+  is.” (_The New Leader_, January
+  22, 1962, p. 15)
+
+
+  BALES BOOKSTORE
+  Searcy, Arkansas
+
+
+
+
+  Copyright 1962 By
+  JAMES D. BALES
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+Senator J. W. Fulbright’s memorandum concerning the military and
+the cold war was likely the most controversial paper which appeared
+in Washington in 1961. It is probable that the memorandum has been
+discussed by a lot of people who have not read it, much less studied
+it. Because it is an important document it ought to be studied by the
+public as a whole, and not just by men in the armed forces or by those
+in the political arena.
+
+The importance of the memorandum is underscored not only by what
+it says but also by the wide and varied reaction to it. As to be
+expected, it has not been favorably received by those individuals and
+organizations which it attacks as extremely radical rightwingers. In
+addition, many individuals from various parts of the United States and
+from both political parties have been critical of the memorandum.
+
+On the other hand, support for the memorandum has come from many and
+different sources. President Kennedy stated that Senator Fulbright
+rendered a service by sending the memorandum to the White House. In
+the Senator’s own state, the _Arkansas Gazette_ has more than once
+indicated its editorial backing of the memorandum.
+
+The leftists as a whole have backed the memorandum. This backing has
+included that of the socialists and of the communists. Kingsley Martin,
+a British socialist said: “The dangerous change came with the Korean
+war, when America discovered that GIs, having no notion why they were
+fighting, were easily influenced by Communist propaganda. As a result,
+the Pentagon has poured out hundreds of booklets instructing officers
+how to indoctrinate the army with hatred of Communism. Quotations
+from these documents, presented at the initial hearing of the Walker
+case, were, one would have thought sufficient evidence of the virulent
+anti-Communist propaganda to which the troops are subjected. But the
+Fulbright memorandum (which should be widely published and not hidden
+in the Congressional Record) proved that politically-minded generals
+had used the permitted task of indoctrination as a means of denigrating
+such distinguished American personalities as Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt
+and Dean Acheson. These were in effect treated as near-Communists, if
+not traitors.”[1] So far as the present author understands the matter,
+the memorandum does not mention but one General even remotely in such
+a way. And even in his case it states that he said that some prominent
+Americans were “tainted with Communist ideology.” This is not the same
+as calling them near-Communists or traitors.
+
+Kingsley Martin further praised Senator Fulbright as an
+internationalist, and as one who “was making a reasoned attempt to
+bring Arkansas into the world community.”[2] What kind of “world
+community” did the socialist Martin have in mind?
+
+Senator Fulbright and his position were backed in the Paris weekly,
+L’EXPRESS on October 12, 1961. This paper is connected with Pierre
+Mendes-France, a leader of the leftwing of the Socialist Party in
+France.[3]
+
+The Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation has backed it
+consistently. Norman Thomas said: “Our immediate purpose in preparing
+this factual pamphlet was to present it to the administration in order
+to back up Senator Fulbright’s excellent memorandum and continue the
+work that the Defense Department has begun.”[4]
+
+Irwin Suall, a prominent socialist, has written: “Flushing out and
+exposing the activities of the ultras is a major current function of
+the Socialist Party. From that standpoint, Thomas called the results of
+his press conference ‘highly gratifying’.”[5]
+
+The Communist Party in the United States thought so highly of the
+memorandum that they reprinted without comment several columns of the
+memorandum in _The Worker_ for August 27, 1961.
+
+No attempt is made to identify Senator Fulbright with each of these
+groups just because they back him in this matter. This would be neither
+sensible nor fair. However, such questions as the following are raised:
+Why are they backing him in this matter? How do they believe that this
+would contribute to their long-range or short-range purposes? Would
+it make a contribution to any of their purposes? We do know that the
+socialists and the communists are backing the memorandum. This reveals
+their evaluation of it and indicates whose causes they think that the
+memorandum serves.
+
+The extent to which the censorship, which is recommended in memorandum
+of Senator Fulbright, is being carried out already is indicated in
+a directive issued to Reserve Officers in at least one area of the
+United States. It reads: “Although Reserve personnel are not subject
+to Army Regulations except when on active duty, such regulations are
+distributed to Reserve units with the intention of providing guidance
+where appropriate. Members of the Reserve are encouraged to conform
+whenever possible to the spirit and intent of regulations even though
+they are not bound by them. It is pointed out that information they
+convey to the public becomes at least quasi-official when linked with
+their Reserve Status.”
+
+Since within a few months an attempt was being made to carry over the
+censorship into the private lives of Reservists, in the above manner,
+what will happen within a few years unless the trend is changed? Will
+the Reserves be prohibited from the freedom of speech which is the
+birthright of American citizens?
+
+The memorandum is thus seen to raise questions which are tremendous in
+their import.
+
+Our examination of the memorandum does not imply that there are no
+extremists. Obviously there are extremists of all varieties in America,
+and it would be unreasonable to conclude that there were no extremists
+in the military or amongst the anti-Communists. However, in the
+author’s judgment it is highly doubtful that the number of extremists
+in the military is anywhere near as high as the percentage of soldiers
+in Korean prisoner of war camps who in one way or another collaborated
+with the enemy, or defected, or failed to manifest the proper
+discipline or failed to cooperate with their fellow soldiers.
+
+Our defense of some of the individuals and positions which are attacked
+in the memorandum does not imply an endorsement of every individual
+and organization mentioned in the memorandum; nor does it imply an
+endorsement of everything which may have been said at one time or
+another by the individuals and organizations in whose defense we have
+spoken.
+
+In our discussion of the memorandum we have sometimes quoted Senator
+Fulbright against Senator Fulbright. We have also quoted some liberals
+against Senator Fulbright. This illustrates that one is not necessarily
+a so-called ultra rightist just because he opposes certain positions
+taken by the Senator.
+
+There are some who have implied that Senator Fulbright is not
+responsible for what is in the memorandum since he did not personally
+write it. Of such we would ask: Is there anything in the memorandum’s
+charges and recommendations with which the Senator disagrees? If so,
+why has he not said so? As far as our knowledge goes, the Senator
+himself has never suggested that he disagrees with any of its charges
+and recommendations.
+
+Although the Senator did not personally write the memorandum, he is
+responsible for it; and as far as we know he has never suggested
+otherwise. He submitted it “to the Secretary of Defense.”[6] He said:
+“The memorandum was based on my strong belief in the principle of
+military subordination to civilian control.”[7] “The memorandum was a
+personal one.... It was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense as a
+personal correspondence.” It was a part of his “private papers.”[8]
+
+According to the President, Senator Fulbright’s memorandum presented
+the Senator’s views. “Senator Fulbright sent a memorandum to the
+Secretary of Defense at the request of the Secretary of Defense, and
+expressed his views about a matter which is, of course, of concern to
+the Department of Defense.”
+
+“So, in my judgment, Senator Fulbright performed a service in sending
+his viewpoint to the Department of Defense....”[9]
+
+In order to assist the public in their evaluation of the memorandum,
+the following discussion of the memorandum is placed before the public.
+
+This discussion does not endeavor to present and to examine the basic
+philosophy, strategy and tactics of the enemy—communism. This the
+author has endeavored to do in two other books, _Communism: Its Faith
+and Fallacies_ and _Understanding Communism_.
+
+Appreciation is expressed to those who gave permission to quote from
+copyrighted material.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] _New Statesman_, November 17, 1961, p. 732, col. 2,t. The
+difficulty of speaking on some phases of the present world situation
+without crossing Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt is illustrated by following
+remarks which she made in a recent interview. _First_, the President
+has urged the people to build shelters. Mrs. Roosevelt said: “I don’t
+believe in private shelters, or school shelters.” It must be done,
+she said, through “a comprehensive government program” if it is to be
+done at all. _Second_, the President indicates that we shall fight
+if necessary. Military men teach the same thing. She said: “War
+is inadmissible anymore.... Today willingness to go to war means
+willingness to face the loss of civilization.” (Hal Boyle, “Eleanor
+Roosevelt Recalls Pearl Harbor,” _Arkansas Democrat_, Dec. 7, 1961, p.
+19.)
+
+[2] _New Statesman_, p. 732, col. 1,m.
+
+[3] “Politically, it speaks for the non-Communist left and is close to
+ex-Premier Pierre Mendes-France.” _Newsweek_, Feb. 12, 1962, p. 82,
+col. 3,b.
+
+[4] _New America_, December 8, 1961, p. 2.
+
+[5] _Ibid._, p. 6, col. 5,t. _Maclean’s_ magazine (September 9, 1961)
+defended Senator Fulbright and implied that “fanatics, numbskulls and
+mediocrities” were the core of the opposition to him in his home state
+(p. 81. From an article by Ian Schlanders.)
+
+[6] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m.
+
+[7] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 2,m.
+
+[8] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 3,t.
+
+[9] Press conference of August 10. _Congressional Record_, August 11,
+1961, p. 14449, col. 1,t,m. See also p. 14559.
+
+
+
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+
+  CHAPTERS                                                          Page
+
+  Preface
+
+     I The Background                                                  1
+
+    II The Secret Memorandum Made Public                               5
+
+   III The Effect of the Memorandum                                    6
+
+    IV Who Is Attacked in the Memorandum                               9
+
+     V The Protracted Conflict Concept Criticized                     29
+
+    VI The American People the Principle Problem?                     50
+
+   VII Who Is the Defeatest?                                          70
+
+  VIII Senator Fulbright and World Opinion                            70
+
+    IX Is Communism A Matter of Politics?                             80
+
+     X The Memorandum and the Community Party Line                    80
+
+    XI Conclusions                                                   101
+
+
+
+
+Chapter I
+
+THE BACKGROUND
+
+
+Too many Americans have understood neither the American system
+of freedom, and how it works, nor the communist challenge to our
+freedom, and how it operates. The well known liberal, William E. Bohn,
+wrote: “Many of us on the democratic side are poorly prepared for
+this historic conflict. There are editors, clergymen, educators and
+politicians in this country who hardly know what Communism is.”[10]
+This lack of understanding was illustrated in the case of those
+prisoners of war in Korea who were brainwashed.[11]
+
+Out of this lack of understanding of the nature of our country, and of
+the nature of the enemy who has challenged us, has come an apathy which
+threatens our very survival. Senator Fulbright himself has spoken of
+our having become “snug and complacent.”[12] He lamented: “... If only
+we would stop snoring with our eyes open.”[13] His fear was that even
+if we are aroused out of our sleep we “again subside into dreamland.”
+In fact, he said: “Mr. President, I have no idea what must be done to
+awaken Americans to the unpleasant facts of life. As unwilling as I
+am to face it, perhaps the answer is that we simply do not wish to be
+disturbed.”[14]
+
+In December, 1960, the Senator said: “The greatest crisis confronting
+the West is not Berlin. It is the apathy of the free world and its
+incomprehensible unwillingness to look facts in the face. Evolution and
+the survival of the fittest are concepts we understand when applied to
+plants and animals—but we seem not to realize that these concepts apply
+to us.”[15]
+
+The people, said the Senator, must be informed. “The American people
+ought to be told the bleak truth about their world, the character of
+the forces arrayed against them, and what they must do, at whatever
+cost, to survive or even to bring about a state of high security. They
+must be told that, however humane their society, whatever its ideals,
+this alone will not save them from destruction by a society armed with
+the prodigious mechanisms of our times and an implacable determination
+to dominate all men.”[16]
+
+Spurred on by the studies of the Korean prisoners of war, and deeply
+concerned with the apathy and ignorance in America, efforts were made
+to do a better job of equipping the American soldier for the war in
+which we have become involved. On August 17, 1955, President Eisenhower
+made an official proclamation that soldiers were expected to live up to
+the newly formulated “Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces
+of the United States.” Since the ignorance in the Armed Forces was but
+a reflection of the ignorance of the general population, President
+Eisenhower and the National Security Council issued in 1958 a directive
+which more fully put the military in the cold war.
+
+The National Security Council is our top policy and planning agency.
+It is composed of the Cabinet members who have responsibilities in
+the field of national security, and included in it by law are the
+President, Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
+of State, the National Security Resources Board’s Chairman; and, as
+statutory advisers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
+CIA. It was this group which issued the directive of 1958 which placed
+upon the military the duty of helping not only the military but also
+the civilian population to gain an understanding of the issues involved
+in the cold war. By name, its statutory members in 1958 were President
+Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, John Foster Dulles, Neil H. McElroy,
+and Gordon Grey, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.
+
+As a result of this directive of the National Security Council,
+national strategy seminars were conducted throughout the country.
+Originating in the War College, these seminars were making a valuable
+contribution to the waging of the cold war, as Roscoe Drummond has
+pointed out.[17] Civilian organizations who wanted speakers on the
+subject of Communism and the cold war could contact the military and
+secure the services of military officials who were versed in some phase
+of the cold war. In some cases facilities on military bases were made
+available.
+
+During 1961, however, there was an increase in censorship of the
+speeches of military men. In July, 1961, the Defense Department issued
+a directive placing certain restraints on military speakers, and this
+action, according to Cabell Phillips in the _New York Times_ of July
+21, was the result of a memorandum of Senator J. W. Fulbright.[18]
+Supposedly directed only toward the curbing of political utterances
+by rightwing military speakers, the impact of the directive and the
+controversy which has arisen have been much broader. As a result, as
+Roscoe Drummond pointed out, the country is being deprived “of the
+useful and needed service which the military can properly perform.”
+
+“We have just about thrown away the public national-strategy seminars
+which were doing so much to alert people” concerning communism and its
+strategy in the cold war.[19]
+
+As far as we know the Defense Department has now limited the military
+to military subjects, which include the military threat of Russia; but
+anything dealing with the _specific aims and political tactics of the
+communists must be cleared by the Pentagon_.[20]
+
+Fulbright’s memorandum, which has had an influence on the stand taken
+by the Department of Defense, is thus seen to be an important one.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[10] _The New Leader_, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 15.
+
+[11] William E. Mayer, “Communist Indoctrination—Its Significance to
+Americans,” Searcy, Arkansas: National Education Program, 1957, pp.
+14-15, _Congressional Record_, Jan. 21, 1960, p. 877, col. 1,m. Senator
+Dodd has endeavored to give the percentage of collaborators in The
+_Congressional Record_, July 23, 1962, p. 13569. On the same page he
+said: “The overwhelming majority of these POW’s succumbed to Communist
+pressures and became collaborators in one degree or another. So general
+was the phenomena of defeatism and ‘give-up-itis,’ that we cannot
+write them off to individual weakness. The fault lay not with the
+individual, but with our society.” See also the statements of Admiral
+Arleigh A. Burke in the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the
+Committee on Armed Services, _Military Cold War Education and Speech
+Review Policies_, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962, Part 1,
+p.19. Also Secretary McNamara, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed
+Services, _Defense Secretary McNamara on S. Res. 191_, Washington:
+Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 4.
+
+[12] _Congressional Record_, May 11, 1959, p. A3890, col. 2,b.
+
+[13] _Ibid._, p. A3890, col. 1,m.
+
+[14] _Congressional Record_, Jan. 23, 1959, p. 1007, col. 1,b.
+
+[15] _Congressional Record_, Feb. 16, 1961, p. A925, col. 2,b.
+
+[16] _Congressional Record_, March 28, 1960, p. A2709, col. 2,t.
+
+[17] “When the Generals Should Be Allowed To Speak,” _Arkansas
+Democrat_, October 26, 1961. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of
+the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thought that qualified military personnel
+should participate in such seminars. Special Preparedness Subcommittee
+of the Committee on Armed Services, _Military Cold War Education and
+Speech Review Policies_, Part 1, page 103.
+
+[18] See the directive and Phillips’ articles reprinted by Senator
+Strom Thurmond in the _Congressional Record_, July 26, 1961, pp.
+12620-12621. Compare _U.S. News and World Report_, August 7, 1961, p.
+9. See also pp. 12-15 of a reprint entitled “Excerpts From Speeches
+by Senator Strom Thurmond on Efforts to Gag Military Anti-Communist
+Speeches and Seminars.”
+
+[19] “When the Generals Should Be Allowed To Speak,” _Arkansas
+Democrat_, October 26, 1961.
+
+[20] According to _U.S. News and World Report_, September 18, 1961, p.
+8. Reporting on the September 6 testimony of Defense Secretary McNamara.
+
+
+
+
+Chapter II
+
+THE SECRET MEMORANDUM MADE PUBLIC
+
+
+The Fulbright memorandum was sent to the Secretary of Defense and
+to the President. It was so secret that other members of the Senate
+Foreign Relations Committee, of which Senator Fulbright is the
+chairman, did not know of its existence.[21] Someone, however, made
+it available to the United Press International.[22] Senator Thurmond
+learned of its existence and tried, without success at first, to secure
+a copy. He, Senator Mundt, and Senator Styles Bridges were concerned
+that such an influential memorandum was kept secret.[23] As Senator
+Fulbright himself had said, more than a year before, when something has
+been leaked to the press it should be more or less officially released.
+When it is not released, people wonder whether some things which they
+should know have been withheld from them.[24] But Senator Fulbright was
+willing to let the people wonder in this case!
+
+Due to circumstances beyond the control of Senator Fulbright, Senator
+Thurmond secured a copy of the memorandum and inserted it into the
+Congressional Record.[25] Later the same day Senator Fulbright placed
+it in the _Record_.[26]
+
+What was the effect of the secret memorandum which, without Senator
+Fulbright’s aid, has been made public?
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[21] President Kennedy in a press conference on August 10, 1961,
+_Congressional Record_, August 11, 1961, p. 14449, col. 1,t. See
+Senator Fulbright’s letter to Senator Thurmond in the _Congressional
+Record_, August 4, 1961, p. 13687, col. 2,t. _Arkansas Gazette_, July
+21, 1961, p. 1. _Congressional Record_, July 31, 1961, p. 13174. August
+4, 1961, p. 13687, col. 2,t. _Congressional Record_, July 29, 1961,
+p. 13005; Compare August 4, 1961, p. 13687. See also Marquis Childs,
+_Congressional Record_, July 26, 1961, p. 12618.
+
+[22] _Arkansas Gazette_, July 21, 1961, p. 1. See also Marquis Childs,
+“Birchites Finding Allies in Military,” _Congressional Record_, July
+14, 1961, pp. 11659-11660.
+
+[23] _Congressional Record_, July 26, 1961, p. 12621. col. 3,t.; July
+29, 1961, p. 13005, col. 1,m.; p. 13005, col. 3,m.
+
+[24] _Congressional Record_, March 28, 1960, p. 6207, col. 2,m.
+
+[25] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13398.
+
+[26] _Congressional Record_, p. 13436.
+
+
+
+
+Chapter III
+
+THE EFFECT OF THE MEMORANDUM
+
+
+Senator Fulbright, when he inserted the memorandum into the
+_Congressional Record_, said it was based on the principle of military
+subordination to civilian control, and that it was not the function of
+the military to educate the public on political issues.[27] The Senator
+further said: “The memorandum was directed solely at the impropriety
+of officers of the armed services lending their prestige and official
+status to meetings which tend to undermine policies of the civil
+government of the United States, as set forth by the President and the
+Congress.”[28]
+
+“The sole objective of my recommendation was to insure that high
+military personnel adhere to the obligation, which is inherent in their
+duty as officers to refrain from public expressions of opposition to
+the policies of the Government and of their Commander-in-Chief.”[29]
+
+We are not impugning the motives of Senator Fulbright when we say that
+a study of the memorandum reveals that its effect was to challenge
+the National Security Council directive of 1958. This directive did
+not deny the principle of civilian control; in fact, because of
+its subordination to President Eisenhower the military obeyed the
+directive. Furthermore, the directive did not call for the military
+to educate the public on political issues in the sense of partisan
+politics. In the memorandum Senator Fulbright himself said: “Under a
+National Security Council directive in 1958, it remains the policy of
+the U. S. Government to make use of military personnel and facilities
+to arouse the public to the menace of the cold war.”[30]
+
+“The purpose of this memorandum is to give some indication of the
+dangers involved in education and propaganda activities by the
+military, directed at the public, and to suggest steps for dealing with
+the underlying problem.”[31]
+
+“There is little in the education, training or experience of most
+military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary
+to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which their education,
+training and experience are concerned—into proper perspective in the
+President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear age’.”[32]
+
+Under “Recommendations” we find:
+
+“1. With reference to the National Security Council directive of 1958,
+suggested revision is based upon its description in attachment 3 (New
+York Times article of June 18, 1961), from which the following is
+excerpted: ‘President Eisenhower and his top policy leaders decreed
+that the cold war could not be fought as a series of separate and
+often unrelated actions, as with foreign aid and propaganda’. Rather,
+it must be fought with a concentration of all the resources of the
+Government and with the full understanding and support of the civilian
+population. It was decided, in particular, that the military should be
+used to reinforce the cold-war effort.”
+
+“This policy should be reconsidered from the standpoint of a basic
+error, that military personnel have the necessarily broad background
+which would enable them to relate the various aspects of the cold-war
+effort, one to the other.”[33]
+
+The memorandum indicates that it is convinced that the National
+Security Council directive, and its implementation, could be attacked
+from several grounds, including an assumed violation of the “basic
+traditional and constitutional question of military efforts to
+propagandize the public....” As it went on to say: “the violation of
+these concepts alone should be sufficient basis for challenging the
+National Security Council policy, and its implementation.”[34]
+
+This also helps make it certain that the memorandum was not directed
+simply against certain mistakes in the implementation of the policy,
+but against the policy itself. In addition to saying that the military
+is _not qualified_ to engage in the cold war, the Senator claims that
+it is _forbidden on constitutional grounds_.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[27] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m.
+Civilian control is not controversial. In his May 12, 1962 speech
+to the West Point Cadets, General Douglas MacArthur emphasized that
+political problems were “not for your professional participation or
+military solution.” _Congressional Record_, May 31, 1962, p. A4009,
+col. 1,t.
+
+Admiral Arleigh A. Burke testified: “No mature U.S. military officer
+I know of has ever questioned it. Indeed, it is a sacred part of our
+military tradition itself. If a military man cannot reconcile his
+convictions with his civilian superior’s orders, he has only the
+recourse of leaving the service.”
+
+“But the principle of civilian control can be perverted. Civilian
+control of the military is properly exerted by the President, the
+Secretary of Defense, and the secretaries of the individual military
+departments over the military services, within the guidelines laid down
+by Congress. The senior civilians in the Government have the final
+decision on all problems affecting the military posture of the United
+States. This is proper and correct.”
+
+“In my opinion, it is improper that civilian control should be
+exercised in any other echelon but at the top. It should not be
+extended to every subordinate military echelon. To be specific, orders
+and directives to the military should come from the top civilian
+elements to the senior military people. They should not come from
+junior civilian elements to junior military people.” (Military Cold War
+Education and Speech Review Policies, Part 1, pp. 21-22).
+
+General MacArthur further said: “While for the purpose of
+administration and command the Armed forces are within the executive
+branch of the Government, they are accountable as well to the
+Congress, charged with the policymaking responsibility, and to the
+people, ultimate repository of all national power. Yet so inordinate
+has been the application of the Executive power that members of the
+armed services have been subjected to the most arbitrary and ruthless
+treatment for daring to speak the truth in accordance with conviction
+and conscience.” (as quoted by General Edward M. Almond, _Ibid._, Part
+2, p. 714.)
+
+[28] “Statement of Senator J. W. Fulbright Relating to a Memorandum
+Submitted by Him to the Department of Defense,” p. 3.
+
+[29] _Ibid._, page 4.
+
+[30] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b.
+
+[31] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,t.
+
+[32] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,b.
+
+[33] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 3,t.
+
+[34] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 2,b.
+
+
+
+
+Chapter IV
+
+WHO IS ATTACKED IN THE MEMORANDUM?
+
+
+Senator Fulbright’s memorandum attacked a wide variety of Americans, as
+well as the American people as a whole.
+
+
+_President Eisenhower_
+
+In challenging the directive of the National Security Council, Senator
+Fulbright was saying that in spite of his military background President
+Eisenhower did not know enough to realize that the military was not
+qualified to engage in the cold war. Senator Fulbright, however, was
+qualified—he thought—to judge that the military was not qualified.
+Furthermore, when Senator Fulbright said that such participation was
+contrary to certain constitutional values, he was saying that either
+President Eisenhower did not understand these values or that he chose
+to disregard them.
+
+
+_The Military_
+
+Senator Fulbright’s memorandum was an attack on the competency of
+the military to engage in the cold war. Concerning the policy of
+the National Security Council, which put the military into the cold
+war, the memorandum said: “This policy should be reconsidered from
+the standpoint of a basic error, that military personnel have the
+necessarily broad background which would enable them to relate the
+various aspects of the cold-war effort, one to the other.”[35]
+
+It was also stated: “There is little in the education, training or
+experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance
+of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with
+which their education, training and experience are concerned—into
+proper perspective in the President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear
+age’.”[36]
+
+Furthermore, the Senator said: “There are no reasons to believe that
+military personnel generally can contribute to this need, beyond their
+specific, technical competence to explain their own role. On the
+contrary, there are many reasons, and some evidence, for believing
+that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, involves
+considerable danger.”[37]
+
+Whence did the Senator get his competency in the field of the cold war?
+Whence his qualifications as a cold war strategist so that he knows
+that we have much to lose and nothing to gain by having the military
+in the cold war? How did he become qualified to advise in effect the
+neutralization, in so far as the public is involved, of the military in
+the cold war?
+
+Are there any military officials more competent than the Senator is
+in any phase of the cold war? If so, why not let military experts on
+Communism be used to help us win the victory in the cold war?
+
+Senator Fulbright’s position, that military officials are not
+sufficiently educated to engage in the cold war, is an indictment of
+the armed services colleges where these officers have been trained.
+
+Many of the officers have one or more degrees. Many of them have
+travelled extensively and some of them are proficient in more than one
+language.
