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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f57f44 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text +*.htm text +*.html text +*.png binary +*.jpg binary +*.svg text +*.pdf binary +*.bmp binary +*.zip binary +*.midi binary +*.mp3 binary diff --git a/78918-0.txt b/78918-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e79454 --- /dev/null +++ b/78918-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4951 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78918 *** + + + + + Transcriber’s Note + Italic text displayed as: _italic_ + + + + + Senator Fulbright’s + Secret Memorandum + + JAMES D. BALES + + + Concerning the cold war, a well known + liberal, William E. Bohn, said: “Many of + us on the democratic side are poorly prepared + for this historic conflict. There are + editors, clergymen, educators, and politicians + in this country who hardly know what Communism + is.” (_The New Leader_, January + 22, 1962, p. 15) + + + BALES BOOKSTORE + Searcy, Arkansas + + + + + Copyright 1962 By + JAMES D. BALES + + + + +PREFACE + + +Senator J. W. Fulbright’s memorandum concerning the military and +the cold war was likely the most controversial paper which appeared +in Washington in 1961. It is probable that the memorandum has been +discussed by a lot of people who have not read it, much less studied +it. Because it is an important document it ought to be studied by the +public as a whole, and not just by men in the armed forces or by those +in the political arena. + +The importance of the memorandum is underscored not only by what +it says but also by the wide and varied reaction to it. As to be +expected, it has not been favorably received by those individuals and +organizations which it attacks as extremely radical rightwingers. In +addition, many individuals from various parts of the United States and +from both political parties have been critical of the memorandum. + +On the other hand, support for the memorandum has come from many and +different sources. President Kennedy stated that Senator Fulbright +rendered a service by sending the memorandum to the White House. In +the Senator’s own state, the _Arkansas Gazette_ has more than once +indicated its editorial backing of the memorandum. + +The leftists as a whole have backed the memorandum. This backing has +included that of the socialists and of the communists. Kingsley Martin, +a British socialist said: “The dangerous change came with the Korean +war, when America discovered that GIs, having no notion why they were +fighting, were easily influenced by Communist propaganda. As a result, +the Pentagon has poured out hundreds of booklets instructing officers +how to indoctrinate the army with hatred of Communism. Quotations +from these documents, presented at the initial hearing of the Walker +case, were, one would have thought sufficient evidence of the virulent +anti-Communist propaganda to which the troops are subjected. But the +Fulbright memorandum (which should be widely published and not hidden +in the Congressional Record) proved that politically-minded generals +had used the permitted task of indoctrination as a means of denigrating +such distinguished American personalities as Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt +and Dean Acheson. These were in effect treated as near-Communists, if +not traitors.”[1] So far as the present author understands the matter, +the memorandum does not mention but one General even remotely in such +a way. And even in his case it states that he said that some prominent +Americans were “tainted with Communist ideology.” This is not the same +as calling them near-Communists or traitors. + +Kingsley Martin further praised Senator Fulbright as an +internationalist, and as one who “was making a reasoned attempt to +bring Arkansas into the world community.”[2] What kind of “world +community” did the socialist Martin have in mind? + +Senator Fulbright and his position were backed in the Paris weekly, +L’EXPRESS on October 12, 1961. This paper is connected with Pierre +Mendes-France, a leader of the leftwing of the Socialist Party in +France.[3] + +The Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation has backed it +consistently. Norman Thomas said: “Our immediate purpose in preparing +this factual pamphlet was to present it to the administration in order +to back up Senator Fulbright’s excellent memorandum and continue the +work that the Defense Department has begun.”[4] + +Irwin Suall, a prominent socialist, has written: “Flushing out and +exposing the activities of the ultras is a major current function of +the Socialist Party. From that standpoint, Thomas called the results of +his press conference ‘highly gratifying’.”[5] + +The Communist Party in the United States thought so highly of the +memorandum that they reprinted without comment several columns of the +memorandum in _The Worker_ for August 27, 1961. + +No attempt is made to identify Senator Fulbright with each of these +groups just because they back him in this matter. This would be neither +sensible nor fair. However, such questions as the following are raised: +Why are they backing him in this matter? How do they believe that this +would contribute to their long-range or short-range purposes? Would +it make a contribution to any of their purposes? We do know that the +socialists and the communists are backing the memorandum. This reveals +their evaluation of it and indicates whose causes they think that the +memorandum serves. + +The extent to which the censorship, which is recommended in memorandum +of Senator Fulbright, is being carried out already is indicated in +a directive issued to Reserve Officers in at least one area of the +United States. It reads: “Although Reserve personnel are not subject +to Army Regulations except when on active duty, such regulations are +distributed to Reserve units with the intention of providing guidance +where appropriate. Members of the Reserve are encouraged to conform +whenever possible to the spirit and intent of regulations even though +they are not bound by them. It is pointed out that information they +convey to the public becomes at least quasi-official when linked with +their Reserve Status.” + +Since within a few months an attempt was being made to carry over the +censorship into the private lives of Reservists, in the above manner, +what will happen within a few years unless the trend is changed? Will +the Reserves be prohibited from the freedom of speech which is the +birthright of American citizens? + +The memorandum is thus seen to raise questions which are tremendous in +their import. + +Our examination of the memorandum does not imply that there are no +extremists. Obviously there are extremists of all varieties in America, +and it would be unreasonable to conclude that there were no extremists +in the military or amongst the anti-Communists. However, in the +author’s judgment it is highly doubtful that the number of extremists +in the military is anywhere near as high as the percentage of soldiers +in Korean prisoner of war camps who in one way or another collaborated +with the enemy, or defected, or failed to manifest the proper +discipline or failed to cooperate with their fellow soldiers. + +Our defense of some of the individuals and positions which are attacked +in the memorandum does not imply an endorsement of every individual +and organization mentioned in the memorandum; nor does it imply an +endorsement of everything which may have been said at one time or +another by the individuals and organizations in whose defense we have +spoken. + +In our discussion of the memorandum we have sometimes quoted Senator +Fulbright against Senator Fulbright. We have also quoted some liberals +against Senator Fulbright. This illustrates that one is not necessarily +a so-called ultra rightist just because he opposes certain positions +taken by the Senator. + +There are some who have implied that Senator Fulbright is not +responsible for what is in the memorandum since he did not personally +write it. Of such we would ask: Is there anything in the memorandum’s +charges and recommendations with which the Senator disagrees? If so, +why has he not said so? As far as our knowledge goes, the Senator +himself has never suggested that he disagrees with any of its charges +and recommendations. + +Although the Senator did not personally write the memorandum, he is +responsible for it; and as far as we know he has never suggested +otherwise. He submitted it “to the Secretary of Defense.”[6] He said: +“The memorandum was based on my strong belief in the principle of +military subordination to civilian control.”[7] “The memorandum was a +personal one.... It was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense as a +personal correspondence.” It was a part of his “private papers.”[8] + +According to the President, Senator Fulbright’s memorandum presented +the Senator’s views. “Senator Fulbright sent a memorandum to the +Secretary of Defense at the request of the Secretary of Defense, and +expressed his views about a matter which is, of course, of concern to +the Department of Defense.” + +“So, in my judgment, Senator Fulbright performed a service in sending +his viewpoint to the Department of Defense....”[9] + +In order to assist the public in their evaluation of the memorandum, +the following discussion of the memorandum is placed before the public. + +This discussion does not endeavor to present and to examine the basic +philosophy, strategy and tactics of the enemy—communism. This the +author has endeavored to do in two other books, _Communism: Its Faith +and Fallacies_ and _Understanding Communism_. + +Appreciation is expressed to those who gave permission to quote from +copyrighted material. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _New Statesman_, November 17, 1961, p. 732, col. 2,t. The +difficulty of speaking on some phases of the present world situation +without crossing Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt is illustrated by following +remarks which she made in a recent interview. _First_, the President +has urged the people to build shelters. Mrs. Roosevelt said: “I don’t +believe in private shelters, or school shelters.” It must be done, +she said, through “a comprehensive government program” if it is to be +done at all. _Second_, the President indicates that we shall fight +if necessary. Military men teach the same thing. She said: “War +is inadmissible anymore.... Today willingness to go to war means +willingness to face the loss of civilization.” (Hal Boyle, “Eleanor +Roosevelt Recalls Pearl Harbor,” _Arkansas Democrat_, Dec. 7, 1961, p. +19.) + +[2] _New Statesman_, p. 732, col. 1,m. + +[3] “Politically, it speaks for the non-Communist left and is close to +ex-Premier Pierre Mendes-France.” _Newsweek_, Feb. 12, 1962, p. 82, +col. 3,b. + +[4] _New America_, December 8, 1961, p. 2. + +[5] _Ibid._, p. 6, col. 5,t. _Maclean’s_ magazine (September 9, 1961) +defended Senator Fulbright and implied that “fanatics, numbskulls and +mediocrities” were the core of the opposition to him in his home state +(p. 81. From an article by Ian Schlanders.) + +[6] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m. + +[7] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 2,m. + +[8] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 3,t. + +[9] Press conference of August 10. _Congressional Record_, August 11, +1961, p. 14449, col. 1,t,m. See also p. 14559. + + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + + + CHAPTERS Page + + Preface + + I The Background 1 + + II The Secret Memorandum Made Public 5 + + III The Effect of the Memorandum 6 + + IV Who Is Attacked in the Memorandum 9 + + V The Protracted Conflict Concept Criticized 29 + + VI The American People the Principle Problem? 50 + + VII Who Is the Defeatest? 70 + + VIII Senator Fulbright and World Opinion 70 + + IX Is Communism A Matter of Politics? 80 + + X The Memorandum and the Community Party Line 80 + + XI Conclusions 101 + + + + +Chapter I + +THE BACKGROUND + + +Too many Americans have understood neither the American system +of freedom, and how it works, nor the communist challenge to our +freedom, and how it operates. The well known liberal, William E. Bohn, +wrote: “Many of us on the democratic side are poorly prepared for +this historic conflict. There are editors, clergymen, educators and +politicians in this country who hardly know what Communism is.”[10] +This lack of understanding was illustrated in the case of those +prisoners of war in Korea who were brainwashed.[11] + +Out of this lack of understanding of the nature of our country, and of +the nature of the enemy who has challenged us, has come an apathy which +threatens our very survival. Senator Fulbright himself has spoken of +our having become “snug and complacent.”[12] He lamented: “... If only +we would stop snoring with our eyes open.”[13] His fear was that even +if we are aroused out of our sleep we “again subside into dreamland.” +In fact, he said: “Mr. President, I have no idea what must be done to +awaken Americans to the unpleasant facts of life. As unwilling as I +am to face it, perhaps the answer is that we simply do not wish to be +disturbed.”[14] + +In December, 1960, the Senator said: “The greatest crisis confronting +the West is not Berlin. It is the apathy of the free world and its +incomprehensible unwillingness to look facts in the face. Evolution and +the survival of the fittest are concepts we understand when applied to +plants and animals—but we seem not to realize that these concepts apply +to us.”[15] + +The people, said the Senator, must be informed. “The American people +ought to be told the bleak truth about their world, the character of +the forces arrayed against them, and what they must do, at whatever +cost, to survive or even to bring about a state of high security. They +must be told that, however humane their society, whatever its ideals, +this alone will not save them from destruction by a society armed with +the prodigious mechanisms of our times and an implacable determination +to dominate all men.”[16] + +Spurred on by the studies of the Korean prisoners of war, and deeply +concerned with the apathy and ignorance in America, efforts were made +to do a better job of equipping the American soldier for the war in +which we have become involved. On August 17, 1955, President Eisenhower +made an official proclamation that soldiers were expected to live up to +the newly formulated “Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces +of the United States.” Since the ignorance in the Armed Forces was but +a reflection of the ignorance of the general population, President +Eisenhower and the National Security Council issued in 1958 a directive +which more fully put the military in the cold war. + +The National Security Council is our top policy and planning agency. +It is composed of the Cabinet members who have responsibilities in +the field of national security, and included in it by law are the +President, Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary +of State, the National Security Resources Board’s Chairman; and, as +statutory advisers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the +CIA. It was this group which issued the directive of 1958 which placed +upon the military the duty of helping not only the military but also +the civilian population to gain an understanding of the issues involved +in the cold war. By name, its statutory members in 1958 were President +Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, John Foster Dulles, Neil H. McElroy, +and Gordon Grey, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. + +As a result of this directive of the National Security Council, +national strategy seminars were conducted throughout the country. +Originating in the War College, these seminars were making a valuable +contribution to the waging of the cold war, as Roscoe Drummond has +pointed out.[17] Civilian organizations who wanted speakers on the +subject of Communism and the cold war could contact the military and +secure the services of military officials who were versed in some phase +of the cold war. In some cases facilities on military bases were made +available. + +During 1961, however, there was an increase in censorship of the +speeches of military men. In July, 1961, the Defense Department issued +a directive placing certain restraints on military speakers, and this +action, according to Cabell Phillips in the _New York Times_ of July +21, was the result of a memorandum of Senator J. W. Fulbright.[18] +Supposedly directed only toward the curbing of political utterances +by rightwing military speakers, the impact of the directive and the +controversy which has arisen have been much broader. As a result, as +Roscoe Drummond pointed out, the country is being deprived “of the +useful and needed service which the military can properly perform.” + +“We have just about thrown away the public national-strategy seminars +which were doing so much to alert people” concerning communism and its +strategy in the cold war.[19] + +As far as we know the Defense Department has now limited the military +to military subjects, which include the military threat of Russia; but +anything dealing with the _specific aims and political tactics of the +communists must be cleared by the Pentagon_.[20] + +Fulbright’s memorandum, which has had an influence on the stand taken +by the Department of Defense, is thus seen to be an important one. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[10] _The New Leader_, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 15. + +[11] William E. Mayer, “Communist Indoctrination—Its Significance to +Americans,” Searcy, Arkansas: National Education Program, 1957, pp. +14-15, _Congressional Record_, Jan. 21, 1960, p. 877, col. 1,m. Senator +Dodd has endeavored to give the percentage of collaborators in The +_Congressional Record_, July 23, 1962, p. 13569. On the same page he +said: “The overwhelming majority of these POW’s succumbed to Communist +pressures and became collaborators in one degree or another. So general +was the phenomena of defeatism and ‘give-up-itis,’ that we cannot +write them off to individual weakness. The fault lay not with the +individual, but with our society.” See also the statements of Admiral +Arleigh A. Burke in the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the +Committee on Armed Services, _Military Cold War Education and Speech +Review Policies_, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962, Part 1, +p.19. Also Secretary McNamara, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed +Services, _Defense Secretary McNamara on S. Res. 191_, Washington: +Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 4. + +[12] _Congressional Record_, May 11, 1959, p. A3890, col. 2,b. + +[13] _Ibid._, p. A3890, col. 1,m. + +[14] _Congressional Record_, Jan. 23, 1959, p. 1007, col. 1,b. + +[15] _Congressional Record_, Feb. 16, 1961, p. A925, col. 2,b. + +[16] _Congressional Record_, March 28, 1960, p. A2709, col. 2,t. + +[17] “When the Generals Should Be Allowed To Speak,” _Arkansas +Democrat_, October 26, 1961. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of +the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thought that qualified military personnel +should participate in such seminars. Special Preparedness Subcommittee +of the Committee on Armed Services, _Military Cold War Education and +Speech Review Policies_, Part 1, page 103. + +[18] See the directive and Phillips’ articles reprinted by Senator +Strom Thurmond in the _Congressional Record_, July 26, 1961, pp. +12620-12621. Compare _U.S. News and World Report_, August 7, 1961, p. +9. See also pp. 12-15 of a reprint entitled “Excerpts From Speeches +by Senator Strom Thurmond on Efforts to Gag Military Anti-Communist +Speeches and Seminars.” + +[19] “When the Generals Should Be Allowed To Speak,” _Arkansas +Democrat_, October 26, 1961. + +[20] According to _U.S. News and World Report_, September 18, 1961, p. +8. Reporting on the September 6 testimony of Defense Secretary McNamara. + + + + +Chapter II + +THE SECRET MEMORANDUM MADE PUBLIC + + +The Fulbright memorandum was sent to the Secretary of Defense and +to the President. It was so secret that other members of the Senate +Foreign Relations Committee, of which Senator Fulbright is the +chairman, did not know of its existence.[21] Someone, however, made +it available to the United Press International.[22] Senator Thurmond +learned of its existence and tried, without success at first, to secure +a copy. He, Senator Mundt, and Senator Styles Bridges were concerned +that such an influential memorandum was kept secret.[23] As Senator +Fulbright himself had said, more than a year before, when something has +been leaked to the press it should be more or less officially released. +When it is not released, people wonder whether some things which they +should know have been withheld from them.[24] But Senator Fulbright was +willing to let the people wonder in this case! + +Due to circumstances beyond the control of Senator Fulbright, Senator +Thurmond secured a copy of the memorandum and inserted it into the +Congressional Record.[25] Later the same day Senator Fulbright placed +it in the _Record_.[26] + +What was the effect of the secret memorandum which, without Senator +Fulbright’s aid, has been made public? + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[21] President Kennedy in a press conference on August 10, 1961, +_Congressional Record_, August 11, 1961, p. 14449, col. 1,t. See +Senator Fulbright’s letter to Senator Thurmond in the _Congressional +Record_, August 4, 1961, p. 13687, col. 2,t. _Arkansas Gazette_, July +21, 1961, p. 1. _Congressional Record_, July 31, 1961, p. 13174. August +4, 1961, p. 13687, col. 2,t. _Congressional Record_, July 29, 1961, +p. 13005; Compare August 4, 1961, p. 13687. See also Marquis Childs, +_Congressional Record_, July 26, 1961, p. 12618. + +[22] _Arkansas Gazette_, July 21, 1961, p. 1. See also Marquis Childs, +“Birchites Finding Allies in Military,” _Congressional Record_, July +14, 1961, pp. 11659-11660. + +[23] _Congressional Record_, July 26, 1961, p. 12621. col. 3,t.; July +29, 1961, p. 13005, col. 1,m.; p. 13005, col. 3,m. + +[24] _Congressional Record_, March 28, 1960, p. 6207, col. 2,m. + +[25] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13398. + +[26] _Congressional Record_, p. 13436. + + + + +Chapter III + +THE EFFECT OF THE MEMORANDUM + + +Senator Fulbright, when he inserted the memorandum into the +_Congressional Record_, said it was based on the principle of military +subordination to civilian control, and that it was not the function of +the military to educate the public on political issues.[27] The Senator +further said: “The memorandum was directed solely at the impropriety +of officers of the armed services lending their prestige and official +status to meetings which tend to undermine policies of the civil +government of the United States, as set forth by the President and the +Congress.”[28] + +“The sole objective of my recommendation was to insure that high +military personnel adhere to the obligation, which is inherent in their +duty as officers to refrain from public expressions of opposition to +the policies of the Government and of their Commander-in-Chief.”[29] + +We are not impugning the motives of Senator Fulbright when we say that +a study of the memorandum reveals that its effect was to challenge +the National Security Council directive of 1958. This directive did +not deny the principle of civilian control; in fact, because of +its subordination to President Eisenhower the military obeyed the +directive. Furthermore, the directive did not call for the military +to educate the public on political issues in the sense of partisan +politics. In the memorandum Senator Fulbright himself said: “Under a +National Security Council directive in 1958, it remains the policy of +the U. S. Government to make use of military personnel and facilities +to arouse the public to the menace of the cold war.”[30] + +“The purpose of this memorandum is to give some indication of the +dangers involved in education and propaganda activities by the +military, directed at the public, and to suggest steps for dealing with +the underlying problem.”[31] + +“There is little in the education, training or experience of most +military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary +to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which their education, +training and experience are concerned—into proper perspective in the +President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear age’.”[32] + +Under “Recommendations” we find: + +“1. With reference to the National Security Council directive of 1958, +suggested revision is based upon its description in attachment 3 (New +York Times article of June 18, 1961), from which the following is +excerpted: ‘President Eisenhower and his top policy leaders decreed +that the cold war could not be fought as a series of separate and +often unrelated actions, as with foreign aid and propaganda’. Rather, +it must be fought with a concentration of all the resources of the +Government and with the full understanding and support of the civilian +population. It was decided, in particular, that the military should be +used to reinforce the cold-war effort.” + +“This policy should be reconsidered from the standpoint of a basic +error, that military personnel have the necessarily broad background +which would enable them to relate the various aspects of the cold-war +effort, one to the other.”[33] + +The memorandum indicates that it is convinced that the National +Security Council directive, and its implementation, could be attacked +from several grounds, including an assumed violation of the “basic +traditional and constitutional question of military efforts to +propagandize the public....” As it went on to say: “the violation of +these concepts alone should be sufficient basis for challenging the +National Security Council policy, and its implementation.”[34] + +This also helps make it certain that the memorandum was not directed +simply against certain mistakes in the implementation of the policy, +but against the policy itself. In addition to saying that the military +is _not qualified_ to engage in the cold war, the Senator claims that +it is _forbidden on constitutional grounds_. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[27] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m. +Civilian control is not controversial. In his May 12, 1962 speech +to the West Point Cadets, General Douglas MacArthur emphasized that +political problems were “not for your professional participation or +military solution.” _Congressional Record_, May 31, 1962, p. A4009, +col. 1,t. + +Admiral Arleigh A. Burke testified: “No mature U.S. military officer +I know of has ever questioned it. Indeed, it is a sacred part of our +military tradition itself. If a military man cannot reconcile his +convictions with his civilian superior’s orders, he has only the +recourse of leaving the service.” + +“But the principle of civilian control can be perverted. Civilian +control of the military is properly exerted by the President, the +Secretary of Defense, and the secretaries of the individual military +departments over the military services, within the guidelines laid down +by Congress. The senior civilians in the Government have the final +decision on all problems affecting the military posture of the United +States. This is proper and correct.” + +“In my opinion, it is improper that civilian control should be +exercised in any other echelon but at the top. It should not be +extended to every subordinate military echelon. To be specific, orders +and directives to the military should come from the top civilian +elements to the senior military people. They should not come from +junior civilian elements to junior military people.” (Military Cold War +Education and Speech Review Policies, Part 1, pp. 21-22). + +General MacArthur further said: “While for the purpose of +administration and command the Armed forces are within the executive +branch of the Government, they are accountable as well to the +Congress, charged with the policymaking responsibility, and to the +people, ultimate repository of all national power. Yet so inordinate +has been the application of the Executive power that members of the +armed services have been subjected to the most arbitrary and ruthless +treatment for daring to speak the truth in accordance with conviction +and conscience.” (as quoted by General Edward M. Almond, _Ibid._, Part +2, p. 714.) + +[28] “Statement of Senator J. W. Fulbright Relating to a Memorandum +Submitted by Him to the Department of Defense,” p. 3. + +[29] _Ibid._, page 4. + +[30] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b. + +[31] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,t. + +[32] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,b. + +[33] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 3,t. + +[34] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 2,b. + + + + +Chapter IV + +WHO IS ATTACKED IN THE MEMORANDUM? + + +Senator Fulbright’s memorandum attacked a wide variety of Americans, as +well as the American people as a whole. + + +_President Eisenhower_ + +In challenging the directive of the National Security Council, Senator +Fulbright was saying that in spite of his military background President +Eisenhower did not know enough to realize that the military was not +qualified to engage in the cold war. Senator Fulbright, however, was +qualified—he thought—to judge that the military was not qualified. +Furthermore, when Senator Fulbright said that such participation was +contrary to certain constitutional values, he was saying that either +President Eisenhower did not understand these values or that he chose +to disregard them. + + +_The Military_ + +Senator Fulbright’s memorandum was an attack on the competency of +the military to engage in the cold war. Concerning the policy of +the National Security Council, which put the military into the cold +war, the memorandum said: “This policy should be reconsidered from +the standpoint of a basic error, that military personnel have the +necessarily broad background which would enable them to relate the +various aspects of the cold-war effort, one to the other.”[35] + +It was also stated: “There is little in the education, training or +experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance +of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with +which their education, training and experience are concerned—into +proper perspective in the President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear +age’.”[36] + +Furthermore, the Senator said: “There are no reasons to believe that +military personnel generally can contribute to this need, beyond their +specific, technical competence to explain their own role. On the +contrary, there are many reasons, and some evidence, for believing +that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, involves +considerable danger.”[37] + +Whence did the Senator get his competency in the field of the cold war? +Whence his qualifications as a cold war strategist so that he knows +that we have much to lose and nothing to gain by having the military +in the cold war? How did he become qualified to advise in effect the +neutralization, in so far as the public is involved, of the military in +the cold war? + +Are there any military officials more competent than the Senator is +in any phase of the cold war? If so, why not let military experts on +Communism be used to help us win the victory in the cold war? + +Senator Fulbright’s position, that military officials are not +sufficiently educated to engage in the cold war, is an indictment of +the armed services colleges where these officers have been trained. + +Many of the officers have one or more degrees. Many of them have +travelled extensively and some of them are proficient in more than one +language. + +Senator Styles Bridges expressed his shock at Senator Fulbright’s +evaluation of the military. “I assume, and it is an assumption which I +believe to be valid, that our senior military officers, particularly +those of flag and general officer rank, are persons of judgment and +responsibility. Most of these officers are graduates of our Military +Academies, and all of them have many years of experience in leadership, +many of them are held directly responsible for the welfare and lives +of large segments of our military forces, and many of them are held +directly chargeable with the care, custody and protection of millions +of dollars worth of property belonging to the U. S. Government. The +appointment of each of them to a position of high rank was made as +an expression of trust and confidence by the President and with the +concurrence of the U. S. Senate.”[38] After discussing the education of +most of the Army officers, Major John A. Burns wrote: “It is doubtful +if any professional group is so rigorously trained and educated as the +American officer.”[39] + +The Senator recognizes, as do the rest of us, that the United States +is confronted by a situation which it has never before faced. The +memorandum indicates that it is not in the American tradition to be +involved in the “long twilight struggle” which we are now involved in; +but we are so involved.[40] + +That we are in an unprecedented situation in the history of America, +is underscored by the fact that on December 16, 1950, President Truman +declared, in Proclamation 2914, that we are in a state of national +emergency because of Communist imperialism. Events since that time +have only further emphasized that we are in a state of national +emergency.[41] + +It is not contrary to our tradition for the military to go into action +when war comes. War has come. + +W. D. Workman wrote: “If warfare today were confined to the +battlefield, and if the battlefield alone were the concern of the +military, there might be some justification for buttoning the lips +of our senior officers. But warfare now is fourth dimensional, +encompassing politics, culture, economics and all other institutions +which lend themselves to internal subversion as well as external +manipulation.”[42] + + +_The Military Oath_ + +Military men have taken an oath to defend the United States against +enemies both domestic and foreign. This oath calls on them to defend +the country against _domestic_ enemies as well as foreign enemies. Why, +then, does Senator Fulbright take a position which in effect keeps the +military men from carrying out their oath against such a domestic enemy +as the Communist conspiracy in America? + +It is in the light of their oath, and of the threat of internal and +external communism, that we can fully understand Resolution 99 of the +American Legion convention in Denver. It states: “Whereas the morale +and fighting spirit of our Armed Forces is directly related to their +knowledge and their belief in the fundamental principles upon which +the Government of their homeland is founded and to their knowledge and +understanding of the aims and purposes of the enemy; and + +“Whereas the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and author +of ‘Masters of Deceit’, a most knowledgeable work on communism, has +stated and warned, ‘We cannot hope to successfully meet the Communist +menace unless there is a wide knowledge and understanding of its aims +and designs’, and + +“Whereas, Lenin, the real architect of communism, proclaimed, ‘It is +inconceivable that communism and democracy can exist side by side in +this world.’ Lenin said inevitably we must perish; and + +“Whereas this doctrine has been iterated and reiterated many times by +his successors, and their actions have consistently been in conformity +therewith; and + +“Whereas the military officers of the U. S. Armed Forces are charged +under oath with the duty to defend our country from all enemies foreign +and domestic and that to accomplish fealty to this oath, the military +leaders must know the enemy—his aims and purposes in order to instruct +the men under their command, fortify their morale, and so defend our +homeland against the enemy; and + +“Whereas this right and duty of the military officers of the U. S. +Armed Forces has recently been challenged publicly by certain officials +in high places in Government: Now, therefore, be it + +“_Resolved_, That the American Legion in convention assembled in +Denver, Colo., September 9 through 14, 1961, urge the officers of the +U. S. Armed Forces to continue to perform their duty to defend the +Constitution of the United States, that they better inform themselves +regarding the fundamental principles of our form of government +exemplified by our Declaration of Independence and Constitution, that +they transmit and impart this knowledge to the Armed Forces under their +command and to the general public, that the officers of our Armed +Forces familiarize themselves with the aims and purposes of the known +enemy, that they earnestly and patriotically strive at all times to +impart this knowledge to the men under their command and to the general +public to the end that the morale and fighting spirit of our Armed +Forces be kept at all times at the highest possible level. We further +urge that the challenge of certain Government officials in high places +to the established rights and duties of the officers of our Armed +Forces be removed and that they be left unshackled and unhampered in +the discharge of their duties to the above end.”[43] + +Does the Senator think that the only way that the military can live +up to its oath is by bullets in a hot war, and not also by words in a +cold war? The oath does not say that the defense of the United States +is limited to defense by bullets. To uphold the United States includes +upholding it by word also. Or does the Senator, with his attitude +toward at least some aspects of our constitutional system, think that +if one upholds the Constitution by the teaching method that he is +engaging in partisan politics? + +If it is not a violation of their oath to defend the Constitution by +words against the domestic enemy communism, if they can in harmony with +their oath expose and oppose the domestic enemy communism, then why not +let them participate in the cold war? + +Is not the memorandum, in effect, a demand that the military not carry +out their oath in so far as domestic Communists are concerned, which +domestic Communists are a part of the international communist threat? + +The Senator in effect wants the military eliminated from the cold war. +As Senator Curtis, from Nebraska, said: “If this paper were devoted +to errors of judgment or fact—which are going to creep into any +program—everybody should consider those errors so that they might not +be repeated or that they might be corrected. But the purport of this +memorandum is plain—it is a pronouncement that the military should not +alert the citizens of the internal Communist threat. I am afraid it +serves interests that were never intended to be served by whoever had +the responsibility of putting the memorandum together.”[44] + +We would add the observation that there is no indication that Senator +Fulbright in the memorandum proposed that the military officials +should alert even their own troops to the menace and nature of the +cold war except possibly later when some of them have been educated +by civilians. And even then he says it should be done under civilian +direction as far as possible. + +The Senator does not seem to want the military to have the right to +speak out against internal communism, or to inform the public of the +dangers which threaten us or to show how the Communists operate. + +We are confident that, regardless of the Senator’s motives, Khrushchev +must be pleased with the idea of the military being so neutralized in +the cold war. Since the cold war is the major war which Khrushchev and +world communism are now waging against us, Khrushchev must consider it +to be a real victory for his side to have the military forces knocked +out of the cold war to the extent that the memorandum knocked the +military out of the cold war. + +We would have little or no hope for the survival of our country if the +military did not have greater confidence in America than the Senator +seems to have in the military. Indeed, the Senator himself once said: +“If we lose faith in the integrity of our military men, in addition +to the criticism which has been heaped upon the leadership in the +political field, we certainly are in a sad state.”[45] + +We are afraid that under the influence of Senator Fulbright’s +memorandum concerning the military, and the increased power which the +Secretary of Defense is wielding over the statements of the military, +that a situation is developing which a few years ago the Senator +himself thought would be a serious condition indeed. Senator Taft had +criticized the Chiefs of Staff because he thought that they were but +rubber stamps for the administration. Taft said: “I accepted them as +experts; but I have come to the point where I do not accept them as +experts, particularly when General Bradley makes a foreign policy +speech. I suggest to the Senator that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are +absolutely under the control of the administration, and that their +recommendations are what the administration demands that they make. + +“_Mr. Fulbright._ Mr. President, I think that is a very serious charge +which is made by the Senator from Ohio. I can think of nothing which is +more likely to cause consternation in this country, to develop a fear +which I believe the facts do not warrant, and generally to disrupt our +effort in this great struggle with the Russians and with communism, +than to state here that in effect he has no confidence in the integrity +of the leading military figures in our Government. I think it is a +very sad state in which we find ourselves if we are led to such extreme +views.”[46] Yet in 1960, Senator Fulbright praised an article which +said, among other things, that in President Eisenhower’s administration +“uniformity of viewpoint is virtually enforced.”[47] + +If the military is not permitted to speak out on the issues of the cold +war, if they must silently wait until the time comes for them to rubber +stamp whatever program the President finally comes up with, one would +have the situation which Taft had in mind, i.e. they would recommend +whatever the administration demanded. And this they would do without +having had the opportunity to have participated in public discussions +before the program was arrived at. + + +_General MacArthur Attacked_ + +The Senator smeared one of the greatest generals in the history of +America, and included him as a sample of the attitude of rightwing +extremism. Of MacArthur, who was born in Arkansas, the Senator said: +“Pride in victory, and frustration in restraint, during the Korean war, +led to MacArthur’s revolt and McCarthyism.”[48] + +Surely the Senator must have at least hesitated before impugning the +motives of General MacArthur. Although it would be a good thing for us +to win the victory over communism, pride in victory is not the motive. +The important things are for what one is fighting and against what +one is fighting. The desire to win victory over communism is highly +commendable. Was the General motivated by pride in victory or by love +of country, love of freedom and by opposition to this tremendous evil +which would enslave mankind? In our opinion, the Senator’s evaluation +of the General is a reflection on the Senator instead of on the +General. We do not believe that the General’s long life of service to +his country gives us any reason for believing that “pride in victory” +is a correct analysis. The Senator was judging motives. + +In another place, the Senator has said: “This technique of questioning +the motives of the opposition instead of arguing about the wisdom of +their views is one of the oldest and most effective tools of tyrants or +demagogues.” He went on to say that one could question his judgment and +intellect, but “I do object to their questioning my motives or purposes +or loyalty.”[49] And yet, the Senator questioned the motives of the +General and said that the General acted out of “pride in victory.” + +As for the General being frustrated under restraint, it likely would +have been frustrating to any soldier to have been ordered into a +war in which the main enemy—the Chinese Communists—was permitted a +privileged sanctuary beyond the Yalu River. Furthermore, it was a war +which the General was not permitted to try to win. Would the Senator be +frustrated if he was ordered into a political campaign which he would +not be permitted—by those who ordered him into it—to win? How much +more so when one wanted to win against communism and for the cause of +freedom. + +The term “McCarthyism” is used as a smear word, and by thus equating +“MacArthur’s revolt” and “McCarthyism” was the Senator unconscious of +the fact that in the minds of some a bit, at least, of the smear would +rub off on the General? + +We contrast the Senator’s views of MacArthur with that of General +Carlos P. Romulo, the Ambassador to the United States from the +Philippines. + +“Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s sentimental journey to the Philippines has a +fourfold significance: + +“1. At a time when Soviet propaganda is sparing no effort to +distort America’s image in the eyes of the peoples of Asia, General +MacArthur’s personality emerges as a living refutation of Communist +misrepresentations. Received by an Asian people with open arms and +given a reception that in warmth and magnitude is unprecedented in that +section of the globe, the American people should be proud that they +have one of their own who can draw to his person and to his country +such universal popular acclaim and admiration.”[50] + +MacArthur’s wisdom concerning China, in contract with the illusions of +the civilian authorities who then formed policy, is illustrated in his +cable to the House Foreign Affairs Committee around the early part of +1948. + +“The international aspect of the Chinese problem, unfortunately, has +become somewhat beclouded by demands for internal reform. Desirable +as such reform may be, its importance is but secondary to the issue +of civil strife now engulfing the land, and these two issues are as +impossible of synchronization as it would be to alter the structural +design of a house while the same was being consumed by flame. The +maintenance of China’s integrity against destructive forces which +threaten her engulfment is of infinitely more concern. For with the +firm maintenance of such integrity, reform will gradually take place in +the evolutionary processes of China’s future. + +“The Chinese problem is part of a global situation which should be +considered in its entirely. Fragmentary decisions in disconnected +sectors of the world will not bring an integrated solution. It would be +utterly fallacious to underrate either China’s needs or her importance. +For if we embark upon a general policy to bulwark the frontiers of +freedom against the assaults of political despotism, one major frontier +is no less important than another, and a decisive breach of any will +inevitably engulf all.”[51] + +When he was a Congressman, President Kennedy also spoke of some of +the illusions of civilian authorities concerning China. “Mr. Speaker, +over this week end we have learned the extent of the disaster that +has befallen China and the United States. The responsibility for the +failure of our foreign policy in the Far East rests squarely with the +White House and the Department of State. + +“The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming, unless a +coalition government with the Communists was formed, was a crippling +blow to the National Government. + +“So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the Lattimores and +the Fairbanks, with the imperfection of the domestic system in China +after 20 years of war and the tales of corruption in high places that +they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China. + +“Our policy in the words of the Premier of the National Government, Sun +Fo, of vacillation, uncertainty, and confusion has reaped the whirlwind. + +“This House must now assume the responsibility of preventing the +onrushing tide of communism from engulfing all of Asia.”[52] + +We wonder whether or not Senator Fulbright would have lectured this +Congressman on the need to support the President’s total program, that +criticism of this nature divides the country, that this is extremely +radical rightwingism, etc.!! + +We are glad that President Kennedy’s visits with General MacArthur +indicate that he has a higher regard for the General than does +Senator Fulbright. The Senator’s opinion of General MacArthur is +also in contrast with that of the House of Representatives in their +resolution in which the _Senate_ also concurred. “_Resolved by the +House of Representatives_ (_the Senate concurring_), That the thanks +and appreciation of the Congress and the American people are hereby +tendered to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in recognition of his +outstanding devotion to the American people, his brilliant leadership +during and following World War II, and the unsurpassed affection held +for him by the people of the Republic of the Philippines which has done +so much to strengthen the ties of friendship between the people of that +nation and the people of the United States.”[53] + + +_The American People Attacked_ + +Senator Fulbright not only indicted General MacArthur, but also the +American people. Thus we read: “The American people have never really +been tested in such a struggle. In the long run, it is quite possible +that the principle problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, +to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with +everything we’ve got, particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos. +Pride in victory, and frustration in restraint, during the Korean war, +led to MacArthur’s revolt and McCarthyism.”[54] + +Is the Senator saying that the American people may revolt if they are +restrained so much that they are not permitted, as MacArthur was not +permitted, to win the struggle in which the Communists have engaged us? + +This, incidentally, is the first time that we have known that the +Senator had such a charitable interpretation of McCarthyism. In effect +the memorandum is saying that the American people want to win the +victory over communism in the struggle which is now going on in the +world; and that when they are restrained and kept from this victory, +McCarthyism is the result. McCarthyism, according to this, is the +desire to break down the restraints which keep us from winning, and the +desire to go on to win the victory over the evil forces of communism. +This, in effect, is what the Senator said. + +The American people will doubtless weigh well the Senator’s implication +that they possess the two essential ingredients which, according to +the Senator lead to McCarthyism. These two are: Pride in victory and +frustration in restraint. In other words, the Senator believes that +we are all potential or incipient McCarthyites. There is no reason to +assume that the Senator meant this in any complimentary way. + + +_Dr. Benson_[55] + +Senator Fulbright included Dr. George S. Benson, Arkansan of the Year +for 1953-1954, President of Harding College and President of the +National Education Program, as one of the extremely radical rightwing +speakers. Dr. Benson believes in and advocates the religious and moral +principles on which this country was founded; constitutional and +thus limited government; citizenship responsibility; free enterprise +and freedom. He is against both the internal and external threat of +communism, which are two aspects of the same threat—international +communism. + +Does adherence to the traditional values on which America has been +built, and which has made America great, make one an extremely radical +rightwinger? If it does, what does Senator Fulbright’s classification +of Dr. Benson reveal about Senator Fulbright’s stand? Is the Senator so +far away from the positions that Dr. Benson advocates that the Senator +thinks that Dr. Benson is an extremely radical rightwinger? + +It would be educational for all concerned if Senator Fulbright would +make an attempt to sustain his charge against Dr. Benson by listing, +with documentation from Dr. Benson’s writings and speeches, those +positions which the Senator believes prove that Dr. Benson is an +extremely radical rightwing speaker. Assertions are not sufficient. The +Senator’s charges, where the Senator has much influence, are damaging +to Dr. Benson’s work for free enterprise and against communism. They +should either be sustained or the Senator should withdraw them publicly. + + +_Dr. Clifton L. Ganus, Jr._ + +In his secret memorandum Senator Fulbright passed on, without checking +with Dr. Ganus, a misrepresentation of Dr. Ganus. Senator Fulbright’s +memorandum said: “An Arkansas citizen wrote of the Fort Smith meeting: +‘Dr. Clifton L. Ganus, Jr., vice president and dean of the School +of American Studies at Harding College, made the statement “your +Representative (James W. Trimble) in this area has voted 89 percent of +the time to aid and abet the Communist Party”’.”[56] + +Dr. Ganus did not make this statement.[57] If he had made such a +startling statement, surely it would have been picked up by the +newspapers at that time and reported. However, as far as we know even +the _Arkansas Gazette_ did not refer to it until months later. This was +after it had been published in the _Reporter_ magazine—which magazine +presented this false accusation without any effort to check it with Dr. +Ganus. As far as I know, the first time this false accusation appeared +in print was in the July 20, 1961 issue of the _Reporter_, which was +published at least a week earlier than July 20.[58] + +It is also instructive that Perry Mason of Harding Academy spoke in +Fort Smith several times, and to some of the same people, a few days +after Dr. Ganus spoke. Although he received some questions concerning +some points made in Dr. Ganus’ speech, no one either publicly or +privately said anything about the statement later attributed to Dr. +Ganus. + +If Dr. Ganus had made such a preposterous statement, surely someone +would have defended their Congressman right then and there. + +Furthermore, several people have made out affidavits, and have +testified that they were there and that Dr. Ganus did not make the +statement attributed to him.[59] + + +_Harding College_ + +Because it has won for ten straight years the highest award of Freedoms +Foundation At Valley Forge, Harding College, a fully accredited +educational institution, has been known as the nation’s most honored +college. Freedoms Foundation has honored Harding College as the +nation’s No. 1 school in promoting the American way of life. On +February 9, 1962, the All-American Conference to Combat Communism, made +up of organizations whose combined membership is well over 50,000,000, +gave Harding College a citation. + +The socialists have felt the impact of the College in its stand for +the traditional free enterprise system in America. This helps explain +the attack of Norman Thomas, the leading socialist in America, on the +College early in 1961. + +The Communists have recognized that the College is a bulwark against +their designs on America, and thus they have attacked Harding College +and have falsely accused it of being “one of the biggest political +machines of the ultra-Right.”[60] This attack by the Communists is +in reality a tribute to Harding College. The Communists know who is +hurting them. + +However, it must come as something of a shock that Senator Fulbright +from the State of Arkansas, should also attack Harding College as +a source of extremely radical rightwing teaching. And yet, this is +the label under which he secretly represented Harding College to the +President of the United States and to the Secretary of Defense.[61] +Harding College, located in the Senator’s home state, was the only +college attacked in the memorandum. + + +_Chamber of Commerce_ + +Senator Fulbright’s memorandum regarded the Strategy for Survival +Conferences as dominated by the extremely rightwing speakers.[62] The +Chamber of Commerce had sponsored this Conference. Thus the Chamber +of Commerce was involved in extreme rightwingism! It is of interest +that the Chamber of Commerce had tried to get Senator Fulbright, but +he was out of the country; and then Senator McClellan, and he was also +unavailable. It was then that they got Dr. Ganus.[63] + +The memorandum also stated that General William C. Bullock had +personally persuaded the Chamber of Commerce to sponsor the Conference +in Little Rock. Peyton Rice, who is chairman of the Chamber’s Armed +Services Committee, said that General Bullock had not presented the +proposal to the Chamber.[64] + + +_House Committee_ + +The House Committee on Un-American Activities has not been perfect, +but neither has any other Committee. However, on the whole it has done +splendid work investigating and exposing the Communist conspiracy. If +Senator Fulbright had listened to the evidence presented in just the +1938 hearings of the Committee, he would have learned much truth about +communism. He would not have said in 1945 that “our fear of Russia +and communism” is a “powerful prejudice” which we must give up in +order to have peace. He would not have misread history and concluded +that Lenin’s revolution was in any sense a following of our example +in the revolution which we fought for our independence. The Senator +also said: “As I read history, the Russian experiment in socialism is +scarcely more radical, under modern conditions, than the Declaration +of Independence was in the days of George III.”[65] This sounds +somewhat like the statement of Earl Browder when he was head of the +Communist Party in America. “The Declaration of Independence was for +that time what _The Communist Manifesto_ is for ours.”[66] Lenin in his +resolution was basically following the _Communist Manifesto_. + +As a Rhodes scholar, Senator Fulbright should have been able to read +_history_, instead of accepting such an obviously false view of +history. Senator Fulbright seems to have known either little or nothing +about Lenin’s revolution, or little or nothing about our revolution. +The kindest thing we can say about the Senator is that he was seemingly +ignorant of some very fundamental matters. + +What are some of the differences between Lenin’s revolution and ours? +(1) Our revolution had as its objective the establishment of a reign of +law, but Lenin’s revolution was designed to establish the rule of the +head of the Communist Party who would rule according to his own will. +(2) Our revolution established a Republic, while Lenin’s established a +dictatorship. (3) Our revolution did not result in a reign of terror of +Americans over Americans, but Lenin’s revolution did establish a reign +of terror. (4) Our revolution did not have as its aim the establishment +of a world wide conspiracy which would endeavor to overthrow all other +governments—democratic governments as well as dictatorships. (5) Our +revolution was not a counter-revolution against self-government. Lenin +did not overthrow the Czar, he overthrew the Kerensky Government which +was endeavoring to establish a form of democracy. Lenin was not even +in Russia at the time the Czar abdicated. (6) Our revolution was over +in a very few years, in so far as establishing our form of government +is concerned. How long does it take to overthrow the previous regime? +As Kravchenko said “The French Terror was over in five years.”[67] +By 1945, when Senator Fulbright made his statement concerning Lenin’s +revolution, the Soviet terror had been going on for almost thirty +years. (7) The Communist revolution was not just a revolution in +government. It was a revolt against God, religion, morals and humanity. +Its aim has been, and is, to create a godless society and the new +Soviet man. + +All of these things could have been known by Senator Fulbright in 1945 +and long before. Communist books and actions had made abundantly clear +the nature of their revolution. Only a “powerful prejudice” could keep +a reader of their history from knowing the nature of Lenin’s revolution. + +Also in 1945 the Senator was seemingly so misinformed about Communism +that he said: “I do not believe the Soviets desire to dominate the +world as the Germans did.”[68] Before Hitler came to power the Soviets +made clear their desire to rule the world. And their actions showed +that they meant it. The House Committee had pointed this out. So had +many individuals. + +Senator Fulbright’s “powerful prejudice,” or whatever it was, against +the House Committee, however, is such that he objected because in one +of the meetings mentioned in the memorandum, someone defended the +House Committee.[69] Such a defense could hardly be called a matter +of partisan politics, since the House has supported the Committee +for years, and in 1961 the vote to give the Committee its full +appropriation was passed 412 to 6.[70] + + +“_Operation Abolition_” + +The memorandum classified “Operation Abolition” as objectionable +material. Did the Senator want to censor this film? Is he a “film +burner”? Does he think that J. Edgar Hoover and the House Committee +were wrong in saying that the San Francisco riots were Communist +inspired, and that most of the young people were duped?[71] + + +_Herbert A. Philbrick_ + +Herbert A. Philbrick, of “I Led Three Lives” fame, was smeared by +Senator Fulbright as being an extremely radical rightwing speaker.[72] +Philbrick spent nine years as a counterspy for the FBI and for America. +He was commended by J. Edgar Hoover.[73] Philbrick has continued to +fight Communism. He has sacrificed much to do so. The Communists +have smeared him. And Senator Fulbright, without giving one shred of +documentation, smeared Philbrick. The Senator must be very, very far +to the left of Mr. Philbrick if from where the Senator is standing, +Philbrick looks to him like an extremely radical rightwinger. + + +_Dr. Fred Schwarz_ + +Billy Graham found good reason to commend the anti-communist work of +Dr. Fred Schwarz,[74] and _Life_ Magazine in an unprecedented action on +Oct. 17, 1961, apologized to Dr. Schwarz for their misinterpretation +of him and his work.[75] But Senator Fulbright has never apologized +for accusing, without giving one bit of proof, Dr. Schwarz of being +an extremely radical rightwinger. The Senator made this charge in his +secret memorandum, and without giving Dr. Schwarz an opportunity to +answer the accusation. Did the Senator wish to remain a “faceless” +accuser? + + +_Dr. Frank Barnett_ + +Dr. Frank Barnett, who was criticized more than once in the +memorandum,[76] has been commended by Secretary of Defense McNamara in +September, 1961 for an “excellent speech”[77] which contained some of +the ideas which Fulbright’s memorandum condemns.[78] + + +_The Institute for American Strategy_ + +As late as April 10, 1961, a National Military-Industrial Conference +sponsored by the Institute was commended by President Kennedy.[79] +These Conferences were criticized in the memorandum.[80] + + +_American Strategy for the Nuclear Age_ + +The Institute for American Strategy sponsored a book which was +prepared by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of +Pennsylvania. This book is called _American Strategy for the Nuclear +Age_. The memorandum criticized this book and said that “its total +effect can be said to be contrary to the President’s program.”[81] The +book, among other things, brings out that the communists are at war +with us on many different levels, and that we ought to fight back and +win. Is this against the President’s program? + +Among the contributors to the book are: J. Edgar Hoover, Hanson W. +Baldwin, Henry A. Kissinger, Lieut. General Arthur G. Trudeau, Walt W. +Rostow, Dean Acheson and David Sarnoff. + + +_233 Talks_ + +One Captain was mentioned in the memorandum as having given 233 talks +to civilians on the “dangers of internal communism.” As I do not know +what the Captain said, I do not know to what extent I would agree or +disagree with him. But the fact that he gave 233 talks is not within +itself a criticism. In fact, it shows that he was very zealous in +carrying out his oath to defend America against domestic enemies. + +The Senator made at least seventy-five talks in Arkansas in the fall +of 1961, in the interest of _his_ re-election to office.[82] Doubtless +he will make other such talks. A man who is that zealous in behalf of +his own re-election to office ought not to be critical of a Captain for +making so many speeches for America and against the internal enemy—who +is also an external enemy—communism. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[35] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t. + +[36] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,b. President Eisenhower said: +“Accordingly, should departmental instructions be so phrased as unduly +to prohibit desirable military participation in these educational +efforts respecting the Communist menace, I suggest that your committee +recommend their restudy with view to appropriate revision. The Reds are +well aware of the integrity, patriotic motives, and high qualifications +of our military. I suspect they would be delighted if we should prevent +such people from spreading the truth about Communist imperialism. + +“Pertaining at least indirectly to this subject, I have heard of +accusations alleging that military education is so narrow as to make +service personnel incapable of grasping the whole complex of dangers +confronting our country. It is hinted that the entire officer corps +has become politically infected, and prone to be disloyal to the +Commander in Chief. I, for one, want to be on record as expressing my +indestructible faith and pride in our armed services—even though their +loyalty, patriotism, and breadth of understanding needs no defense from +me or anyone else” (_Military Cold War Education and Speech Review +Policies_, Part 1, p. 7.) + +“I believe, therefore, that your committee will render valuable service +by rejecting the recent spate of attacks upon the competence and +loyalty of the military and by disapproving any effort to thrust them, +so to speak, behind an American iron curtain, ordered to stand mutely +by as hostile forces tirelessly strive to undermine every aspect of +American life.” (_ibid._, p. 7). + +Admiral Arthur W. Radford also thought that the military ought to +be used in the cold war. He further emphasized that attacks on the +military could hurt morale and that it was the duty of civilian +authorities to defend the military against “unwarranted and unjust +civilian attacks” (_ibid._, part 2, pp. 707-708). + +[37] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t. + +[38] _Congressional Record_, August 3, 1961, p. 13517, col. 2,m. + +[39] Quoted in _Human Events_, 1961, p. 867. Lt. Gen. Edward M. +Almond wrote: “Fulbright’s thesis ignores the fact that last year +there were 1,521 officers of the armed services engaged in studies at +civilian institutions of higher learning which dealt with educational, +scientific, economic, and political subjects; these all have a +relation to national strategy. In addition to this number there are +some 2,918 other officers engaged in special studies in languages, +medical sciences, engineering sciences and management courses. This +thesis in the Fulbright memorandum further ignores the fact that +each year some 500 officers of senior grade attend the service war +colleges and universities where they study the very topic that the +nuclear age demands solution of. This topic is studied intensively. +Furthermore, the Fulbright thesis ignores the fact that nowhere is +there such an intensive study made to prepare any politician (before or +after his election to office) for the task ‘to put their own ultimate +solutions into proper perspective in the President’s total strategy +for the nuclear age.’” (_Military Cold War Education and Speech Review +Policies_, Part 2, p. 714.) + +[40] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b. + +[41] Quoted in the _Congressional Record_, June 12, 1961, p. 9404, col. +2,m. + +[42] Reprinted from the July 24, 1961 issue of the _News and Courier_, +Charleston, S. C., _Congressional Record_, July 31, 1961, p. 13177, +col. 3,b. + +[43] _Congressional Record_, September 15, 1961, p. 18455, col. +2,b.-3,t. + +[44] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13402, col. 1,b.-2,t. + +[45] _Congressional Record_, April 26, 1951, p. 4402, col. 2,m. + +[46] _Ibid._, p. 4402, col. 2,t. + +[47] _Ibid._, February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col. 3,b. + +[48] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t. + +[49] Speech before the Arkansas Chamber of Commerce, Little Rock, Nov. +8, 1961. _Arkansas Gazette_, Nov. 9, 1961, p. 2A. + +[50] _Congressional Record_, July 27, 1961, p. A5795, col. 1-2. Japan’s +view of MacArthur is illustrated in the fact that Japan gave him their +“highest decoration for foreigners,” _Congressional Record_, June 25, +1960, p. A5518, col. 2,b. + +[51] Quoted in the _Congressional Record_, August 19, 1949, p. A5439. + +[52] _Congressional Record_, January 25, 1949, pp. 532-533. + +[53] As quoted in the _Congressional Record_, August 8, 1962, p. +A6084, col. 1,t. See Speaker McCormack’s tribute in the _Congressional +Record_, August 16, 1962, p. A6243. Even the _Arkansas Gazette_ paid +tribute to him. Editorial, August 19, 1962. + +[54] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t. + +[55] The Fulbright memorandum quoted a statement of Dr. Benson +concerning the John Birch Society. It is important, however, to realize +that this statement was made at a time when Dr. Benson was not aware of +the radical positions which Mr. Robert Welch had taken on some matters. +These radical positions Dr. Benson repudiates. Furthermore, his +commendation was of their stated long-range purpose “to work for less +government, more responsibility and a better world,” and their purpose +to inform citizens concerning communism. Is Senator Fulbright against +these aims? + +[56] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13438, col. 1,b. + +[57] See his open letter of July 25, 1961 to Congressman Trimble. + +[58] _The Reporter_ article has been reprinted in the Senate Internal +Security Subcommittee, _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist +Program_, pp. 57-63. + +[59] _Arkansas Gazette_, December 28, 1961, p. 3A. + +[60] Mike Newberry, _The Worker_, August 13, 1961, p. 5, col. 1,m. + +[61] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13438-13439. + +[62] _Ibid._, p. 13438, col. 1,t. + +[63] _Arkansas Gazette_, August 6, 1961. + +[64] _Arkansas Gazette_, August 6, 1961. + +[65] James William Fulbright, “The Price of Peace Is The Loss of +Prejudices”, _Vogue_, July, 1945. Reprinted in Louise E. Rorabacher, +_Assignments in Exposition_. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946, pp. +197-198. + +[66] _What Is Communism?_ pp. 19-20. + +[67] _I Chose Justice_, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950, p. 137. + +[68] As reprinted in Louise E. Rorabacher, _Assignments in Exposition_, +p. 198. + +[69] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13438-13439. William +F. Buckley, Jr., has announced the publication of a study of _The +Committee and Its Critics_. “National Review”, 150 E. 35th St., New +York 16, N.Y. + +[70] _Ibid_, June 22, 1961, p. A4722. + +[71] See J. Edgar Hoover, _Communist Target—Youth_. Washington: +Government Printing Office, 1960. House Committee on Un-American +Activities. _The Truth About the Film “Operation Abolition.”