+
+Senator Styles Bridges expressed his shock at Senator Fulbright’s
+evaluation of the military. “I assume, and it is an assumption which I
+believe to be valid, that our senior military officers, particularly
+those of flag and general officer rank, are persons of judgment and
+responsibility. Most of these officers are graduates of our Military
+Academies, and all of them have many years of experience in leadership,
+many of them are held directly responsible for the welfare and lives
+of large segments of our military forces, and many of them are held
+directly chargeable with the care, custody and protection of millions
+of dollars worth of property belonging to the U. S. Government. The
+appointment of each of them to a position of high rank was made as
+an expression of trust and confidence by the President and with the
+concurrence of the U. S. Senate.”[38] After discussing the education of
+most of the Army officers, Major John A. Burns wrote: “It is doubtful
+if any professional group is so rigorously trained and educated as the
+American officer.”[39]
+
+The Senator recognizes, as do the rest of us, that the United States
+is confronted by a situation which it has never before faced. The
+memorandum indicates that it is not in the American tradition to be
+involved in the “long twilight struggle” which we are now involved in;
+but we are so involved.[40]
+
+That we are in an unprecedented situation in the history of America,
+is underscored by the fact that on December 16, 1950, President Truman
+declared, in Proclamation 2914, that we are in a state of national
+emergency because of Communist imperialism. Events since that time
+have only further emphasized that we are in a state of national
+emergency.[41]
+
+It is not contrary to our tradition for the military to go into action
+when war comes. War has come.
+
+W. D. Workman wrote: “If warfare today were confined to the
+battlefield, and if the battlefield alone were the concern of the
+military, there might be some justification for buttoning the lips
+of our senior officers. But warfare now is fourth dimensional,
+encompassing politics, culture, economics and all other institutions
+which lend themselves to internal subversion as well as external
+manipulation.”[42]
+
+
+_The Military Oath_
+
+Military men have taken an oath to defend the United States against
+enemies both domestic and foreign. This oath calls on them to defend
+the country against _domestic_ enemies as well as foreign enemies. Why,
+then, does Senator Fulbright take a position which in effect keeps the
+military men from carrying out their oath against such a domestic enemy
+as the Communist conspiracy in America?
+
+It is in the light of their oath, and of the threat of internal and
+external communism, that we can fully understand Resolution 99 of the
+American Legion convention in Denver. It states: “Whereas the morale
+and fighting spirit of our Armed Forces is directly related to their
+knowledge and their belief in the fundamental principles upon which
+the Government of their homeland is founded and to their knowledge and
+understanding of the aims and purposes of the enemy; and
+
+“Whereas the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and author
+of ‘Masters of Deceit’, a most knowledgeable work on communism, has
+stated and warned, ‘We cannot hope to successfully meet the Communist
+menace unless there is a wide knowledge and understanding of its aims
+and designs’, and
+
+“Whereas, Lenin, the real architect of communism, proclaimed, ‘It is
+inconceivable that communism and democracy can exist side by side in
+this world.’ Lenin said inevitably we must perish; and
+
+“Whereas this doctrine has been iterated and reiterated many times by
+his successors, and their actions have consistently been in conformity
+therewith; and
+
+“Whereas the military officers of the U. S. Armed Forces are charged
+under oath with the duty to defend our country from all enemies foreign
+and domestic and that to accomplish fealty to this oath, the military
+leaders must know the enemy—his aims and purposes in order to instruct
+the men under their command, fortify their morale, and so defend our
+homeland against the enemy; and
+
+“Whereas this right and duty of the military officers of the U. S.
+Armed Forces has recently been challenged publicly by certain officials
+in high places in Government: Now, therefore, be it
+
+“_Resolved_, That the American Legion in convention assembled in
+Denver, Colo., September 9 through 14, 1961, urge the officers of the
+U. S. Armed Forces to continue to perform their duty to defend the
+Constitution of the United States, that they better inform themselves
+regarding the fundamental principles of our form of government
+exemplified by our Declaration of Independence and Constitution, that
+they transmit and impart this knowledge to the Armed Forces under their
+command and to the general public, that the officers of our Armed
+Forces familiarize themselves with the aims and purposes of the known
+enemy, that they earnestly and patriotically strive at all times to
+impart this knowledge to the men under their command and to the general
+public to the end that the morale and fighting spirit of our Armed
+Forces be kept at all times at the highest possible level. We further
+urge that the challenge of certain Government officials in high places
+to the established rights and duties of the officers of our Armed
+Forces be removed and that they be left unshackled and unhampered in
+the discharge of their duties to the above end.”[43]
+
+Does the Senator think that the only way that the military can live
+up to its oath is by bullets in a hot war, and not also by words in a
+cold war? The oath does not say that the defense of the United States
+is limited to defense by bullets. To uphold the United States includes
+upholding it by word also. Or does the Senator, with his attitude
+toward at least some aspects of our constitutional system, think that
+if one upholds the Constitution by the teaching method that he is
+engaging in partisan politics?
+
+If it is not a violation of their oath to defend the Constitution by
+words against the domestic enemy communism, if they can in harmony with
+their oath expose and oppose the domestic enemy communism, then why not
+let them participate in the cold war?
+
+Is not the memorandum, in effect, a demand that the military not carry
+out their oath in so far as domestic Communists are concerned, which
+domestic Communists are a part of the international communist threat?
+
+The Senator in effect wants the military eliminated from the cold war.
+As Senator Curtis, from Nebraska, said: “If this paper were devoted
+to errors of judgment or fact—which are going to creep into any
+program—everybody should consider those errors so that they might not
+be repeated or that they might be corrected. But the purport of this
+memorandum is plain—it is a pronouncement that the military should not
+alert the citizens of the internal Communist threat. I am afraid it
+serves interests that were never intended to be served by whoever had
+the responsibility of putting the memorandum together.”[44]
+
+We would add the observation that there is no indication that Senator
+Fulbright in the memorandum proposed that the military officials
+should alert even their own troops to the menace and nature of the
+cold war except possibly later when some of them have been educated
+by civilians. And even then he says it should be done under civilian
+direction as far as possible.
+
+The Senator does not seem to want the military to have the right to
+speak out against internal communism, or to inform the public of the
+dangers which threaten us or to show how the Communists operate.
+
+We are confident that, regardless of the Senator’s motives, Khrushchev
+must be pleased with the idea of the military being so neutralized in
+the cold war. Since the cold war is the major war which Khrushchev and
+world communism are now waging against us, Khrushchev must consider it
+to be a real victory for his side to have the military forces knocked
+out of the cold war to the extent that the memorandum knocked the
+military out of the cold war.
+
+We would have little or no hope for the survival of our country if the
+military did not have greater confidence in America than the Senator
+seems to have in the military. Indeed, the Senator himself once said:
+“If we lose faith in the integrity of our military men, in addition
+to the criticism which has been heaped upon the leadership in the
+political field, we certainly are in a sad state.”[45]
+
+We are afraid that under the influence of Senator Fulbright’s
+memorandum concerning the military, and the increased power which the
+Secretary of Defense is wielding over the statements of the military,
+that a situation is developing which a few years ago the Senator
+himself thought would be a serious condition indeed. Senator Taft had
+criticized the Chiefs of Staff because he thought that they were but
+rubber stamps for the administration. Taft said: “I accepted them as
+experts; but I have come to the point where I do not accept them as
+experts, particularly when General Bradley makes a foreign policy
+speech. I suggest to the Senator that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
+absolutely under the control of the administration, and that their
+recommendations are what the administration demands that they make.
+
+“_Mr. Fulbright._ Mr. President, I think that is a very serious charge
+which is made by the Senator from Ohio. I can think of nothing which is
+more likely to cause consternation in this country, to develop a fear
+which I believe the facts do not warrant, and generally to disrupt our
+effort in this great struggle with the Russians and with communism,
+than to state here that in effect he has no confidence in the integrity
+of the leading military figures in our Government. I think it is a
+very sad state in which we find ourselves if we are led to such extreme
+views.”[46] Yet in 1960, Senator Fulbright praised an article which
+said, among other things, that in President Eisenhower’s administration
+“uniformity of viewpoint is virtually enforced.”[47]
+
+If the military is not permitted to speak out on the issues of the cold
+war, if they must silently wait until the time comes for them to rubber
+stamp whatever program the President finally comes up with, one would
+have the situation which Taft had in mind, i.e. they would recommend
+whatever the administration demanded. And this they would do without
+having had the opportunity to have participated in public discussions
+before the program was arrived at.
+
+
+_General MacArthur Attacked_
+
+The Senator smeared one of the greatest generals in the history of
+America, and included him as a sample of the attitude of rightwing
+extremism. Of MacArthur, who was born in Arkansas, the Senator said:
+“Pride in victory, and frustration in restraint, during the Korean war,
+led to MacArthur’s revolt and McCarthyism.”[48]
+
+Surely the Senator must have at least hesitated before impugning the
+motives of General MacArthur. Although it would be a good thing for us
+to win the victory over communism, pride in victory is not the motive.
+The important things are for what one is fighting and against what
+one is fighting. The desire to win victory over communism is highly
+commendable. Was the General motivated by pride in victory or by love
+of country, love of freedom and by opposition to this tremendous evil
+which would enslave mankind? In our opinion, the Senator’s evaluation
+of the General is a reflection on the Senator instead of on the
+General. We do not believe that the General’s long life of service to
+his country gives us any reason for believing that “pride in victory”
+is a correct analysis. The Senator was judging motives.
+
+In another place, the Senator has said: “This technique of questioning
+the motives of the opposition instead of arguing about the wisdom of
+their views is one of the oldest and most effective tools of tyrants or
+demagogues.” He went on to say that one could question his judgment and
+intellect, but “I do object to their questioning my motives or purposes
+or loyalty.”[49] And yet, the Senator questioned the motives of the
+General and said that the General acted out of “pride in victory.”
+
+As for the General being frustrated under restraint, it likely would
+have been frustrating to any soldier to have been ordered into a
+war in which the main enemy—the Chinese Communists—was permitted a
+privileged sanctuary beyond the Yalu River. Furthermore, it was a war
+which the General was not permitted to try to win. Would the Senator be
+frustrated if he was ordered into a political campaign which he would
+not be permitted—by those who ordered him into it—to win? How much
+more so when one wanted to win against communism and for the cause of
+freedom.
+
+The term “McCarthyism” is used as a smear word, and by thus equating
+“MacArthur’s revolt” and “McCarthyism” was the Senator unconscious of
+the fact that in the minds of some a bit, at least, of the smear would
+rub off on the General?
+
+We contrast the Senator’s views of MacArthur with that of General
+Carlos P. Romulo, the Ambassador to the United States from the
+Philippines.
+
+“Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s sentimental journey to the Philippines has a
+fourfold significance:
+
+“1. At a time when Soviet propaganda is sparing no effort to
+distort America’s image in the eyes of the peoples of Asia, General
+MacArthur’s personality emerges as a living refutation of Communist
+misrepresentations. Received by an Asian people with open arms and
+given a reception that in warmth and magnitude is unprecedented in that
+section of the globe, the American people should be proud that they
+have one of their own who can draw to his person and to his country
+such universal popular acclaim and admiration.”[50]
+
+MacArthur’s wisdom concerning China, in contract with the illusions of
+the civilian authorities who then formed policy, is illustrated in his
+cable to the House Foreign Affairs Committee around the early part of
+1948.
+
+“The international aspect of the Chinese problem, unfortunately, has
+become somewhat beclouded by demands for internal reform. Desirable
+as such reform may be, its importance is but secondary to the issue
+of civil strife now engulfing the land, and these two issues are as
+impossible of synchronization as it would be to alter the structural
+design of a house while the same was being consumed by flame. The
+maintenance of China’s integrity against destructive forces which
+threaten her engulfment is of infinitely more concern. For with the
+firm maintenance of such integrity, reform will gradually take place in
+the evolutionary processes of China’s future.
+
+“The Chinese problem is part of a global situation which should be
+considered in its entirely. Fragmentary decisions in disconnected
+sectors of the world will not bring an integrated solution. It would be
+utterly fallacious to underrate either China’s needs or her importance.
+For if we embark upon a general policy to bulwark the frontiers of
+freedom against the assaults of political despotism, one major frontier
+is no less important than another, and a decisive breach of any will
+inevitably engulf all.”[51]
+
+When he was a Congressman, President Kennedy also spoke of some of
+the illusions of civilian authorities concerning China. “Mr. Speaker,
+over this week end we have learned the extent of the disaster that
+has befallen China and the United States. The responsibility for the
+failure of our foreign policy in the Far East rests squarely with the
+White House and the Department of State.
+
+“The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming, unless a
+coalition government with the Communists was formed, was a crippling
+blow to the National Government.
+
+“So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the Lattimores and
+the Fairbanks, with the imperfection of the domestic system in China
+after 20 years of war and the tales of corruption in high places that
+they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China.
+
+“Our policy in the words of the Premier of the National Government, Sun
+Fo, of vacillation, uncertainty, and confusion has reaped the whirlwind.
+
+“This House must now assume the responsibility of preventing the
+onrushing tide of communism from engulfing all of Asia.”[52]
+
+We wonder whether or not Senator Fulbright would have lectured this
+Congressman on the need to support the President’s total program, that
+criticism of this nature divides the country, that this is extremely
+radical rightwingism, etc.!!
+
+We are glad that President Kennedy’s visits with General MacArthur
+indicate that he has a higher regard for the General than does
+Senator Fulbright. The Senator’s opinion of General MacArthur is
+also in contrast with that of the House of Representatives in their
+resolution in which the _Senate_ also concurred. “_Resolved by the
+House of Representatives_ (_the Senate concurring_), That the thanks
+and appreciation of the Congress and the American people are hereby
+tendered to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in recognition of his
+outstanding devotion to the American people, his brilliant leadership
+during and following World War II, and the unsurpassed affection held
+for him by the people of the Republic of the Philippines which has done
+so much to strengthen the ties of friendship between the people of that
+nation and the people of the United States.”[53]
+
+
+_The American People Attacked_
+
+Senator Fulbright not only indicted General MacArthur, but also the
+American people. Thus we read: “The American people have never really
+been tested in such a struggle. In the long run, it is quite possible
+that the principle problem of leadership will be, if it is not already,
+to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with
+everything we’ve got, particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos.
+Pride in victory, and frustration in restraint, during the Korean war,
+led to MacArthur’s revolt and McCarthyism.”[54]
+
+Is the Senator saying that the American people may revolt if they are
+restrained so much that they are not permitted, as MacArthur was not
+permitted, to win the struggle in which the Communists have engaged us?
+
+This, incidentally, is the first time that we have known that the
+Senator had such a charitable interpretation of McCarthyism. In effect
+the memorandum is saying that the American people want to win the
+victory over communism in the struggle which is now going on in the
+world; and that when they are restrained and kept from this victory,
+McCarthyism is the result. McCarthyism, according to this, is the
+desire to break down the restraints which keep us from winning, and the
+desire to go on to win the victory over the evil forces of communism.
+This, in effect, is what the Senator said.
+
+The American people will doubtless weigh well the Senator’s implication
+that they possess the two essential ingredients which, according to
+the Senator lead to McCarthyism. These two are: Pride in victory and
+frustration in restraint. In other words, the Senator believes that
+we are all potential or incipient McCarthyites. There is no reason to
+assume that the Senator meant this in any complimentary way.
+
+
+_Dr. Benson_[55]
+
+Senator Fulbright included Dr. George S. Benson, Arkansan of the Year
+for 1953-1954, President of Harding College and President of the
+National Education Program, as one of the extremely radical rightwing
+speakers. Dr. Benson believes in and advocates the religious and moral
+principles on which this country was founded; constitutional and
+thus limited government; citizenship responsibility; free enterprise
+and freedom. He is against both the internal and external threat of
+communism, which are two aspects of the same threat—international
+communism.
+
+Does adherence to the traditional values on which America has been
+built, and which has made America great, make one an extremely radical
+rightwinger? If it does, what does Senator Fulbright’s classification
+of Dr. Benson reveal about Senator Fulbright’s stand? Is the Senator so
+far away from the positions that Dr. Benson advocates that the Senator
+thinks that Dr. Benson is an extremely radical rightwinger?
+
+It would be educational for all concerned if Senator Fulbright would
+make an attempt to sustain his charge against Dr. Benson by listing,
+with documentation from Dr. Benson’s writings and speeches, those
+positions which the Senator believes prove that Dr. Benson is an
+extremely radical rightwing speaker. Assertions are not sufficient. The
+Senator’s charges, where the Senator has much influence, are damaging
+to Dr. Benson’s work for free enterprise and against communism. They
+should either be sustained or the Senator should withdraw them publicly.
+
+
+_Dr. Clifton L. Ganus, Jr._
+
+In his secret memorandum Senator Fulbright passed on, without checking
+with Dr. Ganus, a misrepresentation of Dr. Ganus. Senator Fulbright’s
+memorandum said: “An Arkansas citizen wrote of the Fort Smith meeting:
+‘Dr. Clifton L. Ganus, Jr., vice president and dean of the School
+of American Studies at Harding College, made the statement “your
+Representative (James W. Trimble) in this area has voted 89 percent of
+the time to aid and abet the Communist Party”’.”[56]
+
+Dr. Ganus did not make this statement.[57] If he had made such a
+startling statement, surely it would have been picked up by the
+newspapers at that time and reported. However, as far as we know even
+the _Arkansas Gazette_ did not refer to it until months later. This was
+after it had been published in the _Reporter_ magazine—which magazine
+presented this false accusation without any effort to check it with Dr.
+Ganus. As far as I know, the first time this false accusation appeared
+in print was in the July 20, 1961 issue of the _Reporter_, which was
+published at least a week earlier than July 20.[58]
+
+It is also instructive that Perry Mason of Harding Academy spoke in
+Fort Smith several times, and to some of the same people, a few days
+after Dr. Ganus spoke. Although he received some questions concerning
+some points made in Dr. Ganus’ speech, no one either publicly or
+privately said anything about the statement later attributed to Dr.
+Ganus.
+
+If Dr. Ganus had made such a preposterous statement, surely someone
+would have defended their Congressman right then and there.
+
+Furthermore, several people have made out affidavits, and have
+testified that they were there and that Dr. Ganus did not make the
+statement attributed to him.[59]
+
+
+_Harding College_
+
+Because it has won for ten straight years the highest award of Freedoms
+Foundation At Valley Forge, Harding College, a fully accredited
+educational institution, has been known as the nation’s most honored
+college. Freedoms Foundation has honored Harding College as the
+nation’s No. 1 school in promoting the American way of life. On
+February 9, 1962, the All-American Conference to Combat Communism, made
+up of organizations whose combined membership is well over 50,000,000,
+gave Harding College a citation.
+
+The socialists have felt the impact of the College in its stand for
+the traditional free enterprise system in America. This helps explain
+the attack of Norman Thomas, the leading socialist in America, on the
+College early in 1961.
+
+The Communists have recognized that the College is a bulwark against
+their designs on America, and thus they have attacked Harding College
+and have falsely accused it of being “one of the biggest political
+machines of the ultra-Right.”[60] This attack by the Communists is
+in reality a tribute to Harding College. The Communists know who is
+hurting them.
+
+However, it must come as something of a shock that Senator Fulbright
+from the State of Arkansas, should also attack Harding College as
+a source of extremely radical rightwing teaching. And yet, this is
+the label under which he secretly represented Harding College to the
+President of the United States and to the Secretary of Defense.[61]
+Harding College, located in the Senator’s home state, was the only
+college attacked in the memorandum.
+
+
+_Chamber of Commerce_
+
+Senator Fulbright’s memorandum regarded the Strategy for Survival
+Conferences as dominated by the extremely rightwing speakers.[62] The
+Chamber of Commerce had sponsored this Conference. Thus the Chamber
+of Commerce was involved in extreme rightwingism! It is of interest
+that the Chamber of Commerce had tried to get Senator Fulbright, but
+he was out of the country; and then Senator McClellan, and he was also
+unavailable. It was then that they got Dr. Ganus.[63]
+
+The memorandum also stated that General William C. Bullock had
+personally persuaded the Chamber of Commerce to sponsor the Conference
+in Little Rock. Peyton Rice, who is chairman of the Chamber’s Armed
+Services Committee, said that General Bullock had not presented the
+proposal to the Chamber.[64]
+
+
+_House Committee_
+
+The House Committee on Un-American Activities has not been perfect,
+but neither has any other Committee. However, on the whole it has done
+splendid work investigating and exposing the Communist conspiracy. If
+Senator Fulbright had listened to the evidence presented in just the
+1938 hearings of the Committee, he would have learned much truth about
+communism. He would not have said in 1945 that “our fear of Russia
+and communism” is a “powerful prejudice” which we must give up in
+order to have peace. He would not have misread history and concluded
+that Lenin’s revolution was in any sense a following of our example
+in the revolution which we fought for our independence. The Senator
+also said: “As I read history, the Russian experiment in socialism is
+scarcely more radical, under modern conditions, than the Declaration
+of Independence was in the days of George III.”[65] This sounds
+somewhat like the statement of Earl Browder when he was head of the
+Communist Party in America. “The Declaration of Independence was for
+that time what _The Communist Manifesto_ is for ours.”[66] Lenin in his
+resolution was basically following the _Communist Manifesto_.
+
+As a Rhodes scholar, Senator Fulbright should have been able to read
+_history_, instead of accepting such an obviously false view of
+history. Senator Fulbright seems to have known either little or nothing
+about Lenin’s revolution, or little or nothing about our revolution.
+The kindest thing we can say about the Senator is that he was seemingly
+ignorant of some very fundamental matters.
+
+What are some of the differences between Lenin’s revolution and ours?
+(1) Our revolution had as its objective the establishment of a reign of
+law, but Lenin’s revolution was designed to establish the rule of the
+head of the Communist Party who would rule according to his own will.
+(2) Our revolution established a Republic, while Lenin’s established a
+dictatorship. (3) Our revolution did not result in a reign of terror of
+Americans over Americans, but Lenin’s revolution did establish a reign
+of terror. (4) Our revolution did not have as its aim the establishment
+of a world wide conspiracy which would endeavor to overthrow all other
+governments—democratic governments as well as dictatorships. (5) Our
+revolution was not a counter-revolution against self-government. Lenin
+did not overthrow the Czar, he overthrew the Kerensky Government which
+was endeavoring to establish a form of democracy. Lenin was not even
+in Russia at the time the Czar abdicated. (6) Our revolution was over
+in a very few years, in so far as establishing our form of government
+is concerned. How long does it take to overthrow the previous regime?
+As Kravchenko said “The French Terror was over in five years.”[67]
+By 1945, when Senator Fulbright made his statement concerning Lenin’s
+revolution, the Soviet terror had been going on for almost thirty
+years. (7) The Communist revolution was not just a revolution in
+government. It was a revolt against God, religion, morals and humanity.
+Its aim has been, and is, to create a godless society and the new
+Soviet man.
+
+All of these things could have been known by Senator Fulbright in 1945
+and long before. Communist books and actions had made abundantly clear
+the nature of their revolution. Only a “powerful prejudice” could keep
+a reader of their history from knowing the nature of Lenin’s revolution.
+
+Also in 1945 the Senator was seemingly so misinformed about Communism
+that he said: “I do not believe the Soviets desire to dominate the
+world as the Germans did.”[68] Before Hitler came to power the Soviets
+made clear their desire to rule the world. And their actions showed
+that they meant it. The House Committee had pointed this out. So had
+many individuals.
+
+Senator Fulbright’s “powerful prejudice,” or whatever it was, against
+the House Committee, however, is such that he objected because in one
+of the meetings mentioned in the memorandum, someone defended the
+House Committee.[69] Such a defense could hardly be called a matter
+of partisan politics, since the House has supported the Committee
+for years, and in 1961 the vote to give the Committee its full
+appropriation was passed 412 to 6.[70]
+
+
+“_Operation Abolition_”
+
+The memorandum classified “Operation Abolition” as objectionable
+material. Did the Senator want to censor this film? Is he a “film
+burner”? Does he think that J. Edgar Hoover and the House Committee
+were wrong in saying that the San Francisco riots were Communist
+inspired, and that most of the young people were duped?[71]
+
+
+_Herbert A. Philbrick_
+
+Herbert A. Philbrick, of “I Led Three Lives” fame, was smeared by
+Senator Fulbright as being an extremely radical rightwing speaker.[72]
+Philbrick spent nine years as a counterspy for the FBI and for America.
+He was commended by J. Edgar Hoover.[73] Philbrick has continued to
+fight Communism. He has sacrificed much to do so. The Communists
+have smeared him. And Senator Fulbright, without giving one shred of
+documentation, smeared Philbrick. The Senator must be very, very far
+to the left of Mr. Philbrick if from where the Senator is standing,
+Philbrick looks to him like an extremely radical rightwinger.
+
+
+_Dr. Fred Schwarz_
+
+Billy Graham found good reason to commend the anti-communist work of
+Dr. Fred Schwarz,[74] and _Life_ Magazine in an unprecedented action on
+Oct. 17, 1961, apologized to Dr. Schwarz for their misinterpretation
+of him and his work.[75] But Senator Fulbright has never apologized
+for accusing, without giving one bit of proof, Dr. Schwarz of being
+an extremely radical rightwinger. The Senator made this charge in his
+secret memorandum, and without giving Dr. Schwarz an opportunity to
+answer the accusation. Did the Senator wish to remain a “faceless”
+accuser?
+
+
+_Dr. Frank Barnett_
+
+Dr. Frank Barnett, who was criticized more than once in the
+memorandum,[76] has been commended by Secretary of Defense McNamara in
+September, 1961 for an “excellent speech”[77] which contained some of
+the ideas which Fulbright’s memorandum condemns.[78]
+
+
+_The Institute for American Strategy_
+
+As late as April 10, 1961, a National Military-Industrial Conference
+sponsored by the Institute was commended by President Kennedy.[79]
+These Conferences were criticized in the memorandum.[80]
+
+
+_American Strategy for the Nuclear Age_
+
+The Institute for American Strategy sponsored a book which was
+prepared by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of
+Pennsylvania. This book is called _American Strategy for the Nuclear
+Age_. The memorandum criticized this book and said that “its total
+effect can be said to be contrary to the President’s program.”[81] The
+book, among other things, brings out that the communists are at war
+with us on many different levels, and that we ought to fight back and
+win. Is this against the President’s program?
+
+Among the contributors to the book are: J. Edgar Hoover, Hanson W.
+Baldwin, Henry A. Kissinger, Lieut. General Arthur G. Trudeau, Walt W.
+Rostow, Dean Acheson and David Sarnoff.
+
+
+_233 Talks_
+
+One Captain was mentioned in the memorandum as having given 233 talks
+to civilians on the “dangers of internal communism.” As I do not know
+what the Captain said, I do not know to what extent I would agree or
+disagree with him. But the fact that he gave 233 talks is not within
+itself a criticism. In fact, it shows that he was very zealous in
+carrying out his oath to defend America against domestic enemies.
+
+The Senator made at least seventy-five talks in Arkansas in the fall
+of 1961, in the interest of _his_ re-election to office.[82] Doubtless
+he will make other such talks. A man who is that zealous in behalf of
+his own re-election to office ought not to be critical of a Captain for
+making so many speeches for America and against the internal enemy—who
+is also an external enemy—communism.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[35] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t.
+
+[36] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,b. President Eisenhower said:
+“Accordingly, should departmental instructions be so phrased as unduly
+to prohibit desirable military participation in these educational
+efforts respecting the Communist menace, I suggest that your committee
+recommend their restudy with view to appropriate revision. The Reds are
+well aware of the integrity, patriotic motives, and high qualifications
+of our military. I suspect they would be delighted if we should prevent
+such people from spreading the truth about Communist imperialism.
+
+“Pertaining at least indirectly to this subject, I have heard of
+accusations alleging that military education is so narrow as to make
+service personnel incapable of grasping the whole complex of dangers
+confronting our country. It is hinted that the entire officer corps
+has become politically infected, and prone to be disloyal to the
+Commander in Chief. I, for one, want to be on record as expressing my
+indestructible faith and pride in our armed services—even though their
+loyalty, patriotism, and breadth of understanding needs no defense from
+me or anyone else” (_Military Cold War Education and Speech Review
+Policies_, Part 1, p. 7.)
+
+“I believe, therefore, that your committee will render valuable service
+by rejecting the recent spate of attacks upon the competence and
+loyalty of the military and by disapproving any effort to thrust them,
+so to speak, behind an American iron curtain, ordered to stand mutely
+by as hostile forces tirelessly strive to undermine every aspect of
+American life.” (_ibid._, p. 7).
+
+Admiral Arthur W. Radford also thought that the military ought to
+be used in the cold war. He further emphasized that attacks on the
+military could hurt morale and that it was the duty of civilian
+authorities to defend the military against “unwarranted and unjust
+civilian attacks” (_ibid._, part 2, pp. 707-708).
+
+[37] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t.
+
+[38] _Congressional Record_, August 3, 1961, p. 13517, col. 2,m.
+
+[39] Quoted in _Human Events_, 1961, p. 867. Lt. Gen. Edward M.
+Almond wrote: “Fulbright’s thesis ignores the fact that last year
+there were 1,521 officers of the armed services engaged in studies at
+civilian institutions of higher learning which dealt with educational,
+scientific, economic, and political subjects; these all have a
+relation to national strategy. In addition to this number there are
+some 2,918 other officers engaged in special studies in languages,
+medical sciences, engineering sciences and management courses. This
+thesis in the Fulbright memorandum further ignores the fact that
+each year some 500 officers of senior grade attend the service war
+colleges and universities where they study the very topic that the
+nuclear age demands solution of. This topic is studied intensively.
+Furthermore, the Fulbright thesis ignores the fact that nowhere is
+there such an intensive study made to prepare any politician (before or
+after his election to office) for the task ‘to put their own ultimate
+solutions into proper perspective in the President’s total strategy
+for the nuclear age.’” (_Military Cold War Education and Speech Review
+Policies_, Part 2, p. 714.)
+
+[40] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b.
+
+[41] Quoted in the _Congressional Record_, June 12, 1961, p. 9404, col.
+2,m.
+
+[42] Reprinted from the July 24, 1961 issue of the _News and Courier_,
+Charleston, S. C., _Congressional Record_, July 31, 1961, p. 13177,
+col. 3,b.
+
+[43] _Congressional Record_, September 15, 1961, p. 18455, col.
+2,b.-3,t.
+
+[44] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13402, col. 1,b.-2,t.
+
+[45] _Congressional Record_, April 26, 1951, p. 4402, col. 2,m.
+
+[46] _Ibid._, p. 4402, col. 2,t.
+
+[47] _Ibid._, February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col. 3,b.
+
+[48] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
+
+[49] Speech before the Arkansas Chamber of Commerce, Little Rock, Nov.
+8, 1961. _Arkansas Gazette_, Nov. 9, 1961, p. 2A.
+
+[50] _Congressional Record_, July 27, 1961, p. A5795, col. 1-2. Japan’s
+view of MacArthur is illustrated in the fact that Japan gave him their
+“highest decoration for foreigners,” _Congressional Record_, June 25,
+1960, p. A5518, col. 2,b.
+
+[51] Quoted in the _Congressional Record_, August 19, 1949, p. A5439.
+
+[52] _Congressional Record_, January 25, 1949, pp. 532-533.
+
+[53] As quoted in the _Congressional Record_, August 8, 1962, p.
+A6084, col. 1,t. See Speaker McCormack’s tribute in the _Congressional
+Record_, August 16, 1962, p. A6243. Even the _Arkansas Gazette_ paid
+tribute to him. Editorial, August 19, 1962.
+
+[54] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
+
+[55] The Fulbright memorandum quoted a statement of Dr. Benson
+concerning the John Birch Society. It is important, however, to realize
+that this statement was made at a time when Dr. Benson was not aware of
+the radical positions which Mr. Robert Welch had taken on some matters.
+These radical positions Dr. Benson repudiates. Furthermore, his
+commendation was of their stated long-range purpose “to work for less
+government, more responsibility and a better world,” and their purpose
+to inform citizens concerning communism. Is Senator Fulbright against
+these aims?
+
+[56] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13438, col. 1,b.
+
+[57] See his open letter of July 25, 1961 to Congressman Trimble.
+
+[58] _The Reporter_ article has been reprinted in the Senate Internal
+Security Subcommittee, _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist
+Program_, pp. 57-63.
+
+[59] _Arkansas Gazette_, December 28, 1961, p. 3A.
+
+[60] Mike Newberry, _The Worker_, August 13, 1961, p. 5, col. 1,m.
+
+[61] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13438-13439.
+
+[62] _Ibid._, p. 13438, col. 1,t.
+
+[63] _Arkansas Gazette_, August 6, 1961.
+
+[64] _Arkansas Gazette_, August 6, 1961.
+
+[65] James William Fulbright, “The Price of Peace Is The Loss of
+Prejudices”, _Vogue_, July, 1945. Reprinted in Louise E. Rorabacher,
+_Assignments in Exposition_. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946, pp.
+197-198.
+
+[66] _What Is Communism?_ pp. 19-20.
+
+[67] _I Chose Justice_, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950, p. 137.
+
+[68] As reprinted in Louise E. Rorabacher, _Assignments in Exposition_,
+p. 198.
+
+[69] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13438-13439. William
+F. Buckley, Jr., has announced the publication of a study of _The
+Committee and Its Critics_. “National Review”, 150 E. 35th St., New
+York 16, N.Y.
+
+[70] _Ibid_, June 22, 1961, p. A4722.
+
+[71] See J. Edgar Hoover, _Communist Target—Youth_. Washington:
+Government Printing Office, 1960. House Committee on Un-American
+Activities. _The Truth About the Film “Operation Abolition.”_
+Washington: Government Printing Office, 961, parts 1,2.
+
+[72] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 1,t.
+
+We wish that the Senator had been well read enough to have known that
+a decade ago Mr. Philbrick warned Americans against becoming extremely
+radical rightwingers! “The most important single thing is to avoid
+behaving the way a Communist says the individual must behave in a
+capitalist society. If the Communist had his way, he would force all
+non-Communists to the extreme right, toward fascism and state control.”
+(_I Led Three Lives_, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952, p.
+300). “If we adhere to our traditional American dream of a society of
+freedom, of personal rather than state responsibility, of individual as
+well as collective intelligence, and of civil rights rather than rigid
+civil controls, then we will have disproved the Communist theory of the
+inevitability of capitalist deterioration.” (_ibid._, p. 301).
+
+[73] On the back of the jacket of Mr. Philbrick’s book.
+
+[74] See jacket of Dr. Schwarz’s book _You Can Trust the Communists_,
+Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960.
+
+[75] _Arkansas Gazette_, October 18, 1961, p. 5A.
+
+[76] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 2,t.
+_Ibid._ pp. 13436, col. 3,b., 13439-13440.
+
+[77] Committee on Armed Services, _Defense Secretary McNamara on S.
+Res. 191_, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, p. 152.
+
+[78] See the entire speech reprinted in _Defense Secretary McNamara on
+S. Res. 191_. pp. 154-162.
+
+[79] Quoted in _Congressional Record_, August 10, 1961, p. 14405, col.
+3,t. A copy of the program of that Conference is reprinted beginning on
+p. 14405, col. 3,b.
+
+[80] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13441.
+
+[81] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 3,b.
+
+[82] _Arkansas Gazette_, July 11, 1962.
+
+
+
+
+Chapter V
+
+THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT CONCEPT CRITICIZED
+
+
+One of the main ideas attacked in the memorandum was the concept of
+protracted conflict.[83] This concept, with other materials, was
+presented in the handbook entitled _American Strategy for the Nuclear
+Age_. The memorandum stated that this handbook contained basic material
+for implementing the 1958 directive of the National Security Council.
+“Although scholarly, and worth attention as elements of strategy,
+its total effect can be said to be contrary to the President’s
+program.”[84] What is the concept of protracted conflict?
+
+
+_Protracted Conflict_
+
+“The West can hope to defeat the Communists only by giving battle on
+its own chosen terrain. It must carry the battle to the vital sectors
+of Communist defense. To do that it must learn to counter the strategy
+of protracted conflict—to manage conflict in space and in time.
+
+“The development of proper Western attitudes toward protracted conflict
+will be immensely difficult. The Communists possess a mentality that
+is much better suited to protracted and controlled conflict than that
+of the Western peoples. The West has neither a doctrine of protracted
+conflict nor an international conspiratorial apparatus for executing
+it. What is more, we do not want such a doctrine or such a political
+apparatus, for it would be a tragic piece of irony if the men of
+the Free World, in trying to combat the Communists, should become
+like them. Some of our ‘weaknesses’ vis-a-vis the Communists are
+irremediable: we cannot turn ourselves into a conflict society, nor can
+we assign to the government and, in the last resort, to the police the
+discipline of our conscience. It is within these limitations—which are
+the ramparts of civilized self-restraint—that we are forced to cope
+with Communist perversity.
+
+“Pericles long ago was confronted with a similar problem. As the
+leader of the open society of Athens, locked in an irreconcilable
+conflict with the garrison state of Sparta, he recognized a relatively
+simple fact which many of the theorists of war in the nuclear age have
+overlooked, namely, that there are subtle alternatives to the risky and
+blunt strategy of engaging the enemy in direct and decisive military
+action. In the protracted conflict known as the Peloponnesian War,
+Pericles chose to pursue an extended strategy which was designed to
+avoid a showdown battle while wearing down, by a campaign of economic,
+political, and psychological attrition, the enemy’s will to resist.
+Lidell Hart pointed out that the Periclean plan was simply a war policy
+aimed at ‘draining the enemy’s endurance in order to convince him that
+he could not gain a decision’. In today’s protracted conflict the
+United States must maintain and use its power for the same ultimate
+purposes: to turn the tide of battle against the Communists, to induce
+them to overextend themselves, to exploit the weakness of their system,
+to paralyze their will, and to bring about their final collapse. Within
+the framework of mutual deterrence, both sides can employ the strategy
+of protracted conflict, and we can do so quite effectively without
+the dispensation of a jealous and demanding dogma of conflict for
+conflict’s sake.
+
+“A psychopolitical offensive, directed against the Communist citadel
+itself, offers the West its best chance for winning the battle for its
+own survival and for spoiling the Communist strategy for the subversion
+of the uncommitted world. Although the currents within the uncommitted
+world are running against the West, the West need not despair of
+holding its remaining positions once it has forced the Communists on
+the psychopolitical defensive by engaging them on the most favorable
+terrain, namely, the Communists’ own ‘peace zone’.
+
+“It is rather in the psychological arena than in its technological
+workshop that the West has displayed its most alarming shortcomings.
+Objectively, Western strategy has been far more effective than the
+sensational charges of its critics will have it. It is improbable that
+either side from now on will be able to achieve decisive technological
+superiority for more than a temporary, even brief, period. No doubt,
+our military posture is susceptible to a great deal of improvement. But
+an exaggerated zeal for improvement, especially when it is triggered
+by pained surprise at the latest ploy of communist psychological
+warfare or considerations of domestic advantage, might prove to be
+‘counterproductive’ in developing our real range of power. Do not
+let us pour the baby out with the bath water. What we need now more
+than anything else is an understanding of the comprehensive, complex,
+subtle, and consistent strategy of our opponent—and the calm resolution
+to draw the practical consequences.”[85]
+
+Now let the reader raise this question. If one is opposed to this
+concept of protracted conflict is he not in reality opposed to firm,
+unyielding opposition to communism?
+
+
+_Secretary McNamara Seems to Accept Protracted Conflict_
+
+Secretary of Defense McNamara realizes that if we lose the war with
+communism it will be total defeat. He also recognized that the
+Communists are out to conquer the world and that there is no indication
+that they will change.
+
+This necessitates educating our troops in the nature of Communism as
+well as the nature of the freedom which we enjoy. As the Secretary
+himself put it: “There is no true historical parallel to the drive
+of Soviet Communist imperialism to colonize the world. This is not
+the first time that ambitious dictators have sought to dominate the
+globe. But none has ever been so well organized, has possessed so many
+instruments of destruction, or has been so adept at disguising ignoble
+motives and objectives with noble phrases and noble words.
+
+“Furthermore, there is a totality in Soviet aggression which can be
+matched only by turning to ancient history when warring tribes sought
+not merely conquest but the total obliteration of the enemy.
+
+“Soviet communism does not seek the physical obliteration of a
+conquered people, although it would not hesitate to do so, in my
+opinion, if this would serve its ends. But it does seek the total
+obliteration of their customs, their social structure, their political
+structure, their religion and their freedoms. Everything and everybody
+must be remolded according to a blueprint laid down by Lenin and
+altered only for the purposes of ruthless efficiency by Stalin and the
+present-day leaders.
+
+“There is nothing too sacred—friendship, integrity, church or
+family—that it escapes the attention of the Soviet Commissar or the
+Communist bureaucrat.
+
+“Soviet communism seeks to wipe out the cherished traditions and
+institutions of the free world with the same fanaticism that once
+impelled winning armies to burn villages and sow the fields with salt
+so they would not again become productive.
+
+“To this primitive concept of total obliteration, the Communists have
+brought the resources of modern technology and science. The combination
+is formidable. Twentieth century knowledge, when robbed of any moral
+restraints, is the most dangerous force ever let loose in the world.
+And the entire literature of Soviet communism can be searched without
+turning up the faintest trace of moral restraint.
+
+“If the free world should lose to communism, the loss would be total,
+final, and irrevocable. The citadel of freedom must be preserved
+because there is no road back, no road back to freedom for anyone if
+the citadel is lost.
+
+“These are not new convictions with me. I have held them for many
+years. I was deeply impressed and horrified by the human misery and
+destruction that Hitler was able to create. Hitler’s philosophy was
+based on the concept of total obliteration and Hitler lost. But the
+years since the end of World War II have demonstrated that Soviet
+communism is operating from a far stronger position than Hitler ever
+held.
+
+“In 1949, 12 years ago, I read an article in Foreign Affairs magazine
+which analyzed the writings of Stalin and quoted him at length. It
+was clear from these quotes that the Communist world had no intention
+of living forever in peace with the world of freedom. One of Stalin’s
+favorite quotations from Lenin states this point and, as translated and
+published in Foreign Affairs, this is what he said:
+
+  ‘We live * * * not only in a state but in a system of states, and the
+  existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist
+  states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either one or the
+  other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most
+  terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois
+  states is inevitable.’
+
+“It is obvious that the aggressive goals of Soviet communism have not
+changed, for Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, has said that our
+grandchildren will live under communism.
+
+“I cite this material because I want you to know the spirit in which
+I believe the education program of our Defense Establishment should
+be conducted. The threat is clear and it is immediate. Our fighting
+men should know the positive values of the freedoms which the Nation
+is calling them to defend, and they should know the nature of Soviet
+communism which seeks to take them away.
+
+“One of my most vivid recollections is that of a colleague in the Ford
+Motor Co. calling me out of my office a few years ago. He asked that
+I drop the work in which I was engaged to hear an analysis of the
+behavior of U. S. soldiers of war in North Korea, and I heard with
+amazement the story of prisoners who had cracked and become informers;
+men who had written articles for Communist newspapers; men who had
+cooperated with their captors.
+
+“These American soldiers did not understand the Communist threat. They
+had not been taught to value the freedom of individual choice, which
+is at the basis of our form of society. They had not been taught what
+happens when the spirit of individual freedom and free inquiry is lost.”
+
+“I believe we suffered during the Korean war because we did not stress
+with sufficient force and vigor the realities of freedom and the threat
+of communism.
+
+“As Secretary of Defense, it is my policy that the members of the
+Military Establishment be educated in the role that they are playing
+in the battle against communism, through knowledge of the strength of
+our democracy, as well as the nature of the threat we face. We are
+prosecuting a vigorous program and we intend to step it up.”[86]
+
+Is not this analysis, in brief, but a presentation of the concept
+of protracted conflict which is advanced by Dr. Barnett, and the
+Institute for American Strategy, and which is condemned in the
+memorandum?
+
+Since there is a total threat certainly we should meet it on every
+level on which it faces us. And yet, according to the article from the
+_Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists_, which was the longest reprint
+in the memorandum, if we act in the light of the realization of the
+nature, tactics and threat of Communism which is outlined by the
+Secretary, we shall split the world and be in more serious trouble!
+In other words, we must be careful lest we do something to make the
+Communists mad! As a matter of fact, their philosophy and ambitions
+have made them mad. They are angry unto death with us because we exist
+as a free people.
+
+
+_Senator Fulbright Repudiates Protracted Conflict_
+
+How does the _Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists_ view the possibility
+of our waging protracted conflict? The _Bulletin_ and the memorandum
+are resolutely opposed to our so doing. The memorandum said that
+the handbook—which advances the concept—undermines the President’s
+program.[87] The _Bulletin_ said: “The significance of ‘American
+Strategy for the Nuclear Age’ lies in its analysis of the international
+situation and its appeal for direct action. To a very large extent,
+the theme depends on the particular estimate of Soviet intentions that
+is presented and the particular prophecy of the Communist future that
+is forecast. Several contributions stress the persistency, strength,
+and versatility of ideology in the evolution of Soviet communism but
+nowhere is there adequate treatment of the forces that limit Soviet
+policy, and thus limit the projection of its ideological motivation.
+There is ample evidence, for example, of instability in the Soviet
+leadership and of ideological differences between the Russians and
+their Chinese colleagues. The diverse effect of these forces is
+highly problematical, but they do suggest that Communist policy is
+far less monolithic than the concept of protracted conflict presumes.
+Indeed, like other major powers, the Soviet Union is also limited by
+external forces. Within the framework set by the editors of ‘American
+Strategy,’ however, any attempt to take advantage of these forces in
+order to insulate an area from big power confrontation, or to seek a
+resolution of differences on an ad hoc basis of mutual interest, would
+be tantamount to appeasement.
+
+“The nonmilitary techniques advocated by Barnett and several other
+contributors (such as Strausz-Hupe and William Kintner) clearly
+recognize a grave deficiency in American Strategy, but they hardly
+cover the full spectrum of alternatives open to the United States.
+None of these suggestions includes the full use of either traditional
+diplomacy or innovating methods of settling disputes. At the same time,
+they contain an element of militancy that raises serious problems,
+geared as they are to setting up a savage dichotomy between the
+Communist and the Western World, and of making almost every issue a
+matter of irreconcilable competition.
+
+“It is difficult to see how these tactics can do anything but intensify
+international tensions and, short of a complete collapse of the Soviet
+bloc (which the editors would surely discount), increase the likelihood
+that force will be used. Indeed, the more intense the conditions of
+rivalry become, the greater the inclination will be to reassess the
+major premises of our strategic doctrine, including our renunciation of
+preventative war, and to begin to incorporate provisions for offensive
+military action in the calculus of our planning. The editors fail to
+consider whether the provocative nature of the policies they openly
+advocate can be restricted to the nonmilitary spheres for very long.
+Indeed, they seem to assume that the Communists will back down under
+pressure—a highly dangerous assumption.
+
+“Perhaps the most fundamental criticism that can be made of the book is
+that it fails to analyze the impact of a policy of protracted conflict
+on our domestic institutions. Barnett’s program of action, for example,
+would require large sums of public funds used with little public
+accountability, a wide network of secrecy and security in government
+operations, a cold war orientation in our schools and universities—in
+short, a stunting of pluralism, a curtailment of individual liberties,
+and a weakening of politically responsible government. The editors
+of ‘American Strategy’ seem to see no alternative to confronting the
+Soviets with strong opposition at every turn. Indeed, they appear more
+concerned with virility than freedom, as if strength and courage were
+goals in themselves. This, together with the somewhat static nature of
+their view of history and the militant nature of their recommendations,
+justifies further inquiry about the men and the organizations who
+advocate a strategy based on these premises.”[88]
+
+What shall we say to these things? _First_, it must be recognized that
+we are at war, and that the concept of protracted conflict is based on
+this obvious fact of present-day life. In other words, this concept
+takes seriously the words and deeds of the Communists which say that
+they are fighting to conquer and to rule the world, and that we must
+act accordingly. The memorandum shrinks from accepting this fact and
+its implications. Ivo Duchacek, a member of the Czech Parliament until
+the Communists took over, said: “Nobody likes to accept the idea that
+we cannot get along with our fellow men if we try hard enough....
+When I look back at my own practical experience in Czechoslovakia
+where cooperation with the Communists was tried on both national and
+international levels, I realize that the basic mistake was our wishful
+thinking that communism had fundamentally changed under the influence
+of its 25-year experience and under the impact of World War II.”[89]
+According to James Reston, who has been close to the President,
+President Kennedy came to office with the idea that he could work out
+reasonable arrangements with the Communists and put an end to the angry
+dialogue which has been going on.[90]
+
+It is not of our choosing, it is not to our taste, but the fact is that
+the Communists are at war with us. It does not take two to start a
+war, and the Communists have started a war whether we like it or not.
+As Edgar Ansel Mowrer, one of the nation’s outstanding students of
+world affairs, put it: “Communists play to win.... The West, including
+the United States, want only to call the game off. It fails to admit
+that this is a real war which it can win only if it gives it No. 1
+priority and stops considering it just another problem like smog or
+juvenile delinquency,”[91] Roscoe Drummond said: “It is my conviction
+that we will continue to lose this war called peace as long as we try
+to conduct it on a basis of business as usual, politics as usual and
+defence as usual.”[92]
+
+Congressman Hosmer observed that “we can freeze to death in cold war as
+easily as we can burn to death in hot war.”[93]
+
+Roscoe Drummond has underscored the fact that although we are at war,
+we are not acting in the light of that unpleasant reality. “It is my
+conviction that the time for words has passed, that the moment is at
+hand when it is not enough to say what needs to be done—but to do what
+needs to be done before it is too late.
+
+“It is my conviction that the time has come when the American
+Government and the American people must act on the reality that we are
+not at peace, but at war, though a different and more difficult kind of
+war than we have ever faced; that, as the Overstreets have put it, we
+are in a war called peace and that there is nothing peaceful about it.
+
+“At this stage we are losing, not winning—and we are not yet strong
+enough to win.”
+
+“In New York last week, President Kennedy declared that ‘every new
+piece of information, every fresh event, have deepened my conviction
+that the survival of our civilization is at stake—and the hour is
+late’.”[94]
+
+_Second_, the intensification of international tensions is going on
+today because the Communists are pushing even harder for the conquest
+of the world. Any so-called easing of international tension would
+be equivalent to a boxer relaxing in the middle of the fight. For
+tension to be relaxed in reality would necessitate the cessation of the
+communist drive for world conquest. In other words, it would mean that
+the Communists had ceased to be Communists.
+
+That communism, and not the waging of protracted conflict by the
+non-communist world, is the cause of the existing tension is recognized
+by President Kennedy. Thus he told editor Adzhubei, of _Izvestia_, that
+the root of the conflict is the Soviet’s efforts “to communize, in a
+sense, the entire world.”[95]
+
+As the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of the British
+Government, said to the United Nations General Assembly on September
+27, 1961, “the world is divided by an ideological chasm.... And when
+one side advertises its intention to destroy the way of life of the
+other, then you cannot have true collective security.”[96]
+
+George E. Kennan, now Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and at one time
+Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., has summarized in his book _Russia and the
+West_ what the communists are saying to us through their words and
+their deeds. Roscoe Drummond presented it in his column as follows:
+“We despise you. We consider that you should be swept from the earth
+as governments and physically destroyed as individuals. We reserve
+the right in our private if not in our official capacities to do what
+we can to bring this about: to revile you publicly, to do everything
+within our power to detach your own people from their loyalty to you
+and their confidence in you, to subvert your armed forces, and to work
+for your downfall in favor of a Communist dictatorship. But since we
+are not strong enough to destroy you today ... we want you during this
+interval to trade with us; we want you to finance us; we want you to
+give us the advantages of full-fledged diplomatic recognition, just as
+you accord these advantages to one another.
+
+“An outrageous demand? Perhaps. But you will accept it nevertheless.
+Driven by this competition, which you cannot escape, you will do what
+we want you to do until such time as we are ready to make an end of
+you.* * *”[97]
+
+Mr. Kennan also quoted a resolution of the Communist International
+which said: “The Comintern will not let its freedom be hampered by any
+obligation whatever. We are deadly enemies of bourgeois society to the
+last breath, in word and in deed and if necessary with arms in hand.
+It is the historical mission of the Communist International to be the
+gravedigger of the bourgeois society.”[98]
+
+Roscoe Drummond commented as follows on this resolution. “Mr. Kennan is
+here describing Communist policy and purpose toward all non-Communist
+governments formulated in the 1930’s, which hasn’t changed in the least.
+
+“It is the same today—in Korea, in Laos, in Viet-Nam, in the Congo, at
+the conference table in Geneva. To the Communists, U. S. aid to the
+legitimate government of South Vietnam is ‘aggressive’ because the
+Communists recognize no non-Communist government as ever legitimate.