_ +Washington: Government Printing Office, 961, parts 1,2. + +[72] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 1,t. + +We wish that the Senator had been well read enough to have known that +a decade ago Mr. Philbrick warned Americans against becoming extremely +radical rightwingers! “The most important single thing is to avoid +behaving the way a Communist says the individual must behave in a +capitalist society. If the Communist had his way, he would force all +non-Communists to the extreme right, toward fascism and state control.” +(_I Led Three Lives_, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952, p. +300). “If we adhere to our traditional American dream of a society of +freedom, of personal rather than state responsibility, of individual as +well as collective intelligence, and of civil rights rather than rigid +civil controls, then we will have disproved the Communist theory of the +inevitability of capitalist deterioration.” (_ibid._, p. 301). + +[73] On the back of the jacket of Mr. Philbrick’s book. + +[74] See jacket of Dr. Schwarz’s book _You Can Trust the Communists_, +Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960. + +[75] _Arkansas Gazette_, October 18, 1961, p. 5A. + +[76] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 2,t. +_Ibid._ pp. 13436, col. 3,b., 13439-13440. + +[77] Committee on Armed Services, _Defense Secretary McNamara on S. +Res. 191_, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, p. 152. + +[78] See the entire speech reprinted in _Defense Secretary McNamara on +S. Res. 191_. pp. 154-162. + +[79] Quoted in _Congressional Record_, August 10, 1961, p. 14405, col. +3,t. A copy of the program of that Conference is reprinted beginning on +p. 14405, col. 3,b. + +[80] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13441. + +[81] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 3,b. + +[82] _Arkansas Gazette_, July 11, 1962. + + + + +Chapter V + +THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT CONCEPT CRITICIZED + + +One of the main ideas attacked in the memorandum was the concept of +protracted conflict.[83] This concept, with other materials, was +presented in the handbook entitled _American Strategy for the Nuclear +Age_. The memorandum stated that this handbook contained basic material +for implementing the 1958 directive of the National Security Council. +“Although scholarly, and worth attention as elements of strategy, +its total effect can be said to be contrary to the President’s +program.”[84] What is the concept of protracted conflict? + + +_Protracted Conflict_ + +“The West can hope to defeat the Communists only by giving battle on +its own chosen terrain. It must carry the battle to the vital sectors +of Communist defense. To do that it must learn to counter the strategy +of protracted conflict—to manage conflict in space and in time. + +“The development of proper Western attitudes toward protracted conflict +will be immensely difficult. The Communists possess a mentality that +is much better suited to protracted and controlled conflict than that +of the Western peoples. The West has neither a doctrine of protracted +conflict nor an international conspiratorial apparatus for executing +it. What is more, we do not want such a doctrine or such a political +apparatus, for it would be a tragic piece of irony if the men of +the Free World, in trying to combat the Communists, should become +like them. Some of our ‘weaknesses’ vis-a-vis the Communists are +irremediable: we cannot turn ourselves into a conflict society, nor can +we assign to the government and, in the last resort, to the police the +discipline of our conscience. It is within these limitations—which are +the ramparts of civilized self-restraint—that we are forced to cope +with Communist perversity. + +“Pericles long ago was confronted with a similar problem. As the +leader of the open society of Athens, locked in an irreconcilable +conflict with the garrison state of Sparta, he recognized a relatively +simple fact which many of the theorists of war in the nuclear age have +overlooked, namely, that there are subtle alternatives to the risky and +blunt strategy of engaging the enemy in direct and decisive military +action. In the protracted conflict known as the Peloponnesian War, +Pericles chose to pursue an extended strategy which was designed to +avoid a showdown battle while wearing down, by a campaign of economic, +political, and psychological attrition, the enemy’s will to resist. +Lidell Hart pointed out that the Periclean plan was simply a war policy +aimed at ‘draining the enemy’s endurance in order to convince him that +he could not gain a decision’. In today’s protracted conflict the +United States must maintain and use its power for the same ultimate +purposes: to turn the tide of battle against the Communists, to induce +them to overextend themselves, to exploit the weakness of their system, +to paralyze their will, and to bring about their final collapse. Within +the framework of mutual deterrence, both sides can employ the strategy +of protracted conflict, and we can do so quite effectively without +the dispensation of a jealous and demanding dogma of conflict for +conflict’s sake. + +“A psychopolitical offensive, directed against the Communist citadel +itself, offers the West its best chance for winning the battle for its +own survival and for spoiling the Communist strategy for the subversion +of the uncommitted world. Although the currents within the uncommitted +world are running against the West, the West need not despair of +holding its remaining positions once it has forced the Communists on +the psychopolitical defensive by engaging them on the most favorable +terrain, namely, the Communists’ own ‘peace zone’. + +“It is rather in the psychological arena than in its technological +workshop that the West has displayed its most alarming shortcomings. +Objectively, Western strategy has been far more effective than the +sensational charges of its critics will have it. It is improbable that +either side from now on will be able to achieve decisive technological +superiority for more than a temporary, even brief, period. No doubt, +our military posture is susceptible to a great deal of improvement. But +an exaggerated zeal for improvement, especially when it is triggered +by pained surprise at the latest ploy of communist psychological +warfare or considerations of domestic advantage, might prove to be +‘counterproductive’ in developing our real range of power. Do not +let us pour the baby out with the bath water. What we need now more +than anything else is an understanding of the comprehensive, complex, +subtle, and consistent strategy of our opponent—and the calm resolution +to draw the practical consequences.”[85] + +Now let the reader raise this question. If one is opposed to this +concept of protracted conflict is he not in reality opposed to firm, +unyielding opposition to communism? + + +_Secretary McNamara Seems to Accept Protracted Conflict_ + +Secretary of Defense McNamara realizes that if we lose the war with +communism it will be total defeat. He also recognized that the +Communists are out to conquer the world and that there is no indication +that they will change. + +This necessitates educating our troops in the nature of Communism as +well as the nature of the freedom which we enjoy. As the Secretary +himself put it: “There is no true historical parallel to the drive +of Soviet Communist imperialism to colonize the world. This is not +the first time that ambitious dictators have sought to dominate the +globe. But none has ever been so well organized, has possessed so many +instruments of destruction, or has been so adept at disguising ignoble +motives and objectives with noble phrases and noble words. + +“Furthermore, there is a totality in Soviet aggression which can be +matched only by turning to ancient history when warring tribes sought +not merely conquest but the total obliteration of the enemy. + +“Soviet communism does not seek the physical obliteration of a +conquered people, although it would not hesitate to do so, in my +opinion, if this would serve its ends. But it does seek the total +obliteration of their customs, their social structure, their political +structure, their religion and their freedoms. Everything and everybody +must be remolded according to a blueprint laid down by Lenin and +altered only for the purposes of ruthless efficiency by Stalin and the +present-day leaders. + +“There is nothing too sacred—friendship, integrity, church or +family—that it escapes the attention of the Soviet Commissar or the +Communist bureaucrat. + +“Soviet communism seeks to wipe out the cherished traditions and +institutions of the free world with the same fanaticism that once +impelled winning armies to burn villages and sow the fields with salt +so they would not again become productive. + +“To this primitive concept of total obliteration, the Communists have +brought the resources of modern technology and science. The combination +is formidable. Twentieth century knowledge, when robbed of any moral +restraints, is the most dangerous force ever let loose in the world. +And the entire literature of Soviet communism can be searched without +turning up the faintest trace of moral restraint. + +“If the free world should lose to communism, the loss would be total, +final, and irrevocable. The citadel of freedom must be preserved +because there is no road back, no road back to freedom for anyone if +the citadel is lost. + +“These are not new convictions with me. I have held them for many +years. I was deeply impressed and horrified by the human misery and +destruction that Hitler was able to create. Hitler’s philosophy was +based on the concept of total obliteration and Hitler lost. But the +years since the end of World War II have demonstrated that Soviet +communism is operating from a far stronger position than Hitler ever +held. + +“In 1949, 12 years ago, I read an article in Foreign Affairs magazine +which analyzed the writings of Stalin and quoted him at length. It +was clear from these quotes that the Communist world had no intention +of living forever in peace with the world of freedom. One of Stalin’s +favorite quotations from Lenin states this point and, as translated and +published in Foreign Affairs, this is what he said: + + ‘We live * * * not only in a state but in a system of states, and the + existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist + states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either one or the + other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most + terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois + states is inevitable.’ + +“It is obvious that the aggressive goals of Soviet communism have not +changed, for Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, has said that our +grandchildren will live under communism. + +“I cite this material because I want you to know the spirit in which +I believe the education program of our Defense Establishment should +be conducted. The threat is clear and it is immediate. Our fighting +men should know the positive values of the freedoms which the Nation +is calling them to defend, and they should know the nature of Soviet +communism which seeks to take them away. + +“One of my most vivid recollections is that of a colleague in the Ford +Motor Co. calling me out of my office a few years ago. He asked that +I drop the work in which I was engaged to hear an analysis of the +behavior of U. S. soldiers of war in North Korea, and I heard with +amazement the story of prisoners who had cracked and become informers; +men who had written articles for Communist newspapers; men who had +cooperated with their captors. + +“These American soldiers did not understand the Communist threat. They +had not been taught to value the freedom of individual choice, which +is at the basis of our form of society. They had not been taught what +happens when the spirit of individual freedom and free inquiry is lost.” + +“I believe we suffered during the Korean war because we did not stress +with sufficient force and vigor the realities of freedom and the threat +of communism. + +“As Secretary of Defense, it is my policy that the members of the +Military Establishment be educated in the role that they are playing +in the battle against communism, through knowledge of the strength of +our democracy, as well as the nature of the threat we face. We are +prosecuting a vigorous program and we intend to step it up.”[86] + +Is not this analysis, in brief, but a presentation of the concept +of protracted conflict which is advanced by Dr. Barnett, and the +Institute for American Strategy, and which is condemned in the +memorandum? + +Since there is a total threat certainly we should meet it on every +level on which it faces us. And yet, according to the article from the +_Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists_, which was the longest reprint +in the memorandum, if we act in the light of the realization of the +nature, tactics and threat of Communism which is outlined by the +Secretary, we shall split the world and be in more serious trouble! +In other words, we must be careful lest we do something to make the +Communists mad! As a matter of fact, their philosophy and ambitions +have made them mad. They are angry unto death with us because we exist +as a free people. + + +_Senator Fulbright Repudiates Protracted Conflict_ + +How does the _Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists_ view the possibility +of our waging protracted conflict? The _Bulletin_ and the memorandum +are resolutely opposed to our so doing. The memorandum said that +the handbook—which advances the concept—undermines the President’s +program.[87] The _Bulletin_ said: “The significance of ‘American +Strategy for the Nuclear Age’ lies in its analysis of the international +situation and its appeal for direct action. To a very large extent, +the theme depends on the particular estimate of Soviet intentions that +is presented and the particular prophecy of the Communist future that +is forecast. Several contributions stress the persistency, strength, +and versatility of ideology in the evolution of Soviet communism but +nowhere is there adequate treatment of the forces that limit Soviet +policy, and thus limit the projection of its ideological motivation. +There is ample evidence, for example, of instability in the Soviet +leadership and of ideological differences between the Russians and +their Chinese colleagues. The diverse effect of these forces is +highly problematical, but they do suggest that Communist policy is +far less monolithic than the concept of protracted conflict presumes. +Indeed, like other major powers, the Soviet Union is also limited by +external forces. Within the framework set by the editors of ‘American +Strategy,’ however, any attempt to take advantage of these forces in +order to insulate an area from big power confrontation, or to seek a +resolution of differences on an ad hoc basis of mutual interest, would +be tantamount to appeasement. + +“The nonmilitary techniques advocated by Barnett and several other +contributors (such as Strausz-Hupe and William Kintner) clearly +recognize a grave deficiency in American Strategy, but they hardly +cover the full spectrum of alternatives open to the United States. +None of these suggestions includes the full use of either traditional +diplomacy or innovating methods of settling disputes. At the same time, +they contain an element of militancy that raises serious problems, +geared as they are to setting up a savage dichotomy between the +Communist and the Western World, and of making almost every issue a +matter of irreconcilable competition. + +“It is difficult to see how these tactics can do anything but intensify +international tensions and, short of a complete collapse of the Soviet +bloc (which the editors would surely discount), increase the likelihood +that force will be used. Indeed, the more intense the conditions of +rivalry become, the greater the inclination will be to reassess the +major premises of our strategic doctrine, including our renunciation of +preventative war, and to begin to incorporate provisions for offensive +military action in the calculus of our planning. The editors fail to +consider whether the provocative nature of the policies they openly +advocate can be restricted to the nonmilitary spheres for very long. +Indeed, they seem to assume that the Communists will back down under +pressure—a highly dangerous assumption. + +“Perhaps the most fundamental criticism that can be made of the book is +that it fails to analyze the impact of a policy of protracted conflict +on our domestic institutions. Barnett’s program of action, for example, +would require large sums of public funds used with little public +accountability, a wide network of secrecy and security in government +operations, a cold war orientation in our schools and universities—in +short, a stunting of pluralism, a curtailment of individual liberties, +and a weakening of politically responsible government. The editors +of ‘American Strategy’ seem to see no alternative to confronting the +Soviets with strong opposition at every turn. Indeed, they appear more +concerned with virility than freedom, as if strength and courage were +goals in themselves. This, together with the somewhat static nature of +their view of history and the militant nature of their recommendations, +justifies further inquiry about the men and the organizations who +advocate a strategy based on these premises.”[88] + +What shall we say to these things? _First_, it must be recognized that +we are at war, and that the concept of protracted conflict is based on +this obvious fact of present-day life. In other words, this concept +takes seriously the words and deeds of the Communists which say that +they are fighting to conquer and to rule the world, and that we must +act accordingly. The memorandum shrinks from accepting this fact and +its implications. Ivo Duchacek, a member of the Czech Parliament until +the Communists took over, said: “Nobody likes to accept the idea that +we cannot get along with our fellow men if we try hard enough.... +When I look back at my own practical experience in Czechoslovakia +where cooperation with the Communists was tried on both national and +international levels, I realize that the basic mistake was our wishful +thinking that communism had fundamentally changed under the influence +of its 25-year experience and under the impact of World War II.”[89] +According to James Reston, who has been close to the President, +President Kennedy came to office with the idea that he could work out +reasonable arrangements with the Communists and put an end to the angry +dialogue which has been going on.[90] + +It is not of our choosing, it is not to our taste, but the fact is that +the Communists are at war with us. It does not take two to start a +war, and the Communists have started a war whether we like it or not. +As Edgar Ansel Mowrer, one of the nation’s outstanding students of +world affairs, put it: “Communists play to win.... The West, including +the United States, want only to call the game off. It fails to admit +that this is a real war which it can win only if it gives it No. 1 +priority and stops considering it just another problem like smog or +juvenile delinquency,”[91] Roscoe Drummond said: “It is my conviction +that we will continue to lose this war called peace as long as we try +to conduct it on a basis of business as usual, politics as usual and +defence as usual.”[92] + +Congressman Hosmer observed that “we can freeze to death in cold war as +easily as we can burn to death in hot war.”[93] + +Roscoe Drummond has underscored the fact that although we are at war, +we are not acting in the light of that unpleasant reality. “It is my +conviction that the time for words has passed, that the moment is at +hand when it is not enough to say what needs to be done—but to do what +needs to be done before it is too late. + +“It is my conviction that the time has come when the American +Government and the American people must act on the reality that we are +not at peace, but at war, though a different and more difficult kind of +war than we have ever faced; that, as the Overstreets have put it, we +are in a war called peace and that there is nothing peaceful about it. + +“At this stage we are losing, not winning—and we are not yet strong +enough to win.” + +“In New York last week, President Kennedy declared that ‘every new +piece of information, every fresh event, have deepened my conviction +that the survival of our civilization is at stake—and the hour is +late’.”[94] + +_Second_, the intensification of international tensions is going on +today because the Communists are pushing even harder for the conquest +of the world. Any so-called easing of international tension would +be equivalent to a boxer relaxing in the middle of the fight. For +tension to be relaxed in reality would necessitate the cessation of the +communist drive for world conquest. In other words, it would mean that +the Communists had ceased to be Communists. + +That communism, and not the waging of protracted conflict by the +non-communist world, is the cause of the existing tension is recognized +by President Kennedy. Thus he told editor Adzhubei, of _Izvestia_, that +the root of the conflict is the Soviet’s efforts “to communize, in a +sense, the entire world.”[95] + +As the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of the British +Government, said to the United Nations General Assembly on September +27, 1961, “the world is divided by an ideological chasm.... And when +one side advertises its intention to destroy the way of life of the +other, then you cannot have true collective security.”[96] + +George E. Kennan, now Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and at one time +Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., has summarized in his book _Russia and the +West_ what the communists are saying to us through their words and +their deeds. Roscoe Drummond presented it in his column as follows: +“We despise you. We consider that you should be swept from the earth +as governments and physically destroyed as individuals. We reserve +the right in our private if not in our official capacities to do what +we can to bring this about: to revile you publicly, to do everything +within our power to detach your own people from their loyalty to you +and their confidence in you, to subvert your armed forces, and to work +for your downfall in favor of a Communist dictatorship. But since we +are not strong enough to destroy you today ... we want you during this +interval to trade with us; we want you to finance us; we want you to +give us the advantages of full-fledged diplomatic recognition, just as +you accord these advantages to one another. + +“An outrageous demand? Perhaps. But you will accept it nevertheless. +Driven by this competition, which you cannot escape, you will do what +we want you to do until such time as we are ready to make an end of +you.* * *”[97] + +Mr. Kennan also quoted a resolution of the Communist International +which said: “The Comintern will not let its freedom be hampered by any +obligation whatever. We are deadly enemies of bourgeois society to the +last breath, in word and in deed and if necessary with arms in hand. +It is the historical mission of the Communist International to be the +gravedigger of the bourgeois society.”[98] + +Roscoe Drummond commented as follows on this resolution. “Mr. Kennan is +here describing Communist policy and purpose toward all non-Communist +governments formulated in the 1930’s, which hasn’t changed in the least. + +“It is the same today—in Korea, in Laos, in Viet-Nam, in the Congo, at +the conference table in Geneva. To the Communists, U. S. aid to the +legitimate government of South Vietnam is ‘aggressive’ because the +Communists recognize no non-Communist government as ever legitimate. + +“We are not at peace with the Communists. We are engaged in a war +called peace by the Communists. We can’t afford to think or act +otherwise for 1 second.”[99] + +The _Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists_ does not realize that our +resistance to Communism does not set up a “savage dichotomy between the +Communist and the Western World”. This dichotomy or division exists +but it has been set up by the ideology and actions of the Communists. +We _wish_ that it were not so, we _wish_ that they would change, but +wishing does not make it so. It is a fact of life which we should +realize, and which we fail to realize only at our peril. The Communists +in the _Communist Manifesto_, which they consider to be an up-to-date +document, and many times since have stated that they are irreconcilably +at war with us. + +Lenin, who is stressed today, said: “We are living not merely in a +state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet +Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is +unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that +end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet +Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that +if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold sway, it must prove +its capacity to do so by its military organizations.” + +“As long as capitalism and socialism exists, we cannot live in peace; +in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung +over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism.”[100] + +Mao Tse-tung speaks in no uncertain terms about their revolutionary +triumph. “In human history, antagonism between the classes exists as a +particular manifestation of the struggle within the contradiction. The +contradiction between the exploiting class and the exploited class: +the two mutually contradictory classes coexist for a long time in one +society, be it a slave society, or a feudal or a capitalist society, +and struggle with each other; but it is not until the contradiction +between the two classes has developed to a certain stage that the +two sides adopt the form of open antagonism which develops into a +revolution. In a class society, the transformation of peace into war is +also like that. + +“The time when a bomb has not yet exploded is the time when +contradictory things, because of certain conditions, coexist in an +entity. It is not until a new condition (ignition) is present that the +explosion takes place. An analogous situation exists in all natural +phenomena when they finally assume the form of open antagonism to solve +old contradictions and to produce new things. + +“It is very important to know this situation. It enables us to +understand that in a class society revolutions and revolutionary wars +are inevitable, that apart from them the leap in social development +cannot be made, and the reactionary ruling classes cannot be overthrown +so that the people will win political power. Communists must expose +the deceitful propaganda of the reactionaries that social revolution +is unnecessary and impossible, and so on, and firmly uphold the +Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution so as to help the people +to understand that social revolution is not only entirely necessary but +also entirely possible and that the whole history of mankind and the +triumph of the Soviet Union all confirm this scientific truth.”[101] + +The cold war and the danger of hot war come, according to the +Communists, only because we resist their so-called inevitable conquest +of the world. As Hugo Pauk, a Communist in the Ruhr, told Dr. John +R. Van de Water, “You must also understand that unless you accept our +Communist way of life, war is inevitable.”[102] + +If we did not resist communism there would be no cold war—only +enslavement and death. For the cold war is their term for our +resistance to communism. In one of the leading communist journals, +_International Affairs_, we read that: “The aggressive imperialist +forces have let loose upon the world their horrible offspring—the +cold war. Its purpose was to keep the people in a state of constant +fear, to persuade them that war is inevitable, and to compel them to +spill more and more money into the bottomless pit of the arms race. +The cold war was to help the doomed forces of the old world to retain +their positions and hold back the surging advance of social and +national-liberation movements, to prepare war against the Socialist +camp, that untiring champion of world peace.”[103] + +“The Socialist countries have set themselves the task of eliminating +war from the lives of nations for all time—a goal for which the best +minds in the world have striven for centuries. Proceeding from the +analysis of the real balance of power on Earth, the 21st Congress of +the C.P.S.U. stressed that this problem could be solved even before the +complete victory of Socialism, with capitalism still extant in a part +of the world.”[104] + +“To establish durable peace on Earth is no easy task, of course. There +are influential forces outside the bounds of the Socialist world whose +riches and privileges depend on the arms race, on the preparation +and unleashing of wars. These forces will not give in without +desperate resistance and will do everything to prevent a relaxation +of international tension. It will take the utmost effort of all the +peace-loving forces in the world to turn into reality the existing +possibility of achieving an international _detente_ and putting an end +to the cold war. + +“N. S. Khrushchev’s visit to the United States is another brilliant +proof of the fact that the Soviet Government and Communist Party are +doing everything to terminate the cold war.”[105] + +These quotations show that, as a matter of fact, with the Communists +every issue is a matter of irreconcilable competition in the sense that +they are not out to make reasonable agreements which they will keep +with integrity, but that every discussion is another front on which +they are fighting us. Any agreement is made only because they have to +make it or because in some way it contributes to their total program of +victory. + +The quotations which we took from the memorandum are saying that if we +firmly resist Communism we are apt to have trouble! The Senator should +raise the question: What trouble will there be if we do not firmly +resist Communism and win this war for freedom? + +International tension exists because of Communist aggression. Of +course, if we ceased resisting they would enslave us, and kill +millions, but this hardly seems like a desirable way to lessen tensions. + +The fact that the Communists are waging protracted conflict on us is +the provocative factor in the world situation. Why is it that the +memorandum speaks of “the provocative nature of the policies” of those +who call on us to awaken to the fact that the Communists have declared +protracted war on us, and that we should wage protracted conflict for +victory and freedom—yes, and for survival. + +Concerning those who advocate that we wage this protracted conflict +the _Bulletin_ says: “Indeed, they seem to assume that the Communists +will back down under pressure—a highly dangerous assumption.” Does +the _Bulletin_ and the Senator think that the Communists will back +down if we retreat? Or if we are not firm? Does he think that the +Communists have not been encouraged by the success which they have had +hithertofore on their road to world conquest? Does he suggest that +we relieve pressure by backing down? Does he think that the road of +retreat is the road to survival? If we are not to put on increased +pressure, what are we to do? Does he think that the Communists respect +anything other than firm pressure? + +Does the Senator believe, or does he not, that the Communists are +intent on world conquest? If the Senator believes that the Communists +are waging protracted conflict to conquer the world, why did he include +the article from the _Bulletin_? If he does not believe that they are +waging protracted conflict to conquer the world, we ask: Can America +afford public servants, men who help shape national policy, who think +that the Communists are not trying to conquer the world? On the other +hand, can America afford public servants who, if they believe that the +Communists are out to conquer the world, criticize those who agree +with them, and who also say that we ought to act accordingly and wage +protracted conflict to defeat Communism? + +Does the Senator believe that we should refuse to act in the light +of the realization that the Communists are out to conquer the world? +In other words, since the Communists are waging war on us on various +fronts and in various ways, should we not engage them in combat on +these various levels? Or should we leave the victory to them by +default? The Communists have declared war on us, they are at war with +us. They are engaging in protracted conflict against us. What should we +do? Fail to respond? Respond weakly? Fearfully? + +Since the _Bulletin_ does not expect the Soviet bloc to collapse, since +it does not think we should meet its aggression in protracted conflict; +just what does it and what does Senator Fulbright propose? Do they +suggest that Communism will back down from world conquest if we refuse +to engage them in protracted conflict? If Communists will not back down +under pressure, will they back down if we yield or refuse to apply +pressure? As a matter of fact, every retreat on our part and every +advance on their part, is viewed by them as proof that their theory of +history is right.[106] Even if we surrendered, they would consider this +as further proof that they have a mandate from history to overthrow all +existing social conditions and to remake man. + +In reply to the _Bulletin’s_ repudiation of protracted conflict, we +would say, in the _third_ place, that it should be clearly understood +that there is no evidence that the Communists will change their goal of +world conquest. G. F. Hudson, Director of the Center for Far Eastern +Studies at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford University, has said: “Ever +since the early days of the Bolshevik regime, there has been the +expectation abroad that it was just about to settle down, discard +its fantastic ideas of world revolution, and revert to the normal +habits and usages of a national sovereign state in its international +relations.” + +“Yet, every time the world has become convinced that the original +creed of Lenin no longer governed Soviet actions and that the policies +of the Soviet Union could be interpreted simply in terms of national +interest and security, like the policies of non-Communist states, +events have provided fresh evidence that the ultimate aim of the +rulers of Russia continued to be the destruction of all ‘bourgeois’ +governments.”[107] + +In the _fourth_ place, the concept of protracted conflict does not rule +out the use of traditional diplomacy or innovating methods of settling +disputes. But it does ask that we recognize that all of these must be +used as weapons in our war with communism. For it is obvious to every +student that the Communists use traditional diplomacy and innovating +methods as but phases of their warfare against civilization. + +It is clear that traditional diplomacy has been tried again and again. +We have even had innovating methods, such as helping enemy countries +with financial aid. We have tried to work through the U.N. Traditional +methods are still being tried. We should continue to use them to the +best of our ability. + +Furthermore, the concept of protracted conflict does not rule out the +resolution of some particular differences “on an ad hoc basis of mutual +interest....” + +Our _fifth_ observation on the _Bulletin’s_ charges, is that the cold +war is bound to have some effect on our democratic institutions. +However, it will not involve near the dangers that would be created +by putting greater power in the hands of the President—whoever the +President may be at a given time—as Senator Fulbright wants to do. The +_Bulletin_ spoke of funds being spent secretly but it made no comments +on the danger of secret executive agreements. + +But there is no reason for protracted conflict to destroy democratic +institutions. We can erect the proper safeguards. Furthermore, the +failure to wage protracted conflict and to win the war we are in +will lead to the destruction of our democratic institutions by the +Communists. + +Whether we wage protracted conflict or not, we are engaged in a war. +Even Senator Fulbright speaks of the long twilight struggle and the +influence it may have on the people. But certainly it is better to risk +the possibility of some dangers to our democratic institutions than to +accept the certainty of their destruction if the Communists win. + +The Communists leave us no range of pleasant choices. We either win in +the struggle with them or we lose all. + +Our _sixth_ observation is that to win this war we must wage it on +every necessary level. We must put the Communists on the defensive +instead of simply reacting to their aggressive moves. As Charles +Malik said: “It is most important that the Communists be put on the +defensive. It is most important that the total arsenal of political, +moral, and spiritual values be bought to bear upon this struggle.”[108] +Even Senator Fulbright has said that we ought to take the initiative +and that a truly tough “approach to Communism is one that meets it with +‘every instrumentality of foreign and domestic policy’....”[109] This +is exactly what the concept of protracted conflict calls for, including +the use of the military in the cold war! + +This does not mean that a nuclear war will take place if we wage +protracted conflict; although we might keep in mind that a failure +to wage protracted conflict will result in our defeat, for they will +nibble us to death, or slice us to pieces with the salami tactic. Edgar +Ansel Mowrer has well said: “And whatever one thinks of the cold war, +one fact stands out: The Soviets have made of it a third way, neither +peace nor hot war. And the conclusions seem obvious: If such a third +way exists for communism, does it not also exist for the West? + +“It certainly does. Its name is waging freedom. Waging freedom means +that, instead of continuing the military and diplomatic defensive, the +West publicly sets as its goal an extension or recovery of the area of +national determination—the rollback of communism. It means the cool, +calculated, and determined acceptance of the Soviet challenge in the +intermediate field. Above all, it means a complete repudiation of +the thesis that the West has no choice save humbly seeking peace or +accepting nuclear annihilation. + +“Most of all, waging peace would mean an end to the present +make-believe in regard to Soviet intentions that dominates too much +thinking. Many, too many, believe, or are trying to believe, that +by some means—a mixture of defensive firmness, magical formula, and +turning the other cheek—the Kremlin can be induced to call the cold war +off. + +“For this, with apologies to Prime Minister Macmillan, there is no +shred of concrete evidence. All known facts point the other way—to the +conclusion that the U.S.S.R. is gradually forcing the West back without +fighting by playing upon its nuclear fears, its reluctance to believe +the unpleasant, and its even greater reluctance to overtrump Soviet +military expenditures. + + +“_West Has Best Hand_” + +“Yet curiously enough, even in such an intermediate struggle, the +stronger cards are on the side of the West. The Kremlin can play upon +the reluctance of a free people to accept a long and costly diplomatic +and arms-building struggle. But the West can count upon much more—the +fact that so far as is known, communism is popular in no country where +it has firmly fixed its claws—not even in the U.S.S.R. as hundreds +of thousands of defections from the Soviet Army during World War II +demonstrated. + +“To be brief: The West has it in its hands to adopt a third policy, a +policy of waging freedom short of major war—and outlasting the Kremlin +at its own chosen game. For the West has several times the economic +resources and in addition the overwhelming moral resource of the appeal +against Communist tyranny. It can, if it chooses, chivvy and harry +Moscow to the point of exhaustion and despair. It can win without +fighting provided it has the courage and the stamina.”[110] + +As James Reston put it: “The choice before the President and the other +leaders of the Western world today is not between the certainty of +destruction and the certainty of Communist expansion, but between +the possibility of destruction if we risk war, and the certainty of +Communist expansion if we don’t.”[111] + +Both from Communist theory and from their past actions we know that +they will start some local conflicts, when and if they think they can +get away with it. They will do this regardless of whether or not we use +protracted conflict. As Dr. Ralph K. White, of the U.S.I.A. said: “But +for a well indoctrinated Communist the rational, prudent aggressive +use of force in the cause of Communism is not only legitimate; it is +obligatory. It is an accepted, integral part of his self-image. He +believes with Karl Marx that ‘force is the midwife of every old society +that is pregnant with the new.’”[112] + + +_Is Victory the Goal?_ + +The memorandum includes an article which is critical of the call for +total victory. “At a 2-day strategy seminar held in Chicago last +September, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs +of Staff, called for ‘total victory over the Communist system—not +stalemate,’ and warned that ‘the minute we become satisfied with the +status quo, we have started down the road to defeat.’ This theme has, +in fact, dominated a series of strategy seminars that have been held +throughout the country during the past 2 years—in New York, Cleveland, +New Orleans, and Wilmington; in California, Massachusetts, Texas, and +Washington, D. C. The chief force behind these meetings of businessmen, +teachers, servicemen, and church leaders has been an organization +called the Institute for American Strategy.”[113] + +The Communist is working toward total victory over the non-Communist +world. In dealing with an enemy who seeks total victory over us, and +in the conflict with whom final defeat would be total defeat, can one +win if he does not seek total victory? Well did Jay Lovestone say: “The +war is total. If we don’t fight them down the line, we lose down the +line.”[114] + +Total victory does not mean that there will be no more evil in the +world once Communism has been defeated. It simply means, in my view +of it, that we should take the initiative and endeavor to meet and to +defeat them on every necessary level. We all wish that by so doing +on some levels that they will be halted in their onward march and +ultimately cease to be Communists. However, in our battle plans we +should not relax and expect the Communists to cease being Communists. +It would have been a real blessing if Hitler had ceased to be Hitler +and if World War II had not been started. But he wasn’t converted from +the errors of his way, and World War II did take place. + +Khrushchev closed the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the +Soviet Union in the Fall of 1961 by saying: “Our aims are clear, the +tasks have been set. To work, comrades! For new victories of communism.” + +What is wrong with seeking total victory over Communism? This would +include victory over its ideology, its subversive activities and its +other forms of aggression. + +Is the call for victory contrary to the President’s program for +survival in this nuclear age? Doesn’t his program for survival +include a program for victory? If such a total victory is not in the +President’s program then the people need to know it. If it is in the +President’s program, what is wrong with backing it and struggling +for it? Senator Fulbright said that the military and the civilian +population should back the President’s program. + +Elsewhere Senator Fulbright himself recognized that the challenge is +total, and that the Communists are waging protracted conflict. “We +endure in an era of total crisis.”[115] After speaking of the armies +and navy of the U.S.S.R., Fulbright said: “In addition the Soviet +Union is mounting a world wide trade offensive aimed primarily at us. +Hence the challenge to us is total. It involves the military, the +political, the intellectual, and the industrial. The measures of our +antagonist cannot be countered by half measures or by half-hearted +competition.”[116] + +“Since we are now in deadly conflict with a prodigious antagonist, we +can neglect nothing that might assure our security.”[117] + +Why, then, take the military out of the cold war? Why, then, did +the Senator criticize in the memorandum the concept of protracted +conflict?[118] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[83] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439, col. 2,m.-p. +13441, col. 1. + +[84] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 3,b. point 2. + +[85] Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, _American Strategy for the +Nuclear Age_, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960, pp. +30-31. I agree with Gerhart Niemeyer that the ideological dimension of +the cold war must be emphasized. _Problems of Communism_, Nov.-Dec. +1961, p. 59. + +[86] Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, _Defense +Secretary McNamara on S. Res. 191_, Washington: Government Printing +Office, 1961, pp. 3-4. + +[87] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b. A +government official in a position to know the viewpoint of current +policy-makers, told Edith Kermit Roosevelt that: “The purpose of +American policy is to work for a merger of East and West. It is +believed accommodation can be reached as the two systems become more +alike politically and economically: As the United States adopts a +more collectivist pattern of federal control, while at the same time +a consolidation of Soviet rule makes genocide purges, and other +less-pleasant attributes of the police state unnecessary.” (“Policy of +‘No Win’ Now Official”, _Dallas Morning News_, May 27, 1962.) + +[88] _Ibid._, p. 13440, col. 1,t. + +[89] _Ibid._, August 2, 1949, pp. A4995-A4996. + +[90] Quoted in the _Congressional Record_, October 3, 1961, p. A7922, +col. 3,t. + +[91] “Ten Reasons Why Communism is Winning”, _Congressional Record_, +April 25, 1961, p. A2788, col. 2,m. + +[92] “War Called Peace: Time for Words Has Passed.” _Congressional +Record_, May 3, 1961, p. A3045, col. 3,m. + +[93] _Congressional Record_, August 7, 1961, p. 13759, col. 3,m. + +[94] _Congressional Record_, May 3, 1961, p. A3045, col. 3. + +[95] _Arkansas Democrat_, November 28, 1961, p. 1, _Arkansas Gazette_, +November 29, 1961, p. 1. + +[96] “Speech Delivered by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to +the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday, September 27, 1961,” +mimeographed copy of the speech, p. 2. + +[97] _Congressional Record_, June 19, 1961, p. A4545, col. 3,m. + +[98] _Ibid._, p. A4546, col. 1,t. + +[99] _Ibid._, p. A4546, col. 1,t. + +[100] Quoted in Department of State, _Soviet World Outlook_, July 1959, +p. 96. + +[101] Mao Tse-tung, _On Contradiction_, Foreign Language Press, Peking, +1952, pp. 66-67. + +[102] John R. Van de Water, _Ideologies in Conflict_. Address on June +8, 1951, p. 7. + +[103] _International Affairs_, Moscow, November 1959, pp. 3-4. + +[104] _Ibid._, p. 5. + +[105] _Ibid._, p. 6. + +[106] Mao Tse-tung _On Contradiction_, p. 61. + +[107] G. F. Hudson, _Problems of Communism_, July-Aug. 1961, p. 31. + +[108] _Congressional Record_, Oct. 3, 1961, p. A7894, col. 3,m. See +Frank J. Johnson, _No Substitute For Victory_, Chicago: Regnery, 1962. + +[109] _Arkansas Democrat_, November 8, 1961, p. 1. + +[110] _Congressional Record_, March 26, 1959, p. A2762, col. 2,m-3,t. + +[111] _Ibid._, September 26, 1961, p. A7750, col. 3,t. + +[112] Ralph K. White’s speech before the American Psychological +Association, Duplicated copy, p. 4. + +[113] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 2,b. + +[114] Taken from my notes of Mr. Lovestone’s speech, Washington, D. +C., November 4, 1961. Congressman Judd said: “Mr. Chairman, nobody +has ever yet won a struggle military or otherwise, by being only on +the defensive and announcing ahead of time that he is not trying to +win.” _Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy._ Washington: Government +Printing Office, 1959, p. 123. + +[115] Senator Fulbright, _Congressional Record_, March 28, 1960, p. +A2707, col. 2,b. + +[116] _Ibid._, p. A2708, col. 2,t. + +[117] _Ibid._, p. A2709, col. 1,m. Congressman McCormack of +Massachusetts said: “As long as the Communists adhere to dialectic +communism and their ultimate intent for world revolution and world +domination, as long as the dominating influence of communism is its +dialectic aspect, the dominating and controlling power or influence of +international communism, they have got to keep on going, and going, +and going until their (sic) either conquer the world or blow up. +International communism as presently constituted cannot permanently +survive in any part of the world there are free men and women.” +(_Congressional Record_, January 22, 1959, p. 951, col. 2,t.) + +[118] In the author’s judgment, there are some who want the military +out of the cold war, because they fear that the military is for the +hard line against communism, i.e. for victory over communism. This, +they fear, will start a war. Several years ago Arthur M. Schlesinger, +Jr. wrote an article on the future of democratic socialism in the +United States. In it he advocated some ideas which, he said, the State +Department had been somewhat following for some time. Among these ideas +were: (a) The U.S.S.R. will get over its “messianic intoxication.” +(b) We must contain her so that she will not run the risk of the +aggression that might prove a general war. (c) We must not engage in +an anti-Soviet crusade. (d) We must not “permit reactionaries in the +buffer states to precipitate conflicts in defense of their own obsolete +prerogatives.” (e) We must demonstrate to the U.S.S.R. that we have +no aggressive intentions toward the U.S.S.R. (f) We must back the +non-Communist left, since—the implication is—such governments will not +be apt to engage in an anti-Soviet crusade. In this way, perhaps we can +stave off general war and give the U.S.S.R. time to undergo a change of +heart. See the _Congressional Record_, Feb. 6, 1962, pp. A881-A884. A +reprint. + +This approach would not only mean that we should encourage neutralism +in at least some nations, but it would also mean that an anti-communist +crusade in America should be defeated. + +It would mean that we should not seek victory over communism. + +It would encourage the salami tactics of the Communists who will try to +see to it that each slice they cut off from the non-Communist world is +not large enough to precipitate a general war. + + + + +Chapter VI + +THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE PRINCIPLE PROBLEM? + + +Senator Fulbright takes a dim view of the American people. He indicates +that the curbing of the people, or the manipulation of the masses, may +be the primary problem of the President. The masses are all potential +McCarthyites who are easily infected with the virus of extremely +radical rightwingism. “In the long run, it is quite possible that the +principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, to +restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with everything +we’ve got, particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos. Pride in +victory, and frustration in restraint, during the Korean war, led to +MacArthur’s revolt and McCarthyism.”[119] This is the most charitable +interpretation of McCarthyism which the Senator has ever made. For +in effect he is saying that McCarthyism is the result of the desire +for victory over Communism, and the frustration which comes when the +leaders try to restrain people from winning this victory. + +We think that the principal problem is Communism and not the American +people. + +The memorandum went on to say that the people cannot be trusted on +foreign policy. They tend to “obey the impulse of passion” and “to +abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary caprice.” +Thus the Senator thought that if foreign aid was “laid before the +people in a referendum, it would be defeated.” The Senator obviously +does not want what _he thinks_ is the people’s will to be carried out. +The people want simple solutions, they want to scourge devils or lash +out at the enemy.[120] + +The Senator, it is plain to see, does not have a very high opinion of +the American people and their ability to govern themselves. Is not +this a lack of confidence in our republican form of government? + + +_How Much Is the Senator For Civilian Control?_ + +Senator Fulbright says that he has a “strong belief in the principle +of military subordination to civilian control.”[121] So does this +reviewer. Furthermore, civilian control ultimately means the +_sovereignty of the people_. Thus it ultimately means the civilian +control of the President and of all other politicians and statesmen. + +Does the Senator believe as strongly in the civilian control of +politicians as well as of the military? It does not seem that the +Senator is too well pleased with this bedrock principle of our +constitutional system. In a TV interview July 30, 1961, he said, +concerning the question of Red China and the U. N. and the recognition +of Communist Outer Mongolia, that: “The sentiments of this country have +been developed to such a pitch our President has no freedom of action +in this field.”[122] Again: “... we will not recognize Red China, +because of the price of dissension within our own ranks at home; it is +too great to pay ... I think we have no freedom of action in this field +because of domestic politics.”[123] + +If he thought that he could get by with it would the Senator thwart the +will of the people concerning Red China and Outer Mongolia? Would he +like to have the freedom to act in these matters contrary to what he +knows to be the will of the people? + +As a matter of fact, the Senator wants us to recognize Outer Mongolia. +He thinks that it might help us learn more about the relationship +between the U.S.S.R. and Red China. Obviously he would urge the +President to recognize Outer Mongolia if he thought that the people +would stand for it. + +The American people, in my judgment, have good reason to be against the +recognition of Outer Mongolia. _First_, around five thousand of her +troops fought Americans and the U.N. forces in Korea.[124] _Second_, +it is one of the oldest of the satellites of the U.S.S.R. _Third_, +it is recognized as a loyal Communist country by Red China. For +example, a Communist paper recently carried an article entitled: “China +Salutes Fraternal Mongolia.”[125] In trade talks around the first of +March, 1961, it was emphasized by Peking that the cooperation between +Mongolia and China was “on the basis of the principles of proletarian +Internationalism.” Marshall Malinevsky, who is chief of the Russian +Army, “described the bond between Mongolian, Chinese and Russian Armies +as ‘cemented in blood’.” _Fourth_, the Premier of Outer Mongolia in +a broadcast on April 24, 1961, emphasized their loyalty to Lenin. +Furthermore, he said: “In their struggle for building a new life, +our people always leaned and continue to lean upon the disinterested +all-around aid of the Soviet Union, the first country of triumphant +Socialism.” _Fifth_, if we recognize Outer Mongolia, Japan will likely +do likewise. This will help increase the sentiment of neutralism in +Japan.[126] _Sixth_, it would have a bad psychological effect in Asia. +The Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, Felix Berto Serrano, said +that it would be “an example of the softening of the U.S. attitude +toward Communism in this part of the world.” The Foreign Minister of +Thailand, Phanat Khoman, said that it would have an adverse affect on +free world morale.[127] + +The Senator thinks that if the people were given a choice in the +matter, they would defeat foreign aid. He may or may not be right. But +is he not saying that what he thinks is the will of the people should +not rule in this matter? + + +_Attitude Towards America_ + +The Senator attacks those individuals who, he says, run down America. +“Implicit in much of the propaganda of the radical right is the +assumption that our free society is permeated with corruption and +decay.”[128] + +There is much that is right in America. We believe that it is the +greatest country in the world. The principles on which it is founded +are the principles which when followed produce progress and prosperity. + +On the other hand, there is enough crime, corruption and decay to cause +all thoughtful Americans real concern. For example, J. Edgar Hoover has +called our attention to these matters countless times. + +We shall not enter into a discussion of this except to point out that +the Senator himself has some hard things to say about America. + +In the speech at Stanford University he said: “In the last few years +American statesmen and scholars have been turning their thoughts +toward an effort to re-define the national ‘purpose,’ to interpret our +national life and politics in terms of goals. The genesis of this quest +for a clear national objective was a feeling that somehow the American +people had strayed from their historic course into a blind alley of +aimlessness and frustration. In an era of unexampled affluence, the +American people, by and large, are not happy. In the years since World +War II, we have attained our private purposes almost too well at home, +but beyond our personal material needs we have not yet recognized an +objective or purpose which inspires our real interest. At home we +have become immersed in the crass delight of extravagant consumption, +puerile faddism, and callow amusements.” + +“The quest for a definition of the national purpose has been generated +by this sense of malaise. If our people were engaged in vigorous +and meaningful activity, it is quite possible that we would not now +be troubling ourselves with a quest for abstract definition and +articulation.”[129] + +Rightwing extremism, he says, has great appeal to the American public, +and in times of crisis it has “great mass appeal”. The people are the +ones who need to be restrained in our conflict with communism. The +people do not have enough understanding to back an adequate foreign +policy.[130] The people are misled by simple solutions and need some +devils to scourge. “The radicalism of the right can be expected to +have great mass appeal during such periods. It offers the simple +solution, easily understood: Scourging of the devils within the body +politic, or, in the extreme, lashing out at the enemy.”[131] + +On September 1, 1960, Senator Fulbright said: “I believe that such +a study would conclude that America’s trouble is basically one of +aimlessness at home and frustration abroad.”[132] + +In the light of these contentions of the Senator, he is hardly the one +to defend America against the charge, which he says is made by the +“radical right,” that our “free society is permeated with corruption +and decay.” Has the “radical right” said anything harder about America +than has the Senator? If not, why should they be classified as radical, +and the Senator not also be grouped with them in this matter. + + +_The Manipulated Masses?_ + +Not only does the Senator think that the problem is to restrain +the people, but that the people should be “directed” into backing +whatever the President’s program happens to be. He does not trust +the people; his statements make this clear. They must be “directed”. +“Fundamentally, it is believed that the American people have little, +if any, need to be alerted to the menace of the cold war. Rather, +the need is for understanding of the true nature of that menace, and +the direction of the public’s present and foreseeable awareness of +the fact of the menace toward support of the President’s own total +program for survival in a nuclear age. There are no reasons to believe +that military personnel generally can contribute to this need, beyond +their specific, technical competence to explain their own role. On the +contrary, there are many reasons, and some evidence, for believing +that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, involves +considerable danger.”[133] + +Frankly at times we are not sure what is the President’s own total +program. It has vacillated, for example, concerning Laos and Cuba. Are +we to be “directed” into it, as the President unfolds it, or shapes it, +from time to time? + +Senator Fulbright has attacked the competency of the people. He laid +down in his secret memorandum, in our judgement, the ideological basis +for a program of Pavlovian conditioning of the American people to +accept whatever is decided on in the White House, the State Department +and by a small group of advisors.[134] + +The Senator thinks that the people are susceptible to radicalism. He +says that extremely radical rightwingism “already has great appeal to +the public. In the future it may well have much greater appeal.”[135] +So the problem is to “direct” them into the President’s own total +program. This program, the Senator implies, _is quite different_ from +the general program for victory and survival which is discussed in the +memorandum and repudiated as being rightwing. For he thinks that the +rightwingers are raising an obstacle to the “public acceptance of the +President’s program.”[136] + +Carried out to its logical conclusion, we believe that the memorandum, +and the way in which it was formed and implemented, introduces a +new concept into our government, a concept which would replace the +Constitution and the sovereignty of the people. The President, the +State Department and a few advisors are the ones who through their own +will and wisdom formulate the policies which shall be followed. This +they are to do independently of the people, for the people are too +deficient in understanding; they are so immature that they follow the +momentary caprice; they tend to obey the impulse of passion and thus +the “Radicalism of the right can be expected to have great mass appeal +during such periods” as the “long twilight struggle”. Furthermore, +our age is complex, therefore, the public must either be ignored or +conditioned so that they will follow the leader. In directing the +people into the President’s program, the military should engage in the +cold war only to the extent that it can help do this in explaining +their own strictly military role. After speaking of the need for the +direction of the people’s awareness, that there is a danger, into +support for the President’s program, he said: “There are no reasons +to believe that military personnel generally can contribute to this +need, beyond their specific technical competence to explain their own +role. On the contrary, there are many reasons and some evidence, for +believing that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, +involves considerable danger.”[137] Does this mean that when the +military cannot be used as a rubber stamp it must not be used in waging +the cold war? + +It should be remembered that this basically anti-constitutional +concept—against the Constitution in that it distrusts and wants +to “direct” the people, rather than accept the sovereignty of the +people—was set forth in a secret memorandum. The other members of the +Foreign Relations Committee did not see it. It was sent directly to the +President and the Secretary of Defense, and has had an influence on a +very important policy. + +Walter Lippmann, who is highly regarded by Senator Fulbright, said that +there was a tendency of Government “insiders” to view the criticism +of the “outsiders” as that of ignoramuses who were not enlightened +by secret files and conferences. He said: “I tell the critic, you be +careful. You will be denouncing the principle of democracy itself, +which asserts that the outsiders shall be sovereign over the insiders. +For you will be showing that the people themselves, since they are +ignoramuses because they are outsiders, are therefore incapable of +governing themselves. + +“Furthermore, Lippmann declared that as far as the affairs of the world +are concerned, those who regard themselves as insiders are actually +outsiders since none of them read all of the U.S. papers and they +have no access to the records of foreign governments that are equally +important and if one is to have the total wisdom the insiders indicate +they have.”[138] + + +_An Out-Moded Constitutional System?_ + +Senator Fulbright seems to want to change our system of government +so that it will be run by one man, the President. He has unlimited +confidence in the President as a man who is above partisan politics +and who is of high moral calibre _by virtue of the fact_ that he is +President. He views our constitutional system as out of date. Thus in +his Stanford speech, July 28, 1961, he said: + +“The President is hobbled in his task of leading the American people +to consensus and concerted action by the restrictions of power imposed +on him by a constitutional system designed for an eighteenth century +agrarian society far removed from the centers of world power. It is +imperative that we break out of the intelligent confines of cherished +and traditional beliefs and open our minds to the possibility that +basic changes in our system may be essential to meet the requirements +of the twentieth century. + +“The ability of this nation to preserve the value system which +constitutes the core of our national interest has come to depend +principally on our ability to cope with world wide revolutionary +forces. If we are to deal with these forces successfully, we must be +able to act quickly and decisively on the one hand and persistently and +patiently on the other. ‘Our American task,’ wrote Walter Lippmann in +a recent article, ‘is to generate superior national strength. For this +we must have a powerful and purposeful National Government.... There is +no getting away from the fact that, as Lord Acton said, power corrupts. +But also, there is no getting away from the fact that powerlessness +invites confusion, demoralization, and defeat.’ + +“The fact that is needed is Presidential power. He alone, among elected +officials, can rise above parochialism and private pressures. He +alone, in his role as teacher and moral leader, can hope to overcome +the excesses and inadequacies of a public opinion that is all too +often ignorant of the needs, the dangers, and the opportunities in our +foreign relations. + +“Public Opinion, wrote Lippmann in _The Public Philosophy_, +consistently lags a generation behind in its attitudes and assessments +of international relations. The tyranny of public opinion, he says, +imposes upon our policy-makers a ‘compulsion to make mistakes.’ +The poet Yeats was not wholly wrong when he laid down this harsh +pronouncement on public opinion: ‘The best lack all conviction—the +worst are filled with passionate intensity.’ + +“These views may be extreme but they are not wholly without merit, +and I point to them in order to stress the point that public opinion +must be educated and led if it is to bolster wise and effective +national policies. Only the President can provide the guidance that is +necessary, while legislators display a distressing tendency to adhere +slavishly to the dictates of public opinion, or at least to its vocal +and highly organized minority segments.”[139] + +Lippmann’s statement concerning the “insiders” and “outsiders” ought to +be recalled in this connection. We should also remember his criticism +that President Eisenhower was a defeatist who lacked faith in our +people and in our system.[140] Why, then, should he contend that what +is needed is more Presidential power? Why should Senator Fulbright +maintain the same thing? + +In a news conference in Washington, President Eisenhower said on May +10, 1962, that: “I believe that the problem of the Presidency is +rarely an inadequacy of power. Ordinarily, the problem is to use the +already enormous power of the Presidency judiciously, temperately and +wisely.”[141] + +With all due respect to the President of the United States, whoever he +may be at any given time in our history, we do not believe that any +President is wise enough, knows enough or is good enough to occupy the +position to which Senator Fulbright would elevate him. Of course, with +the attitude which Fulbright has toward the masses, it is logical that +he should accept the Fuhrer (Fuhrer means “leader”) principle. The +masses must look to _the leader_. He must be their teacher and their +moral leader. + +“We got rid of kings back there in 1776, Senator.”[142] The Senator +talks like a reactionary who wants to go back to kings and their +“divine right” to rule. + +Senator Fulbright thinks that legislators are slaves of public opinion, +but the President is exempt from such. We ask: In our Republic +shouldn’t the legislators and the President be subject to public +opinion under law? If they are not to be responsive to the will of the +people within the framework of our constitutional government, to whom +and to what are they to be responsive? + +Has the Senator from Arkansas forgotten that less than two years +ago President Kennedy was a Senator, and thus a legislator; and +legislators, according to Fulbright, display a “distressing tendency +to adhere slavishly to the dictates of public opinion, or at least to +its vocal and highly organized minority segments.” Just because this +particular Senator was elected President did he therefore become so +transformed that he rose above “parochialism and private pressures”? +Did he become overnight the “teacher and moral leader”, the “only” one +who can “provide the guidance that is necessary”? Does the Senator +think, if Nixon had been elected President, that automatically on +his shoulders would have descended the wisdom, the knowledge and the +unlimited goodness which would be necessary in one who is to be our +Leader in morality, our Teacher and our Guide? As a matter of fact, +we know that the Senator does not believe that Mr. Nixon, if he had +been elected, would have metamorphized into the Leader which Senator +Fulbright claims that the President by the very nature of the case +becomes. On February 1, 1960, Senator Fulbright reprinted in the +_Congressional Record_ an article by James Reston which was critical +of Mr. Nixon. Senator Fulbright said of the article that “it is seldom +in this stolid and humorless era that an observer of our political +scene sees through the absurd double talk of so much of the political +speeches with which we are entertained.” Reston, however, had done so +concerning Mr. Nixon.[143] And yet, Senator Fulbright’s concept of the +Presidency is such that he must believe, if he follows his position to +its logical conclusion, that Mr. Nixon would have ceased all double +talk, and have become the teacher and the moral leader of the nation if +he had been elected! + +Did Senator Fulbright think that President Truman was the moral and +educational leader of the people just because he was President? Of +Truman he said in 1951: “For a long time we have been walking on +opposite sides of the street, neither of us nodding to the other. He +has often thought me wrong and unspeakable, while I have sometimes +thought him wrong and incomprehensible.” + +“I have spoken with him on official business only once in several +years.”[144] + +Senator Fulbright did not think that because President Eisenhower +was in the office of President that he was therefore qualified as +the leader and teacher of the people. He thought that Eisenhower was +confused and engaged in the lucrative business of making and selling +tranquilizer pills.[145] He spoke of the absence of leadership on the +part of the President.[146] A veto message was described as “unworthy +of his great office and beneath the dignity of the Congress to which +it was sent. It is not factual. It is intemperate. It was obviously +designed to catch newspaper headlines and radio and television news +blurbs.”[147] The President himself; the Senator said, was unaware of +the vastness of the Soviet challenge. “In defense, in our domestic +economy, and in our foreign relations, the administration seems to +be unaware of the depth and scope of the Soviet challenge. There is +no evidence that the administration is now or ever will be willing +to urge the American people to take in one notch on our belt to deal +with a Soviet challenge which confronts us in missiles, arms, and just +downright capacity to produce.”