+
+“We are not at peace with the Communists. We are engaged in a war
+called peace by the Communists. We can’t afford to think or act
+otherwise for 1 second.”[99]
+
+The _Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists_ does not realize that our
+resistance to Communism does not set up a “savage dichotomy between the
+Communist and the Western World”. This dichotomy or division exists
+but it has been set up by the ideology and actions of the Communists.
+We _wish_ that it were not so, we _wish_ that they would change, but
+wishing does not make it so. It is a fact of life which we should
+realize, and which we fail to realize only at our peril. The Communists
+in the _Communist Manifesto_, which they consider to be an up-to-date
+document, and many times since have stated that they are irreconcilably
+at war with us.
+
+Lenin, who is stressed today, said: “We are living not merely in a
+state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet
+Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is
+unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that
+end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet
+Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that
+if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold sway, it must prove
+its capacity to do so by its military organizations.”
+
+“As long as capitalism and socialism exists, we cannot live in peace;
+in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung
+over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism.”[100]
+
+Mao Tse-tung speaks in no uncertain terms about their revolutionary
+triumph. “In human history, antagonism between the classes exists as a
+particular manifestation of the struggle within the contradiction. The
+contradiction between the exploiting class and the exploited class:
+the two mutually contradictory classes coexist for a long time in one
+society, be it a slave society, or a feudal or a capitalist society,
+and struggle with each other; but it is not until the contradiction
+between the two classes has developed to a certain stage that the
+two sides adopt the form of open antagonism which develops into a
+revolution. In a class society, the transformation of peace into war is
+also like that.
+
+“The time when a bomb has not yet exploded is the time when
+contradictory things, because of certain conditions, coexist in an
+entity. It is not until a new condition (ignition) is present that the
+explosion takes place. An analogous situation exists in all natural
+phenomena when they finally assume the form of open antagonism to solve
+old contradictions and to produce new things.
+
+“It is very important to know this situation. It enables us to
+understand that in a class society revolutions and revolutionary wars
+are inevitable, that apart from them the leap in social development
+cannot be made, and the reactionary ruling classes cannot be overthrown
+so that the people will win political power. Communists must expose
+the deceitful propaganda of the reactionaries that social revolution
+is unnecessary and impossible, and so on, and firmly uphold the
+Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution so as to help the people
+to understand that social revolution is not only entirely necessary but
+also entirely possible and that the whole history of mankind and the
+triumph of the Soviet Union all confirm this scientific truth.”[101]
+
+The cold war and the danger of hot war come, according to the
+Communists, only because we resist their so-called inevitable conquest
+of the world. As Hugo Pauk, a Communist in the Ruhr, told Dr. John
+R. Van de Water, “You must also understand that unless you accept our
+Communist way of life, war is inevitable.”[102]
+
+If we did not resist communism there would be no cold war—only
+enslavement and death. For the cold war is their term for our
+resistance to communism. In one of the leading communist journals,
+_International Affairs_, we read that: “The aggressive imperialist
+forces have let loose upon the world their horrible offspring—the
+cold war. Its purpose was to keep the people in a state of constant
+fear, to persuade them that war is inevitable, and to compel them to
+spill more and more money into the bottomless pit of the arms race.
+The cold war was to help the doomed forces of the old world to retain
+their positions and hold back the surging advance of social and
+national-liberation movements, to prepare war against the Socialist
+camp, that untiring champion of world peace.”[103]
+
+“The Socialist countries have set themselves the task of eliminating
+war from the lives of nations for all time—a goal for which the best
+minds in the world have striven for centuries. Proceeding from the
+analysis of the real balance of power on Earth, the 21st Congress of
+the C.P.S.U. stressed that this problem could be solved even before the
+complete victory of Socialism, with capitalism still extant in a part
+of the world.”[104]
+
+“To establish durable peace on Earth is no easy task, of course. There
+are influential forces outside the bounds of the Socialist world whose
+riches and privileges depend on the arms race, on the preparation
+and unleashing of wars. These forces will not give in without
+desperate resistance and will do everything to prevent a relaxation
+of international tension. It will take the utmost effort of all the
+peace-loving forces in the world to turn into reality the existing
+possibility of achieving an international _detente_ and putting an end
+to the cold war.
+
+“N. S. Khrushchev’s visit to the United States is another brilliant
+proof of the fact that the Soviet Government and Communist Party are
+doing everything to terminate the cold war.”[105]
+
+These quotations show that, as a matter of fact, with the Communists
+every issue is a matter of irreconcilable competition in the sense that
+they are not out to make reasonable agreements which they will keep
+with integrity, but that every discussion is another front on which
+they are fighting us. Any agreement is made only because they have to
+make it or because in some way it contributes to their total program of
+victory.
+
+The quotations which we took from the memorandum are saying that if we
+firmly resist Communism we are apt to have trouble! The Senator should
+raise the question: What trouble will there be if we do not firmly
+resist Communism and win this war for freedom?
+
+International tension exists because of Communist aggression. Of
+course, if we ceased resisting they would enslave us, and kill
+millions, but this hardly seems like a desirable way to lessen tensions.
+
+The fact that the Communists are waging protracted conflict on us is
+the provocative factor in the world situation. Why is it that the
+memorandum speaks of “the provocative nature of the policies” of those
+who call on us to awaken to the fact that the Communists have declared
+protracted war on us, and that we should wage protracted conflict for
+victory and freedom—yes, and for survival.
+
+Concerning those who advocate that we wage this protracted conflict
+the _Bulletin_ says: “Indeed, they seem to assume that the Communists
+will back down under pressure—a highly dangerous assumption.” Does
+the _Bulletin_ and the Senator think that the Communists will back
+down if we retreat? Or if we are not firm? Does he think that the
+Communists have not been encouraged by the success which they have had
+hithertofore on their road to world conquest? Does he suggest that
+we relieve pressure by backing down? Does he think that the road of
+retreat is the road to survival? If we are not to put on increased
+pressure, what are we to do? Does he think that the Communists respect
+anything other than firm pressure?
+
+Does the Senator believe, or does he not, that the Communists are
+intent on world conquest? If the Senator believes that the Communists
+are waging protracted conflict to conquer the world, why did he include
+the article from the _Bulletin_? If he does not believe that they are
+waging protracted conflict to conquer the world, we ask: Can America
+afford public servants, men who help shape national policy, who think
+that the Communists are not trying to conquer the world? On the other
+hand, can America afford public servants who, if they believe that the
+Communists are out to conquer the world, criticize those who agree
+with them, and who also say that we ought to act accordingly and wage
+protracted conflict to defeat Communism?
+
+Does the Senator believe that we should refuse to act in the light
+of the realization that the Communists are out to conquer the world?
+In other words, since the Communists are waging war on us on various
+fronts and in various ways, should we not engage them in combat on
+these various levels? Or should we leave the victory to them by
+default? The Communists have declared war on us, they are at war with
+us. They are engaging in protracted conflict against us. What should we
+do? Fail to respond? Respond weakly? Fearfully?
+
+Since the _Bulletin_ does not expect the Soviet bloc to collapse, since
+it does not think we should meet its aggression in protracted conflict;
+just what does it and what does Senator Fulbright propose? Do they
+suggest that Communism will back down from world conquest if we refuse
+to engage them in protracted conflict? If Communists will not back down
+under pressure, will they back down if we yield or refuse to apply
+pressure? As a matter of fact, every retreat on our part and every
+advance on their part, is viewed by them as proof that their theory of
+history is right.[106] Even if we surrendered, they would consider this
+as further proof that they have a mandate from history to overthrow all
+existing social conditions and to remake man.
+
+In reply to the _Bulletin’s_ repudiation of protracted conflict, we
+would say, in the _third_ place, that it should be clearly understood
+that there is no evidence that the Communists will change their goal of
+world conquest. G. F. Hudson, Director of the Center for Far Eastern
+Studies at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford University, has said: “Ever
+since the early days of the Bolshevik regime, there has been the
+expectation abroad that it was just about to settle down, discard
+its fantastic ideas of world revolution, and revert to the normal
+habits and usages of a national sovereign state in its international
+relations.”
+
+“Yet, every time the world has become convinced that the original
+creed of Lenin no longer governed Soviet actions and that the policies
+of the Soviet Union could be interpreted simply in terms of national
+interest and security, like the policies of non-Communist states,
+events have provided fresh evidence that the ultimate aim of the
+rulers of Russia continued to be the destruction of all ‘bourgeois’
+governments.”[107]
+
+In the _fourth_ place, the concept of protracted conflict does not rule
+out the use of traditional diplomacy or innovating methods of settling
+disputes. But it does ask that we recognize that all of these must be
+used as weapons in our war with communism. For it is obvious to every
+student that the Communists use traditional diplomacy and innovating
+methods as but phases of their warfare against civilization.
+
+It is clear that traditional diplomacy has been tried again and again.
+We have even had innovating methods, such as helping enemy countries
+with financial aid. We have tried to work through the U.N. Traditional
+methods are still being tried. We should continue to use them to the
+best of our ability.
+
+Furthermore, the concept of protracted conflict does not rule out the
+resolution of some particular differences “on an ad hoc basis of mutual
+interest....”
+
+Our _fifth_ observation on the _Bulletin’s_ charges, is that the cold
+war is bound to have some effect on our democratic institutions.
+However, it will not involve near the dangers that would be created
+by putting greater power in the hands of the President—whoever the
+President may be at a given time—as Senator Fulbright wants to do. The
+_Bulletin_ spoke of funds being spent secretly but it made no comments
+on the danger of secret executive agreements.
+
+But there is no reason for protracted conflict to destroy democratic
+institutions. We can erect the proper safeguards. Furthermore, the
+failure to wage protracted conflict and to win the war we are in
+will lead to the destruction of our democratic institutions by the
+Communists.
+
+Whether we wage protracted conflict or not, we are engaged in a war.
+Even Senator Fulbright speaks of the long twilight struggle and the
+influence it may have on the people. But certainly it is better to risk
+the possibility of some dangers to our democratic institutions than to
+accept the certainty of their destruction if the Communists win.
+
+The Communists leave us no range of pleasant choices. We either win in
+the struggle with them or we lose all.
+
+Our _sixth_ observation is that to win this war we must wage it on
+every necessary level. We must put the Communists on the defensive
+instead of simply reacting to their aggressive moves. As Charles
+Malik said: “It is most important that the Communists be put on the
+defensive. It is most important that the total arsenal of political,
+moral, and spiritual values be bought to bear upon this struggle.”[108]
+Even Senator Fulbright has said that we ought to take the initiative
+and that a truly tough “approach to Communism is one that meets it with
+‘every instrumentality of foreign and domestic policy’....”[109] This
+is exactly what the concept of protracted conflict calls for, including
+the use of the military in the cold war!
+
+This does not mean that a nuclear war will take place if we wage
+protracted conflict; although we might keep in mind that a failure
+to wage protracted conflict will result in our defeat, for they will
+nibble us to death, or slice us to pieces with the salami tactic. Edgar
+Ansel Mowrer has well said: “And whatever one thinks of the cold war,
+one fact stands out: The Soviets have made of it a third way, neither
+peace nor hot war. And the conclusions seem obvious: If such a third
+way exists for communism, does it not also exist for the West?
+
+“It certainly does. Its name is waging freedom. Waging freedom means
+that, instead of continuing the military and diplomatic defensive, the
+West publicly sets as its goal an extension or recovery of the area of
+national determination—the rollback of communism. It means the cool,
+calculated, and determined acceptance of the Soviet challenge in the
+intermediate field. Above all, it means a complete repudiation of
+the thesis that the West has no choice save humbly seeking peace or
+accepting nuclear annihilation.
+
+“Most of all, waging peace would mean an end to the present
+make-believe in regard to Soviet intentions that dominates too much
+thinking. Many, too many, believe, or are trying to believe, that
+by some means—a mixture of defensive firmness, magical formula, and
+turning the other cheek—the Kremlin can be induced to call the cold war
+off.
+
+“For this, with apologies to Prime Minister Macmillan, there is no
+shred of concrete evidence. All known facts point the other way—to the
+conclusion that the U.S.S.R. is gradually forcing the West back without
+fighting by playing upon its nuclear fears, its reluctance to believe
+the unpleasant, and its even greater reluctance to overtrump Soviet
+military expenditures.
+
+
+“_West Has Best Hand_”
+
+“Yet curiously enough, even in such an intermediate struggle, the
+stronger cards are on the side of the West. The Kremlin can play upon
+the reluctance of a free people to accept a long and costly diplomatic
+and arms-building struggle. But the West can count upon much more—the
+fact that so far as is known, communism is popular in no country where
+it has firmly fixed its claws—not even in the U.S.S.R. as hundreds
+of thousands of defections from the Soviet Army during World War II
+demonstrated.
+
+“To be brief: The West has it in its hands to adopt a third policy, a
+policy of waging freedom short of major war—and outlasting the Kremlin
+at its own chosen game. For the West has several times the economic
+resources and in addition the overwhelming moral resource of the appeal
+against Communist tyranny. It can, if it chooses, chivvy and harry
+Moscow to the point of exhaustion and despair. It can win without
+fighting provided it has the courage and the stamina.”[110]
+
+As James Reston put it: “The choice before the President and the other
+leaders of the Western world today is not between the certainty of
+destruction and the certainty of Communist expansion, but between
+the possibility of destruction if we risk war, and the certainty of
+Communist expansion if we don’t.”[111]
+
+Both from Communist theory and from their past actions we know that
+they will start some local conflicts, when and if they think they can
+get away with it. They will do this regardless of whether or not we use
+protracted conflict. As Dr. Ralph K. White, of the U.S.I.A. said: “But
+for a well indoctrinated Communist the rational, prudent aggressive
+use of force in the cause of Communism is not only legitimate; it is
+obligatory. It is an accepted, integral part of his self-image. He
+believes with Karl Marx that ‘force is the midwife of every old society
+that is pregnant with the new.’”[112]
+
+
+_Is Victory the Goal?_
+
+The memorandum includes an article which is critical of the call for
+total victory. “At a 2-day strategy seminar held in Chicago last
+September, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
+of Staff, called for ‘total victory over the Communist system—not
+stalemate,’ and warned that ‘the minute we become satisfied with the
+status quo, we have started down the road to defeat.’ This theme has,
+in fact, dominated a series of strategy seminars that have been held
+throughout the country during the past 2 years—in New York, Cleveland,
+New Orleans, and Wilmington; in California, Massachusetts, Texas, and
+Washington, D. C. The chief force behind these meetings of businessmen,
+teachers, servicemen, and church leaders has been an organization
+called the Institute for American Strategy.”[113]
+
+The Communist is working toward total victory over the non-Communist
+world. In dealing with an enemy who seeks total victory over us, and
+in the conflict with whom final defeat would be total defeat, can one
+win if he does not seek total victory? Well did Jay Lovestone say: “The
+war is total. If we don’t fight them down the line, we lose down the
+line.”[114]
+
+Total victory does not mean that there will be no more evil in the
+world once Communism has been defeated. It simply means, in my view
+of it, that we should take the initiative and endeavor to meet and to
+defeat them on every necessary level. We all wish that by so doing
+on some levels that they will be halted in their onward march and
+ultimately cease to be Communists. However, in our battle plans we
+should not relax and expect the Communists to cease being Communists.
+It would have been a real blessing if Hitler had ceased to be Hitler
+and if World War II had not been started. But he wasn’t converted from
+the errors of his way, and World War II did take place.
+
+Khrushchev closed the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the
+Soviet Union in the Fall of 1961 by saying: “Our aims are clear, the
+tasks have been set. To work, comrades! For new victories of communism.”
+
+What is wrong with seeking total victory over Communism? This would
+include victory over its ideology, its subversive activities and its
+other forms of aggression.
+
+Is the call for victory contrary to the President’s program for
+survival in this nuclear age? Doesn’t his program for survival
+include a program for victory? If such a total victory is not in the
+President’s program then the people need to know it. If it is in the
+President’s program, what is wrong with backing it and struggling
+for it? Senator Fulbright said that the military and the civilian
+population should back the President’s program.
+
+Elsewhere Senator Fulbright himself recognized that the challenge is
+total, and that the Communists are waging protracted conflict. “We
+endure in an era of total crisis.”[115] After speaking of the armies
+and navy of the U.S.S.R., Fulbright said: “In addition the Soviet
+Union is mounting a world wide trade offensive aimed primarily at us.
+Hence the challenge to us is total. It involves the military, the
+political, the intellectual, and the industrial. The measures of our
+antagonist cannot be countered by half measures or by half-hearted
+competition.”[116]
+
+“Since we are now in deadly conflict with a prodigious antagonist, we
+can neglect nothing that might assure our security.”[117]
+
+Why, then, take the military out of the cold war? Why, then, did
+the Senator criticize in the memorandum the concept of protracted
+conflict?[118]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[83] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439, col. 2,m.-p.
+13441, col. 1.
+
+[84] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 3,b. point 2.
+
+[85] Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, _American Strategy for the
+Nuclear Age_, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960, pp.
+30-31. I agree with Gerhart Niemeyer that the ideological dimension of
+the cold war must be emphasized. _Problems of Communism_, Nov.-Dec.
+1961, p. 59.
+
+[86] Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, _Defense
+Secretary McNamara on S. Res. 191_, Washington: Government Printing
+Office, 1961, pp. 3-4.
+
+[87] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b. A
+government official in a position to know the viewpoint of current
+policy-makers, told Edith Kermit Roosevelt that: “The purpose of
+American policy is to work for a merger of East and West. It is
+believed accommodation can be reached as the two systems become more
+alike politically and economically: As the United States adopts a
+more collectivist pattern of federal control, while at the same time
+a consolidation of Soviet rule makes genocide purges, and other
+less-pleasant attributes of the police state unnecessary.” (“Policy of
+‘No Win’ Now Official”, _Dallas Morning News_, May 27, 1962.)
+
+[88] _Ibid._, p. 13440, col. 1,t.
+
+[89] _Ibid._, August 2, 1949, pp. A4995-A4996.
+
+[90] Quoted in the _Congressional Record_, October 3, 1961, p. A7922,
+col. 3,t.
+
+[91] “Ten Reasons Why Communism is Winning”, _Congressional Record_,
+April 25, 1961, p. A2788, col. 2,m.
+
+[92] “War Called Peace: Time for Words Has Passed.” _Congressional
+Record_, May 3, 1961, p. A3045, col. 3,m.
+
+[93] _Congressional Record_, August 7, 1961, p. 13759, col. 3,m.
+
+[94] _Congressional Record_, May 3, 1961, p. A3045, col. 3.
+
+[95] _Arkansas Democrat_, November 28, 1961, p. 1, _Arkansas Gazette_,
+November 29, 1961, p. 1.
+
+[96] “Speech Delivered by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to
+the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday, September 27, 1961,”
+mimeographed copy of the speech, p. 2.
+
+[97] _Congressional Record_, June 19, 1961, p. A4545, col. 3,m.
+
+[98] _Ibid._, p. A4546, col. 1,t.
+
+[99] _Ibid._, p. A4546, col. 1,t.
+
+[100] Quoted in Department of State, _Soviet World Outlook_, July 1959,
+p. 96.
+
+[101] Mao Tse-tung, _On Contradiction_, Foreign Language Press, Peking,
+1952, pp. 66-67.
+
+[102] John R. Van de Water, _Ideologies in Conflict_. Address on June
+8, 1951, p. 7.
+
+[103] _International Affairs_, Moscow, November 1959, pp. 3-4.
+
+[104] _Ibid._, p. 5.
+
+[105] _Ibid._, p. 6.
+
+[106] Mao Tse-tung _On Contradiction_, p. 61.
+
+[107] G. F. Hudson, _Problems of Communism_, July-Aug. 1961, p. 31.
+
+[108] _Congressional Record_, Oct. 3, 1961, p. A7894, col. 3,m. See
+Frank J. Johnson, _No Substitute For Victory_, Chicago: Regnery, 1962.
+
+[109] _Arkansas Democrat_, November 8, 1961, p. 1.
+
+[110] _Congressional Record_, March 26, 1959, p. A2762, col. 2,m-3,t.
+
+[111] _Ibid._, September 26, 1961, p. A7750, col. 3,t.
+
+[112] Ralph K. White’s speech before the American Psychological
+Association, Duplicated copy, p. 4.
+
+[113] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 2,b.
+
+[114] Taken from my notes of Mr. Lovestone’s speech, Washington, D.
+C., November 4, 1961. Congressman Judd said: “Mr. Chairman, nobody
+has ever yet won a struggle military or otherwise, by being only on
+the defensive and announcing ahead of time that he is not trying to
+win.” _Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy._ Washington: Government
+Printing Office, 1959, p. 123.
+
+[115] Senator Fulbright, _Congressional Record_, March 28, 1960, p.
+A2707, col. 2,b.
+
+[116] _Ibid._, p. A2708, col. 2,t.
+
+[117] _Ibid._, p. A2709, col. 1,m. Congressman McCormack of
+Massachusetts said: “As long as the Communists adhere to dialectic
+communism and their ultimate intent for world revolution and world
+domination, as long as the dominating influence of communism is its
+dialectic aspect, the dominating and controlling power or influence of
+international communism, they have got to keep on going, and going,
+and going until their (sic) either conquer the world or blow up.
+International communism as presently constituted cannot permanently
+survive in any part of the world there are free men and women.”
+(_Congressional Record_, January 22, 1959, p. 951, col. 2,t.)
+
+[118] In the author’s judgment, there are some who want the military
+out of the cold war, because they fear that the military is for the
+hard line against communism, i.e. for victory over communism. This,
+they fear, will start a war. Several years ago Arthur M. Schlesinger,
+Jr. wrote an article on the future of democratic socialism in the
+United States. In it he advocated some ideas which, he said, the State
+Department had been somewhat following for some time. Among these ideas
+were: (a) The U.S.S.R. will get over its “messianic intoxication.”
+(b) We must contain her so that she will not run the risk of the
+aggression that might prove a general war. (c) We must not engage in
+an anti-Soviet crusade. (d) We must not “permit reactionaries in the
+buffer states to precipitate conflicts in defense of their own obsolete
+prerogatives.” (e) We must demonstrate to the U.S.S.R. that we have
+no aggressive intentions toward the U.S.S.R. (f) We must back the
+non-Communist left, since—the implication is—such governments will not
+be apt to engage in an anti-Soviet crusade. In this way, perhaps we can
+stave off general war and give the U.S.S.R. time to undergo a change of
+heart. See the _Congressional Record_, Feb. 6, 1962, pp. A881-A884. A
+reprint.
+
+This approach would not only mean that we should encourage neutralism
+in at least some nations, but it would also mean that an anti-communist
+crusade in America should be defeated.
+
+It would mean that we should not seek victory over communism.
+
+It would encourage the salami tactics of the Communists who will try to
+see to it that each slice they cut off from the non-Communist world is
+not large enough to precipitate a general war.
+
+
+
+
+Chapter VI
+
+THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE PRINCIPLE PROBLEM?
+
+
+Senator Fulbright takes a dim view of the American people. He indicates
+that the curbing of the people, or the manipulation of the masses, may
+be the primary problem of the President. The masses are all potential
+McCarthyites who are easily infected with the virus of extremely
+radical rightwingism. “In the long run, it is quite possible that the
+principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, to
+restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with everything
+we’ve got, particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos. Pride in
+victory, and frustration in restraint, during the Korean war, led to
+MacArthur’s revolt and McCarthyism.”[119] This is the most charitable
+interpretation of McCarthyism which the Senator has ever made. For
+in effect he is saying that McCarthyism is the result of the desire
+for victory over Communism, and the frustration which comes when the
+leaders try to restrain people from winning this victory.
+
+We think that the principal problem is Communism and not the American
+people.
+
+The memorandum went on to say that the people cannot be trusted on
+foreign policy. They tend to “obey the impulse of passion” and “to
+abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary caprice.”
+Thus the Senator thought that if foreign aid was “laid before the
+people in a referendum, it would be defeated.” The Senator obviously
+does not want what _he thinks_ is the people’s will to be carried out.
+The people want simple solutions, they want to scourge devils or lash
+out at the enemy.[120]
+
+The Senator, it is plain to see, does not have a very high opinion of
+the American people and their ability to govern themselves. Is not
+this a lack of confidence in our republican form of government?
+
+
+_How Much Is the Senator For Civilian Control?_
+
+Senator Fulbright says that he has a “strong belief in the principle
+of military subordination to civilian control.”[121] So does this
+reviewer. Furthermore, civilian control ultimately means the
+_sovereignty of the people_. Thus it ultimately means the civilian
+control of the President and of all other politicians and statesmen.
+
+Does the Senator believe as strongly in the civilian control of
+politicians as well as of the military? It does not seem that the
+Senator is too well pleased with this bedrock principle of our
+constitutional system. In a TV interview July 30, 1961, he said,
+concerning the question of Red China and the U. N. and the recognition
+of Communist Outer Mongolia, that: “The sentiments of this country have
+been developed to such a pitch our President has no freedom of action
+in this field.”[122] Again: “... we will not recognize Red China,
+because of the price of dissension within our own ranks at home; it is
+too great to pay ... I think we have no freedom of action in this field
+because of domestic politics.”[123]
+
+If he thought that he could get by with it would the Senator thwart the
+will of the people concerning Red China and Outer Mongolia? Would he
+like to have the freedom to act in these matters contrary to what he
+knows to be the will of the people?
+
+As a matter of fact, the Senator wants us to recognize Outer Mongolia.
+He thinks that it might help us learn more about the relationship
+between the U.S.S.R. and Red China. Obviously he would urge the
+President to recognize Outer Mongolia if he thought that the people
+would stand for it.
+
+The American people, in my judgment, have good reason to be against the
+recognition of Outer Mongolia. _First_, around five thousand of her
+troops fought Americans and the U.N. forces in Korea.[124] _Second_,
+it is one of the oldest of the satellites of the U.S.S.R. _Third_,
+it is recognized as a loyal Communist country by Red China. For
+example, a Communist paper recently carried an article entitled: “China
+Salutes Fraternal Mongolia.”[125] In trade talks around the first of
+March, 1961, it was emphasized by Peking that the cooperation between
+Mongolia and China was “on the basis of the principles of proletarian
+Internationalism.” Marshall Malinevsky, who is chief of the Russian
+Army, “described the bond between Mongolian, Chinese and Russian Armies
+as ‘cemented in blood’.” _Fourth_, the Premier of Outer Mongolia in
+a broadcast on April 24, 1961, emphasized their loyalty to Lenin.
+Furthermore, he said: “In their struggle for building a new life,
+our people always leaned and continue to lean upon the disinterested
+all-around aid of the Soviet Union, the first country of triumphant
+Socialism.” _Fifth_, if we recognize Outer Mongolia, Japan will likely
+do likewise. This will help increase the sentiment of neutralism in
+Japan.[126] _Sixth_, it would have a bad psychological effect in Asia.
+The Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, Felix Berto Serrano, said
+that it would be “an example of the softening of the U.S. attitude
+toward Communism in this part of the world.” The Foreign Minister of
+Thailand, Phanat Khoman, said that it would have an adverse affect on
+free world morale.[127]
+
+The Senator thinks that if the people were given a choice in the
+matter, they would defeat foreign aid. He may or may not be right. But
+is he not saying that what he thinks is the will of the people should
+not rule in this matter?
+
+
+_Attitude Towards America_
+
+The Senator attacks those individuals who, he says, run down America.
+“Implicit in much of the propaganda of the radical right is the
+assumption that our free society is permeated with corruption and
+decay.”[128]
+
+There is much that is right in America. We believe that it is the
+greatest country in the world. The principles on which it is founded
+are the principles which when followed produce progress and prosperity.
+
+On the other hand, there is enough crime, corruption and decay to cause
+all thoughtful Americans real concern. For example, J. Edgar Hoover has
+called our attention to these matters countless times.
+
+We shall not enter into a discussion of this except to point out that
+the Senator himself has some hard things to say about America.
+
+In the speech at Stanford University he said: “In the last few years
+American statesmen and scholars have been turning their thoughts
+toward an effort to re-define the national ‘purpose,’ to interpret our
+national life and politics in terms of goals. The genesis of this quest
+for a clear national objective was a feeling that somehow the American
+people had strayed from their historic course into a blind alley of
+aimlessness and frustration. In an era of unexampled affluence, the
+American people, by and large, are not happy. In the years since World
+War II, we have attained our private purposes almost too well at home,
+but beyond our personal material needs we have not yet recognized an
+objective or purpose which inspires our real interest. At home we
+have become immersed in the crass delight of extravagant consumption,
+puerile faddism, and callow amusements.”
+
+“The quest for a definition of the national purpose has been generated
+by this sense of malaise. If our people were engaged in vigorous
+and meaningful activity, it is quite possible that we would not now
+be troubling ourselves with a quest for abstract definition and
+articulation.”[129]
+
+Rightwing extremism, he says, has great appeal to the American public,
+and in times of crisis it has “great mass appeal”. The people are the
+ones who need to be restrained in our conflict with communism. The
+people do not have enough understanding to back an adequate foreign
+policy.[130] The people are misled by simple solutions and need some
+devils to scourge. “The radicalism of the right can be expected to
+have great mass appeal during such periods. It offers the simple
+solution, easily understood: Scourging of the devils within the body
+politic, or, in the extreme, lashing out at the enemy.”[131]
+
+On September 1, 1960, Senator Fulbright said: “I believe that such
+a study would conclude that America’s trouble is basically one of
+aimlessness at home and frustration abroad.”[132]
+
+In the light of these contentions of the Senator, he is hardly the one
+to defend America against the charge, which he says is made by the
+“radical right,” that our “free society is permeated with corruption
+and decay.” Has the “radical right” said anything harder about America
+than has the Senator? If not, why should they be classified as radical,
+and the Senator not also be grouped with them in this matter.
+
+
+_The Manipulated Masses?_
+
+Not only does the Senator think that the problem is to restrain
+the people, but that the people should be “directed” into backing
+whatever the President’s program happens to be. He does not trust
+the people; his statements make this clear. They must be “directed”.
+“Fundamentally, it is believed that the American people have little,
+if any, need to be alerted to the menace of the cold war. Rather,
+the need is for understanding of the true nature of that menace, and
+the direction of the public’s present and foreseeable awareness of
+the fact of the menace toward support of the President’s own total
+program for survival in a nuclear age. There are no reasons to believe
+that military personnel generally can contribute to this need, beyond
+their specific, technical competence to explain their own role. On the
+contrary, there are many reasons, and some evidence, for believing
+that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, involves
+considerable danger.”[133]
+
+Frankly at times we are not sure what is the President’s own total
+program. It has vacillated, for example, concerning Laos and Cuba. Are
+we to be “directed” into it, as the President unfolds it, or shapes it,
+from time to time?
+
+Senator Fulbright has attacked the competency of the people. He laid
+down in his secret memorandum, in our judgement, the ideological basis
+for a program of Pavlovian conditioning of the American people to
+accept whatever is decided on in the White House, the State Department
+and by a small group of advisors.[134]
+
+The Senator thinks that the people are susceptible to radicalism. He
+says that extremely radical rightwingism “already has great appeal to
+the public. In the future it may well have much greater appeal.”[135]
+So the problem is to “direct” them into the President’s own total
+program. This program, the Senator implies, _is quite different_ from
+the general program for victory and survival which is discussed in the
+memorandum and repudiated as being rightwing. For he thinks that the
+rightwingers are raising an obstacle to the “public acceptance of the
+President’s program.”[136]
+
+Carried out to its logical conclusion, we believe that the memorandum,
+and the way in which it was formed and implemented, introduces a
+new concept into our government, a concept which would replace the
+Constitution and the sovereignty of the people. The President, the
+State Department and a few advisors are the ones who through their own
+will and wisdom formulate the policies which shall be followed. This
+they are to do independently of the people, for the people are too
+deficient in understanding; they are so immature that they follow the
+momentary caprice; they tend to obey the impulse of passion and thus
+the “Radicalism of the right can be expected to have great mass appeal
+during such periods” as the “long twilight struggle”. Furthermore,
+our age is complex, therefore, the public must either be ignored or
+conditioned so that they will follow the leader. In directing the
+people into the President’s program, the military should engage in the
+cold war only to the extent that it can help do this in explaining
+their own strictly military role. After speaking of the need for the
+direction of the people’s awareness, that there is a danger, into
+support for the President’s program, he said: “There are no reasons
+to believe that military personnel generally can contribute to this
+need, beyond their specific technical competence to explain their own
+role. On the contrary, there are many reasons and some evidence, for
+believing that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation,
+involves considerable danger.”[137] Does this mean that when the
+military cannot be used as a rubber stamp it must not be used in waging
+the cold war?
+
+It should be remembered that this basically anti-constitutional
+concept—against the Constitution in that it distrusts and wants
+to “direct” the people, rather than accept the sovereignty of the
+people—was set forth in a secret memorandum. The other members of the
+Foreign Relations Committee did not see it. It was sent directly to the
+President and the Secretary of Defense, and has had an influence on a
+very important policy.
+
+Walter Lippmann, who is highly regarded by Senator Fulbright, said that
+there was a tendency of Government “insiders” to view the criticism
+of the “outsiders” as that of ignoramuses who were not enlightened
+by secret files and conferences. He said: “I tell the critic, you be
+careful. You will be denouncing the principle of democracy itself,
+which asserts that the outsiders shall be sovereign over the insiders.
+For you will be showing that the people themselves, since they are
+ignoramuses because they are outsiders, are therefore incapable of
+governing themselves.
+
+“Furthermore, Lippmann declared that as far as the affairs of the world
+are concerned, those who regard themselves as insiders are actually
+outsiders since none of them read all of the U.S. papers and they
+have no access to the records of foreign governments that are equally
+important and if one is to have the total wisdom the insiders indicate
+they have.”[138]
+
+
+_An Out-Moded Constitutional System?_
+
+Senator Fulbright seems to want to change our system of government
+so that it will be run by one man, the President. He has unlimited
+confidence in the President as a man who is above partisan politics
+and who is of high moral calibre _by virtue of the fact_ that he is
+President. He views our constitutional system as out of date. Thus in
+his Stanford speech, July 28, 1961, he said:
+
+“The President is hobbled in his task of leading the American people
+to consensus and concerted action by the restrictions of power imposed
+on him by a constitutional system designed for an eighteenth century
+agrarian society far removed from the centers of world power. It is
+imperative that we break out of the intelligent confines of cherished
+and traditional beliefs and open our minds to the possibility that
+basic changes in our system may be essential to meet the requirements
+of the twentieth century.
+
+“The ability of this nation to preserve the value system which
+constitutes the core of our national interest has come to depend
+principally on our ability to cope with world wide revolutionary
+forces. If we are to deal with these forces successfully, we must be
+able to act quickly and decisively on the one hand and persistently and
+patiently on the other. ‘Our American task,’ wrote Walter Lippmann in
+a recent article, ‘is to generate superior national strength. For this
+we must have a powerful and purposeful National Government.... There is
+no getting away from the fact that, as Lord Acton said, power corrupts.
+But also, there is no getting away from the fact that powerlessness
+invites confusion, demoralization, and defeat.’
+
+“The fact that is needed is Presidential power. He alone, among elected
+officials, can rise above parochialism and private pressures. He
+alone, in his role as teacher and moral leader, can hope to overcome
+the excesses and inadequacies of a public opinion that is all too
+often ignorant of the needs, the dangers, and the opportunities in our
+foreign relations.
+
+“Public Opinion, wrote Lippmann in _The Public Philosophy_,
+consistently lags a generation behind in its attitudes and assessments
+of international relations. The tyranny of public opinion, he says,
+imposes upon our policy-makers a ‘compulsion to make mistakes.’
+The poet Yeats was not wholly wrong when he laid down this harsh
+pronouncement on public opinion: ‘The best lack all conviction—the
+worst are filled with passionate intensity.’
+
+“These views may be extreme but they are not wholly without merit,
+and I point to them in order to stress the point that public opinion
+must be educated and led if it is to bolster wise and effective
+national policies. Only the President can provide the guidance that is
+necessary, while legislators display a distressing tendency to adhere
+slavishly to the dictates of public opinion, or at least to its vocal
+and highly organized minority segments.”[139]
+
+Lippmann’s statement concerning the “insiders” and “outsiders” ought to
+be recalled in this connection. We should also remember his criticism
+that President Eisenhower was a defeatist who lacked faith in our
+people and in our system.[140] Why, then, should he contend that what
+is needed is more Presidential power? Why should Senator Fulbright
+maintain the same thing?
+
+In a news conference in Washington, President Eisenhower said on May
+10, 1962, that: “I believe that the problem of the Presidency is
+rarely an inadequacy of power. Ordinarily, the problem is to use the
+already enormous power of the Presidency judiciously, temperately and
+wisely.”[141]
+
+With all due respect to the President of the United States, whoever he
+may be at any given time in our history, we do not believe that any
+President is wise enough, knows enough or is good enough to occupy the
+position to which Senator Fulbright would elevate him. Of course, with
+the attitude which Fulbright has toward the masses, it is logical that
+he should accept the Fuhrer (Fuhrer means “leader”) principle. The
+masses must look to _the leader_. He must be their teacher and their
+moral leader.
+
+“We got rid of kings back there in 1776, Senator.”[142] The Senator
+talks like a reactionary who wants to go back to kings and their
+“divine right” to rule.
+
+Senator Fulbright thinks that legislators are slaves of public opinion,
+but the President is exempt from such. We ask: In our Republic
+shouldn’t the legislators and the President be subject to public
+opinion under law? If they are not to be responsive to the will of the
+people within the framework of our constitutional government, to whom
+and to what are they to be responsive?
+
+Has the Senator from Arkansas forgotten that less than two years
+ago President Kennedy was a Senator, and thus a legislator; and
+legislators, according to Fulbright, display a “distressing tendency
+to adhere slavishly to the dictates of public opinion, or at least to
+its vocal and highly organized minority segments.” Just because this
+particular Senator was elected President did he therefore become so
+transformed that he rose above “parochialism and private pressures”?
+Did he become overnight the “teacher and moral leader”, the “only” one
+who can “provide the guidance that is necessary”? Does the Senator
+think, if Nixon had been elected President, that automatically on
+his shoulders would have descended the wisdom, the knowledge and the
+unlimited goodness which would be necessary in one who is to be our
+Leader in morality, our Teacher and our Guide? As a matter of fact,
+we know that the Senator does not believe that Mr. Nixon, if he had
+been elected, would have metamorphized into the Leader which Senator
+Fulbright claims that the President by the very nature of the case
+becomes. On February 1, 1960, Senator Fulbright reprinted in the
+_Congressional Record_ an article by James Reston which was critical
+of Mr. Nixon. Senator Fulbright said of the article that “it is seldom
+in this stolid and humorless era that an observer of our political
+scene sees through the absurd double talk of so much of the political
+speeches with which we are entertained.” Reston, however, had done so
+concerning Mr. Nixon.[143] And yet, Senator Fulbright’s concept of the
+Presidency is such that he must believe, if he follows his position to
+its logical conclusion, that Mr. Nixon would have ceased all double
+talk, and have become the teacher and the moral leader of the nation if
+he had been elected!
+
+Did Senator Fulbright think that President Truman was the moral and
+educational leader of the people just because he was President? Of
+Truman he said in 1951: “For a long time we have been walking on
+opposite sides of the street, neither of us nodding to the other. He
+has often thought me wrong and unspeakable, while I have sometimes
+thought him wrong and incomprehensible.”
+
+“I have spoken with him on official business only once in several
+years.”[144]
+
+Senator Fulbright did not think that because President Eisenhower
+was in the office of President that he was therefore qualified as
+the leader and teacher of the people. He thought that Eisenhower was
+confused and engaged in the lucrative business of making and selling
+tranquilizer pills.[145] He spoke of the absence of leadership on the
+part of the President.[146] A veto message was described as “unworthy
+of his great office and beneath the dignity of the Congress to which
+it was sent. It is not factual. It is intemperate. It was obviously
+designed to catch newspaper headlines and radio and television news
+blurbs.”[147] The President himself; the Senator said, was unaware of
+the vastness of the Soviet challenge. “In defense, in our domestic
+economy, and in our foreign relations, the administration seems to
+be unaware of the depth and scope of the Soviet challenge. There is
+no evidence that the administration is now or ever will be willing
+to urge the American people to take in one notch on our belt to deal
+with a Soviet challenge which confronts us in missiles, arms, and just
+downright capacity to produce.”[148] “I believe that the people of
+America will rise to the needs of our situation if they are clearly
+told what is at stake. They certainly would be willing to be taxed
+if it is necessary to survival. But I am not sure the administration
+agrees with even that simple proposition.”[149]
+
+With high commendation, Senator Fulbright inserted an article by Joseph
+Alsop into the _Congressional Record_ which indicated that he thought
+that President Eisenhower did not have, to say the least, the balanced
+judgment necessary for guiding aright the ship of state. Of a reason
+advanced by the President concerning test bans, Alsop said: “Surely
+this singular choice of reasons for a high policy decision of truly
+immeasurable import, reveals a mind gripped by one idea to the point
+of total obsession. Surely it shows a man driven by a single purpose
+almost to the point of mania.”[150]
+
+Senator Fulbright further charged that President Eisenhower did not
+have the proper attitude toward Congress and that he did not take
+them into his confidence. Perhaps the Senator thought that there were
+too many secret memorandums floating around! At any rate he said: “I
+believe that a great deal of this stems from the President’s attitude
+toward Congress, particularly toward the Democratic Members of
+Congress. He has shown very little disposition to take them into his
+confidence, now or at any other time.
+
+“I believe that legitimately leaves many people with the feeling that
+we do not know all that we ought to know. I asked Mr. Kohler about the
+letter which Khrushchev had written, and Mr. Kohler said flatly that
+he could not discuss it. I said that it had appeared at least in part
+in the Herald Tribune, and that it was strange indeed that it could
+be revealed to Miss Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune, but not
+to a committee of the Senate. He said that he could not discuss it.
+Apparently he was under orders not to discuss it in any respect with
+the committee. That did not leave a very good taste in my mouth. It is
+a mystery to me why a letter, unless it was specifically agreed that
+Mr. Khrushchev considered it a personal and confidential letter, should
+not be released. Having been released, or leaked, as the new term is,
+to the Herald Tribune, I do not know of any reason why it should not be
+made available to the committee, and to the public, for that matter, in
+a more official manner than the way in which it was.
+
+“With reference to the statement of the Senator regarding what Mr.
+Tsarapkin said, I have only seen a summary of it which Mr. Farley
+brought to me and said:
+
+“‘This is all that can be released now.’
+
+“I do not quite understand why that should be true. Maybe the Senator’s
+explanation would be a violation of an understanding. That is possible.
+However, I must agree with the Senator that a little more frank
+discussion, and taking the public into their confidence, certainly the
+Senate of the United States, particularly the Committee on Foreign
+Relations, would be a very healthy step.”[151]
+
+Senator Fulbright also thought that President Eisenhower was forcing
+uniformity of viewpoint in his administration. Men under him were
+either muzzled or suffered the consequences. Or at least the Senator
+indicated this in an insertion, with high praise, of an article by
+Joseph Alsop which said: “In this administration, uniformity of
+viewpoint is virtually enforced. Independent-minded persons who do
+not take their viewpoint, readymade, from the White House have always
+been condemned as non-team players. Soon or late, they have always
+met the fate of General Gavin, General Ridgway, and Gen. Maxwell D.
+Taylor.”[152]
+
+As late as March 22, 1960, Senator Fulbright, in a speech before the
+Annual Dinner of the Harvard Club of Washington, D. C., commended
+a high military official for disagreeing with the President. And,
+furthermore, Senator Fulbright seems to cast scorn on the idea that
+it was not for Generals to reason why! As the Senator put it: “Gen.
+Bernard Schriever has also said that there is ‘very much evidence’
+that Russia has greatly strengthened its bomber defenses. But the
+aircraft that might not be able to get through may not even be able to
+demonstrate their impotence. ‘For,’ states Gen. Thomas Power, Chief of
+the Strategic Air Command, ‘our bomber bases are vulnerable to surprise
+attack.’
+
+“Generals are not to reason why. Their Commander in Chief complains
+that, ‘too many generals have all sorts of ideas.’
+
+“Yet mankind moves on ideas. Men with ideas are the makers and shakers
+of the world. The larger their number serving the country the more
+fruitful and vigorous the country. But few men of ideas come to
+Washington. They are not likely to seek service in a government which
+is scornful of their kind.”[153]
+
+The Senator seemed to agree with the idea that “President Eisenhower
+leads a dangerously sheltered life as Chief Executive of the
+Nation.”[154]
+
+Lyndon B. Johnson also commended, on February 16, 1960, the idea that
+public debate by military officials was good. He reprinted a letter
+from a Harvard professor, Henry A. Kissinger, that: “The President
+says he deplores public argument by military experts regarding our
+defense policy. Prior to this, he had called his critics parochial and
+had invoked his superior expertise in the subject. It is impossible,
+of course, for laymen to pass judgment on a debate of such technical
+complexity. They have a right to insist, however, that the categories
+of the debate be properly put.”[155]
+
+In the light of these considerations, it is a serious question as to
+what has happened to Senator Fulbright within the last year or so that
+has led him to think now that President Kennedy is in office, that
+the office of the Presidency has automatically raised the President
+above the temptations and mistakes that not only beset legislators—and
+Kennedy was a Senator less than two years ago—but also above those
+which beset Eisenhower. What makes the Senator, in the light of his
+previous criticisms of Eisenhower, think what is needed in this country
+is more power for the President? After all, the Senator might reflect,
+President Kennedy will not be President forever, and what if after we
+have conferred far greater powers on the President, while Kennedy was
+in office, someone like Eisenhower or Truman, of whom the Senator was
+so critical, became President!!
+
+In denouncing those whom he labeled as “fanatics” and “extremists” of
+the right, in a speech in Los Angeles on November 18, President Kennedy
+said: “They call for a ‘man on horseback’ because they do not trust
+the people.”[156] And yet, Senator Fulbright calls for more power for
+the President, because the people are so ignorant that they need the
+Leader. Wouldn’t this position make the Senator, in this matter, akin
+to the rightwing “fanatics”? As Joseph Alsop said, in regards to a
+position President Eisenhower had taken, “perhaps it would have been
+better to assert, at the outset, that it is always wrong for any nation
+to trust any leader, instead of trusting the hard facts.”[157]
+
+Former President Herbert Hoover has indicated that more than one loss
+to communism has taken place because the man in the position of the
+Presidency, along with his selected advisors, entered into agreements
+without an opportunity being given to the Congress or to the people to
+know of, to discuss or to pass on these matters. “Executive agreements,
+Mr. Hoover said, had spread communism over the earth, turned over the
+Baltic States to Soviet Russia, partitioned Poland at the Teheran
+Conference, surrendered 10 nations to slavery at Yalta and set in
+motion the communization of Mongolia, North Korea, and all China. One
+result of these ‘unrestrained Presidential actions’ is a worldwide
+shrinking of human freedoms. Another has been a steady encroachment on
+powers of the legislative branch by the executive.”[158]
+
+Senator Fulbright would lead us away from our constitutional system
+to a system wherein the power would be concentrated in the hands of
+the President. “The power that is needed is Presidential power.” “Only
+the President can provide the guidance that is necessary....” But
+this is not to lead us to a newer and higher form of government, than
+that of our so-called out-moded “eighteenth century agrarian society”
+constitutional system. It is to lead us back to the concept of
+dictatorship, of the Fuhrer.
+
+The leader, of course, would have his small, select group of advisors.
+In such a set-up, government by secret memorandums would likely be the
+order of the day.
+
+We trust that Senator Fulbright, who is influential in the present
+administration, will not influence President Kennedy to accept this
+concept of our constitutional system, nor this idea of the role of the
+President.
+
+The Senator knows that power tends to corrupt and that absolute power
+corrupts absolutely, for he himself once said: “Wherever there is power
+there is the possibility that it will be used and the danger that it
+will be misused. This assumption, expressed in Lord Acton’s maxim that
+‘power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,’ is common
+to all effective democracies. This principle is one of instinctive
+distrust of power itself wherever it exists. It has nothing to do with
+the motives of any group or individual who may wield it. It has been
+directed against big business, big labor, and big government, and now,
+inevitably, it is directed against our big Military Establishment.”[159]
+
+Why, then, does the Senator want to give to the President far more
+power than the Constitution now allows and the President now has? For
+what does the President need more power?
+
+
+_Backing the President_
+
+The Senator said that the need is for the public to be directed into
+the support of the President’s own total program.[160] Does this apply
+to the Senator?
+
+As a candidate, President Kennedy said he would do something about
+Cuba. He was going to do something, i.e. back an invasion. But Senator
+Fulbright’s opposition to our backing an invasion had an influence,
+according to some, on the President which helped induce him to modify
+his plans. Thus the invasion was doomed to failure.
+
+President Kennedy emphasized that we would stand firm in Berlin.[161]
+On a TV program on July 30, 1961, the following exchange took place:
+
+“Mr. Scali. In any negotiations over Berlin, Senator, would you be
+willing to accept any concessions on the part of the West which closed
+West Berlin as an escape hatch for refugees in any way?
+
+“Senator Fulbright. Well, I think that that might certainly be a
+negotiable point. The truth of the matter is I think the Russians have
+the power to close it in any case. I mean we are not giving up very
+much because I believe next week if they chose to close their borders,
+they could, without violating any treaty right I know of. We have no
+right to insist that they be allowed to come out. As I said I don’t
+understand why the East Germans don’t close the border because I think
+they have a right to close it. So why is this a great concession? You
+don’t have that right now.”[162]
+
+The question dealt specifically with the West making some concessions
+which would close the escape hatch. The Senator thought “that might
+certainly be a negotiable point.” He made it clear that we could not
+negotiate with them as to whether they had the power to close it, so he
+was not implying we should negotiate concerning their power; nor, as
+he also put it, their right to close the escape hatch. The only thing
+left to negotiate was, as the question specifically said, whether the
+West should make any concessions “which closed West Berlin as an escape
+hatch for refugees in any way.” In other words, the Senator indicates
+that we should negotiate as to whether or not the West should help—by
+making concessions on our part, since obviously we could not make
+concessions for the Russians—close the escape hatch and thus in effect
+whether the West should help the Communists guard the prison house in
+which the Communists have their slaves.
+
+The East German Communists made use of the Senator’s statements, and
+commended him. On August 3, 1961, in East Berlin _Neues Deutschland_
+had the following heading for an article: “U. S. Senator Against Trade
+in Human Beings.” He was quoted as saying that: “the East Germans have
+the right to close their borders.” The paper stressed that the Bonn
+government was very much upset with Senator Fulbright’s proposal, as
+they put it, to hold “serious negotiations on Berlin with the USSR.”
+On August 4 the same paper said: “But the man seems to be a realistic
+politician.” “Apparently Fulbright is aware of the fact that the
+man-trap of West Berlin is an untenable situation, that it must and
+will be closed.”
+
+We wonder whether the President felt that the Senator’s speech upheld
+the President’s position on Berlin.
+
+The Senator later explained that this was not what he meant. It was,
+however, what he said. We quote the entire explanation which was made
+in the Senate on August 4, 1961.
+
+“Last Sunday, I appeared on the ABC network television and radio
+program, ‘Issues and Answers.’ In the course of that program one of
+the exchanges led to an unfortunate and erroneous impression of my
+views. When asked if I thought the West should make any concessions
+on the question of the flight of East German refugees to West Berlin,
+I responded that this, too, is something that could be discussed,
+because—and this is the point—the East Germans have the ability to
+control travel _within_ East Germany.
+
+“The imposition of tighter travel restrictions by the East Germans
+on travel of East German citizens within East Germany could restrict
+access of East German citizens to all of Berlin, thus depriving a large
+number of potential refugees from East Germany (as distinguished from
+East Berlin) of this convenient means of escape.
+
+“As I pointed out in the TV and radio interview, I know of no
+agreements to which the Western Powers are party which prohibit the
+East Germans from restricting the travel of East German citizens within
+East Germany (outside of Berlin). It is to that point of reference that
+my response was intended in the interview.
+
+“I certainly did not intend to imply that the West should execute any
+agreement whereby the West would assist in enforcing any restriction
+imposed by East Germany on travel within East Germany nor that the West
+should consider changing existing agreements and consent to closing
+West Berlin to refugees wishing to enter.