[148] “I believe that the people of +America will rise to the needs of our situation if they are clearly +told what is at stake. They certainly would be willing to be taxed +if it is necessary to survival. But I am not sure the administration +agrees with even that simple proposition.”[149] + +With high commendation, Senator Fulbright inserted an article by Joseph +Alsop into the _Congressional Record_ which indicated that he thought +that President Eisenhower did not have, to say the least, the balanced +judgment necessary for guiding aright the ship of state. Of a reason +advanced by the President concerning test bans, Alsop said: “Surely +this singular choice of reasons for a high policy decision of truly +immeasurable import, reveals a mind gripped by one idea to the point +of total obsession. Surely it shows a man driven by a single purpose +almost to the point of mania.”[150] + +Senator Fulbright further charged that President Eisenhower did not +have the proper attitude toward Congress and that he did not take +them into his confidence. Perhaps the Senator thought that there were +too many secret memorandums floating around! At any rate he said: “I +believe that a great deal of this stems from the President’s attitude +toward Congress, particularly toward the Democratic Members of +Congress. He has shown very little disposition to take them into his +confidence, now or at any other time. + +“I believe that legitimately leaves many people with the feeling that +we do not know all that we ought to know. I asked Mr. Kohler about the +letter which Khrushchev had written, and Mr. Kohler said flatly that +he could not discuss it. I said that it had appeared at least in part +in the Herald Tribune, and that it was strange indeed that it could +be revealed to Miss Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune, but not +to a committee of the Senate. He said that he could not discuss it. +Apparently he was under orders not to discuss it in any respect with +the committee. That did not leave a very good taste in my mouth. It is +a mystery to me why a letter, unless it was specifically agreed that +Mr. Khrushchev considered it a personal and confidential letter, should +not be released. Having been released, or leaked, as the new term is, +to the Herald Tribune, I do not know of any reason why it should not be +made available to the committee, and to the public, for that matter, in +a more official manner than the way in which it was. + +“With reference to the statement of the Senator regarding what Mr. +Tsarapkin said, I have only seen a summary of it which Mr. Farley +brought to me and said: + +“‘This is all that can be released now.’ + +“I do not quite understand why that should be true. Maybe the Senator’s +explanation would be a violation of an understanding. That is possible. +However, I must agree with the Senator that a little more frank +discussion, and taking the public into their confidence, certainly the +Senate of the United States, particularly the Committee on Foreign +Relations, would be a very healthy step.”[151] + +Senator Fulbright also thought that President Eisenhower was forcing +uniformity of viewpoint in his administration. Men under him were +either muzzled or suffered the consequences. Or at least the Senator +indicated this in an insertion, with high praise, of an article by +Joseph Alsop which said: “In this administration, uniformity of +viewpoint is virtually enforced. Independent-minded persons who do +not take their viewpoint, readymade, from the White House have always +been condemned as non-team players. Soon or late, they have always +met the fate of General Gavin, General Ridgway, and Gen. Maxwell D. +Taylor.”[152] + +As late as March 22, 1960, Senator Fulbright, in a speech before the +Annual Dinner of the Harvard Club of Washington, D. C., commended +a high military official for disagreeing with the President. And, +furthermore, Senator Fulbright seems to cast scorn on the idea that +it was not for Generals to reason why! As the Senator put it: “Gen. +Bernard Schriever has also said that there is ‘very much evidence’ +that Russia has greatly strengthened its bomber defenses. But the +aircraft that might not be able to get through may not even be able to +demonstrate their impotence. ‘For,’ states Gen. Thomas Power, Chief of +the Strategic Air Command, ‘our bomber bases are vulnerable to surprise +attack.’ + +“Generals are not to reason why. Their Commander in Chief complains +that, ‘too many generals have all sorts of ideas.’ + +“Yet mankind moves on ideas. Men with ideas are the makers and shakers +of the world. The larger their number serving the country the more +fruitful and vigorous the country. But few men of ideas come to +Washington. They are not likely to seek service in a government which +is scornful of their kind.”[153] + +The Senator seemed to agree with the idea that “President Eisenhower +leads a dangerously sheltered life as Chief Executive of the +Nation.”[154] + +Lyndon B. Johnson also commended, on February 16, 1960, the idea that +public debate by military officials was good. He reprinted a letter +from a Harvard professor, Henry A. Kissinger, that: “The President +says he deplores public argument by military experts regarding our +defense policy. Prior to this, he had called his critics parochial and +had invoked his superior expertise in the subject. It is impossible, +of course, for laymen to pass judgment on a debate of such technical +complexity. They have a right to insist, however, that the categories +of the debate be properly put.”[155] + +In the light of these considerations, it is a serious question as to +what has happened to Senator Fulbright within the last year or so that +has led him to think now that President Kennedy is in office, that +the office of the Presidency has automatically raised the President +above the temptations and mistakes that not only beset legislators—and +Kennedy was a Senator less than two years ago—but also above those +which beset Eisenhower. What makes the Senator, in the light of his +previous criticisms of Eisenhower, think what is needed in this country +is more power for the President? After all, the Senator might reflect, +President Kennedy will not be President forever, and what if after we +have conferred far greater powers on the President, while Kennedy was +in office, someone like Eisenhower or Truman, of whom the Senator was +so critical, became President!! + +In denouncing those whom he labeled as “fanatics” and “extremists” of +the right, in a speech in Los Angeles on November 18, President Kennedy +said: “They call for a ‘man on horseback’ because they do not trust +the people.”[156] And yet, Senator Fulbright calls for more power for +the President, because the people are so ignorant that they need the +Leader. Wouldn’t this position make the Senator, in this matter, akin +to the rightwing “fanatics”? As Joseph Alsop said, in regards to a +position President Eisenhower had taken, “perhaps it would have been +better to assert, at the outset, that it is always wrong for any nation +to trust any leader, instead of trusting the hard facts.”[157] + +Former President Herbert Hoover has indicated that more than one loss +to communism has taken place because the man in the position of the +Presidency, along with his selected advisors, entered into agreements +without an opportunity being given to the Congress or to the people to +know of, to discuss or to pass on these matters. “Executive agreements, +Mr. Hoover said, had spread communism over the earth, turned over the +Baltic States to Soviet Russia, partitioned Poland at the Teheran +Conference, surrendered 10 nations to slavery at Yalta and set in +motion the communization of Mongolia, North Korea, and all China. One +result of these ‘unrestrained Presidential actions’ is a worldwide +shrinking of human freedoms. Another has been a steady encroachment on +powers of the legislative branch by the executive.”[158] + +Senator Fulbright would lead us away from our constitutional system +to a system wherein the power would be concentrated in the hands of +the President. “The power that is needed is Presidential power.” “Only +the President can provide the guidance that is necessary....” But +this is not to lead us to a newer and higher form of government, than +that of our so-called out-moded “eighteenth century agrarian society” +constitutional system. It is to lead us back to the concept of +dictatorship, of the Fuhrer. + +The leader, of course, would have his small, select group of advisors. +In such a set-up, government by secret memorandums would likely be the +order of the day. + +We trust that Senator Fulbright, who is influential in the present +administration, will not influence President Kennedy to accept this +concept of our constitutional system, nor this idea of the role of the +President. + +The Senator knows that power tends to corrupt and that absolute power +corrupts absolutely, for he himself once said: “Wherever there is power +there is the possibility that it will be used and the danger that it +will be misused. This assumption, expressed in Lord Acton’s maxim that +‘power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,’ is common +to all effective democracies. This principle is one of instinctive +distrust of power itself wherever it exists. It has nothing to do with +the motives of any group or individual who may wield it. It has been +directed against big business, big labor, and big government, and now, +inevitably, it is directed against our big Military Establishment.”[159] + +Why, then, does the Senator want to give to the President far more +power than the Constitution now allows and the President now has? For +what does the President need more power? + + +_Backing the President_ + +The Senator said that the need is for the public to be directed into +the support of the President’s own total program.[160] Does this apply +to the Senator? + +As a candidate, President Kennedy said he would do something about +Cuba. He was going to do something, i.e. back an invasion. But Senator +Fulbright’s opposition to our backing an invasion had an influence, +according to some, on the President which helped induce him to modify +his plans. Thus the invasion was doomed to failure. + +President Kennedy emphasized that we would stand firm in Berlin.[161] +On a TV program on July 30, 1961, the following exchange took place: + +“Mr. Scali. In any negotiations over Berlin, Senator, would you be +willing to accept any concessions on the part of the West which closed +West Berlin as an escape hatch for refugees in any way? + +“Senator Fulbright. Well, I think that that might certainly be a +negotiable point. The truth of the matter is I think the Russians have +the power to close it in any case. I mean we are not giving up very +much because I believe next week if they chose to close their borders, +they could, without violating any treaty right I know of. We have no +right to insist that they be allowed to come out. As I said I don’t +understand why the East Germans don’t close the border because I think +they have a right to close it. So why is this a great concession? You +don’t have that right now.”[162] + +The question dealt specifically with the West making some concessions +which would close the escape hatch. The Senator thought “that might +certainly be a negotiable point.” He made it clear that we could not +negotiate with them as to whether they had the power to close it, so he +was not implying we should negotiate concerning their power; nor, as +he also put it, their right to close the escape hatch. The only thing +left to negotiate was, as the question specifically said, whether the +West should make any concessions “which closed West Berlin as an escape +hatch for refugees in any way.” In other words, the Senator indicates +that we should negotiate as to whether or not the West should help—by +making concessions on our part, since obviously we could not make +concessions for the Russians—close the escape hatch and thus in effect +whether the West should help the Communists guard the prison house in +which the Communists have their slaves. + +The East German Communists made use of the Senator’s statements, and +commended him. On August 3, 1961, in East Berlin _Neues Deutschland_ +had the following heading for an article: “U. S. Senator Against Trade +in Human Beings.” He was quoted as saying that: “the East Germans have +the right to close their borders.” The paper stressed that the Bonn +government was very much upset with Senator Fulbright’s proposal, as +they put it, to hold “serious negotiations on Berlin with the USSR.” +On August 4 the same paper said: “But the man seems to be a realistic +politician.” “Apparently Fulbright is aware of the fact that the +man-trap of West Berlin is an untenable situation, that it must and +will be closed.” + +We wonder whether the President felt that the Senator’s speech upheld +the President’s position on Berlin. + +The Senator later explained that this was not what he meant. It was, +however, what he said. We quote the entire explanation which was made +in the Senate on August 4, 1961. + +“Last Sunday, I appeared on the ABC network television and radio +program, ‘Issues and Answers.’ In the course of that program one of +the exchanges led to an unfortunate and erroneous impression of my +views. When asked if I thought the West should make any concessions +on the question of the flight of East German refugees to West Berlin, +I responded that this, too, is something that could be discussed, +because—and this is the point—the East Germans have the ability to +control travel _within_ East Germany. + +“The imposition of tighter travel restrictions by the East Germans +on travel of East German citizens within East Germany could restrict +access of East German citizens to all of Berlin, thus depriving a large +number of potential refugees from East Germany (as distinguished from +East Berlin) of this convenient means of escape. + +“As I pointed out in the TV and radio interview, I know of no +agreements to which the Western Powers are party which prohibit the +East Germans from restricting the travel of East German citizens within +East Germany (outside of Berlin). It is to that point of reference that +my response was intended in the interview. + +“I certainly did not intend to imply that the West should execute any +agreement whereby the West would assist in enforcing any restriction +imposed by East Germany on travel within East Germany nor that the West +should consider changing existing agreements and consent to closing +West Berlin to refugees wishing to enter. + +“The right of persons to move freely within all sectors of Berlin is +entirely another matter and is guaranteed by post-war agreements signed +by the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. I do not +consider such right to be negotiable.”[163] + +According to Constantine Brown, Germans and other Europeans have raised +the question: “How can we reconcile what your President tells us with +what his own important party leaders and especially the chairman of +the most important Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Fulbright, says +in public, on the floor of the Senate and in radio and television +interviews?” + +“The suspicions of what may be termed a schizophrenic foreign policy +started some time ago when Senator Mansfield, the majority leader, and +later Senator Fulbright urged negotiations on Berlin after Mr. Kennedy +had taken a formally strong stand on that very matter.”[164] + +We wonder if the Senator has set the public a good example of clearly +and wholeheartedly backing the President’s program in such matters as +we have mentioned? + +In a review of some of our history Senator Fulbright took the position +that it was important for the people themselves to bring to bear +pressure on the President, instead of always following the leader. +“Moreover, throughout the whole of this process, while much was done +by the action of individual Presidents, a great deal was done as a +direct result of congressional action or by the direct play of public +pressures, rising from a people whose life was being progressively +democratized. + +“The key point is that the conduct of foreign affairs did not appear +to be an elite function, limited to specialists in and around the +Executive. Neither the electorate nor the Congress was ever overawed +by the Executive claim to exclusive knowledge, or its claim that it +would be against the national interest to disclose the facts relevant +to a foreign policy decision. Foreign policy was debated in remote +frontier outposts as well as in seaboard cities, with a shrewdness and +a knowledge of great power rivalries that astonishes any modern reader +who browses through the records of these debates preserved in our +National Archives.”[165] + +Now that the Senator’s secret memorandum has been made public, +the people can study it, debate it and continue to exercise their +sovereignty. It is through knowledge and action based thereon that +the civilian control can be maintained over the government and thus +over the military. Those who do not believe that our constitutional +system is out of date will surely want to examine closely the Senator’s +position.[166] In fact, the Senator himself once emphasized the +necessity of debating issues. “Too many people are given a practical +veto over policy. There is an inhibition of the kind of free debate out +of which a fundamental national agreement emerges.” “Nonpartisanship +does not mean the absence of debate on foreign policy.” “I do not think +it is possible for a democratic country to have a viable, effective +policy unless it is founded on the widest possible public discussion. +Debate is a necessary ingredient of policymaking.”[167] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[119] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t. + +[120] _Ibid._, p. 13437. + +[121] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,b. + +[122] _Ibid._, August 1, 1961, p. 13219, col. 2,t. + +[123] _Ibid._, p. 13219, col. 2,m. + +[124] _Commercial Appeal_, August 1, 1961. Report of speech of +Congressman Frank J. Becker. This same news item said that Senator +Fulbright was for the recognition of Outer Mongolia. + +[125] _Peking Review_, July 14, 1961, p. 7. + +[126] See the American-Asian Educational Exchange’s recent report on +Communist China and Asia, July, 1961. See also _The Worker_, October 1, +1961, p. 6. _World Marxist Review_, July 1961, p. 3. + +[127] _Chinese News Service_, August 1, 1961, pp. 3-4. For some +additional comments see Thomas J. Dodd’s speech in the _Congressional +Record_, August 2, 1961. + +[128] _Congressional Record_, August 21, 1961, p. 15357, col. 3,m. + +[129] Speech of Senator Fulbright before the 1961 Summer Cubberly +Conference of Stanford University, Stanford, California, July 28, 1961. +Mimeographed copy, pp. 1-2. + +[130] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,m. + +[131] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 2,m. + +[132] _Ibid._, September 2, 1960, p. A6708, col. 2,b. + +[133] _Ibid._, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b. Dr. Robert T. +Oliver, of Pennsylvania State University, expressed his opinion on +October 24, 1961, that: “Democratic and totalitarian governments are +becoming more and more alike in their methods of governing—through the +manipulation of public opinion by control of secrecy and publicity.” +(_Congressional Record_, Jan. 15, 1962, p. A141, col. 2,t.) + +[134] See Edward Hunter, speech on the Manion Forum. 1961. Reprinted in +the _Congressional Record_, Feb. 6, 1962, pp. A906-907. + +[135] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 1,b.-2,t. + +[136] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,b. See also p. 13436, col. 3,b. + +[137] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 3,t. + +[138] _Ibid._, January 18, 1960, p. 578, col. 3,m. Dr. Robert T. +Oliver, who served over twelve years in the inner councils of the +government of Korea, dealing with matters of foreign policy, said: “On +the whole, however, the significant facts concerning all the major +international issues are completely available to anyone who takes the +trouble to keep up with the news.” (_Ibid._, Jan. 5, 1962, p. A140, +col. 3,b.) + +[139] Speech of Senator Fulbright before the 1961 Summer Cubberly +Conference at Stanford University, Stanford, California, July 28, +1961, pp. 7-8. When he was a Senator, Kennedy made it clear that +the Presidency conferred no wisdom in his criticism of Eisenhower. +(_Congressional Record_, June 14, 1960, p. 11630, col. 3,t.) The +question is raised in my mind as to whether or not Senator Kennedy, +who spoke of the “missile gap” and other “gaps” in our defenses during +the campaign for President, was really that ignorant of our defense +posture? Yet, within a few months after he became president—and +certainly before anything that his administration did could have +changed the picture basically—we “learned” that there was no “missile +gap” and that our defense posture was strong. (See the article by David +Lawrence in the _Congressional Record_, Jan. 16, 1962, p. A241, cols. 2 +and 3.) + +Senator Fulbright himself said “In a democratic system, such as ours, +the people do have much to say about policy, and they decide who shall +govern them. How, may I ask, can our people be expected to discharge +their duty as citizens of a self-governing republic, if they are not +told the truth about their affairs? It would be easier, more pleasant, +and I am sure more popular, to join those who pretend that all is +well, that the summit meeting was a triumph for the West and that the +Japanese fiasco only demonstrates once again the viciousness of the +Communists.” (_Ibid._, June 28, 1960, p. 13672, col. 2,m.) + +[140] Column of February 11, 1960. _Congressional Record_, February 19, +1960, p. 2761, col. 3,t. + +[141] _U.S. News and World Report_, May 21, 1962, p. 15. + +[142] _Evening Tribune_, San Diego, California, Editorial, August 14, +1961. + +[143] _Congressional Record_, February 1, 1960, p. 1519, col. 2,m, +Senator Fulbright once accused Nixon of “deceiving the American +people”. Quoted in _The Arkansas Historical Quarterly_, Winter, 1961, +p. 328. + +[144] _Congressional Record_, April 26, 1951, p. 4409, col. 3,m. + +[145] _Ibid_, September 9, 1959, p. 17250, col. 3,m. + +[146] _Ibid._, April 24, 1959, p. 5932, col. 3,b. + +[147] _Ibid._, August 12, 1959, p. 14272, col. 1,m. + +[148] _Ibid._, March 18, 1959, p. 3948, col. 1,m. + +[149] _Ibid._, p. 3948, col 1,b. + +[150] _Ibid._, February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col 3,m. + +[151] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, p. 6207, col. 2,m. + +[152] _Ibid._, February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col. 3,b.-p. 1979, col. 1,t. + +[153] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 2,m. + +[154] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 2,b. + +[155] _Ibid._, February 16, 1960, pp. A1250, col. 3,b. A1251, col. 1,t. + +[156] As quoted in the _U.S. News and World Report_, December 4, 1961, +p. 4, col. 1,b. + +[157] _Congressional Record_, February 19, 1961, p. 2769. + +[158] _Congressional Record_, August 16, 1954, p. A6075, col. 3,m. +See the entire speech in Herbert Hoover, _Addresses Upon the American +Road_, August 10, 1954, pp. 74-84. + +[159] _Ibid._, August 21, 1961, p. 15357, col. 1,t. Speech before the +National War College, August 21, 1961. + +[160] _Ibid._, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t. + +[161] Compare Constantine Brown, _Congressional Record_, September 5, +1961, p. A6963. + +[162] _Ibid._, August 1, 1961, p. 13218, col. 2,t. + +[163] Statement by Senator Fulbright before the United States Senate, +August 4, 1961. It is regrettable that the right to move freely within +all sectors of Berlin has been abrogated by the Communists without any +negotiations. J.D.B. + +[164] _Congressional Record_, September 5, 1961, p. A6963, col. 2,m. + +[165] Speech by Senator Fulbright at the 10th anniversary banquet of +the _Reporter_ magazine. April 16, 1959. _Congressional Record_, April +17, 1959, p. 5543, col. 2,m. + +[166] Compare Constantine Brown, “Remaking the Constitution?” _Ibid._, +September 12, 1961, p. A7150, col. 2. + +[167] Senator Fulbright, _Congressional Record_, April 17, 1959, p. +5542, col. 3. + + + + +Chapter VII + +WHO IS THE DEFEATIST? + +One reason that was given for the banning of “Communism on the Map” +from military installations was that it was defeatist. If a diagnosis +of the dangerous situation we are in is defeatism a doctor should not +diagnose a serious disease. It is not a defeatist film, although it +does show that we are in real danger. Senator Fulbright himself said: +“We are confronted by the most formidable and resourceful adversary +ever to have challenged us...”[168] President Kennedy on October 12, +1961, stated that mankind is in the most dangerous situation the human +race has ever been in. + +An examination of some of Senator Fulbright’s positions shows that +he is a defeatist in that he indicates that we should not try to win +victory over communism. The Senator does not think in terms of victory +over the communist enemy; although he seemed to think in terms of +victory, and that immediately, over the military in his effort to knock +them out of the cold war! + +The Senator does not seem to understand the principle set forth by +Anthony Harrigan, director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, +that: “As important to a navy as new ships and late-model weapons is a +victory psychology. In the last analysis, it is the will to win that +turns the tide of battle. The great conflicts of former centuries +are replete with illustrations of the truth that the nation that is +emotionally dedicated to victory is the nation that triumphs, even +though its weapons may not be a match for the enemy’s weapons. To +cite only one example, the outnumbered airmen of the Royal Air Force +defeated the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain because they had the +will to win.”[169] + + +_Victory not Sought_ + +Senator Fulbright said that both “World Wars ended in total victory, +but the world is far less safe for democracy today than it was in 1914, +when the current era of upheavals began. One of the principle lessons +of two World Wars is that wars, and total victories, generate more +problems than they solve.”[170] What if we had lost these wars? The +trouble was not that we won the wars but that we failed to keep the +peace after the wars were won. + +Senator Fulbright, to be consistent, should take the position that +we should not fight communism even if war is forced on us, since he +says that war and victory create more problems than they solve. The +Senator says that he is not for total victory, and by that he means +such a victory as we won in World War I and World War II, and that +even if we won we would have the additional problem of what to do with +victory![171] + +What is it but defeatism for one to say that we should not seek victory +over communism, and that if we did win it would create more problems +than it would solve? + + +_Defeatism concerning Cuba_ + +In the campaign for the Presidency, John F. Kennedy said that he +would do something about Cuba. The Monroe Doctrine calls on us to do +something about Cuba. The influence of Senator Fulbright, according +to Charles J. V. Murphy, helped bring about a change in plans which +contributed to the “fatal dismemberment of the whole plan.”[172] The +Senator thought that the invasion was a bad thing to do even if we +succeeded. World opinion would label us as an aggressor, and we would +have to support Cuba after we had thrown out Castro, and this would be +a drain on our Treasury![173] It is strange that the Senator did not +think of such arguments when U.N. troops, with United States support, +waged war on Katanga. Furthermore, the Senator approved the State +Department’s action in the show of force of American troops, ships and +planes off the coast of the Dominican Republic in the fall of 1961.[174] + +Fulbright is such a defeatist that he thinks that we cannot do much +about Cuba, and that communist-controlled Cuba seems to be here to +stay[175]. + +The rejection of the idea of victory over communism may be the reason +that Edgar Ansel Mowrer, on returning to the United States after being +in Europe, wrote: “In short, I find the Washington official attitude +one of basic defeatism hidden behind a hot air screen of talk about the +historical trend being on our side.”[176] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[168] Stanford Speech, p. 11. + +[169] “The Will to Win”, _Congressional Record_, August 29, 1961, p. +A6794. + +[170] _Congressional Record_, July 24, 1961, pp. 12280-12281, col. 3,b. +The Senator thought that possible action on our part might provoke the +Soviets to an unrestricted nuclear arms race. At the very moment he +was saying this, the Communists were finishing their preparations for +renewed atmospheric testing, although we had not prepared for such and +had not “provoked” them into doing this! When will some people learn +that the driving power of communist activity is not reaction to our +moves, but a positive program of world conquest based on their world +view. + +[171] Same as 3. + +[172] _Congressional Record_, September 7, 1961, p. A7040. Senator +Fulbright thought that it violated the OAS Charter. This statement in +the quotation concerning Kennedy’s change of plans, does not imply that +Senator Fulbright had anything to do with planning or executing the +project. + +[173] _Arkansas Gazette_, July 30, 1961, p. 5E. This quotation from the +_Gazette_ is based on the Senator’s speech of July 24. _Congressional +Record_, July 24, 1961, p. 12281. + +[174] _Arkansas Democrat_, December 4, 1961. + +[175] _Congressional Record_, June 29, 1961, p. 10874. The Senator +once said that he did not know whether Castro was a Communist or not, +but the main thing was that we must be patient and understanding and +drive him toward the Communists. We must not confuse communism with +nationalism, he said. He reprinted an article by Walter Lippmann which +attacked the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee for indicating +that Castro and his revolutionists were pro-communist. _Congressional +Record_, August 11, 1959, p. 14100, _New York Times_, August 12, 1959. + +[176] Edgar Ansel Mowrer, “Washington Attitude is one of Defeatism,” +_Congressional Record_, July 23, 1962, p. A5660. + + + + +Chapter VIII + +SENATOR FULBRIGHT AND WORLD OPINION + + +From some of the Senator’s remarks one can draw the conclusion that we +are in a “popularity contest” in _the_ court of world opinion. This +implies that if we are more popular with world opinion than are the +Communists we shall win. + +For the United States to liberate Cuba from the control of the +communists would, the Senator thinks, result in “the alienation of most +of Latin America, Asia and Africa.”[177] + +Robert Murphy has written: “I was in Brazil at the time of the unhappy +Cuban operation. Apart from the apathy of the mass I was a bit startled +to be told that the reason the United States failed to intervene openly +in Cuba was because our government feared it would provoke war between +the U.S.S.R. and the United States. I found little or no recognition +of the consistent effort our government has loyally made through the +years to adhere to a policy of non-intervention. We have done this on +moral grounds and by observing the rule of law in an effort to work in +harmony with and as a good neighbor of the members of the Organization +of American States. When I urged these reasons I was met by polite +incredulity. I found that our government was actually blamed in the +last analysis for permitting the Cuban attempt to fail but given little +or no credit for restraint and non-intervention. President Kennedy’s +statement warning that our patience is not inexhaustible and that +the government of the United States will not hesitate to meet its +primary obligations was like a timely ray of brilliant sunshine in the +gloomy atmosphere. I gained the distinct impression that those Latin +Americans with whom I talked, who are not unfriendly to the United +States, would have welcomed successful intervention in Cuba because +they fear the expansion of Castroism in South America and doubt it will +be stopped without intervention. The test in their minds seemed to +be that it succeed. There was evidence of understanding on their part +that both under a reasonable interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as +well as because of the severe provocation by Castro that some form of +intervention would be justifiable.”[178] + +James A. Farley has spoken thus concerning Cuba, invasion and world +opinion. “In the last year, I have spoken personally and privately +to most of the heads of government in the Far East and in South +America. It is my opinion that as spokesmen for the free world they +are far more in favor of a firm and final position than a policy of +appeasement masquerading as the easing of a series of crises, crises +which the Communists themselves manufacture. These foreign statesmen +are much more aware than some of our own statesmen, of the fact that by +practicing unceasing brinksmanship, Khrushchev is pushing us back into +the abyss of dishonor and disaster. + +“It follows that the President has gained free world approval in +drawing the line. He has placed the responsibility where it belongs—on +the Communist aggressor. + +“Since President Kennedy has said that we do not intend to abandon Cuba +to Communism, and since the Communists are accelerating their rate of +acquisition there, it may be that the force of the United States may be +necessary to expel them. That decision can be made under American law +and oath of God by one man alone. + +“But it is my conviction that should President Kennedy elect to order +the Armed Forces of the United States into action against Communist +Castro his action would be hailed by the free governments and the free +peoples of the world. In these times of agonizing decision, their +prayers are already with him. Furthermore, even more important than the +preservation of the Western Hemisphere, the avoidance of global War may +well depend upon giving unmistakable evidence to the Kremlin that to +the extent that it believes itself on the way to world conquest it is +in fact on the road to global war. + +“It is a fact that we may have to accept such war in defense of our +liberty. We must not conceal this from ourselves and, still less, +should we conceal it from our enemy. The peace of the world may +well depend on the reeducation of Mr. Khrushchev, because if war he +seeks he has found the way in which to make it inevitable. The fact +is, freedom will not be edged off this earth by Mr. Khrushchev’s +brinksmanship.”[179] + + +_What is World Opinion?_ + +On the news broadcast on Sept. 22, 1961, David Brinkley implied that +the foreign policy advisors who were so concerned about world opinion +were not very wise. He spoke of the “vague and formless thing called +world opinion—whatever that is.” + +_There is no such thing today as “world opinion.”_ There are many +different views, aims and ambitions. Whose “world opinion” shall we +court? Africa? Which tribe in Africa? Which Nation? Nkrumah? Or the +freedom lovers he has jailed? The neutrals, are they the ones we should +court? The Soviet manner of “courting” seems to be more successful with +many of them than ours! + +Arthur Krock of the _New York Times_ has pointed out that the concept +of “world opinion” ignores the fact that hundreds of millions have no +knowledge whatever of exterior events.[180] And yet, as he pointed +out, in some matters affecting our national security we have paid more +attention to “world opinion” than to the warnings of experts. He has +special reference to the three year test ban, without inspection, which +we gave to the U.S.S.R. + +Yet Senator Fulbright says: “World opinion is a civilizing force in the +world, helping to restrain the great powers from the worst possible +consequences of their mutual hostility.”[181] This hostility is mutual +only in the sense that after our countless words and deeds of good +will, the Communists still hate us. They are inherently hostile to +all that stands in their way of world conquest. They have said that +they are our irreconcilable enemy, and then they have proceeded to +treat us in this light. The hostility is mutual only in the sense that +we have been waking up to the fact that this is an enemy bent on our +destruction. + +How has the U.S.S.R. been responding to world opinion? How has world +opinion helped civilize the Communists in Russia or in China, or in the +United States? + +What is world opinion doing to civilize Castro? Did world opinion keep +the U.S.S.R. from renewing the bomb tests? + +As Senator Prouty said: “Twenty-four so-called neutral nations were +sitting in the jury box at Belgrade when the Soviet Union announced its +intention—since carried out—to resume nuclear explosions. + +“And what was the verdict of this jury we have been so assiduously +courting? ‘Not quite guilty’. + +“Nehru said: I am not in a position and I suppose no one else here is +in a position to know all the facts underlying the decision—military, +political or nonpolitical, whatever they may be. + +‘But I know this decision makes the situation much more dangerous. This +is obvious to me. Therefore, I regret it deeply.’ + +“President Tito of Yugoslavia said he understood why Moscow had decided +to resume nuclear testing; Nasser was simply shocked. The rest were +eloquently silent. + +“The shrieking shame on you, Russia, hoped for by the White House, +turned out to be a whispered version of ‘Miss Otis regrets she is +unable to lunch today.’ + +“About the only character missing from the very tragic comedy in +Belgrade was the fictional creation of Lewis Carroll who said: ‘I am +very brave generally only today I happen to have a headache.’ + +“Joseph Alsop nailed to the wall for all time the naive code of leading +U.S. policy-makers—the code that lets a synthetic world opinion—not +enlightened self-interest—shape the policies of this Nation. Alsop said: + +‘If you listen to persons of this school of thought you might suppose +that foreign policy could be conducted on the principle of Sir +Galahad—“my strength is as the strength of 10, because my heart is +pure.” + +‘The truth is, alas, that naked power counts far more in this sad world +than virtuous intentions.’ + +“Mr. Khrushchev did not give a hoot about world opinion. He was +brutally frank about his reason for resuming nuclear weapons tests +at this time. According to the New York Times, Khrushchev told some +leftwing British visitors, he is doing it to terrorize the Western +Powers into negotiations on Berlin, Germany, and disarmament—on his own +terms.”[182] + +Eric Sevareid, who as far as I know has never been accused by Senator +Fulbright of being a rightwing radical, had this to say of the +Communists as they read about the concern of some Americans for “world +opinion”. “Surely they adore reading the worrying, hair-shirt arguments +that the United States must not do this or that because it will offend +‘world opinion’, knowing as they do that there is no such thing in the +moralistic sense—the proof of which is that after all their crimes, +including Hungary, they enjoy more influence and respect in the world +than ever. They must love the British-American notion that the bosses +of the new ‘neutral’ nations are somehow more high-minded and spiritual +than those of the committed nations.”[183] + +“The gamesmen in the Kremlin must smile in their sleep as they realize +how deeply ingrained is the American illusion that a ton of wheat can +offset a ton of Communist artillery shells, that a squad of Peace +Corpsmen is a match for a squad of guerrilla fighters. + +“But I hope they frowned a bit when they read the angry retort of +Defense Secretary McNamara when he heard for the umpteenth time the +pious theory that the Communists were gaining in Laos and South Vietnam +because the regimes there are ‘unresponsive to the people’s needs.’ A +burning sense of reality on a short fuse can make a quiet man shout (as +I’m afraid it makes me shout these days), and McNamara shouted that +the Communists are gaining in those countries for very simple reasons +known as guns, bombs, fighters and threats. + +“Frightened people in a score of desperate countries want to be on +the winning but not necessarily the moral side; and we have to start +winning soon. We are going to lose in several more places before we do. +We may as well face the fact that we will also lose in places we cannot +afford to lose, until and unless we are willing to fight, no matter the +reproving editorials in the Manchester Guardian, no matter what the +temporary backlash of world opinion may be. + +“The relations between nations are not the same as those between +individuals. We can afford to lose everything—except respect for our +strength and determination. Lose that, and Khrushchev won’t bother to +sit down and talk again even to say no.”[184] + +The Senator who is so impressed with “world” opinion does not think +that the President should be too impressed with opinion in the United +States. Instead of being influenced by public opinion, Senator +Fulbright thinks that the main problem of the President may be to +restrain the American people from too vigorous a response to Communist +aggression and gains and the resulting losses for the non-communist +world. + +Winning the victory over those who would enslave the world is far more +important than what Nehru, or Latin America thinks.[185] Goa shows that +Nehru thumbs his nose at “world opinion.” Nehru, of course, is one of +the “neutrals” whose “world opinion” some in America have courted. + +Edgar Ansel Mowrer said that aside from a major war, “the next +strongest weapon in the cold war is prestige.” He said that this was +largely “a matter of military power—and the readiness to use it.” The +crushing of the Hungarian revolt hurt the popularity of the U.S.S.R. +but increased its prestige.[186] + +James A. Farley on July 8, 1960 said: “Any American administration +which refuses to protect American citizens and American property in any +quarter of the globe, on the ground that its action will be called +Yankee imperialism, has in effect struck the flag. Let us not perform +the disgraceful act of offering the American people a spurious dove of +peace, when every page of recent history identifies it as the white +flag of cowardly surrender.”[187] Just before this he stated: “I have +traveled as much abroad as almost any man in this party. I, too, value +the opinion of the world. But I am sure that sound policy cannot be +based on loss of self-respect.” + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[177] _Congressional Record_, June 29, 1961, pp. 10874-10875. + +[178] Address of Robert Murphy, Commencement Exercises, Boston College, +June 12, 1961, pp. 8-9. Also reprinted in the _Congressional Record_, +June 13, 1961, p. A4314, col. 2,t. + +[179] _Congressional Record_, June 12, 1961, p. A4237, col. 2,b.-3,t. +General Carlos P. Romulo said: “But what is significant to the +peoples outside this country is that in these 16 years you have not +succeeded to make Soviet Russia recede or retreat one inch from any +of her ill-gotten gains.” (_Congressional Record_, Feb. 15, 1962, p. +A1134, col. 3,t.) The Republic of China Chapter of the Asian Peoples’ +Anti-Communist League has spoken of the weakening of confidence in the +United States on the part of Southeast Asian countries as a result of +our actions in Laos (_Free China and Asia_, March, 1962, p 2. See also +the _Congressional Record_, March 7, 1962, p. A1714). + +Burmese Army leaders think that the Chinese Communists will take +Southeast Asia in a few years; therefore, they lean toward them +(_Newsweek_, May 21, 1962, p. 17.) + +George E. Sokolsky has pointed out that not only Cuba, but aiding our +enemies and alienating our allies in certain instances has damaged our +prestige (“The National Image,” _Searcy Daily Citizen_, May 3, 1962, p. +4.) + +[180] _Arkansas Gazette_, September 5, 1961. + +[181] _Congressional Record_, July 24, 1961, p. 12281, col. 2,b. + +[182] _Congressional Record_, September 19, 1961, p. 19015, col. +2,t.-3,m. + +[183] _Congressional Record_, June 29, 1961, p. 10891, col. 1,b. + +[184] _Ibid._, p. 10891, col. 2,m. + +[185] Compare Marguerite Higgins, “Power and Popularity,” +_Congressional Record_, September 5, 1961, p. A6963. + +[186] _Congressional Record_, June 25, 1960, p. A5506, col. 3,t. + +[187] _Ibid._, August 22, 1960, p. A6153, col. 3,m. + + + + +Chapter IX + +_IS COMMUNISM A MATTER OF POLITICS?_ + + +The 1958 directive of the National Security Council ordered the +military into the cold war. In their participation in the cold war +they had to deal with the history, the philosophy, the strategy and +the tactics of communism. Since communism had endeavored to extend +its influence throughout the world in a thousand and one ways, their +tactics also involve the use of individuals, who are not Communists, to +extend their influence whenever possible. An analysis of their tactics +certainly involves analyzing how they have worked through the united +fronts, the communist fronts, through infiltration and in other ways. +Since communism does not work in a vacuum void of people, some people +who were not Communists were unwittingly involved in certain aspects of +the manifold operations of the Communists. + +Would it be political to take an actual case history and to show +how the Communists have operated? Of course, such an analysis would +take on a different hue if the analyzer impugned the _motives_ of +the individuals who were involved. But the point here is that it is +impossible to show fully how the Communists work without giving some +concrete cases. When it is shown that even patriotic Americans have +been duped—and surely the Senator would not say that none of them have +been duped—it emphasizes the care which all need to exercise lest we in +turn be duped. + +We are not contending that the military become a spokesman for varying +points of view in American politics. The 1958 directive did not +authorize “political propaganda”. As Senator Thurmond said: “I think +our people in uniform generally should not speak promiscuously on all +subjects, but they are entitled to tell their own military personnel +and entitled to tell the civilian population the aims, the methods +of operations, and the dangers of the enemy. The enemy today is +communism.”[188] + +And yet some have raised a false issue, whether they are conscious +of it or not, and have said that Senator Thurmond is in favor of the +military educating America on politics. The _Arkansas Gazette_ said in +an editorial on August 4, 1961, that: “Mr. Thurmond, we are compelled +to observe, has not examined the implications of his doctrine that the +military should assume responsibility for the political education of +the American people—nor have Senator Goldwater and Karl Mundt.” + +“Senator Fulbright just about said it all when he remarked to Senator +Thurmond recently in a Senate debate: + +‘The Senator from South Carolina, who opposed federal aid to education +because he feared federal control of education, apparently wants the +military to educate the people.’ + +“There you have it. The right wing evangelists—the Thurmonds, the +Goldwaters, the Mundts, and the Alfords, who daily preach the dangers +of central control—are prepared to concede the point which has in so +many places resulted in dictatorial government: That the military is +and ought to be a means of political control and influence.”[189] + +Is not the _Arkansas Gazette_ implying that communism is just a matter +of politics, and that Senator Thurmond is wanting the military to +educate the public in politics just because Senator Thurmond wants the +military to help educate the public with regard to the dangers, aims +and tactics of the enemy, communism? + +Senator Fulbright has stated that his memorandum was directed against +the involvement of the military in partisan political propaganda. “For +all these reasons I strongly oppose political propaganda activities by +military personnel directed at the public. If we are to maintain our +political freedom and the Constitutional system which distinguishes +us from totalitarian dictatorships, we must retain civil control over +the military. This principle lies at the very core of our heritage of +freedom and Constitutional government.”[190] + +If engaging in the cold war, in obedience to the directive of the +National Security Council, is engaging in political propaganda, the +military not only has no right to educate the public, but it also has +no right to educate the troops in any subject pertaining to the cold +war. + +No one who knows the nature of the Communist menace can say that +instruction in this area is dabbling in partisan politics. Furthermore, +Senator Fulbright himself in his vote for the Peace Corps Act voted for +an amendment made by the Senate. “The Senate amendment, section 8(c), +included a provision that ‘training hereinabove provided for shall +include instruction in the philosophy, strategy, tactics, and menace of +communism.’ + +“The House bill did not contain a similar provision. + +“The managers on the part of the House accepted the Senate language. +The Peace Corps officials have given assurance that such training +is already required in every Peace Corps training curriculum. There +appears to be every reason to give statutory recognition to this +requirement.”[191] The Peace Corps, the Senator says, is “part of the +cold war.”[192] + +If the military in teaching the public concerning these matters is +engaging in partisan politics, then the Peace Corps is giving partisan +political indoctrination to members of the Corps. Unless Senator +Fulbright is willing to say that the Peace Corps should become a +center of partisan politics, he must say that such instruction is not +political. If this is partisan politics, towards what party would the +head of the Peace Corps, the President’s brother-in-law, be expected +to slant this “partisan political” indoctrination? But if it is not +political when done by the Peace Corps, why is it political when done +by the military? + +We wonder why the Senator is involved in this basic contradiction? He +voted for training the Peace Corps in the above matters, will he vote +for the military to do the same? No, he will not, for his memorandum, +in effect denies them this right. If he says that it is right for the +troops to be taught the above, but not for the military to teach the +public—because they should not engage in political propaganda—then why +teach political propaganda to the troops? Yet his memorandum, which he +says was against political propaganda by the military, was against +the 1958 directive of the National Security Council. But the National +Security Council basically did not authorize instruction in any fields +other than those covered in the above instructions to the Peace Corps. + +Although the Senator may not be aware of it, it is a part of the +Communist Party line to view anti-communism education conducted by the +military as partisan politics. It so happens that the Communists are +wrong about this. Communism, in both its internal and external aspects, +is not a matter of party politics. + +We remind the reader that the Senator does not object to radical +statements only, but the entire concept of the military’s participation +in the cold war. He objected to the directive of the National Security +Council which put the military into the cold war. + +The policy of the President is against the recognition of Red China. +Does the Senator think that it would be dabbling in politics for a +military spokesman to oppose the recognition of Red China and to give +reasons for his opposition?[193] + +The author is against the military educating the public or the troops +in partisan politics. When a military official oversteps the proper +bounds, his mistake can be dealt with without abolishing, in effect, +the 1958 directive of the National Security Council. In curing a cold +the doctor does not decide that one must kill the patient. That would, +of course, get rid of the cold, but we can’t say that it helps the +patient. One can throw out dirty bathwater without throwing out the +baby with it. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[188] _Congressional Record_, August 17, 1961, p. 15030, col. 2,m. Also +in “Excerpts from Speeches by Senator Strom Thurmond on Efforts to Gag +Military Anti-Communist Speeches and Seminars,” p. 35, col. 1,t. + +[189] _Arkansas Gazette_, August 4, 1961, p. 4A. + +[190] “Statement of Senator J. W. Fulbright Relating to a memorandum +submitted by him to the Department of Defense,” p. 6. + +[191] House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. +1239, _Peace Corps Act_, September 19, 1961, p. 21. + +[192] _Arkansas Democrat_, November 28, 1961. + +[193] Both the Senate and the House have more than once gone on record +as being opposed to the recognition of Red China. For example see 87th +Congress, 1st Session, S. Con. Res. 34, July 28, 1961. + + + + +Chapter X + +THE MEMORANDUM AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY LINE + + +The Communists thought so highly of Senator Fulbright’s memorandum +that they reprinted several columns of it in _The Worker_ for August +27, 1961. It is not often that a Senator of the United States receives +this type of “recognition”. Dr. Benson, Dr. Barnett and Herbert A. +Philbrick, for example, have never received such an “honor”, and it is +unlikely that they shall receive such an “honor” in the future. + +The Religious Freedom Committee, Inc., which is well known for its +defense of pro-communist causes and persons, calls on people to rally +behind the Senator from Arkansas. As it views the struggle: “On the +one side are the liberal elements in church and state; on the other, +an alliance of fundamentalist religious groups, the military, and +reactionary elements in the Congress and in the financial and business +community.”[194] If the Religious Freedom Committee, Inc. thought that +the Senator’s memorandum was damaging to internal communism, it is my +judgment, based on their record, that they would not defend it. + +We are not suggesting that the Senator wants this type of support, but +he is espousing a cause which Communists and pro-Communists consider +worthy of support. He ought to make a serious investigation of this +question: Why do pro-Communists and Communists support the memorandum? + +There are those who are not pro-Communists who support the memorandum, +this we realize; but the Senator ought to find out why pro-Communists +support it. + +Gus Hall, the General Secretary of the Communist Party in the United +States, makes it clear that one of the main objectives of the Communist +Party is to defeat what he calls the “ultra-Right”. Certainly anything +on the center, or to the right of center, would be “ultra-Right” to +Gus Hall. He includes Dr. Benson and many others. He indicates that +Communists have hopes of defeating the “ultra-Right”. “If the tactical +problem is solved correctly, it will be possible to slam shut the door +on the ultra-Right, defeat it, and force a shift in policy upon the +Administration itself in the direction of peace and democracy.”[195] + + +_The Communist Line_ + +Of course, we realize with J. Edgar Hoover that there may be times +when the Communist Party line coincides with some objective sought by +a non-Communist or anti-Communist group. “Because communism thrives +on turmoil, the party is continuously attempting to exploit all +grievances—real or imagined—for its own tactical purposes. It is, +therefore, almost inevitable that, on many issues, the party line +will coincide with the position of many non-Communists. The danger of +indiscriminately alleging that someone is a Communist merely because +his views on a particular issue happen to parallel the official party +position is obvious. The confusion which is thereby created helps the +Communists by diffusing the forces of their opponents.”[196] + +A person, however, who finds some of his views parallel those of the +Party needs, of course, to examine his views to see whether or not they +are non-Communist views which the party has taken merely to gain favor +with the masses, or for some other reason, or whether or not they are +views which can only help communism instead of freedom. One should also +ask: How does the Communist try to use this for his own ends? Then one +can try to work for the legitimate goals in such a way that no comfort +is given to the Communists. + +When one points out that a position parallels the party line, and when +one shows in what way or ways the position advances communism, one +does not need to go into the motives of the non-Communist who advances +this position. It is unnecessary, in order to deal with any concrete +issue, to know why the person takes a particular position. Regardless +of motives, one can be convinced that certain things do advance +communism. This can be pointed out without entering into the question +of motives. We, therefore, are not attacking Senator Fulbright’s +motives, but his judgment. + +The Senator, we regret to say, has accused some people of misquoting +the memorandum in order to get headlines. “I regret the continued +misquote of this memorandum by extremist groups and conservatives +seeking headlines.”[197] We cannot sanction any misquotations, but +neither do we endorse this judging of motives. + +There are many things, however, in the Communist line which can hardly +be said to fall into the category of legitimate objectives. The careful +reader will ask: Does this or that item fall into this category? +Even, however, when it does not, we need not deal with the motives +of non-Communists who follow this or that aspect of the line. We can +oppose their judgment in the matter. We emphasize that if they blunder +us into slavery it will be slavery just as certain as if they had taken +us into slavery with their eyes open. + +There are several points in the memorandum which are included in the +current Communist line. + + +_Communism as Politics_ + +The Fulbright memorandum implies that the military is engaging in +politics if it follows the 1958 directive of the National Security +Council, and participates in the cold war by instructing the people +concerning the history, philosophy, strategy and tactics of communism, +including the internal menace. It assumes that this is partisan +politics. If this is not the assumption of the memorandum, why does +the Senator say that the purpose of the memorandum is to uphold the +principle of the military’s subordination to civilian control, and +that there “has been a strong tradition in this country that it is +not the function of the military to educate the public on political +issues.”[198] His memorandum is a challenge of the National Security +Council directive of 1958 which put the military into the cold war to +alert the people on the menace and nature of the enemy—communism. + +If, on the other hand, the memorandum is not against the military +alerting the civilian population concerning communism—in both its +external and internal threat—then why doesn’t the memorandum protest +against just the abuses of the directive instead of seeking the +elimination of the directive? + +Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, agrees with +the position that for military officials to expose the workings +of communism in America and elsewhere is to engage in political +discussion. For Gus Hall maintains that the Communist Party is simply a +political party. “A very important lesson is to learned from this. No +matter what one’s attitude may be towards the Communist Party, it must +be recognized that the fight for its rights as a political party is a +matter of defending the Bill of Rights and all democratic rights, and +is the concern of all, especially of all left, democratic, and peace +forces, and not of the Communists alone. This is an old lesson, but +sometimes it has to be learned anew.”[199] + + +_Restraining the “Radicals”_ + +Senator Fulbright thinks that in “the long run, it is quite possible +that the principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not +already, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists +with everything we’ve got, particularly if there are more Cubas and +Laos.”[200] This is because the people are infected with the “virus of +rightwing radicalism”, and also since “radicalism of the right can be +expected to have great mass appeal during such periods” of crisis.[201] +When one takes this to its logical conclusion it means that the Senator +must think that the main problem is to fight the so-called “rightwing +radicals”. + +That the “ultra-right” is at least one of the main problems is also +the judgment of Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party. +“However, the situation requires that the main direction of the +attack should be at the war-mongering and fascist forces, who are +pressuring the Kennedy Administration further to the Right. At the +same time, every policy or action of Kennedy that plays into the hands +of the Right should be sharply opposed and criticized, building up +the pressures upon the Administration for a change of policy in the +direction of peaceful coexistence and defense of democracy.”[202] + + +_The Masses Susceptible to “Rightwingism”_ + +Senator Fulbright thinks that in the “long twilight struggle” ahead +that the people may become frustrated and that under such circumstances +“radical rightism” will appeal to them even more strongly than at the +present.[203] + +Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, has more or less +the same fear. “We need to be aware that when people in large numbers +become disillusioned or panicky there is always the danger that they +may be entrapped by the demagogy of the ultra-Right, especially when +their leaders become the instruments or allies of monopoly. For +example, the recent statement of the AFL-CIO executive council, drawn +up by professional anti-Communists, supports the most aggressive +warlike incitement in the so-called Berlin crisis, and even urges the +resumption of nuclear testing.”[204] + + +_Protracted Conflict_ + +The memorandum takes the position that the concept of protracted +conflict will lead to war, that it is an element of radical +rightwingism, and that we must seek some sort of accommodation with +communism instead of engaging in protracted conflict to defeat it.[205] + +The Communists have made it one of their objectives to utilize their +influence, in any way that they can, toward getting the Kennedy +administration to seek an accommodation with communism, i.e., to +refuse to try to roll back the tide of Communist advance. Thus Gus +Hall write: “It is of course true that these maneuvers, pretenses, and +concessions are forced upon him by the strength of the world peace +forces, by the deterioration of imperialism, by the declining world +prestige and position of U. S. imperialism in particular, and by the +deep-rooted peace and democratic sentiment of the American people. + +“But the fact remains that the Kennedy administration has not closed +the door to accommodation to these world realities, as the ultra-Right +wishes it to do, and this involves a certain recognition of the new +necessities of the present-day world at home and abroad. This is an +important difference, which the forces for peace and democracy must +recognize and exploit in order to bring about the required change in +national policy.”[206] + +That the Communists want the administration to take the position that +communism is a world trend which cannot be resisted is made clear from +another statement. “Continuing rebuffs and defeats for the cold war +and interventionist policy (most recently in Cuba and Laos) confront +the dominant monopoly power with a choice, essentially between two +alternatives. One is to end the cold war and to seek some form of +accommodation to the socialist and national revolutionary world, which +would mean a turn to a policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful +competition. Such a shift of policy would meet the most urgent national +needs of the country in the present period of world history. + +“The other course is to seek to contain and reverse world trends by all +means, including so-called limited war and the ultimate nuclear war. +It is necessary to recognize that the present cold-war policies of the +Administration lead in this direction. However, we must also recognize +that the most aggressive and extreme expression of this suicidal policy +comes from the ultra-Right.”[207] + +Thus they are out to influence those whom they consider to be the +liberal forces in the Kennedy administration. “It would be wishful +thinking to assume that all liberal or forward-looking forces in the +Kennedy camp, who must in their way participate in turning the tide, +are equally aware of the double role played by Kennedy. These elements +can become an effective positive force once they realize it is +necessary to fight Kennedy’s cold war and anti-democratic policies in +order to defend democracy and to close the door to the extreme Right +and defeat the threat from that direction.”[208] + + +_Cuba_ + +The Senator, as we have seen, was extremely disturbed by the Cuban +invasion, and he opposes any direct efforts on our part to overthrow +Castro. Gus Hall is also disturbed about the matter, although at +least some of his reasons are different. Hall did think that it was +immoral for he said that the decision to invade Cuba was “criminal +and reprehensible”. “It is also of significance that Kennedy decided +not to back up the emigre invasion of Cuba with direct and open U. S. +military support, as criminal and reprehensible as was his decision +to go through with the military adventure, and as serious as still is +the danger of U. S. imperialist intervention. It is also noteworthy +that Kennedy must still seek to maintain democratic and anti-colonial +pretenses in his dealings with the national liberation movements, +although his objective remains to contain and reverse them. This +creates certain embarrassments for him in world affairs, in view of +anti-democratic measures at home.”[209] + + +_Self-Destruction of Democracy_ + +In the discussion and rejection of the concept of protracted conflict, +the memorandum indicates that to engage in protracted conflict, to +meet with strength the Communists at every turn, will undermine +democracy. Thus it said: “Perhaps the most fundamental criticism +that can be made of the book is that it fails to analyze the impact +of a policy of protracted conflict on our democratic institutions. +Barnett’s program of action, for example, would require large sums of +public funds used with little public accountability, a wide network of +secrecy and security in government operations, a cold war orientation +in our schools and universities—in short, a stunting of pluralism, a +curtailment of individual liberties, and a weakening of politically +responsible government. The editors of ‘American Strategy’ seem to +see no alternative to confronting the Soviets with strong opposition +at every turn. Indeed, they appear more concerned with virility than +freedom, as if strength and courage were goals in themselves. This, +together with the somewhat static nature of their view of history and +the militant nature of their recommendations, justifies further inquiry +about the men and the organizations who advocate a strategy based on +those premises.”[210] + +Gus Hall is also convinced that the ultra-Right is trying to build +“a garrison state that will seek to drive the country to war and +self-destruction.”[211] + + +“_French General_” + +Senator Fulbright says: “Perhaps it is far-fetched to call forth the +revolt of the French generals as an example of the ultimate danger. +Nevertheless, military officers, French or American, have some common +characteristics arising from their profession and there are numerous +military ‘fingers on the trigger’ throughout the world. While this +danger may appear very remote, contrary to American tradition, and even +American military tradition, so also is the ‘long twilight struggle’, +and so also is the very existence of an American military program for +educating the public.”[212] + +Gus Hall, in his discussion of the directive of the National Security +Council is more emphatic than Senator Fulbright. “The entire line +of policy, coupled with CIA and similar training in subversive and +putschist activities, cannot help but create our own ‘French Generals,’ +who feel at home in fascist circles, and are ready to lend themselves +to their objectives.”[213] + + +_National Security Council Directive 1958_ + +Gus Hall attacks the 1958 directive of the National Security +Council.[214] + +The Senator’s memorandum was aimed directly at the directive.[215] + + +_General Walker_ + +Senator Fulbright considers General Walker’s case as but an +illustration of the deeper problem of the military’s involvement in the +“rightwing” activities. Thus he wrote: “With respect to the problem +illustrated by the case of General Walker....”[216] + +This is also the way that Gus Hall feels about it. “The case of General +Walker was only a symptom of a much deeper affliction.”[217] + + +_Spread of “Rightwingism” in the Military_ + +Senator Fulbright thinks that the military has a good deal of +“rightwingism” in it. “Whether these instances are representative of +programs implementing the National Security Council directive is not +known, but the pattern they form, makes it strongly suspect that they +are. There are many indications that the philosophy of the programs +is representative of a substantial element of military thought, and +has great appeal to the military mind. A strong case can be made, +logically, that this type of activity is the inevitable consequence +of such a directive. There is little in the education, training or +experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance +of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with +which their education, training and experiences are concerned—into +proper perspective in the President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear +age.’”[218] + +Gus Hall says: “Another pronounced characteristic of this growing +fascist movement is its spreading influence among the higher military +personnel.”[219] The Draft Program of the Communist Party in the +U.S.S.R. in 1961 also said that the military was involved in the +“fascist” anti-Communist drive.[220] + +The Communists have at least two objectives in their attack on the +military. _First_, the military contains some experts in the field of +the cold war, and it is organized so that it can effectively reach all +parts of America. Neutralizing the military in the cold war means that +the Communists have far fewer foes to fight in the cold war. _Second_, +the attack on the military can be used to try to undermine the morale +of the military. + + +_Two Films_ + +The memorandum classifies “Communism on the Map” and “Operation +Abolition” as part of the extremely radical rightwing material being +used in seminars.[221] + +“Communism on the Map” is also noted in an unfavorable way by Gus +Hall.[222] + +Gus Hall also notices in an unfavorable context “Operation +Abolition.”[223] These two films are “obnoxious films.”[224] + +Gus Hall evidently is against “Operation Abolition” because it is an +indictment of the Communists and an exposure of how they work and how +they manipulate others. + +In a speech in Arkadelphia on October 11 Senator Fulbright’s opposition +to the film is based on the following, according to the _Arkansas +Gazette_. + +“One widely distributed film, Fulbright said, tries to show that +the student body of the University of California is ‘ready to +desert the American system’. He referred to ‘Operation Abolition’, +which purports to show that student protests at a House Un-American +Activities Committee hearing last year at San Francisco were Communist +inspired.”[225] + +The film tries to show no such desertion by the student body. It +does show that _some_ students from the University were duped. It is +doubtful that many of them really knew that the Communists were using +them. Or does the Senator think that the students knew what they were +doing? + + +_Fascists_ + +The Senator views as “fascist” those whom he labels as radical +rightwingers.[226] + +Gus Hall also characterizes the “ultra-right” as fascist.[227] And +by the “ultra-right” he is including at least some of the groups +classified by Senator Fulbright as radical rightwingers. For example, +Dr. Benson, Harding College and the National Education Program. + + +_Frustration and Rightwingism_ + +Senator Fulbright thinks that frustration in restraint is one of the +reasons that the American people need to be curbed, and that this need +will grow if there are any more Cubas and Laoses.[228] + +Gus Hall explains the reaction of what he calls the extreme right +on the grounds that the extreme right wants to turn back the tide +of history (i.e. they want to win the victory over Communism), but +that they are frustrated at seeing the advances of communism. “In the +opinion of the Communist Party, there can be no question but that the +threat from the extreme Right is serious. It arises from a situation +which is new for the United States. This, the most powerful capitalist +country, cannot have its way in a world in which the forces of +socialism, national liberation, and peace are playing a decisive role. +Continuing rebuffs and defeats for the cold war and interventionist +policy (most recently in Cuba and Laos) confront the dominant monopoly +power with a choice, essentially between two alternatives. One is +to end the cold war and to seek some form of accommodation to the +socialist and national revolutionary world, which would mean a turn to +a policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition. Such a shift +of policy would meet the most urgent national needs of the country in +the present period of world history. + +“The other course is to seek to contain and reverse world trends by all +means, including so-called limited war and the ultimate nuclear war. +It is necessary to recognize that the present cold-war policies of the +Administration lead in this direction. However, we must also recognize +that the most aggressive and extreme expression of this suicidal policy +comes from the ultra-Right.”[229] + +We agree with the Senator that Americans will find it very frustrating +if there are any more Cubas and Laoses. And, _if_ the tide of communism +continues to advance, they will undoubtedly come to the place where +they will demand that we hit the Communists with everything we have +_if_ such is necessary to stop communism. + +We do not agree with Gus Hall that the advance of Communism is +inevitable. + +In the author’s judgment Senator Fulbright and Gus Hall are right in +saying that there are Americans who are frustrated because of continued +losses to communism. There are people, of course, whose frustrations +are not due to communism itself. However, there are many Americans who +are not extremists but who are frustrated in various degrees because we +have not stopped, not to speak of the fact that we are not winning the +cold war, the advances of communism. + +Roscoe Drummond has well pointed out that there is a mounting sense of +frustration because we are always on the defensive in the cold war. He +suggests that the way to overcome this, and to keep extremists from +having any appeal to the masses, is for the President either to take +the diplomatic initiative in the cold war or to show the people that +it is not possible to do so. We have been on the diplomatic defensive +since World War II ended, he affirmed, and unless the President is +able to find the will and the way to take the initiative that the +President “will be leaving the field open to the extremists”.[230] + + +_If We Wage Protracted War it Will Bring Nuclear War_ + +A study of the quotation, in the above section, from Gus Hall indicates +that he is saying that we must accommodate ourselves to communism +and its advances, or we shall have limited wars and then a nuclear +war. This is curiously like the line in the _Bulletin of the Atomic +Scientists_ that if we meet Communist aggression with a determined +effort to win the cold war we shall likely end up in war.[231] + +The Communist journal, _World Marxist Review_, has said that those +who seek for victory over communism are eager for war. Dr. Robert +Strausz-Hupe is quoted as follows: “Our lot is conflict. History +brings us ‘not peace but a sword’.... The ultimate strategy for +freedom, therefore, must be the devolution of Communist totalitarian +governments.... The United States cannot renounce the first use of +atomic weapons.” The _World Marxist Review_ says that: “This incendiary +strategy is elaborated in detail from Herman Kahns _On Thermonuclear +War_.”[232] + +Then the _World Marxist Review_ comments: “These are not only the +personal views of Mr. Strausz-Hupe or Mr. Kahn. They are the credo of +the American military, many of whom make no secret of their eagerness +to unleash the dogs of war. Moreover, as the foregoing shows, neither +the ideas nor the ‘total’ war preparations of the U. S. government can +be traced to the so-called ‘Berlin crisis’.”[233] + +Of course, the memorandum and the _World Marxist Review_ differ in that +the _World Marxist Review_ says that the military is eager to start +war. The memorandum simply takes the position that the position of +protracted conflict will likely lead to world war. + +The effect of each—the memorandum and the _World Marxist Review_—in +this matter is the same. Both of them try to discourage us from waging +protracted conflict and winning the victory over communism. + +It is a major Communist objective to convince the non-Communist world +that if they wage cold war that they will end up in a nuclear war. To +strive for victory in the cold war must involve finally nuclear war. +This, we are convinced, is not the case. Continual losses in the cold +war are much more apt to bring us to nuclear war, since Communist +victories in the cold war emboldens them, weakens us and brings more +“neutrals” on to their bandwagon. When the Communists think that they +have the United States sufficiently isolated and undermined it is +quite likely that the Communists will confront us with the demand to +surrender or to be involved in nuclear war. + +If we endeavor to win the cold war, and it is my conviction that we +can do so, as our victories in the cold war increase the Communists +will realize that regardless of what a nuclear war will do to us it +will destroy Communism. A nuclear war would immediately destroy the +Communist chain of command. A dictatorship cannot go on with its chain +of command shattered. Revolts will take place in the satellites. The +masses of China would revolt if a nuclear war shattered the Red’s chain +of control in China. + +It is the judgment of the author, based not only on the above, but +also on the fact that the Russian Communists have backed down when the +United States government has met them firmly, that the Communists do +not want a nuclear war. In the author’s judgment, short of an all-out +attack we could not force them into a nuclear war, unless they were +ready for one and wanted one. They hope to achieve their objectives +without a nuclear war. But they will resort to such a war if they +are convinced it is absolutely necessary and that war would enable +them to win over us. In which case nothing we could do would stop the +Communists from starting a war unless we surrendered. Furthermore, if +we surrendered this would not guarantee that no nuclear war would take +place. Who knows but what after world victory Communists would fall out +among themselves and one group use the bomb on another group. + +In the author’s judgment there is no way to guarantee that there will +not be a nuclear war. But for us to let our policy be determined by an +overwhelming fear of nuclear war will lead us to defeat. + +When we think of the millions which the Communists kill _after_ they +take over a country, there is no certainty that more will not be killed +if we surrendered than if we waged nuclear war, if such were forced on +us. + +Although there are Americans who do not want us to publicly proclaim +that our goal is to win the victory over the aggressive forces of +communism, the Communists have made clear that they expect to win. +Khrushchev said that Marxism-Leninism when assimilated by the people +leads them to “take power into their hands and build their state. + +“This is a mighty force which nothing can resist. And let Mssrs. +Imperialists, Monopolists and various Colonialists—for it is the same +thing——know that no prayers, no incantations can reverse the march of +history to make it move backward. Victory will be ours, comrades!”[234] + +The Communists, we see, are not letting the idea that the waging of +protracted conflict, and the aim of victory, will lead to war restrain +them from fighting to win. + + +_Anti-Anti-Communism_ + +It is well for us to realize that Communists have been ordered to +intensify their efforts to discredit, to discourage and to destroy +anti-communism. As Edward Hunter pointed out, they know where they are +hurting, and if anti-communism were not hurting them they would not +make anti-anti-communism a prime objective. + +The Moscow Manifesto issued by 81 Communist Parties in +November-December, 1960, and which is accepted as providing guidance +for the Communist Party in America,[235] calls for an intensification +of the attack on anti-communists. + +“Anti-communism, which is indicative of a deep ideological crisis +in, and extreme decline of bourgeois ideology, resorts to monstrous +distortions of Marxist doctrine and crude slander against the +Socialist social system, presents Communist policies and objectives +in a false light and carries on a witch hunt against the democratic +peaceful forces and organizations.” + +“To effectively defend the interests of the working people, maintain +peace and realize the Socialist ideals of the working class, it is +indispensable to wage a resolute struggle against anti-communism—that +poisoned weapon which the bourgeoisie uses to fence off the masses from +socialism.”[236] + +The 1961 Congress of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. called for +warfare against anti-communism. “The chief ideological and political +weapon of imperialism is anti-communism, which consists mainly +in slandering the Socialist system and distorting the policy and +objectives of the Communist Parties and Marxist-Leninist theory. + +“Under cover of anti-communism, imperialist reaction persecutes and +hounds all that is progressive and revolutionary; it seeks to split +the ranks of the working people and to paralyze the proletarians’ will +to fight. Rallied to this black banner today are all the enemies of +social progress: the finance oligarchy and the military, the Fascists +and reactionary clericals, the colonialists and landlords and all +the ideological and political vehicles of imperialist reaction. +Anti-communism is a reflection of the extreme decadence of bourgeois +ideology.”[237] The _World Marxist Review_ for October 1961 carried an +article on “Anti-Communism—a Crime Against the People.” + +We have neither stated nor implied that every criticism against every +anti-Communist is an implementation of this directive from the Kremlin. +In the anti-Communist movements in the United States you can find +extremists, some uninformed people, crackpots and a few totalitarians. +However, the anti-Communist movements have no monopoly on such persons. +Thus there may be ample grounds to criticize some individuals, some +organizations, and some positions which are taken. There are criticisms +which are justified and which need to be made. + +However, criticism of the crackpots, the mistaken and the +totalitarians is not the only kind of criticism going on today. +Different groups, even widely different groups, are lumped together by +some critics. They are all classified as “extremely radical rightwing” +people and positions. They are all classified as the “ultra-right”. + +We are not suggesting that all the extremists who lump together +different anti-Communist groups as “the ultra-right” and “extremely +radical rightwingers”, are responding to the Moscow directive. We are +confident that some are misinformed and misguided; that some see an +opportunity to make political hay; that some have a vested interest +in discrediting those who have compiled and publicized _their_ public +record; that there are others who hate capitalism and oppose those who +defend it; these or other reasons explain the attack of some. Since, +however, the Communists have been working for decades to infiltrate +various phases of American life we can be certain that there are some +hidden Communists who are vigorously engaged in anti-anti-communism. +Who are they? I don’t know who the hidden Communists, or hidden +sympathizers and fellow travelers, are. I doubt that even the FBI could +possibly know about _all_ of them. + +It is fortunate, however, that one does not need to know _why_ people +do something in order to evaluate the _actions_ of these people. Thus +although it is certainly not without significance that, so soon after +the Moscow directive, there should be several storms of criticism +of and attacks on various anti-Communists, it would be inaccurate +and unfair to say that they are all implementations of the Moscow +directive. The fact that the Communists are now trying to destroy the +vigorous anti-Communist organizations and individuals, does suggest +to us that we should all endeavor to be fair and precise in our +criticisms, and that we should exercise great care lest we promote the +cause of anti-anti-communism. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[194] “Religious Freedom News,” October 1961, p. 2. + +[195] Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, U.S.A., +_Worker_, July 16, 1961. The entire article is reprinted in the +Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, _The New Drive Against the +Anti-Communist Program_. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961. +This quotation is from page 47. We shall quote from the article as +reprinted in this Senate publication. Edward Hunter’s testimony is +contained in the above Senate publication. _The Worker_ boasts that it +was among the first to attack the “ultra-right,” Jan. 14, 1962, p. 5. + +[196] J. Edgar Hoover, _The Communist Party Line_, Washington, D. C.: +Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 6. + +[197] _Arkansas Democrat_, December 4, 1961. + +[198] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,b. + +[199] Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, _The New Drive Against the +Anti-Communist Program_, July 11, 1961, p. 50. Most of this publication +was reprinted in the _Congressional Record_, August 28, 1961, pp. +16094-16116. An entire article by Gus Hall is in this Senate report... + +[200] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t. + +[201] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 2,b. + +[202] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 49. + +[203] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t. + +[204] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 48. + +[205] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13440. + +[206] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 48. + +[207] _Ibid._, p. 46. + +[208] _Ibid._, p. 48. + +[209] _Ibid._, pp. 47-48. + +[210] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13440, col. 1,b-2,t. +“There have been dire predictions since the end of World War II that an +attempt to defend ourselves would turn America into a garrison state. +But, our defense budget has varied from 40 percent to 5 percent to 15 +percent and down again to 9 percent of our gross national product, +and our experience offers little confirmation for such fears.” Albert +Wohlstetter, an official in the Rand Corporation. _Congressional +Record_, June 16, 1960, p. 11911, col. 3,m. “From the radical left, and +sometimes from the radical pacifists, we hear other voices of doom. We +have great armed forces, they say, therefore our freedom is doomed by a +garrison state. Or we have big businesses, therefore democracy is being +strangled by greedy monopolies. We have ‘internal contradictions,’ as +the ideologists love to say—labor versus capital, farms versus cities, +importers versus exporters—and therefore democracy will soon tear +itself to pieces.” (Press Release No. 3910, January 14, 1962. Address +by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the U.N., +before Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith on the occasion of his +receipt of the America’s Democratic Legacy Award, Hotel Plaza, New +York, N.Y.) + +[211] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 47. + +[212] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b. + +[213] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 46. + +[214] _Ibid._, p. 46. + +[215] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b., pp. +13436-13437, col. 3,b-1,t., p. 13437 col. 3,t. + +[216] _Ibid._, p. 13438, col. 1,t. + +[217] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 46. + +[218] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 1,b. + +[219] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 46. + +[220] _The Worker_, August 20, 1961, p. S7, col. 2,b. _Program of the +Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Draft)_, New York: Crosscurrents +Press, Inc., 1961, p. 50. + +[221] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 1,t. p. +13438, col. 1,m. col. 2,m. + +[222] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 46. + +[223] _Ibid._, p. 46. + +[224] _Ibid._, p. 46. + +[225] _Arkansas Gazette_, October 12, 1961, p. 1B. + +[226] _Congressional Record_, August 21, 1961, pp. 15357-15358. + +[227] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, p. 46. See +also _The Worker_, November 12, 1961, p. 1. Mike Newberry, _The Fascist +Revival_, New York: New Century Publishers, 1961. This is a Communist +publication. + +[228] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t. + +[229] _The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program_, pp. 45-46. + +[230] “Extremism Comes From a Sense of Frustration,” _Arkansas +Democrat_, November 28, 1961. + +[231] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13440. + +[232] _World Marxist Review_, December, 1961, p. 25, col. 1,t. + +[233] _Ibid._, p. 25, col. 1,b. + +[234] Speech at the Fifth World Congress of Trade Unions, December 9, +1961. This is No. 227 press release from EMBASSY OF THE U.S.S.R., Dec. +11, 1961, p. 2. + +[235] James E. Jackson, “The General Crisis of Capitalism Deepens,” +_World Marxist Review_, January 1961, p. 38. + +[236] Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, _Communist and Workers’ +Parties’ Manifesto Adopted November-December, 1960. Interpretation and +Analysis._ Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 72. The +entire Manifesto is reprinted in this government document, along with +some statements by Communists in America. + +[237] _Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Draft)_, p. +50. + + + + +Chapter XI + +CONCLUSIONS + + +The _Communist Manifesto_ in its closing words declared war on all +non-Communists. The Communists have continued this warfare even until +now. It will culminate, they are confident, in the complete victory of +communism. Although they want to avoid World War III, _if_ they can +attain their aims without it, they are now waging cold war, as well as +hot war, against us in order to ultimately make possible world conquest. + +The present period of peaceful coexistence is but another phase of +their war on non-Communist societies. In the Statement by 81 Communist +Parties in Moscow, November, 1960, this was clearly set forth. + +“The policy of peaceful coexistence meets the basic interests of all +peoples, of all who want no new cruel wars and seek durable peace. This +policy strengthens the positions of socialism, enhances the prestige +and international influence of the socialist countries and promotes +the prestige and influence of the socialist countries and promotes +the prestige and influence of the Communist Parties in the capitalist +countries. Peace is a loyal ally of socialism, for time is working for +socialism against capitalism. + +“The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the +masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. +Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class +struggle as the revisionists claim. The coexistence of states with +differing social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism +and capitalism. In conditions of peaceful coexistence favorable +opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle +in the capitalist countries and the national-liberation movement of +the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. In their turn, +the successes of the revolutionary class and the national liberation +struggle promote peaceful coexistence. The Communists consider it +their duty to fortify the faith of the people in the possibility of +furthering peaceful coexistence, their determination to prevent world +war. They will do their utmost for the people to weaken imperialism and +limit its sphere of action by an active struggle for peace, democracy +and national liberation. + +“Peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems does +not mean conciliation of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the +contrary, it implies intensification of the struggle of the working +class, of all the Communist Parties, for the triumph of socialist +ideas. But ideological and political disputes between states must not +be settled through war.”[238] + +Communist doctrine, action and aggression, however, has called forth +anti-communism. Those who are for liberty and righteousness are aroused +when they realize the inroads which communism is making throughout the +world. If men are for the traditional values of Western civilization, +for example, they must be against communism which endeavors to destroy +those values. + +It is very unfortunate that Senator Fulbright should brand so many +informed anti-Communists as belonging (as Gus Hall puts it) to the +ultra-right,[239] or extreme radical rightwing (as Senator Fulbright +puts it). It is tragic that the Senator has helped knock the military +out of the cold war (one of the prime objectives of the Communists in +America). It also is harmful to the cause of anti-communism and freedom +that he has identified this so-called radical rightwing with fascism. +It does not help military morale to raise the idea of “French Generals” +in America in the future threatening civilian authority. + +We hope that the Senator will reconsider and that he will use his +tremendous influence to get the Secretary of Defense and the White +House to disregard his very influential secret memorandum. We are +not asking that mistakes of anti-communists not be pointed out, but +we are asking him not to lump together so many different groups of +anti-communists and label them as “radical rightwingers”. We are not +asking that the military engage in partisan politics, but in view of +the great danger we stand in we are asking that at least some of the +individuals in the military, who are equipped to wage the cold war, be +allowed to help inform and alert the public, as well as the military, +concerning the history, philosophy, strategy and tactics of communism. +The need to meet the enemy in the cold war, and to win over the very +present danger of communism, is a pressing reality; and in dealing with +it we should use all necessary forces without being held back by the +fear that in some distant future some military leaders might get out +of hand. It is not realism to refuse to do what we can, including the +use of the military in the cold war, to meet a very real present danger +because of a fear of a danger which the Senator admits does not now +exist. + +The great problems which face us today center in communism and the war +which it is now waging on civilization. We hope that the influence of +Senator Fulbright, and those of like mind, on the President will not +keep him from implementing one of his own statements wherein he said: +“So, therefore, the problem always is, how can the military remain +removed from political life, how can civilian control of the military +remain removed from political life, how can civilian control of the +military be effectively maintained, and at the same time the military +have the right and the necessity to express their educated views +on some of the great problems that face us around the world?”[240] +This, however, it will be impossible for them to do if the Fulbright +memorandum continues to have an influence on the Government. + +Let us not lose sight of the basic issues which are involved. _First_, +we have been forced into the cold war by the aggressive acts and +designs of the Communists. _Second_, there is no reason to believe +that the Communists will change their minds and abandon their efforts +to conquer the world and to remake man into the image demanded by +their godless philosophy of life. _Third_, the cold war is a real +war. _Fourth_, the cold war is the major war which the Communists are +now waging against us. _Fifth_, the military has within its ranks +experts on the history, the philosophy, the strategy and the tactics +of communism. _Sixth_, international communism not only operates +outside of the borders of our country, but also inside the borders +through its various agents, including the Communist Party. _Seventh_, +the oath taken by the military binds the military to defend the +country against enemies both domestic and foreign. Communism today is +_the_ foreign and domestic enemy. _Eighth_, informing the troops and +the public concerning communism is not the same as participating in +partisan politics. _Ninth_, there is a need for both the troops and the +public to know more about the enemy who faces us. _Tenth_, civilian +control of the military is not really being threatened. _Eleventh_, +it is possible to deal with a military official who oversteps his +bounds without nullifying the directive issued in 1958 by the National +Security Council. _Twelfth_, the Fulbright memorandum was aimed at +the nullification of this directive and was designed, therefore, to +take the military out of the cold war in the very sense in which +the directive was designed to put the military into the cold war. +_Thirteen_, the memorandum and the Stanford speech introduce a new +concept of government. _Fourteen_, the memorandum is a serious matter +whose implementation hinders, not helps, the United States in the cold +war. Thus the author believes that the memorandum is against the real +interests of Senator Fulbright and all other Americans. + +Furthermore, let it be observed, in conclusion, that Senator Fulbright +has recognized elsewhere that the people need to be both alerted +and informed, although at times the Senator seems confused on these +matters. Thus in the memorandum Senator Fulbright said: “Fundamentally, +it is believed that the American people have little, if any, need to +be alerted to the menace of the cold war. Rather, the need is for +understanding of the true nature of that menace, and the direction +of the public’s present and foreseeable awareness of the fact of the +menace toward the support of the President’s own total program for +survival in a nuclear age.”[241] + +Does the Senator mean that the American people have already been +sufficiently alerted? Only a year before he doubted that Americans +had yet heeded the warning. He further thought that the President was +failing to sound the warning sufficiently. “We have been warned, but +have we heard? If we should perish it will not be for lack of warning +but for lack of the will to survive.”[242] “Mr. Sprague insisted that +the United States be awakened to the scope of the overall Russian +threat to us. But who is to ring the alarm bell? + +“‘There is only one man in the United States that can do this +effectively, and that is the President,’ said Mr. Sprague. He +continued: ‘I believe, and this is a personal belief, that the danger +is more serious than the President has indicated to the American +public.’”[243] + +As late as December 1960 the Senator was saying: “The greatest crisis +confronting the West is not Berlin. It is the apathy of the free world +and its incomprehensible unwillingness to look facts in the face. +Evolution and the survival of the fittest are concepts we understand +when applied to plants and animals—but we seem not to realize that +these concepts apply to us.”[244] + +Toward the end of April 1961 President Kennedy said: “Our greatest +adversary is not the Russians. It is our own unwillingness to do what +must be done.”[245] + +Senator Fulbright agrees that the people need to be informed. “The +successful waging of peace requires a vigorous national administration, +an informed people, and a mature people who know that you cannot be +adult without being willing to pay for what you want.”[246] “The +American people ought to be told the bleak truth about their world, +the character of the forces arrayed against them, and what they must +do, at whatever cost, to survive or even to bring about a state of +high security. They must be told that, however humane their society, +whatever its ideals, this alone will not save them from destruction by +a society armed with the prodigious mechanisms of our times and an +implacable determination to dominate all men.”[247] + +Since this is the case, there is no real reason why qualified men in +the military should not be used in alerting and informing America. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[238] _Statement of the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers’ Parties_, +November 1960, Toronto 3, Canada: Progress Books. Published for the +C.P. of Canada, pp. 16-17. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, _op. +cit._ p. 64. + +[239] Gus Hall, the Communist, in the _Worker_, July 16, 1961. + +[240] Excerpts from press conference of President Kennedy, +_Congressional Record_, August 11, 1961, p. 14449, col. 1,m. + +[241] _Ibid._, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col 2,b.-3,t. + +[242] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 1,t. + +[243] _Ibid._, p. A2708, col. 3,m. + +[244] _Ibid._, February 16, 1961, p. A925. + +[245] As quoted in the _Congressional Record_, May 9, 1961, p. 7138, +col. 3,b. + +[246] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, pp. A2708, col. 3,b.—A2709. + +[247] _Ibid._, p. A2709, col. 2,t. Senator Fulbright also said: “As +things now stand, however, the Soviets profit not only from their own +energy, but also from our apathy.” (_Congressional Record_, Sept. 9, +1961, p. 17249. Col.3, m.) “Many among us expressed the fear that our +inertia would be overcome—but momentarily, and that, like one who is +awakened from a deep sleep by some minor disturbance, we would again +subside into dreamland.” “Mr. President, I have no idea what must be +done to awaken Americans to the unpleasant facts of life. As unwilling +as I am to face it, perhaps the answer is that we simply do not wish +to be disturbed.” (_Congressional Record_, January 23, 1959, p. 1007, +col. 1,b.) “I believe that such a study would conclude that America’s +trouble is basically one of aimlessness at home and frustration +abroad.” (Speech before the American Bar Association, Sept. 1, 1960. +_Congressional Record_, Sept 2, 1961, p. A6708, col. 2,b.) “... if only +we would stop snoring with our eyes open.” (_Congressional Record_, +May 11, 1959, p. A3890. col. 1,m.) “We might even look forward to the +day when the Soviets become as snug and complacent as we have become.” +(_ibid._, col. 2,b.) “Indeed, we are not even united on the nature and +magnitude of that threat.” (_ibid._, p. A3891, col. 2,m.) Edgar Ansel +Mowrer has written a book entitled, _An End to Make-Believe_. New York: +Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961. + +Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt, on October 17, 1957, said: “It’s not communism +I am afraid of. What frightens me is the complacency of the American +people and their lack of knowledge about communism and its objectives.” +(_New York Herald Tribune_, October 18, 1957, p. 4) In the author’s +judgment, many of the common people today are ahead of some of the +“uncommon” people in their understanding of the nature of the threat. + + + + + Transcriber’s Notes + + pg vii Changed: the following discusison of the memorandum + To: the following discussion of the memorandum + + pg 6 Changed: or military solution.” Congressonal Record + To: or military solution.” Congressional Record + + pg 10 Changed: Arthur W. Radford also though that the military + To: Arthur W. Radford also thought that the military + + pg 14 Changed: it should be done under civiliain direction + To: it should be done under civilian direction + + pg 18 Changed: assaults of political depotism + To: assaults of political despotism + + pg 26 Changed: rather than state responsibltiy + To: rather than state responsibility + + pg 30 Changed: Within the framework of mutual deterrance + To: Within the framework of mutual deterrence + + pg 32 Changed: human misory and destruction + To: human misery and destruction + + pg 32 Changed: the imperalist states for a long iime + To: the imperialist states for a long time + + pg 34 Changed: It is believed accomodation can be + To: It is believed accommodation can be + + pg 35 Changed: of mutual interest, would be tantamont + To: of mutual interest, would be tantamount + + pg 49 Changed: International communist as presently constituted + To: International communism as presently constituted + + pg 54 Changed: public’s present and forseeable awareness + To: public’s present and foreseeable awareness + + pg 56 Changed: therefore incapable of governing thmselves + To: therefore incapable of governing themselves + + pg 56 Changed: have no access to the records of forign + To: have no access to the records of foreign + + pg 57 Changed: powerful and purposeful National Goverment + To: powerful and purposeful National Government + + pg 58 Changed: and certinly before anything + To: and certainly before anything + + pg 63 Changed: President Kenndy will not be President forever + To: President Kennedy will not be President forever + + pg 65 Changed: expressed in Lord Action maxim + To: expressed in Lord Acton’s maxim + + pg 68 Changed: It is rgrettable that the right to move + To: It is regrettable that the right to move + + pg 81 Changed: he feared federal control of education, aparently + To: he feared federal control of education, apparently + + pg 81 Changed: submitted by him to the Deparment of Defense + To: submitted by him to the Department of Defense + + pg 91 Changed: We have ‘internal contraditions,’ + To: We have ‘internal contradictions,’ + + pg 92 Changed: Spead of “Rightwingism” in the Military + To: Spread of “Rightwingism” in the Military + + pg 99 Changed: is reprinted in this goverment document + To: is reprinted in this government document + + pg 100 Changed: we should exerise great care + To: we should exercise great care +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78918 *** diff --git a/78918-h/78918-h.htm b/78918-h/78918-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..81a6bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/78918-h/78918-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,6137 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> +<head> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <title> + Senator Fulbright’s Secret Memorandum | Project Gutenberg + </title> + <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover"> + <style> + +body { + margin-left: 10%; 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+ margin-right: 10%; +} + +.center {text-align: center;} + +/* Images */ + +img { + max-width: 100%; + height: auto; +} + + +.figcenter { + margin: auto; + text-align: center; + page-break-inside: avoid; + max-width: 100%; +} + +/* Footnotes */ +.footnotes {border: 1px dashed;} + +.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + +.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + +.fnanchor { + vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: + none; +} + +/* Transcriber's notes */ +.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; + color: black; + font-size:small; + padding:0.5em; + margin-bottom:5em; + font-family:sans-serif, serif; +} + +.fs80 {font-size: 80%} +.fs90 {font-size: 90%} +.fs150 {font-size: 150%} + +.no-indent {text-indent: 0em;} +.bold {font-weight: bold;} +.wsp {word-spacing: 0.3em;} +.lh {line-height: 1.5em;} + +h2 {font-size: 110%; font-weight: normal; line-height: 1.6em; word-spacing: .3em;} +h3 {font-size: 100%; font-weight: normal; line-height: 1.6em; word-spacing: .3em;} + </style> +</head> + +<body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78918 ***</div> + + +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 85%"> +<img src="images/cover.jpg" alt="" data-role="presentation"> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> +<h1> +Senator Fulbright’s<br> +Secret Memorandum +</h1> + +<p class="center no-indent wsp"> + JAMES D. BALES<br> + <br> + <br> + <span class="fs90">Concerning the cold war, a well known<br> + liberal, William E. Bohn, said: “Many of<br> + us on the democratic side are poorly prepared<br> + for this historic conflict. There are<br> + editors, clergymen, educators, and politicians<br> + in this country who hardly know what Communism<br> + is.” (<cite>The New Leader</cite>, January<br> + 22, 1962, p. 15)</span><br> + <br> + <br> + BALES BOOKSTORE<br> + <span class="fs80">Searcy, Arkansas</span> +</p> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="center no-indent wsp"> + Copyright 1962 By<br> + JAMES D. BALES +</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</span></p> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="PREFACE"> + PREFACE + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Senator J. W. Fulbright’s memorandum concerning the military +and the cold war was likely the most controversial paper +which appeared in Washington in 1961. It is probable that the +memorandum has been discussed by a lot of people who have +not read it, much less studied it. Because it is an important +document it ought to be studied by the public as a whole, and +not just by men in the armed forces or by those in the political +arena.</p> + +<p>The importance of the memorandum is underscored not only +by what it says but also by the wide and varied reaction to it. +As to be expected, it has not been favorably received by those +individuals and organizations which it attacks as extremely +radical rightwingers. In addition, many individuals from various +parts of the United States and from both political parties have +been critical of the memorandum.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, support for the memorandum has come +from many and different sources. President Kennedy stated that +Senator Fulbright rendered a service by sending the memorandum +to the White House. In the Senator’s own state, the <cite>Arkansas +Gazette</cite> has more than once indicated its editorial backing +of the memorandum.</p> + +<p>The leftists as a whole have backed the memorandum. This +backing has included that of the socialists and of the communists. +Kingsley Martin, a British socialist said: “The dangerous change +came with the Korean war, when America discovered that GIs, +having no notion why they were fighting, were easily influenced +by Communist propaganda. As a result, the Pentagon has poured +out hundreds of booklets instructing officers how to indoctrinate +the army with hatred of Communism. Quotations from these +documents, presented at the initial hearing of the Walker case, +were, one would have thought sufficient evidence of the virulent +anti-Communist propaganda to which the troops are subjected. +But the Fulbright memorandum (which should be widely published +and not hidden in the Congressional Record) proved that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</span>politically-minded generals had used the permitted task of indoctrination +as a means of denigrating such distinguished American +personalities as Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt and Dean Acheson. +These were in effect treated as near-Communists, if not traitors.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_1_1" href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> +So far as the present author understands the matter, the memorandum +does not mention but one General even remotely in such +a way. And even in his case it states that he said that some +prominent Americans were “tainted with Communist ideology.” +This is not the same as calling them near-Communists or traitors.</p> + +<p>Kingsley Martin further praised Senator Fulbright as an internationalist, +and as one who “was making a reasoned attempt to +bring Arkansas into the world community.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_2_2" href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> What kind of “world +community” did the socialist Martin have in mind?</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright and his position were backed in the Paris +weekly, L’EXPRESS on October 12, 1961. This paper is connected +with Pierre Mendes-France, a leader of the leftwing of the +Socialist Party in France.⁠<a id="FNanchor_3_3" href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation has backed +it consistently. Norman Thomas said: “Our immediate purpose +in preparing this factual pamphlet was to present it to the administration +in order to back up Senator Fulbright’s excellent +memorandum and continue the work that the Defense Department +has begun.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_4_4" href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Irwin Suall, a prominent socialist, has written: “Flushing out +and exposing the activities of the ultras is a major current function +of the Socialist Party. From that standpoint, Thomas called +the results of his press conference ‘highly gratifying’.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_5_5" href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>⁠</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</span></p> + +<p>The Communist Party in the United States thought so highly +of the memorandum that they reprinted without comment several +columns of the memorandum in <cite>The Worker</cite> for August 27, 1961.</p> + +<p>No attempt is made to identify Senator Fulbright with each of +these groups just because they back him in this matter. This +would be neither sensible nor fair. However, such questions as +the following are raised: Why are they backing him in this matter? +How do they believe that this would contribute to their long-range +or short-range purposes? Would it make a contribution to +any of their purposes? We do know that the socialists and the +communists are backing the memorandum. This reveals their +evaluation of it and indicates whose causes they think that the +memorandum serves.</p> + +<p>The extent to which the censorship, which is recommended in +memorandum of Senator Fulbright, is being carried out already +is indicated in a directive issued to Reserve Officers in at least +one area of the United States. It reads: “Although Reserve +personnel are not subject to Army Regulations except when on +active duty, such regulations are distributed to Reserve units +with the intention of providing guidance where appropriate. +Members of the Reserve are encouraged to conform whenever +possible to the spirit and intent of regulations even though they +are not bound by them. It is pointed out that information they +convey to the public becomes at least quasi-official when linked +with their Reserve Status.”</p> + +<p>Since within a few months an attempt was being made to +carry over the censorship into the private lives of Reservists, in +the above manner, what will happen within a few years unless +the trend is changed? Will the Reserves be prohibited from the +freedom of speech which is the birthright of American citizens?</p> + +<p>The memorandum is thus seen to raise questions which are +tremendous in their import.</p> + +<p>Our examination of the memorandum does not imply that +there are no extremists. Obviously there are extremists of all +varieties in America, and it would be unreasonable to conclude +that there were no extremists in the military or amongst the +anti-Communists. However, in the author’s judgment it is highly +doubtful that the number of extremists in the military is anywhere +near as high as the percentage of soldiers in Korean prisoner +of war camps who in one way or another collaborated with +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</span>the enemy, or defected, or failed to manifest the proper discipline +or failed to cooperate with their fellow soldiers.</p> + +<p>Our defense of some of the individuals and positions which +are attacked in the memorandum does not imply an endorsement +of every individual and organization mentioned in the memorandum; +nor does it imply an endorsement of everything which may +have been said at one time or another by the individuals and +organizations in whose defense we have spoken.</p> + +<p>In our discussion of the memorandum we have sometimes +quoted Senator Fulbright against Senator Fulbright. We have +also quoted some liberals against Senator Fulbright. This illustrates +that one is not necessarily a so-called ultra rightist just +because he opposes certain positions taken by the Senator.</p> + +<p>There are some who have implied that Senator Fulbright is +not responsible for what is in the memorandum since he did +not personally write it. Of such we would ask: Is there anything +in the memorandum’s charges and recommendations with which +the Senator disagrees? If so, why has he not said so? As far as +our knowledge goes, the Senator himself has never suggested +that he disagrees with any of its charges and recommendations.</p> + +<p>Although the Senator did not personally write the memorandum, +he is responsible for it; and as far as we know he has never +suggested otherwise. He submitted it “to the Secretary of Defense.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_6_6" href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> +He said: “The memorandum was based on my strong +belief in the principle of military subordination to civilian control.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_7_7" href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> +“The memorandum was a personal one.... It was transmitted +to the Secretary of Defense as a personal correspondence.” +It was a part of his “private papers.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_8_8" href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>According to the President, Senator Fulbright’s memorandum +presented the Senator’s views. “Senator Fulbright sent a memorandum +to the Secretary of Defense at the request of the Secretary +of Defense, and expressed his views about a matter which is, of +course, of concern to the Department of Defense.”</p> + +<p>“So, in my judgment, Senator Fulbright performed a service +in sending his viewpoint to the Department of Defense....”⁠<a id="FNanchor_9_9" href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>In order to assist the public in their evaluation of the memorandum, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</span>the following discussion of the memorandum is placed +before the public.</p> + +<p>This discussion does not endeavor to present and to examine +the basic philosophy, strategy and tactics of the enemy—communism. +This the author has endeavored to do in two other books, +<cite>Communism: Its Faith and Fallacies</cite> and <cite>Understanding Communism</cite>.</p> + +<p>Appreciation is expressed to those who gave permission to +quote from copyrighted material.</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_1_1" href="#FNanchor_1_1" class="label">[1]</a> <cite>New Statesman</cite>, November 17, 1961, p. 732, col. 2,t. The difficulty of +speaking on some phases of the present world situation without crossing +Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt is illustrated by following remarks which she made +in a recent interview. <em>First</em>, the President has urged the people to build +shelters. Mrs. Roosevelt said: “I don’t believe in private shelters, or school +shelters.” It must be done, she said, through “a comprehensive government +program” if it is to be done at all. <em>Second</em>, the President indicates that we +shall fight if necessary. Military men teach the same thing. She said: “War +is inadmissible anymore.... Today willingness to go to war means willingness +to face the loss of civilization.” (Hal Boyle, “Eleanor Roosevelt Recalls +Pearl Harbor,” <cite>Arkansas Democrat</cite>, Dec. 7, 1961, p. 19.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_2_2" href="#FNanchor_2_2" class="label">[2]</a> <cite>New Statesman</cite>, p. 732, col. 1,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_3_3" href="#FNanchor_3_3" class="label">[3]</a> “Politically, it speaks for the non-Communist left and is close to ex-Premier +Pierre Mendes-France.” <cite>Newsweek</cite>, Feb. 12, 1962, p. 82, col. 3,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_4_4" href="#FNanchor_4_4" class="label">[4]</a> <cite>New America</cite>, December 8, 1961, p. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_5_5" href="#FNanchor_5_5" class="label">[5]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 6, col. 5,t. <cite>Maclean’s</cite> magazine (September 9, 1961) defended +Senator Fulbright and implied that “fanatics, numbskulls and mediocrities” +were the core of the opposition to him in his home state (p. 81. From an +article by Ian Schlanders.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_6_6" href="#FNanchor_6_6" class="label">[6]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_7_7" href="#FNanchor_7_7" class="label">[7]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13436, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_8_8" href="#FNanchor_8_8" class="label">[8]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13436, col. 3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_9_9" href="#FNanchor_9_9" class="label">[9]</a> Press conference of August 10. <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 11, 1961, +p. 14449, col. 1,t,m. See also p. 14559.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</span></p> + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="TABLE_OF_CONTENTS"> + TABLE OF CONTENTS + </h2> +</div> + +<table class="autotable lh"> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +CHAPTERS +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +</td> +<td class="tdr fs90"> +Page +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr fs90"> +Preface +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +I +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +The Background +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +<a href="#Chapter_I">1</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +II +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +The Secret Memorandum Made Public +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +<a href="#Chapter_II">5</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +III +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +The Effect of the Memorandum +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +<a href="#Chapter_III">6</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +IV +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +Who Is Attacked in the Memorandum +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +<a href="#Chapter_IV">9</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +V +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +The Protracted Conflict Concept Criticized +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +<a href="#Chapter_V">29</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +VI +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +The American People the Principle Problem? +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +<a href="#CHAPTER_VI">50</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +VII +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +Who Is the Defeatest? +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +<a href="#CHAPTER_VII">70</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +VIII +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +Senator Fulbright and World Opinion +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +<a href="#Chapter_VIII">70</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +IX +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +Is Communism A Matter of Politics? +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +<a href="#Chapter_IX">80</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +X +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +The Memorandum and the Community Party Line +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +<a href="#CHAPTER_X">80</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +XI +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +Conclusions +</td> +<td class="tdr"> +<a href="#CHAPTER_XI">101</a> +</td> +</tr> +</table> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</span></p> + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Chapter_I"> + Chapter I + <br> + THE BACKGROUND + </h2> +</div> + +<p>Too many Americans have understood neither the American +system of freedom, and how it works, nor the communist challenge +to our freedom, and how it operates. The well known +liberal, William E. Bohn, wrote: “Many of us on the democratic +side are poorly prepared for this historic conflict. There are +editors, clergymen, educators and politicians in this country who +hardly know what Communism is.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_10_10" href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> This lack of understanding +was illustrated in the case of those prisoners of war in Korea who +were brainwashed.⁠<a id="FNanchor_11_11" href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Out of this lack of understanding of the nature of our country, +and of the nature of the enemy who has challenged us, has +come an apathy which threatens our very survival. Senator Fulbright +himself has spoken of our having become “snug and complacent.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_12_12" href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> +He lamented: “... If only we would stop snoring +with our eyes open.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_13_13" href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> His fear was that even if we are aroused +out of our sleep we “again subside into dreamland.” In fact, he +said: “Mr. President, I have no idea what must be done to +awaken Americans to the unpleasant facts of life. As unwilling +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</span>as I am to face it, perhaps the answer is that we simply do not +wish to be disturbed.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_14_14" href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>In December, 1960, the Senator said: “The greatest crisis confronting +the West is not Berlin. It is the apathy of the free world +and its incomprehensible unwillingness to look facts in the face. +Evolution and the survival of the fittest are concepts we understand +when applied to plants and animals—but we seem not to +realize that these concepts apply to us.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_15_15" href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The people, said the Senator, must be informed. “The American +people ought to be told the bleak truth about their world, +the character of the forces arrayed against them, and what they +must do, at whatever cost, to survive or even to bring about a +state of high security. They must be told that, however humane +their society, whatever its ideals, this alone will not save them +from destruction by a society armed with the prodigious mechanisms +of our times and an implacable determination to dominate +all men.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_16_16" href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Spurred on by the studies of the Korean prisoners of war, and +deeply concerned with the apathy and ignorance in America, +efforts were made to do a better job of equipping the American +soldier for the war in which we have become involved. On August +17, 1955, President Eisenhower made an official proclamation +that soldiers were expected to live up to the newly formulated +“Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the +United States.” Since the ignorance in the Armed Forces was +but a reflection of the ignorance of the general population, President +Eisenhower and the National Security Council issued in +1958 a directive which more fully put the military in the cold +war.</p> + +<p>The National Security Council is our top policy and planning +agency. It is composed of the Cabinet members who have responsibilities +in the field of national security, and included in it +by law are the President, Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, +the Secretary of State, the National Security Resources +Board’s Chairman; and, as statutory advisers, the Chairman of +the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA. It was this group which +issued the directive of 1958 which placed upon the military the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</span>duty of helping not only the military but also the civilian population +to gain an understanding of the issues involved in the +cold war. By name, its statutory members in 1958 were President +Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, John Foster Dulles, Neil H. +McElroy, and Gordon Grey, the Director of the Office of Defense +Mobilization.</p> + +<p>As a result of this directive of the National Security Council, +national strategy seminars were conducted throughout the country. +Originating in the War College, these seminars were making +a valuable contribution to the waging of the cold war, as +Roscoe Drummond has pointed out.⁠<a id="FNanchor_17_17" href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> Civilian organizations who +wanted speakers on the subject of Communism and the cold war +could contact the military and secure the services of military +officials who were versed in some phase of the cold war. In some +cases facilities on military bases were made available.</p> + +<p>During 1961, however, there was an increase in censorship of +the speeches of military men. In July, 1961, the Defense Department +issued a directive placing certain restraints on military +speakers, and this action, according to Cabell Phillips in the +<cite>New York Times</cite> of July 21, was the result of a memorandum +of Senator J. W. Fulbright.⁠<a id="FNanchor_18_18" href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Supposedly directed only toward +the curbing of political utterances by rightwing military speakers, +the impact of the directive and the controversy which has arisen +have been much broader. As a result, as Roscoe Drummond +pointed out, the country is being deprived “of the useful and +needed service which the military can properly perform.”</p> + +<p>“We have just about thrown away the public national-strategy +seminars which were doing so much to alert people” concerning +communism and its strategy in the cold war.⁠<a id="FNanchor_19_19" href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>As far as we know the Defense Department has now limited +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</span>the military to military subjects, which include the military +threat of Russia; but anything dealing with the <em>specific aims and +political tactics of the communists must be cleared by the Pentagon</em>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_20_20" href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Fulbright’s memorandum, which has had an influence on the +stand taken by the Department of Defense, is thus seen to be +an important one.</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_10_10" href="#FNanchor_10_10" class="label">[10]</a> <cite>The New Leader</cite>, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 15.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_11_11" href="#FNanchor_11_11" class="label">[11]</a> William E. Mayer, “Communist Indoctrination—Its Significance to +Americans,” Searcy, Arkansas: National Education Program, 1957, pp. 14-15, +<cite>Congressional Record</cite>, Jan. 21, 1960, p. 877, col. 1,m. Senator Dodd has +endeavored to give the percentage of collaborators in The <cite>Congressional +Record</cite>, July 23, 1962, p. 13569. On the same page he said: “The overwhelming +majority of these POW’s succumbed to Communist pressures and +became collaborators in one degree or another. So general was the phenomena +of defeatism and ‘give-up-itis,’ that we cannot write them off to +individual weakness. The fault lay not with the individual, but with our +society.” See also the statements of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke in the Special +Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, <cite>Military +Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies</cite>, Washington: Government +Printing Office, 1962, Part 1, p.19. Also Secretary McNamara, Hearings +Before the Committee on Armed Services, <cite>Defense Secretary McNamara on +S. Res. 191</cite>, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_12_12" href="#FNanchor_12_12" class="label">[12]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, May 11, 1959, p. A3890, col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_13_13" href="#FNanchor_13_13" class="label">[13]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. A3890, col. 1,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_14_14" href="#FNanchor_14_14" class="label">[14]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, Jan. 23, 1959, p. 1007, col. 1,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_15_15" href="#FNanchor_15_15" class="label">[15]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, Feb. 16, 1961, p. A925, col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_16_16" href="#FNanchor_16_16" class="label">[16]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, March 28, 1960, p. A2709, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_17_17" href="#FNanchor_17_17" class="label">[17]</a> “When the Generals Should Be Allowed To Speak,” <cite>Arkansas Democrat</cite>, +October 26, 1961. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint +Chiefs of Staff, thought that qualified military personnel should participate +in such seminars. Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on +Armed Services, <cite>Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies</cite>, +Part 1, page 103.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_18_18" href="#FNanchor_18_18" class="label">[18]</a> See the directive and Phillips’ articles reprinted by Senator Strom +Thurmond in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, July 26, 1961, pp. 12620-12621. Compare +<cite>U.S. News and World Report</cite>, August 7, 1961, p. 9. See also pp. 12-15 +of a reprint entitled “Excerpts From Speeches by Senator Strom Thurmond +on Efforts to Gag Military Anti-Communist Speeches and Seminars.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_19_19" href="#FNanchor_19_19" class="label">[19]</a> “When the Generals Should Be Allowed To Speak,” <cite>Arkansas Democrat</cite>, +October 26, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_20_20" href="#FNanchor_20_20" class="label">[20]</a> According to <cite>U.S. News and World Report</cite>, September 18, 1961, p. 8. +Reporting on the September 6 testimony of Defense Secretary McNamara.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Chapter_II"> + Chapter II + <br> + THE SECRET MEMORANDUM MADE PUBLIC + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>The Fulbright memorandum was sent to the Secretary of Defense +and to the President. It was so secret that other members +of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which Senator +Fulbright is the chairman, did not know of its existence.⁠<a id="FNanchor_21_21" href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> Someone, +however, made it available to the United Press International.⁠<a id="FNanchor_22_22" href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> +Senator Thurmond learned of its existence and tried, without +success at first, to secure a copy. He, Senator Mundt, and Senator +Styles Bridges were concerned that such an influential +memorandum was kept secret.⁠<a id="FNanchor_23_23" href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> As Senator Fulbright himself +had said, more than a year before, when something has been +leaked to the press it should be more or less officially released. +When it is not released, people wonder whether some things +which they should know have been withheld from them.⁠<a id="FNanchor_24_24" href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> But +Senator Fulbright was willing to let the people wonder in this +case!</p> + +<p>Due to circumstances beyond the control of Senator Fulbright, +Senator Thurmond secured a copy of the memorandum and inserted +it into the Congressional Record.⁠<a id="FNanchor_25_25" href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> Later the same day +Senator Fulbright placed it in the <cite>Record</cite>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_26_26" href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>What was the effect of the secret memorandum which, without +Senator Fulbright’s aid, has been made public?</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_21_21" href="#FNanchor_21_21" class="label">[21]</a> President Kennedy in a press conference on August 10, 1961, <cite>Congressional +Record</cite>, August 11, 1961, p. 14449, col. 1,t. See Senator Fulbright’s +letter to Senator Thurmond in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 4, 1961, +p. 13687, col. 2,t. <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, July 21, 1961, p. 1. <cite>Congressional +Record</cite>, July 31, 1961, p. 13174. August 4, 1961, p. 13687, col. 2,t. <cite>Congressional +Record</cite>, July 29, 1961, p. 13005; Compare August 4, 1961, p. 13687. +See also Marquis Childs, <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, July 26, 1961, p. 12618.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_22_22" href="#FNanchor_22_22" class="label">[22]</a> <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, July 21, 1961, p. 1. See also Marquis Childs, “Birchites +Finding Allies in Military,” <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, July 14, 1961, pp. +11659-11660.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_23_23" href="#FNanchor_23_23" class="label">[23]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, July 26, 1961, p. 12621. col. 3,t.; July 29, 1961, +p. 13005, col. 1,m.; p. 13005, col. 3,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_24_24" href="#FNanchor_24_24" class="label">[24]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, March 28, 1960, p. 6207, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_25_25" href="#FNanchor_25_25" class="label">[25]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13398.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_26_26" href="#FNanchor_26_26" class="label">[26]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, p. 13436.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Chapter_III"> + Chapter III + <br> + THE EFFECT OF THE MEMORANDUM + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Senator Fulbright, when he inserted the memorandum into +the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, said it was based on the principle of +military subordination to civilian control, and that it was not +the function of the military to educate the public on political +issues.⁠<a id="FNanchor_27_27" href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> The Senator further said: “The memorandum was directed +solely at the impropriety of officers of the armed services +lending their prestige and official status to meetings which tend +to undermine policies of the civil government of the United +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</span>States, as set forth by the President and the Congress.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_28_28" href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>“The sole objective of my recommendation was to insure that +high military personnel adhere to the obligation, which is inherent +in their duty as officers to refrain from public expressions +of opposition to the policies of the Government and of their Commander-in-Chief.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_29_29" href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>We are not impugning the motives of Senator Fulbright when +we say that a study of the memorandum reveals that its effect +was to challenge the National Security Council directive of 1958. +This directive did not deny the principle of civilian control; +in fact, because of its subordination to President Eisenhower +the military obeyed the directive. Furthermore, the directive did +not call for the military to educate the public on political issues +in the sense of partisan politics. In the memorandum Senator +Fulbright himself said: “Under a National Security Council directive +in 1958, it remains the policy of the U. S. Government to +make use of military personnel and facilities to arouse the public +to the menace of the cold war.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_30_30" href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>“The purpose of this memorandum is to give some indication +of the dangers involved in education and propaganda activities +by the military, directed at the public, and to suggest steps +for dealing with the underlying problem.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_31_31" href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>“There is little in the education, training or experience of most +military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment +necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which +their education, training and experience are concerned—into +proper perspective in the President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear +age’.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_32_32" href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Under “Recommendations” we find:</p> + +<p>“1. With reference to the National Security Council directive +of 1958, suggested revision is based upon its description in attachment +3 (New York Times article of June 18, 1961), from +which the following is excerpted: ‘President Eisenhower and his +top policy leaders decreed that the cold war could not be fought +as a series of separate and often unrelated actions, as with foreign +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</span>aid and propaganda’. Rather, it must be fought with a concentration +of all the resources of the Government and with the +full understanding and support of the civilian population. It was +decided, in particular, that the military should be used to reinforce +the cold-war effort.”</p> + +<p>“This policy should be reconsidered from the standpoint of a +basic error, that military personnel have the necessarily broad +background which would enable them to relate the various +aspects of the cold-war effort, one to the other.