+
+“The right of persons to move freely within all sectors of Berlin is
+entirely another matter and is guaranteed by post-war agreements signed
+by the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. I do not
+consider such right to be negotiable.”[163]
+
+According to Constantine Brown, Germans and other Europeans have raised
+the question: “How can we reconcile what your President tells us with
+what his own important party leaders and especially the chairman of
+the most important Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Fulbright, says
+in public, on the floor of the Senate and in radio and television
+interviews?”
+
+“The suspicions of what may be termed a schizophrenic foreign policy
+started some time ago when Senator Mansfield, the majority leader, and
+later Senator Fulbright urged negotiations on Berlin after Mr. Kennedy
+had taken a formally strong stand on that very matter.”[164]
+
+We wonder if the Senator has set the public a good example of clearly
+and wholeheartedly backing the President’s program in such matters as
+we have mentioned?
+
+In a review of some of our history Senator Fulbright took the position
+that it was important for the people themselves to bring to bear
+pressure on the President, instead of always following the leader.
+“Moreover, throughout the whole of this process, while much was done
+by the action of individual Presidents, a great deal was done as a
+direct result of congressional action or by the direct play of public
+pressures, rising from a people whose life was being progressively
+democratized.
+
+“The key point is that the conduct of foreign affairs did not appear
+to be an elite function, limited to specialists in and around the
+Executive. Neither the electorate nor the Congress was ever overawed
+by the Executive claim to exclusive knowledge, or its claim that it
+would be against the national interest to disclose the facts relevant
+to a foreign policy decision. Foreign policy was debated in remote
+frontier outposts as well as in seaboard cities, with a shrewdness and
+a knowledge of great power rivalries that astonishes any modern reader
+who browses through the records of these debates preserved in our
+National Archives.”[165]
+
+Now that the Senator’s secret memorandum has been made public,
+the people can study it, debate it and continue to exercise their
+sovereignty. It is through knowledge and action based thereon that
+the civilian control can be maintained over the government and thus
+over the military. Those who do not believe that our constitutional
+system is out of date will surely want to examine closely the Senator’s
+position.[166] In fact, the Senator himself once emphasized the
+necessity of debating issues. “Too many people are given a practical
+veto over policy. There is an inhibition of the kind of free debate out
+of which a fundamental national agreement emerges.” “Nonpartisanship
+does not mean the absence of debate on foreign policy.” “I do not think
+it is possible for a democratic country to have a viable, effective
+policy unless it is founded on the widest possible public discussion.
+Debate is a necessary ingredient of policymaking.”[167]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[119] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
+
+[120] _Ibid._, p. 13437.
+
+[121] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,b.
+
+[122] _Ibid._, August 1, 1961, p. 13219, col. 2,t.
+
+[123] _Ibid._, p. 13219, col. 2,m.
+
+[124] _Commercial Appeal_, August 1, 1961. Report of speech of
+Congressman Frank J. Becker. This same news item said that Senator
+Fulbright was for the recognition of Outer Mongolia.
+
+[125] _Peking Review_, July 14, 1961, p. 7.
+
+[126] See the American-Asian Educational Exchange’s recent report on
+Communist China and Asia, July, 1961. See also _The Worker_, October 1,
+1961, p. 6. _World Marxist Review_, July 1961, p. 3.
+
+[127] _Chinese News Service_, August 1, 1961, pp. 3-4. For some
+additional comments see Thomas J. Dodd’s speech in the _Congressional
+Record_, August 2, 1961.
+
+[128] _Congressional Record_, August 21, 1961, p. 15357, col. 3,m.
+
+[129] Speech of Senator Fulbright before the 1961 Summer Cubberly
+Conference of Stanford University, Stanford, California, July 28, 1961.
+Mimeographed copy, pp. 1-2.
+
+[130] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,m.
+
+[131] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 2,m.
+
+[132] _Ibid._, September 2, 1960, p. A6708, col. 2,b.
+
+[133] _Ibid._, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b. Dr. Robert T.
+Oliver, of Pennsylvania State University, expressed his opinion on
+October 24, 1961, that: “Democratic and totalitarian governments are
+becoming more and more alike in their methods of governing—through the
+manipulation of public opinion by control of secrecy and publicity.”
+(_Congressional Record_, Jan. 15, 1962, p. A141, col. 2,t.)
+
+[134] See Edward Hunter, speech on the Manion Forum. 1961. Reprinted in
+the _Congressional Record_, Feb. 6, 1962, pp. A906-907.
+
+[135] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 1,b.-2,t.
+
+[136] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,b. See also p. 13436, col. 3,b.
+
+[137] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 3,t.
+
+[138] _Ibid._, January 18, 1960, p. 578, col. 3,m. Dr. Robert T.
+Oliver, who served over twelve years in the inner councils of the
+government of Korea, dealing with matters of foreign policy, said: “On
+the whole, however, the significant facts concerning all the major
+international issues are completely available to anyone who takes the
+trouble to keep up with the news.” (_Ibid._, Jan. 5, 1962, p. A140,
+col. 3,b.)
+
+[139] Speech of Senator Fulbright before the 1961 Summer Cubberly
+Conference at Stanford University, Stanford, California, July 28,
+1961, pp. 7-8. When he was a Senator, Kennedy made it clear that
+the Presidency conferred no wisdom in his criticism of Eisenhower.
+(_Congressional Record_, June 14, 1960, p. 11630, col. 3,t.) The
+question is raised in my mind as to whether or not Senator Kennedy,
+who spoke of the “missile gap” and other “gaps” in our defenses during
+the campaign for President, was really that ignorant of our defense
+posture? Yet, within a few months after he became president—and
+certainly before anything that his administration did could have
+changed the picture basically—we “learned” that there was no “missile
+gap” and that our defense posture was strong. (See the article by David
+Lawrence in the _Congressional Record_, Jan. 16, 1962, p. A241, cols. 2
+and 3.)
+
+Senator Fulbright himself said “In a democratic system, such as ours,
+the people do have much to say about policy, and they decide who shall
+govern them. How, may I ask, can our people be expected to discharge
+their duty as citizens of a self-governing republic, if they are not
+told the truth about their affairs? It would be easier, more pleasant,
+and I am sure more popular, to join those who pretend that all is
+well, that the summit meeting was a triumph for the West and that the
+Japanese fiasco only demonstrates once again the viciousness of the
+Communists.” (_Ibid._, June 28, 1960, p. 13672, col. 2,m.)
+
+[140] Column of February 11, 1960. _Congressional Record_, February 19,
+1960, p. 2761, col. 3,t.
+
+[141] _U.S. News and World Report_, May 21, 1962, p. 15.
+
+[142] _Evening Tribune_, San Diego, California, Editorial, August 14,
+1961.
+
+[143] _Congressional Record_, February 1, 1960, p. 1519, col. 2,m,
+Senator Fulbright once accused Nixon of “deceiving the American
+people”. Quoted in _The Arkansas Historical Quarterly_, Winter, 1961,
+p. 328.
+
+[144] _Congressional Record_, April 26, 1951, p. 4409, col. 3,m.
+
+[145] _Ibid_, September 9, 1959, p. 17250, col. 3,m.
+
+[146] _Ibid._, April 24, 1959, p. 5932, col. 3,b.
+
+[147] _Ibid._, August 12, 1959, p. 14272, col. 1,m.
+
+[148] _Ibid._, March 18, 1959, p. 3948, col. 1,m.
+
+[149] _Ibid._, p. 3948, col 1,b.
+
+[150] _Ibid._, February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col 3,m.
+
+[151] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, p. 6207, col. 2,m.
+
+[152] _Ibid._, February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col. 3,b.-p. 1979, col. 1,t.
+
+[153] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 2,m.
+
+[154] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 2,b.
+
+[155] _Ibid._, February 16, 1960, pp. A1250, col. 3,b. A1251, col. 1,t.
+
+[156] As quoted in the _U.S. News and World Report_, December 4, 1961,
+p. 4, col. 1,b.
+
+[157] _Congressional Record_, February 19, 1961, p. 2769.
+
+[158] _Congressional Record_, August 16, 1954, p. A6075, col. 3,m.
+See the entire speech in Herbert Hoover, _Addresses Upon the American
+Road_, August 10, 1954, pp. 74-84.
+
+[159] _Ibid._, August 21, 1961, p. 15357, col. 1,t. Speech before the
+National War College, August 21, 1961.
+
+[160] _Ibid._, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t.
+
+[161] Compare Constantine Brown, _Congressional Record_, September 5,
+1961, p. A6963.
+
+[162] _Ibid._, August 1, 1961, p. 13218, col. 2,t.
+
+[163] Statement by Senator Fulbright before the United States Senate,
+August 4, 1961. It is regrettable that the right to move freely within
+all sectors of Berlin has been abrogated by the Communists without any
+negotiations. J.D.B.
+
+[164] _Congressional Record_, September 5, 1961, p. A6963, col. 2,m.
+
+[165] Speech by Senator Fulbright at the 10th anniversary banquet of
+the _Reporter_ magazine. April 16, 1959. _Congressional Record_, April
+17, 1959, p. 5543, col. 2,m.
+
+[166] Compare Constantine Brown, “Remaking the Constitution?” _Ibid._,
+September 12, 1961, p. A7150, col. 2.
+
+[167] Senator Fulbright, _Congressional Record_, April 17, 1959, p.
+5542, col. 3.
+
+
+
+
+Chapter VII
+
+WHO IS THE DEFEATIST?
+
+One reason that was given for the banning of “Communism on the Map”
+from military installations was that it was defeatist. If a diagnosis
+of the dangerous situation we are in is defeatism a doctor should not
+diagnose a serious disease. It is not a defeatist film, although it
+does show that we are in real danger. Senator Fulbright himself said:
+“We are confronted by the most formidable and resourceful adversary
+ever to have challenged us...”[168] President Kennedy on October 12,
+1961, stated that mankind is in the most dangerous situation the human
+race has ever been in.
+
+An examination of some of Senator Fulbright’s positions shows that
+he is a defeatist in that he indicates that we should not try to win
+victory over communism. The Senator does not think in terms of victory
+over the communist enemy; although he seemed to think in terms of
+victory, and that immediately, over the military in his effort to knock
+them out of the cold war!
+
+The Senator does not seem to understand the principle set forth by
+Anthony Harrigan, director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute,
+that: “As important to a navy as new ships and late-model weapons is a
+victory psychology. In the last analysis, it is the will to win that
+turns the tide of battle. The great conflicts of former centuries
+are replete with illustrations of the truth that the nation that is
+emotionally dedicated to victory is the nation that triumphs, even
+though its weapons may not be a match for the enemy’s weapons. To
+cite only one example, the outnumbered airmen of the Royal Air Force
+defeated the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain because they had the
+will to win.”[169]
+
+
+_Victory not Sought_
+
+Senator Fulbright said that both “World Wars ended in total victory,
+but the world is far less safe for democracy today than it was in 1914,
+when the current era of upheavals began. One of the principle lessons
+of two World Wars is that wars, and total victories, generate more
+problems than they solve.”[170] What if we had lost these wars? The
+trouble was not that we won the wars but that we failed to keep the
+peace after the wars were won.
+
+Senator Fulbright, to be consistent, should take the position that
+we should not fight communism even if war is forced on us, since he
+says that war and victory create more problems than they solve. The
+Senator says that he is not for total victory, and by that he means
+such a victory as we won in World War I and World War II, and that
+even if we won we would have the additional problem of what to do with
+victory![171]
+
+What is it but defeatism for one to say that we should not seek victory
+over communism, and that if we did win it would create more problems
+than it would solve?
+
+
+_Defeatism concerning Cuba_
+
+In the campaign for the Presidency, John F. Kennedy said that he
+would do something about Cuba. The Monroe Doctrine calls on us to do
+something about Cuba. The influence of Senator Fulbright, according
+to Charles J. V. Murphy, helped bring about a change in plans which
+contributed to the “fatal dismemberment of the whole plan.”[172] The
+Senator thought that the invasion was a bad thing to do even if we
+succeeded. World opinion would label us as an aggressor, and we would
+have to support Cuba after we had thrown out Castro, and this would be
+a drain on our Treasury![173] It is strange that the Senator did not
+think of such arguments when U.N. troops, with United States support,
+waged war on Katanga. Furthermore, the Senator approved the State
+Department’s action in the show of force of American troops, ships and
+planes off the coast of the Dominican Republic in the fall of 1961.[174]
+
+Fulbright is such a defeatist that he thinks that we cannot do much
+about Cuba, and that communist-controlled Cuba seems to be here to
+stay[175].
+
+The rejection of the idea of victory over communism may be the reason
+that Edgar Ansel Mowrer, on returning to the United States after being
+in Europe, wrote: “In short, I find the Washington official attitude
+one of basic defeatism hidden behind a hot air screen of talk about the
+historical trend being on our side.”[176]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[168] Stanford Speech, p. 11.
+
+[169] “The Will to Win”, _Congressional Record_, August 29, 1961, p.
+A6794.
+
+[170] _Congressional Record_, July 24, 1961, pp. 12280-12281, col. 3,b.
+The Senator thought that possible action on our part might provoke the
+Soviets to an unrestricted nuclear arms race. At the very moment he
+was saying this, the Communists were finishing their preparations for
+renewed atmospheric testing, although we had not prepared for such and
+had not “provoked” them into doing this! When will some people learn
+that the driving power of communist activity is not reaction to our
+moves, but a positive program of world conquest based on their world
+view.
+
+[171] Same as 3.
+
+[172] _Congressional Record_, September 7, 1961, p. A7040. Senator
+Fulbright thought that it violated the OAS Charter. This statement in
+the quotation concerning Kennedy’s change of plans, does not imply that
+Senator Fulbright had anything to do with planning or executing the
+project.
+
+[173] _Arkansas Gazette_, July 30, 1961, p. 5E. This quotation from the
+_Gazette_ is based on the Senator’s speech of July 24. _Congressional
+Record_, July 24, 1961, p. 12281.
+
+[174] _Arkansas Democrat_, December 4, 1961.
+
+[175] _Congressional Record_, June 29, 1961, p. 10874. The Senator
+once said that he did not know whether Castro was a Communist or not,
+but the main thing was that we must be patient and understanding and
+drive him toward the Communists. We must not confuse communism with
+nationalism, he said. He reprinted an article by Walter Lippmann which
+attacked the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee for indicating
+that Castro and his revolutionists were pro-communist. _Congressional
+Record_, August 11, 1959, p. 14100, _New York Times_, August 12, 1959.
+
+[176] Edgar Ansel Mowrer, “Washington Attitude is one of Defeatism,”
+_Congressional Record_, July 23, 1962, p. A5660.
+
+
+
+
+Chapter VIII
+
+SENATOR FULBRIGHT AND WORLD OPINION
+
+
+From some of the Senator’s remarks one can draw the conclusion that we
+are in a “popularity contest” in _the_ court of world opinion. This
+implies that if we are more popular with world opinion than are the
+Communists we shall win.
+
+For the United States to liberate Cuba from the control of the
+communists would, the Senator thinks, result in “the alienation of most
+of Latin America, Asia and Africa.”[177]
+
+Robert Murphy has written: “I was in Brazil at the time of the unhappy
+Cuban operation. Apart from the apathy of the mass I was a bit startled
+to be told that the reason the United States failed to intervene openly
+in Cuba was because our government feared it would provoke war between
+the U.S.S.R. and the United States. I found little or no recognition
+of the consistent effort our government has loyally made through the
+years to adhere to a policy of non-intervention. We have done this on
+moral grounds and by observing the rule of law in an effort to work in
+harmony with and as a good neighbor of the members of the Organization
+of American States. When I urged these reasons I was met by polite
+incredulity. I found that our government was actually blamed in the
+last analysis for permitting the Cuban attempt to fail but given little
+or no credit for restraint and non-intervention. President Kennedy’s
+statement warning that our patience is not inexhaustible and that
+the government of the United States will not hesitate to meet its
+primary obligations was like a timely ray of brilliant sunshine in the
+gloomy atmosphere. I gained the distinct impression that those Latin
+Americans with whom I talked, who are not unfriendly to the United
+States, would have welcomed successful intervention in Cuba because
+they fear the expansion of Castroism in South America and doubt it will
+be stopped without intervention. The test in their minds seemed to
+be that it succeed. There was evidence of understanding on their part
+that both under a reasonable interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as
+well as because of the severe provocation by Castro that some form of
+intervention would be justifiable.”[178]
+
+James A. Farley has spoken thus concerning Cuba, invasion and world
+opinion. “In the last year, I have spoken personally and privately
+to most of the heads of government in the Far East and in South
+America. It is my opinion that as spokesmen for the free world they
+are far more in favor of a firm and final position than a policy of
+appeasement masquerading as the easing of a series of crises, crises
+which the Communists themselves manufacture. These foreign statesmen
+are much more aware than some of our own statesmen, of the fact that by
+practicing unceasing brinksmanship, Khrushchev is pushing us back into
+the abyss of dishonor and disaster.
+
+“It follows that the President has gained free world approval in
+drawing the line. He has placed the responsibility where it belongs—on
+the Communist aggressor.
+
+“Since President Kennedy has said that we do not intend to abandon Cuba
+to Communism, and since the Communists are accelerating their rate of
+acquisition there, it may be that the force of the United States may be
+necessary to expel them. That decision can be made under American law
+and oath of God by one man alone.
+
+“But it is my conviction that should President Kennedy elect to order
+the Armed Forces of the United States into action against Communist
+Castro his action would be hailed by the free governments and the free
+peoples of the world. In these times of agonizing decision, their
+prayers are already with him. Furthermore, even more important than the
+preservation of the Western Hemisphere, the avoidance of global War may
+well depend upon giving unmistakable evidence to the Kremlin that to
+the extent that it believes itself on the way to world conquest it is
+in fact on the road to global war.
+
+“It is a fact that we may have to accept such war in defense of our
+liberty. We must not conceal this from ourselves and, still less,
+should we conceal it from our enemy. The peace of the world may
+well depend on the reeducation of Mr. Khrushchev, because if war he
+seeks he has found the way in which to make it inevitable. The fact
+is, freedom will not be edged off this earth by Mr. Khrushchev’s
+brinksmanship.”[179]
+
+
+_What is World Opinion?_
+
+On the news broadcast on Sept. 22, 1961, David Brinkley implied that
+the foreign policy advisors who were so concerned about world opinion
+were not very wise. He spoke of the “vague and formless thing called
+world opinion—whatever that is.”
+
+_There is no such thing today as “world opinion.”_ There are many
+different views, aims and ambitions. Whose “world opinion” shall we
+court? Africa? Which tribe in Africa? Which Nation? Nkrumah? Or the
+freedom lovers he has jailed? The neutrals, are they the ones we should
+court? The Soviet manner of “courting” seems to be more successful with
+many of them than ours!
+
+Arthur Krock of the _New York Times_ has pointed out that the concept
+of “world opinion” ignores the fact that hundreds of millions have no
+knowledge whatever of exterior events.[180] And yet, as he pointed
+out, in some matters affecting our national security we have paid more
+attention to “world opinion” than to the warnings of experts. He has
+special reference to the three year test ban, without inspection, which
+we gave to the U.S.S.R.
+
+Yet Senator Fulbright says: “World opinion is a civilizing force in the
+world, helping to restrain the great powers from the worst possible
+consequences of their mutual hostility.”[181] This hostility is mutual
+only in the sense that after our countless words and deeds of good
+will, the Communists still hate us. They are inherently hostile to
+all that stands in their way of world conquest. They have said that
+they are our irreconcilable enemy, and then they have proceeded to
+treat us in this light. The hostility is mutual only in the sense that
+we have been waking up to the fact that this is an enemy bent on our
+destruction.
+
+How has the U.S.S.R. been responding to world opinion? How has world
+opinion helped civilize the Communists in Russia or in China, or in the
+United States?
+
+What is world opinion doing to civilize Castro? Did world opinion keep
+the U.S.S.R. from renewing the bomb tests?
+
+As Senator Prouty said: “Twenty-four so-called neutral nations were
+sitting in the jury box at Belgrade when the Soviet Union announced its
+intention—since carried out—to resume nuclear explosions.
+
+“And what was the verdict of this jury we have been so assiduously
+courting? ‘Not quite guilty’.
+
+“Nehru said: I am not in a position and I suppose no one else here is
+in a position to know all the facts underlying the decision—military,
+political or nonpolitical, whatever they may be.
+
+‘But I know this decision makes the situation much more dangerous. This
+is obvious to me. Therefore, I regret it deeply.’
+
+“President Tito of Yugoslavia said he understood why Moscow had decided
+to resume nuclear testing; Nasser was simply shocked. The rest were
+eloquently silent.
+
+“The shrieking shame on you, Russia, hoped for by the White House,
+turned out to be a whispered version of ‘Miss Otis regrets she is
+unable to lunch today.’
+
+“About the only character missing from the very tragic comedy in
+Belgrade was the fictional creation of Lewis Carroll who said: ‘I am
+very brave generally only today I happen to have a headache.’
+
+“Joseph Alsop nailed to the wall for all time the naive code of leading
+U.S. policy-makers—the code that lets a synthetic world opinion—not
+enlightened self-interest—shape the policies of this Nation. Alsop said:
+
+‘If you listen to persons of this school of thought you might suppose
+that foreign policy could be conducted on the principle of Sir
+Galahad—“my strength is as the strength of 10, because my heart is
+pure.”
+
+‘The truth is, alas, that naked power counts far more in this sad world
+than virtuous intentions.’
+
+“Mr. Khrushchev did not give a hoot about world opinion. He was
+brutally frank about his reason for resuming nuclear weapons tests
+at this time. According to the New York Times, Khrushchev told some
+leftwing British visitors, he is doing it to terrorize the Western
+Powers into negotiations on Berlin, Germany, and disarmament—on his own
+terms.”[182]
+
+Eric Sevareid, who as far as I know has never been accused by Senator
+Fulbright of being a rightwing radical, had this to say of the
+Communists as they read about the concern of some Americans for “world
+opinion”. “Surely they adore reading the worrying, hair-shirt arguments
+that the United States must not do this or that because it will offend
+‘world opinion’, knowing as they do that there is no such thing in the
+moralistic sense—the proof of which is that after all their crimes,
+including Hungary, they enjoy more influence and respect in the world
+than ever. They must love the British-American notion that the bosses
+of the new ‘neutral’ nations are somehow more high-minded and spiritual
+than those of the committed nations.”[183]
+
+“The gamesmen in the Kremlin must smile in their sleep as they realize
+how deeply ingrained is the American illusion that a ton of wheat can
+offset a ton of Communist artillery shells, that a squad of Peace
+Corpsmen is a match for a squad of guerrilla fighters.
+
+“But I hope they frowned a bit when they read the angry retort of
+Defense Secretary McNamara when he heard for the umpteenth time the
+pious theory that the Communists were gaining in Laos and South Vietnam
+because the regimes there are ‘unresponsive to the people’s needs.’ A
+burning sense of reality on a short fuse can make a quiet man shout (as
+I’m afraid it makes me shout these days), and McNamara shouted that
+the Communists are gaining in those countries for very simple reasons
+known as guns, bombs, fighters and threats.
+
+“Frightened people in a score of desperate countries want to be on
+the winning but not necessarily the moral side; and we have to start
+winning soon. We are going to lose in several more places before we do.
+We may as well face the fact that we will also lose in places we cannot
+afford to lose, until and unless we are willing to fight, no matter the
+reproving editorials in the Manchester Guardian, no matter what the
+temporary backlash of world opinion may be.
+
+“The relations between nations are not the same as those between
+individuals. We can afford to lose everything—except respect for our
+strength and determination. Lose that, and Khrushchev won’t bother to
+sit down and talk again even to say no.”[184]
+
+The Senator who is so impressed with “world” opinion does not think
+that the President should be too impressed with opinion in the United
+States. Instead of being influenced by public opinion, Senator
+Fulbright thinks that the main problem of the President may be to
+restrain the American people from too vigorous a response to Communist
+aggression and gains and the resulting losses for the non-communist
+world.
+
+Winning the victory over those who would enslave the world is far more
+important than what Nehru, or Latin America thinks.[185] Goa shows that
+Nehru thumbs his nose at “world opinion.” Nehru, of course, is one of
+the “neutrals” whose “world opinion” some in America have courted.
+
+Edgar Ansel Mowrer said that aside from a major war, “the next
+strongest weapon in the cold war is prestige.” He said that this was
+largely “a matter of military power—and the readiness to use it.” The
+crushing of the Hungarian revolt hurt the popularity of the U.S.S.R.
+but increased its prestige.[186]
+
+James A. Farley on July 8, 1960 said: “Any American administration
+which refuses to protect American citizens and American property in any
+quarter of the globe, on the ground that its action will be called
+Yankee imperialism, has in effect struck the flag. Let us not perform
+the disgraceful act of offering the American people a spurious dove of
+peace, when every page of recent history identifies it as the white
+flag of cowardly surrender.”[187] Just before this he stated: “I have
+traveled as much abroad as almost any man in this party. I, too, value
+the opinion of the world. But I am sure that sound policy cannot be
+based on loss of self-respect.”
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[177] _Congressional Record_, June 29, 1961, pp. 10874-10875.
+
+[178] Address of Robert Murphy, Commencement Exercises, Boston College,
+June 12, 1961, pp. 8-9. Also reprinted in the _Congressional Record_,
+June 13, 1961, p. A4314, col. 2,t.
+
+[179] _Congressional Record_, June 12, 1961, p. A4237, col. 2,b.-3,t.
+General Carlos P. Romulo said: “But what is significant to the
+peoples outside this country is that in these 16 years you have not
+succeeded to make Soviet Russia recede or retreat one inch from any
+of her ill-gotten gains.” (_Congressional Record_, Feb. 15, 1962, p.
+A1134, col. 3,t.) The Republic of China Chapter of the Asian Peoples’
+Anti-Communist League has spoken of the weakening of confidence in the
+United States on the part of Southeast Asian countries as a result of
+our actions in Laos (_Free China and Asia_, March, 1962, p 2. See also
+the _Congressional Record_, March 7, 1962, p. A1714).
+
+Burmese Army leaders think that the Chinese Communists will take
+Southeast Asia in a few years; therefore, they lean toward them
+(_Newsweek_, May 21, 1962, p. 17.)