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_33_33" href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The memorandum indicates that it is convinced that the National +Security Council directive, and its implementation, could +be attacked from several grounds, including an assumed violation +of the “basic traditional and constitutional question of military +efforts to propagandize the public....” As it went on to say: +“the violation of these concepts alone should be sufficient basis +for challenging the National Security Council policy, and its +implementation.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_34_34" href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>This also helps make it certain that the memorandum was not +directed simply against certain mistakes in the implementation of +the policy, but against the policy itself. In addition to saying +that the military is <em>not qualified</em> to engage in the cold war, the +Senator claims that it is <em>forbidden on constitutional grounds</em>.</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_27_27" href="#FNanchor_27_27" class="label">[27]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m. Civilian control +is not controversial. In his May 12, 1962 speech to the West Point +Cadets, General Douglas MacArthur emphasized that political problems +were “not for your professional participation or military solution.” <cite>Congressional +Record</cite>, May 31, 1962, p. A4009, col. 1,t.</p> + +<p>Admiral Arleigh A. Burke testified: “No mature U.S. military officer I +know of has ever questioned it. Indeed, it is a sacred part of our military +tradition itself. If a military man cannot reconcile his convictions with his +civilian superior’s orders, he has only the recourse of leaving the service.”</p> + +<p>“But the principle of civilian control can be perverted. Civilian control +of the military is properly exerted by the President, the Secretary of Defense, +and the secretaries of the individual military departments over the +military services, within the guidelines laid down by Congress. The senior +civilians in the Government have the final decision on all problems affecting +the military posture of the United States. This is proper and correct.”</p> + +<p>“In my opinion, it is improper that civilian control should be exercised +in any other echelon but at the top. It should not be extended to every +subordinate military echelon. To be specific, orders and directives to the +military should come from the top civilian elements to the senior military +people. They should not come from junior civilian elements to junior military +people.” (Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, +Part 1, pp. 21-22).</p> + +<p>General MacArthur further said: “While for the purpose of administration +and command the Armed forces are within the executive branch of the +Government, they are accountable as well to the Congress, charged with the +policymaking responsibility, and to the people, ultimate repository of all +national power. Yet so inordinate has been the application of the Executive +power that members of the armed services have been subjected to the most +arbitrary and ruthless treatment for daring to speak the truth in accordance +with conviction and conscience.” (as quoted by General Edward M. Almond, +<em>Ibid.</em>, Part 2, p. 714.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_28_28" href="#FNanchor_28_28" class="label">[28]</a> “Statement of Senator J. W. Fulbright Relating to a Memorandum +Submitted by Him to the Department of Defense,” p. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_29_29" href="#FNanchor_29_29" class="label">[29]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, page 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_30_30" href="#FNanchor_30_30" class="label">[30]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_31_31" href="#FNanchor_31_31" class="label">[31]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13437, col. 1,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_32_32" href="#FNanchor_32_32" class="label">[32]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13437, col. 1,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_33_33" href="#FNanchor_33_33" class="label">[33]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13437, col. 3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_34_34" href="#FNanchor_34_34" class="label">[34]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13437, col. 2,b.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Chapter_IV"> + Chapter IV + <br> + WHO IS ATTACKED IN THE MEMORANDUM? + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Senator Fulbright’s memorandum attacked a wide variety of +Americans, as well as the American people as a whole.</p> + + +<h3><em>President Eisenhower</em></h3> + +<p>In challenging the directive of the National Security Council, +Senator Fulbright was saying that in spite of his military background +President Eisenhower did not know enough to realize +that the military was not qualified to engage in the cold war. +Senator Fulbright, however, was qualified—he thought—to judge +that the military was not qualified. Furthermore, when Senator +Fulbright said that such participation was contrary to certain +constitutional values, he was saying that either President Eisenhower +did not understand these values or that he chose to disregard +them.</p> + + +<h3><em>The Military</em></h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright’s memorandum was an attack on the competency +of the military to engage in the cold war. Concerning +the policy of the National Security Council, which put the military +into the cold war, the memorandum said: “This policy +should be reconsidered from the standpoint of a basic error, that +military personnel have the necessarily broad background which +would enable them to relate the various aspects of the cold-war +effort, one to the other.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_35_35" href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>It was also stated: “There is little in the education, training +or experience of most military officers to equip them with the +balance of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those +with which their education, training and experience +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</span>are concerned—into proper perspective in the President’s total +‘strategy for the nuclear age’.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_36_36" href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Furthermore, the Senator said: “There are no reasons to believe +that military personnel generally can contribute to this +need, beyond their specific, technical competence to explain +their own role. On the contrary, there are many reasons, and +some evidence, for believing that an effort by the military, beyond +this limitation, involves considerable danger.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_37_37" href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Whence did the Senator get his competency in the field of +the cold war? Whence his qualifications as a cold war strategist +so that he knows that we have much to lose and nothing to gain +by having the military in the cold war? How did he become +qualified to advise in effect the neutralization, in so far as the +public is involved, of the military in the cold war?</p> + +<p>Are there any military officials more competent than the +Senator is in any phase of the cold war? If so, why not let +military experts on Communism be used to help us win the +victory in the cold war?</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright’s position, that military officials are not +sufficiently educated to engage in the cold war, is an indictment +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</span>of the armed services colleges where these officers have +been trained.</p> + +<p>Many of the officers have one or more degrees. Many of them +have travelled extensively and some of them are proficient in +more than one language.</p> + +<p>Senator Styles Bridges expressed his shock at Senator Fulbright’s +evaluation of the military. “I assume, and it is an +assumption which I believe to be valid, that our senior military +officers, particularly those of flag and general officer rank, +are persons of judgment and responsibility. Most of these +officers are graduates of our Military Academies, and all of +them have many years of experience in leadership, many of +them are held directly responsible for the welfare and lives of +large segments of our military forces, and many of them are +held directly chargeable with the care, custody and protection of +millions of dollars worth of property belonging to the U. S. +Government. The appointment of each of them to a position +of high rank was made as an expression of trust and confidence +by the President and with the concurrence of the U. S. Senate.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_38_38" href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> +After discussing the education of most of the Army officers, +Major John A. Burns wrote: “It is doubtful if any professional +group is so rigorously trained and educated as the American +officer.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_39_39" href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Senator recognizes, as do the rest of us, that the United +States is confronted by a situation which it has never before +faced. The memorandum indicates that it is not in the American +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</span>tradition to be involved in the “long twilight struggle” which we +are now involved in; but we are so involved.⁠<a id="FNanchor_40_40" href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>That we are in an unprecedented situation in the history of +America, is underscored by the fact that on December 16, 1950, +President Truman declared, in Proclamation 2914, that we are +in a state of national emergency because of Communist imperialism. +Events since that time have only further emphasized that +we are in a state of national emergency.⁠<a id="FNanchor_41_41" href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>It is not contrary to our tradition for the military to go into +action when war comes. War has come.</p> + +<p>W. D. Workman wrote: “If warfare today were confined to +the battlefield, and if the battlefield alone were the concern of +the military, there might be some justification for buttoning the +lips of our senior officers. But warfare now is fourth dimensional, +encompassing politics, culture, economics and all other +institutions which lend themselves to internal subversion as well +as external manipulation.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_42_42" href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>The Military Oath</em></h3> + +<p>Military men have taken an oath to defend the United States +against enemies both domestic and foreign. This oath calls on +them to defend the country against <em>domestic</em> enemies as well +as foreign enemies. Why, then, does Senator Fulbright take a +position which in effect keeps the military men from carrying +out their oath against such a domestic enemy as the Communist +conspiracy in America?</p> + +<p>It is in the light of their oath, and of the threat of internal +and external communism, that we can fully understand Resolution +99 of the American Legion convention in Denver. It states: +“Whereas the morale and fighting spirit of our Armed Forces +is directly related to their knowledge and their belief in the +fundamental principles upon which the Government of their +homeland is founded and to their knowledge and understanding +of the aims and purposes of the enemy; and</p> + +<p>“Whereas the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation +and author of ‘Masters of Deceit’, a most knowledgeable work +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</span>on communism, has stated and warned, ‘We cannot hope to +successfully meet the Communist menace unless there is a wide +knowledge and understanding of its aims and designs’, and</p> + +<p>“Whereas, Lenin, the real architect of communism, proclaimed, +‘It is inconceivable that communism and democracy can exist +side by side in this world.’ Lenin said inevitably we must perish; +and</p> + +<p>“Whereas this doctrine has been iterated and reiterated many +times by his successors, and their actions have consistently been +in conformity therewith; and</p> + +<p>“Whereas the military officers of the U. S. Armed Forces +are charged under oath with the duty to defend our country +from all enemies foreign and domestic and that to accomplish +fealty to this oath, the military leaders must know the enemy—his +aims and purposes in order to instruct the men under their +command, fortify their morale, and so defend our homeland +against the enemy; and</p> + +<p>“Whereas this right and duty of the military officers of the +U. S. Armed Forces has recently been challenged publicly by +certain officials in high places in Government: Now, therefore, +be it</p> + +<p>“<em>Resolved</em>, That the American Legion in convention assembled +in Denver, Colo., September 9 through 14, 1961, urge the officers +of the U. S. Armed Forces to continue to perform their duty to +defend the Constitution of the United States, that they better +inform themselves regarding the fundamental principles of our +form of government exemplified by our Declaration of Independence +and Constitution, that they transmit and impart this +knowledge to the Armed Forces under their command and to +the general public, that the officers of our Armed Forces familiarize +themselves with the aims and purposes of the known +enemy, that they earnestly and patriotically strive at all times +to impart this knowledge to the men under their command and +to the general public to the end that the morale and fighting +spirit of our Armed Forces be kept at all times at the highest +possible level. We further urge that the challenge of certain +Government officials in high places to the established rights +and duties of the officers of our Armed Forces be removed and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</span>that they be left unshackled and unhampered in the discharge +of their duties to the above end.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_43_43" href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Does the Senator think that the only way that the military +can live up to its oath is by bullets in a hot war, and not also +by words in a cold war? The oath does not say that the defense +of the United States is limited to defense by bullets. To uphold +the United States includes upholding it by word also. Or does +the Senator, with his attitude toward at least some aspects of +our constitutional system, think that if one upholds the Constitution +by the teaching method that he is engaging in partisan +politics?</p> + +<p>If it is not a violation of their oath to defend the Constitution +by words against the domestic enemy communism, if they can +in harmony with their oath expose and oppose the domestic +enemy communism, then why not let them participate in the +cold war?</p> + +<p>Is not the memorandum, in effect, a demand that the military +not carry out their oath in so far as domestic Communists are +concerned, which domestic Communists are a part of the international +communist threat?</p> + +<p>The Senator in effect wants the military eliminated from the +cold war. As Senator Curtis, from Nebraska, said: “If this +paper were devoted to errors of judgment or fact—which are +going to creep into any program—everybody should consider +those errors so that they might not be repeated or that they +might be corrected. But the purport of this memorandum is +plain—it is a pronouncement that the military should not alert +the citizens of the internal Communist threat. I am afraid it +serves interests that were never intended to be served by whoever +had the responsibility of putting the memorandum together.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_44_44" href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>We would add the observation that there is no indication that +Senator Fulbright in the memorandum proposed that the military +officials should alert even their own troops to the menace +and nature of the cold war except possibly later when some of +them have been educated by civilians. And even then he says +it should be done under civilian direction as far as possible.</p> + +<p>The Senator does not seem to want the military to have the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</span>right to speak out against internal communism, or to inform +the public of the dangers which threaten us or to show how the +Communists operate.</p> + +<p>We are confident that, regardless of the Senator’s motives, +Khrushchev must be pleased with the idea of the military being +so neutralized in the cold war. Since the cold war is the major +war which Khrushchev and world communism are now waging +against us, Khrushchev must consider it to be a real victory +for his side to have the military forces knocked out of the cold +war to the extent that the memorandum knocked the military +out of the cold war.</p> + +<p>We would have little or no hope for the survival of our +country if the military did not have greater confidence in +America than the Senator seems to have in the military. Indeed, +the Senator himself once said: “If we lose faith in the +integrity of our military men, in addition to the criticism +which has been heaped upon the leadership in the political +field, we certainly are in a sad state.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_45_45" href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>We are afraid that under the influence of Senator Fulbright’s +memorandum concerning the military, and the increased power +which the Secretary of Defense is wielding over the statements +of the military, that a situation is developing which a few years +ago the Senator himself thought would be a serious condition +indeed. Senator Taft had criticized the Chiefs of Staff because +he thought that they were but rubber stamps for the administration. +Taft said: “I accepted them as experts; but I have come +to the point where I do not accept them as experts, particularly +when General Bradley makes a foreign policy speech. I suggest +to the Senator that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are absolutely under +the control of the administration, and that their recommendations +are what the administration demands that they make.</p> + +<p>“<em>Mr. Fulbright.</em> Mr. President, I think that is a very serious +charge which is made by the Senator from Ohio. I can think +of nothing which is more likely to cause consternation in this +country, to develop a fear which I believe the facts do not +warrant, and generally to disrupt our effort in this great struggle +with the Russians and with communism, than to state here that +in effect he has no confidence in the integrity of the leading +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</span>military figures in our Government. I think it is a very sad +state in which we find ourselves if we are led to such extreme +views.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_46_46" href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Yet in 1960, Senator Fulbright praised an article which +said, among other things, that in President Eisenhower’s administration +“uniformity of viewpoint is virtually enforced.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_47_47" href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>If the military is not permitted to speak out on the issues of +the cold war, if they must silently wait until the time comes +for them to rubber stamp whatever program the President finally +comes up with, one would have the situation which Taft had in +mind, i.e. they would recommend whatever the administration +demanded. And this they would do without having had the opportunity +to have participated in public discussions before the +program was arrived at.</p> + + +<h3><em>General MacArthur Attacked</em></h3> + +<p>The Senator smeared one of the greatest generals in the +history of America, and included him as a sample of the attitude +of rightwing extremism. Of MacArthur, who was born in Arkansas, +the Senator said: “Pride in victory, and frustration in +restraint, during the Korean war, led to MacArthur’s revolt +and McCarthyism.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_48_48" href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Surely the Senator must have at least hesitated before impugning +the motives of General MacArthur. Although it would +be a good thing for us to win the victory over communism, +pride in victory is not the motive. The important things are +for what one is fighting and against what one is fighting. The +desire to win victory over communism is highly commendable. +Was the General motivated by pride in victory or by love of +country, love of freedom and by opposition to this tremendous +evil which would enslave mankind? In our opinion, the Senator’s +evaluation of the General is a reflection on the Senator instead +of on the General. We do not believe that the General’s long +life of service to his country gives us any reason for believing +that “pride in victory” is a correct analysis. The Senator was +judging motives.</p> + +<p>In another place, the Senator has said: “This technique of +questioning the motives of the opposition instead of arguing +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</span>about the wisdom of their views is one of the oldest and most +effective tools of tyrants or demagogues.” He went on to say +that one could question his judgment and intellect, but “I do +object to their questioning my motives or purposes or loyalty.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_49_49" href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> +And yet, the Senator questioned the motives of the General and +said that the General acted out of “pride in victory.”</p> + +<p>As for the General being frustrated under restraint, it likely +would have been frustrating to any soldier to have been ordered +into a war in which the main enemy—the Chinese Communists—was +permitted a privileged sanctuary beyond the Yalu River. +Furthermore, it was a war which the General was not permitted +to try to win. Would the Senator be frustrated if he was ordered +into a political campaign which he would not be permitted—by +those who ordered him into it—to win? How much more so +when one wanted to win against communism and for the cause +of freedom.</p> + +<p>The term “McCarthyism” is used as a smear word, and by +thus equating “MacArthur’s revolt” and “McCarthyism” was +the Senator unconscious of the fact that in the minds of some +a bit, at least, of the smear would rub off on the General?</p> + +<p>We contrast the Senator’s views of MacArthur with that of +General Carlos P. Romulo, the Ambassador to the United States +from the Philippines.</p> + +<p>“Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s sentimental journey to the Philippines +has a fourfold significance:</p> + +<p>“1. At a time when Soviet propaganda is sparing no effort +to distort America’s image in the eyes of the peoples of Asia, +General MacArthur’s personality emerges as a living refutation +of Communist misrepresentations. Received by an Asian people +with open arms and given a reception that in warmth and +magnitude is unprecedented in that section of the globe, the +American people should be proud that they have one of their +own who can draw to his person and to his country such +universal popular acclaim and admiration.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_50_50" href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>MacArthur’s wisdom concerning China, in contract with the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</span>illusions of the civilian authorities who then formed policy, is +illustrated in his cable to the House Foreign Affairs Committee +around the early part of 1948.</p> + +<p>“The international aspect of the Chinese problem, unfortunately, +has become somewhat beclouded by demands for internal +reform. Desirable as such reform may be, its importance is but +secondary to the issue of civil strife now engulfing the land, +and these two issues are as impossible of synchronization as it +would be to alter the structural design of a house while the +same was being consumed by flame. The maintenance of China’s +integrity against destructive forces which threaten her engulfment +is of infinitely more concern. For with the firm maintenance +of such integrity, reform will gradually take place in +the evolutionary processes of China’s future.</p> + +<p>“The Chinese problem is part of a global situation which +should be considered in its entirely. Fragmentary decisions in +disconnected sectors of the world will not bring an integrated +solution. It would be utterly fallacious to underrate either +China’s needs or her importance. For if we embark upon a +general policy to bulwark the frontiers of freedom against the +assaults of political despotism, one major frontier is no less important +than another, and a decisive breach of any will inevitably +engulf all.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_51_51" href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>When he was a Congressman, President Kennedy also spoke +of some of the illusions of civilian authorities concerning China. +“Mr. Speaker, over this week end we have learned the extent of +the disaster that has befallen China and the United States. +The responsibility for the failure of our foreign policy in the +Far East rests squarely with the White House and the Department +of State.</p> + +<p>“The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming, +unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed, +was a crippling blow to the National Government.</p> + +<p>“So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the +Lattimores and the Fairbanks, with the imperfection of the +domestic system in China after 20 years of war and the tales +of corruption in high places that they lost sight of our tremendous +stake in a non-Communist China.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</span></p> + +<p>“Our policy in the words of the Premier of the National Government, +Sun Fo, of vacillation, uncertainty, and confusion has +reaped the whirlwind.</p> + +<p>“This House must now assume the responsibility of preventing +the onrushing tide of communism from engulfing all of Asia.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_52_52" href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>We wonder whether or not Senator Fulbright would have +lectured this Congressman on the need to support the President’s +total program, that criticism of this nature divides the country, +that this is extremely radical rightwingism, etc.!!</p> + +<p>We are glad that President Kennedy’s visits with General +MacArthur indicate that he has a higher regard for the General +than does Senator Fulbright. The Senator’s opinion of General +MacArthur is also in contrast with that of the House of Representatives +in their resolution in which the <em>Senate</em> also concurred. +“<em>Resolved by the House of Representatives</em> (<em>the Senate +concurring</em>), That the thanks and appreciation of the Congress +and the American people are hereby tendered to General of +the Army Douglas MacArthur in recognition of his outstanding +devotion to the American people, his brilliant leadership during +and following World War II, and the unsurpassed affection held +for him by the people of the Republic of the Philippines which +has done so much to strengthen the ties of friendship between +the people of that nation and the people of the United States.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_53_53" href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>The American People Attacked</em></h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright not only indicted General MacArthur, but +also the American people. Thus we read: “The American people +have never really been tested in such a struggle. In the long +run, it is quite possible that the principle problem of leadership +will be, if it is not already, to restrain the desire of the people +to hit the Communists with everything we’ve got, particularly +if there are more Cubas and Laos. Pride in victory, and frustration +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</span>in restraint, during the Korean war, led to MacArthur’s +revolt and McCarthyism.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_54_54" href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Is the Senator saying that the American people may revolt if +they are restrained so much that they are not permitted, as +MacArthur was not permitted, to win the struggle in which +the Communists have engaged us?</p> + +<p>This, incidentally, is the first time that we have known that +the Senator had such a charitable interpretation of McCarthyism. +In effect the memorandum is saying that the American people +want to win the victory over communism in the struggle which +is now going on in the world; and that when they are restrained +and kept from this victory, McCarthyism is the result. McCarthyism, +according to this, is the desire to break down the restraints +which keep us from winning, and the desire to go on to win the +victory over the evil forces of communism. This, in effect, is +what the Senator said.</p> + +<p>The American people will doubtless weigh well the Senator’s +implication that they possess the two essential ingredients which, +according to the Senator lead to McCarthyism. These two +are: Pride in victory and frustration in restraint. In other +words, the Senator believes that we are all potential or incipient +McCarthyites. There is no reason to assume that the Senator +meant this in any complimentary way.</p> + + +<h3><em>Dr. Benson</em>⁠<a id="FNanchor_55_55" href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a>⁠</h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright included Dr. George S. Benson, Arkansan +of the Year for 1953-1954, President of Harding College and +President of the National Education Program, as one of the +extremely radical rightwing speakers. Dr. Benson believes in +and advocates the religious and moral principles on which this +country was founded; constitutional and thus limited government; +citizenship responsibility; free enterprise and freedom. +He is against both the internal and external threat of communism, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</span>which are two aspects of the same threat—international +communism.</p> + +<p>Does adherence to the traditional values on which America +has been built, and which has made America great, make one +an extremely radical rightwinger? If it does, what does Senator +Fulbright’s classification of Dr. Benson reveal about Senator +Fulbright’s stand? Is the Senator so far away from the positions +that Dr. Benson advocates that the Senator thinks that Dr. +Benson is an extremely radical rightwinger?</p> + +<p>It would be educational for all concerned if Senator Fulbright +would make an attempt to sustain his charge against +Dr. Benson by listing, with documentation from Dr. Benson’s +writings and speeches, those positions which the Senator believes +prove that Dr. Benson is an extremely radical rightwing +speaker. Assertions are not sufficient. The Senator’s charges, +where the Senator has much influence, are damaging to Dr. +Benson’s work for free enterprise and against communism. They +should either be sustained or the Senator should withdraw them +publicly.</p> + + +<h3><em>Dr. Clifton L. Ganus, Jr.</em></h3> + +<p>In his secret memorandum Senator Fulbright passed on, without +checking with Dr. Ganus, a misrepresentation of Dr. Ganus. +Senator Fulbright’s memorandum said: “An Arkansas citizen +wrote of the Fort Smith meeting: ‘Dr. Clifton L. Ganus, Jr., +vice president and dean of the School of American Studies at +Harding College, made the statement “your Representative +(James W. Trimble) in this area has voted 89 percent of the +time to aid and abet the Communist Party”’.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_56_56" href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Dr. Ganus did not make this statement.⁠<a id="FNanchor_57_57" href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> If he had made +such a startling statement, surely it would have been picked up +by the newspapers at that time and reported. However, as +far as we know even the <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite> did not refer to it +until months later. This was after it had been published in the +<cite>Reporter</cite> magazine—which magazine presented this false accusation +without any effort to check it with Dr. Ganus. As far as +I know, the first time this false accusation appeared in print +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</span>was in the July 20, 1961 issue of the <cite>Reporter</cite>, which was +published at least a week earlier than July 20.⁠<a id="FNanchor_58_58" href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>It is also instructive that Perry Mason of Harding Academy +spoke in Fort Smith several times, and to some of the same +people, a few days after Dr. Ganus spoke. Although he received +some questions concerning some points made in Dr. Ganus’ +speech, no one either publicly or privately said anything about +the statement later attributed to Dr. Ganus.</p> + +<p>If Dr. Ganus had made such a preposterous statement, surely +someone would have defended their Congressman right then +and there.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, several people have made out affidavits, and +have testified that they were there and that Dr. Ganus did +not make the statement attributed to him.⁠<a id="FNanchor_59_59" href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>Harding College</em></h3> + +<p>Because it has won for ten straight years the highest award +of Freedoms Foundation At Valley Forge, Harding College, a +fully accredited educational institution, has been known as the +nation’s most honored college. Freedoms Foundation has honored +Harding College as the nation’s No. 1 school in promoting the +American way of life. On February 9, 1962, the All-American +Conference to Combat Communism, made up of organizations +whose combined membership is well over 50,000,000, gave Harding +College a citation.</p> + +<p>The socialists have felt the impact of the College in its stand +for the traditional free enterprise system in America. This helps +explain the attack of Norman Thomas, the leading socialist in +America, on the College early in 1961.</p> + +<p>The Communists have recognized that the College is a bulwark +against their designs on America, and thus they have attacked +Harding College and have falsely accused it of being “one of +the biggest political machines of the ultra-Right.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_60_60" href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> This attack +by the Communists is in reality a tribute to Harding College. +The Communists know who is hurting them.</p> + +<p>However, it must come as something of a shock that Senator +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</span>Fulbright from the State of Arkansas, should also attack Harding +College as a source of extremely radical rightwing teaching. +And yet, this is the label under which he secretly represented +Harding College to the President of the United States and to +the Secretary of Defense.⁠<a id="FNanchor_61_61" href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> Harding College, located in the +Senator’s home state, was the only college attacked in the +memorandum.</p> + + +<h3><em>Chamber of Commerce</em></h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright’s memorandum regarded the Strategy for +Survival Conferences as dominated by the extremely rightwing +speakers.⁠<a id="FNanchor_62_62" href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> The Chamber of Commerce had sponsored this Conference. +Thus the Chamber of Commerce was involved in +extreme rightwingism! It is of interest that the Chamber of +Commerce had tried to get Senator Fulbright, but he was out +of the country; and then Senator McClellan, and he was also +unavailable. It was then that they got Dr. Ganus.⁠<a id="FNanchor_63_63" href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The memorandum also stated that General William C. Bullock +had personally persuaded the Chamber of Commerce to sponsor +the Conference in Little Rock. Peyton Rice, who is chairman +of the Chamber’s Armed Services Committee, said that General +Bullock had not presented the proposal to the Chamber.⁠<a id="FNanchor_64_64" href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>House Committee</em></h3> + +<p>The House Committee on Un-American Activities has not +been perfect, but neither has any other Committee. However, on +the whole it has done splendid work investigating and exposing +the Communist conspiracy. If Senator Fulbright had listened +to the evidence presented in just the 1938 hearings of the +Committee, he would have learned much truth about communism. +He would not have said in 1945 that “our fear of Russia +and communism” is a “powerful prejudice” which we must +give up in order to have peace. He would not have misread +history and concluded that Lenin’s revolution was in any sense +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</span>a following of our example in the revolution which we fought +for our independence. The Senator also said: “As I read history, +the Russian experiment in socialism is scarcely more radical, +under modern conditions, than the Declaration of Independence +was in the days of George III.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_65_65" href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> This sounds somewhat like +the statement of Earl Browder when he was head of the Communist +Party in America. “The Declaration of Independence +was for that time what <cite>The Communist Manifesto</cite> is for ours.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_66_66" href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> +Lenin in his resolution was basically following the <cite>Communist +Manifesto</cite>.</p> + +<p>As a Rhodes scholar, Senator Fulbright should have been +able to read <em>history</em>, instead of accepting such an obviously +false view of history. Senator Fulbright seems to have known +either little or nothing about Lenin’s revolution, or little or +nothing about our revolution. The kindest thing we can say +about the Senator is that he was seemingly ignorant of some +very fundamental matters.</p> + +<p>What are some of the differences between Lenin’s revolution +and ours? (1) Our revolution had as its objective the establishment +of a reign of law, but Lenin’s revolution was designed to +establish the rule of the head of the Communist Party who +would rule according to his own will. (2) Our revolution established +a Republic, while Lenin’s established a dictatorship. +(3) Our revolution did not result in a reign of terror of Americans +over Americans, but Lenin’s revolution did establish a +reign of terror. (4) Our revolution did not have as its aim the +establishment of a world wide conspiracy which would endeavor +to overthrow all other governments—democratic governments as +well as dictatorships. (5) Our revolution was not a counter-revolution +against self-government. Lenin did not overthrow the +Czar, he overthrew the Kerensky Government which was endeavoring +to establish a form of democracy. Lenin was not even +in Russia at the time the Czar abdicated. (6) Our revolution +was over in a very few years, in so far as establishing our form +of government is concerned. How long does it take to overthrow +the previous regime? As Kravchenko said “The French Terror +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</span>was over in five years.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_67_67" href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> By 1945, when Senator Fulbright made +his statement concerning Lenin’s revolution, the Soviet terror +had been going on for almost thirty years. (7) The Communist +revolution was not just a revolution in government. It was a +revolt against God, religion, morals and humanity. Its aim has +been, and is, to create a godless society and the new Soviet man.</p> + +<p>All of these things could have been known by Senator Fulbright +in 1945 and long before. Communist books and actions +had made abundantly clear the nature of their revolution. Only +a “powerful prejudice” could keep a reader of their history from +knowing the nature of Lenin’s revolution.</p> + +<p>Also in 1945 the Senator was seemingly so misinformed about +Communism that he said: “I do not believe the Soviets desire +to dominate the world as the Germans did.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_68_68" href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> Before Hitler came +to power the Soviets made clear their desire to rule the world. +And their actions showed that they meant it. The House Committee +had pointed this out. So had many individuals.</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright’s “powerful prejudice,” or whatever it was, +against the House Committee, however, is such that he objected +because in one of the meetings mentioned in the memorandum, +someone defended the House Committee.⁠<a id="FNanchor_69_69" href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> Such a defense could +hardly be called a matter of partisan politics, since the House +has supported the Committee for years, and in 1961 the vote to +give the Committee its full appropriation was passed 412 to 6.⁠<a id="FNanchor_70_70" href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3>“<em>Operation Abolition</em>”</h3> + +<p>The memorandum classified “Operation Abolition” as objectionable +material. Did the Senator want to censor this film? Is +he a “film burner”? Does he think that J. Edgar Hoover and +the House Committee were wrong in saying that the San Francisco +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</span>riots were Communist inspired, and that most of the young +people were duped?⁠<a id="FNanchor_71_71" href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>Herbert A. Philbrick</em></h3> + +<p>Herbert A. Philbrick, of “I Led Three Lives” fame, was +smeared by Senator Fulbright as being an extremely radical +rightwing speaker.⁠<a id="FNanchor_72_72" href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> Philbrick spent nine years as a counterspy +for the FBI and for America. He was commended by J. Edgar +Hoover.⁠<a id="FNanchor_73_73" href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> Philbrick has continued to fight Communism. He has +sacrificed much to do so. The Communists have smeared him. +And Senator Fulbright, without giving one shred of documentation, +smeared Philbrick. The Senator must be very, very far to +the left of Mr. Philbrick if from where the Senator is standing, +Philbrick looks to him like an extremely radical rightwinger.</p> + + +<h3><em>Dr. Fred Schwarz</em></h3> + +<p>Billy Graham found good reason to commend the anti-communist +work of Dr. Fred Schwarz,⁠<a id="FNanchor_74_74" href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> and <cite>Life</cite> Magazine in an unprecedented +action on Oct. 17, 1961, apologized to Dr. Schwarz +for their misinterpretation of him and his work.⁠<a id="FNanchor_75_75" href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> But Senator +Fulbright has never apologized for accusing, without giving one +bit of proof, Dr. Schwarz of being an extremely radical rightwinger. +The Senator made this charge in his secret memorandum, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</span>and without giving Dr. Schwarz an opportunity to answer the +accusation. Did the Senator wish to remain a “faceless” accuser?</p> + + +<h3><em>Dr. Frank Barnett</em></h3> + +<p>Dr. Frank Barnett, who was criticized more than once in the +memorandum,⁠<a id="FNanchor_76_76" href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> has been commended by Secretary of Defense +McNamara in September, 1961 for an “excellent speech”⁠<a id="FNanchor_77_77" href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> which +contained some of the ideas which Fulbright’s memorandum condemns.⁠<a id="FNanchor_78_78" href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>The Institute for American Strategy</em></h3> + +<p>As late as April 10, 1961, a National Military-Industrial Conference +sponsored by the Institute was commended by President +Kennedy.⁠<a id="FNanchor_79_79" href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> + These Conferences were criticized in the memorandum.⁠<a id="FNanchor_80_80" href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>American Strategy for the Nuclear Age</em></h3> + +<p>The Institute for American Strategy sponsored a book which +was prepared by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the +University of Pennsylvania. This book is called <cite>American Strategy +for the Nuclear Age</cite>. The memorandum criticized this book +and said that “its total effect can be said to be contrary to the +President’s program.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_81_81" href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> The book, among other things, brings out +that the communists are at war with us on many different levels, +and that we ought to fight back and win. Is this against the +President’s program?</p> + +<p>Among the contributors to the book are: J. Edgar Hoover, +Hanson W. Baldwin, Henry A. Kissinger, Lieut. General Arthur +G. Trudeau, Walt W. Rostow, Dean Acheson and David Sarnoff.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</span></p> + + +<h3><em>233 Talks</em></h3> + +<p>One Captain was mentioned in the memorandum as having +given 233 talks to civilians on the “dangers of internal communism.” +As I do not know what the Captain said, I do not +know to what extent I would agree or disagree with him. But +the fact that he gave 233 talks is not within itself a criticism. +In fact, it shows that he was very zealous in carrying out his +oath to defend America against domestic enemies.</p> + +<p>The Senator made at least seventy-five talks in Arkansas in +the fall of 1961, in the interest of <em>his</em> re-election to office.⁠<a id="FNanchor_82_82" href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> Doubtless +he will make other such talks. A man who is that zealous +in behalf of his own re-election to office ought not to be critical +of a Captain for making so many speeches for America and +against the internal enemy—who is also an external enemy—communism.</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_35_35" href="#FNanchor_35_35" class="label">[35]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_36_36" href="#FNanchor_36_36" class="label">[36]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13437, col. 1,b. President Eisenhower said: “Accordingly, +should departmental instructions be so phrased as unduly to prohibit desirable +military participation in these educational efforts respecting the +Communist menace, I suggest that your committee recommend their restudy +with view to appropriate revision. The Reds are well aware of the integrity, +patriotic motives, and high qualifications of our military. I suspect they +would be delighted if we should prevent such people from spreading the +truth about Communist imperialism.</p> + +<p>“Pertaining at least indirectly to this subject, I have heard of accusations +alleging that military education is so narrow as to make service personnel +incapable of grasping the whole complex of dangers confronting our +country. It is hinted that the entire officer corps has become politically +infected, and prone to be disloyal to the Commander in Chief. I, for one, +want to be on record as expressing my indestructible faith and pride in +our armed services—even though their loyalty, patriotism, and breadth of +understanding needs no defense from me or anyone else” (<cite>Military Cold +War Education and Speech Review Policies</cite>, Part 1, p. 7.)</p> + +<p>“I believe, therefore, that your committee will render valuable service by +rejecting the recent spate of attacks upon the competence and loyalty of +the military and by disapproving any effort to thrust them, so to speak, +behind an American iron curtain, ordered to stand mutely by as hostile +forces tirelessly strive to undermine every aspect of American life.” (<em>ibid.</em>, +p. 7).</p> + +<p>Admiral Arthur W. Radford also thought that the military ought to be +used in the cold war. He further emphasized that attacks on the military +could hurt morale and that it was the duty of civilian authorities to defend +the military against “unwarranted and unjust civilian attacks” (<em>ibid.</em>, part +2, pp. 707-708).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_37_37" href="#FNanchor_37_37" class="label">[37]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_38_38" href="#FNanchor_38_38" class="label">[38]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 3, 1961, p. 13517, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_39_39" href="#FNanchor_39_39" class="label">[39]</a> Quoted in <cite>Human Events</cite>, 1961, p. 867. Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond +wrote: “Fulbright’s thesis ignores the fact that last year there were 1,521 +officers of the armed services engaged in studies at civilian institutions of +higher learning which dealt with educational, scientific, economic, and political +subjects; these all have a relation to national strategy. In addition +to this number there are some 2,918 other officers engaged in special studies +in languages, medical sciences, engineering sciences and management +courses. This thesis in the Fulbright memorandum further ignores the fact +that each year some 500 officers of senior grade attend the service war +colleges and universities where they study the very topic that the nuclear +age demands solution of. This topic is studied intensively. Furthermore, the +Fulbright thesis ignores the fact that nowhere is there such an intensive +study made to prepare any politician (before or after his election to office) +for the task ‘to put their own ultimate solutions into proper perspective in +the President’s total strategy for the nuclear age.’” (<cite>Military Cold War +Education and Speech Review Policies</cite>, Part 2, p. 714.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_40_40" href="#FNanchor_40_40" class="label">[40]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_41_41" href="#FNanchor_41_41" class="label">[41]</a> Quoted in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, June 12, 1961, p. 9404, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_42_42" href="#FNanchor_42_42" class="label">[42]</a> Reprinted from the July 24, 1961 issue of the <cite>News and Courier</cite>, +Charleston, S. C., <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, July 31, 1961, p. 13177, col. 3,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_43_43" href="#FNanchor_43_43" class="label">[43]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, September 15, 1961, p. 18455, col. 2,b.-3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_44_44" href="#FNanchor_44_44" class="label">[44]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13402, col. 1,b.-2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_45_45" href="#FNanchor_45_45" class="label">[45]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, April 26, 1951, p. 4402, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_46_46" href="#FNanchor_46_46" class="label">[46]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 4402, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_47_47" href="#FNanchor_47_47" class="label">[47]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col. 3,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_48_48" href="#FNanchor_48_48" class="label">[48]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_49_49" href="#FNanchor_49_49" class="label">[49]</a> Speech before the Arkansas Chamber of Commerce, Little Rock, Nov. +8, 1961. <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, Nov. 9, 1961, p. 2A.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_50_50" href="#FNanchor_50_50" class="label">[50]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, July 27, 1961, p. A5795, col. 1-2. Japan’s view +of MacArthur is illustrated in the fact that Japan gave him their “highest +decoration for foreigners,” <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, June 25, 1960, p. A5518, +col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_51_51" href="#FNanchor_51_51" class="label">[51]</a> Quoted in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 19, 1949, p. A5439.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_52_52" href="#FNanchor_52_52" class="label">[52]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, January 25, 1949, pp. 532-533.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_53_53" href="#FNanchor_53_53" class="label">[53]</a> As quoted in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 8, 1962, p. A6084, col. +1,t. See Speaker McCormack’s tribute in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August +16, 1962, p. A6243. Even the <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite> paid tribute to him. Editorial, +August 19, 1962.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_54_54" href="#FNanchor_54_54" class="label">[54]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_55_55" href="#FNanchor_55_55" class="label">[55]</a> The Fulbright memorandum quoted a statement of Dr. Benson concerning +the John Birch Society. It is important, however, to realize that +this statement was made at a time when Dr. Benson was not aware of the +radical positions which Mr. Robert Welch had taken on some matters. These +radical positions Dr. Benson repudiates. Furthermore, his commendation +was of their stated long-range purpose “to work for less government, more +responsibility and a better world,” and their purpose to inform citizens +concerning communism. Is Senator Fulbright against these aims?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_56_56" href="#FNanchor_56_56" class="label">[56]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13438, col. 1,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_57_57" href="#FNanchor_57_57" class="label">[57]</a> See his open letter of July 25, 1961 to Congressman Trimble.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_58_58" href="#FNanchor_58_58" class="label">[58]</a> <cite>The Reporter</cite> article has been reprinted in the Senate Internal +Security Subcommittee, <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>, +pp. 57-63.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_59_59" href="#FNanchor_59_59" class="label">[59]</a> <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, December 28, 1961, p. 3A.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_60_60" href="#FNanchor_60_60" class="label">[60]</a> Mike Newberry, <cite>The Worker</cite>, August 13, 1961, p. 5, col. 1,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_61_61" href="#FNanchor_61_61" class="label">[61]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, pp. 13438-13439.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_62_62" href="#FNanchor_62_62" class="label">[62]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13438, col. 1,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_63_63" href="#FNanchor_63_63" class="label">[63]</a> <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, August 6, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_64_64" href="#FNanchor_64_64" class="label">[64]</a> <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, August 6, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_65_65" href="#FNanchor_65_65" class="label">[65]</a> James William Fulbright, “The Price of Peace Is The Loss of Prejudices”, +<cite>Vogue</cite>, July, 1945. Reprinted in Louise E. Rorabacher, <cite>Assignments +in Exposition</cite>. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946, pp. 197-198.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_66_66" href="#FNanchor_66_66" class="label">[66]</a> <cite>What Is Communism?</cite> pp. 19-20.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_67_67" href="#FNanchor_67_67" class="label">[67]</a> <cite>I Chose Justice</cite>, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950, p. 137.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_68_68" href="#FNanchor_68_68" class="label">[68]</a> As reprinted in Louise E. Rorabacher, <cite>Assignments in Exposition</cite>, +p. 198.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_69_69" href="#FNanchor_69_69" class="label">[69]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, pp. 13438-13439. William F. +Buckley, Jr., has announced the publication of a study of <cite>The Committee +and Its Critics</cite>. “National Review”, 150 E. 35th St., New York 16, N.Y.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_70_70" href="#FNanchor_70_70" class="label">[70]</a> <em>Ibid</em>, June 22, 1961, p. A4722.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_71_71" href="#FNanchor_71_71" class="label">[71]</a> See J. Edgar Hoover, <cite>Communist Target—Youth</cite>. Washington: Government +Printing Office, 1960. House Committee on Un-American Activities. +<cite>The Truth About the Film “Operation Abolition.”</cite> Washington: Government +Printing Office, 961, parts 1,2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_72_72" href="#FNanchor_72_72" class="label">[72]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 1,t.</p> + +<p>We wish that the Senator had been well read enough to have known that +a decade ago Mr. Philbrick warned Americans against becoming extremely +radical rightwingers! “The most important single thing is to avoid behaving +the way a Communist says the individual must behave in a capitalist +society. If the Communist had his way, he would force all non-Communists +to the extreme right, toward fascism and state control.” (<cite>I Led Three +Lives</cite>, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952, p. 300). “If we adhere +to our traditional American dream of a society of freedom, of personal +rather than state responsibility, of individual as well as collective +intelligence, and of civil rights rather than rigid civil controls, then we will +have disproved the Communist theory of the inevitability of capitalist deterioration.” +(<em>ibid.</em>, p. 301).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_73_73" href="#FNanchor_73_73" class="label">[73]</a> On the back of the jacket of Mr. Philbrick’s book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_74_74" href="#FNanchor_74_74" class="label">[74]</a> See jacket of Dr. Schwarz’s book <cite>You Can Trust the Communists</cite>, +Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_75_75" href="#FNanchor_75_75" class="label">[75]</a> <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, October 18, 1961, p. 5A.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_76_76" href="#FNanchor_76_76" class="label">[76]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 2,t. <em>Ibid.</em> pp. +13436, col. 3,b., 13439-13440.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_77_77" href="#FNanchor_77_77" class="label">[77]</a> Committee on Armed Services, <cite>Defense Secretary McNamara on S. +Res. 191</cite>, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, p. 152.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_78_78" href="#FNanchor_78_78" class="label">[78]</a> See the entire speech reprinted in <cite>Defense Secretary McNamara on +S. Res. 191</cite>. pp. 154-162.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_79_79" href="#FNanchor_79_79" class="label">[79]</a> Quoted in <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 10, 1961, p. 14405, col. 3,t. +A copy of the program of that Conference is reprinted beginning on p. +14405, col. 3,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_80_80" href="#FNanchor_80_80" class="label">[80]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13441.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_81_81" href="#FNanchor_81_81" class="label">[81]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13436, col. 3,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_82_82" href="#FNanchor_82_82" class="label">[82]</a> <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, July 11, 1962.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</span></p> + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Chapter_V"> + Chapter V + <br> + THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT CONCEPT CRITICIZED + </h2> +</div> + +<p>One of the main ideas attacked in the memorandum was the +concept of protracted conflict.⁠<a id="FNanchor_83_83" href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> This concept, with other materials, +was presented in the handbook entitled <cite>American Strategy +for the Nuclear Age</cite>. The memorandum stated that this +handbook contained basic material for implementing the 1958 +directive of the National Security Council. “Although scholarly, +and worth attention as elements of strategy, its total effect +can be said to be contrary to the President’s program.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_84_84" href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> What +is the concept of protracted conflict?</p> + + +<h3><em>Protracted Conflict</em></h3> + +<p>“The West can hope to defeat the Communists only by giving +battle on its own chosen terrain. It must carry the battle to +the vital sectors of Communist defense. To do that it must +learn to counter the strategy of protracted conflict—to manage +conflict in space and in time.</p> + +<p>“The development of proper Western attitudes toward protracted +conflict will be immensely difficult. The Communists +possess a mentality that is much better suited to protracted and +controlled conflict than that of the Western peoples. The West +has neither a doctrine of protracted conflict nor an international +conspiratorial apparatus for executing it. What is more, we +do not want such a doctrine or such a political apparatus, for it +would be a tragic piece of irony if the men of the Free World, +in trying to combat the Communists, should become like them. +Some of our ‘weaknesses’ vis-a-vis the Communists are irremediable: +we cannot turn ourselves into a conflict society, nor can +we assign to the government and, in the last resort, to the police +the discipline of our conscience. It is within these limitations—which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</span>are the ramparts of civilized self-restraint—that we are +forced to cope with Communist perversity.</p> + +<p>“Pericles long ago was confronted with a similar problem. +As the leader of the open society of Athens, locked in an irreconcilable +conflict with the garrison state of Sparta, he recognized +a relatively simple fact which many of the theorists of +war in the nuclear age have overlooked, namely, that there are +subtle alternatives to the risky and blunt strategy of engaging +the enemy in direct and decisive military action. In the protracted +conflict known as the Peloponnesian War, Pericles +chose to pursue an extended strategy which was designed to +avoid a showdown battle while wearing down, by a campaign +of economic, political, and psychological attrition, the enemy’s +will to resist. Lidell Hart pointed out that the Periclean plan +was simply a war policy aimed at ‘draining the enemy’s endurance +in order to convince him that he could not gain a +decision’. In today’s protracted conflict the United States must +maintain and use its power for the same ultimate purposes: +to turn the tide of battle against the Communists, to induce +them to overextend themselves, to exploit the weakness of their +system, to paralyze their will, and to bring about their final +collapse. Within the framework of mutual deterrence, both +sides can employ the strategy of protracted conflict, and we can +do so quite effectively without the dispensation of a jealous and +demanding dogma of conflict for conflict’s sake.</p> + +<p>“A psychopolitical offensive, directed against the Communist +citadel itself, offers the West its best chance for winning the +battle for its own survival and for spoiling the Communist +strategy for the subversion of the uncommitted world. Although +the currents within the uncommitted world are running +against the West, the West need not despair of holding its +remaining positions once it has forced the Communists on the +psychopolitical defensive by engaging them on the most favorable +terrain, namely, the Communists’ own ‘peace zone’.</p> + +<p>“It is rather in the psychological arena than in its technological +workshop that the West has displayed its most alarming +shortcomings. Objectively, Western strategy has been far more +effective than the sensational charges of its critics will have +it. It is improbable that either side from now on will be able +to achieve decisive technological superiority for more than a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</span>temporary, even brief, period. No doubt, our military posture +is susceptible to a great deal of improvement. But an exaggerated +zeal for improvement, especially when it is triggered by +pained surprise at the latest ploy of communist psychological +warfare or considerations of domestic advantage, might prove +to be ‘counterproductive’ in developing our real range of +power. Do not let us pour the baby out with the bath water. +What we need now more than anything else is an understanding +of the comprehensive, complex, subtle, and consistent strategy +of our opponent—and the calm resolution to draw the +practical consequences.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_85_85" href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Now let the reader raise this question. If one is opposed to +this concept of protracted conflict is he not in reality opposed +to firm, unyielding opposition to communism?</p> + + +<h3><em>Secretary McNamara Seems to Accept Protracted Conflict</em></h3> + +<p>Secretary of Defense McNamara realizes that if we lose the +war with communism it will be total defeat. He also recognized +that the Communists are out to conquer the world and that +there is no indication that they will change.</p> + +<p>This necessitates educating our troops in the nature of Communism +as well as the nature of the freedom which we enjoy. +As the Secretary himself put it: “There is no true historical +parallel to the drive of Soviet Communist imperialism to colonize +the world. This is not the first time that ambitious +dictators have sought to dominate the globe. But none has ever +been so well organized, has possessed so many instruments of +destruction, or has been so adept at disguising ignoble motives +and objectives with noble phrases and noble words.</p> + +<p>“Furthermore, there is a totality in Soviet aggression which +can be matched only by turning to ancient history when warring +tribes sought not merely conquest but the total obliteration of +the enemy.</p> + +<p>“Soviet communism does not seek the physical obliteration +of a conquered people, although it would not hesitate to do so, +in my opinion, if this would serve its ends. But it does seek +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</span>the total obliteration of their customs, their social structure, +their political structure, their religion and their freedoms. +Everything and everybody must be remolded according to a +blueprint laid down by Lenin and altered only for the purposes +of ruthless efficiency by Stalin and the present-day leaders.</p> + +<p>“There is nothing too sacred—friendship, integrity, church +or family—that it escapes the attention of the Soviet Commissar +or the Communist bureaucrat.</p> + +<p>“Soviet communism seeks to wipe out the cherished traditions +and institutions of the free world with the same fanaticism +that once impelled winning armies to burn villages and sow the +fields with salt so they would not again become productive.</p> + +<p>“To this primitive concept of total obliteration, the Communists +have brought the resources of modern technology and +science. The combination is formidable. Twentieth century +knowledge, when robbed of any moral restraints, is the most +dangerous force ever let loose in the world. And the entire +literature of Soviet communism can be searched without turning +up the faintest trace of moral restraint.</p> + +<p>“If the free world should lose to communism, the loss would +be total, final, and irrevocable. The citadel of freedom must +be preserved because there is no road back, no road back to +freedom for anyone if the citadel is lost.</p> + +<p>“These are not new convictions with me. I have held them +for many years. I was deeply impressed and horrified by the +human misery and destruction that Hitler was able to create. +Hitler’s philosophy was based on the concept of total obliteration +and Hitler lost. But the years since the end of World War +II have demonstrated that Soviet communism is operating +from a far stronger position than Hitler ever held.</p> + +<p>“In 1949, 12 years ago, I read an article in Foreign Affairs +magazine which analyzed the writings of Stalin and quoted him +at length. It was clear from these quotes that the Communist +world had no intention of living forever in peace with the world +of freedom. One of Stalin’s favorite quotations from Lenin +states this point and, as translated and published in Foreign +Affairs, this is what he said:</p> + +<blockquote> +<p>‘We live * * * not only in a state but in a system of states, +and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with +the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</span>end either one or the other will conquer. And until that end +comes, a series of the most terrible collisions between the +Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable.’</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>“It is obvious that the aggressive goals of Soviet communism +have not changed, for Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, has +said that our grandchildren will live under communism.</p> + +<p>“I cite this material because I want you to know the spirit +in which I believe the education program of our Defense +Establishment should be conducted. The threat is clear and it +is immediate. Our fighting men should know the positive values +of the freedoms which the Nation is calling them to defend, +and they should know the nature of Soviet communism which +seeks to take them away.</p> + +<p>“One of my most vivid recollections is that of a colleague in +the Ford Motor Co. calling me out of my office a few years +ago. He asked that I drop the work in which I was engaged to +hear an analysis of the behavior of U. S. soldiers of war in North +Korea, and I heard with amazement the story of prisoners who +had cracked and become informers; men who had written +articles for Communist newspapers; men who had cooperated +with their captors.</p> + +<p>“These American soldiers did not understand the Communist +threat. They had not been taught to value the freedom of individual +choice, which is at the basis of our form of society. +They had not been taught what happens when the spirit of +individual freedom and free inquiry is lost.”</p> + +<p>“I believe we suffered during the Korean war because we did +not stress with sufficient force and vigor the realities of freedom +and the threat of communism.</p> + +<p>“As Secretary of Defense, it is my policy that the members of +the Military Establishment be educated in the role that they +are playing in the battle against communism, through knowledge +of the strength of our democracy, as well as the nature +of the threat we face. We are prosecuting a vigorous program +and we intend to step it up.