+
+George E. Sokolsky has pointed out that not only Cuba, but aiding our
+enemies and alienating our allies in certain instances has damaged our
+prestige (“The National Image,” _Searcy Daily Citizen_, May 3, 1962, p.
+4.)
+
+[180] _Arkansas Gazette_, September 5, 1961.
+
+[181] _Congressional Record_, July 24, 1961, p. 12281, col. 2,b.
+
+[182] _Congressional Record_, September 19, 1961, p. 19015, col.
+2,t.-3,m.
+
+[183] _Congressional Record_, June 29, 1961, p. 10891, col. 1,b.
+
+[184] _Ibid._, p. 10891, col. 2,m.
+
+[185] Compare Marguerite Higgins, “Power and Popularity,”
+_Congressional Record_, September 5, 1961, p. A6963.
+
+[186] _Congressional Record_, June 25, 1960, p. A5506, col. 3,t.
+
+[187] _Ibid._, August 22, 1960, p. A6153, col. 3,m.
+
+
+
+
+Chapter IX
+
+_IS COMMUNISM A MATTER OF POLITICS?_
+
+
+The 1958 directive of the National Security Council ordered the
+military into the cold war. In their participation in the cold war
+they had to deal with the history, the philosophy, the strategy and
+the tactics of communism. Since communism had endeavored to extend
+its influence throughout the world in a thousand and one ways, their
+tactics also involve the use of individuals, who are not Communists, to
+extend their influence whenever possible. An analysis of their tactics
+certainly involves analyzing how they have worked through the united
+fronts, the communist fronts, through infiltration and in other ways.
+Since communism does not work in a vacuum void of people, some people
+who were not Communists were unwittingly involved in certain aspects of
+the manifold operations of the Communists.
+
+Would it be political to take an actual case history and to show
+how the Communists have operated? Of course, such an analysis would
+take on a different hue if the analyzer impugned the _motives_ of
+the individuals who were involved. But the point here is that it is
+impossible to show fully how the Communists work without giving some
+concrete cases. When it is shown that even patriotic Americans have
+been duped—and surely the Senator would not say that none of them have
+been duped—it emphasizes the care which all need to exercise lest we in
+turn be duped.
+
+We are not contending that the military become a spokesman for varying
+points of view in American politics. The 1958 directive did not
+authorize “political propaganda”. As Senator Thurmond said: “I think
+our people in uniform generally should not speak promiscuously on all
+subjects, but they are entitled to tell their own military personnel
+and entitled to tell the civilian population the aims, the methods
+of operations, and the dangers of the enemy. The enemy today is
+communism.”[188]
+
+And yet some have raised a false issue, whether they are conscious
+of it or not, and have said that Senator Thurmond is in favor of the
+military educating America on politics. The _Arkansas Gazette_ said in
+an editorial on August 4, 1961, that: “Mr. Thurmond, we are compelled
+to observe, has not examined the implications of his doctrine that the
+military should assume responsibility for the political education of
+the American people—nor have Senator Goldwater and Karl Mundt.”
+
+“Senator Fulbright just about said it all when he remarked to Senator
+Thurmond recently in a Senate debate:
+
+‘The Senator from South Carolina, who opposed federal aid to education
+because he feared federal control of education, apparently wants the
+military to educate the people.’
+
+“There you have it. The right wing evangelists—the Thurmonds, the
+Goldwaters, the Mundts, and the Alfords, who daily preach the dangers
+of central control—are prepared to concede the point which has in so
+many places resulted in dictatorial government: That the military is
+and ought to be a means of political control and influence.”[189]
+
+Is not the _Arkansas Gazette_ implying that communism is just a matter
+of politics, and that Senator Thurmond is wanting the military to
+educate the public in politics just because Senator Thurmond wants the
+military to help educate the public with regard to the dangers, aims
+and tactics of the enemy, communism?
+
+Senator Fulbright has stated that his memorandum was directed against
+the involvement of the military in partisan political propaganda. “For
+all these reasons I strongly oppose political propaganda activities by
+military personnel directed at the public. If we are to maintain our
+political freedom and the Constitutional system which distinguishes
+us from totalitarian dictatorships, we must retain civil control over
+the military. This principle lies at the very core of our heritage of
+freedom and Constitutional government.”[190]
+
+If engaging in the cold war, in obedience to the directive of the
+National Security Council, is engaging in political propaganda, the
+military not only has no right to educate the public, but it also has
+no right to educate the troops in any subject pertaining to the cold
+war.
+
+No one who knows the nature of the Communist menace can say that
+instruction in this area is dabbling in partisan politics. Furthermore,
+Senator Fulbright himself in his vote for the Peace Corps Act voted for
+an amendment made by the Senate. “The Senate amendment, section 8(c),
+included a provision that ‘training hereinabove provided for shall
+include instruction in the philosophy, strategy, tactics, and menace of
+communism.’
+
+“The House bill did not contain a similar provision.
+
+“The managers on the part of the House accepted the Senate language.
+The Peace Corps officials have given assurance that such training
+is already required in every Peace Corps training curriculum. There
+appears to be every reason to give statutory recognition to this
+requirement.”[191] The Peace Corps, the Senator says, is “part of the
+cold war.”[192]
+
+If the military in teaching the public concerning these matters is
+engaging in partisan politics, then the Peace Corps is giving partisan
+political indoctrination to members of the Corps. Unless Senator
+Fulbright is willing to say that the Peace Corps should become a
+center of partisan politics, he must say that such instruction is not
+political. If this is partisan politics, towards what party would the
+head of the Peace Corps, the President’s brother-in-law, be expected
+to slant this “partisan political” indoctrination? But if it is not
+political when done by the Peace Corps, why is it political when done
+by the military?
+
+We wonder why the Senator is involved in this basic contradiction? He
+voted for training the Peace Corps in the above matters, will he vote
+for the military to do the same? No, he will not, for his memorandum,
+in effect denies them this right. If he says that it is right for the
+troops to be taught the above, but not for the military to teach the
+public—because they should not engage in political propaganda—then why
+teach political propaganda to the troops? Yet his memorandum, which he
+says was against political propaganda by the military, was against
+the 1958 directive of the National Security Council. But the National
+Security Council basically did not authorize instruction in any fields
+other than those covered in the above instructions to the Peace Corps.
+
+Although the Senator may not be aware of it, it is a part of the
+Communist Party line to view anti-communism education conducted by the
+military as partisan politics. It so happens that the Communists are
+wrong about this. Communism, in both its internal and external aspects,
+is not a matter of party politics.
+
+We remind the reader that the Senator does not object to radical
+statements only, but the entire concept of the military’s participation
+in the cold war. He objected to the directive of the National Security
+Council which put the military into the cold war.
+
+The policy of the President is against the recognition of Red China.
+Does the Senator think that it would be dabbling in politics for a
+military spokesman to oppose the recognition of Red China and to give
+reasons for his opposition?[193]
+
+The author is against the military educating the public or the troops
+in partisan politics. When a military official oversteps the proper
+bounds, his mistake can be dealt with without abolishing, in effect,
+the 1958 directive of the National Security Council. In curing a cold
+the doctor does not decide that one must kill the patient. That would,
+of course, get rid of the cold, but we can’t say that it helps the
+patient. One can throw out dirty bathwater without throwing out the
+baby with it.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[188] _Congressional Record_, August 17, 1961, p. 15030, col. 2,m. Also
+in “Excerpts from Speeches by Senator Strom Thurmond on Efforts to Gag
+Military Anti-Communist Speeches and Seminars,” p. 35, col. 1,t.
+
+[189] _Arkansas Gazette_, August 4, 1961, p. 4A.
+
+[190] “Statement of Senator J. W. Fulbright Relating to a memorandum
+submitted by him to the Department of Defense,” p. 6.
+
+[191] House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Report No.
+1239, _Peace Corps Act_, September 19, 1961, p. 21.
+
+[192] _Arkansas Democrat_, November 28, 1961.
+
+[193] Both the Senate and the House have more than once gone on record
+as being opposed to the recognition of Red China. For example see 87th
+Congress, 1st Session, S. Con. Res. 34, July 28, 1961.
+
+
+
+
+Chapter X
+
+THE MEMORANDUM AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY LINE
+
+
+The Communists thought so highly of Senator Fulbright’s memorandum
+that they reprinted several columns of it in _The Worker_ for August
+27, 1961. It is not often that a Senator of the United States receives
+this type of “recognition”. Dr. Benson, Dr. Barnett and Herbert A.
+Philbrick, for example, have never received such an “honor”, and it is
+unlikely that they shall receive such an “honor” in the future.
+
+The Religious Freedom Committee, Inc., which is well known for its
+defense of pro-communist causes and persons, calls on people to rally
+behind the Senator from Arkansas. As it views the struggle: “On the
+one side are the liberal elements in church and state; on the other,
+an alliance of fundamentalist religious groups, the military, and
+reactionary elements in the Congress and in the financial and business
+community.”[194] If the Religious Freedom Committee, Inc. thought that
+the Senator’s memorandum was damaging to internal communism, it is my
+judgment, based on their record, that they would not defend it.
+
+We are not suggesting that the Senator wants this type of support, but
+he is espousing a cause which Communists and pro-Communists consider
+worthy of support. He ought to make a serious investigation of this
+question: Why do pro-Communists and Communists support the memorandum?
+
+There are those who are not pro-Communists who support the memorandum,
+this we realize; but the Senator ought to find out why pro-Communists
+support it.
+
+Gus Hall, the General Secretary of the Communist Party in the United
+States, makes it clear that one of the main objectives of the Communist
+Party is to defeat what he calls the “ultra-Right”. Certainly anything
+on the center, or to the right of center, would be “ultra-Right” to
+Gus Hall. He includes Dr. Benson and many others. He indicates that
+Communists have hopes of defeating the “ultra-Right”. “If the tactical
+problem is solved correctly, it will be possible to slam shut the door
+on the ultra-Right, defeat it, and force a shift in policy upon the
+Administration itself in the direction of peace and democracy.”[195]
+
+
+_The Communist Line_
+
+Of course, we realize with J. Edgar Hoover that there may be times
+when the Communist Party line coincides with some objective sought by
+a non-Communist or anti-Communist group. “Because communism thrives
+on turmoil, the party is continuously attempting to exploit all
+grievances—real or imagined—for its own tactical purposes. It is,
+therefore, almost inevitable that, on many issues, the party line
+will coincide with the position of many non-Communists. The danger of
+indiscriminately alleging that someone is a Communist merely because
+his views on a particular issue happen to parallel the official party
+position is obvious. The confusion which is thereby created helps the
+Communists by diffusing the forces of their opponents.”[196]
+
+A person, however, who finds some of his views parallel those of the
+Party needs, of course, to examine his views to see whether or not they
+are non-Communist views which the party has taken merely to gain favor
+with the masses, or for some other reason, or whether or not they are
+views which can only help communism instead of freedom. One should also
+ask: How does the Communist try to use this for his own ends? Then one
+can try to work for the legitimate goals in such a way that no comfort
+is given to the Communists.
+
+When one points out that a position parallels the party line, and when
+one shows in what way or ways the position advances communism, one
+does not need to go into the motives of the non-Communist who advances
+this position. It is unnecessary, in order to deal with any concrete
+issue, to know why the person takes a particular position. Regardless
+of motives, one can be convinced that certain things do advance
+communism. This can be pointed out without entering into the question
+of motives. We, therefore, are not attacking Senator Fulbright’s
+motives, but his judgment.
+
+The Senator, we regret to say, has accused some people of misquoting
+the memorandum in order to get headlines. “I regret the continued
+misquote of this memorandum by extremist groups and conservatives
+seeking headlines.”[197] We cannot sanction any misquotations, but
+neither do we endorse this judging of motives.
+
+There are many things, however, in the Communist line which can hardly
+be said to fall into the category of legitimate objectives. The careful
+reader will ask: Does this or that item fall into this category?
+Even, however, when it does not, we need not deal with the motives
+of non-Communists who follow this or that aspect of the line. We can
+oppose their judgment in the matter. We emphasize that if they blunder
+us into slavery it will be slavery just as certain as if they had taken
+us into slavery with their eyes open.
+
+There are several points in the memorandum which are included in the
+current Communist line.
+
+
+_Communism as Politics_
+
+The Fulbright memorandum implies that the military is engaging in
+politics if it follows the 1958 directive of the National Security
+Council, and participates in the cold war by instructing the people
+concerning the history, philosophy, strategy and tactics of communism,
+including the internal menace. It assumes that this is partisan
+politics. If this is not the assumption of the memorandum, why does
+the Senator say that the purpose of the memorandum is to uphold the
+principle of the military’s subordination to civilian control, and
+that there “has been a strong tradition in this country that it is
+not the function of the military to educate the public on political
+issues.”[198] His memorandum is a challenge of the National Security
+Council directive of 1958 which put the military into the cold war to
+alert the people on the menace and nature of the enemy—communism.
+
+If, on the other hand, the memorandum is not against the military
+alerting the civilian population concerning communism—in both its
+external and internal threat—then why doesn’t the memorandum protest
+against just the abuses of the directive instead of seeking the
+elimination of the directive?
+
+Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, agrees with
+the position that for military officials to expose the workings
+of communism in America and elsewhere is to engage in political
+discussion. For Gus Hall maintains that the Communist Party is simply a
+political party. “A very important lesson is to learned from this. No
+matter what one’s attitude may be towards the Communist Party, it must
+be recognized that the fight for its rights as a political party is a
+matter of defending the Bill of Rights and all democratic rights, and
+is the concern of all, especially of all left, democratic, and peace
+forces, and not of the Communists alone. This is an old lesson, but
+sometimes it has to be learned anew.”[199]
+
+
+_Restraining the “Radicals”_
+
+Senator Fulbright thinks that in “the long run, it is quite possible
+that the principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not
+already, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists
+with everything we’ve got, particularly if there are more Cubas and
+Laos.”[200] This is because the people are infected with the “virus of
+rightwing radicalism”, and also since “radicalism of the right can be
+expected to have great mass appeal during such periods” of crisis.[201]
+When one takes this to its logical conclusion it means that the Senator
+must think that the main problem is to fight the so-called “rightwing
+radicals”.
+
+That the “ultra-right” is at least one of the main problems is also
+the judgment of Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party.
+“However, the situation requires that the main direction of the
+attack should be at the war-mongering and fascist forces, who are
+pressuring the Kennedy Administration further to the Right. At the
+same time, every policy or action of Kennedy that plays into the hands
+of the Right should be sharply opposed and criticized, building up
+the pressures upon the Administration for a change of policy in the
+direction of peaceful coexistence and defense of democracy.”[202]
+
+
+_The Masses Susceptible to “Rightwingism”_
+
+Senator Fulbright thinks that in the “long twilight struggle” ahead
+that the people may become frustrated and that under such circumstances
+“radical rightism” will appeal to them even more strongly than at the
+present.[203]
+
+Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, has more or less
+the same fear. “We need to be aware that when people in large numbers
+become disillusioned or panicky there is always the danger that they
+may be entrapped by the demagogy of the ultra-Right, especially when
+their leaders become the instruments or allies of monopoly. For
+example, the recent statement of the AFL-CIO executive council, drawn
+up by professional anti-Communists, supports the most aggressive
+warlike incitement in the so-called Berlin crisis, and even urges the
+resumption of nuclear testing.”[204]
+
+
+_Protracted Conflict_
+
+The memorandum takes the position that the concept of protracted
+conflict will lead to war, that it is an element of radical
+rightwingism, and that we must seek some sort of accommodation with
+communism instead of engaging in protracted conflict to defeat it.[205]
+
+The Communists have made it one of their objectives to utilize their
+influence, in any way that they can, toward getting the Kennedy
+administration to seek an accommodation with communism, i.e., to
+refuse to try to roll back the tide of Communist advance. Thus Gus
+Hall write: “It is of course true that these maneuvers, pretenses, and
+concessions are forced upon him by the strength of the world peace
+forces, by the deterioration of imperialism, by the declining world
+prestige and position of U. S. imperialism in particular, and by the
+deep-rooted peace and democratic sentiment of the American people.
+
+“But the fact remains that the Kennedy administration has not closed
+the door to accommodation to these world realities, as the ultra-Right
+wishes it to do, and this involves a certain recognition of the new
+necessities of the present-day world at home and abroad. This is an
+important difference, which the forces for peace and democracy must
+recognize and exploit in order to bring about the required change in
+national policy.”[206]
+
+That the Communists want the administration to take the position that
+communism is a world trend which cannot be resisted is made clear from
+another statement. “Continuing rebuffs and defeats for the cold war
+and interventionist policy (most recently in Cuba and Laos) confront
+the dominant monopoly power with a choice, essentially between two
+alternatives. One is to end the cold war and to seek some form of
+accommodation to the socialist and national revolutionary world, which
+would mean a turn to a policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful
+competition. Such a shift of policy would meet the most urgent national
+needs of the country in the present period of world history.
+
+“The other course is to seek to contain and reverse world trends by all
+means, including so-called limited war and the ultimate nuclear war.
+It is necessary to recognize that the present cold-war policies of the
+Administration lead in this direction. However, we must also recognize
+that the most aggressive and extreme expression of this suicidal policy
+comes from the ultra-Right.”[207]
+
+Thus they are out to influence those whom they consider to be the
+liberal forces in the Kennedy administration. “It would be wishful
+thinking to assume that all liberal or forward-looking forces in the
+Kennedy camp, who must in their way participate in turning the tide,
+are equally aware of the double role played by Kennedy. These elements
+can become an effective positive force once they realize it is
+necessary to fight Kennedy’s cold war and anti-democratic policies in
+order to defend democracy and to close the door to the extreme Right
+and defeat the threat from that direction.”[208]
+
+
+_Cuba_
+
+The Senator, as we have seen, was extremely disturbed by the Cuban
+invasion, and he opposes any direct efforts on our part to overthrow
+Castro. Gus Hall is also disturbed about the matter, although at
+least some of his reasons are different. Hall did think that it was
+immoral for he said that the decision to invade Cuba was “criminal
+and reprehensible”. “It is also of significance that Kennedy decided
+not to back up the emigre invasion of Cuba with direct and open U. S.
+military support, as criminal and reprehensible as was his decision
+to go through with the military adventure, and as serious as still is
+the danger of U. S. imperialist intervention. It is also noteworthy
+that Kennedy must still seek to maintain democratic and anti-colonial
+pretenses in his dealings with the national liberation movements,
+although his objective remains to contain and reverse them. This
+creates certain embarrassments for him in world affairs, in view of
+anti-democratic measures at home.”[209]
+
+
+_Self-Destruction of Democracy_
+
+In the discussion and rejection of the concept of protracted conflict,
+the memorandum indicates that to engage in protracted conflict, to
+meet with strength the Communists at every turn, will undermine
+democracy. Thus it said: “Perhaps the most fundamental criticism
+that can be made of the book is that it fails to analyze the impact
+of a policy of protracted conflict on our democratic institutions.
+Barnett’s program of action, for example, would require large sums of
+public funds used with little public accountability, a wide network of
+secrecy and security in government operations, a cold war orientation
+in our schools and universities—in short, a stunting of pluralism, a
+curtailment of individual liberties, and a weakening of politically
+responsible government. The editors of ‘American Strategy’ seem to
+see no alternative to confronting the Soviets with strong opposition
+at every turn. Indeed, they appear more concerned with virility than
+freedom, as if strength and courage were goals in themselves. This,
+together with the somewhat static nature of their view of history and
+the militant nature of their recommendations, justifies further inquiry
+about the men and the organizations who advocate a strategy based on
+those premises.”[210]
+
+Gus Hall is also convinced that the ultra-Right is trying to build
+“a garrison state that will seek to drive the country to war and
+self-destruction.”[211]
+
+
+“_French General_”
+
+Senator Fulbright says: “Perhaps it is far-fetched to call forth the
+revolt of the French generals as an example of the ultimate danger.
+Nevertheless, military officers, French or American, have some common
+characteristics arising from their profession and there are numerous
+military ‘fingers on the trigger’ throughout the world. While this
+danger may appear very remote, contrary to American tradition, and even
+American military tradition, so also is the ‘long twilight struggle’,
+and so also is the very existence of an American military program for
+educating the public.”[212]
+
+Gus Hall, in his discussion of the directive of the National Security
+Council is more emphatic than Senator Fulbright. “The entire line
+of policy, coupled with CIA and similar training in subversive and
+putschist activities, cannot help but create our own ‘French Generals,’
+who feel at home in fascist circles, and are ready to lend themselves
+to their objectives.”[213]
+
+
+_National Security Council Directive 1958_
+
+Gus Hall attacks the 1958 directive of the National Security
+Council.[214]
+
+The Senator’s memorandum was aimed directly at the directive.[215]
+
+
+_General Walker_
+
+Senator Fulbright considers General Walker’s case as but an
+illustration of the deeper problem of the military’s involvement in the
+“rightwing” activities. Thus he wrote: “With respect to the problem
+illustrated by the case of General Walker....”[216]
+
+This is also the way that Gus Hall feels about it. “The case of General
+Walker was only a symptom of a much deeper affliction.”[217]
+
+
+_Spread of “Rightwingism” in the Military_
+
+Senator Fulbright thinks that the military has a good deal of
+“rightwingism” in it. “Whether these instances are representative of
+programs implementing the National Security Council directive is not
+known, but the pattern they form, makes it strongly suspect that they
+are. There are many indications that the philosophy of the programs
+is representative of a substantial element of military thought, and
+has great appeal to the military mind. A strong case can be made,
+logically, that this type of activity is the inevitable consequence
+of such a directive. There is little in the education, training or
+experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance
+of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with
+which their education, training and experiences are concerned—into
+proper perspective in the President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear
+age.’”[218]
+
+Gus Hall says: “Another pronounced characteristic of this growing
+fascist movement is its spreading influence among the higher military
+personnel.”[219] The Draft Program of the Communist Party in the
+U.S.S.R. in 1961 also said that the military was involved in the
+“fascist” anti-Communist drive.[220]
+
+The Communists have at least two objectives in their attack on the
+military. _First_, the military contains some experts in the field of
+the cold war, and it is organized so that it can effectively reach all
+parts of America. Neutralizing the military in the cold war means that
+the Communists have far fewer foes to fight in the cold war. _Second_,
+the attack on the military can be used to try to undermine the morale
+of the military.
+
+
+_Two Films_
+
+The memorandum classifies “Communism on the Map” and “Operation
+Abolition” as part of the extremely radical rightwing material being
+used in seminars.[221]
+
+“Communism on the Map” is also noted in an unfavorable way by Gus
+Hall.[222]
+
+Gus Hall also notices in an unfavorable context “Operation
+Abolition.”[223] These two films are “obnoxious films.”[224]
+
+Gus Hall evidently is against “Operation Abolition” because it is an
+indictment of the Communists and an exposure of how they work and how
+they manipulate others.
+
+In a speech in Arkadelphia on October 11 Senator Fulbright’s opposition
+to the film is based on the following, according to the _Arkansas
+Gazette_.
+
+“One widely distributed film, Fulbright said, tries to show that
+the student body of the University of California is ‘ready to
+desert the American system’. He referred to ‘Operation Abolition’,
+which purports to show that student protests at a House Un-American
+Activities Committee hearing last year at San Francisco were Communist
+inspired.”[225]
+
+The film tries to show no such desertion by the student body. It
+does show that _some_ students from the University were duped. It is
+doubtful that many of them really knew that the Communists were using
+them. Or does the Senator think that the students knew what they were
+doing?
+
+
+_Fascists_
+
+The Senator views as “fascist” those whom he labels as radical
+rightwingers.[226]
+
+Gus Hall also characterizes the “ultra-right” as fascist.[227] And
+by the “ultra-right” he is including at least some of the groups
+classified by Senator Fulbright as radical rightwingers. For example,
+Dr. Benson, Harding College and the National Education Program.
+
+
+_Frustration and Rightwingism_
+
+Senator Fulbright thinks that frustration in restraint is one of the
+reasons that the American people need to be curbed, and that this need
+will grow if there are any more Cubas and Laoses.[228]
+
+Gus Hall explains the reaction of what he calls the extreme right
+on the grounds that the extreme right wants to turn back the tide
+of history (i.e. they want to win the victory over Communism), but
+that they are frustrated at seeing the advances of communism. “In the
+opinion of the Communist Party, there can be no question but that the
+threat from the extreme Right is serious. It arises from a situation
+which is new for the United States. This, the most powerful capitalist
+country, cannot have its way in a world in which the forces of
+socialism, national liberation, and peace are playing a decisive role.
+Continuing rebuffs and defeats for the cold war and interventionist
+policy (most recently in Cuba and Laos) confront the dominant monopoly
+power with a choice, essentially between two alternatives. One is
+to end the cold war and to seek some form of accommodation to the
+socialist and national revolutionary world, which would mean a turn to
+a policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition. Such a shift
+of policy would meet the most urgent national needs of the country in
+the present period of world history.
+
+“The other course is to seek to contain and reverse world trends by all
+means, including so-called limited war and the ultimate nuclear war.
+It is necessary to recognize that the present cold-war policies of the
+Administration lead in this direction. However, we must also recognize
+that the most aggressive and extreme expression of this suicidal policy
+comes from the ultra-Right.”[229]
+
+We agree with the Senator that Americans will find it very frustrating
+if there are any more Cubas and Laoses. And, _if_ the tide of communism
+continues to advance, they will undoubtedly come to the place where
+they will demand that we hit the Communists with everything we have
+_if_ such is necessary to stop communism.
+
+We do not agree with Gus Hall that the advance of Communism is
+inevitable.
+
+In the author’s judgment Senator Fulbright and Gus Hall are right in
+saying that there are Americans who are frustrated because of continued
+losses to communism. There are people, of course, whose frustrations
+are not due to communism itself. However, there are many Americans who
+are not extremists but who are frustrated in various degrees because we
+have not stopped, not to speak of the fact that we are not winning the
+cold war, the advances of communism.
+
+Roscoe Drummond has well pointed out that there is a mounting sense of
+frustration because we are always on the defensive in the cold war. He
+suggests that the way to overcome this, and to keep extremists from
+having any appeal to the masses, is for the President either to take
+the diplomatic initiative in the cold war or to show the people that
+it is not possible to do so. We have been on the diplomatic defensive
+since World War II ended, he affirmed, and unless the President is
+able to find the will and the way to take the initiative that the
+President “will be leaving the field open to the extremists”.[230]
+
+
+_If We Wage Protracted War it Will Bring Nuclear War_
+
+A study of the quotation, in the above section, from Gus Hall indicates
+that he is saying that we must accommodate ourselves to communism
+and its advances, or we shall have limited wars and then a nuclear
+war. This is curiously like the line in the _Bulletin of the Atomic
+Scientists_ that if we meet Communist aggression with a determined
+effort to win the cold war we shall likely end up in war.[231]
+
+The Communist journal, _World Marxist Review_, has said that those
+who seek for victory over communism are eager for war. Dr. Robert
+Strausz-Hupe is quoted as follows: “Our lot is conflict. History
+brings us ‘not peace but a sword’.... The ultimate strategy for
+freedom, therefore, must be the devolution of Communist totalitarian
+governments.... The United States cannot renounce the first use of
+atomic weapons.” The _World Marxist Review_ says that: “This incendiary
+strategy is elaborated in detail from Herman Kahns _On Thermonuclear
+War_.”[232]
+
+Then the _World Marxist Review_ comments: “These are not only the
+personal views of Mr. Strausz-Hupe or Mr. Kahn. They are the credo of
+the American military, many of whom make no secret of their eagerness
+to unleash the dogs of war. Moreover, as the foregoing shows, neither
+the ideas nor the ‘total’ war preparations of the U. S. government can
+be traced to the so-called ‘Berlin crisis’.”[233]
+
+Of course, the memorandum and the _World Marxist Review_ differ in that
+the _World Marxist Review_ says that the military is eager to start
+war. The memorandum simply takes the position that the position of
+protracted conflict will likely lead to world war.
+
+The effect of each—the memorandum and the _World Marxist Review_—in
+this matter is the same. Both of them try to discourage us from waging
+protracted conflict and winning the victory over communism.
+
+It is a major Communist objective to convince the non-Communist world
+that if they wage cold war that they will end up in a nuclear war. To
+strive for victory in the cold war must involve finally nuclear war.
+This, we are convinced, is not the case. Continual losses in the cold
+war are much more apt to bring us to nuclear war, since Communist
+victories in the cold war emboldens them, weakens us and brings more
+“neutrals” on to their bandwagon. When the Communists think that they
+have the United States sufficiently isolated and undermined it is
+quite likely that the Communists will confront us with the demand to
+surrender or to be involved in nuclear war.
+
+If we endeavor to win the cold war, and it is my conviction that we
+can do so, as our victories in the cold war increase the Communists
+will realize that regardless of what a nuclear war will do to us it
+will destroy Communism. A nuclear war would immediately destroy the
+Communist chain of command. A dictatorship cannot go on with its chain
+of command shattered. Revolts will take place in the satellites. The
+masses of China would revolt if a nuclear war shattered the Red’s chain
+of control in China.
+
+It is the judgment of the author, based not only on the above, but
+also on the fact that the Russian Communists have backed down when the
+United States government has met them firmly, that the Communists do
+not want a nuclear war. In the author’s judgment, short of an all-out
+attack we could not force them into a nuclear war, unless they were
+ready for one and wanted one. They hope to achieve their objectives
+without a nuclear war. But they will resort to such a war if they
+are convinced it is absolutely necessary and that war would enable
+them to win over us. In which case nothing we could do would stop the
+Communists from starting a war unless we surrendered. Furthermore, if
+we surrendered this would not guarantee that no nuclear war would take
+place. Who knows but what after world victory Communists would fall out
+among themselves and one group use the bomb on another group.
+
+In the author’s judgment there is no way to guarantee that there will
+not be a nuclear war. But for us to let our policy be determined by an
+overwhelming fear of nuclear war will lead us to defeat.
+
+When we think of the millions which the Communists kill _after_ they
+take over a country, there is no certainty that more will not be killed
+if we surrendered than if we waged nuclear war, if such were forced on
+us.
+
+Although there are Americans who do not want us to publicly proclaim
+that our goal is to win the victory over the aggressive forces of
+communism, the Communists have made clear that they expect to win.
+Khrushchev said that Marxism-Leninism when assimilated by the people
+leads them to “take power into their hands and build their state.
+
+“This is a mighty force which nothing can resist. And let Mssrs.
+Imperialists, Monopolists and various Colonialists—for it is the same
+thing——know that no prayers, no incantations can reverse the march of
+history to make it move backward. Victory will be ours, comrades!”[234]
+
+The Communists, we see, are not letting the idea that the waging of
+protracted conflict, and the aim of victory, will lead to war restrain
+them from fighting to win.
+
+
+_Anti-Anti-Communism_
+
+It is well for us to realize that Communists have been ordered to
+intensify their efforts to discredit, to discourage and to destroy
+anti-communism. As Edward Hunter pointed out, they know where they are
+hurting, and if anti-communism were not hurting them they would not
+make anti-anti-communism a prime objective.
+
+The Moscow Manifesto issued by 81 Communist Parties in
+November-December, 1960, and which is accepted as providing guidance
+for the Communist Party in America,[235] calls for an intensification
+of the attack on anti-communists.
+
+“Anti-communism, which is indicative of a deep ideological crisis
+in, and extreme decline of bourgeois ideology, resorts to monstrous
+distortions of Marxist doctrine and crude slander against the
+Socialist social system, presents Communist policies and objectives
+in a false light and carries on a witch hunt against the democratic
+peaceful forces and organizations.”
+
+“To effectively defend the interests of the working people, maintain
+peace and realize the Socialist ideals of the working class, it is
+indispensable to wage a resolute struggle against anti-communism—that
+poisoned weapon which the bourgeoisie uses to fence off the masses from
+socialism.”[236]
+
+The 1961 Congress of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. called for
+warfare against anti-communism. “The chief ideological and political
+weapon of imperialism is anti-communism, which consists mainly
+in slandering the Socialist system and distorting the policy and
+objectives of the Communist Parties and Marxist-Leninist theory.
+
+“Under cover of anti-communism, imperialist reaction persecutes and
+hounds all that is progressive and revolutionary; it seeks to split
+the ranks of the working people and to paralyze the proletarians’ will
+to fight. Rallied to this black banner today are all the enemies of
+social progress: the finance oligarchy and the military, the Fascists
+and reactionary clericals, the colonialists and landlords and all
+the ideological and political vehicles of imperialist reaction.
+Anti-communism is a reflection of the extreme decadence of bourgeois
+ideology.”[237] The _World Marxist Review_ for October 1961 carried an
+article on “Anti-Communism—a Crime Against the People.”
+
+We have neither stated nor implied that every criticism against every
+anti-Communist is an implementation of this directive from the Kremlin.
+In the anti-Communist movements in the United States you can find
+extremists, some uninformed people, crackpots and a few totalitarians.
+However, the anti-Communist movements have no monopoly on such persons.
+Thus there may be ample grounds to criticize some individuals, some
+organizations, and some positions which are taken. There are criticisms
+which are justified and which need to be made.
+
+However, criticism of the crackpots, the mistaken and the
+totalitarians is not the only kind of criticism going on today.
+Different groups, even widely different groups, are lumped together by
+some critics. They are all classified as “extremely radical rightwing”
+people and positions. They are all classified as the “ultra-right”.
+
+We are not suggesting that all the extremists who lump together
+different anti-Communist groups as “the ultra-right” and “extremely
+radical rightwingers”, are responding to the Moscow directive. We are
+confident that some are misinformed and misguided; that some see an
+opportunity to make political hay; that some have a vested interest
+in discrediting those who have compiled and publicized _their_ public
+record; that there are others who hate capitalism and oppose those who
+defend it; these or other reasons explain the attack of some. Since,
+however, the Communists have been working for decades to infiltrate
+various phases of American life we can be certain that there are some
+hidden Communists who are vigorously engaged in anti-anti-communism.
+Who are they? I don’t know who the hidden Communists, or hidden
+sympathizers and fellow travelers, are. I doubt that even the FBI could
+possibly know about _all_ of them.
+
+It is fortunate, however, that one does not need to know _why_ people
+do something in order to evaluate the _actions_ of these people. Thus
+although it is certainly not without significance that, so soon after
+the Moscow directive, there should be several storms of criticism
+of and attacks on various anti-Communists, it would be inaccurate
+and unfair to say that they are all implementations of the Moscow
+directive. The fact that the Communists are now trying to destroy the
+vigorous anti-Communist organizations and individuals, does suggest
+to us that we should all endeavor to be fair and precise in our
+criticisms, and that we should exercise great care lest we promote the
+cause of anti-anti-communism.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[194] “Religious Freedom News,” October 1961, p. 2.
+
+[195] Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, U.S.A.,
+_Worker_, July 16, 1961. The entire article is reprinted in the
+Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, _The New Drive Against the
+Anti-Communist Program_. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961.
+This quotation is from page 47. We shall quote from the article as
+reprinted in this Senate publication. Edward Hunter’s testimony is
+contained in the above Senate publication. _The Worker_ boasts that it
+was among the first to attack the “ultra-right,” Jan. 14, 1962, p. 5.
+
+[196] J. Edgar Hoover, _The Communist Party Line_, Washington, D. C.:
+Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 6.
+
+[197] _Arkansas Democrat_, December 4, 1961.
+
+[198] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,b.
+
+[199] Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, _The New Drive Against the
+Anti-Communist Program_, July 11, 1961, p. 50. Most of this publication
+was reprinted in the _Congressional Record_, August 28, 1961, pp.
+16094-16116. An entire article by Gus Hall is in this Senate report...
+
+[200] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
+
+[201] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 2,b.
+
+[202] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 49.
+
+[203] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
+
+[204] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 48.
+
+[205] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13440.
+
+[206] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 48.
+
+[207] _Ibid._, p. 46.
+
+[208] _Ibid._, p. 48.
+
+[209] _Ibid._, pp. 47-48.
+
+[210] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13440, col. 1,b-2,t.
+“There have been dire predictions since the end of World War II that an
+attempt to defend ourselves would turn America into a garrison state.
+But, our defense budget has varied from 40 percent to 5 percent to 15
+percent and down again to 9 percent of our gross national product,
+and our experience offers little confirmation for such fears.” Albert
+Wohlstetter, an official in the Rand Corporation. _Congressional
+Record_, June 16, 1960, p. 11911, col. 3,m. “From the radical left, and
+sometimes from the radical pacifists, we hear other voices of doom. We
+have great armed forces, they say, therefore our freedom is doomed by a
+garrison state. Or we have big businesses, therefore democracy is being
+strangled by greedy monopolies. We have ‘internal contradictions,’ as
+the ideologists love to say—labor versus capital, farms versus cities,
+importers versus exporters—and therefore democracy will soon tear
+itself to pieces.” (Press Release No. 3910, January 14, 1962. Address
+by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the U.N.,
+before Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith on the occasion of his
+receipt of the America’s Democratic Legacy Award, Hotel Plaza, New
+York, N.Y.)
+
+[211] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 47.
+
+[212] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b.
+
+[213] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 46.
+
+[214] _Ibid._, p. 46.
+
+[215] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b., pp.
+13436-13437, col. 3,b-1,t., p. 13437 col. 3,t.
+
+[216] _Ibid._, p. 13438, col. 1,t.
+
+[217] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 46.
+
+[218] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 1,b.
+
+[219] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 46.
+
+[220] _The Worker_, August 20, 1961, p. S7, col. 2,b. _Program of the
+Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Draft)_, New York: Crosscurrents
+Press, Inc., 1961, p. 50.
+
+[221] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 1,t. p.
+13438, col. 1,m. col. 2,m.
+
+[222] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 46.
+
+[223] _Ibid._, p. 46.
+
+[224] _Ibid._, p. 46.
+
+[225] _Arkansas Gazette_, October 12, 1961, p. 1B.
+
+[226] _Congressional Record_, August 21, 1961, pp. 15357-15358.
+
+[227] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 46. See
+also _The Worker_, November 12, 1961, p. 1. Mike Newberry, _The Fascist
+Revival_, New York: New Century Publishers, 1961. This is a Communist
+publication.
+
+[228] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
+
+[229] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, pp. 45-46.
+
+[230] “Extremism Comes From a Sense of Frustration,” _Arkansas
+Democrat_, November 28, 1961.
+
+[231] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13440.
+
+[232] _World Marxist Review_, December, 1961, p. 25, col. 1,t.
+
+[233] _Ibid._, p. 25, col. 1,b.
+
+[234] Speech at the Fifth World Congress of Trade Unions, December 9,
+1961. This is No. 227 press release from EMBASSY OF THE U.S.S.R., Dec.
+11, 1961, p. 2.
+
+[235] James E. Jackson, “The General Crisis of Capitalism Deepens,”
+_World Marxist Review_, January 1961, p. 38.
+
+[236] Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, _Communist and Workers’
+Parties’ Manifesto Adopted November-December, 1960. Interpretation and
+Analysis._ Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 72. The
+entire Manifesto is reprinted in this government document, along with
+some statements by Communists in America.
+
+[237] _Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Draft)_, p.
+50.
+
+
+
+
+Chapter XI
+
+CONCLUSIONS
+
+
+The _Communist Manifesto_ in its closing words declared war on all
+non-Communists. The Communists have continued this warfare even until
+now. It will culminate, they are confident, in the complete victory of
+communism. Although they want to avoid World War III, _if_ they can
+attain their aims without it, they are now waging cold war, as well as
+hot war, against us in order to ultimately make possible world conquest.
+
+The present period of peaceful coexistence is but another phase of
+their war on non-Communist societies. In the Statement by 81 Communist
+Parties in Moscow, November, 1960, this was clearly set forth.
+
+“The policy of peaceful coexistence meets the basic interests of all
+peoples, of all who want no new cruel wars and seek durable peace. This
+policy strengthens the positions of socialism, enhances the prestige
+and international influence of the socialist countries and promotes
+the prestige and influence of the socialist countries and promotes
+the prestige and influence of the Communist Parties in the capitalist
+countries. Peace is a loyal ally of socialism, for time is working for
+socialism against capitalism.
+
+“The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the
+masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace.
+Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class
+struggle as the revisionists claim. The coexistence of states with
+differing social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism
+and capitalism. In conditions of peaceful coexistence favorable
+opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle
+in the capitalist countries and the national-liberation movement of
+the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. In their turn,
+the successes of the revolutionary class and the national liberation
+struggle promote peaceful coexistence. The Communists consider it
+their duty to fortify the faith of the people in the possibility of
+furthering peaceful coexistence, their determination to prevent world
+war. They will do their utmost for the people to weaken imperialism and
+limit its sphere of action by an active struggle for peace, democracy
+and national liberation.
+
+“Peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems does
+not mean conciliation of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the
+contrary, it implies intensification of the struggle of the working
+class, of all the Communist Parties, for the triumph of socialist
+ideas. But ideological and political disputes between states must not
+be settled through war.”[238]
+
+Communist doctrine, action and aggression, however, has called forth
+anti-communism. Those who are for liberty and righteousness are aroused
+when they realize the inroads which communism is making throughout the
+world. If men are for the traditional values of Western civilization,
+for example, they must be against communism which endeavors to destroy
+those values.
+
+It is very unfortunate that Senator Fulbright should brand so many
+informed anti-Communists as belonging (as Gus Hall puts it) to the
+ultra-right,[239] or extreme radical rightwing (as Senator Fulbright
+puts it). It is tragic that the Senator has helped knock the military
+out of the cold war (one of the prime objectives of the Communists in
+America). It also is harmful to the cause of anti-communism and freedom
+that he has identified this so-called radical rightwing with fascism.
+It does not help military morale to raise the idea of “French Generals”
+in America in the future threatening civilian authority.
+
+We hope that the Senator will reconsider and that he will use his
+tremendous influence to get the Secretary of Defense and the White
+House to disregard his very influential secret memorandum. We are
+not asking that mistakes of anti-communists not be pointed out, but
+we are asking him not to lump together so many different groups of
+anti-communists and label them as “radical rightwingers”. We are not
+asking that the military engage in partisan politics, but in view of
+the great danger we stand in we are asking that at least some of the
+individuals in the military, who are equipped to wage the cold war, be
+allowed to help inform and alert the public, as well as the military,
+concerning the history, philosophy, strategy and tactics of communism.
+The need to meet the enemy in the cold war, and to win over the very
+present danger of communism, is a pressing reality; and in dealing with
+it we should use all necessary forces without being held back by the
+fear that in some distant future some military leaders might get out
+of hand. It is not realism to refuse to do what we can, including the
+use of the military in the cold war, to meet a very real present danger
+because of a fear of a danger which the Senator admits does not now
+exist.
+
+The great problems which face us today center in communism and the war
+which it is now waging on civilization. We hope that the influence of
+Senator Fulbright, and those of like mind, on the President will not
+keep him from implementing one of his own statements wherein he said:
+“So, therefore, the problem always is, how can the military remain
+removed from political life, how can civilian control of the military
+remain removed from political life, how can civilian control of the
+military be effectively maintained, and at the same time the military
+have the right and the necessity to express their educated views
+on some of the great problems that face us around the world?”[240]
+This, however, it will be impossible for them to do if the Fulbright
+memorandum continues to have an influence on the Government.
+
+Let us not lose sight of the basic issues which are involved. _First_,
+we have been forced into the cold war by the aggressive acts and
+designs of the Communists. _Second_, there is no reason to believe
+that the Communists will change their minds and abandon their efforts
+to conquer the world and to remake man into the image demanded by
+their godless philosophy of life. _Third_, the cold war is a real
+war. _Fourth_, the cold war is the major war which the Communists are
+now waging against us. _Fifth_, the military has within its ranks
+experts on the history, the philosophy, the strategy and the tactics
+of communism. _Sixth_, international communism not only operates
+outside of the borders of our country, but also inside the borders
+through its various agents, including the Communist Party. _Seventh_,
+the oath taken by the military binds the military to defend the
+country against enemies both domestic and foreign. Communism today is
+_the_ foreign and domestic enemy. _Eighth_, informing the troops and
+the public concerning communism is not the same as participating in
+partisan politics. _Ninth_, there is a need for both the troops and the
+public to know more about the enemy who faces us. _Tenth_, civilian
+control of the military is not really being threatened. _Eleventh_,
+it is possible to deal with a military official who oversteps his
+bounds without nullifying the directive issued in 1958 by the National
+Security Council. _Twelfth_, the Fulbright memorandum was aimed at
+the nullification of this directive and was designed, therefore, to
+take the military out of the cold war in the very sense in which
+the directive was designed to put the military into the cold war.
+_Thirteen_, the memorandum and the Stanford speech introduce a new
+concept of government. _Fourteen_, the memorandum is a serious matter
+whose implementation hinders, not helps, the United States in the cold
+war. Thus the author believes that the memorandum is against the real
+interests of Senator Fulbright and all other Americans.
+
+Furthermore, let it be observed, in conclusion, that Senator Fulbright
+has recognized elsewhere that the people need to be both alerted
+and informed, although at times the Senator seems confused on these
+matters. Thus in the memorandum Senator Fulbright said: “Fundamentally,
+it is believed that the American people have little, if any, need to
+be alerted to the menace of the cold war. Rather, the need is for
+understanding of the true nature of that menace, and the direction
+of the public’s present and foreseeable awareness of the fact of the
+menace toward the support of the President’s own total program for
+survival in a nuclear age.”[241]
+
+Does the Senator mean that the American people have already been
+sufficiently alerted? Only a year before he doubted that Americans
+had yet heeded the warning. He further thought that the President was
+failing to sound the warning sufficiently. “We have been warned, but
+have we heard? If we should perish it will not be for lack of warning
+but for lack of the will to survive.”[242] “Mr. Sprague insisted that
+the United States be awakened to the scope of the overall Russian
+threat to us. But who is to ring the alarm bell?
+
+“‘There is only one man in the United States that can do this
+effectively, and that is the President,’ said Mr. Sprague. He
+continued: ‘I believe, and this is a personal belief, that the danger
+is more serious than the President has indicated to the American
+public.’”[243]
+
+As late as December 1960 the Senator was saying: “The greatest crisis
+confronting the West is not Berlin. It is the apathy of the free world
+and its incomprehensible unwillingness to look facts in the face.
+Evolution and the survival of the fittest are concepts we understand
+when applied to plants and animals—but we seem not to realize that
+these concepts apply to us.”[244]
+
+Toward the end of April 1961 President Kennedy said: “Our greatest
+adversary is not the Russians. It is our own unwillingness to do what
+must be done.”[245]
+
+Senator Fulbright agrees that the people need to be informed. “The
+successful waging of peace requires a vigorous national administration,
+an informed people, and a mature people who know that you cannot be
+adult without being willing to pay for what you want.”[246] “The
+American people ought to be told the bleak truth about their world,
+the character of the forces arrayed against them, and what they must
+do, at whatever cost, to survive or even to bring about a state of
+high security. They must be told that, however humane their society,
+whatever its ideals, this alone will not save them from destruction by
+a society armed with the prodigious mechanisms of our times and an
+implacable determination to dominate all men.”[247]
+
+Since this is the case, there is no real reason why qualified men in
+the military should not be used in alerting and informing America.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[238] _Statement of the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers’ Parties_,
+November 1960, Toronto 3, Canada: Progress Books. Published for the
+C.P. of Canada, pp. 16-17. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, _op.
+cit._ p. 64.
+
+[239] Gus Hall, the Communist, in the _Worker_, July 16, 1961.
+
+[240] Excerpts from press conference of President Kennedy,
+_Congressional Record_, August 11, 1961, p. 14449, col. 1,m.
+
+[241] _Ibid._, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col 2,b.-3,t.
+
+[242] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 1,t.
+
+[243] _Ibid._, p. A2708, col. 3,m.
+
+[244] _Ibid._, February 16, 1961, p. A925.
+
+[245] As quoted in the _Congressional Record_, May 9, 1961, p. 7138,
+col. 3,b.
+
+[246] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, pp. A2708, col. 3,b.—A2709.
+
+[247] _Ibid._, p. A2709, col. 2,t. Senator Fulbright also said: “As
+things now stand, however, the Soviets profit not only from their own
+energy, but also from our apathy.” (_Congressional Record_, Sept. 9,
+1961, p. 17249. Col.3, m.) “Many among us expressed the fear that our
+inertia would be overcome—but momentarily, and that, like one who is
+awakened from a deep sleep by some minor disturbance, we would again
+subside into dreamland.” “Mr. President, I have no idea what must be
+done to awaken Americans to the unpleasant facts of life. As unwilling
+as I am to face it, perhaps the answer is that we simply do not wish
+to be disturbed.” (_Congressional Record_, January 23, 1959, p. 1007,
+col. 1,b.) “I believe that such a study would conclude that America’s
+trouble is basically one of aimlessness at home and frustration
+abroad.” (Speech before the American Bar Association, Sept. 1, 1960.
+_Congressional Record_, Sept 2, 1961, p. A6708, col. 2,b.) “... if only
+we would stop snoring with our eyes open.” (_Congressional Record_,
+May 11, 1959, p. A3890. col. 1,m.) “We might even look forward to the
+day when the Soviets become as snug and complacent as we have become.”
+(_ibid._, col. 2,b.) “Indeed, we are not even united on the nature and
+magnitude of that threat.” (_ibid._, p. A3891, col. 2,m.) Edgar Ansel
+Mowrer has written a book entitled, _An End to Make-Believe_. New York:
+Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961.
+
+Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt, on October 17, 1957, said: “It’s not communism
+I am afraid of. What frightens me is the complacency of the American
+people and their lack of knowledge about communism and its objectives.”
+(_New York Herald Tribune_, October 18, 1957, p. 4) In the author’s
+judgment, many of the common people today are ahead of some of the
+“uncommon” people in their understanding of the nature of the threat.
+
+
+
+
+  Transcriber’s Notes
+
+  pg vii Changed: the following discusison of the memorandum
+              To: the following discussion of the memorandum
+
+  pg 6 Changed: or military solution.” Congressonal Record
+            To: or military solution.” Congressional Record
+
+  pg 10 Changed: Arthur W. Radford also though that the military
+             To: Arthur W. Radford also thought that the military
+
+  pg 14 Changed: it should be done under civiliain direction
+             To: it should be done under civilian direction
+
+  pg 18 Changed: assaults of political depotism
+             To: assaults of political despotism
+
+  pg 26 Changed: rather than state responsibltiy
+             To: rather than state responsibility
+
+  pg 30 Changed: Within the framework of mutual deterrance
+             To: Within the framework of mutual deterrence
+
+  pg 32 Changed: human misory and destruction
+             To: human misery and destruction
+
+  pg 32 Changed: the imperalist states for a long iime
+             To: the imperialist states for a long time
+
+  pg 34 Changed: It is believed accomodation can be
+             To: It is believed accommodation can be
+
+  pg 35 Changed: of mutual interest, would be tantamont
+             To: of mutual interest, would be tantamount
+
+  pg 49 Changed: International communist as presently constituted
+             To: International communism as presently constituted
+
+  pg 54 Changed: public’s present and forseeable awareness
+             To: public’s present and foreseeable awareness
+
+  pg 56 Changed: therefore incapable of governing thmselves
+             To: therefore incapable of governing themselves
+
+  pg 56 Changed: have no access to the records of forign
+             To: have no access to the records of foreign
+
+  pg 57 Changed: powerful and purposeful National Goverment
+             To: powerful and purposeful National Government
+
+  pg 58 Changed: and certinly before anything
+             To: and certainly before anything
+
+  pg 63 Changed: President Kenndy will not be President forever
+             To: President Kennedy will not be President forever
+
+  pg 65 Changed: expressed in Lord Action maxim
+             To: expressed in Lord Acton’s maxim
+
+  pg 68 Changed: It is rgrettable that the right to move
+             To: It is regrettable that the right to move
+
+  pg 81 Changed: he feared federal control of education, aparently
+             To: he feared federal control of education, apparently
+
+  pg 81 Changed: submitted by him to the Deparment of Defense
+             To: submitted by him to the Department of Defense
+
+  pg 91 Changed: We have ‘internal contraditions,’
+             To: We have ‘internal contradictions,’
+
+  pg 92 Changed: Spead of “Rightwingism” in the Military
+             To: Spread of “Rightwingism” in the Military
+
+  pg 99 Changed: is reprinted in this goverment document
+             To: is reprinted in this government document
+
+  pg 100 Changed: we should exerise great care
+              To: we should exercise great care
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78918 ***