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_86_86" href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Is not this analysis, in brief, but a presentation of the +concept of protracted conflict which is advanced by Dr. Barnett, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</span>and the Institute for American Strategy, and which is condemned +in the memorandum?</p> + +<p>Since there is a total threat certainly we should meet it +on every level on which it faces us. And yet, according to the +article from the <cite>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</cite>, which was +the longest reprint in the memorandum, if we act in the light +of the realization of the nature, tactics and threat of Communism +which is outlined by the Secretary, we shall split the world +and be in more serious trouble! In other words, we must be +careful lest we do something to make the Communists mad! As +a matter of fact, their philosophy and ambitions have made +them mad. They are angry unto death with us because we +exist as a free people.</p> + + +<h3><em>Senator Fulbright Repudiates Protracted Conflict</em></h3> + +<p>How does the <cite>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</cite> view the +possibility of our waging protracted conflict? The <cite>Bulletin</cite> +and the memorandum are resolutely opposed to our so doing. +The memorandum said that the handbook—which advances the +concept—undermines the President’s program.⁠<a id="FNanchor_87_87" href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> The <cite>Bulletin</cite> +said: “The significance of ‘American Strategy for the Nuclear +Age’ lies in its analysis of the international situation and its +appeal for direct action. To a very large extent, the theme +depends on the particular estimate of Soviet intentions that +is presented and the particular prophecy of the Communist +future that is forecast. Several contributions stress the persistency, +strength, and versatility of ideology in the evolution +of Soviet communism but nowhere is there adequate treatment +of the forces that limit Soviet policy, and thus limit the projection +of its ideological motivation. There is ample evidence, +for example, of instability in the Soviet leadership and of +ideological differences between the Russians and their Chinese +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</span>colleagues. The diverse effect of these forces is highly problematical, +but they do suggest that Communist policy is far less +monolithic than the concept of protracted conflict presumes. +Indeed, like other major powers, the Soviet Union is also +limited by external forces. Within the framework set by the +editors of ‘American Strategy,’ however, any attempt to take +advantage of these forces in order to insulate an area from +big power confrontation, or to seek a resolution of differences +on an ad hoc basis of mutual interest, would be tantamount to +appeasement.</p> + +<p>“The nonmilitary techniques advocated by Barnett and several +other contributors (such as Strausz-Hupe and William Kintner) +clearly recognize a grave deficiency in American Strategy, but +they hardly cover the full spectrum of alternatives open to the +United States. None of these suggestions includes the full +use of either traditional diplomacy or innovating methods of +settling disputes. At the same time, they contain an element of +militancy that raises serious problems, geared as they are to +setting up a savage dichotomy between the Communist and +the Western World, and of making almost every issue a matter +of irreconcilable competition.</p> + +<p>“It is difficult to see how these tactics can do anything but +intensify international tensions and, short of a complete collapse +of the Soviet bloc (which the editors would surely discount), +increase the likelihood that force will be used. Indeed, +the more intense the conditions of rivalry become, the greater +the inclination will be to reassess the major premises of our +strategic doctrine, including our renunciation of preventative +war, and to begin to incorporate provisions for offensive military +action in the calculus of our planning. The editors fail to consider +whether the provocative nature of the policies they openly +advocate can be restricted to the nonmilitary spheres for very +long. Indeed, they seem to assume that the Communists will +back down under pressure—a highly dangerous assumption.</p> + +<p>“Perhaps the most fundamental criticism that can be +made of the book is that it fails to analyze the impact of a +policy of protracted conflict on our domestic institutions. Barnett’s +program of action, for example, would require large sums +of public funds used with little public accountability, a wide +network of secrecy and security in government operations, a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</span>cold war orientation in our schools and universities—in short, +a stunting of pluralism, a curtailment of individual liberties, +and a weakening of politically responsible government. The +editors of ‘American Strategy’ seem to see no alternative to +confronting the Soviets with strong opposition at every turn. +Indeed, they appear more concerned with virility than freedom, +as if strength and courage were goals in themselves. This, together +with the somewhat static nature of their view of history +and the militant nature of their recommendations, justifies +further inquiry about the men and the organizations who advocate +a strategy based on these premises.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_88_88" href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>What shall we say to these things? <em>First</em>, it must be recognized +that we are at war, and that the concept of protracted +conflict is based on this obvious fact of present-day life. In +other words, this concept takes seriously the words and deeds +of the Communists which say that they are fighting to conquer +and to rule the world, and that we must act accordingly. The +memorandum shrinks from accepting this fact and its implications. +Ivo Duchacek, a member of the Czech Parliament until +the Communists took over, said: “Nobody likes to accept the +idea that we cannot get along with our fellow men if we try +hard enough.... When I look back at my own practical +experience in Czechoslovakia where cooperation with the Communists +was tried on both national and international levels, I +realize that the basic mistake was our wishful thinking that +communism had fundamentally changed under the influence of +its 25-year experience and under the impact of World War II.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_89_89" href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> +According to James Reston, who has been close to the President, +President Kennedy came to office with the idea that +he could work out reasonable arrangements with the Communists +and put an end to the angry dialogue which has been +going on.⁠<a id="FNanchor_90_90" href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>It is not of our choosing, it is not to our taste, but the fact +is that the Communists are at war with us. It does not take two +to start a war, and the Communists have started a war whether +we like it or not. As Edgar Ansel Mowrer, one of the nation’s +outstanding students of world affairs, put it: “Communists play +to win.... The West, including the United States, want only +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</span>to call the game off. It fails to admit that this is a real war +which it can win only if it gives it No. 1 priority and stops +considering it just another problem like smog or juvenile delinquency,”⁠<a id="FNanchor_91_91" href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> +Roscoe Drummond said: “It is my conviction that +we will continue to lose this war called peace as long as we +try to conduct it on a basis of business as usual, politics as +usual and defence as usual.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_92_92" href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Congressman Hosmer observed that “we can freeze to death +in cold war as easily as we can burn to death in hot war.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_93_93" href="#Footnote_93_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Roscoe Drummond has underscored the fact that although +we are at war, we are not acting in the light of that unpleasant +reality. “It is my conviction that the time for words has +passed, that the moment is at hand when it is not enough to +say what needs to be done—but to do what needs to be done +before it is too late.</p> + +<p>“It is my conviction that the time has come when the American +Government and the American people must act on the +reality that we are not at peace, but at war, though a different +and more difficult kind of war than we have ever faced; that, +as the Overstreets have put it, we are in a war called peace and +that there is nothing peaceful about it.</p> + +<p>“At this stage we are losing, not winning—and we are not +yet strong enough to win.”</p> + +<p>“In New York last week, President Kennedy declared that +‘every new piece of information, every fresh event, have deepened +my conviction that the survival of our civilization is at +stake—and the hour is late’.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_94_94" href="#Footnote_94_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a>⁠</p> + +<p><em>Second</em>, the intensification of international tensions is going +on today because the Communists are pushing even harder +for the conquest of the world. Any so-called easing of international +tension would be equivalent to a boxer relaxing in the +middle of the fight. For tension to be relaxed in reality would +necessitate the cessation of the communist drive for world conquest. +In other words, it would mean that the Communists had +ceased to be Communists.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</span></p> + +<p>That communism, and not the waging of protracted conflict +by the non-communist world, is the cause of the existing tension +is recognized by President Kennedy. Thus he told editor +Adzhubei, of <cite>Izvestia</cite>, that the root of the conflict is the Soviet’s +efforts “to communize, in a sense, the entire world.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_95_95" href="#Footnote_95_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>As the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of the British +Government, said to the United Nations General Assembly on +September 27, 1961, “the world is divided by an ideological +chasm.... And when one side advertises its intention to destroy +the way of life of the other, then you cannot have true +collective security.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_96_96" href="#Footnote_96_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>George E. Kennan, now Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and at +one time Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., has summarized in +his book <cite>Russia and the West</cite> what the communists are saying +to us through their words and their deeds. Roscoe Drummond +presented it in his column as follows: “We despise you. We +consider that you should be swept from the earth as governments +and physically destroyed as individuals. We reserve the right +in our private if not in our official capacities to do what we +can to bring this about: to revile you publicly, to do everything +within our power to detach your own people from their loyalty +to you and their confidence in you, to subvert your armed +forces, and to work for your downfall in favor of a Communist +dictatorship. But since we are not strong enough to destroy +you today ... we want you during this interval to trade with +us; we want you to finance us; we want you to give us the +advantages of full-fledged diplomatic recognition, just as you +accord these advantages to one another.</p> + +<p>“An outrageous demand? Perhaps. But you will accept it +nevertheless. Driven by this competition, which you cannot +escape, you will do what we want you to do until such time as +we are ready to make an end of you.* * *”⁠<a id="FNanchor_97_97" href="#Footnote_97_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Mr. Kennan also quoted a resolution of the Communist International +which said: “The Comintern will not let its freedom +be hampered by any obligation whatever. We are deadly enemies +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</span>of bourgeois society to the last breath, in word and in deed and +if necessary with arms in hand. It is the historical mission of +the Communist International to be the gravedigger of the bourgeois +society.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_98_98" href="#Footnote_98_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Roscoe Drummond commented as follows on this resolution. +“Mr. Kennan is here describing Communist policy and purpose +toward all non-Communist governments formulated in the 1930’s, +which hasn’t changed in the least.</p> + +<p>“It is the same today—in Korea, in Laos, in Viet-Nam, in +the Congo, at the conference table in Geneva. To the Communists, +U. S. aid to the legitimate government of South Vietnam +is ‘aggressive’ because the Communists recognize no non-Communist +government as ever legitimate.</p> + +<p>“We are not at peace with the Communists. We are engaged +in a war called peace by the Communists. We can’t afford to +think or act otherwise for 1 second.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_99_99" href="#Footnote_99_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The <cite>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</cite> does not realize that +our resistance to Communism does not set up a “savage dichotomy +between the Communist and the Western World”. This +dichotomy or division exists but it has been set up by the +ideology and actions of the Communists. We <em>wish</em> that it were +not so, we <em>wish</em> that they would change, but wishing does not +make it so. It is a fact of life which we should realize, and +which we fail to realize only at our peril. The Communists in +the <cite>Communist Manifesto</cite>, which they consider to be an up-to-date +document, and many times since have stated that they +are irreconcilably at war with us.</p> + +<p>Lenin, who is stressed today, said: “We are living not merely +in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the +Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long +time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. +And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions +between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be +inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, +wants to hold sway, it must prove its capacity to do so by its +military organizations.”</p> + +<p>“As long as capitalism and socialism exists, we cannot live +in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</span>dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or over world +capitalism.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_100_100" href="#Footnote_100_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Mao Tse-tung speaks in no uncertain terms about their +revolutionary triumph. “In human history, antagonism between +the classes exists as a particular manifestation of the struggle +within the contradiction. The contradiction between the exploiting +class and the exploited class: the two mutually contradictory +classes coexist for a long time in one society, be it a slave +society, or a feudal or a capitalist society, and struggle with +each other; but it is not until the contradiction between the +two classes has developed to a certain stage that the two sides +adopt the form of open antagonism which develops into a +revolution. In a class society, the transformation of peace into +war is also like that.</p> + +<p>“The time when a bomb has not yet exploded is the time +when contradictory things, because of certain conditions, coexist +in an entity. It is not until a new condition (ignition) is present +that the explosion takes place. An analogous situation exists +in all natural phenomena when they finally assume the form +of open antagonism to solve old contradictions and to produce +new things.</p> + +<p>“It is very important to know this situation. It enables us +to understand that in a class society revolutions and revolutionary +wars are inevitable, that apart from them the leap in +social development cannot be made, and the reactionary ruling +classes cannot be overthrown so that the people will win political +power. Communists must expose the deceitful propaganda of +the reactionaries that social revolution is unnecessary and +impossible, and so on, and firmly uphold the Marxist-Leninist +theory of social revolution so as to help the people to understand +that social revolution is not only entirely necessary but +also entirely possible and that the whole history of mankind +and the triumph of the Soviet Union all confirm this scientific +truth.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_101_101" href="#Footnote_101_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The cold war and the danger of hot war come, according to +the Communists, only because we resist their so-called inevitable +conquest of the world. As Hugo Pauk, a Communist in the Ruhr, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</span>told Dr. John R. Van de Water, “You must also understand +that unless you accept our Communist way of life, war is +inevitable.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_102_102" href="#Footnote_102_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>If we did not resist communism there would be no cold war—only +enslavement and death. For the cold war is their term +for our resistance to communism. In one of the leading communist +journals, <cite>International Affairs</cite>, we read that: “The +aggressive imperialist forces have let loose upon the world their +horrible offspring—the cold war. Its purpose was to keep the +people in a state of constant fear, to persuade them that war +is inevitable, and to compel them to spill more and more money +into the bottomless pit of the arms race. The cold war was to +help the doomed forces of the old world to retain their positions +and hold back the surging advance of social and national-liberation +movements, to prepare war against the Socialist camp, +that untiring champion of world peace.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_103_103" href="#Footnote_103_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>“The Socialist countries have set themselves the task of +eliminating war from the lives of nations for all time—a goal +for which the best minds in the world have striven for centuries. +Proceeding from the analysis of the real balance of power on +Earth, the 21st Congress of the C.P.S.U. stressed that this +problem could be solved even before the complete victory of +Socialism, with capitalism still extant in a part of the world.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_104_104" href="#Footnote_104_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>“To establish durable peace on Earth is no easy task, of +course. There are influential forces outside the bounds of the +Socialist world whose riches and privileges depend on the arms +race, on the preparation and unleashing of wars. These forces +will not give in without desperate resistance and will do everything +to prevent a relaxation of international tension. It will +take the utmost effort of all the peace-loving forces in the world +to turn into reality the existing possibility of achieving an +international <em>detente</em> and putting an end to the cold war.</p> + +<p>“N. S. Khrushchev’s visit to the United States is another +brilliant proof of the fact that the Soviet Government and Communist +Party are doing everything to terminate the cold war.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_105_105" href="#Footnote_105_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>These quotations show that, as a matter of fact, with the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</span>Communists every issue is a matter of irreconcilable competition +in the sense that they are not out to make reasonable agreements +which they will keep with integrity, but that every +discussion is another front on which they are fighting us. Any +agreement is made only because they have to make it or because +in some way it contributes to their total program of victory.</p> + +<p>The quotations which we took from the memorandum are +saying that if we firmly resist Communism we are apt to have +trouble! The Senator should raise the question: What trouble +will there be if we do not firmly resist Communism and win +this war for freedom?</p> + +<p>International tension exists because of Communist aggression. +Of course, if we ceased resisting they would enslave us, and +kill millions, but this hardly seems like a desirable way to lessen +tensions.</p> + +<p>The fact that the Communists are waging protracted conflict +on us is the provocative factor in the world situation. Why is +it that the memorandum speaks of “the provocative nature of +the policies” of those who call on us to awaken to the fact that +the Communists have declared protracted war on us, and that +we should wage protracted conflict for victory and freedom—yes, +and for survival.</p> + +<p>Concerning those who advocate that we wage this protracted +conflict the <cite>Bulletin</cite> says: “Indeed, they seem to assume that +the Communists will back down under pressure—a highly +dangerous assumption.” Does the <cite>Bulletin</cite> and the Senator think +that the Communists will back down if we retreat? Or if we +are not firm? Does he think that the Communists have not been +encouraged by the success which they have had hithertofore +on their road to world conquest? Does he suggest that we +relieve pressure by backing down? Does he think that the road +of retreat is the road to survival? If we are not to put on +increased pressure, what are we to do? Does he think that the +Communists respect anything other than firm pressure?</p> + +<p>Does the Senator believe, or does he not, that the Communists +are intent on world conquest? If the Senator believes that the +Communists are waging protracted conflict to conquer the +world, why did he include the article from the <cite>Bulletin</cite>? If he +does not believe that they are waging protracted conflict to +conquer the world, we ask: Can America afford public servants, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</span>men who help shape national policy, who think that the Communists +are not trying to conquer the world? On the other hand, +can America afford public servants who, if they believe that +the Communists are out to conquer the world, criticize those +who agree with them, and who also say that we ought to act +accordingly and wage protracted conflict to defeat Communism?</p> + +<p>Does the Senator believe that we should refuse to act in the +light of the realization that the Communists are out to conquer +the world? In other words, since the Communists are waging +war on us on various fronts and in various ways, should we +not engage them in combat on these various levels? Or should +we leave the victory to them by default? The Communists have +declared war on us, they are at war with us. They are engaging +in protracted conflict against us. What should we do? Fail to +respond? Respond weakly? Fearfully?</p> + +<p>Since the <cite>Bulletin</cite> does not expect the Soviet bloc to collapse, +since it does not think we should meet its aggression in protracted +conflict; just what does it and what does Senator Fulbright +propose? Do they suggest that Communism will back +down from world conquest if we refuse to engage them in protracted +conflict? If Communists will not back down under +pressure, will they back down if we yield or refuse to apply +pressure? As a matter of fact, every retreat on our part and +every advance on their part, is viewed by them as proof that +their theory of history is right.⁠<a id="FNanchor_106_106" href="#Footnote_106_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a> Even if we surrendered, they +would consider this as further proof that they have a mandate +from history to overthrow all existing social conditions and to +remake man.</p> + +<p>In reply to the <cite>Bulletin’s</cite> repudiation of protracted conflict, +we would say, in the <em>third</em> place, that it should be clearly understood +that there is no evidence that the Communists will change +their goal of world conquest. G. F. Hudson, Director of the +Center for Far Eastern Studies at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford +University, has said: “Ever since the early days of the Bolshevik +regime, there has been the expectation abroad that it was just +about to settle down, discard its fantastic ideas of world revolution, +and revert to the normal habits and usages of a national +sovereign state in its international relations.”</p> + +<p>“Yet, every time the world has become convinced that the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</span>original creed of Lenin no longer governed Soviet actions and +that the policies of the Soviet Union could be interpreted simply +in terms of national interest and security, like the policies of +non-Communist states, events have provided fresh evidence that +the ultimate aim of the rulers of Russia continued to be the +destruction of all ‘bourgeois’ governments.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_107_107" href="#Footnote_107_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>In the <em>fourth</em> place, the concept of protracted conflict does +not rule out the use of traditional diplomacy or innovating +methods of settling disputes. But it does ask that we recognize +that all of these must be used as weapons in our war with +communism. For it is obvious to every student that the Communists +use traditional diplomacy and innovating methods as +but phases of their warfare against civilization.</p> + +<p>It is clear that traditional diplomacy has been tried again +and again. We have even had innovating methods, such as +helping enemy countries with financial aid. We have tried to +work through the U.N. Traditional methods are still being tried. +We should continue to use them to the best of our ability.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, the concept of protracted conflict does not rule +out the resolution of some particular differences “on an ad hoc +basis of mutual interest....”</p> + +<p>Our <em>fifth</em> observation on the <cite>Bulletin’s</cite> charges, is that the +cold war is bound to have some effect on our democratic institutions. +However, it will not involve near the dangers that would +be created by putting greater power in the hands of the President—whoever +the President may be at a given time—as Senator +Fulbright wants to do. The <cite>Bulletin</cite> spoke of funds being spent +secretly but it made no comments on the danger of secret +executive agreements.</p> + +<p>But there is no reason for protracted conflict to destroy +democratic institutions. We can erect the proper safeguards. +Furthermore, the failure to wage protracted conflict and to win +the war we are in will lead to the destruction of our democratic +institutions by the Communists.</p> + +<p>Whether we wage protracted conflict or not, we are engaged +in a war. Even Senator Fulbright speaks of the long twilight +struggle and the influence it may have on the people. But certainly +it is better to risk the possibility of some dangers to our +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</span>democratic institutions than to accept the certainty of their +destruction if the Communists win.</p> + +<p>The Communists leave us no range of pleasant choices. We +either win in the struggle with them or we lose all.</p> + +<p>Our <em>sixth</em> observation is that to win this war we must wage +it on every necessary level. We must put the Communists on +the defensive instead of simply reacting to their aggressive +moves. As Charles Malik said: “It is most important that the +Communists be put on the defensive. It is most important that +the total arsenal of political, moral, and spiritual values be +bought to bear upon this struggle.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_108_108" href="#Footnote_108_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> Even Senator Fulbright +has said that we ought to take the initiative and that a truly +tough “approach to Communism is one that meets it with ‘every +instrumentality of foreign and domestic policy’....”⁠<a id="FNanchor_109_109" href="#Footnote_109_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> This is +exactly what the concept of protracted conflict calls for, including +the use of the military in the cold war!</p> + +<p>This does not mean that a nuclear war will take place if we +wage protracted conflict; although we might keep in mind that +a failure to wage protracted conflict will result in our defeat, +for they will nibble us to death, or slice us to pieces with the +salami tactic. Edgar Ansel Mowrer has well said: “And whatever +one thinks of the cold war, one fact stands out: The Soviets +have made of it a third way, neither peace nor hot war. And +the conclusions seem obvious: If such a third way exists for +communism, does it not also exist for the West?</p> + +<p>“It certainly does. Its name is waging freedom. Waging freedom +means that, instead of continuing the military and diplomatic +defensive, the West publicly sets as its goal an extension +or recovery of the area of national determination—the rollback +of communism. It means the cool, calculated, and determined +acceptance of the Soviet challenge in the intermediate field. +Above all, it means a complete repudiation of the thesis that +the West has no choice save humbly seeking peace or accepting +nuclear annihilation.</p> + +<p>“Most of all, waging peace would mean an end to the present +make-believe in regard to Soviet intentions that dominates too +much thinking. Many, too many, believe, or are trying to believe, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</span>that by some means—a mixture of defensive firmness, magical +formula, and turning the other cheek—the Kremlin can be +induced to call the cold war off.</p> + +<p>“For this, with apologies to Prime Minister Macmillan, there +is no shred of concrete evidence. All known facts point the other +way—to the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. is gradually forcing +the West back without fighting by playing upon its nuclear fears, +its reluctance to believe the unpleasant, and its even greater +reluctance to overtrump Soviet military expenditures.</p> + + +<h3>“<em>West Has Best Hand</em>”</h3> + +<p>“Yet curiously enough, even in such an intermediate struggle, +the stronger cards are on the side of the West. The Kremlin +can play upon the reluctance of a free people to accept a long +and costly diplomatic and arms-building struggle. But the West +can count upon much more—the fact that so far as is known, +communism is popular in no country where it has firmly fixed +its claws—not even in the U.S.S.R. as hundreds of thousands +of defections from the Soviet Army during World War II +demonstrated.</p> + +<p>“To be brief: The West has it in its hands to adopt a third +policy, a policy of waging freedom short of major war—and +outlasting the Kremlin at its own chosen game. For the West +has several times the economic resources and in addition the +overwhelming moral resource of the appeal against Communist +tyranny. It can, if it chooses, chivvy and harry Moscow to the +point of exhaustion and despair. It can win without fighting +provided it has the courage and the stamina.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_110_110" href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>As James Reston put it: “The choice before the President +and the other leaders of the Western world today is not between +the certainty of destruction and the certainty of Communist +expansion, but between the possibility of destruction if we risk +war, and the certainty of Communist expansion if we don’t.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_111_111" href="#Footnote_111_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Both from Communist theory and from their past actions we +know that they will start some local conflicts, when and if they +think they can get away with it. They will do this regardless +of whether or not we use protracted conflict. As Dr. Ralph K. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</span>White, of the U.S.I.A. said: “But for a well indoctrinated Communist +the rational, prudent aggressive use of force in the cause +of Communism is not only legitimate; it is obligatory. It is an +accepted, integral part of his self-image. He believes with Karl +Marx that ‘force is the midwife of every old society that is +pregnant with the new.’”⁠<a id="FNanchor_112_112" href="#Footnote_112_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>Is Victory the Goal?</em></h3> + +<p>The memorandum includes an article which is critical of the +call for total victory. “At a 2-day strategy seminar held +in Chicago last September, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, former +Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for ‘total victory +over the Communist system—not stalemate,’ and warned that +‘the minute we become satisfied with the status quo, we have +started down the road to defeat.’ This theme has, in fact, dominated +a series of strategy seminars that have been held throughout +the country during the past 2 years—in New York, Cleveland, +New Orleans, and Wilmington; in California, Massachusetts, +Texas, and Washington, D. C. The chief force behind +these meetings of businessmen, teachers, servicemen, and church +leaders has been an organization called the Institute for American +Strategy.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_113_113" href="#Footnote_113_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Communist is working toward total victory over the non-Communist +world. In dealing with an enemy who seeks total +victory over us, and in the conflict with whom final defeat +would be total defeat, can one win if he does not seek total +victory? Well did Jay Lovestone say: “The war is total. If we +don’t fight them down the line, we lose down the line.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_114_114" href="#Footnote_114_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Total victory does not mean that there will be no more evil +in the world once Communism has been defeated. It simply +means, in my view of it, that we should take the initiative and +endeavor to meet and to defeat them on every necessary level. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</span>We all wish that by so doing on some levels that they will be +halted in their onward march and ultimately cease to be Communists. +However, in our battle plans we should not relax and +expect the Communists to cease being Communists. It would +have been a real blessing if Hitler had ceased to be Hitler and +if World War II had not been started. But he wasn’t converted +from the errors of his way, and World War II did take place.</p> + +<p>Khrushchev closed the 22nd Congress of the Communist +Party of the Soviet Union in the Fall of 1961 by saying: “Our +aims are clear, the tasks have been set. To work, comrades! +For new victories of communism.”</p> + +<p>What is wrong with seeking total victory over Communism? +This would include victory over its ideology, its subversive +activities and its other forms of aggression.</p> + +<p>Is the call for victory contrary to the President’s program for +survival in this nuclear age? Doesn’t his program for survival +include a program for victory? If such a total victory is not in the +President’s program then the people need to know it. If it is in +the President’s program, what is wrong with backing it and +struggling for it? Senator Fulbright said that the military and +the civilian population should back the President’s program.</p> + +<p>Elsewhere Senator Fulbright himself recognized that the +challenge is total, and that the Communists are waging protracted +conflict. “We endure in an era of total crisis.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_115_115" href="#Footnote_115_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> After +speaking of the armies and navy of the U.S.S.R., Fulbright said: +“In addition the Soviet Union is mounting a world wide trade +offensive aimed primarily at us. Hence the challenge to us is +total. It involves the military, the political, the intellectual, and +the industrial. The measures of our antagonist cannot be countered +by half measures or by half-hearted competition.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_116_116" href="#Footnote_116_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>“Since we are now in deadly conflict with a prodigious +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</span>antagonist, we can neglect nothing that might assure our +security.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_117_117" href="#Footnote_117_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Why, then, take the military out of the cold war? Why, then, +did the Senator criticize in the memorandum the concept of +protracted conflict?⁠<a id="FNanchor_118_118" href="#Footnote_118_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a>⁠</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_83_83" href="#FNanchor_83_83" class="label">[83]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439, col. 2,m.-p. 13441, +col. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_84_84" href="#FNanchor_84_84" class="label">[84]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13436, col. 3,b. point 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_85_85" href="#FNanchor_85_85" class="label">[85]</a> Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, <cite>American Strategy for the Nuclear +Age</cite>, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960, pp. 30-31. I +agree with Gerhart Niemeyer that the ideological dimension of the cold +war must be emphasized. <cite>Problems of Communism</cite>, Nov.-Dec. 1961, p. 59.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_86_86" href="#FNanchor_86_86" class="label">[86]</a> Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, <cite>Defense Secretary +McNamara on S. Res. 191</cite>, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961, +pp. 3-4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_87_87" href="#FNanchor_87_87" class="label">[87]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b. A government +official in a position to know the viewpoint of current policy-makers, told +Edith Kermit Roosevelt that: “The purpose of American policy is to +work for a merger of East and West. It is believed accommodation can be +reached as the two systems become more alike politically and economically: +As the United States adopts a more collectivist pattern of federal control, +while at the same time a consolidation of Soviet rule makes genocide purges, +and other less-pleasant attributes of the police state unnecessary.” (“Policy +of ‘No Win’ Now Official”, <cite>Dallas Morning News</cite>, May 27, 1962.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_88_88" href="#FNanchor_88_88" class="label">[88]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13440, col. 1,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_89_89" href="#FNanchor_89_89" class="label">[89]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, August 2, 1949, pp. A4995-A4996.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_90_90" href="#FNanchor_90_90" class="label">[90]</a> Quoted in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, October 3, 1961, p. A7922, col. 3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_91_91" href="#FNanchor_91_91" class="label">[91]</a> “Ten Reasons Why Communism is Winning”, <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, +April 25, 1961, p. A2788, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_92_92" href="#FNanchor_92_92" class="label">[92]</a> “War Called Peace: Time for Words Has Passed.” <cite>Congressional +Record</cite>, May 3, 1961, p. A3045, col. 3,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_93_93" href="#FNanchor_93_93" class="label">[93]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 7, 1961, p. 13759, col. 3,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_94_94" href="#FNanchor_94_94" class="label">[94]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, May 3, 1961, p. A3045, col. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_95_95" href="#FNanchor_95_95" class="label">[95]</a> <cite>Arkansas Democrat</cite>, November 28, 1961, p. 1, <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, November +29, 1961, p. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_96_96" href="#FNanchor_96_96" class="label">[96]</a> “Speech Delivered by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to +the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday, September 27, 1961,” +mimeographed copy of the speech, p. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_97_97" href="#FNanchor_97_97" class="label">[97]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, June 19, 1961, p. A4545, col. 3,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_98_98" href="#FNanchor_98_98" class="label">[98]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. A4546, col. 1,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_99_99" href="#FNanchor_99_99" class="label">[99]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. A4546, col. 1,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_100_100" href="#FNanchor_100_100" class="label">[100]</a> Quoted in Department of State, <cite>Soviet World Outlook</cite>, July 1959, p. 96.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_101_101" href="#FNanchor_101_101" class="label">[101]</a> Mao Tse-tung, <cite>On Contradiction</cite>, Foreign Language Press, Peking, +1952, pp. 66-67.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_102_102" href="#FNanchor_102_102" class="label">[102]</a> John R. Van de Water, <cite>Ideologies in Conflict</cite>. Address on June 8, +1951, p. 7.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_103_103" href="#FNanchor_103_103" class="label">[103]</a> <cite>International Affairs</cite>, Moscow, November 1959, pp. 3-4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_104_104" href="#FNanchor_104_104" class="label">[104]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_105_105" href="#FNanchor_105_105" class="label">[105]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 6.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_106_106" href="#FNanchor_106_106" class="label">[106]</a> Mao Tse-tung <cite>On Contradiction</cite>, p. 61.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_107_107" href="#FNanchor_107_107" class="label">[107]</a> G. F. Hudson, <cite>Problems of Communism</cite>, July-Aug. 1961, p. 31.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_108_108" href="#FNanchor_108_108" class="label">[108]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, Oct. 3, 1961, p. A7894, col. 3,m. See Frank J. +Johnson, <cite>No Substitute For Victory</cite>, Chicago: Regnery, 1962.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_109_109" href="#FNanchor_109_109" class="label">[109]</a> <cite>Arkansas Democrat</cite>, November 8, 1961, p. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_110_110" href="#FNanchor_110_110" class="label">[110]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, March 26, 1959, p. A2762, col. 2,m-3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_111_111" href="#FNanchor_111_111" class="label">[111]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, September 26, 1961, p. A7750, col. 3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_112_112" href="#FNanchor_112_112" class="label">[112]</a> Ralph K. White’s speech before the American Psychological Association, +Duplicated copy, p. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_113_113" href="#FNanchor_113_113" class="label">[113]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_114_114" href="#FNanchor_114_114" class="label">[114]</a> Taken from my notes of Mr. Lovestone’s speech, Washington, D. C., +November 4, 1961. Congressman Judd said: “Mr. Chairman, nobody has +ever yet won a struggle military or otherwise, by being only on the defensive +and announcing ahead of time that he is not trying to win.” <cite>Freedom +Commission and Freedom Academy.</cite> Washington: Government Printing +Office, 1959, p. 123.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_115_115" href="#FNanchor_115_115" class="label">[115]</a> Senator Fulbright, <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, March 28, 1960, p. A2707, +col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_116_116" href="#FNanchor_116_116" class="label">[116]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. A2708, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_117_117" href="#FNanchor_117_117" class="label">[117]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. A2709, col. 1,m. Congressman McCormack of Massachusetts +said: “As long as the Communists adhere to dialectic communism and +their ultimate intent for world revolution and world domination, as long as +the dominating influence of communism is its dialectic aspect, the dominating +and controlling power or influence of international communism, they +have got to keep on going, and going, and going until their (sic) either +conquer the world or blow up. International communism as presently constituted +cannot permanently survive in any part of the world there are free +men and women.” (<cite>Congressional Record</cite>, January 22, 1959, p. 951, col. 2,t.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_118_118" href="#FNanchor_118_118" class="label">[118]</a> In the author’s judgment, there are some who want the military out +of the cold war, because they fear that the military is for the hard line +against communism, i.e. for victory over communism. This, they fear, will +start a war. Several years ago Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote an article +on the future of democratic socialism in the United States. In it he advocated +some ideas which, he said, the State Department had been somewhat +following for some time. Among these ideas were: (a) The U.S.S.R. will +get over its “messianic intoxication.” (b) We must contain her so that +she will not run the risk of the aggression that might prove a general war. +(c) We must not engage in an anti-Soviet crusade. (d) We must not “permit +reactionaries in the buffer states to precipitate conflicts in defense of +their own obsolete prerogatives.” (e) We must demonstrate to the U.S.S.R. +that we have no aggressive intentions toward the U.S.S.R. (f) We must back +the non-Communist left, since—the implication is—such governments will +not be apt to engage in an anti-Soviet crusade. In this way, perhaps we can +stave off general war and give the U.S.S.R. time to undergo a change of +heart. See the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, Feb. 6, 1962, pp. A881-A884. A reprint.</p> + +<p>This approach would not only mean that we should encourage neutralism +in at least some nations, but it would also mean that an anti-communist +crusade in America should be defeated.</p> + +<p>It would mean that we should not seek victory over communism.</p> + +<p>It would encourage the salami tactics of the Communists who will try +to see to it that each slice they cut off from the non-Communist world is +not large enough to precipitate a general war.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</span></p> + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VI"> + Chapter VI + <br> + THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE PRINCIPLE PROBLEM? + </h2> +</div> + +<p>Senator Fulbright takes a dim view of the American people. +He indicates that the curbing of the people, or the manipulation +of the masses, may be the primary problem of the President. +The masses are all potential McCarthyites who are easily +infected with the virus of extremely radical rightwingism. “In +the long run, it is quite possible that the principal problem of +leadership will be, if it is not already, to restrain the desire of +the people to hit the Communists with everything we’ve got, +particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos. Pride in victory, +and frustration in restraint, during the Korean war, led to MacArthur’s +revolt and McCarthyism.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_119_119" href="#Footnote_119_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> This is the most charitable +interpretation of McCarthyism which the Senator has ever made. +For in effect he is saying that McCarthyism is the result of the +desire for victory over Communism, and the frustration which +comes when the leaders try to restrain people from winning this +victory.</p> + +<p>We think that the principal problem is Communism and not +the American people.</p> + +<p>The memorandum went on to say that the people cannot be +trusted on foreign policy. They tend to “obey the impulse of +passion” and “to abandon a mature design for the gratification +of a momentary caprice.” Thus the Senator thought that if +foreign aid was “laid before the people in a referendum, it +would be defeated.” The Senator obviously does not want what +<em>he thinks</em> is the people’s will to be carried out. The people want +simple solutions, they want to scourge devils or lash out at the +enemy.⁠<a id="FNanchor_120_120" href="#Footnote_120_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Senator, it is plain to see, does not have a very high +opinion of the American people and their ability to govern +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</span>themselves. Is not this a lack of confidence in our republican +form of government?</p> + + +<h3><em>How Much Is the Senator For Civilian Control?</em></h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright says that he has a “strong belief in the +principle of military subordination to civilian control.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_121_121" href="#Footnote_121_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> So does +this reviewer. Furthermore, civilian control ultimately means the +<em>sovereignty of the people</em>. Thus it ultimately means the civilian +control of the President and of all other politicians and statesmen.</p> + +<p>Does the Senator believe as strongly in the civilian control of +politicians as well as of the military? It does not seem that the +Senator is too well pleased with this bedrock principle of our +constitutional system. In a TV interview July 30, 1961, he said, +concerning the question of Red China and the U. N. and the +recognition of Communist Outer Mongolia, that: “The sentiments +of this country have been developed to such a pitch our +President has no freedom of action in this field.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_122_122" href="#Footnote_122_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a> Again: “... we +will not recognize Red China, because of the price of dissension +within our own ranks at home; it is too great to pay ... I think +we have no freedom of action in this field because of domestic +politics.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_123_123" href="#Footnote_123_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>If he thought that he could get by with it would the Senator +thwart the will of the people concerning Red China and Outer +Mongolia? Would he like to have the freedom to act in these +matters contrary to what he knows to be the will of the people?</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, the Senator wants us to recognize Outer +Mongolia. He thinks that it might help us learn more about +the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Red China. Obviously +he would urge the President to recognize Outer Mongolia if he +thought that the people would stand for it.</p> + +<p>The American people, in my judgment, have good reason to +be against the recognition of Outer Mongolia. <em>First</em>, around five +thousand of her troops fought Americans and the U.N. forces +in Korea.⁠<a id="FNanchor_124_124" href="#Footnote_124_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> <em>Second</em>, it is one of the oldest of the satellites of the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</span>U.S.S.R. <em>Third</em>, it is recognized as a loyal Communist country +by Red China. For example, a Communist paper recently +carried an article entitled: “China Salutes Fraternal Mongolia.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_125_125" href="#Footnote_125_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> +In trade talks around the first of March, 1961, it was emphasized +by Peking that the cooperation between Mongolia and China +was “on the basis of the principles of proletarian Internationalism.” +Marshall Malinevsky, who is chief of the Russian Army, +“described the bond between Mongolian, Chinese and Russian +Armies as ‘cemented in blood’.” <em>Fourth</em>, the Premier of Outer +Mongolia in a broadcast on April 24, 1961, emphasized their +loyalty to Lenin. Furthermore, he said: “In their struggle for +building a new life, our people always leaned and continue to +lean upon the disinterested all-around aid of the Soviet Union, +the first country of triumphant Socialism.” <em>Fifth</em>, if we recognize +Outer Mongolia, Japan will likely do likewise. This will help +increase the sentiment of neutralism in Japan.⁠<a id="FNanchor_126_126" href="#Footnote_126_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> <em>Sixth</em>, it would +have a bad psychological effect in Asia. The Foreign Secretary +of the Philippines, Felix Berto Serrano, said that it would be +“an example of the softening of the U.S. attitude toward Communism +in this part of the world.” The Foreign Minister of +Thailand, Phanat Khoman, said that it would have an adverse +affect on free world morale.⁠<a id="FNanchor_127_127" href="#Footnote_127_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Senator thinks that if the people were given a choice +in the matter, they would defeat foreign aid. He may or may not +be right. But is he not saying that what he thinks is the will of +the people should not rule in this matter?</p> + + +<h3><em>Attitude Towards America</em></h3> + +<p>The Senator attacks those individuals who, he says, run +down America. “Implicit in much of the propaganda of the +radical right is the assumption that our free society is permeated +with corruption and decay.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_128_128" href="#Footnote_128_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>There is much that is right in America. We believe that it +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</span>is the greatest country in the world. The principles on which +it is founded are the principles which when followed produce +progress and prosperity.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, there is enough crime, corruption and +decay to cause all thoughtful Americans real concern. For +example, J. Edgar Hoover has called our attention to these +matters countless times.</p> + +<p>We shall not enter into a discussion of this except to point +out that the Senator himself has some hard things to say about +America.</p> + +<p>In the speech at Stanford University he said: “In the last +few years American statesmen and scholars have been turning +their thoughts toward an effort to re-define the national ‘purpose,’ +to interpret our national life and politics in terms of goals. +The genesis of this quest for a clear national objective was a +feeling that somehow the American people had strayed from +their historic course into a blind alley of aimlessness and frustration. +In an era of unexampled affluence, the American +people, by and large, are not happy. In the years since World +War II, we have attained our private purposes almost too well +at home, but beyond our personal material needs we have not +yet recognized an objective or purpose which inspires our real +interest. At home we have become immersed in the crass delight +of extravagant consumption, puerile faddism, and callow +amusements.”</p> + +<p>“The quest for a definition of the national purpose has been +generated by this sense of malaise. If our people were engaged +in vigorous and meaningful activity, it is quite possible that we +would not now be troubling ourselves with a quest for abstract +definition and articulation.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_129_129" href="#Footnote_129_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Rightwing extremism, he says, has great appeal to the American +public, and in times of crisis it has “great mass appeal”. +The people are the ones who need to be restrained in our conflict +with communism. The people do not have enough understanding +to back an adequate foreign policy.⁠<a id="FNanchor_130_130" href="#Footnote_130_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> The people are +misled by simple solutions and need some devils to scourge. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</span>“The radicalism of the right can be expected to have great mass +appeal during such periods. It offers the simple solution, easily +understood: Scourging of the devils within the body politic, or, +in the extreme, lashing out at the enemy.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_131_131" href="#Footnote_131_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>On September 1, 1960, Senator Fulbright said: “I believe that +such a study would conclude that America’s trouble is basically +one of aimlessness at home and frustration abroad.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_132_132" href="#Footnote_132_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>In the light of these contentions of the Senator, he is hardly +the one to defend America against the charge, which he says +is made by the “radical right,” that our “free society is permeated +with corruption and decay.” Has the “radical right” said +anything harder about America than has the Senator? If not, +why should they be classified as radical, and the Senator not +also be grouped with them in this matter.</p> + + +<h3><em>The Manipulated Masses?</em></h3> + +<p>Not only does the Senator think that the problem is to restrain +the people, but that the people should be “directed” into +backing whatever the President’s program happens to be. He +does not trust the people; his statements make this clear. They +must be “directed”. “Fundamentally, it is believed that the +American people have little, if any, need to be alerted to the +menace of the cold war. Rather, the need is for understanding +of the true nature of that menace, and the direction of the +public’s present and foreseeable awareness of the fact of the +menace toward support of the President’s own total program +for survival in a nuclear age. There are no reasons to believe +that military personnel generally can contribute to this need, +beyond their specific, technical competence to explain their own +role. On the contrary, there are many reasons, and some evidence, +for believing that an effort by the military, beyond this +limitation, involves considerable danger.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_133_133" href="#Footnote_133_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Frankly at times we are not sure what is the President’s own +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</span>total program. It has vacillated, for example, concerning Laos +and Cuba. Are we to be “directed” into it, as the President +unfolds it, or shapes it, from time to time?</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright has attacked the competency of the people. +He laid down in his secret memorandum, in our judgement, +the ideological basis for a program of Pavlovian conditioning +of the American people to accept whatever is decided on in the +White House, the State Department and by a small group of +advisors.⁠<a id="FNanchor_134_134" href="#Footnote_134_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Senator thinks that the people are susceptible to radicalism. +He says that extremely radical rightwingism “already +has great appeal to the public. In the future it may well have +much greater appeal.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_135_135" href="#Footnote_135_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> So the problem is to “direct” them +into the President’s own total program. This program, the Senator +implies, <em>is quite different</em> from the general program for +victory and survival which is discussed in the memorandum and +repudiated as being rightwing. For he thinks that the rightwingers +are raising an obstacle to the “public acceptance of the +President’s program.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_136_136" href="#Footnote_136_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Carried out to its logical conclusion, we believe that the +memorandum, and the way in which it was formed and implemented, +introduces a new concept into our government, a concept +which would replace the Constitution and the sovereignty +of the people. The President, the State Department and a few +advisors are the ones who through their own will and wisdom +formulate the policies which shall be followed. This they are to +do independently of the people, for the people are too deficient +in understanding; they are so immature that they follow the +momentary caprice; they tend to obey the impulse of passion +and thus the “Radicalism of the right can be expected to have +great mass appeal during such periods” as the “long twilight +struggle”. Furthermore, our age is complex, therefore, the public +must either be ignored or conditioned so that they will follow +the leader. In directing the people into the President’s program, +the military should engage in the cold war only to the extent +that it can help do this in explaining their own strictly military +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</span>role. After speaking of the need for the direction of the people’s +awareness, that there is a danger, into support for the President’s +program, he said: “There are no reasons to believe that military +personnel generally can contribute to this need, beyond +their specific technical competence to explain their own role. +On the contrary, there are many reasons and some evidence, +for believing that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, +involves considerable danger.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_137_137" href="#Footnote_137_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a> Does this mean that when +the military cannot be used as a rubber stamp it must not be +used in waging the cold war?</p> + +<p>It should be remembered that this basically anti-constitutional +concept—against the Constitution in that it distrusts and +wants to “direct” the people, rather than accept the sovereignty +of the people—was set forth in a secret memorandum. The +other members of the Foreign Relations Committee did not see +it. It was sent directly to the President and the Secretary of +Defense, and has had an influence on a very important policy.</p> + +<p>Walter Lippmann, who is highly regarded by Senator Fulbright, +said that there was a tendency of Government “insiders” +to view the criticism of the “outsiders” as that of ignoramuses +who were not enlightened by secret files and conferences. He +said: “I tell the critic, you be careful. You will be denouncing +the principle of democracy itself, which asserts that the outsiders +shall be sovereign over the insiders. For you will be showing +that the people themselves, since they are ignoramuses because +they are outsiders, are therefore incapable of governing themselves.</p> + +<p>“Furthermore, Lippmann declared that as far as the affairs +of the world are concerned, those who regard themselves as +insiders are actually outsiders since none of them read all of +the U.S. papers and they have no access to the records of foreign +governments that are equally important and if one is to +have the total wisdom the insiders indicate they have.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_138_138" href="#Footnote_138_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a>⁠</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</span></p> + + +<h3><em>An Out-Moded Constitutional System?</em></h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright seems to want to change our system of +government so that it will be run by one man, the President. +He has unlimited confidence in the President as a man who is +above partisan politics and who is of high moral calibre <em>by virtue +of the fact</em> that he is President. He views our constitutional +system as out of date. Thus in his Stanford speech, July 28, +1961, he said:</p> + +<p>“The President is hobbled in his task of leading the American +people to consensus and concerted action by the restrictions of +power imposed on him by a constitutional system designed for +an eighteenth century agrarian society far removed from the +centers of world power. It is imperative that we break out of +the intelligent confines of cherished and traditional beliefs and +open our minds to the possibility that basic changes in our system +may be essential to meet the requirements of the twentieth +century.</p> + +<p>“The ability of this nation to preserve the value system which +constitutes the core of our national interest has come to depend +principally on our ability to cope with world wide revolutionary +forces. If we are to deal with these forces successfully, we must +be able to act quickly and decisively on the one hand and persistently +and patiently on the other. ‘Our American task,’ wrote +Walter Lippmann in a recent article, ‘is to generate superior +national strength. For this we must have a powerful and purposeful +National Government.... There is no getting away from +the fact that, as Lord Acton said, power corrupts. But also, there +is no getting away from the fact that powerlessness invites confusion, +demoralization, and defeat.’</p> + +<p>“The fact that is needed is Presidential power. He alone, among +elected officials, can rise above parochialism and private +pressures. He alone, in his role as teacher and moral leader, +can hope to overcome the excesses and inadequacies of a public +opinion that is all too often ignorant of the needs, the dangers, +and the opportunities in our foreign relations.</p> + +<p>“Public Opinion, wrote Lippmann in <cite>The Public Philosophy</cite>, +consistently lags a generation behind in its attitudes and assessments +of international relations. The tyranny of public opinion, +he says, imposes upon our policy-makers a ‘compulsion to make +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</span>mistakes.’ The poet Yeats was not wholly wrong when he laid +down this harsh pronouncement on public opinion: ‘The best +lack all conviction—the worst are filled with passionate intensity.’</p> + +<p>“These views may be extreme but they are not wholly without +merit, and I point to them in order to stress the point that public +opinion must be educated and led if it is to bolster wise +and effective national policies. Only the President can provide +the guidance that is necessary, while legislators display a distressing +tendency to adhere slavishly to the dictates of public +opinion, or at least to its vocal and highly organized minority +segments.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_139_139" href="#Footnote_139_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Lippmann’s statement concerning the “insiders” and “outsiders” +ought to be recalled in this connection. We should also +remember his criticism that President Eisenhower was a defeatist +who lacked faith in our people and in our system.⁠<a id="FNanchor_140_140" href="#Footnote_140_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> Why, +then, should he contend that what is needed is more Presidential +power? Why should Senator Fulbright maintain the same thing?</p> + +<p>In a news conference in Washington, President Eisenhower +said on May 10, 1962, that: “I believe that the problem of the +Presidency is rarely an inadequacy of power. Ordinarily, the +problem is to use the already enormous power of the Presidency +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</span>judiciously, temperately and wisely.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_141_141" href="#Footnote_141_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>With all due respect to the President of the United States, +whoever he may be at any given time in our history, we do +not believe that any President is wise enough, knows enough +or is good enough to occupy the position to which Senator Fulbright +would elevate him. Of course, with the attitude which +Fulbright has toward the masses, it is logical that he should accept +the Fuhrer (Fuhrer means “leader”) principle. The masses +must look to <em>the leader</em>. He must be their teacher and their +moral leader.</p> + +<p>“We got rid of kings back there in 1776, Senator.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_142_142" href="#Footnote_142_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a> The +Senator talks like a reactionary who wants to go back to kings +and their “divine right” to rule.</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright thinks that legislators are slaves of public +opinion, but the President is exempt from such. We ask: In +our Republic shouldn’t the legislators and the President be subject +to public opinion under law? If they are not to be responsive +to the will of the people within the framework of our constitutional +government, to whom and to what are they to be responsive?</p> + +<p>Has the Senator from Arkansas forgotten that less than two +years ago President Kennedy was a Senator, and thus a legislator; +and legislators, according to Fulbright, display a “distressing +tendency to adhere slavishly to the dictates of public +opinion, or at least to its vocal and highly organized minority +segments.” Just because this particular Senator was elected +President did he therefore become so transformed that he rose +above “parochialism and private pressures”? Did he become +overnight the “teacher and moral leader”, the “only” one who +can “provide the guidance that is necessary”? Does the Senator +think, if Nixon had been elected President, that automatically +on his shoulders would have descended the wisdom, the knowledge +and the unlimited goodness which would be necessary in +one who is to be our Leader in morality, our Teacher and our +Guide? As a matter of fact, we know that the Senator does not +believe that Mr. Nixon, if he had been elected, would have +metamorphized into the Leader which Senator Fulbright claims +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</span>that the President by the very nature of the case becomes. On +February 1, 1960, Senator Fulbright reprinted in the <cite>Congressional +Record</cite> an article by James Reston which was critical of +Mr. Nixon. Senator Fulbright said of the article that “it is +seldom in this stolid and humorless era that an observer of +our political scene sees through the absurd double talk of so +much of the political speeches with which we are entertained.” +Reston, however, had done so concerning Mr. Nixon.⁠<a id="FNanchor_143_143" href="#Footnote_143_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> And yet, +Senator Fulbright’s concept of the Presidency is such that he +must believe, if he follows his position to its logical conclusion, +that Mr. Nixon would have ceased all double talk, and have +become the teacher and the moral leader of the nation if he had +been elected!</p> + +<p>Did Senator Fulbright think that President Truman was the +moral and educational leader of the people just because he was +President? Of Truman he said in 1951: “For a long time we +have been walking on opposite sides of the street, neither of +us nodding to the other. He has often thought me wrong and +unspeakable, while I have sometimes thought him wrong and +incomprehensible.”</p> + +<p>“I have spoken with him on official business only once in +several years.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_144_144" href="#Footnote_144_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright did not think that because President Eisenhower +was in the office of President that he was therefore qualified +as the leader and teacher of the people. He thought that +Eisenhower was confused and engaged in the lucrative business +of making and selling tranquilizer pills.⁠<a id="FNanchor_145_145" href="#Footnote_145_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> He spoke of the absence +of leadership on the part of the President.⁠<a id="FNanchor_146_146" href="#Footnote_146_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> A veto message +was described as “unworthy of his great office and beneath +the dignity of the Congress to which it was sent. It is not factual. +It is intemperate. It was obviously designed to catch newspaper +headlines and radio and television news blurbs.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_147_147" href="#Footnote_147_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> The President +himself; the Senator said, was unaware of the vastness of the +Soviet challenge. “In defense, in our domestic economy, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</span>in our foreign relations, the administration seems to be unaware +of the depth and scope of the Soviet challenge. There is no +evidence that the administration is now or ever will be willing +to urge the American people to take in one notch on our belt +to deal with a Soviet challenge which confronts us in missiles, +arms, and just downright capacity to produce.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_148_148" href="#Footnote_148_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> “I believe that +the people of America will rise to the needs of our situation +if they are clearly told what is at stake. They certainly would +be willing to be taxed if it is necessary to survival. But I am +not sure the administration agrees with even that simple proposition.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_149_149" href="#Footnote_149_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>With high commendation, Senator Fulbright inserted an article +by Joseph Alsop into the <cite>Congressional Record</cite> which indicated +that he thought that President Eisenhower did not have, +to say the least, the balanced judgment necessary for guiding +aright the ship of state. Of a reason advanced by the President +concerning test bans, Alsop said: “Surely this singular choice +of reasons for a high policy decision of truly immeasurable import, +reveals a mind gripped by one idea to the point of total +obsession. Surely it shows a man driven by a single purpose +almost to the point of mania.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_150_150" href="#Footnote_150_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright further charged that President Eisenhower +did not have the proper attitude toward Congress and that he +did not take them into his confidence. Perhaps the Senator +thought that there were too many secret memorandums floating +around! At any rate he said: “I believe that a great deal of this +stems from the President’s attitude toward Congress, particularly +toward the Democratic Members of Congress. He has +shown very little disposition to take them into his confidence, +now or at any other time.</p> + +<p>“I believe that legitimately leaves many people with the +feeling that we do not know all that we ought to know. I asked +Mr. Kohler about the letter which Khrushchev had written, and +Mr. Kohler said flatly that he could not discuss it. I said that it +had appeared at least in part in the Herald Tribune, and that +it was strange indeed that it could be revealed to Miss Higgins +of the New York Herald Tribune, but not to a committee of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</span>the Senate. He said that he could not discuss it. Apparently he +was under orders not to discuss it in any respect with the +committee. That did not leave a very good taste in my mouth. +It is a mystery to me why a letter, unless it was specifically +agreed that Mr. Khrushchev considered it a personal and confidential +letter, should not be released. Having been released, or +leaked, as the new term is, to the Herald Tribune, I do not +know of any reason why it should not be made available to the +committee, and to the public, for that matter, in a more official +manner than the way in which it was.</p> + +<p>“With reference to the statement of the Senator regarding +what Mr. Tsarapkin said, I have only seen a summary of it +which Mr. Farley brought to me and said:</p> + +<p>“‘This is all that can be released now.’</p> + +<p>“I do not quite understand why that should be true. Maybe +the Senator’s explanation would be a violation of an understanding. +That is possible. However, I must agree with the Senator +that a little more frank discussion, and taking the public into +their confidence, certainly the Senate of the United States, +particularly the Committee on Foreign Relations, would be a +very healthy step.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_151_151" href="#Footnote_151_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright also thought that President Eisenhower was +forcing uniformity of viewpoint in his administration. Men under +him were either muzzled or suffered the consequences. Or at +least the Senator indicated this in an insertion, with high praise, +of an article by Joseph Alsop which said: “In this administration, +uniformity of viewpoint is virtually enforced. Independent-minded +persons who do not take their viewpoint, readymade, +from the White House have always been condemned as non-team +players. Soon or late, they have always met the fate of +General Gavin, General Ridgway, and Gen. Maxwell D. +Taylor.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_152_152" href="#Footnote_152_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>As late as March 22, 1960, Senator Fulbright, in a speech +before the Annual Dinner of the Harvard Club of Washington, +D. C., commended a high military official for disagreeing with +the President. And, furthermore, Senator Fulbright seems to +cast scorn on the idea that it was not for Generals to reason +why! As the Senator put it: “Gen. Bernard Schriever has also +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</span>said that there is ‘very much evidence’ that Russia has greatly +strengthened its bomber defenses. But the aircraft that might +not be able to get through may not even be able to demonstrate +their impotence. ‘For,’ states Gen. Thomas Power, Chief of the +Strategic Air Command, ‘our bomber bases are vulnerable to +surprise attack.’</p> + +<p>“Generals are not to reason why. Their Commander in Chief +complains that, ‘too many generals have all sorts of ideas.’</p> + +<p>“Yet mankind moves on ideas. Men with ideas are the makers +and shakers of the world. The larger their number serving the +country the more fruitful and vigorous the country. But few +men of ideas come to Washington. They are not likely to seek +service in a government which is scornful of their kind.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_153_153" href="#Footnote_153_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Senator seemed to agree with the idea that “President +Eisenhower leads a dangerously sheltered life as Chief Executive +of the Nation.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_154_154" href="#Footnote_154_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Lyndon B. Johnson also commended, on February 16, 1960, +the idea that public debate by military officials was good. He +reprinted a letter from a Harvard professor, Henry A. Kissinger, +that: “The President says he deplores public argument by military +experts regarding our defense policy. Prior to this, he had +called his critics parochial and had invoked his superior expertise +in the subject. It is impossible, of course, for laymen to pass +judgment on a debate of such technical complexity. They have +a right to insist, however, that the categories of the debate be +properly put.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_155_155" href="#Footnote_155_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>In the light of these considerations, it is a serious question +as to what has happened to Senator Fulbright within the last +year or so that has led him to think now that President Kennedy +is in office, that the office of the Presidency has automatically +raised the President above the temptations and mistakes that not +only beset legislators—and Kennedy was a Senator less than two +years ago—but also above those which beset Eisenhower. What +makes the Senator, in the light of his previous criticisms of +Eisenhower, think what is needed in this country is more power +for the President? After all, the Senator might reflect, President +Kennedy will not be President forever, and what if after we have +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</span>conferred far greater powers on the President, while Kennedy +was in office, someone like Eisenhower or Truman, of whom the +Senator was so critical, became President!!</p> + +<p>In denouncing those whom he labeled as “fanatics” and +“extremists” of the right, in a speech in Los Angeles on November +18, President Kennedy said: “They call for a ‘man on horseback’ +because they do not trust the people.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_156_156" href="#Footnote_156_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a> And yet, Senator +Fulbright calls for more power for the President, because the +people are so ignorant that they need the Leader. Wouldn’t this +position make the Senator, in this matter, akin to the rightwing +“fanatics”? As Joseph Alsop said, in regards to a position President +Eisenhower had taken, “perhaps it would have been better +to assert, at the outset, that it is always wrong for any nation to +trust any leader, instead of trusting the hard facts.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_157_157" href="#Footnote_157_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Former President Herbert Hoover has indicated that more +than one loss to communism has taken place because the man +in the position of the Presidency, along with his selected +advisors, entered into agreements without an opportunity being +given to the Congress or to the people to know of, to discuss +or to pass on these matters. “Executive agreements, Mr. Hoover +said, had spread communism over the earth, turned over the +Baltic States to Soviet Russia, partitioned Poland at the Teheran +Conference, surrendered 10 nations to slavery at Yalta and set +in motion the communization of Mongolia, North Korea, and +all China. One result of these ‘unrestrained Presidential actions’ +is a worldwide shrinking of human freedoms. Another has been +a steady encroachment on powers of the legislative branch by +the executive.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_158_158" href="#Footnote_158_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright would lead us away from our constitutional +system to a system wherein the power would be concentrated +in the hands of the President. “The power that is needed is +Presidential power.” “Only the President can provide the +guidance that is necessary....” But this is not to lead us to a +newer and higher form of government, than that of our so-called +out-moded “eighteenth century agrarian society” constitutional +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</span>system. It is to lead us back to the concept of dictatorship, of +the Fuhrer.</p> + +<p>The leader, of course, would have his small, select group of +advisors. In such a set-up, government by secret memorandums +would likely be the order of the day.</p> + +<p>We trust that Senator Fulbright, who is influential in the +present administration, will not influence President Kennedy to +accept this concept of our constitutional system, nor this idea +of the role of the President.</p> + +<p>The Senator knows that power tends to corrupt and that +absolute power corrupts absolutely, for he himself once said: +“Wherever there is power there is the possibility that it will be +used and the danger that it will be misused. This assumption, +expressed in Lord Acton’s maxim that ‘power corrupts, and +absolute power corrupts absolutely,’ is common to all effective +democracies. This principle is one of instinctive distrust of +power itself wherever it exists. It has nothing to do with the +motives of any group or individual who may wield it. It has +been directed against big business, big labor, and big government, +and now, inevitably, it is directed against our big Military +Establishment.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_159_159" href="#Footnote_159_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Why, then, does the Senator want to give to the President +far more power than the Constitution now allows and the President +now has? For what does the President need more power?</p> + + +<h3><em>Backing the President</em></h3> + +<p>The Senator said that the need is for the public to be directed +into the support of the President’s own total program.⁠<a id="FNanchor_160_160" href="#Footnote_160_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> Does +this apply to the Senator?</p> + +<p>As a candidate, President Kennedy said he would do something +about Cuba. He was going to do something, i.e. back an +invasion. But Senator Fulbright’s opposition to our backing an +invasion had an influence, according to some, on the President +which helped induce him to modify his plans. Thus the invasion +was doomed to failure.</p> + +<p>President Kennedy emphasized that we would stand firm in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</span>Berlin.⁠<a id="FNanchor_161_161" href="#Footnote_161_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a> On a TV program on July 30, 1961, the following +exchange took place:</p> + +<p>“Mr. Scali. In any negotiations over Berlin, Senator, would +you be willing to accept any concessions on the part of the West +which closed West Berlin as an escape hatch for refugees in +any way?</p> + +<p>“Senator Fulbright. Well, I think that that might certainly +be a negotiable point. The truth of the matter is I think the +Russians have the power to close it in any case. I mean we are +not giving up very much because I believe next week if they +chose to close their borders, they could, without violating any +treaty right I know of. We have no right to insist that they be +allowed to come out. As I said I don’t understand why the East +Germans don’t close the border because I think they have a +right to close it. So why is this a great concession? You don’t +have that right now.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_162_162" href="#Footnote_162_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The question dealt specifically with the West making some +concessions which would close the escape hatch. The Senator +thought “that might certainly be a negotiable point.” He made +it clear that we could not negotiate with them as to whether +they had the power to close it, so he was not implying we should +negotiate concerning their power; nor, as he also put it, their +right to close the escape hatch. The only thing left to negotiate +was, as the question specifically said, whether the West should +make any concessions “which closed West Berlin as an escape +hatch for refugees in any way.” In other words, the Senator +indicates that we should negotiate as to whether or not the West +should help—by making concessions on our part, since obviously +we could not make concessions for the Russians—close the +escape hatch and thus in effect whether the West should help +the Communists guard the prison house in which the Communists +have their slaves.</p> + +<p>The East German Communists made use of the Senator’s +statements, and commended him. On August 3, 1961, in East +Berlin <cite>Neues Deutschland</cite> had the following heading for an +article: “U. S. Senator Against Trade in Human Beings.” He +was quoted as saying that: “the East Germans have the right +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</span>to close their borders.” The paper stressed that the Bonn government +was very much upset with Senator Fulbright’s proposal, +as they put it, to hold “serious negotiations on Berlin with the +USSR.” On August 4 the same paper said: “But the man seems +to be a realistic politician.” “Apparently Fulbright is aware of +the fact that the man-trap of West Berlin is an untenable +situation, that it must and will be closed.”</p> + +<p>We wonder whether the President felt that the Senator’s +speech upheld the President’s position on Berlin.</p> + +<p>The Senator later explained that this was not what he meant. +It was, however, what he said. We quote the entire explanation +which was made in the Senate on August 4, 1961.</p> + +<p>“Last Sunday, I appeared on the ABC network television and +radio program, ‘Issues and Answers.’ In the course of that program +one of the exchanges led to an unfortunate and erroneous +impression of my views. When asked if I thought the West +should make any concessions on the question of the flight of +East German refugees to West Berlin, I responded that this, too, +is something that could be discussed, because—and this is the +point—the East Germans have the ability to control travel +<em>within</em> East Germany.</p> + +<p>“The imposition of tighter travel restrictions by the East +Germans on travel of East German citizens within East Germany +could restrict access of East German citizens to all of Berlin, +thus depriving a large number of potential refugees from East +Germany (as distinguished from East Berlin) of this convenient +means of escape.</p> + +<p>“As I pointed out in the TV and radio interview, I know of +no agreements to which the Western Powers are party which +prohibit the East Germans from restricting the travel of East +German citizens within East Germany (outside of Berlin). It +is to that point of reference that my response was intended in +the interview.</p> + +<p>“I certainly did not intend to imply that the West should +execute any agreement whereby the West would assist in +enforcing any restriction imposed by East Germany on travel +within East Germany nor that the West should consider changing +existing agreements and consent to closing West Berlin to +refugees wishing to enter.</p> + +<p>“The right of persons to move freely within all sectors of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</span>Berlin is entirely another matter and is guaranteed by post-war +agreements signed by the United States, Britain, France and the +Soviet Union. I do not consider such right to be negotiable.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_163_163" href="#Footnote_163_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>According to Constantine Brown, Germans and other Europeans +have raised the question: “How can we reconcile what your +President tells us with what his own important party leaders +and especially the chairman of the most important Foreign +Relations Committee, Mr. Fulbright, says in public, on the floor +of the Senate and in radio and television interviews?”</p> + +<p>“The suspicions of what may be termed a schizophrenic foreign +policy started some time ago when Senator Mansfield, the +majority leader, and later Senator Fulbright urged negotiations +on Berlin after Mr. Kennedy had taken a formally strong stand +on that very matter.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_164_164" href="#Footnote_164_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>We wonder if the Senator has set the public a good example +of clearly and wholeheartedly backing the President’s program +in such matters as we have mentioned?</p> + +<p>In a review of some of our history Senator Fulbright took +the position that it was important for the people themselves to +bring to bear pressure on the President, instead of always +following the leader. “Moreover, throughout the whole of this +process, while much was done by the action of individual Presidents, +a great deal was done as a direct result of congressional +action or by the direct play of public pressures, rising from a +people whose life was being progressively democratized.</p> + +<p>“The key point is that the conduct of foreign affairs did not +appear to be an elite function, limited to specialists in and +around the Executive. Neither the electorate nor the Congress +was ever overawed by the Executive claim to exclusive knowledge, +or its claim that it would be against the national interest to +disclose the facts relevant to a foreign policy decision. Foreign +policy was debated in remote frontier outposts as well as in +seaboard cities, with a shrewdness and a knowledge of great +power rivalries that astonishes any modern reader who browses +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</span>through the records of these debates preserved in our National +Archives.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_165_165" href="#Footnote_165_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Now that the Senator’s secret memorandum has been made +public, the people can study it, debate it and continue to +exercise their sovereignty. It is through knowledge and action +based thereon that the civilian control can be maintained over +the government and thus over the military. Those who do not +believe that our constitutional system is out of date will surely +want to examine closely the Senator’s position.⁠<a id="FNanchor_166_166" href="#Footnote_166_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> In fact, the +Senator himself once emphasized the necessity of debating issues. +“Too many people are given a practical veto over policy. There +is an inhibition of the kind of free debate out of which a fundamental +national agreement emerges.” “Nonpartisanship does not +mean the absence of debate on foreign policy.” “I do not think +it is possible for a democratic country to have a viable, effective +policy unless it is founded on the widest possible public discussion. +Debate is a necessary ingredient of policymaking.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_167_167" href="#Footnote_167_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a>⁠</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_119_119" href="#FNanchor_119_119" class="label">[119]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_120_120" href="#FNanchor_120_120" class="label">[120]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13437.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_121_121" href="#FNanchor_121_121" class="label">[121]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_122_122" href="#FNanchor_122_122" class="label">[122]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, August 1, 1961, p. 13219, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_123_123" href="#FNanchor_123_123" class="label">[123]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13219, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_124_124" href="#FNanchor_124_124" class="label">[124]</a> <cite>Commercial Appeal</cite>, August 1, 1961. Report of speech of Congressman +Frank J. Becker. This same news item said that Senator Fulbright was for +the recognition of Outer Mongolia.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_125_125" href="#FNanchor_125_125" class="label">[125]</a> <cite>Peking Review</cite>, July 14, 1961, p. 7.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_126_126" href="#FNanchor_126_126" class="label">[126]</a> See the American-Asian Educational Exchange’s recent report on Communist +China and Asia, July, 1961. See also <cite>The Worker</cite>, October 1, 1961, +p. 6. <cite>World Marxist Review</cite>, July 1961, p. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_127_127" href="#FNanchor_127_127" class="label">[127]</a> <cite>Chinese News Service</cite>, August 1, 1961, pp. 3-4. For some additional +comments see Thomas J. Dodd’s speech in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August +2, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_128_128" href="#FNanchor_128_128" class="label">[128]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 21, 1961, p. 15357, col. 3,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_129_129" href="#FNanchor_129_129" class="label">[129]</a> Speech of Senator Fulbright before the 1961 Summer Cubberly Conference +of Stanford University, Stanford, California, July 28, 1961. Mimeographed +copy, pp. 1-2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_130_130" href="#FNanchor_130_130" class="label">[130]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_131_131" href="#FNanchor_131_131" class="label">[131]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13437, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_132_132" href="#FNanchor_132_132" class="label">[132]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, September 2, 1960, p. A6708, col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_133_133" href="#FNanchor_133_133" class="label">[133]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b. Dr. Robert T. Oliver, of +Pennsylvania State University, expressed his opinion on October 24, 1961, +that: “Democratic and totalitarian governments are becoming more and +more alike in their methods of governing—through the manipulation of public +opinion by control of secrecy and publicity.” (<cite>Congressional Record</cite>, +Jan. 15, 1962, p. A141, col. 2,t.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_134_134" href="#FNanchor_134_134" class="label">[134]</a> See Edward Hunter, speech on the Manion Forum. 1961. Reprinted in +the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, Feb. 6, 1962, pp. A906-907.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_135_135" href="#FNanchor_135_135" class="label">[135]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 1,b.-2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_136_136" href="#FNanchor_136_136" class="label">[136]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13437, col. 1,b. See also p. 13436, col. 3,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_137_137" href="#FNanchor_137_137" class="label">[137]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13437, col. 3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_138_138" href="#FNanchor_138_138" class="label">[138]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, January 18, 1960, p. 578, col. 3,m. Dr. Robert T. Oliver, who +served over twelve years in the inner councils of the government of Korea, +dealing with matters of foreign policy, said: “On the whole, however, the +significant facts concerning all the major international issues are completely +available to anyone who takes the trouble to keep up with the news.” +(<em>Ibid.</em>, Jan. 5, 1962, p. A140, col. 3,b.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_139_139" href="#FNanchor_139_139" class="label">[139]</a> Speech of Senator Fulbright before the 1961 Summer Cubberly Conference +at Stanford University, Stanford, California, July 28, 1961, pp. +7-8. When he was a Senator, Kennedy made it clear that the Presidency +conferred no wisdom in his criticism of Eisenhower. (<cite>Congressional Record</cite>, +June 14, 1960, p. 11630, col. 3,t.) The question is raised in my mind as +to whether or not Senator Kennedy, who spoke of the “missile gap” and +other “gaps” in our defenses during the campaign for President, was +really that ignorant of our defense posture? Yet, within a few months +after he became president—and certainly before anything that his administration +did could have changed the picture basically—we “learned” that +there was no “missile gap” and that our defense posture was strong. (See +the article by David Lawrence in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, Jan. 16, 1962, +p. A241, cols. 2 and 3.)</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright himself said “In a democratic system, such as ours, +the people do have much to say about policy, and they decide who shall +govern them. How, may I ask, can our people be expected to discharge +their duty as citizens of a self-governing republic, if they are not told the +truth about their affairs? It would be easier, more pleasant, and I am sure +more popular, to join those who pretend that all is well, that the summit +meeting was a triumph for the West and that the Japanese fiasco only +demonstrates once again the viciousness of the Communists.” (<em>Ibid.</em>, June +28, 1960, p. 13672, col. 2,m.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_140_140" href="#FNanchor_140_140" class="label">[140]</a> Column of February 11, 1960. <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, February 19, +1960, p. 2761, col. 3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_141_141" href="#FNanchor_141_141" class="label">[141]</a> <cite>U.S. News and World Report</cite>, May 21, 1962, p. 15.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_142_142" href="#FNanchor_142_142" class="label">[142]</a> <cite>Evening Tribune</cite>, San Diego, California, Editorial, August 14, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_143_143" href="#FNanchor_143_143" class="label">[143]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, February 1, 1960, p. 1519, col. 2,m, Senator +Fulbright once accused Nixon of “deceiving the American people”. Quoted +in <cite>The Arkansas Historical Quarterly</cite>, Winter, 1961, p. 328.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_144_144" href="#FNanchor_144_144" class="label">[144]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, April 26, 1951, p. 4409, col. 3,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_145_145" href="#FNanchor_145_145" class="label">[145]</a> <em>Ibid</em>, September 9, 1959, p. 17250, col. 3,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_146_146" href="#FNanchor_146_146" class="label">[146]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, April 24, 1959, p. 5932, col. 3,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_147_147" href="#FNanchor_147_147" class="label">[147]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, August 12, 1959, p. 14272, col. 1,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_148_148" href="#FNanchor_148_148" class="label">[148]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, March 18, 1959, p. 3948, col. 1,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_149_149" href="#FNanchor_149_149" class="label">[149]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 3948, col 1,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_150_150" href="#FNanchor_150_150" class="label">[150]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col 3,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_151_151" href="#FNanchor_151_151" class="label">[151]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, March 28, 1960, p. 6207, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_152_152" href="#FNanchor_152_152" class="label">[152]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col. 3,b.-p. 1979, col. 1,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_153_153" href="#FNanchor_153_153" class="label">[153]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_154_154" href="#FNanchor_154_154" class="label">[154]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_155_155" href="#FNanchor_155_155" class="label">[155]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, February 16, 1960, pp. A1250, col. 3,b. A1251, col. 1,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_156_156" href="#FNanchor_156_156" class="label">[156]</a> As quoted in the <cite>U.S. News and World Report</cite>, December 4, 1961, p. +4, col. 1,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_157_157" href="#FNanchor_157_157" class="label">[157]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, February 19, 1961, p. 2769.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_158_158" href="#FNanchor_158_158" class="label">[158]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 16, 1954, p. A6075, col. 3,m. See the +entire speech in Herbert Hoover, <cite>Addresses Upon the American Road</cite>, +August 10, 1954, pp. 74-84.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_159_159" href="#FNanchor_159_159" class="label">[159]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, August 21, 1961, p. 15357, col. 1,t. Speech before the National +War College, August 21, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_160_160" href="#FNanchor_160_160" class="label">[160]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_161_161" href="#FNanchor_161_161" class="label">[161]</a> Compare Constantine Brown, <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, September 5, 1961, +p. A6963.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_162_162" href="#FNanchor_162_162" class="label">[162]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, August 1, 1961, p. 13218, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_163_163" href="#FNanchor_163_163" class="label">[163]</a> Statement by Senator Fulbright before the United States Senate, +August 4, 1961. It is regrettable that the right to move freely within all +sectors of Berlin has been abrogated by the Communists without any +negotiations. J.D.B.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_164_164" href="#FNanchor_164_164" class="label">[164]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, September 5, 1961, p. A6963, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_165_165" href="#FNanchor_165_165" class="label">[165]</a> Speech by Senator Fulbright at the 10th anniversary banquet of the +<cite>Reporter</cite> magazine. April 16, 1959. <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, April 17, 1959, +p. 5543, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_166_166" href="#FNanchor_166_166" class="label">[166]</a> Compare Constantine Brown, “Remaking the Constitution?” <em>Ibid.</em>, +September 12, 1961, p. A7150, col. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_167_167" href="#FNanchor_167_167" class="label">[167]</a> Senator Fulbright, <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, April 17, 1959, p. 5542, col. 3.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</span></p> + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VII"> + Chapter VII + <br> + WHO IS THE DEFEATIST? + </h2> +</div> + +<p> +One reason that was given for the banning of “Communism +on the Map” from military installations was that it was defeatist. +If a diagnosis of the dangerous situation we are in is defeatism +a doctor should not diagnose a serious disease. It is not a +defeatist film, although it does show that we are in real danger. +Senator Fulbright himself said: “We are confronted by the most +formidable and resourceful adversary ever to have challenged +us...”⁠<a id="FNanchor_168_168" href="#Footnote_168_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> President Kennedy on October 12, 1961, stated that +mankind is in the most dangerous situation the human race has +ever been in. +<br> +An examination of some of Senator Fulbright’s positions shows +that he is a defeatist in that he indicates that we should not +try to win victory over communism. The Senator does not think +in terms of victory over the communist enemy; although he +seemed to think in terms of victory, and that immediately, over +the military in his effort to knock them out of the cold war! +<br> +The Senator does not seem to understand the principle set +forth by Anthony Harrigan, director of the Foreign Policy Research +Institute, that: “As important to a navy as new ships +and late-model weapons is a victory psychology. In the last +analysis, it is the will to win that turns the tide of battle. The +great conflicts of former centuries are replete with illustrations +of the truth that the nation that is emotionally dedicated to +victory is the nation that triumphs, even though its weapons may +not be a match for the enemy’s weapons. To cite only one example, +the outnumbered airmen of the Royal Air Force defeated +the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain because they had the will +to win.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_169_169" href="#Footnote_169_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</span></p> + +<h3><em>Victory not Sought</em></h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright said that both “World Wars ended in total +victory, but the world is far less safe for democracy today than +it was in 1914, when the current era of upheavals began. One +of the principle lessons of two World Wars is that wars, and +total victories, generate more problems than they solve.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_170_170" href="#Footnote_170_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a> What +if we had lost these wars? The trouble was not that we won +the wars but that we failed to keep the peace after the wars +were won.</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright, to be consistent, should take the position +that we should not fight communism even if war is forced on +us, since he says that war and victory create more problems +than they solve. The Senator says that he is not for total victory, +and by that he means such a victory as we won in World +War I and World War II, and that even if we won we would +have the additional problem of what to do with victory!⁠<a id="FNanchor_171_171" href="#Footnote_171_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>What is it but defeatism for one to say that we should not +seek victory over communism, and that if we did win it would +create more problems than it would solve?</p> + + +<h3><em>Defeatism concerning Cuba</em></h3> + +<p>In the campaign for the Presidency, John F. Kennedy said +that he would do something about Cuba. The Monroe Doctrine +calls on us to do something about Cuba. The influence of Senator +Fulbright, according to Charles J. V. Murphy, helped bring +about a change in plans which contributed to the “fatal dismemberment +of the whole plan.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_172_172" href="#Footnote_172_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a> The Senator thought that the +invasion was a bad thing to do even if we succeeded. World +opinion would label us as an aggressor, and we would have to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</span>support Cuba after we had thrown out Castro, and this would +be a drain on our Treasury!⁠<a id="FNanchor_173_173" href="#Footnote_173_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> It is strange that the Senator did +not think of such arguments when U.N. troops, with United +States support, waged war on Katanga. Furthermore, the Senator +approved the State Department’s action in the show of +force of American troops, ships and planes off the coast of the +Dominican Republic in the fall of 1961.⁠<a id="FNanchor_174_174" href="#Footnote_174_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Fulbright is such a defeatist that he thinks that we cannot do +much about Cuba, and that communist-controlled Cuba seems +to be here to stay⁠<a id="FNanchor_175_175" href="#Footnote_175_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a>⁠.</p> + +<p>The rejection of the idea of victory over communism may +be the reason that Edgar Ansel Mowrer, on returning to the +United States after being in Europe, wrote: “In short, I find +the Washington official attitude one of basic defeatism hidden +behind a hot air screen of talk about the historical trend being +on our side.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_176_176" href="#Footnote_176_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a>⁠</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_168_168" href="#FNanchor_168_168" class="label">[168]</a> Stanford Speech, p. 11.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_169_169" href="#FNanchor_169_169" class="label">[169]</a> “The Will to Win”, <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 29, 1961, p. A6794.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_170_170" href="#FNanchor_170_170" class="label">[170]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, July 24, 1961, pp. 12280-12281, col. 3,b. The +Senator thought that possible action on our part might provoke the +Soviets to an unrestricted nuclear arms race. At the very moment he was +saying this, the Communists were finishing their preparations for renewed +atmospheric testing, although we had not prepared for such and had not +“provoked” them into doing this! When will some people learn that +the driving power of communist activity is not reaction to our moves, +but a positive program of world conquest based on their world view.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_171_171" href="#FNanchor_171_171" class="label">[171]</a> Same as 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_172_172" href="#FNanchor_172_172" class="label">[172]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, September 7, 1961, p. A7040. Senator Fulbright +thought that it violated the OAS Charter. This statement in the quotation +concerning Kennedy’s change of plans, does not imply that Senator +Fulbright had anything to do with planning or executing the project.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_173_173" href="#FNanchor_173_173" class="label">[173]</a> <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, July 30, 1961, p. 5E. This quotation from the <cite>Gazette</cite> +is based on the Senator’s speech of July 24. <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, +July 24, 1961, p. 12281.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_174_174" href="#FNanchor_174_174" class="label">[174]</a> <cite>Arkansas Democrat</cite>, December 4, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_175_175" href="#FNanchor_175_175" class="label">[175]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, June 29, 1961, p. 10874. The Senator once said +that he did not know whether Castro was a Communist or not, but the +main thing was that we must be patient and understanding and drive him +toward the Communists. We must not confuse communism with nationalism, +he said. He reprinted an article by Walter Lippmann which attacked the +Senate Internal Security Subcommittee for indicating that Castro and his +revolutionists were pro-communist. <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 11, 1959, +p. 14100, <cite>New York Times</cite>, August 12, 1959.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_176_176" href="#FNanchor_176_176" class="label">[176]</a> Edgar Ansel Mowrer, “Washington Attitude is one of Defeatism,” +<cite>Congressional Record</cite>, July 23, 1962, p. A5660.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</span></p> + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Chapter_VIII"> + Chapter VIII + <br> + SENATOR FULBRIGHT AND WORLD OPINION + </h2> +</div> + +<p>From some of the Senator’s remarks one can draw the conclusion +that we are in a “popularity contest” in <em>the</em> court of +world opinion. This implies that if we are more popular with +world opinion than are the Communists we shall win.</p> + +<p>For the United States to liberate Cuba from the control of the +communists would, the Senator thinks, result in “the alienation +of most of Latin America, Asia and Africa.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_177_177" href="#Footnote_177_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Robert Murphy has written: “I was in Brazil at the time of +the unhappy Cuban operation. Apart from the apathy of the +mass I was a bit startled to be told that the reason the United +States failed to intervene openly in Cuba was because our government +feared it would provoke war between the U.S.S.R. +and the United States. I found little or no recognition of the +consistent effort our government has loyally made through the +years to adhere to a policy of non-intervention. We have done +this on moral grounds and by observing the rule of law in an +effort to work in harmony with and as a good neighbor of the +members of the Organization of American States. When I urged +these reasons I was met by polite incredulity. I found that our +government was actually blamed in the last analysis for permitting +the Cuban attempt to fail but given little or no credit +for restraint and non-intervention. President Kennedy’s statement +warning that our patience is not inexhaustible and that +the government of the United States will not hesitate to meet +its primary obligations was like a timely ray of brilliant sunshine +in the gloomy atmosphere. I gained the distinct impression that +those Latin Americans with whom I talked, who are not unfriendly +to the United States, would have welcomed successful +intervention in Cuba because they fear the expansion of Castroism +in South America and doubt it will be stopped without intervention. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</span>The test in their minds seemed to be that it succeed. +There was evidence of understanding on their part that both +under a reasonable interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as +well as because of the severe provocation by Castro that some +form of intervention would be justifiable.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_178_178" href="#Footnote_178_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>James A. Farley has spoken thus concerning Cuba, invasion +and world opinion. “In the last year, I have spoken personally +and privately to most of the heads of government in the Far +East and in South America. It is my opinion that as spokesmen +for the free world they are far more in favor of a firm and final +position than a policy of appeasement masquerading as the easing +of a series of crises, crises which the Communists themselves +manufacture. These foreign statesmen are much more aware than +some of our own statesmen, of the fact that by practicing unceasing +brinksmanship, Khrushchev is pushing us back into the +abyss of dishonor and disaster.</p> + +<p>“It follows that the President has gained free world approval +in drawing the line. He has placed the responsibility where it +belongs—on the Communist aggressor.</p> + +<p>“Since President Kennedy has said that we do not intend to +abandon Cuba to Communism, and since the Communists are +accelerating their rate of acquisition there, it may be that the +force of the United States may be necessary to expel them. +That decision can be made under American law and oath of +God by one man alone.</p> + +<p>“But it is my conviction that should President Kennedy elect +to order the Armed Forces of the United States into action +against Communist Castro his action would be hailed by the +free governments and the free peoples of the world. In these +times of agonizing decision, their prayers are already with him. +Furthermore, even more important than the preservation of the +Western Hemisphere, the avoidance of global War may well +depend upon giving unmistakable evidence to the Kremlin that +to the extent that it believes itself on the way to world conquest +it is in fact on the road to global war.</p> + +<p>“It is a fact that we may have to accept such war in defense +of our liberty. We must not conceal this from ourselves and, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</span>still less, should we conceal it from our enemy. The peace of the +world may well depend on the reeducation of Mr. Khrushchev, +because if war he seeks he has found the way in which to make +it inevitable. The fact is, freedom will not be edged off this +earth by Mr. Khrushchev’s brinksmanship.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_179_179" href="#Footnote_179_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>What is World Opinion?</em></h3> + +<p>On the news broadcast on Sept. 22, 1961, David Brinkley implied +that the foreign policy advisors who were so concerned +about world opinion were not very wise. He spoke of the “vague +and formless thing called world opinion—whatever that is.”</p> + +<p><em>There is no such thing today as “world opinion.”</em> There are +many different views, aims and ambitions. Whose “world opinion” +shall we court? Africa? Which tribe in Africa? Which Nation? +Nkrumah? Or the freedom lovers he has jailed? The neutrals, +are they the ones we should court? The Soviet manner of +“courting” seems to be more successful with many of them than +ours!</p> + +<p>Arthur Krock of the <cite>New York Times</cite> has pointed out that +the concept of “world opinion” ignores the fact that hundreds +of millions have no knowledge whatever of exterior events.⁠<a id="FNanchor_180_180" href="#Footnote_180_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> +And yet, as he pointed out, in some matters affecting our national +security we have paid more attention to “world opinion” +than to the warnings of experts. He has special reference to +the three year test ban, without inspection, which we gave to +the U.S.S.R.</p> + +<p>Yet Senator Fulbright says: “World opinion is a civilizing +force in the world, helping to restrain the great powers from the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</span>worst possible consequences of their mutual hostility.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_181_181" href="#Footnote_181_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a> This +hostility is mutual only in the sense that after our countless +words and deeds of good will, the Communists still hate us. +They are inherently hostile to all that stands in their way of +world conquest. They have said that they are our irreconcilable +enemy, and then they have proceeded to treat us in this light. +The hostility is mutual only in the sense that we have been +waking up to the fact that this is an enemy bent on our destruction.</p> + +<p>How has the U.S.S.R. been responding to world opinion? +How has world opinion helped civilize the Communists in +Russia or in China, or in the United States?</p> + +<p>What is world opinion doing to civilize Castro? Did world +opinion keep the U.S.S.R. from renewing the bomb tests?</p> + +<p>As Senator Prouty said: “Twenty-four so-called neutral nations +were sitting in the jury box at Belgrade when the Soviet +Union announced its intention—since carried out—to resume +nuclear explosions.</p> + +<p>“And what was the verdict of this jury we have been so assiduously +courting? ‘Not quite guilty’.</p> + +<p>“Nehru said: I am not in a position and I suppose no one +else here is in a position to know all the facts underlying the +decision—military, political or nonpolitical, whatever they may +be.</p> + +<p>‘But I know this decision makes the situation much more +dangerous. This is obvious to me. Therefore, I regret it deeply.’</p> + +<p>“President Tito of Yugoslavia said he understood why Moscow +had decided to resume nuclear testing; Nasser was simply +shocked. The rest were eloquently silent.</p> + +<p>“The shrieking shame on you, Russia, hoped for by the White +House, turned out to be a whispered version of ‘Miss Otis regrets +she is unable to lunch today.’</p> + +<p>“About the only character missing from the very tragic comedy +in Belgrade was the fictional creation of Lewis Carroll who +said: ‘I am very brave generally only today I happen to have +a headache.’</p> + +<p>“Joseph Alsop nailed to the wall for all time the naive code +of leading U.S. policy-makers—the code that lets a synthetic +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</span>world opinion—not enlightened self-interest—shape the policies +of this Nation. Alsop said:</p> + +<p>‘If you listen to persons of this school of thought you might +suppose that foreign policy could be conducted on the principle +of Sir Galahad—“my strength is as the strength of 10, because +my heart is pure.”</p> + +<p>‘The truth is, alas, that naked power counts far more in this +sad world than virtuous intentions.’</p> + +<p>“Mr. Khrushchev did not give a hoot about world opinion. +He was brutally frank about his reason for resuming nuclear +weapons tests at this time. According to the New York Times, +Khrushchev told some leftwing British visitors, he is doing it +to terrorize the Western Powers into negotiations on Berlin, +Germany, and disarmament—on his own terms.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_182_182" href="#Footnote_182_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Eric Sevareid, who as far as I know has never been accused +by Senator Fulbright of being a rightwing radical, had this to +say of the Communists as they read about the concern of some +Americans for “world opinion”. “Surely they adore reading the +worrying, hair-shirt arguments that the United States must not +do this or that because it will offend ‘world opinion’, knowing +as they do that there is no such thing in the moralistic sense—the +proof of which is that after all their crimes, including Hungary, +they enjoy more influence and respect in the world than +ever. They must love the British-American notion that the bosses +of the new ‘neutral’ nations are somehow more high-minded +and spiritual than those of the committed nations.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_183_183" href="#Footnote_183_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>“The gamesmen in the Kremlin must smile in their sleep as +they realize how deeply ingrained is the American illusion that +a ton of wheat can offset a ton of Communist artillery shells, +that a squad of Peace Corpsmen is a match for a squad of +guerrilla fighters.</p> + +<p>“But I hope they frowned a bit when they read the angry +retort of Defense Secretary McNamara when he heard for the +umpteenth time the pious theory that the Communists were +gaining in Laos and South Vietnam because the regimes there +are ‘unresponsive to the people’s needs.’ A burning sense of reality +on a short fuse can make a quiet man shout (as I’m afraid +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</span>it makes me shout these days), and McNamara shouted that the +Communists are gaining in those countries for very simple +reasons known as guns, bombs, fighters and threats.</p> + +<p>“Frightened people in a score of desperate countries want +to be on the winning but not necessarily the moral side; and +we have to start winning soon. We are going to lose in several +more places before we do. We may as well face the fact that we +will also lose in places we cannot afford to lose, until and unless +we are willing to fight, no matter the reproving editorials +in the Manchester Guardian, no matter what the temporary +backlash of world opinion may be.</p> + +<p>“The relations between nations are not the same as those +between individuals. We can afford to lose everything—except +respect for our strength and determination. Lose that, and +Khrushchev won’t bother to sit down and talk again even to +say no.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_184_184" href="#Footnote_184_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Senator who is so impressed with “world” opinion does +not think that the President should be too impressed with opinion +in the United States. Instead of being influenced by public +opinion, Senator Fulbright thinks that the main problem of +the President may be to restrain the American people from +too vigorous a response to Communist aggression and gains and +the resulting losses for the non-communist world.</p> + +<p>Winning the victory over those who would enslave the world +is far more important than what Nehru, or Latin America +thinks.⁠<a id="FNanchor_185_185" href="#Footnote_185_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> Goa shows that Nehru thumbs his nose at “world opinion.” +Nehru, of course, is one of the “neutrals” whose “world +opinion” some in America have courted.</p> + +<p>Edgar Ansel Mowrer said that aside from a major war, “the +next strongest weapon in the cold war is prestige.” He said +that this was largely “a matter of military power—and the +readiness to use it.” The crushing of the Hungarian revolt hurt +the popularity of the U.S.S.R. but increased its prestige.⁠<a id="FNanchor_186_186" href="#Footnote_186_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>James A. Farley on July 8, 1960 said: “Any American administration +which refuses to protect American citizens and +American property in any quarter of the globe, on the ground +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</span>that its action will be called Yankee imperialism, has in effect +struck the flag. Let us not perform the disgraceful act of offering +the American people a spurious dove of peace, when every +page of recent history identifies it as the white flag of cowardly +surrender.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_187_187" href="#Footnote_187_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a> Just before this he stated: “I have traveled as +much abroad as almost any man in this party. I, too, value the +opinion of the world. But I am sure that sound policy cannot +be based on loss of self-respect.”</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_177_177" href="#FNanchor_177_177" class="label">[177]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, June 29, 1961, pp. 10874-10875.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_178_178" href="#FNanchor_178_178" class="label">[178]</a> Address of Robert Murphy, Commencement Exercises, Boston College, +June 12, 1961, pp. 8-9. Also reprinted in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, June +13, 1961, p. A4314, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_179_179" href="#FNanchor_179_179" class="label">[179]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, June 12, 1961, p. A4237, col. 2,b.-3,t. General +Carlos P. Romulo said: “But what is significant to the peoples outside +this country is that in these 16 years you have not succeeded to make Soviet +Russia recede or retreat one inch from any of her ill-gotten gains.” +(<cite>Congressional Record</cite>, Feb. 15, 1962, p. A1134, col. 3,t.) The Republic of +China Chapter of the Asian Peoples’ Anti-Communist League has spoken +of the weakening of confidence in the United States on the part of Southeast +Asian countries as a result of our actions in Laos (<cite>Free China and +Asia</cite>, March, 1962, p 2. See also the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, March 7, 1962, +p. A1714).</p> + +<p>Burmese Army leaders think that the Chinese Communists will take +Southeast Asia in a few years; therefore, they lean toward them (<cite>Newsweek</cite>, +May 21, 1962, p. 17.)</p> + +<p>George E. Sokolsky has pointed out that not only Cuba, but aiding our +enemies and alienating our allies in certain instances has damaged our +prestige (“The National Image,” <cite>Searcy Daily Citizen</cite>, May 3, 1962, p. 4.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_180_180" href="#FNanchor_180_180" class="label">[180]</a> <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, September 5, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_181_181" href="#FNanchor_181_181" class="label">[181]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, July 24, 1961, p. 12281, col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_182_182" href="#FNanchor_182_182" class="label">[182]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, September 19, 1961, p. 19015, col. 2,t.-3,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_183_183" href="#FNanchor_183_183" class="label">[183]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, June 29, 1961, p. 10891, col. 1,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_184_184" href="#FNanchor_184_184" class="label">[184]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 10891, col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_185_185" href="#FNanchor_185_185" class="label">[185]</a> Compare Marguerite Higgins, “Power and Popularity,” <cite>Congressional +Record</cite>, September 5, 1961, p. A6963.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_186_186" href="#FNanchor_186_186" class="label">[186]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, June 25, 1960, p. A5506, col. 3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_187_187" href="#FNanchor_187_187" class="label">[187]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, August 22, 1960, p. A6153, col. 3,m.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</span></p> + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Chapter_IX"> + Chapter IX + <br> + <em>IS COMMUNISM A MATTER OF POLITICS?</em> + </h2> +</div> + +<p>The 1958 directive of the National Security Council ordered +the military into the cold war. In their participation in the cold +war they had to deal with the history, the philosophy, the strategy +and the tactics of communism. Since communism had endeavored +to extend its influence throughout the world in a +thousand and one ways, their tactics also involve the use of +individuals, who are not Communists, to extend their influence +whenever possible. An analysis of their tactics certainly involves +analyzing how they have worked through the united fronts, the +communist fronts, through infiltration and in other ways. Since +communism does not work in a vacuum void of people, some +people who were not Communists were unwittingly involved in +certain aspects of the manifold operations of the Communists.</p> + +<p>Would it be political to take an actual case history and to +show how the Communists have operated? Of course, such an +analysis would take on a different hue if the analyzer impugned +the <em>motives</em> of the individuals who were involved. But the point +here is that it is impossible to show fully how the Communists +work without giving some concrete cases. When it is shown +that even patriotic Americans have been duped—and surely the +Senator would not say that none of them have been duped—it +emphasizes the care which all need to exercise lest we in turn +be duped.</p> + +<p>We are not contending that the military become a spokesman +for varying points of view in American politics. The 1958 directive +did not authorize “political propaganda”. As Senator +Thurmond said: “I think our people in uniform generally should +not speak promiscuously on all subjects, but they are entitled +to tell their own military personnel and entitled to tell the +civilian population the aims, the methods of operations, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</span>the + dangers of the enemy. The enemy today is communism.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_188_188" href="#Footnote_188_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>And yet some have raised a false issue, whether they are conscious +of it or not, and have said that Senator Thurmond is in +favor of the military educating America on politics. The <cite>Arkansas +Gazette</cite> said in an editorial on August 4, 1961, that: “Mr. +Thurmond, we are compelled to observe, has not examined the +implications of his doctrine that the military should assume +responsibility for the political education of the American people—nor +have Senator Goldwater and Karl Mundt.”</p> + +<p>“Senator Fulbright just about said it all when he remarked +to Senator Thurmond recently in a Senate debate:</p> + +<p>‘The Senator from South Carolina, who opposed federal aid to +education because he feared federal control of education, apparently +wants the military to educate the people.’</p> + +<p>“There you have it. The right wing evangelists—the Thurmonds, +the Goldwaters, the Mundts, and the Alfords, who daily +preach the dangers of central control—are prepared to concede +the point which has in so many places resulted in dictatorial +government: That the military is and ought to be a means +of political control and influence.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_189_189" href="#Footnote_189_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Is not the <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite> implying that communism is just +a matter of politics, and that Senator Thurmond is wanting the +military to educate the public in politics just because Senator +Thurmond wants the military to help educate the public with +regard to the dangers, aims and tactics of the enemy, communism?</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright has stated that his memorandum was +directed against the involvement of the military in partisan +political propaganda. “For all these reasons I strongly oppose +political propaganda activities by military personnel directed +at the public. If we are to maintain our political freedom and +the Constitutional system which distinguishes us from totalitarian +dictatorships, we must retain civil control over the +military. This principle lies at the very core of our heritage of +freedom and Constitutional government.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_190_190" href="#Footnote_190_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a>⁠</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</span></p> + +<p>If engaging in the cold war, in obedience to the directive of +the National Security Council, is engaging in political propaganda, +the military not only has no right to educate the public, +but it also has no right to educate the troops in any subject +pertaining to the cold war.</p> + +<p>No one who knows the nature of the Communist menace can +say that instruction in this area is dabbling in partisan politics. +Furthermore, Senator Fulbright himself in his vote for the Peace +Corps Act voted for an amendment made by the Senate. “The +Senate amendment, section 8(c), included a provision that +‘training hereinabove provided for shall include instruction in +the philosophy, strategy, tactics, and menace of communism.’</p> + +<p>“The House bill did not contain a similar provision.</p> + +<p>“The managers on the part of the House accepted the Senate +language. The Peace Corps officials have given assurance that +such training is already required in every Peace Corps training +curriculum. There appears to be every reason to give statutory +recognition to this requirement.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_191_191" href="#Footnote_191_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a> The Peace Corps, the Senator +says, is “part of the cold war.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_192_192" href="#Footnote_192_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>If the military in teaching the public concerning these matters +is engaging in partisan politics, then the Peace Corps is giving +partisan political indoctrination to members of the Corps. Unless +Senator Fulbright is willing to say that the Peace Corps should +become a center of partisan politics, he must say that such +instruction is not political. If this is partisan politics, towards +what party would the head of the Peace Corps, the President’s +brother-in-law, be expected to slant this “partisan political” +indoctrination? But if it is not political when done by the Peace +Corps, why is it political when done by the military?</p> + +<p>We wonder why the Senator is involved in this basic contradiction? +He voted for training the Peace Corps in the above +matters, will he vote for the military to do the same? No, he +will not, for his memorandum, in effect denies them this right. +If he says that it is right for the troops to be taught the above, +but not for the military to teach the public—because they should +not engage in political propaganda—then why teach political +propaganda to the troops? Yet his memorandum, which he says +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</span>was against political propaganda by the military, was against +the 1958 directive of the National Security Council. But the +National Security Council basically did not authorize instruction +in any fields other than those covered in the above instructions +to the Peace Corps.</p> + +<p>Although the Senator may not be aware of it, it is a part of +the Communist Party line to view anti-communism education +conducted by the military as partisan politics. It so happens +that the Communists are wrong about this. Communism, in both +its internal and external aspects, is not a matter of party politics.</p> + +<p>We remind the reader that the Senator does not object to +radical statements only, but the entire concept of the military’s +participation in the cold war. He objected to the directive of +the National Security Council which put the military into the +cold war.</p> + +<p>The policy of the President is against the recognition of Red +China. Does the Senator think that it would be dabbling in +politics for a military spokesman to oppose the recognition of +Red China and to give reasons for his opposition?⁠<a id="FNanchor_193_193" href="#Footnote_193_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The author is against the military educating the public or +the troops in partisan politics. When a military official oversteps +the proper bounds, his mistake can be dealt with without +abolishing, in effect, the 1958 directive of the National Security +Council. In curing a cold the doctor does not decide that one +must kill the patient. That would, of course, get rid of the cold, +but we can’t say that it helps the patient. One can throw out +dirty bathwater without throwing out the baby with it.</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_188_188" href="#FNanchor_188_188" class="label">[188]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 17, 1961, p. 15030, col. 2,m. Also in “Excerpts +from Speeches by Senator Strom Thurmond on Efforts to Gag Military +Anti-Communist Speeches and Seminars,” p. 35, col. 1,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_189_189" href="#FNanchor_189_189" class="label">[189]</a> <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, August 4, 1961, p. 4A.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_190_190" href="#FNanchor_190_190" class="label">[190]</a> “Statement of Senator J. W. Fulbright Relating to a memorandum +submitted by him to the Department of Defense,” p. 6.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_191_191" href="#FNanchor_191_191" class="label">[191]</a> House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 1239, +<cite>Peace Corps Act</cite>, September 19, 1961, p. 21.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_192_192" href="#FNanchor_192_192" class="label">[192]</a> <cite>Arkansas Democrat</cite>, November 28, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_193_193" href="#FNanchor_193_193" class="label">[193]</a> Both the Senate and the House have more than once gone on record as +being opposed to the recognition of Red China. For example see 87th Congress, +1st Session, S. Con. Res. 34, July 28, 1961.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</span></p> + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_X"> + Chapter X + <br> + THE MEMORANDUM AND THE + COMMUNIST PARTY LINE + </h2> +</div> + +<p>The Communists thought so highly of Senator Fulbright’s +memorandum that they reprinted several columns of it in <cite>The +Worker</cite> for August 27, 1961. It is not often that a Senator of +the United States receives this type of “recognition”. Dr. Benson, +Dr. Barnett and Herbert A. Philbrick, for example, have never +received such an “honor”, and it is unlikely that they shall +receive such an “honor” in the future.</p> + +<p>The Religious Freedom Committee, Inc., which is well known +for its defense of pro-communist causes and persons, calls on +people to rally behind the Senator from Arkansas. As it views +the struggle: “On the one side are the liberal elements in church +and state; on the other, an alliance of fundamentalist religious +groups, the military, and reactionary elements in the Congress +and in the financial and business community.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_194_194" href="#Footnote_194_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> If the Religious +Freedom Committee, Inc. thought that the Senator’s memorandum +was damaging to internal communism, it is my judgment, +based on their record, that they would not defend it.</p> + +<p>We are not suggesting that the Senator wants this type of +support, but he is espousing a cause which Communists and +pro-Communists consider worthy of support. He ought to make +a serious investigation of this question: Why do pro-Communists +and Communists support the memorandum?</p> + +<p>There are those who are not pro-Communists who support +the memorandum, this we realize; but the Senator ought to find +out why pro-Communists support it.</p> + +<p>Gus Hall, the General Secretary of the Communist Party in +the United States, makes it clear that one of the main objectives +of the Communist Party is to defeat what he calls the “ultra-Right”. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</span>Certainly anything on the center, or to the right of +center, would be “ultra-Right” to Gus Hall. He includes Dr. +Benson and many others. He indicates that Communists have +hopes of defeating the “ultra-Right”. “If the tactical problem is +solved correctly, it will be possible to slam shut the door on the +ultra-Right, defeat it, and force a shift in policy upon the +Administration itself in the direction of peace and democracy.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_195_195" href="#Footnote_195_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>The Communist Line</em></h3> + +<p>Of course, we realize with J. Edgar Hoover that there may +be times when the Communist Party line coincides with some +objective sought by a non-Communist or anti-Communist group. +“Because communism thrives on turmoil, the party is continuously +attempting to exploit all grievances—real or imagined—for +its own tactical purposes. It is, therefore, almost inevitable +that, on many issues, the party line will coincide with the position +of many non-Communists. The danger of indiscriminately +alleging that someone is a Communist merely because his views +on a particular issue happen to parallel the official party position +is obvious. The confusion which is thereby created helps the +Communists by diffusing the forces of their opponents.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_196_196" href="#Footnote_196_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>A person, however, who finds some of his views parallel those +of the Party needs, of course, to examine his views to see whether +or not they are non-Communist views which the party has taken +merely to gain favor with the masses, or for some other reason, +or whether or not they are views which can only help communism +instead of freedom. One should also ask: How does the Communist +try to use this for his own ends? Then one can try to +work for the legitimate goals in such a way that no comfort is +given to the Communists.</p> + +<p>When one points out that a position parallels the party line, +and when one shows in what way or ways the position advances +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</span>communism, one does not need to go into the motives of the +non-Communist who advances this position. It is unnecessary, +in order to deal with any concrete issue, to know why the person +takes a particular position. Regardless of motives, one can be +convinced that certain things do advance communism. This can +be pointed out without entering into the question of motives. +We, therefore, are not attacking Senator Fulbright’s motives, but +his judgment.</p> + +<p>The Senator, we regret to say, has accused some people of +misquoting the memorandum in order to get headlines. “I regret +the continued misquote of this memorandum by extremist groups +and conservatives seeking headlines.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_197_197" href="#Footnote_197_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> We cannot sanction any +misquotations, but neither do we endorse this judging of motives.</p> + +<p>There are many things, however, in the Communist line +which can hardly be said to fall into the category of legitimate +objectives. The careful reader will ask: Does this or that item +fall into this category? Even, however, when it does not, we +need not deal with the motives of non-Communists who follow +this or that aspect of the line. We can oppose their judgment +in the matter. We emphasize that if they blunder us into slavery +it will be slavery just as certain as if they had taken us into +slavery with their eyes open.</p> + +<p>There are several points in the memorandum which are +included in the current Communist line.</p> + + +<h3><em>Communism as Politics</em></h3> + +<p>The Fulbright memorandum implies that the military is +engaging in politics if it follows the 1958 directive of the +National Security Council, and participates in the cold war by +instructing the people concerning the history, philosophy, +strategy and tactics of communism, including the internal +menace. It assumes that this is partisan politics. If this is not +the assumption of the memorandum, why does the Senator say +that the purpose of the memorandum is to uphold the principle +of the military’s subordination to civilian control, and that there +“has been a strong tradition in this country that it is not the +function of the military to educate the public on political issues.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_198_198" href="#Footnote_198_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</span>His memorandum is a challenge of the National Security Council +directive of 1958 which put the military into the cold war to +alert the people on the menace and nature of the enemy—communism.</p> + +<p>If, on the other hand, the memorandum is not against the +military alerting the civilian population concerning communism—in +both its external and internal threat—then why doesn’t +the memorandum protest against just the abuses of the directive +instead of seeking the elimination of the directive?</p> + +<p>Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, agrees +with the position that for military officials to expose the workings +of communism in America and elsewhere is to engage in political +discussion. For Gus Hall maintains that the Communist Party +is simply a political party. “A very important lesson is to learned +from this. No matter what one’s attitude may be towards the +Communist Party, it must be recognized that the fight for its +rights as a political party is a matter of defending the Bill of +Rights and all democratic rights, and is the concern of all, +especially of all left, democratic, and peace forces, and not of +the Communists alone. This is an old lesson, but sometimes it +has to be learned anew.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_199_199" href="#Footnote_199_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>Restraining the “Radicals”</em></h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright thinks that in “the long run, it is quite +possible that the principal problem of leadership will be, if it is +not already, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists +with everything we’ve got, particularly if there are more +Cubas and Laos.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_200_200" href="#Footnote_200_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> This is because the people are infected with +the “virus of rightwing radicalism”, and also since “radicalism +of the right can be expected to have great mass appeal during +such periods” of crisis.⁠<a id="FNanchor_201_201" href="#Footnote_201_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> When one takes this to its logical +conclusion it means that the Senator must think that the main +problem is to fight the so-called “rightwing radicals”.</p> + +<p>That the “ultra-right” is at least one of the main problems +is also the judgment of Gus Hall, General Secretary of the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</span>Communist Party. “However, the situation requires that the +main direction of the attack should be at the war-mongering and +fascist forces, who are pressuring the Kennedy Administration +further to the Right. At the same time, every policy or action +of Kennedy that plays into the hands of the Right should be +sharply opposed and criticized, building up the pressures upon +the Administration for a change of policy in the direction of +peaceful coexistence and defense of democracy.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_202_202" href="#Footnote_202_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>The Masses Susceptible to “Rightwingism”</em></h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright thinks that in the “long twilight struggle” +ahead that the people may become frustrated and that under +such circumstances “radical rightism” will appeal to them even +more strongly than at the present.⁠<a id="FNanchor_203_203" href="#Footnote_203_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, has +more or less the same fear. “We need to be aware that when +people in large numbers become disillusioned or panicky there +is always the danger that they may be entrapped by the +demagogy of the ultra-Right, especially when their leaders +become the instruments or allies of monopoly. For example, the +recent statement of the AFL-CIO executive council, drawn up +by professional anti-Communists, supports the most aggressive +warlike incitement in the so-called Berlin crisis, and even urges +the resumption of nuclear testing.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_204_204" href="#Footnote_204_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>Protracted Conflict</em></h3> + +<p>The memorandum takes the position that the concept of +protracted conflict will lead to war, that it is an element of +radical rightwingism, and that we must seek some sort of +accommodation with communism instead of engaging in protracted +conflict to defeat it.⁠<a id="FNanchor_205_205" href="#Footnote_205_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Communists have made it one of their objectives to +utilize their influence, in any way that they can, toward getting +the Kennedy administration to seek an accommodation with +communism, i.e., to refuse to try to roll back the tide of Communist +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</span>advance. Thus Gus Hall write: “It is of course true that +these maneuvers, pretenses, and concessions are forced upon +him by the strength of the world peace forces, by the deterioration +of imperialism, by the declining world prestige and position +of U. S. imperialism in particular, and by the deep-rooted peace +and democratic sentiment of the American people.</p> + +<p>“But the fact remains that the Kennedy administration has +not closed the door to accommodation to these world realities, +as the ultra-Right wishes it to do, and this involves a certain +recognition of the new necessities of the present-day world at +home and abroad. This is an important difference, which the +forces for peace and democracy must recognize and exploit in +order to bring about the required change in national policy.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_206_206" href="#Footnote_206_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>That the Communists want the administration to take the +position that communism is a world trend which cannot be +resisted is made clear from another statement. “Continuing +rebuffs and defeats for the cold war and interventionist policy +(most recently in Cuba and Laos) confront the dominant +monopoly power with a choice, essentially between two alternatives. +One is to end the cold war and to seek some form of +accommodation to the socialist and national revolutionary world, +which would mean a turn to a policy of peaceful coexistence and +peaceful competition. Such a shift of policy would meet the most +urgent national needs of the country in the present period of +world history.</p> + +<p>“The other course is to seek to contain and reverse world +trends by all means, including so-called limited war and the +ultimate nuclear war. It is necessary to recognize that the present +cold-war policies of the Administration lead in this direction. +However, we must also recognize that the most aggressive and +extreme expression of this suicidal policy comes from the ultra-Right.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_207_207" href="#Footnote_207_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Thus they are out to influence those whom they consider to +be the liberal forces in the Kennedy administration. “It would +be wishful thinking to assume that all liberal or forward-looking +forces in the Kennedy camp, who must in their way participate +in turning the tide, are equally aware of the double role played +by Kennedy. These elements can become an effective positive +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</span>force once they realize it is necessary to fight Kennedy’s +cold war and anti-democratic policies in order to defend democracy +and to close the door to the extreme Right and defeat the +threat from that direction.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_208_208" href="#Footnote_208_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>Cuba</em></h3> + +<p>The Senator, as we have seen, was extremely disturbed by +the Cuban invasion, and he opposes any direct efforts on our +part to overthrow Castro. Gus Hall is also disturbed about the +matter, although at least some of his reasons are different. Hall +did think that it was immoral for he said that the decision to +invade Cuba was “criminal and reprehensible”. “It is also of +significance that Kennedy decided not to back up the emigre +invasion of Cuba with direct and open U. S. military support, +as criminal and reprehensible as was his decision to go through +with the military adventure, and as serious as still is the danger +of U. S. imperialist intervention. It is also noteworthy that +Kennedy must still seek to maintain democratic and anti-colonial +pretenses in his dealings with the national liberation movements, +although his objective remains to contain and reverse them. +This creates certain embarrassments for him in world affairs, in +view of anti-democratic measures at home.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_209_209" href="#Footnote_209_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>Self-Destruction of Democracy</em></h3> + +<p>In the discussion and rejection of the concept of protracted +conflict, the memorandum indicates that to engage in protracted +conflict, to meet with strength the Communists at every turn, +will undermine democracy. Thus it said: “Perhaps the most +fundamental criticism that can be made of the book is that it +fails to analyze the impact of a policy of protracted conflict +on our democratic institutions. Barnett’s program of action, for +example, would require large sums of public funds used with +little public accountability, a wide network of secrecy and +security in government operations, a cold war orientation in +our schools and universities—in short, a stunting of pluralism, +a curtailment of individual liberties, and a weakening of politically +responsible government. The editors of ‘American Strategy’ +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</span>seem to see no alternative to confronting the Soviets with strong +opposition at every turn. Indeed, they appear more concerned +with virility than freedom, as if strength and courage were goals +in themselves. This, together with the somewhat static nature +of their view of history and the militant nature of their recommendations, +justifies further inquiry about the men and the +organizations who advocate a strategy based on those premises.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_210_210" href="#Footnote_210_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Gus Hall is also convinced that the ultra-Right is trying to +build “a garrison state that will seek to drive the country to +war and self-destruction.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_211_211" href="#Footnote_211_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3>“<em>French General</em>”</h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright says: “Perhaps it is far-fetched to call forth +the revolt of the French generals as an example of the ultimate +danger. Nevertheless, military officers, French or American, have +some common characteristics arising from their profession and +there are numerous military ‘fingers on the trigger’ throughout +the world. While this danger may appear very remote, contrary +to American tradition, and even American military tradition, so +also is the ‘long twilight struggle’, and so also is the very +existence of an American military program for educating the +public.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_212_212" href="#Footnote_212_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Gus Hall, in his discussion of the directive of the National +Security Council is more emphatic than Senator Fulbright. “The +entire line of policy, coupled with CIA and similar training in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</span>subversive and putschist activities, cannot help but create our +own ‘French Generals,’ who feel at home in fascist circles, and +are ready to lend themselves to their objectives.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_213_213" href="#Footnote_213_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>National Security Council Directive 1958</em></h3> + +<p>Gus Hall attacks the 1958 directive of the National Security +Council.⁠<a id="FNanchor_214_214" href="#Footnote_214_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Senator’s memorandum was aimed directly at the +directive.⁠<a id="FNanchor_215_215" href="#Footnote_215_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>General Walker</em></h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright considers General Walker’s case as but an +illustration of the deeper problem of the military’s involvement +in the “rightwing” activities. Thus he wrote: “With respect +to the problem illustrated by the case of General Walker....”⁠<a id="FNanchor_216_216" href="#Footnote_216_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>This is also the way that Gus Hall feels about it. “The case +of General Walker was only a symptom of a much deeper +affliction.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_217_217" href="#Footnote_217_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>Spread of “Rightwingism” in the Military</em></h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright thinks that the military has a good deal +of “rightwingism” in it. “Whether these instances are representative +of programs implementing the National Security Council +directive is not known, but the pattern they form, makes it +strongly suspect that they are. There are many indications that +the philosophy of the programs is representative of a substantial +element of military thought, and has great appeal to the military +mind. A strong case can be made, logically, that this type of +activity is the inevitable consequence of such a directive. There +is little in the education, training or experience of most military +officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary +to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which their +education, training and experiences are concerned—into proper +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</span>perspective in the President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear +age.’”⁠<a id="FNanchor_218_218" href="#Footnote_218_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Gus Hall says: “Another pronounced characteristic of this +growing fascist movement is its spreading influence among the +higher military personnel.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_219_219" href="#Footnote_219_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> The Draft Program of the Communist +Party in the U.S.S.R. in 1961 also said that the military +was involved in the “fascist” anti-Communist drive.⁠<a id="FNanchor_220_220" href="#Footnote_220_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Communists have at least two objectives in their attack +on the military. <em>First</em>, the military contains some experts in +the field of the cold war, and it is organized so that it can +effectively reach all parts of America. Neutralizing the military +in the cold war means that the Communists have far fewer foes +to fight in the cold war. <em>Second</em>, the attack on the military can +be used to try to undermine the morale of the military.</p> + + +<h3><em>Two Films</em></h3> + +<p>The memorandum classifies “Communism on the Map” and +“Operation Abolition” as part of the extremely radical rightwing +material being used in seminars.⁠<a id="FNanchor_221_221" href="#Footnote_221_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>“Communism on the Map” is also noted in an unfavorable +way by Gus Hall.⁠<a id="FNanchor_222_222" href="#Footnote_222_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Gus Hall also notices in an unfavorable context “Operation +Abolition.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_223_223" href="#Footnote_223_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> + These two films are “obnoxious films.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_224_224" href="#Footnote_224_224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Gus Hall evidently is against “Operation Abolition” because +it is an indictment of the Communists and an exposure of how +they work and how they manipulate others.</p> + +<p>In a speech in Arkadelphia on October 11 Senator Fulbright’s +opposition to the film is based on the following, according to +the <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>.</p> + +<p>“One widely distributed film, Fulbright said, tries to show +that the student body of the University of California is ‘ready +to desert the American system’. He referred to ‘Operation +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</span>Abolition’, which purports to show that student protests at a +House Un-American Activities Committee hearing last year at +San Francisco were Communist inspired.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_225_225" href="#Footnote_225_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The film tries to show no such desertion by the student body. +It does show that <em>some</em> students from the University were duped. +It is doubtful that many of them really knew that the Communists +were using them. Or does the Senator think that the +students knew what they were doing?</p> + + +<h3><em>Fascists</em></h3> + +<p>The Senator views as “fascist” those whom he labels as radical +rightwingers.⁠<a id="FNanchor_226_226" href="#Footnote_226_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Gus Hall also characterizes the “ultra-right” as fascist.⁠<a id="FNanchor_227_227" href="#Footnote_227_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a> +And by the “ultra-right” he is including at least some of the +groups classified by Senator Fulbright as radical rightwingers. +For example, Dr. Benson, Harding College and the National +Education Program.</p> + + +<h3><em>Frustration and Rightwingism</em></h3> + +<p>Senator Fulbright thinks that frustration in restraint is one +of the reasons that the American people need to be curbed, and +that this need will grow if there are any more Cubas and +Laoses.⁠<a id="FNanchor_228_228" href="#Footnote_228_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Gus Hall explains the reaction of what he calls the extreme +right on the grounds that the extreme right wants to turn back +the tide of history (i.e. they want to win the victory over Communism), +but that they are frustrated at seeing the advances of +communism. “In the opinion of the Communist Party, there +can be no question but that the threat from the extreme Right +is serious. It arises from a situation which is new for the United +States. This, the most powerful capitalist country, cannot have +its way in a world in which the forces of socialism, national +liberation, and peace are playing a decisive role. Continuing +rebuffs and defeats for the cold war and interventionist policy +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</span>(most recently in Cuba and Laos) confront the dominant +monopoly power with a choice, essentially between two alternatives. +One is to end the cold war and to seek some form of +accommodation to the socialist and national revolutionary world, +which would mean a turn to a policy of peaceful coexistence +and peaceful competition. Such a shift of policy would meet +the most urgent national needs of the country in the present +period of world history.</p> + +<p>“The other course is to seek to contain and reverse world +trends by all means, including so-called limited war and the +ultimate nuclear war. It is necessary to recognize that the present +cold-war policies of the Administration lead in this direction. +However, we must also recognize that the most aggressive and +extreme expression of this suicidal policy comes from the ultra-Right.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_229_229" href="#Footnote_229_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>We agree with the Senator that Americans will find it very +frustrating if there are any more Cubas and Laoses. And, <em>if</em> +the tide of communism continues to advance, they will undoubtedly +come to the place where they will demand that we +hit the Communists with everything we have <em>if</em> such is necessary +to stop communism.</p> + +<p>We do not agree with Gus Hall that the advance of Communism +is inevitable.</p> + +<p>In the author’s judgment Senator Fulbright and Gus Hall +are right in saying that there are Americans who are frustrated +because of continued losses to communism. There are people, +of course, whose frustrations are not due to communism itself. +However, there are many Americans who are not extremists but +who are frustrated in various degrees because we have not +stopped, not to speak of the fact that we are not winning the +cold war, the advances of communism.</p> + +<p>Roscoe Drummond has well pointed out that there is a mounting +sense of frustration because we are always on the defensive +in the cold war. He suggests that the way to overcome this, and +to keep extremists from having any appeal to the masses, is for +the President either to take the diplomatic initiative in the cold +war or to show the people that it is not possible to do so. We +have been on the diplomatic defensive since World War II +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</span>ended, he affirmed, and unless the President is able to find the +will and the way to take the initiative that the President “will +be leaving the field open to the extremists”.⁠<a id="FNanchor_230_230" href="#Footnote_230_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a>⁠</p> + + +<h3><em>If We Wage Protracted War it Will Bring Nuclear War</em></h3> + +<p>A study of the quotation, in the above section, from Gus Hall +indicates that he is saying that we must accommodate ourselves +to communism and its advances, or we shall have limited wars +and then a nuclear war. This is curiously like the line in the +<cite>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</cite> that if we meet Communist +aggression with a determined effort to win the cold war we shall +likely end up in war.⁠<a id="FNanchor_231_231" href="#Footnote_231_231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Communist journal, <cite>World Marxist Review</cite>, has said that +those who seek for victory over communism are eager for war. +Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe is quoted as follows: “Our lot is conflict. +History brings us ‘not peace but a sword’.... The ultimate +strategy for freedom, therefore, must be the devolution of Communist +totalitarian governments.... The United States cannot +renounce the first use of atomic weapons.” The <cite>World Marxist +Review</cite> says that: “This incendiary strategy is elaborated in +detail from Herman Kahns <cite>On Thermonuclear War</cite>.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_232_232" href="#Footnote_232_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Then the <cite>World Marxist Review</cite> comments: “These are not +only the personal views of Mr. Strausz-Hupe or Mr. Kahn. They +are the credo of the American military, many of whom make no +secret of their eagerness to unleash the dogs of war. Moreover, +as the foregoing shows, neither the ideas nor the ‘total’ war +preparations of the U. S. government can be traced to the so-called +‘Berlin crisis’.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_233_233" href="#Footnote_233_233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Of course, the memorandum and the <cite>World Marxist Review</cite> +differ in that the <cite>World Marxist Review</cite> says that the military +is eager to start war. The memorandum simply takes the position +that the position of protracted conflict will likely lead to +world war.</p> + +<p>The effect of each—the memorandum and the <cite>World Marxist +Review</cite>—in this matter is the same. Both of them try to discourage +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</span>us from waging protracted conflict and winning the +victory over communism.</p> + +<p>It is a major Communist objective to convince the non-Communist +world that if they wage cold war that they will end up +in a nuclear war. To strive for victory in the cold war must +involve finally nuclear war. This, we are convinced, is not the +case. Continual losses in the cold war are much more apt to +bring us to nuclear war, since Communist victories in the cold +war emboldens them, weakens us and brings more “neutrals” +on to their bandwagon. When the Communists think that they +have the United States sufficiently isolated and undermined it is +quite likely that the Communists will confront us with the +demand to surrender or to be involved in nuclear war.</p> + +<p>If we endeavor to win the cold war, and it is my conviction +that we can do so, as our victories in the cold war increase the +Communists will realize that regardless of what a nuclear war +will do to us it will destroy Communism. A nuclear war would +immediately destroy the Communist chain of command. A dictatorship +cannot go on with its chain of command shattered. +Revolts will take place in the satellites. The masses of China +would revolt if a nuclear war shattered the Red’s chain of control +in China.</p> + +<p>It is the judgment of the author, based not only on the above, +but also on the fact that the Russian Communists have backed +down when the United States government has met them firmly, +that the Communists do not want a nuclear war. In the author’s +judgment, short of an all-out attack we could not force them into +a nuclear war, unless they were ready for one and wanted one. +They hope to achieve their objectives without a nuclear war. But +they will resort to such a war if they are convinced it is +absolutely necessary and that war would enable them to win +over us. In which case nothing we could do would stop the Communists +from starting a war unless we surrendered. Furthermore, +if we surrendered this would not guarantee that no nuclear war +would take place. Who knows but what after world victory +Communists would fall out among themselves and one group use +the bomb on another group.</p> + +<p>In the author’s judgment there is no way to guarantee that +there will not be a nuclear war. But for us to let our policy be +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</span>determined by an overwhelming fear of nuclear war will lead us +to defeat.</p> + +<p>When we think of the millions which the Communists kill +<em>after</em> they take over a country, there is no certainty that more +will not be killed if we surrendered than if we waged nuclear +war, if such were forced on us.</p> + +<p>Although there are Americans who do not want us to publicly +proclaim that our goal is to win the victory over the aggressive +forces of communism, the Communists have made clear that +they expect to win. Khrushchev said that Marxism-Leninism +when assimilated by the people leads them to “take power into +their hands and build their state.</p> + +<p>“This is a mighty force which nothing can resist. And let +Mssrs. Imperialists, Monopolists and various Colonialists—for +it is the same thing——know that no prayers, no incantations can +reverse the march of history to make it move backward. Victory +will be ours, comrades!”⁠<a id="FNanchor_234_234" href="#Footnote_234_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The Communists, we see, are not letting the idea that the +waging of protracted conflict, and the aim of victory, will lead +to war restrain them from fighting to win.</p> + + +<h3><em>Anti-Anti-Communism</em></h3> + +<p>It is well for us to realize that Communists have been ordered +to intensify their efforts to discredit, to discourage and to +destroy anti-communism. As Edward Hunter pointed out, they +know where they are hurting, and if anti-communism were not +hurting them they would not make anti-anti-communism a prime +objective.</p> + +<p>The Moscow Manifesto issued by 81 Communist Parties in +November-December, 1960, and which is accepted as providing +guidance for the Communist Party in America,⁠<a id="FNanchor_235_235" href="#Footnote_235_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a> calls for an +intensification of the attack on anti-communists.</p> + +<p>“Anti-communism, which is indicative of a deep ideological +crisis in, and extreme decline of bourgeois ideology, resorts to +monstrous distortions of Marxist doctrine and crude slander +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</span>against the Socialist social system, presents Communist policies +and objectives in a false light and carries on a witch hunt against +the democratic peaceful forces and organizations.”</p> + +<p>“To effectively defend the interests of the working people, +maintain peace and realize the Socialist ideals of the working +class, it is indispensable to wage a resolute struggle against +anti-communism—that poisoned weapon which the bourgeoisie +uses to fence off the masses from socialism.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_236_236" href="#Footnote_236_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>The 1961 Congress of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. +called for warfare against anti-communism. “The chief ideological +and political weapon of imperialism is anti-communism, which +consists mainly in slandering the Socialist system and distorting +the policy and objectives of the Communist Parties and Marxist-Leninist +theory.</p> + +<p>“Under cover of anti-communism, imperialist reaction persecutes +and hounds all that is progressive and revolutionary; it +seeks to split the ranks of the working people and to paralyze +the proletarians’ will to fight. Rallied to this black banner today +are all the enemies of social progress: the finance oligarchy and +the military, the Fascists and reactionary clericals, the colonialists +and landlords and all the ideological and political vehicles +of imperialist reaction. Anti-communism is a reflection of the +extreme decadence of bourgeois ideology.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_237_237" href="#Footnote_237_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a> The <cite>World Marxist +Review</cite> for October 1961 carried an article on “Anti-Communism—a +Crime Against the People.”</p> + +<p>We have neither stated nor implied that every criticism against +every anti-Communist is an implementation of this directive +from the Kremlin. In the anti-Communist movements in the +United States you can find extremists, some uninformed people, +crackpots and a few totalitarians. However, the anti-Communist +movements have no monopoly on such persons. Thus there may +be ample grounds to criticize some individuals, some organizations, +and some positions which are taken. There are criticisms +which are justified and which need to be made.</p> + +<p>However, criticism of the crackpots, the mistaken and the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</span>totalitarians is not the only kind of criticism going on today. +Different groups, even widely different groups, are lumped together +by some critics. They are all classified as “extremely +radical rightwing” people and positions. They are all classified +as the “ultra-right”.</p> + +<p>We are not suggesting that all the extremists who lump together +different anti-Communist groups as “the ultra-right” and +“extremely radical rightwingers”, are responding to the Moscow +directive. We are confident that some are misinformed and misguided; +that some see an opportunity to make political hay; +that some have a vested interest in discrediting those who have +compiled and publicized <em>their</em> public record; that there are +others who hate capitalism and oppose those who defend it; +these or other reasons explain the attack of some. Since, however, +the Communists have been working for decades to infiltrate +various phases of American life we can be certain that +there are some hidden Communists who are vigorously engaged +in anti-anti-communism. Who are they? I don’t know who the +hidden Communists, or hidden sympathizers and fellow travelers, +are. I doubt that even the FBI could possibly know about <em>all</em> +of them.</p> + +<p>It is fortunate, however, that one does not need to know <em>why</em> +people do something in order to evaluate the <em>actions</em> of these +people. Thus although it is certainly not without significance +that, so soon after the Moscow directive, there should be several +storms of criticism of and attacks on various anti-Communists, it +would be inaccurate and unfair to say that they are all implementations +of the Moscow directive. The fact that the Communists +are now trying to destroy the vigorous anti-Communist +organizations and individuals, does suggest to us that we should +all endeavor to be fair and precise in our criticisms, and that +we should exercise great care lest we promote the cause of anti-anti-communism.</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_194_194" href="#FNanchor_194_194" class="label">[194]</a> “Religious Freedom News,” October 1961, p. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_195_195" href="#FNanchor_195_195" class="label">[195]</a> Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, U.S.A., <cite>Worker</cite>, +July 16, 1961. The entire article is reprinted in the Senate Internal Security +Subcommittee, <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>. +Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961. This quotation is from page +47. We shall quote from the article as reprinted in this Senate publication. +Edward Hunter’s testimony is contained in the above Senate publication. +<cite>The Worker</cite> boasts that it was among the first to attack the “ultra-right,” +Jan. 14, 1962, p. 5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_196_196" href="#FNanchor_196_196" class="label">[196]</a> J. Edgar Hoover, <cite>The Communist Party Line</cite>, Washington, D. C.: Government +Printing Office, 1961, p. 6.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_197_197" href="#FNanchor_197_197" class="label">[197]</a> <cite>Arkansas Democrat</cite>, December 4, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_198_198" href="#FNanchor_198_198" class="label">[198]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_199_199" href="#FNanchor_199_199" class="label">[199]</a> Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, <cite>The New Drive Against the +Anti-Communist Program</cite>, July 11, 1961, p. 50. Most of this publication was +reprinted in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 28, 1961, pp. 16094-16116. +An entire article by Gus Hall is in this Senate report...</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_200_200" href="#FNanchor_200_200" class="label">[200]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_201_201" href="#FNanchor_201_201" class="label">[201]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13437, col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_202_202" href="#FNanchor_202_202" class="label">[202]</a> <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>, p. 49.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_203_203" href="#FNanchor_203_203" class="label">[203]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_204_204" href="#FNanchor_204_204" class="label">[204]</a> <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>, p. 48.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_205_205" href="#FNanchor_205_205" class="label">[205]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13440.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_206_206" href="#FNanchor_206_206" class="label">[206]</a> <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>, p. 48.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_207_207" href="#FNanchor_207_207" class="label">[207]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 46.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_208_208" href="#FNanchor_208_208" class="label">[208]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 48.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_209_209" href="#FNanchor_209_209" class="label">[209]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, pp. 47-48.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_210_210" href="#FNanchor_210_210" class="label">[210]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13440, col. 1,b-2,t. “There +have been dire predictions since the end of World War II that an attempt +to defend ourselves would turn America into a garrison state. But, our defense +budget has varied from 40 percent to 5 percent to 15 percent and +down again to 9 percent of our gross national product, and our experience +offers little confirmation for such fears.” Albert Wohlstetter, an official +in the Rand Corporation. <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, June 16, 1960, p. 11911, +col. 3,m. “From the radical left, and sometimes from the radical pacifists, +we hear other voices of doom. We have great armed forces, they say, therefore +our freedom is doomed by a garrison state. Or we have big businesses, +therefore democracy is being strangled by greedy monopolies. We have ‘internal +contradictions,’ as the ideologists love to say—labor versus capital, +farms versus cities, importers versus exporters—and therefore democracy +will soon tear itself to pieces.” (Press Release No. 3910, January 14, 1962. +Address by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the +U.N., before Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith on the occasion of +his receipt of the America’s Democratic Legacy Award, Hotel Plaza, New +York, N.Y.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_211_211" href="#FNanchor_211_211" class="label">[211]</a> <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>, p. 47.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_212_212" href="#FNanchor_212_212" class="label">[212]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_213_213" href="#FNanchor_213_213" class="label">[213]</a> <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>, p. 46.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_214_214" href="#FNanchor_214_214" class="label">[214]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 46.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_215_215" href="#FNanchor_215_215" class="label">[215]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b., pp. 13436-13437, +col. 3,b-1,t., p. 13437 col. 3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_216_216" href="#FNanchor_216_216" class="label">[216]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 13438, col. 1,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_217_217" href="#FNanchor_217_217" class="label">[217]</a> <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>, p. 46.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_218_218" href="#FNanchor_218_218" class="label">[218]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 1,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_219_219" href="#FNanchor_219_219" class="label">[219]</a> <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>, p. 46.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_220_220" href="#FNanchor_220_220" class="label">[220]</a> <cite>The Worker</cite>, August 20, 1961, p. S7, col. 2,b. <cite>Program of the Communist +Party of the Soviet Union (Draft)</cite>, New York: Crosscurrents Press, +Inc., 1961, p. 50.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_221_221" href="#FNanchor_221_221" class="label">[221]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 1,t. p. 13438, col. +1,m. col. 2,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_222_222" href="#FNanchor_222_222" class="label">[222]</a> <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>, p. 46.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_223_223" href="#FNanchor_223_223" class="label">[223]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 46.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_224_224" href="#FNanchor_224_224" class="label">[224]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 46.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_225_225" href="#FNanchor_225_225" class="label">[225]</a> <cite>Arkansas Gazette</cite>, October 12, 1961, p. 1B.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_226_226" href="#FNanchor_226_226" class="label">[226]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 21, 1961, pp. 15357-15358.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_227_227" href="#FNanchor_227_227" class="label">[227]</a> <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>, p. 46. See also +<cite>The Worker</cite>, November 12, 1961, p. 1. Mike Newberry, <cite>The Fascist Revival</cite>, +New York: New Century Publishers, 1961. This is a Communist publication.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_228_228" href="#FNanchor_228_228" class="label">[228]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_229_229" href="#FNanchor_229_229" class="label">[229]</a> <cite>The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program</cite>, pp. 45-46.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_230_230" href="#FNanchor_230_230" class="label">[230]</a> “Extremism Comes From a Sense of Frustration,” <cite>Arkansas Democrat</cite>, +November 28, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_231_231" href="#FNanchor_231_231" class="label">[231]</a> <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13440.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_232_232" href="#FNanchor_232_232" class="label">[232]</a> <cite>World Marxist Review</cite>, December, 1961, p. 25, col. 1,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_233_233" href="#FNanchor_233_233" class="label">[233]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 25, col. 1,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_234_234" href="#FNanchor_234_234" class="label">[234]</a> Speech at the Fifth World Congress of Trade Unions, December 9, +1961. This is No. 227 press release from EMBASSY OF THE U.S.S.R., +Dec. 11, 1961, p. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_235_235" href="#FNanchor_235_235" class="label">[235]</a> James E. Jackson, “The General Crisis of Capitalism Deepens,” +<cite>World Marxist Review</cite>, January 1961, p. 38.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_236_236" href="#FNanchor_236_236" class="label">[236]</a> Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, <cite>Communist and Workers’ Parties’ +Manifesto Adopted November-December, 1960. Interpretation and +Analysis.</cite> Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 72. The entire +Manifesto is reprinted in this government document, along with some statements +by Communists in America.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_237_237" href="#FNanchor_237_237" class="label">[237]</a> <cite>Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Draft)</cite>, p. 50.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XI"> + Chapter XI + <br> + CONCLUSIONS + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>The <cite>Communist Manifesto</cite> in its closing words declared war +on all non-Communists. The Communists have continued this +warfare even until now. It will culminate, they are confident, in +the complete victory of communism. Although they want to +avoid World War III, <em>if</em> they can attain their aims without it, +they are now waging cold war, as well as hot war, against us +in order to ultimately make possible world conquest.</p> + +<p>The present period of peaceful coexistence is but another +phase of their war on non-Communist societies. In the Statement +by 81 Communist Parties in Moscow, November, 1960, this +was clearly set forth.</p> + +<p>“The policy of peaceful coexistence meets the basic interests +of all peoples, of all who want no new cruel wars and seek +durable peace. This policy strengthens the positions of socialism, +enhances the prestige and international influence of the socialist +countries and promotes the prestige and influence of the socialist +countries and promotes the prestige and influence of the Communist +Parties in the capitalist countries. Peace is a loyal ally +of socialism, for time is working for socialism against capitalism.</p> + +<p>“The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing +the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies +of peace. Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation +of the class struggle as the revisionists claim. The coexistence +of states with differing social systems is a form of +class struggle between socialism and capitalism. In conditions +of peaceful coexistence favorable opportunities are provided for +the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries +and the national-liberation movement of the peoples of the +colonial and dependent countries. In their turn, the successes +of the revolutionary class and the national liberation struggle +promote peaceful coexistence. The Communists consider it their +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</span>duty to fortify the faith of the people in the possibility of furthering +peaceful coexistence, their determination to prevent world +war. They will do their utmost for the people to weaken imperialism +and limit its sphere of action by an active struggle for peace, +democracy and national liberation.</p> + +<p>“Peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems +does not mean conciliation of the socialist and bourgeois +ideologies. On the contrary, it implies intensification of the +struggle of the working class, of all the Communist Parties, for +the triumph of socialist ideas. But ideological and political +disputes between states must not be settled through war.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_238_238" href="#Footnote_238_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Communist doctrine, action and aggression, however, has called +forth anti-communism. Those who are for liberty and righteousness +are aroused when they realize the inroads which communism +is making throughout the world. If men are for the +traditional values of Western civilization, for example, they must +be against communism which endeavors to destroy those values.</p> + +<p>It is very unfortunate that Senator Fulbright should brand +so many informed anti-Communists as belonging (as Gus Hall +puts it) to the ultra-right,⁠<a id="FNanchor_239_239" href="#Footnote_239_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a> or extreme radical rightwing (as +Senator Fulbright puts it). It is tragic that the Senator has +helped knock the military out of the cold war (one of the prime +objectives of the Communists in America). It also is harmful to +the cause of anti-communism and freedom that he has identified +this so-called radical rightwing with fascism. It does not help +military morale to raise the idea of “French Generals” in America +in the future threatening civilian authority.</p> + +<p>We hope that the Senator will reconsider and that he will use +his tremendous influence to get the Secretary of Defense and +the White House to disregard his very influential secret memorandum. +We are not asking that mistakes of anti-communists +not be pointed out, but we are asking him not to lump together +so many different groups of anti-communists and label them as +“radical rightwingers”. We are not asking that the military +engage in partisan politics, but in view of the great danger we +stand in we are asking that at least some of the individuals in +the military, who are equipped to wage the cold war, be allowed +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</span>to help inform and alert the public, as well as the military, concerning +the history, philosophy, strategy and tactics of communism. +The need to meet the enemy in the cold war, and to +win over the very present danger of communism, is a pressing +reality; and in dealing with it we should use all necessary forces +without being held back by the fear that in some distant future +some military leaders might get out of hand. It is not realism +to refuse to do what we can, including the use of the military +in the cold war, to meet a very real present danger because of +a fear of a danger which the Senator admits does not now exist.</p> + +<p>The great problems which face us today center in communism +and the war which it is now waging on civilization. We hope +that the influence of Senator Fulbright, and those of like mind, +on the President will not keep him from implementing one of his +own statements wherein he said: “So, therefore, the problem +always is, how can the military remain removed from political +life, how can civilian control of the military remain removed +from political life, how can civilian control of the military be +effectively maintained, and at the same time the military have +the right and the necessity to express their educated views on +some of the great problems that face us around the world?”⁠<a id="FNanchor_240_240" href="#Footnote_240_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> +This, however, it will be impossible for them to do if the Fulbright +memorandum continues to have an influence on the +Government.</p> + +<p>Let us not lose sight of the basic issues which are involved. +<em>First</em>, we have been forced into the cold war by the aggressive +acts and designs of the Communists. <em>Second</em>, there is no reason +to believe that the Communists will change their minds and +abandon their efforts to conquer the world and to remake man +into the image demanded by their godless philosophy of life. +<em>Third</em>, the cold war is a real war. <em>Fourth</em>, the cold war is the +major war which the Communists are now waging against us. +<em>Fifth</em>, the military has within its ranks experts on the history, +the philosophy, the strategy and the tactics of communism. +<em>Sixth</em>, international communism not only operates outside of +the borders of our country, but also inside the borders through +its various agents, including the Communist Party. <em>Seventh</em>, +the oath taken by the military binds the military to defend the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</span>country against enemies both domestic and foreign. Communism +today is <em>the</em> foreign and domestic enemy. <em>Eighth</em>, informing +the troops and the public concerning communism is not the +same as participating in partisan politics. <em>Ninth</em>, there is a need +for both the troops and the public to know more about the +enemy who faces us. <em>Tenth</em>, civilian control of the military is +not really being threatened. <em>Eleventh</em>, it is possible to deal with +a military official who oversteps his bounds without nullifying +the directive issued in 1958 by the National Security Council. +<em>Twelfth</em>, the Fulbright memorandum was aimed at the nullification +of this directive and was designed, therefore, to take the +military out of the cold war in the very sense in which the +directive was designed to put the military into the cold war. +<em>Thirteen</em>, the memorandum and the Stanford speech introduce +a new concept of government. <em>Fourteen</em>, the memorandum is +a serious matter whose implementation hinders, not helps, the +United States in the cold war. Thus the author believes that +the memorandum is against the real interests of Senator Fulbright +and all other Americans.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, let it be observed, in conclusion, that Senator +Fulbright has recognized elsewhere that the people need to be +both alerted and informed, although at times the Senator seems +confused on these matters. Thus in the memorandum Senator +Fulbright said: “Fundamentally, it is believed that the American +people have little, if any, need to be alerted to the menace +of the cold war. Rather, the need is for understanding of the +true nature of that menace, and the direction of the public’s +present and foreseeable awareness of the fact of the menace toward +the support of the President’s own total program for survival +in a nuclear age.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_241_241" href="#Footnote_241_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Does the Senator mean that the American people have already +been sufficiently alerted? Only a year before he doubted that +Americans had yet heeded the warning. He further thought that +the President was failing to sound the warning sufficiently. “We +have been warned, but have we heard? If we should perish it +will not be for lack of warning but for lack of the will to survive.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_242_242" href="#Footnote_242_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a> +“Mr. Sprague insisted that the United States be awakened +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</span>to the scope of the overall Russian threat to us. But who is to +ring the alarm bell?</p> + +<p>“‘There is only one man in the United States that can do +this effectively, and that is the President,’ said Mr. Sprague. +He continued: ‘I believe, and this is a personal belief, that the +danger is more serious than the President has indicated to the +American public.’”⁠<a id="FNanchor_243_243" href="#Footnote_243_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>As late as December 1960 the Senator was saying: “The greatest +crisis confronting the West is not Berlin. It is the apathy +of the free world and its incomprehensible unwillingness to look +facts in the face. Evolution and the survival of the fittest are +concepts we understand when applied to plants and animals—but +we seem not to realize that these concepts apply to us.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_244_244" href="#Footnote_244_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Toward the end of April 1961 President Kennedy said: “Our +greatest adversary is not the Russians. It is our own unwillingness +to do what must be done.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_245_245" href="#Footnote_245_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Senator Fulbright agrees that the people need to be informed. +“The successful waging of peace requires a vigorous national +administration, an informed people, and a mature people who +know that you cannot be adult without being willing to pay for +what you want.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_246_246" href="#Footnote_246_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a> “The American people ought to be told the +bleak truth about their world, the character of the forces arrayed +against them, and what they must do, at whatever cost, to survive +or even to bring about a state of high security. They must +be told that, however humane their society, whatever its ideals, +this alone will not save them from destruction by a society armed +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</span>with the prodigious mechanisms of our times and an implacable +determination to dominate all men.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_247_247" href="#Footnote_247_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a>⁠</p> + +<p>Since this is the case, there is no real reason why qualified +men in the military should not be used in alerting and informing +America.</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_238_238" href="#FNanchor_238_238" class="label">[238]</a> <cite>Statement of the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers’ Parties</cite>, November +1960, Toronto 3, Canada: Progress Books. Published for the C.P. of +Canada, pp. 16-17. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, <em>op. cit.</em> p. 64.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_239_239" href="#FNanchor_239_239" class="label">[239]</a> Gus Hall, the Communist, in the <cite>Worker</cite>, July 16, 1961.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_240_240" href="#FNanchor_240_240" class="label">[240]</a> Excerpts from press conference of President Kennedy, <cite>Congressional +Record</cite>, August 11, 1961, p. 14449, col. 1,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_241_241" href="#FNanchor_241_241" class="label">[241]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col 2,b.-3,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_242_242" href="#FNanchor_242_242" class="label">[242]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 1,t.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_243_243" href="#FNanchor_243_243" class="label">[243]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. A2708, col. 3,m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_244_244" href="#FNanchor_244_244" class="label">[244]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, February 16, 1961, p. A925.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_245_245" href="#FNanchor_245_245" class="label">[245]</a> As quoted in the <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, May 9, 1961, p. 7138, col. 3,b.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_246_246" href="#FNanchor_246_246" class="label">[246]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, March 28, 1960, pp. A2708, col. 3,b.—A2709.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_247_247" href="#FNanchor_247_247" class="label">[247]</a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. A2709, col. 2,t. Senator Fulbright also said: “As things now +stand, however, the Soviets profit not only from their own energy, but also +from our apathy.” (<cite>Congressional Record</cite>, Sept. 9, 1961, p. 17249. Col.3, m.) +“Many among us expressed the fear that our inertia would be overcome—but +momentarily, and that, like one who is awakened from a deep sleep by +some minor disturbance, we would again subside into dreamland.” “Mr. +President, I have no idea what must be done to awaken Americans to the +unpleasant facts of life. As unwilling as I am to face it, perhaps the answer +is that we simply do not wish to be disturbed.” (<cite>Congressional Record</cite>, +January 23, 1959, p. 1007, col. 1,b.) “I believe that such a study would +conclude that America’s trouble is basically one of aimlessness at home and +frustration abroad.” (Speech before the American Bar Association, Sept. +1, 1960. <cite>Congressional Record</cite>, Sept 2, 1961, p. A6708, col. 2,b.) “... if +only we would stop snoring with our eyes open.” (<cite>Congressional Record</cite>, +May 11, 1959, p. A3890. col. 1,m.) “We might even look forward to the +day when the Soviets become as snug and complacent as we have become.” +(<em>ibid.</em>, col. 2,b.) “Indeed, we are not even united on the nature and magnitude +of that threat.” (<em>ibid.</em>, p. A3891, col. 2,m.) Edgar Ansel Mowrer +has written a book entitled, <cite>An End to Make-Believe</cite>. New York: Duell, +Sloan and Pearce, 1961.</p> + +<p>Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt, on October 17, 1957, said: “It’s not communism +I am afraid of. What frightens me is the complacency of the American +people and their lack of knowledge about communism and its objectives.” +(<cite>New York Herald Tribune</cite>, October 18, 1957, p. 4) In the author’s judgment, +many of the common people today are ahead of some of the “uncommon” +people in their understanding of the nature of the threat.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 85%"> +<img src="images/cover_rear.jpg" alt="" data-role="presentation"> +</div> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter transnote"> + +<h2 class="bold fs150 wsp">Transcriber’s Notes</h2> + +<table class="autotable"> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg vii Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +the following discusison of the memorandum +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +the following discussion of the memorandum +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 6 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +or military solution.” Congressonal Record +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +or military solution.” Congressional Record +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 10 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +Arthur W. Radford also though that the military +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +Arthur W. Radford also thought that the military +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 14 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +it should be done under civiliain direction +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +it should be done under civilian direction +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 18 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +assaults of political depotism +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +assaults of political despotism +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 26 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +rather than state responsibltiy +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +rather than state responsibility +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 30 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +Within the framework of mutual deterrance +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +Within the framework of mutual deterrence +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 32 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +human misory and destruction +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +human misery and destruction +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 32 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +the imperalist states for a long iime +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +the imperialist states for a long time +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 34 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +It is believed accomodation can be +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +It is believed accommodation can be +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 35 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +of mutual interest, would be tantamont +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +of mutual interest, would be tantamount +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 49 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +International communist as presently constituted +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +International communism as presently constituted +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 54 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +public’s present and forseeable awareness +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +public’s present and foreseeable awareness +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 56 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +therefore incapable of governing thmselves +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +therefore incapable of governing themselves +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 56 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +have no access to the records of forign +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +have no access to the records of foreign +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 57 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +powerful and purposeful National Goverment +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +powerful and purposeful National Government +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 58 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +and certinly before anything +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +and certainly before anything +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 63 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +President Kenndy will not be President forever +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +President Kennedy will not be President forever +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 65 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +expressed in Lord Action maxim +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +expressed in Lord Acton’s maxim +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 68 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +It is rgrettable that the right to move +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +It is regrettable that the right to move +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 81 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +he feared federal control of education, aparently +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +he feared federal control of education, apparently +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 81 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +submitted by him to the Deparment of Defense +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +submitted by him to the Department of Defense +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 91 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +We have ‘internal contraditions,’ +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +We have ‘internal contradictions,’ +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 92 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +Spead of “Rightwingism” in the Military +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +Spread of “Rightwingism” in the Military +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 99 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +is reprinted in this goverment document +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +is reprinted in this government document +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> + +</td> +<td class="tdl"> + +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +pg 100 Changed: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +we should exerise great care +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdr"> +To: +</td> +<td class="tdl"> +we should exercise great care +</td> +</tr> +</table> + +</div> +<br> +<br> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78918 ***</div> +</body> +</html> diff --git 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